The Dionysian Innovation

8/3/2019 The Dionysian Innovation

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-dionysian-innovation 1/16

The Dionysian Innovation

Author(s): Alfred G. SmithReviewed work(s):Source: American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 66, No. 2 (Apr., 1964), pp. 251-265Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the American Anthropological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/669007 .

Accessed: 14/11/2011 19:36

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Blackwell Publishing and American Anthropological Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,

preserve and extend access to American Anthropologist.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=anthro

http://www.jstor.org/stable/669007?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/stable/669007?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=anthro

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black



TheDionysiannnovation

ALFRED G. SMITH

Univeristy f Oregon

INTRODUCTION

T HEstudy of culture is itself a culture. Anthropology itself is a learned and

patterned way of life of a group of people. It is, in fact, the behavior of one

group of people toward other groups of people. Anthropology also has a his-

tory. Like any other culture, anthropology changes-through innovation,

diffusion, and other processes. It is a tradition that studies other traditions.

Americananthropologists are now beginning to study theirown traditions in

the way they have long studied those of other peoples. In the spring of 1962,the Social Science Research Council held a conferenceon the history of anthro-

pology (Hymes 1962; Mitchell 1962). The importance of that conference,wrote

Hymes, lay "not in the intrinsic value of what occurred-but in the fact that it

did occur." It inaugurated a development that led within six months to a ple-

nary session on the history of anthropology at the annual meeting of the Ameri-can Anthropological Association. These beginnings in America coincide with a

new interest shown by British anthropologists. They too are re-examining the

relation between ethnology and history (Evans-Pritchard 1961; Smith 1962;

Schapera 1962). They admit that synchronic and diachronic analyses of cul-

tures are essential to each other. This turn in British orientations should make

us recognize an obvious corollary: studying the history of anthropology also

involves studying the culture of anthropology. We are studying our own

ethnohistory.

One approach to the study of any culture is through its artifacts andmentifacts. In anthropology the ideas of "race," "culture area," and "the

superorganic"are what potsherds and cult gods are for other tribes and tradi-

tions. In this paper I consider the history of one mentifact of the anthropo-

logical culture. I aim to show that this serves the same function as the studyof any other phenomenon in any other culture: it adds to our understanding of

human behavior in general.In 1928, Ruth Benedict introduced the term "Dionysian" to cultural

anthropology.Since that time this Benedictine innovation has been

accepted,rejected, and modified, and it has generated elaborate discussions. Many of

these discussions have tried to evaluate the concept and judge whether it is

legitimate or out of bounds (e.g. Nadel 1937; Williams 1947). This normative

approach has been common in our discussions of other anthropological menti-

facts. Anthropologists have long argued about such concepts as cultural evolu-

tion, cultural logics, and even that of culture itself (e.g. Kroeber and Kluck-

hohn 1952). These discussions meet significant needs, but the normative way

251



252 American Anthropologist [66, 1964

they approach anthropology is not the way anthropologists approach other

cultures. The ethnohistory of anthropology, however, considers the Dionysianinnovation without accepting or rejecting it. To the ethnographer and histor-

ian of this culture the innovation is not a topic for debate but a phenomenonto be observed and explained.

In this study I survey the anthropological literature and take a historical

inventory of definitions, contexts, and evaluations of the Dionysian concept.I regard the acceptance and rejection of the innovation as choices made by

anthropologists. These choices are based on values, and there is a standard set

of values throughout the anthropological tradition. These choices also reveal

behavioral moieties among anthropologists, and reveal their statuses and roles.

Finally, anthropology is regarded as a subsystem of a larger cultural setting.This setting changes and as it does, anthropology and the Dionysian innova-

tion change with it. The basic thesis of this study is that the history and culture

of anthropology can be analyzed in an anthropological manner; that one ap-

proach to this kind of analysis is through the artifacts and mentifacts of the

culture; and that such an analysis can provide new perceptions for the studyof other cultures.

VARIETYAND CHANGE IN THE INNOVATION

The historical inventory reveals that the Dionysian concept has, andalways has had, many different meanings. Today many popular accounts

about anthropology, accounts written for non-anthropologists, accept the

Dionysian innovation. However, they give the term seemingly contradictoryand incommensurable meanings. Herskovits (1955:339), for example, states

that Dionysian is "equivalent to the extraverted," while Keesing (1958:157,427) states that it is "introverted behavior." Neither introvert nor extravertis correct or incorrect. The meaning of Dionysian is whatever meaning it has

for any acceptor or rejector of the innovation.

Hoebel (1958:647) states that Dionysian "emphasizes sensate experience,"while Benedict (1934:79, 80) wrote of the Dionysian "escape from the bound-aries imposed on him by his five senses, to break through . . . the usual sensoryroutine.. . into another order of experience." Herskovits' extravert (1955)and Keesing's introvert (1958), Hoebel's sensate (1958) and what we may callBenedict's exosensate (1934), are only four of the seemingly contradictorymeanings that anthropologists have given the term. Titiev gives its meaningstill another turn when he identifies Dionsyian with Sheldon's somatotonic

type (1954:436). Other anthropologists identify it with the conventions of a

group, while still others identify it with individual inspiration. Some regarditas a release from inhibitions, and some as a pursuit of things beyond the

pleasure principle. These are not full definitions, but all of them do refer to acharacteristic pattern of behavior, or to a personality characteristic, or to

some characteristic beliefs, or experiences, or goals. However, they do notconcur in what these characteristics are, how they are characteristic, or what

they are characteristic of.

These various meanings of Dionysian are themselves innovations. They



SMITH] The Dionysian Innovation 253

stem from the fact that the concept has many features. Each anthropologistselects different features for emphasis, and then equates his own Dionysian

concepts with another concept, from Jung, Sorokin, Sheldon, or some other

typologist. Herskovits and Keesing used the Jungian concepts of introvertand extravert. These concepts also have many different features, and here

again each anthropologist selects different ones for emphasis. Herskovits re-

garded the Dionysian to be passionate, suspicious, magical, and extravagant;he regarded the extravert to be emotional and aggressive. These perceptionsof passionate and of emotional have common denominators and led Herskovits

to identify Dionysian and extravert (1955).

Keesing selected other features. His Dionysian was individualistic; his

introvert saw the world from a subjective point of view. Keesing's perceptionsof individualism and subjectivism also had common denominators and led

him to identify Dionysian and introvert (1958). All of these anthropologistsfollowed one of the processes of innovation that Barnett has isolated and

analyzed: identification (1953:189-207). They equated different features from

different contexts. Incidentally, Jung himself, the innovator of the terms

"introvert," "extravert," and "sensate," regarded Dionysian as a sensate

extraversion (1923:179-180).These anthropologists did not, of course, take their definitions from

Benedict alone. They also defined the term through other sources, such as non-Benedictine information about North AmericanIndians, and the ethnopsycho-

logical orientationsthat weredeveloped by Boas, Sapir,and Mead. Earlier anal-

yses of Dionysian cults by classical scholars such as Harrison, and by Spengler,had also prepared anthropologists for the concept. It was Nietzsche's descrip-tions of Dionysian rites, however, that were the primary prototypes for Bene-

dict's own innovation (cf. Mead 1959). She, for her part, quietly ignored what

these rites symbolized for Nietzsche. He glorified Dionysus as the apotheosisof the Natural Man in whom "the illusion of culture was cast off from the

archetype of man; here the true man, the bearded satyr revealed himself,shouting joyfully to his god . . . Nature which has become estranged, hostile,

or subjugated, celebrates once more her reconciliation with her prodigal son,man" (Nietzsche 1872:989, 955). Benedict adopted Nietzsche's typologybut ignored his ideology. By and large, her innovation was a product of what

Barnett has called "simplification" (1953:218-220).Benedict wrote that she used only those aspects of Nietzsche's conceptions

that were pertinent to the Indian cultures she was studying (1930: note 2).It is obvious, however, that she used only what was pertinent, not to her

Indian cultures, but to her own anthropologicalculture. It was her culture that

would not accept Nietzsche's ideas of the Natural Man and of the illusion of

culture. Benedict's simplification and her rationalization of pertinence to

Indian cultures, reveal a guileless ethnocentrism that even an anthropologistcan exhibit toward his own traditions.

Nietzsche in turn had developed his typology from the cults of the Greek

god Dionysus. This was not a native Hellenic god, but an interloper from

Thrace whom the Greeks had adopted and Hellenized. As a late arrival, and




through a series of identifications, simplifications, and other innovative

processes, Dionysus appropriated from the older Greek gods many of their

attributes and functions. At different times and in different places he acquired

at least 60 different cult names (Farnell 1909: 118-170). Under the cult epithetAigobolos, the goat-shooter, he was worshipped with human sacrifice. As

Aisumnates, the arbiter, he was revered for the abolition of human sacrifice.As Bakxeios, a vegetation and chthonian deity, the primary component of his

orgiastic rites was intoxication. And so on through the alphabet. Whetherthere are any common denominators among these related cults has long beena source of disagreement among Hellenists (Harrison 1922:424-5; Rohde

1925:259-260). In short, the Dionysian concept has always had many differ-ent meanings. Its polymorphism simply conforms to the processes of innova-tion that artifacts and mentifacts observe everywhere. Since tools change and

vary largely as the rest of the culture changes and varies, these innovationscan often serve as diagnostic traits of a culture.

THE VALUESYSTEM

We can study the innovations in a culture in order to discover the valuesof that culture. The acceptance and rejection of an innovation involve

choices, and values are the criteria used for making these choices. Thus the

vicissitudes of the Dionysian concept mark the things that anthropologistsvalue.

They reveal first of all the prevalence of ambivalent values in anthropology.That is, most of the values that lead to acceptance also lead to rejection. The

Dionysian innovation is accepted for the same reasons it is rejected. For ex-

ample, Driver (1961:536) accepts the innovation "as far as it goes" because itfits the life ways of the Plains Indians, while Lowie (1937:279) rejects the in-novation because it does not fit Plains culture. Both Driver and Lowie in

reaching opposite conclusions invoke the same criterion: let the concept fit the

culture. As we shall see, most of the criteria that anthropologists use for mak-ing choices-most of their values-are ambivalent in that they lead to contra-

dictory choices. This also means that widely differing choices are based on acommon set of values.

The correspondencebetween concepts and cultures is itself valued through-out the anthropological tradition. Some anthropologists accept the Dionysianinnovation because they recognize a correspondence between culture and

personality as expressed in such concepts as introvert and extravert, Other

anthropologists reject the innovation because they donot see such a correspond-ence.

Anthropologists also value wholes. The Dionysian innovation is most often

accepted because it applies to cultures as wholes. This is its greatest attractionin the popular accounts about anthropology. The innovation is also rejectedbecause it does not apply to cultures as wholes. This is the most persistentcharge leveled against the innovation, and it was fired against Benedict's

original papers. Radin, who urged that anthropology study any part of aculture only for its relevance to the whole culture (1932:27), rejected the




Dionysian innovation because it "dogmatically includes and excludes in an

unjustifiable and arbitrary manner" (1932:179). The concept is selective. It

separates and divides the parts from the whole. Thus Barnouw (1949) even

charged that the concept is atomistic. Both the acceptors and the rejectorsprize the whole, and impugn the complementary disvalues of selectivity and

atomism. Some anthropologists (e.g. Lowie 1937:288-291; 1940:383-390) ac-

cept the ideal of seeing cultures as wholes, but doubt that it is a practical or

attainable ideal. Dionysian may have a meaning that gives it a high intrinsic

value, yet it may be difficult to apply, giving it a low extrinsic value.

Anthropologists also value differences.Popular accounts accept the Diony-sian innovation because it serves to contrast cultures. It emphasizes cultural

differences: somepeoples

areDionysian

and others are not. Thisemphasison distinctions is also a popular ground for rejecting the innovation: the

Dionysian concept ignores differences. For example, the Plains Indians and the

Kwakiutl are not Dionysian in the same way. Moreover, no one tribe is alto-

gether Dionysian. "Extravagant sensation seeking . . . is not the configurationof Plains culture, for equally strong, if not so spectacular, is another web of

traits ... " (Hoebel 1956:179). This devotion to differences leads to a scepti-cism about cultural similarities and generalizations. Common denominators

are based on simplification, the blurring of distinctions, and over-simplifica-

tion is a common charge against Benedict, and by Benedict against Spengler,and by others against the concept as a whole. The simplicity of the Dionysian

concept contributed to its popular acceptance, but for professional acceptanceit had to be qualified. Its simplicity also permitted the concept to be inter-

preted in various ways and this led to its ambiguity.

Differences, selectivity, and simplification are of course matters of degree.

Anthropologists show a high regard for such degrees, whether they accept or

reject the innovation. Driver (1961:536) accepted Benedict's innovation "as

far as it goes"; Kroeber (1935, 1955) said it does not go far enough; and Lowie

(1937:279) said it goes too far. Anthropologists value degrees as well asdifferences.

They also value consistency. Most acceptors like the Dionysian innovation

because it gives the various traits of a culture coherence and consistency. It

makes a culture hang together. Both the acceptors and the rejectors look for

consistency, but they look for it in different places. The acceptors look for it

mainly in the cultures, while the rejectors look for it more in the approach to

cultures. This leads them to opposite conclusions. Thus the ambivalence of

consistency,as of

manyother

values,is often a

corollaryof

ambiguity. Manyrejectorsmaintain that the criteriafor selecting traits and for interpreting them

are not constant and consistent from one culture to another. Therefore they

reject the Dionysian innovation with the popular complaint that it involves

artistic perception rather than a rigorous methodology. The innovation is

also rejected because it overstresses consistency. It makes a culture appear too

rigidly structured. The rejectors' concern for consistency is tempered bytheir devotion to differences and their regard for degrees.

Finally, many principles are valued by the anthropological culture as a




whole, but some are valued by only one or another segment of the culture.

For example, the innovation is sometimes rejected on the ground that it is

static. Dionysian cultures "spring, fully grown, from history like Minerva

from Jupiter's head" (Nadel 1937). Like any of the Utopias from Plato'sRepublic on, Dionysian cultures have no history. The concept does not explainwhat gives rise to a Dionysian way of life. These rejectors value causality and

dynamics in anthropological descriptions and analyses. All segments of the

culture do not value dynamics equally, and the acceptors tend to ignore it.

These values have all been identified by analyzing the acceptances and

rejections of one innovation. This method may reveal only one kind of value.

Here it reveals such values as the devotion to differencesand degrees, and the

high regard for wholes and consistency. It has not revealed how anthropolo-

gists value such things as bravery, reputation, and power. It may be thatwhen anthropologists discuss their own mentifacts they are only concerned

with methodological ideals and avoid social ones. The method of analysis that

is used here can, however, be applied in different cultures and the results

compared. Are Samoan values as ambivalent as these anthropological ones?

Do the Eskimo have as high a regard for wholes?

ROLEAND STATUSGROUPINGS

Theforegoing analysis considered the values leading to the acceptanceand rejection of the Dionysian concept, but it did not consider who accepts

and who rejects. To that end we can analyze the contexts of explicit statements

on the Dionysian innovation in the anthropological literature. This also in-

volves the more delicate task of noting those contexts where the concept mighthave been used but was not used. In these cases the innovation was probably

rejected, for it is unlikely that the writers were unfamiliar with it. It is particu-

larly difficult to investigate such rejections, for the innovation can be

quietly ignored without explanation. Nevertheless, this procedure reveals

several sets of behavioral moieties that crisscross the anthropological culture.There is a chameleon-like quality in anthropological writings. The same

anthropologists who accept the Dionysian innovation when they write a popu-lar account about anthropology, reject it when they write a researchstudy in

anthropology. They discuss it in almost all introductory textbooks, but al-most never in professional journals. Although the Dionysian innovation wasmade in two research publications (Benedict 1930, 1932), the term is conspicu-ous by its absence in practically all research studies afterwards. It does not

appear in the indexes of the AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST, where such other

terms as "folk-urban" and "themes" are listed. It is not indexed in other

anthropological journals. Nor has the concept been used heuristically for fur-ther research, although comparable innovations such as "cultural focus" havebeen used as a guide for new inquiries (e.g. Wheat 1954). The fact that the

Dionysian concept may be used by an anthropologist in a textbook, but not

in a monograph or article, is a cultural phenomenon that calls for an explana-tion. It suggests a behavioral moiety based on roles.

It is also evident that there are status moieties in anthropology. Research




studies are written for a peer group, while popular accounts are written for a

patron group. The peer group includes professional anthropologists, such as

professors, curators, and other initiates. The anthropological patrons include

students, the public, and professionals in other fields. As patrons they are boththe sponsors and the clients of the peer group. Of course, both the peer and the

patron groups include a range of statuses. The patrons, for example, rangefrom housewives who happen to pick up a book about anthropology to profes-sional sociologists for whom anthropology is a collateral field.

The popular accounts are written by peers for patrons. Thus they reveal

only the peers' perceptions of the patrons. This is the way the patrons will be

considered here, although it is like describing the Navaho from a Hopi concep-tion of them. The

peerswill

speakfor themselves.

The historical inventory of statements about the Dionysian concept reveals

that the peers and patrons have different expectations of anthropology. It is

clear that the Dionysian concept meets the expectations of the patrons and

not of the peers. Differences between the two groups in their approach to seven

anthropological concepts and methods were noted: ethnocentrism; cultural

relativism; explanations; values; personal identifications; academic identifi-

cations; and technical analyses. The approach of the patrons to each of these

items is compatible with their acceptance of the Dionysian innovation, and the

approach of the peers with their rejection of it.The patrons often study other cultures in order to answer questions about

their own culture. All popular accounts state this as an aim of anthropology.Thus the patrons often look to anthropology for cultural alternatives to their

own way of life, and they tend to regard the polygyny of the Paiute with an

ethnocentric interest. The peers generally have a less personal and less ethno-

centric interest in other cultures. Their monographs and articles generally

study other cultures for their own sake. This point requires a full elaboration

and it is the topic of the next section of this paper where the Dionysian innova-

tion is related to this ethnocentric interest.The personal interest in cultural alternatives leads most patrons to become

concerned with cultural relativism. They generally understand cultural rela-

tivism to mean that each culture has its own standards of values (cf. Hersko-

vits 1955:348-366; Honigmann 1959:113-117). It is research rather than

personal alternatives that leads the peers to become concerned with cultural

relativism (cf. Beals and Hoijer 1959:674-5). The peers generally understand

cultural relativism to mean that cultural laws have limited generality. This is

a different kind of relativism. Thus thepeers

tend to look for constants and

variables, while the patrons tend to look for the uniqueness or difference of

each culture. The Dionysian innovation describesa unique and distinctive wayof life. This is more what the patrons expect of anthropology than what the

peers expect.The patrons also prefer a high ratio of explanation to information. They

always call for more interpretation and commentary. The peers often feel that

if there is enough information it will explain itself. They always call for more

data. This is illustrated by the proportion of description to interpretation in




popular accounts and in journals. Proportionally, the popular accounts havemuch less description. The primary aim of the Dionysian concept is to explainand interpret the behavior of various tribes. This makes it attractive for the

patrons and precocious for the peers.When the peers write for patrons, they assume that the patrons are inter-

ested in anthropology as part of a quest for personal values and purposes.Patrons commonly seek explanations in terms of good and better, or interpreta-tions expressed through goals and human destiny. Within the peer group,

however, values are often thought to be elusive and difficult to investigate

scientifically. Peers sometimes believe that explanations in terms of goals are

teleological, which assumes that the future determines the present. This theyconsider to be a pre-scientific direction of inquiry. The peers prefer to look for

explanations in causes, which assumes instead that the past determines the

present. One of the greatest attractions of the Dionysian innovation is its

value oriented formulations and goal directed explanations. These value orien-

tations distinguish the Dionysian concept from such other typologies asSteward's formative cultures or Mead's event-triggered and calendrically-

triggered cultures.

Patrons who come to anthropology in pursuit of values can identify them-selves with the Dionysian way of life, whether that way is perceived as a

sensate extraversion or an introverted transcendentalism. They can recognizemany of the Dionysian traits in themselves. They can imagine themselves

playing Dionysian roles and acting extravagantly, passionately, and indi-

vidualistically. Moreover, the Dionysian concept gives these traits coherence.Patrons can appreciate that this unity of characteristics can give meaning to aman's life. Thus the patrons can see that the Dionysian path to self-fulfill-ment is a possible model for themselves. The peers are less concerned with

finding these kinds of personal identifications in anthropology. Instead theygenerally seek to identify themselves with their peers and with scholarship

and research.The popular accounts about anthropology also suggest that patrons tend

to identify anthropology with sociology and psychology. These fields are knownfor such typologies as sensate, introvert, and extravert. The Dionysian conceptin anthropology supports these academic identifications. The peers, however,are not so ready to identify their academic domain with these behavioralsciences. They tend to emphasize the distinguishing characteristics of anthro-

pology and to separate cultural analyses from social and psychological ones.With this they reject such typologies as sensate and introvert, and

they rejectthe Dionysian typology.In general, patrons do not turn to anthropology in pursuit of technical

analyses involving subsistence patterns, kinship systems, or material cul-ture. Most popularaccounts either explain that they do not present these topicsfully, or they excuse themselves for presenting them. The peers are oftenimmersed in these kinds of analyses. Instead of broad concepts that may be

esthetically satisfying, the peers seek conclusions warranted by scientificevidence. The Dionysian concept is not formulated from this kind of tech-




nical evidence. It is not based, for example, on the ratio of movement responsesto shading responses in a Rorschach. Thus the Dionysian innovation is againmore acceptable to the patrons than to the peers.

These differences in the perceptions of ethnocentrism and cultural relativ-ism, of values and explanations, of personal and academic identifications,and of technical analyses reflect the differences between two status moieties:

patrons and peers. These status moieties also explain the role moieties within

the peer group. The same anthropologists accept the Dionysian innovation

when they write for patrons, and reject it when they write for fellow anthro-

pologists. These moieties are not like the structural divisions of the Toda and

the Iroquois, but they are organizational divisions within the anthropologicalculture (cf. Radcliffe-Brown 1952:11). Naturally, the social

organizationof

anthropology involves much more than these particular divisions and group-

ings. But whatever its social organization may involve, it is important to the

historian and ethnographer of this culture. Statuses and roles define and regu-late the behavior of the anthropologist. They entail obligations to act in

appropriate ways, and they permit others to anticipate appropriate behavior.

Without an analysis of role and status groupings, the traditions and changes in

anthropology would be incomprehensible.

RELATION TO THE CULTURALENVIRONMENT

As there are these subsystems within the anthropological culture, so

anthropology itself is a subsystem in a larger cultural setting. Anthropologyis that part of a broader cultural tradition that studies other cultural tradi-

tions. When its own cultural environment changes, anthropology and the

Dionysian tradition change with it. Therefore, anthropology is likely to ex-

hibit some ethnocentric orientations.

The relation between a culture and its setting is often indicated by its

artifacts. A Paiute seed grinding stone indicates clearly if not completely how

the Paiute were related to their environment. Similarly, the Dionysian menti-fact indicates how the anthropological culture is related to its environment.

The Dionysian concept is an example of what Boas (1902) called an esoteric

doctrine. These doctrines are ethnologically significant because they express"the reaction of the best minds in the community to the general cultural en-

vironment."

The publication of Patterns of Culture in 1934 introduced the Dionysianartifact to patrons. The book was a phenomenal success. It sold over half a

millioncopies

intwenty years (Ray 1956).

It owed apart

of this success to

the anthropological peer group. They promoted the book by assigning it in

classes, and even its rejectors recommended it widely (e.g. Linton 1952).

Nevertheless, the book really succeeded because the patrons felt that it met

their personal needs. It related anthropology to the life and problems of the

day. Patterns of Culturein general, and the Dionysian concept in particular,

explained and illuminated many aspects of American life in 1934.

After the title page of Patterns of Culturethere is an inscription page which

bears a single proverb from Digger Indian lore: "In the beginning God gave




to every people a cup of clay, and from this cup they drank their life." After

an introductory chapter, the book begins by putting this epigraph in its

historical setting. In the beginning the Digger Indians had a cup of clay, but

now their cup is broken. "Our cup is broken. Those things that had givensignificance to the life of (the people) were gone, and with them the shape and

meaning of their life . .. There were other cups of living left, and they held

perhaps the same water, but the loss irreparable" (Benedict 1934:22). This

was not only an epigraph for the Digger Indians and for Patterns of Culture:

it was also a keynote of American life in 1934.

The depression shocked the faith that Americans had in their own tradi-

tions. Coolidge had said that the business of America is business, but now

business was bankrupt. At the same time, droughts turned the land of plentyinto dustbowls and wastelands. Okies and Arkies and 15 million unemployed:their cup was broken. Perhaps there vjere other cups of living left-in New

Deal reforms, or across the sea in fascist demagogues and communist revolu-

tionaries-but the loss was irreparable.When the cup was broken, norms were shattered. A fundamental premise

of Benedict's book was that norms and customs differ from place to place and

time to time. Economic competition, for example, is not a basic trait of Human

Nature; among the Zufii it is an aberrant form of behavior. "The statistically

determined normal on the Northwest Coast would be far outside the extremeboundaries of abnormality in the Pueblos" (Benedict 1934:254). In other

words, norms arevariables. This variety of norms calls for tolerance, an accept-ance of cultural differences,and even of individual abnormalities. If some indi-viduals are misfits in their society, they "are, as Sapir phrases it, 'alienatedfrom an impossible world' " (Benedict 1934:270). Given the opportunity, how-

ever, they can make a significant contribution to the life of their people.This spoke to the America of 1934. Following the upheaval of the first

World War, Harding had inaugurated the 'twenties with the solecism of re-

turning to normalcy, meaning a return to the traditional ways of the goodold days. This ideal or normalcy came tumbling down with the crash. In theold time traditions, being out of work was a social abnormality and a personaldisgrace, but in the depression it became almost normal and accepted. Fifteenmillion unemployed were "alienated from an impossible world." The optimismthat had been a normal part of the American dream became an abnormal fear,even a Roosevelt fear of fear itself,-and Benedict offeredthe fearful Dobuansas a mirrorfor America. The country could not return to normalcy. That cupwas broken. So it turned to reformsinstead.

Benedict's Zufii, Dobuans, and Kwakiutl are folk cultures. The appear-ance of her descriptions of them complemented a renewed interest in folksocieties throughout America. The country had become disenchanted withits traditional symbols of success and the good life. Time magazine's man ofthe year in 1929 had been Walter P. Chrysler, and in 1930, Owen D. Young,but in 1931 it named Mahatma Ghandi (Wecter 1948:2). The millionaireswere succeeded by a man who wore no shoes and represented a folk society.

The depression increased the interest in the little man and the under-




privileged. There was a heightened concern for minorities, for the first manfired and the last man hired. One of these minorities was the aged who were

memorialized in Life Begins at Forty, the Townsend Plan, and the Social

Security Act. Another minority, the American Indian, received new recogni-tion and a New Deal in the Wheeler-Howard Act in 1934. The Okies and

Arkies of the dustbowl, the poor Whites of Tobacco Road, the poor Negroesof Porgy's Catfish Row became symbols of the cultural diversity of America.

Regionalism became a byword in social studies and literature. WPA writers

and TVA planners cultivated grass roots and the concern for poor agrarianareas. A country that had awakened to its own folk was ready for the Zufii,the Dobuans, and the Kwakiutl. It was also ready for the Dionysian innova-

tion.

Benedict was explicit about the relevance of her folk cultures to American

society. "The understanding we need of our own cultural processes can most

economically be arrived at by a d6tour . . . I have chosen three primitivecivilizations . . . " (1934:56). One of these civilizations was the Kwakiutl

whom she labelled as "typical Dionysians" and as "a parody on our own

society."The parody is graphic and sweeping. Basic to both the Kwakiutl and the

American cultures is a "will to superiority" that is rooted in economic compe-

tition. The potlatch of the Kwakiutl economy is the conspicuous consumptionof the American economy. These forms of displaying wealth symbolize that

both societies are made up of status seekers and self-glorifiers.Both societies

are dedicated to rugged individualism and free enterprise. All this is part of

the Dionysian way of life as Benedict defined that way.In the America of 1934, however, the Dionysian way, as Benedict defined

it, was the way of the past. The Dionysian ways of the American frontier had

ended in Oklahoma in 1890, and the Dionysian ways of the American economyhad ended on Wall Street in 1929. The symbols of American culture changed.Social planning replaced rugged individualism. A managed economy replacedfree enterprise. Welfare legislation replaced laissez faire. The recovery pro-

gram instituted broad controls. It regulated the banks and stock exchanges.The AAA created a kind of agrariancollectivism. The NRA established indus-

trial syndicates. Lacerated by the depression, the country sought social

solidarity more than individual autonomy. The new emphasis on restraint

and controls and the de-emphasis on individualism marked a transition in the

character of the American culture, from a Kwakiutl to a Zufii configuration.

Of course, the American culture, or any other, has never been consistentlyApollonian or Dionysian in these terms. The men who symbolized the Diony-sian orientations of the 'twenties-Chrysler, Young, Hoover-exhibited an

Apollonian restraint and formality in public relations. Likewise, the peoplewho symbolized the Apollonian orientations of the depression years-theRoosevelts-exhibited personally a Dionysian flamboyance. The repeal of

prohibition, the epidemic of candid cameras, the swing to jazz, John Dillinger,

Jean Harlow, these were not Apollonian aspects of life in the 'thirties. At

best there were conflicts between the Apollonian and the Dionysian. For




Benedict and for most of the social scientists of that time, the fundamental

conflict was between the older Dionysian individualism and the newer Apol-lonian social consciousness. In this conflict, Benedict placed herself firmly on

the side of the Apollonians.She did not hesitate to take a side. Indeed she made a strong plea for

"passing judgments upon the dominant traits of our own civilization" to

"cast up their cost in social capital." For some of these traits "the price is

great, and the social order may not be able to pay the price" (1934: 248-250).Her specific judgments were unequivocal. The Kwakiutl ethos "is suffi-

ciently close to the attitudes of our own culture to be intelligible to us and

we have a definite vocabulary with which we may discuss it. The megalo-maniac

paranoidtrend is a definite

dangerin our

society. . .

Rivalryis

notoriously wasteful. It ranks low in the scale of human values. It is a

tyranny from which, once it is encouraged in any culture, no man may free

himself. The wish for superiority is gargantuan; it can never be satisfied. The

contest goes on forever . . . In Kwakiutl institutions, such rivalry reaches its

final absurdity ... The social waste is obvious. It is just as obvious in the

obsessive rivalry of Middletown where houses are built and clothing boughtand entertainments attended that each family may prove that it has not been

left out of the game. It is an unattractive picture" (1934:222, 247).

For the American public of the 'thirties, Benedict's judgments had theweight of anthropological science behind them, and she gave solid supportto the popular values of the day. Thus the Dionysian innovation related

anthropology to the larger cultural setting, and Patterns of Culturewon greatpopular acceptance.

As a paperback Patterns of Culture has sold a million and a quarter copiesby 1964 (Dempsey 1964). In 1964, however, the book does not bear the same

meaning that it did in 1934. In 1964, it is read more for its overall thesis of

patterning, for its eloquent interpretations of the Zufii, Dobuans, and the

Kwakiutl, and for its prestige as a classic. It is read less for its application ofthe Dionysian concept to life in the United States. Today, the Dionysianinnovation is still popular in textbooks, although its acceptors have modifiedit radically. As the culture changes and its environment changes, the toolsthat relate the one to the other also change. For a while old tools may survivein the inertia of cultural lag. One day, however, the Dionysian concept mayno longer be meaningful in the larger cultural setting. Then it may join thebutton hook and the pen wiper in a museum of the obsolete.

EXTENSIONS NDCONCLUSIONS

Any mentifact can be informative, even a minor one like the Dionysianconcept of the anthropological culture. In this paper the Dionysian innovationhas served as an example and a point of departure. We can extend the analysisof this mentifact to others in order to expose other values, other status group-ings, and other parts of the culture. For example, the Apollonian innovationhas been more widely accepted than the Dionysian one. There is a far greater




literature on the Apollonianism of the Pueblos than on the Dionysianism of

the other Indians of North America. Other conceptual artifacts, such as

"animism," "relativism," and "structure," are also rich ores for the historian

and ethnographer of anthropology. They are what Lovejoy called "unit ideas"in the history of a tradition (1936:3). They are for anthropology what "prim-itivism" and "the great chain of being" are in the tradition of European

speculative thought. For anthropology, however, they are not ideas to be

analyzed philosophically, but mentifacts to be studied culturally. They are

products and functions of social organization, value system, and other partsof the culture.

Our analyses of processes, such as innovation, acceptance, and rejection,can also be extended. Benedict

herself,for

example, rejecteda

major partof

her own Dionysian innovation. In one of her original papers (1932) she estab-

lished a realist-nonrealist division. Although Plains culture is Dionysian and

the Pueblo culture is Apollonian, they are both realist cultures. The Plains and

non-Pueblo Southwest are both Dionysian, but one is realist and the other

nonrealist. "The two categories operate at a different level and cross-section

each other." This realist-nonrealist antithesis does not appear in Patterns of

Culture, and it has completely disappeared from the literature. What values

did it violate? Perhaps typologies in the sciences are like species in nature:

extinction is the rule and immortality the miracle.We can also extend our knowledge of how anthropological innovations are

made. What are the characteristics and circumstances of the innovator? Is

acceptance an anonymous process, or does anthropology maintain sentries at

its gates? And besides acceptance and rejection, the processes of culture changealso include diffusion, competition, and identification. To what extent, for

example, had professional works diffused to the patrons and prepared them

for Benedict's work? In the competiton among anthropological ideas, were

Benedict's ideas, because she was a lady, treated with more respect than

seriousness? When do anthropologists identify themselves with the largerculture and when do they act purely as scholars? Naturally, the history and

culture of anthropology can extend well beyond the study of these particular

processes and mentifacts.

Such studies may make anthropologists more objective, for objectivityincreases as knowledge about the observer's point of view increases. It is

easier, however, to demonstrate that such studies are important because they

apply the methods and hypotheses used in the study of other cultures; and

in applying them, they test them, reformulate them, and foster newmethods

and hypotheses. For example, the present study identified an innovation

within a culture and then analyzed its rejections and acceptances in order to

identify the values that are held in that culture. It also found that most of

the values in this culture are ambivalent. These methods and hypotheses can

be further tested and reformulated in studying other cultures.

The new interest in the history of anthropology gives anthropologists one

more culture to study. We study the culture of anthropology itself, and thereby




we promote the same methods and concerns that we have in studying the

Dyak, Eyak, or any other culture. We investigate the same general problemsof human behavior.'

NOTE

1I am grateful to Theodore Stern for his helpful reading of the final draft.

REFERENCES CITED

BARNETT, H. G.

1953 Innovation: the basis of cultural change. New York, McGraw-Hill.

BEALS,RALPH . andHARRYHOIJER1959 Introduction to Anthropology. New York, Macmillan. 2nd edition.

BARNOUW, ICTOR

1949 Ruth Benedict: Apollonian and Dionysian. University of Toronto Quarterly18:241-53.

BENEDICT, RUTH

1930 Psychological types in the cultures of the Southwest. Proceedings of the Twenty-third International Congress of Americanists, September 1928. New York. (Re-

printed in Mead 1959:527-81).1932 Configurations of culture in North America. American Anthropologist 34:1-27.

1934 Patterns of culture. Boston and New York, Houghton Miffin.

BOAS,FRANZ

1902 The ethnological significance of esoteric doctrines. Science N.S. 16:872-4 (Re-

printedin

Race, languageand

culture, 1940. New York, Macmillan.)DEMPSEY, DAVID

1964 What's in it for authors? New York Times, January 5, Section 7, Part II, 26-27.

DRIVER, HAROLD E.

1961 Indians of North America. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E.

1961 Anthropology and history. Manchester, University Press.

FARNELJ, LEWIS R.

1909 The cults of the Greek states, Vol. V. Oxford, Clarendon Press.

HARRISON, JANE E.

1922 Prolegomena to the study of Greek religion. Cambridge, University Press. 3rd

edition.

HERSKOVITS, MELVILLE J.

1955 Cultural anthropology. New York, Knopf.

HOEBEL, E. ADAMSON

1956 The nature of culture. In Man, culture, and society, Harry L. Shapiro, editor.New York, Oxford.

1958 Man in the primitive world. New York, McGraw-Hill. 2nd edition.

HONIGMANN, JOHN J.

1959 The world of man. New York, Harper.

HYMES,DELLH.

1962 On studying the history of anthropology. Social Science Research Council, Items16:25-27.

JUNG,C. G.

1923 Psychological types. London, Kegan Paul.

KEESING, FELIX M.

1958 Cultural anthropology. New York, Rinehart.

KROEBER, A. L.

1935 Reviewof Patterns of culture, by Ruth Benedict. American Anthropologist 37:689-90.




1955 History of anthropological thought. In Current anthropology, William L. Thomas,

Jr., ed. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

KROEBER, A. L., and CLYDEKLUCKHOHN

1952 Culture: a critical review of concepts and definitions. Cambridge, Mass., Papers of

the Peabody Museum of American Archeology and Ethnology, Harvard University,

Vol. 47, No. 1.

LINTON,RALPH nd S. W. REED

1952 Anthropology and sociology. In Good reading, Committee on College Reading.

New York, New American Library.

LOvEJOY, RTHUR .1936 The great chain of being. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

LowrE, ROBERTH.

1937 The history of ethnological theory. New York, Rinehart.

1940 An introduction to cultural anthropology. New York, Rinehart.

MEAD,MARGARET1959 An anthropologist at work: writings of Ruth Benedict. Boston, Houghton Mifflin.

MITCHELL,OWLAND., JR.1962 On studying the history of anthropology: reflections of a historian. Social Science

Research Council, Items 16:27-29.

NADEL,S. F.

1937 The typological approach to culture. Character and Personality 5:267-84.

NIETSCHE,RIEDRICH

1872 The birth of tragedy. In Philosophy of Nietzsche. New York, Modern Library.

RADIN,PAUL

1933 The method and theory of ethnology: an essay incriticism. New

York,McGraw-

Hill.

RAY, VERN

1956 Rejoinder (to: Boas once more, by Robert H. Lowie). American Anthropologist

58:164-170.

RADCLIFFE-BROWN,. R.

1952 Structure and function in primitive society. Glencoe, The Free Press.

ROHDE,ERWIN

1925 Psyche: the cult of souls and belief in immortality among the Greeks. New York,

Harcourt Brace.

SCHAPERA,.

1962 Should anthropologists be historians? Journal of the Royal Anthropological Insti-

tute 92:143-156.

SMITH,M. G.

1962 History and social anthropology. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute

92:73-85.

TITIEV,MISCHA

1954 The science of man. New York, Holt.

WECTER, IXON

1948 The age of the great depression, 1929-1941. New York, Macmillan.

WHEAT, OEBEN

1954 A preliminary test of Herskovits' hypothesis of cultural focus in relation to culturalchange. University of Colorado Studies in Anthropology 4:61-77.

WILLIAMS,LGIN

1947 Anthropology for the common man. American Anthropologist 49:84-90.

The Dionysian Innovation

Documents

Transcript of The Dionysian Innovation