The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 12 | Issue 16 | Number 3 | Article ID 4109 | Apr 20, 2014

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The Dulles Brothers, Harry Dexter White, Alger Hiss, and theFate of the Private Pre-War International Banking System ダレス兄弟、ハリー·デクスター·ホワイト、アルジャー·ヒス 戦前の民間国際金融制度の運命

Peter Dale Scott

German translation is available

The election of Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952had permanent consequences for U.S. foreignpolicy. The U.S. major oil companies, whichbefore the election were facing criminalcharges for their cartel arrangements, insteadwere freed to continue their activities, until “Insome of the faraway countries where it didbusiness.… Exxon’s sway over local politics andsecurity was greater than that of the UnitedStates embassy.”1 Parallel to this was a radicalescalation in 1953 of CIA covert operations.Major plots to overthrow the governments ofIran and Guatemala, both of which had beenturned down by Truman and his Secretary ofState, Dean Acheson, now proceeded,redefining America’s relationship to the thirdworld.2

The key to this important change was notEisenhower but the Dulles brothers, formerlyboth partners in the firm Sullivan andCromwell, which for years had represented theoil cartel:

As long as his brother, John FosterDulles, was Secretary of State,[CIA Director] Allen Dulles had noneed to chafe under political“control.”…. An adventurousdirector… whose brother held thesecond highest office in the

administration… was able to actalmost at will as he was shieldedf r o m a n y u n p l e a s a n tconsequences. 3

The 1952 Republican campaign, for which JohnFoster Dulles was partly responsible,successfully attacked Truman’s supposedweakness in dealing with the alleged treason oftwo of his civil servants, Treasury assistantsecretary Harry Dexter White, and StateDepartment official Alger Hiss. In fact neitherWhite nor Hiss was ever convicted of treason;nor were they ever proven to have committedit. But both men’s careers had been ruined bythe sensational charges brought against themin 1948 by a freshman congressman, RichardNixon, in the House Un-American ActivitiesCommittee (HUAC).

An Overview of This Essay

It has long been known that Nixon, in hisinterrogation of White and Hiss, was being fedinformation by FBI agents acting with theapproval of J. Edgar Hoover. This essay willargue that Nixon also received assistance fromthe Dulles brothers, especially in a key meetingbetween the three men on August 11, 1948,five days before White’s untimely and disputeddeath.

At stake in the meeting was the Republicancampaign of 1948, the first campaign,ultimately unsuccessful, in which “the GOPdubbed the Democrats ‘the party of treason.’”4

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But deeper issues were also at stake. As weshall see, Harry Dexter White, backed byTreasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, had hisown candidates for treasonable behavior: aboveall Allen Dulles’s friend and former OSS agent,Thomas McKittrick, the American wartimepresident of the Bank of InternationalSettlements in Basel, Switzerland.5

The BIS had handled Nazi looted gold whenother banks had refused to do so, and at thewar’s end McKittrick was “arranging deals withNazi industrialists to guarantee their profitsafter the war was over.”6 In contrast, theMorgenthau-White Plan for postwar Germanycalled for the country to be deindustrializedand the power of the German cartels to bebroken. The pre-war banking system linkingAmerican bankers to those who had backedHitler was also to be demolished: the meetingof Allies at Bretton Woods in July 1944,organized largely by White, had passed aresolution calling for the dissolution of the BIS“at the earliest possible moment.”

A version of the Morgenthau-White Plan wasapproved by Truman in May 1945 as JCS (JointChiefs of Staff policy) 1067, which directed theU.S. forces of occupation in Germany to "...takeno steps looking toward the economicrehabilitation of Germany."7

But both McKittrick and Allen Dulles had aquite antithetical vision for Germany – that itseconomy should indeed be rehabilitated, andeventually made the underpinning for a moreunited Western Europe.

Thus “Dulles and others began to campaignagainst…JCS 1067,” and for its replacement bywhat later came to be known as the MarshallPlan.8

On one level this was a conflict betweenpowerful individuals: White in Washington(Morgenthau soon retired), versus the bankerMcKittrick and the lawyer Allen Dulles, both ofwhom returned after World War II to Wall

Street. But it was also an institutional conflictbetween Washington and Wall Street, becauseeach center was initially united behindconflicting visions for the future of Germany,and also for the future of the pre-warinternational banking system uniting Germanyand America – at the heart of which was theBIS. Another way to say this is that it was acontest between the conflicting visions of thestate (Washington) and the deep state (WallStreet).

In this contest, as in many others at this time,Washington lost, and Wall Street won.9

The Dulles brothers and theirallies, who argued that Germanymust be rebuilt as rapidly aspossible as a bulwark against theSoviet Union, triumphed overMorgenthau and White. The BISreturned the looted Nazi gold, andthe calls for its dissolution fadedaway.10

There are various reasons for Wall Street’svictory. Prominent among these were the deathof Roosevelt and his replacement by Trumanwith his conservative Secretary of State JamesByrnes. Perhaps even more important was thebrutish behavior of Stalin in eastern Europe,and the revelation (thanks to the 1946defection of a Soviet code clerk in Ottawa), thatMoscow had a robust network of spies in thewest. These and other factors soon madeWashington agree to the replacement of JCS1067 by the Marshall Plan (which perhapswould have been better called the Dulles Plan).

But there were deeper aspects to the conflict.The Dulles brothers were determined todestroy, not just a plan for Germany which theydisliked, but the Democratic New Deal bywhich the party under first Roosevelt and thenTruman had restricted the traditional freedomsof Wall Street, and were now threatening to

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break up the oil cartel. Here the Republicanshad their eyes on Harry Dexter White inparticular.

The reason then given for this, and stillbelieved by some intelligent people, was thatWhite was a spy.11 But as we shall see, thereare also those who believe that the evidence forthis is very debatable. We shall consider thesuggestion of Anthony Summers and othersthat Allen Dulles and the CIA, as early as July1948, were the source of the furor over thealleged treason of first White, and then (afterWhite’s death in August 1948) a far lessprominent substitute figure, Alger Hiss.12

Summers suggests that Allen Dulles, evenwhile still a Wall Street lawyer, may have hadaccess to a secret weapon not available to amere Treasury assistant secretary like White –the VENONA record of deciphered Sovietcommunications.

VENONA, Harry Dexter White, and AlgerHiss

Many on the left have referred to the post-warprosecutions of Alger Hiss and the Rosenbergsas “show trials,” alleging that their underlyingpurpose was not to determine guilt orinnocence, but to influence public opinion bypublicizing a guilt already determined, as awarning against dissent. But the spy scare ofthe 1940s was at least partly genuine, basedlargely on evidence from the newly translatedVENONA record of Soviet transmissions. It iscertain that VENONA intercepts helped identifyand convict spies such as Judith Coplon, eventhough, for security reasons, these interceptswere not introduced at their trials.13

VENONA evidence also was used to raisesuspicions about two other suspects, seniorTreasury official Harry Dexter White and AlgerHiss. However the VENONA evidence againstthese two men is still fiercely debated. And thecampaign against both men was not poweredby security concerns alone. In part at least also

it was a by-product of a deeper conflict over thefuture of America -- between Wall Street(represented by the Dulles brothers) and theremnants of the New Deal (represented byWhite, a principal architect of the InternationalMonetary Fund and the World Bank.)

The Bank of International Settlements HQ in Basel

The Dulles brothers, as lawyers at Sullivan andCromwell, had played key roles in the inter-warwestern financing and refinancing of Germandebt. A primary bank in these transactions wasthe British merchant bank J. Henry Schröderand its American subsidiary the J. HenrySchroder Banking Corporation, where AllenDulles served as director and his brother asattorney. A web of international bankingconnections was created between the wars; andmuch of this web “was connected to the BIS[Bank of International Settlements], via theDulles brothers and their friends on Wall Streetand in London and Germany.”14

Roosevelt New dealers like Treasury SecretaryHenry Morgenthau and his assistant Whiteintended to dismantle this complex networkwith German banks and corporations afterWorld War II: in particular, they “loathed theBIS, seeing it, correctly, as a channel for theperpetuation of Nazi economic interests in theUnited States.”15 Their principal target was the

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wartime BIS president Thomas McKittrick(formerly of the Boston banking firm Lee,Higginson)– rightly so, in the opinion of AdamLebor, who writes that “many of the things thatMcKittrick was doing, such as gold and foreignexchange deals with the Reichsbank after PearlHarbor, were treasonable.” Lebor adds thatMcKittrick, a personal friend of Allen Dulles,came to New York and hired an attorney “topersuade the Treasury to unblock the BIS’sfunds. His choice was never in doubt: JohnFoster Dulles.”16

Thomas McKittrick, American Head of the Swiss-based Bank for International Settlements

In July 1944, at Bretton Woods, Morgenthauand White led the American delegation at theconference which successfully established theInternational Monetary Fund, where Whiteeventually became the executive director andU.S. representative. With the IMF at the centerof the new international system, the two menalso

wanted the BIS to be abolished. OnJuly 10, 1944, they seemed aboutto get their wish. Wilhelm Keilhau,of the Norwegian delegation,introduced a motion to liquidatethe BIS…. No delegation spokepublicly in defense of the BIS. But

behind the scenes its defenders –sections of the State Department,Wall Street, the Bank of England…went into action…. Eventually anew Norwegian-Dutch resolutioncalling for the liquidation of thebank at “the earliest possiblemoment” was finally agreed.17

The 1944 Bretton Woods Conference

The Morgenthau-White opposition to the BISwas consistent with their support of theMorgenthau Plan, endorsed by Roosevelt andChurchill at Quebec, which called for thepartial deindustrialization of Germany. Thoughthis extreme proposal was soon modified,Truman in May 1945 approved JCS (JointChiefs of Staff policy) 1067, which directed theU.S. forces of occupation in Germany to "...takeno steps looking toward the economicrehabilitation of Germany or designed tomaintain or strengthen the German economy."18

But both McKittrick and Allen Dulles had aquite antithetical vision for Germany – that itseconomy should indeed be restored,strengthened, and eventually made theunderpinning for a more united WesternEurope. We know from an OSS communicationto Allen Dulles that, even before the end of thewar, McKittrick as president of the BIS “hadalready concluded an agreement [with Germanindustrialists!] to ‘preserve the industrial

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substance of the Reich.’”19

Thus “Dulles and others began to campaignagainst…JCS 1067,” and for its replacement bywhat later came to be known as the MarshallPlan. 2 0 By mid-1947 the remnants ofMorgenthau’s deindustrialization program

had been so watered down byGeneral Lucius Clay, the Americancommander of occupation forces,that i t was meaningless….Washington’s JSC Directive 1779,passed in the summer of 1947,institutionalized this change inpolicy. German industry would berebuilt; its steel mills and forgesw o u l d o n c e a g a i n b e t h epowerhouse of Europe. 2 1

Who Was Guilty of Treason? McKittrick orWhite?

The plans of White and other New Dealers forpost-war Germany and the BIS had thus beendecisively defeated by 1948. Only in the Clintonera, more than half a century later, did someAmericans’ mistrust of the BIS and McKittrickbecome known. At a minimum,

McKittrick was suspected by Alliedauthorit ies of helping Axiscountries acquire funds the U.S.government had tried to freeze. Hemaintained that the BIS wasneutral and that no looted gold washeld by the BIS. The U.S. Office ofStrategic Services, the forerunnerof the Central Intelligence Agency,had found evidence that McKittrickhad collaborated with the Nazis. Areport given to President BillClinton alleged that the Axispowers had virtually taken over theBIS.22

John Loftus and Marcus Aarons go muchfurther, accusing Allen Dulles and McKittricktogether of having conspired to move Nazilooted gold in the post-war era to Argentina.23 Amore cautious account is given by James CalvinBaker, implicating the BIS under McKittrick’swartime tenure, but not Dulles:

After the war, McKittrick wasappointed to a high-level positionat Chase Manhattan [sic, i.e. ChaseNational] Bank…. And for nearly50 years, the operations involvingthe the BIS and Swiss banks andlooted assets by the Nazis werehidden in classified documents….The U.S. Treasury Department[under White] tracked Nazi gold asit moved in and out of the BIS.Several of these transactions werefound to have occurred betweenthe BIS and major Swiss banks.From these Swiss banks, moneywas used by the Nazis to purchasewar materiel or was wired toaccounts in Spain, Argentina, andhe Middle East.24

But Wall Street rallied to protect McKittrick,offering him positions at first the ChaseNational Bank, and then, at the invitation ofAverell Harriman, to administer what becamethe Marshall Plan. Harriman also appointed anadvisory committee consisting of Owen Young,a principal author of the pre-war German debtarrangements, “and of course Allen Dulles, whosaw the Marshall Plan as the means of dealingthe death blow to the spread of Communism inWestern Europe.”25

One of the things that saved McKittrick and theBIS was the spy scare of the 1940s, whichrightly or wrongly implicated White.Undoubtedly real spies were discovered, someof them thanks to deciphered VENONAintercepts, but others were the victims of

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hysteria.

Was White one of these victims? White diedbefore he could be indicted, and the chargesagainst him are still disputed in America.26

Undoubtedly White shared information withofficials of the Soviet Union, which was then anally; but the weight of evidence is that he wasneither a Communist Party member norsecurely under Soviet control. Chambershimself said of White, "His motives alwaysbaffled me.”27

Harry Dexter White, Architect of the Post-WarInternational Monetary Fund

What is certain is that VENONA transcriptswere used to persuade US officials that Whitewas a Soviet spy – ending his career. It is cleartoo that hysteria also played a role. John Loftusand Mark Aarons claim that the Dulles brothershelped foment this hysteria, and Richard Nixon“became Allen Dulles’s mouthpiece in

Congress.”28 Anthony Summers charges inaddition that Nixon was fed secrets by the CIAas early as July 1948, before Allen Dulles joinedthe organization he had helped create.29

Nixon, Voorhis, and the BIS

Lof tus and Aarons da te th i s secre tcollaboration between Allen Dulles and Nixonback to 1945.

According to several of our sourcesamong the 'old spies,' RichardNixon's political career began in1945, when he was the navy officertemporarily assigned to review . . .captured Nazi documents. AllenDulles allegedly told him to keepquiet about what he had seen and,in return, arranged to finance theyoung man’s first congressionalcampaign against [incumbentCongressman] Jerry Voorhis.30

Although Loftus and Aarons do not mention it,Voorhis was the principal ally and spokesmanin Congress of Morgenthau and White’scharges against the Bank of InternationalSettlements, having called for an investigationof the BIS in 1943.31 Dulles would thereforeunquestionably have had another motive to seeVoorhis defeated.

Voorhis himself wrote in an unpublished 1947book manuscr ipt that he had a lot ofdocumentation “which would have shown howthe [1946] Nixon campaign was a creature ofbig Eastern financial interests,” including “themajor oil companies.” And a representative ofStandard Oil, a company (represented bySull ivan and Cromwell) whose shadygovernment dealings Voorhis had exposed, waspresent at the meeting which selected Nixon asa candidate.32

Nixon and the Dulles Brothers, August 11,

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1948 – and Harry Dexter White

Most accounts of Nixon’s career point to animportant meeting between Nixon and JohnFoster Dulles at the latter’s Republican Partyheadquarters in the Roosevelt Hotel on August11, 1948, a meeting attended also by AllenDulles and Douglas Dillon of Dillon Read, “oneof the banking firms that [had] financedHitler.”33 The conventional account is thatNixon approached the Dulleses with theproceedings from the House Un-AmericanAffairs Committee (HUAC) on which he sat.34

Virtually all accounts say that their discussionconcerned Alger Hiss.

John Foster Dulles, Vice-President Richard Nixon,and the Shah of Iran

It is probable however that when Nixon metwith the Dulles brothers on August 11, 1948,the most urgent matter discussed was not Hiss,but the man then principally targeted byHUAC’s investigation – Harry Dexter White.

White had been the main focus of HUACattention in 1948, both when Elizabeth Bentleyhad testified on July 31, and WhittakerChambers on August 3. White and LauchlinCurrie, Bentley’s two principal targets(together with William Donovan’s law partnerDuncan Lee), were due to testify in reply onAugust 13 (two days after the Dulles-Nixon

meeting), along with Alger Hiss’s brotherDonald. All three men would deny Bentley’scharges in their entirety, including Bentley’scharge (corroborated by Chambers) that Whitehad “placed Communists in government poststo influence policy.”35

Chambers of course would be vindicated byHiss’s ultimate conviction, twice, on perjurycharges. But the main importance of Hiss at theDulles-Nixon meeting on August 11, 1948, wasas a challenge to the credibility of Chambers, awitness against the far more important targetof White.36 One of the two men, either Hiss orChambers, was apparently guilty of perjury.And Truman’s Justice Department was in theprocess of preparing a perjury indictmentagainst Chambers, a key witness againstWhite.37

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Alger Hiss After His Conviction on Perjury Charges

Matters would change five days later. OnAugust 16, three days after his stressful HUACtestimony, White died, after suffering two swiftheart attacks. It was then that Hiss became bydefault HUAC’s principal target (and the key toThomas Dewey’s presidential ambitions in thesame year).

I mention all this because of the suggestion ofmany authors that, in post-war Washington,either White had to be discredited, or a numberof those involved in the Wall Street-Berlinfinancial axis, including not just ThomasMcKittrick but possibly also Prescott Bush (andperhaps even Bush’s lawyer Allen Dulles),risked being indicted. As Glen Yeadon and JohnHawkins write,

White…was arguably one of thegovernment’s most importantpostwar economists. However, dueto his liberal economic policies, aswell as his relentless pursuit of thef inancia l deal ings of largecorporations with the Nazis, hehad to be removed.38

Death did remove White on August 16, 1948,five days after the Dulles-Nixon meeting onAugust 11. But whereas most accounts sayWhite died of a heart attack (e.g. Black,Richard M. Nixon, 118), the well-informedjournalist Willard Edwards reported in 1949that White’s cause of death, after beingadmitted to hospital with a heart attack, was infact an overdose of digitalis.39

Summers charges that in August 1948, as theHUAC investigation of Alger Hiss

faltered in the face of Hiss’sd e n i a l s , N i x o n r e c e i v e dconfirmation that Hiss had indeed

known Chambers . I t came,according to CIA sources, fromAllen Dulles. Dulles, who had had arun-in with Hiss years earlier, wasat this time in close contact withhis former chief, Donovan, and waslikely to be privy to whatever theOSS had learned about Hiss.40

And Summers asks whether a secret weaponused by the Dulleses and Nixon against Whiteand Hiss was a tendentious interpretation ofmaterial which existed about White and Hiss inthe then secret VENONA transcripts ofdeciphered Soviet cable traffic:

A fascinating question, stil lunresolved, is whether Nixon’ssecret sources – J. Edgar Hoover,Allen Dulles, or other OSS/CIAcontacts – were aware by 1948 ofthe deciphered VENONA messages– and o f the ALES cab le inparticular [of March 30, 1945]–that seem to point to Hiss’s guilt.41

He argues suggestively that “Allen Dulles maywell have learned” of the VENONA evidence;and “if as reported he briefed Nixon on thecase – then therein may perhaps lie theexplanation for Nixon’s confidence in hispursuit of Hiss.”42 This theory would alsoexplain why Nixon, backed by Hoover, relied onallegations that now look extremely dubious –the most dubious of all (and yet the mostpersuasive at the time) being the so-calledPumpkin Papers.

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Richard Nixon in a Moment of Triumph

The grand jury convened to indict Chamberswas persuaded in December 1948 by Nixon, inan ex t raord inary per formance by aCongressman, to indict Hiss instead. Nixon didso by the controversial act of giving the grandjury copies of films from the “Pumpkin Papers.”

Nixon had been warned by a fellowCongressman that the f i lmbelonged to the House and shouldnot be given to the grand jury.

But Nixon, as he later wrote in hisbook ''Six Crises,'' saw the film ascrucial evidence of Hiss's guilt,was conv inced the Jus t iceDepartment was not taking theinvestigation seriously and fearedthat the grand jury might seek toindict Chambers for perjuryinstead of Hiss.43

It is clear that in the case of the Rosenbergsthe VENONA evidence played a key role intheir identification and prosecution.44 Because,for national security reasons, it could not berevealed at their trial that the Soviets’ code hadbeen broken, substitute evidence, some of itunconvincing, was used to obtain conviction.The result was to subject the U.S. justice

system to a bifurcation of knowledge, betweenthe public evidence presented in open courts,and a deeper history known only to thosecleared for the secrets of the deep state.

“ALES” in the VENONA Files -- Was This Alger Hiss?

Something like this bifurcation appears to haveoccurred also in the still disputed cases againstfirst Harry Dexter White and then Alger Hiss.

Nixon, Hiss, and the Pumpkin Papers

What is clear is that judicial process in the Hiss

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case was overridden and predetermined byNixon’s election-year persecution of Hiss in themedia. In an essentially favorable biography ofNixon, Conrad Black concedes that “Nixonattacked Hiss however he could, havingconducted a press assault after he had swornunder oath to maintain confidentiality aboutHUAC’s executive session proceedings.”45

Speaking to his White House staff on July 1,1971, and contemplating a similar strategyagainst the leakers of the Pentagon Papers,Nixon himself recalled:

We won the Hiss case in thepapers. We did. I had to leak stuffall over the place. …. It was won inthe papers. We have to developnow a program, a program forleaking out information. We'redestroying these people in thepapers.46

And in 1948 the newspapers eventually tookseriously, as mainstream historians likeStephen Ambrose have continued to takeseriously, the “Pumpkin Papers” -- fivemicrofilm47 rolls planted in an outdoor pumpkinby Whittaker Chambers, where they wereretrieved by investigators the next day. Two ofthese rolls contained classified StateDepartment cables on economic relations withGermany, and on Sino-Japanese affairs.48 Threemore were withheld for decades: according toNixon, “the State Department still felt…thatpublication…would be injurious to the nationalsecurity.” In response to a FOIA suit, AlgerHiss in 1975

was allowed to examine the three withheld rollsof microfilm. Two were from the U.S. NavyDepartment and contained instructions on howto use fire extinguishers, life rafts, and chestparachutes; the third roll was blank.49

It would seem that “national security” had beeninvoked to protect, not the film, but thereputation of those like Nixon who exploitedit.50

The Pumpkin Papers, in other words, amountedto far less than what the press and the publicbelieved. But the Pumpkin Papers were a mediacoup at the time, thanks to an elaboratestratagem, designed to keep the papers in thehands of HUAC and out of the hands ofTruman’s hostile Justice Department. Thestratagem, designed with the approval ofHoover, was the work of Nixon, HUAC ChiefInvestigator Robert Stripling, and an almostforgotten mastermind of the Pumpkin Papersscenario: Washington journalist Bert Andrewsof the New York Herald Tribune.51

On December 1, 1948, UP carried a wire story,stating, “The Justice Department investigation[of Hiss and Chambers] is about to die for lackof evidence…. Unless something new turned upsoon, officials said, there would be little usegoing to grand jury ... to see if there weregrounds for a perjury charge against eitherman.”52 That same night, Stephen Ambrosewrites, Stripling and Nixon drove out toChambers’ Westminster farm and heard fromChambers that he had “another bombshell.”

You keep that second bombshell,”Nixon said. Don't give i t toanybody except the committee.Why he did not issue a subpoenathen and there on Chambers forthe remaining documents [thePumpkin Papers] is another of themany mysteries in the case. In anyevent, he did not -- he and Striplingdrove back empty-handed…. Backin Washington, Nixon phoned BertAndrews [who told him] “get holdof Bob Stripling. Tell him to servea blanket subpoena on Chamberst o p r o d u c e a n y t h i n g a n deverything he still has in his

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possession.53

A pro-Nixon biography summarizes theconsequences:

The next evening, in a cloak-and-dagger scene that f ired thenational imagination, an agent ofthe Committee served a subpoenaon the ex-Communist; Chambersled him in darkness to a pumpkinin his garden, and from thepumpkin he drew five rolls ofmicrofilm containing photostaticcopies of confidential and secretdocuments stolen from the StateDepartment. A New York GrandJury, on the verge of indictingWhittaker Chambers for perjury,reversed itself when Nixon rushedto New York and testified that itmust have been Hiss who lied insaying he had not turned officialdocuments over to Chambers.54

This account fails to mention that, as aconservative website now concedes, thepumpkin was one Chambers “had hollowed outthe night before” – i.e. the night of Nixon’svisit.55

The Hollowed-Out Pumpkin at Whittaker Chambers’Farm

What also fired the national imagination werethe dramatic photos of Nixon, who had left on asea voyage, returning “in theatrical fashion,transferring from his liner to a coast guardseaplane, then flying to Florida to be met by aposse of reporters.”56 This is the answer toAmbrose’s mystery of why the subpoena wasnot served by Nixon on December 1, nor themicrofilm rolls simply taken.

T h e C h a m b e r - H i s scontroversy…was once again front-page news. … Reporters andphotographers swarmed toWestminster. Even staid dailies ranpictures with arrows indicating thepumpkin patch. And there was themicrofilm. Its contents remainedsecret and under twenty-four hourguard…. However [Stripling] didlet Bert Andrews read some of thedocuments.57

In all of this Nixon was coached by Andrews“on how to handle the Hiss-Chambersconfrontation.”58 David Halberstam adds that

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By this time Andrews was not justa reporter covering a story, he wasfriend adviser, press officer, andreporter for Nixon…. He hadsteadied Nixon and advised him,and kept him advised of otherdevelopments in the case throughhis sources in the White House….A n d r e w s p r o v e d t o b e a ninvaluable connection and friend.He not only helped brief theyounger, rawer Nixon on strategy,he helped legitimize him with otherreporters.59

Press reaction to the Pumpkin Papers at thetime was rather mixed, with many liberaljournalists still inclined to favor the well-spokenHiss over the young upstart Nixon. But thatsupport waned after Hiss’s conviction in 1950,possibly influenced by Russia’s successful testof an atom bomb. Public criticism of the“Pumpkin Papers” drama – or farce – becameclosely restricted to Hiss’s waning supporters,especially after the convictions of theRosenbergs during the Korean War, when thechoice presented to everyone was now whetherto side with the government, or the Communistenemy.

By 1968 the columnist Drew Pearson was amaverick in his unpopular reproof of the USpress for having “glossed over the fact that thepumpkin papers had been planted there as aphony but sensational plot so [Nixon] coulddiscover them and make headlines.”60 But Ibelieve Pearson’s salty reproof to have beenjustified.

Press coverage of the “Pumpkin Papers” in1948 was intense, because the public wasaroused by legitimate concerns much widerthan the fate of Alger Hiss. One larger issue –how much the U.S. should commit tosupporting Chiang Kai-shek – aroused anarrower segment of U.S. public opinion thananother: how Roosevelt and Churchill could at

Yalta in 1945 have ratified the delivery ofCatholic eastern Europe into the hands ofStalin.

Hiss had accompanied Roosevelt and hisSecretary of State Edward Stettinius to Yalta.Few today would ascribe to the “falselyclaimed” charge by Senator McCarthy “thatHiss had been integrally involved in draftingthe Yalta agreements.”61 But at the time thepossibility of treason by White and Hiss was anunresolved question, exploited vigorously byRepublican campaign manager HerbertBrownell in his unsuccessful 1948 campaign toelect Governor Thomas Dewey, and hissuccessful campaign in 1952 to electEisenhower. It thus helped make John FosterDulles Secretary of State, and Allen DullesDirector of Central Intelligence.

The two brothers promptly illustrated theirbreak with Truman’s foreign policy byapproving what Truman had rejected, the useof CIA resources to rescue the Anglo-IranianOil Company (now BP) from nationalization byIran. The gates had been opened to fourdecades in which the resources of the Americandeep state would be used to defend U.S.corporate interests abroad by crushing localgovernments that had been democraticallyelected -- from Guatemala in 1954 to Panama in1989.62

The claims against White and Hiss continuedfor years to feed the phobic hysteria weremember as McCarthyism. And unfortunatelythey continue to the present.63

On the institutional level the results of theWashington-Wall Street conflict, initially atleast, were less depressing. Germany wasreconstructed as the strongest economy ofwestern Europe; however Nazism did notseriously revive. The era of private bankinginfluence, as symbolized by the BIS, was also

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restored, but within a new framework whichalso incorporated the public institutions of theInternational Monetary Fund and the WorldBank.

For a quarter century, until it ended underNixon in 1971, the Bretton Woods systemlargely worked, and the BIS functioned as partof its infrastructure. America prospered; andthere were signs of a healthy reduction inincome disparity, not just in America, but alsoin the Third World. Discussing the researchesof the economist Thomas Piketty into thereduced income inequality of that era, RichardBrinkman has written, “The immediate periodafter WWII, from 1950 to 1973, has come to becalled the Golden Age…. a close approximationto the best that in practice can be obtainedfrom a capitalist economy.”64

Thanks to the Vietnam War and other factors,America went off the gold standard in 1971.Since then the dollar has been sustained by asystem of high petroleum prices, highlyprofitable to the oi l cartel , for whichincreasingly impoverished third worldcountries are forced to pay in dollars.

That is another story, too complex to be toldhere. But a major factor in the eventualcollapse of the Bretton Woods system was thesuccess of the Dulles brothers in freeing WallStreet and the oil majors from the restraints oflaw.

Peter Dale Scott, a former Canadian diplomatand English Professor at the University ofCalifornia, Berkeley, is the author of Drugs Oiland War, The Road to 9/11, and The WarConspiracy: JFK, 9/11, and the Deep Politics ofWar. His most recent prose book is AmericanWar Machine: Deep Politics, the CIA GlobalDrug Connection and the Road to Afghanistan.His website, which contains a wealth of hiswritings, is here.

Recommended citation: Peter Dale Scott, "TheDulles Brothers, Harry Dexter White, Alger

Hiss, and the Fate of the Private Pre-WarInternational Banking System" The Asia-PacificJournal, Vol. 12, Issue 16, No. 3, April 21, 2014.

Notes

1 Steve Coll, Private Empire: ExxonMobil andAmerican Power (New York: Penguin Press,2012), 19-20. The name Exxon was used from1973.

2 Bryce Wood, The Dismantling of the GoodNeighbor Policy (Austin: University of TexasPress, 1985), 159: “In writing to Truman on 3May 1961 about the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Achesonsaid: Why we ever engaged in this asinineCuban adventure, I cannot imagine. Before Ileft [the department] it was mentioned to meand I told my informants how you and I hadturned down similar suggestions for Iran andGuatemala and why I thought this Cuban ideahad been put aside, as it should have been”[citing Dean Acheson, Among friends: personalletters of Dean Acheson, ed, David S. McLellanand David C. Acheson (New York: Dodd, Mead,1980), 159].

3 Tom Wicker, New York Times, April 29, 2966.

4 Paul S. Boyer et al., The Enduring Vision: ahistory of the American people, Volume II(Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Co., 1995),812.

5 Some in Washington wished to indict otherWall Street figures for wartime collaborationwith Nazi Germany. Among those investigatedwere Herbert Walker and his son-in-lawPrescott Bush (father of George H.W. Bush), fortheir role in representing the Americaninterests of Fritz Thyssen, the German mogulwho financed Hitler. According to John Loftus,Allen Dulles may also have been involved: “Ifthe investigators realized that the USintelligence chief in postwar Germany, AllenDulles, was also the Rotterdam bank's lawyer,they might have asked some very interestingquestions. They did not know that Thyssen was

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Dulles' client as well. Nor did they ever realizethat it was Allen Dulles's other client, BaronKurt Von Schroeder who was the Nazi trusteefor the Thyssen companies which now claimedto be owned by the Dutch. The Rotterdam Bankwas at the heart of Dulles' cloaking scheme,and he guarded its secrets jealously” (JohnLoftus, “How the Bush Family Made Its Fortunefrom the Nazis,” Tetrahedron.org, September27, 2000; cf. John Loftus and Mark Aarons, TheSecret War Against the Jews New York: St. Martin’s Press,

1994], 358-60).

6 Adam LeBor, “Meet the American Banker WhoHelped Hitler Loot Jewish Gold—While Spyingfor the OSS,” Tablet: A New Read on JewishLife, August 30, 2013,

7 Frank W. Thackeray, ed., Events that ChangedGermany (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,2004), 170. For text of JCS 1067, see here.

8 James Srodes, Allen Dulles: master of spies(Washington: Regnery, 2009), 373.) For arelatively dispassionate account of AllenDulles’s wartime opposition to Roosevelt’sintentions to de-industrialize Germany, see e.g.Stuart Eizenstat, co-

ordinator, “U.S. and Allied Efforts To Recoverand Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen orHidden by Germany During World War,” 37:

“Dulles looked forward to a postwar settlementthat envisioned the United States workingclosely with European business and bankingcircles to reshape Western and Central Europeaccording to American interests.” See alsoStuart Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice: LootedAssets, Slave Labor, and the UnfinishedBusiness of World War II (Jackson, TN:PublicAffairs, 2009).

9 Two other relevant examples: Truman in 1945terminated General Donovan’s plans to convertOSS into a peacetime CIA; but two years laterhe was persuaded to accept a plan, draftedlargely by Allen Dulles, for just such a CIA. In

1948 Defense Secretary James Forrestalpreferred that funds for the anti-Communistparties in the 1948 Italian election should beraised privately, and the hat was passed at theelite Brook Club in New York. But Allen Dulles,still just a lawyer, persuaded the CIA to takeover the funding program.

10 Adam LeBor, “Meet the American BankerWho Helped Hitler Loot Jewish Gold—WhileSpying for the OSS,” Tablet: A New Read onJewish Life, August 30, 2013.

11 Eric Rauchway, “How the Soviets savedcapital ism,” TLS: The Times LiterarySupplement, April 5, 2013.

12 Anthony Summers with Robbyn Swan, TheArrogance of Power: The Secret World ofRichard Nixon (New York: Viking, 2000), 63.

13 “On February 8, 1951, about a month beforethe scheduled start of the trial, the JointCongressional Committee on Atomic Energymet in secret session in Washington to discussthe Rosenberg prosecution… The main purposeof the meeting was to determine what classifiedinformation could be made public at the trial”(Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: the man and thesecrets [New York: Norton, 1991], 421)

14 Adam Lebor, Tower of Basel: the shadowyhistory of the secret bank that runs the world(New York: Public Affairs, 2013), 17. Cf. p. 37:“The Standard Oil-IG Farben agreement set thepattern for a series of powerful cartels. JohnFoster Dulles carried out much of thepioneering legal work for these.”

15 Lebor, Tower of Basel, 95. White was theprincipal author of the so-called MorgenthauPlan to deindustrialize Germany. At the sametime, White “tried without success [againstMorgenthau] to soften the plan by allowingGermany to rebuild the industries in the Ruhrunder international supervision” (James M.Boughton, “The Case against Harry DexterWhite: Still Not Proven” [IMF Working Paper

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WP/00/149, 2000], 12.) This fact challenges oneof the common claims against White: that hewished to weaken Germany in order to pleasethe USSR.

16 Lebor, Tower of Basel, 96.

17 Lebor, Tower of Basel, 121-22, 124. Cf. BennSteil, The Battle of Bretton Woods: JohnMaynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and themaking of a new world order (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 2013); James CalvinBaker, Bank for International Settlements:Evolution and Evaluation (Westport, CT:Greenwood Press, 2002), 7: “During World WarII, some attempts were made to abolish theBIS, so the Federal Reserve delayed joining theBoard. After the war, the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank wereestablished at the Bretton Woods, NewHampshire, conference to form agencies tofacilitate the finance and developmentoperations of the United Nations. U.S. officialsbelieved the BIS operations might be co-optedby these new agencies. However, the UnitedStates position on this matter was mellowed bythe belief that the BIS might be able to performbeneficial operations with the IMF especiallyand, perhaps, with the World Bank.”

18 Frank W. Thackeray, ed., Events thatChanged Germany (Westport, CT: GreenwoodPress, 2004), 170. For text of JCS 1067, seehere.

19 Lebor, Tower of Basel, 120.

20 James Srodes, Allen Dulles: master of spies(Washington: Regnery, 2009), 373.) For arelatively dispassionate account of AllenDulles’s wartime opposition to Roosevelt’sintentions to de-industrialize Germany, see e.g.Stuart Eizenstat, co-

ordinator, “U.S. and Allied Efforts To Recoverand Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen orHidden by Germany During World War,” 37:

“Dulles looked forward to a postwar settlementthat envisioned the United States workingclosely with European business and bankingcircles to reshape Western and Central Europeaccording to American interests.” See alsoStuart Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice: LootedAssets, Slave Labor, and the UnfinishedBusiness of World War II (Jackson, TN:PublicAffairs, 2009).

21 Lebor, Tower of Basel, 138.

2 2 James Calv in Baker , The Bank forInternational Settlements: Evolution andEvaluation (Westport, CT: 2002), 203. Cf. JohnSingleton, Central Banking in the TwentiethCentury (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2011), 149: “In 1948 the BIS agreed toreturn 3,740 kg of looted gold to the originalowners. After this concession, the US assets ofthe BIS, which had been frozen during the war,were unblocked.”

23 Loftus and Aarons, The Secret War Againstthe Jews, 109-13. Citing testimony from aformer naval intelligence officer, DanielHarkins, they claim that some of the fundswere cycled through the post-war “WorldCommerce Corporation, with Allen Dulles,naturally, as their lawyer” (110). Cf. MarkAarons and John Loftus, Unholy Trinity: TheVatican, The Nazis, and The Swiss Banks (NewYork: St. Martin's/ Griffin, 1998), 278-79. Idiscuss their claims in American War Machine,54-56.

24 Baker, Bank for International Settlements,203.

25 Lebor, Tower of Basel, 140.

26 For the case against White, see e.g. John EarlHaynes and Harvey Klehr, Venona: DecodingSoviet Espionage in America (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 1999), 125-26, 139. Forrebuttal, see e.g. James M. Boughton, “TheCase against Harry Dexter White: Still NotProven,” IMF Working Paper WP/00/149, 2000,

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1:”Evaluation of that [VENONA and other new]evidence in the context of White’s career andworldview casts doubt on the case against himand provides the basis for a more benignexplanation.”

27 Whittaker Chambers, Witness (New York:Random House, 1952], 431; discussion in DavidChambers (Whittaker Chambers’ grandson),“The Baffling Harry White,” History NewsNetwork, May 21, 2012.

28 John Loftus and Mark Aarons, The SecretWar Against the Jews, 222; citing “Confidentialinterviews, former agents, U.S. CIC; formerofficers, U.S. MIS; former officers and agents,SSU, CIG, and OPC” (557n17).

29 Anthony Summers with Robbyn Swan, TheArrogance of Power: The Secret World ofRichard Nixon (New York: Viking, 2000), 63.

30 Loftus and Aarons, The Secret War Againstthe Jews, 221.

31 On March 26, 1943, Congressman JerryVoorhis introduced a resolution in the House ofRepresentatives calling for an investigation ofthe Bank for International Settlements,including "the reasons why an American retainsthe position as president of this Bank” (JohnSpritzler The people as enemy: the leaders'hidden agenda in World War Two [Montreal:Black Rose Books, 2003], 97; cf. Lebor, Towerof Basel, 97).

32 Summers, The Arrogance of Power, 46-47.With limited evidence, Russell Baker alsosuspects that Prescott Bush, another prominentmember of the BIS German-American financialcomplex, may have flown to California andparticipated in the Nixon campaign (Family ofsecrets: the Bush dynasty, the powerful forcesthat put it in the White House, and what theirinfluence means for America New York:Bloomsbury Press, 2009], 162-164).

33 Loftus and Aarons, The Secret War Against

the Jews, 156. Dillon Read had handled 29percent of the Wall Street financing of Germanreparations (Antony C. Sutton, Wall Street andthe rise of Hitler [Seal Beach, CA: '76 Press,1976], 29).

34 Conrad Black, Richard M. Nixon: A Life inFull (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), 113.

35 Lewis Hartshorn, Alger Hiss, WhittakerChambers and the Case That IgnitedMcCarthyism, 42. Today almost no one believesthis. The accepted charges against White arethat he shared information, and possibly passeddocuments, that reached the Soviet Union.

36 The sensational charges against Hiss, such asthat he was the architect of betrayal at Yalta,would come later.

37 G. Edward White, Alger Hiss's Looking-glassWars: The Covert Life of a Soviet Spy

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 62.

38 Glen Yeadon and John Hawkins, The NaziHydra in America ( Joshua Tree , CA:Progressive Press, 2008), 195; cf. 193-94,273-74, 368-70, etc.

39 Willard Edwards, "Hiss spy paper linked tolate treasury aid," Chicago Daily Tribune,November 29, 1949, 1-2. The doctor whosigned White’s death certificate (and who wasnot present when White died) later denied thatdigitalis was a factor. More recently the right-wing author John Koster has charged (with noevidence other than a contemporary moviewhich White might have seen) that Whiteoverdosed on digitalis in order to commitsuicide (John P. Koster, Operation Snow: how aSoviet mole in FDR's White House triggeredPearl Harbor Washington: Regnery Publishing,2012], 204-05).

40 Summers, The Arrogance of Power, 63; citingPeter Grose, Gentleman spy: the life of AllenDulles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), 297n

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(run-in).

41 Summers, The Arrogance of Power, 78. Ananti-Hiss author has implied the opposite,suggesting from an annotation in the file thatthe identification of ALES as Hiss was mademuch later, in 1969 (White, Alger Hiss'slooking-glass wars, 225). But a partiallydeclassified FBI memo from 1950, viewable online here, makes it clear that by then the FBIwas already investigating the possibility thatHiss was ALES, who had reportedly flown toMoscow after the Yalta conference (“The AlgerHiss Story: Venona and the Russian Files”).

42 Summers, Arrogance of Power, 78.

43 Benjamin Weiser, “Nixon Lobbied Grand Juryto Indict Hiss in Espionage Case, TranscriptsReveal,” New York Times, October 12, 1999:“Judge Peter K. Leisure of Federal DistrictCourt in Manhattan, who ordered the releaseafter reviewing detailed summaries of thetranscripts, had ruled that an exception totraditional grand jury secrecy should be madefor the archive.

“‘The court finds the public has a significantinterest in disclosure of Nixon's testimony,’Judge Leisure wrote. ‘Grand jury testimony bya Congressional official allegedly attempting toinfluence a grand jury's charging decisions is ofinherent and substant ia l h is tor ica limportance.’ ' '

44 Herbert Romerstein and Eric Breindel, TheVenona Secrets: Exposing Soviet Espionageand America's Traitors (Washington: Regnery,2000), 233-34.

45 Conrad Black, Richard M. Nixon: A Life inFull (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), 122.

46 "President Nixon Remembers the Alger HissCase: Selected References from the NixonTapes," Stanley I. Kutler (ed.), Abuse of Power:The New Nixon Tapes (New York: Free Press,1997), 7.

47 In addition, the materials produced byChambers “included a long letter in HarryWhite’s own handwriting” (Haynes and Klehr,Venona: decoding Soviet espionage in America,139).

48 Black, Richard M. Nixon, 131. My on-lineinvestigations have failed to find a moredetailed description of these cables. Black’saccount should however be enough to establishthat, if the microfilms did in fact come fromHiss, then Hiss was not, as many believe, the“ALES” of VENONA cable traffic, whose workwas described as “obtaining mil itaryinformation only” (see facsimile reproduced inSummers, Arrogance of Power, 493).

49 Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover, 362n; quoting fromRichard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon(New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), 69. Thefive rolls are now deposited in the NationalArchives (Record Group 60.3.5), Black was inerror when he claimed that the withheld rollscontained “Navy Department secret files”(Black, Richard M. Nixon, 130); the Navy fileswere publicly available.

50 This impression is corroborated by the oddfact that the records of the long-defunct HUACcommittee “were sealed, in 1976 [under Ford],for an additional fifty years” (Summers,Arrogance of Power, 77).

51 At the time Andrews “vowed that he couldmake Nixon president” (Tim Weiner, Enemies:a history of the FBI [New York: Random House,2012], 476n).

52 We now know that on December 3 the JusticeDepartment notified the FBI that an indictmentof Chambers [for perjury] was contemplated(Athan Theoharis, Chasing spies: how the FBIfailed in counterintelligence but promoted thepolitics of McCarthyism in the Cold War years[Chicago : Ivan R. Dee, 2002], 115; citing AllenWeinstein, Perjury: the Hiss-Chambers case New

York : Random House, 1997], 271). Not surprising, since by this time Chambers was a

self-admitted perjurer!

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53 Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon: The Education ofa Politician 1913-1962, 128 (emphasis inoriginal); Robert O. Blanchard, ed., Congressand the news media (New York, HastingsHouse, 1974), 305.

54 Gary Allen, Nixon: The Man Behind the Mask(Boston, Western Islands, 1971].

55 “Alger Hiss,” emphasis added. The brevity ofthe storage in the pumpkin (not known at thetime) is also conceded by John Earl Haynes andHarvey Klehr: “The film had actually been inthe pumpkin only since that morning….Chambers explained later that he had brieflyhidden the film in the pumpkin because he hadfeared that agents from Hiss’s defense teamwould steal it” (John Earl Haynes and HarveyKlehr, Early Cold War spies: the espionagetr ials that shaped American pol i t ics[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2006], 108).

56 Summers, The Arrogance of Power, 69. Theday before leaving, Nixon reportedly told theHouse doorkeeper, William Miller, “’I’m goingto get on a steamship, and you will be readingabout it/ I am going out to sea, and they aregoing to send for me. You will understand whenI get back.’… Coast Guard logs also reportedlysuggest that arrangements for Nixon’s returnhad been made even before his ship left harborin New York, which would confirm suspicionthat the trip was a charade to ensure maximumpublicity.” (loc. cit., 70; citing William Miller,Fishbait: The Memoirs of the CongressionalDoorkeeper Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977], 41-).

57 Sam Tanenhaus, Whittaker Chambers: ABiography (New York: Random House, 1997),305.

5 8 Donald A. Ritchie, Report ing fromWashington: The History of the WashingtonPress Corps (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 2005), 75. Ritchie, like many otherauthors, writes that Nixon (and Stripling) wentout to the pumpkin field accompanied by Bert

Andrews (Donald A. Ritchie, Reporting fromWashington: The History of the WashingtonPress Corps New York: Oxford University Press, 2005], 75). Ritchie and the

rest are probably relying on the badly edited posthumous memoir of Andrews, ed.

Peter Andrews, A tragedy of history; a journalist's confidential role in the Hiss-

Chambers case (Washington: Robert. B. Luce, 1962]. Cf. U.S. State Department,

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States, 56: “On December

2, 1948, Andrews joined Nixon on a trip to Chambers’ farm near Westminster,

Maryland.” But on December 2, Nixon was already beginning his preplanned sea

voyage.

59 David Halberstam, The Powers That Be (NewYork: Knopf, 1979), 260.

60 Drew Pearson, Toledo Blade, August 4, 1968.Pearson added, “Thanks in part to BertAndrews of the New York Herald Tribune, Mr.Nixon’s mentor, the headlines helped catapultMr. Nixon into the Senate.”

61 Sheldon Anderson, Condemned to repeat it:"lessons of history" and the making of U.S. ColdWar containment policy (Lanham, MD:Lexington Books, 2008), 95.

One who still blames the Yalta handover onHiss (and on Harry Hopkins, another allegedSoviet agent) is Christina Shelton, in AlgerHiss: Why He Chose Treason (New York: Simon& Schuster, Threshold Editions, 2012), 121-22.

62 The J. Henry Schröder & Co. Bank and J.Henry Schroder Banking Corporation(Schrobanco, the firm of which Allen Dulles hadbeen an officer) had a financial stake in allthree of Allen Dulles’ major CIA covertoperations. Schröder had financed the creationof Anglo-Persian (later Anglo-Iranian) oil: thusFrank Cyril Tiarks was a partner both in J.Henry Schröder & Co., and also in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (1917-1948). (He was alsoa member of the Ribbentrop-inspired Anglo-German Fellowship and of the British Union ofFascists.) Schrobanco had a stake in theInternational Railways of Central America, afirm developed in conjunction with whatbecame United Fruit in order to ship out UnitedFruit’s bananas in Guatemala. Both Schrödersand Schrobanco were heavily invested in Cuban

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sugar; and M.E. Rionda, president of CubaCane Corporat ion , was a member o fSchrobanco’s board.

63 The surrender at Yalta of Eastern Europe toSoviet domination is still blamed on Hiss (andon Harry Hopkins, another alleged Sovietagent) by retired DIA intelligence analystChristina Shelton, in Alger Hiss: Why He Chose

Treason (New York: Simon & Schuster,Threshold Editions, 2012), 121-22. Cf. AnnCoulter, Treason: liberal treachery from thecold war to the war on terrorism (New York:Crown Forum, 2003).

64 Richard Brinkman, Corporate Pharaohs: AVicious Circle of Globalization (Xlibris Corp,2013.), 234.