Wolf 1

The Volatile Divorce of a Marriage of Convenience

Foreign strategy during wartime is often dictated by alliances and diplomacy conducted

throughout the nations involved. However, the effect of such policies and agreements made

throughout the war continue to influence their respective nations long after the war is over. One

of the most exemplary instances of this is the relationship forged between the three major Allied

powers of World War II—Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The agreements

made between Allied leaders at meetings near the end of World War II—such as the Yalta and

Potsdam Conferences—played a major role in influencing United States foreign policy. Due to

its scale and highly destructive nature, World War II affected each nation differently and

ultimately influenced how each leader of the Big Three approached the conferences.

Following the success of the invasion of Normandy and the liberation of France from

Nazi control, the military might of the United States established the nation as a contributing force

in the European war effort. Also essential to the European war effort was the use of U.S. goods

by the British and Soviet militaries which were supplied through the lend-lease program. From

this position of both a superior military power and a benefactor to other Allied nations, the

United States had leverage over Britain and the Soviet Union, and felt entitled to assert its clout

in European politics. Roosevelt was desirous of a Europe that had adopted “a model of postwar

order in which great powers would maintain regional harmony and stability through wise

leadership and by actively cultivating good relations among their neighbors.”1 He intended to

solidify this global alliance through the formation of the United Nations, an organization that

attempted to preserve Allied alliances made during the war. Although he was in a strong position

politically, Roosevelt was prepared to concede to the demands of Stalin in exchange for Soviet

1 George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776. (New York: Oxford University, 2008), 555.

Wolf 2

involvement in the Pacific Theatre. Concessions by Roosevelt—both to Churchill and Stalin—

would serve to promote his view of the cooperation among the Allied nations.

Sharing Roosevelt's vision of cooperation, Churchill was also an advocate for “regional

harmony and stability through wise leadership” between the nations of Europe. “British policy

had been concerned for centuries, and for at least a century quite consciously, with the

maintenance of an equilibrium or balance of power in Europe,” 2 a policy that would later cause

tension between the Big Three concerning the institution of democratic governments in Poland

and other Central European nations. Churchill did not subscribe to the policy of cooperation

through appeasement as ardently as Roosevelt, and when he did so, it was for a different reason.

His principle concern was confined to the status of England on the world stage and as a colonial

empire, the way it had existed before being exhausted by the war. This stress placed on the

restoration of pre-war Europe can be attributed to Churchill's desire to preserve the might of the

British Empire. Of the Big Three, England was the most devastated from the events of the war.

Early involvement in the war and a close proximity to Germany had taken its toll on England’s

resources and infrastructure. With England in such a weakened state and the impending Soviet

emergence as a superpower, Churchill’s primary concern became maintaining England as

Europe’s strongest nation. There is evidence that Churchill’s goal was “to juggle the power of

Russia and America while…he stole the prize of Europe,” 3 but this became more difficult once

the spread of Soviet influence to satellite states started to threaten England’s eminence within

Europe. Anxious to have a series of buffer nations between England and the Soviet Union,

Churchill began vying for the establishment of independent democratic nations free from Soviet

influence as a sort of containment. Bankrupt and unable to challenge the Soviet Union alone,

2 Keith Sainsbury. “British Policy and German Unity at the End of the Second World War,” The English Historical Review 94, no. 373 (1979): 787, http://www.jstor.org/stable/565553.3 Charles L. Mee, Jr., Meeting at Potsdam (New York: Franklin Square, 1975), 28.

Wolf 3

Churchill attempted “to wed the United States to the case of propping up Great Britain, without

letting Britain be absorbed into a new American empire.”4 Churchill was able to accomplish

solidarity with the United States through his concept of the Iron Curtain and the mutual menace

of communism. Together, the nations challenged Stalin’s influence in Central Europe and sought

to contain the spread of communism.

Although they had incurred disastrous losses at Stalingrad, the Soviet Union pressed

further into Europe until eventually the defeat of Germany was rendered inevitable. The success

of the Soviet army at Stalingrad resulted in a major weakening of Hitler’s forces—both reducing

the military might of Germany and causing troops to be withdrawn from the western front—

which marked a turning point in the war. Having greatly contributed to German surrender in this

way, Stalin felt that he was in a strong position to demand compensation; this demand was the

source for the exorbitant reparations requested at the Yalta Conference. German resentment by

the Soviet Union also influenced Stalin’s demand for influence in Poland and other Central

European countries. Stalin asserted that this influence was necessary because “the Germans had

twice invaded Russia via Poland...It is therefore in Russia’s vital interest that Poland should be

both strong and friendly.”5 While Stalin was concerned with invaders entering Russia, he was

also concerned with people leaving Russia. “Russian soldiers had seen foreign lands, foreign

wealth, foreign freedom…Stalin feared that the Russian people would be infected by contact

with the West…He had great need of the iron curtain.”6 Stalin’s unwavering presence in Central

Europe served to keep Russia safe by keeping the ideas of the West out.

4 Mee, Potsdam, 25.5 Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of U.S.S.R and the President of the U.S.A and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1957), quoted in Mee, Potsdam, 49.6 Mee, Potsdam, 46.

Wolf 4

As the first conference discussing post-war policy in Europe, expectations for the Yalta

Conference were high. Three of its defining aspects would prove to be instrumental in shaping

future U.S. foreign policy— the division of German land into four zones, the payment of

reparations among the Big Three and France, and Soviet involvement in Eastern Europe. With

the surrender of Germany imminent, it was decided that—upon unconditional surrender—

Germany would be divided into zones, rendering each power equal in exerting influence over its

post-war reorganization. Although the division of Germany would play a more pivotal role in the

later Potsdam Conference, these zones created a stage for one of the most politically tense

atmospheres of the Cold War. The extent to which reparations must be made remained unclear,

but Stalin’s desire to severely punish Germany clashed with the desire to eventually reunite the

separate zones of Germany into a democratic, self-governing nation. Roosevelt believed that

“political settlements should be based on the concept of self-determination of peoples…colonies

should be readied for independence”7 while Churchill subscribed to the “traditional basis of

[British] national security, which required maintaining...Germany as a major power.”8 Self-

government presented more of a problem in Eastern Europe, namely Poland. Churchill and

Roosevelt both pushed for free elections in Poland, but Stalin saw Soviet involvement as

necessary to the safety of Russia. Poland’s previous, more democratic government had been

forced into exile following Soviet occupation during World War II, and both Churchill and

Roosevelt wished to see it reinstated. An agreement was reached that the governments would be

combined, and Stalin promised that free elections would be permitted. Churchill and Roosevelt

looked to evaluate how the situation was handled to determine how Soviet power and dominance

7 Herring, Colony to Superpower, 549.8 Ibid., 548

Wolf 5

would treat formerly democratic nations in post-war Europe; thus, “Poland had become the issue

over which cooperation would flourish or fail.”9

Roosevelt is often criticized for concessions made at Yalta, but the concessions he made

were in the interest of the United States and his post-war vision of Europe, not a result of naivety

or ignorance; the United States government recognized the reality of Soviet presence in Eastern

Europe. “We have a pretty clear idea of Soviet objectives in Eastern Europe...We know that the

three Baltic States have been re-incorporated into the Soviet Union and that nothing which we

can do can alter this. It is not a question of whether we like it."10 Roosevelt deemed Soviet

activity in Eastern Europe permissible in order to construct a more cooperative relationship with

Stalin, both during and after the war. “He thought accommodation of legitimate Soviet objectives

might enable him to safeguard at less cost more vital American (and British) interests elsewhere

around the globe.”11 Soviet entry into the Pacific Theatre was deemed necessary to secure

victory, a victory which could be achieved with less loss of American lives. In a post-war

context, granting certain concessions to Stalin would enable the U.S. government “to work out a

regime which will obtain the cooperation of the Soviet Union for the rest of Europe and the rest

of the world.”12 The attempt to gain Soviet support was successful: Stalin agreed to join the

United Nations—Roosevelt’s post-war peace keeping organization—and the promise of Soviet

invasion negotiated at Yalta would contribute to the surrender of Japan. However, the

importance of post-war peace stressed by Roosevelt would not extend beyond his administration.

9 Herring, Colony to Superpower, 48.10 The Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State, 8 January 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, 1955), 94.11Melvyn P. Leffler, "Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences of the Early Cold War." International Security 11, no.1 (Summer 1986), http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538877.12Deputy Director to Secretary of State, in Foreign Relations, 95.

Wolf 6

The death of Roosevelt shortly after the Yalta Conference marked a drastic shift in U.S.

foreign policy. Truman—elected as way to compromise between the staunch right and left wing

policies of other candidates—was not deemed important to Roosevelt’s administration, and

Roosevelt deliberately kept Truman ignorant of his foreign policy goals. Roosevelt’s failure to

share the intricacies of his foreign policy goals with Truman enabled the Truman administration

to completely subvert it; U.S. foreign policy changed from one willing to cooperate and make

concessions with the Soviet Union to one dedicated to stopping the expansion of Russian

influence in Europe. The previous stance of the U.S. government under Roosevelt on Soviet

influence in Eastern Europe had been one of ambivalence, but the Truman administration

intended to use Eastern Europe as a theatre to stage a showdown between the two powers in

order to force cooperation. The opinion of the Truman administration was that Stalin had

interpreted the American desire for cooperation as complaisance, and Soviet policy in Eastern

Europe reflected Stalin’s belief that he could act without fear of American involvement. The

Truman administration adopted the view that such actions would not be tolerated and the U.S.

government intended to “make them realize that they cannot continue their present attitude

except at great cost to themselves.”13 This coincided with Churchill’s goal of maintaining the

pre-war balance of power in Europe, and the alliance of the two against Soviet influence would

become a source of anxiety for Stalin. The foreign policy of the Truman administration would

have an alienating effect on the Soviet Union, and would greatly contribute to tensions between

the two, eventually laying the foundation of Cold War politics. The harsh and uncompromising

stance on foreign policy taken by Truman—responding to Soviet policy with what he called “the

13 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 1, Year of Decisions (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1955), quoted in Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy—Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power (New York: Penguin, 1985), 71.

Wolf 7

one-two, right to the jaw”14—is responsible for the drastic differences between the Yalta and

Potsdam Conferences.

A continuation of the negotiations undertaken at the Yalta Conference, the intentions of

the Potsdam Conference were to address the issue of European construction and to solidify what

had been agreed upon, but had not been concluded decisively, at Yalta. Following the

unconditional surrender of Germany and victory in Europe, the Big Three entered negotiations to

decide how reconstruction should take place and to delineate concretely its terms. Germany—

after undergoing demilitarization, denazification, and decentralization of government institutions

—would be split into Allied zones of influence from which reparations would be withdrawn. The

division—split into what was defined as the Western Zones and the Soviet zone—with its

ultimate goal of reuniting Germany under a democratic government would contribute to tensions

between Western democracy and Soviet communism; the dichotomy of these political ideologies

would become the most definitive aspects of the Cold War.

Truman’s tough foreign policy, and his desire to hinder the spread of communism and

Soviet dominance are both evident in his actions toward negotiating the end of the war in Japan.

As stated in the Potsdam Declaration, the Allies were committed to extracting Japan’s

unconditional surrender. While Roosevelt made several concessions at Yalta to provide an

incentive for the Soviet Union to enter the war against Japan, Truman feared the spread of Soviet

influence in the Far East, and was determined to end the war in Japan on American terms before

the terms of Soviet invasion could be agreed upon. Having delayed meeting with Stalin, Truman

faced another threat to Japan’s surrender to the United States—negotiations were being discussed

between the Soviet government and the Emperor of Japan. The opportunity to force a Japanese

14George C. Herring, Aid to Russia, 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War (New York, 1973), 198-99, quoted in Herring, Colony to Superpower, 589.

Wolf 8

surrender without Soviet influence presented itself upon the successful testing of the atomic

bomb. Although Stalin was able to deploy an invasion force before Japan’s surrender, Truman’s

goal of limiting Soviet influence within global politics would come to define the subsequent

decades of U.S. foreign policy.

FDR’s idealistic goal of maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union was supplanted

by Truman’s policy of containment. The policy of containment was the product of George

Kennan, an American diplomat in Moscow, and his assessment of Soviet postwar ambitions

known as the Long Telegram. Writing that communism would “work toward destruction of all

forms of personal independence, economic, political or moral,”15 Kennan’s telegram stressed the

threat the Soviet Union and its communism presented to the qualities that were intrinsic to

American life. The threat of communism, the obligation of the United States to combat it, and

the establishment of global influence through the assertion of American ideals mirrored the

defining document of American nationalism—Henry Luce’s article in Life magazine, “The

American Century.” Luce wrote that America should strive to become “the powerhouse from

which the ideals spread throughout the world and do their mysterious work of lifting the life of

mankind from the level of the beasts to what the Psalmist called a little lower than the angels.”16

The spread of American ideals was the best candidate to fight communism because, as Luce

argued, “the issues which the American people champion revolve around their determination to

make the society of men safe for the freedom, growth and increasing satisfaction of all individual

men.”17 Through his portrayal of Soviet leadership, Kennan’s telegram removed any last vestiges

of FDR’s foreign policy dedicated to maintaining amiable relations with the Soviet Union, and

15 George Kennan to George Marshall, 22 February 1946, in Elsey Papers (Independence, MO: Harry S. Truman Library and Museum).16 Henry R. Luce, “The American Century,” Information Clearing House. 1941, accessed November 24, 2014, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article6139.htm.17 Ibid.

Wolf 9

was influential in turning the tide of American opinion from one of potential negotiation to

outright opposition. The perception of the threat to freedom as presented by communism was

appropriated by Truman to garner support for actions of his foreign policy.

To conduct the policy of containment and to increase the global influence of the United

States, the Truman administration sought to undertake actions conducive to these goals. Truman

secured popular support by citing the defense of freedom, suggesting the United States was

turning from the tradition of isolationism to assume a global responsibility of supporting

freedom-loving peoples around the world. This American commitment to defending freedom—

known as the Truman Doctrine—would become “the guiding spirit of American foreign

policy.”18 The global responsibility of the United States set forth by the Truman Doctrine

entailed providing military and economic support to factions fighting communist regimes, as

well as providing aid to begin the economic recovery of Europe through the Marshall Plan.

Although it was not specifically anticommunist, the Marshall Plan’s intention of creating

conditions beneficial to the establishment of free governments was inexorably linked with

fighting the conditions which had produced “the idea, widespread since the Great Depression,

that capitalism was in decline and communism the wave of the future.”19

With foreign policy dominated by anticommunist sentiment and a heavy emphasis on

ensuring the establishment of free, democratic governments throughout Europe, the United

States—along with Britain and France—united their occupied zones of Germany and Berlin with

the intention of establishing a democratic West German government. The blockade of Berlin by

Stalin, and the Allied response it invoked, resulted in the emergence of two very different nations

—an East and West Germany with Berlin remaining divided. The division of one city into such

18 Eric Foner, Give Me Liberty! An American History, 3rd edition. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011), 954.19 Ibid., 954

Wolf 10

diametric political opposites threw the tensions into sharp contrast, becoming a symbol of

increasing Cold War hostility. This apprehension would only worsen, although not in Europe.

The struggle for dominance between the democracy of the United States and the

communism of the Soviet Union achieved new fervor in Asia. With both nations possessing

nuclear capabilities, each was reluctant to give the other reason for nuclear retaliation. Unwilling

to engage forces directly, the Soviet Union and the United States began a trend of proxy wars—

most notably, the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Separated into Soviet and American zones

following the end of World War II, communist North Korea invaded South Korea in an attempt

to reunite the country, and Truman extended his Doctrine and policy of containment to repel the

invasion force. Although a formal peace treaty has yet to be instituted concerning the conflict, it

was a success for Truman’s containment; communist North Korea had been pushed back within

its original boundaries, and has not moved since. The tensions of the Cold War would dominate

decades of foreign policy, producing a similar situation in Vietnam that would have a more

devastating outcome for the United States.

United solely in their desire to fight the rapidly expanding threat Hitler presented to the

entirety of Europe, the alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States was simply a

“marriage of convenience formed to meet immediate, often urgent needs.”20 Once these needs

had been met following the surrender of the Axis Powers in Europe, the conferences held by the

Big Three to address the postwar organization of Europe and, eventually, of the world led to the

realization that each nation expected different outcomes. The failure to reconcile a majority of

these opposing outcomes—while others were cloaked in the vague language of diplomacy that

left them open to interpretation—became the source of a series of grievances between the Soviet

20 Herring, Colony to Superpower, 546.

Wolf 11

Union and the United States, eventually producing an ideological crusade between the forces of

communism and democracy that would define the Cold War and decades of foreign policy.

Wolf 12

Works Cited

Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of U.S.S.R and the President

of the U.S.A and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of

1941-1945. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1957. Quoted in Charles L.

Mee, Jr., Potsdam (New York: Franklin Square, 1975), 49.

The Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State, 8

January 1945, In Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, The

Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 94. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of

State, 1955.

Foner, Eric, Give Me Liberty! An American History, 3rd ed. New York: W.W. Norton, 2011.

Herring, George C., Aid to Russia, 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold

War, 198-99. New York, 1973. Quoted in George C. Herring, From Colony to

Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776. (New York: Oxford University, 2008),

589.

Herring, George C., From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776. New

York: Oxford University, 2008.

Kennan, George. George Kennan to George Marshall, 22 February 1946, In Elsey Papers.

Independence, MO: Harry S. Truman Library and Museum.

Leffler, Melvyn P., "Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences of the Early Cold

War." International Security 11, no.1 (Summer 1986), 88-123.

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538877.

Mee, Jr., Charles L., Meeting at Potsdam. New York: Franklin Square, 1975.

Wolf 13

Sainsbury, Keith. “British Policy and German Unity at the End of the Second World War.” The

English Historical Review 94, no. 373 (1979): 786-804.

http://www.jstor.org/stable/565553.

Truman, Harry S., Memoirs, vol. 1, Year of Decisions. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1955.

Quoted in Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy—Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the

Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power (New York: Penguin,

1985), 71.