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8/2/2019 THE DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND INSURGENCY USAID POLICY BUREAU FOR POLICY, PLA
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BUREAU FOR POLICYPLANNINGANDLEARNING
THEDEVELOPMENTRESPONSE
TO
VIOLENTEXTREMISMANDINSURGENCY
PuttingPrinciplesintoPractice
USAIDPOLICY
SEPTEMBER2011
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USAIDTHEDEVELOPMENTRESPONSETOVIOLENTEXTREMISMAND
INSURGENCY
POLICY
SEPTEMBER2011
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MessagefromtheAdministrator USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgenc
MESSAGEFROMTHEADMINISTRATORPresidentObamasNationalSecurityStrategyandGlobalDevelopmentPolicybothstressthatsuccessfuldevelopmentisessentialtoadvancingournationalsecurityobjectives.Consistentwiththesebroaderstrategicframeworks,thispol-icyprovidesUSAIDwithaclearmandateandspecificguidanceonthedevelopmentresponsetoviolentextremismandinsurgency.Thispolicycomesatacriticaltime;develop-mentassistanceisincreasinglycalleduponasanintegralcomponentoftheinteragencyresponsetocomplexnationalsecurityanddevelopmentchallenges.InlinewithourUSAIDForwardreformeffort,thispolicyrep-resentsanongoingdrivetouseourlongexperienceandvastknowledgebasetoprovidecrucialthoughtleadershiptothedevelopmentfield.ThepolicyisnotdefinedsimplybyourinvolvementinrecentconflictslikeAfghanistanandIraq.ItbuildsupontheAgencysexperienceincountriesseizedwithviolentextremismandinsurgencyinotherpartsofAsiaand
theMiddleEast,aswellasAfricaandLatinAmerica.ClarifyingUSAIDsroleinthecontextofviolentextremismandinsurgencydoesnotcomewithoutcontroversy. Someholdstrongviewsonwhetherdevelopmentagenciesgener-allyandUSAIDinparticularshouldengageontheseissues.Programmingresourcestorespondtoviolentextrem-ismandinsurgencyrequirestheAgencytoassumegreaterinstitutionalandoperationalrisk.ButastheWorldBanksrecent2011WorldDevelopmentReportmadeclear,thecostsofconflictdevelopmentally,economicandhumanaresimplytoocostlytoignore.Bynotconfrontingwherewecanthosedevelopmentrelatedfactorsthatdriveconflictand,specifictothispolicy,violentextremismandinsurgency,wewillignoretheplightofmanyaroundtheworldingreatneed.
Alreadytoday,closeto60percentofStateandUSAIDsfor-eignassistancegoesto50countriesthatareinthemidstof,ortryingtopreventconflictorstatefailure.Thispolicyiscriticaltosupportingourstaffonthefrontlinesofourgreatestnationalsecurityanddevelopmentchallenges.OurAgencysrenewedemphasisonlearning,innovationandrisk-takingmeanswewillstudyandimproveourworkinexactlythoseareasthathaveprovenmostdifficult.
Withthispolicy,theAgencyanditsfieldMissionscannowrelyonaclearsetofcommonconceptsanddefinitions,engagementcriteria,andprogrammingprinciplestosupportandguideourwork,enhanceitsimpactandensurewedeliversustainableresults.Mostimportantly,itsimplementa-
tionwillbecharacterizedbyclosecooperationwithinteragency,international,andlocalpartnersaswecontinue
toaddressthesepressingglobalchallengeswhilelearningfromongoingefforts.
RajivShahAdministratorU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment
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USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency Acknowledgements
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
APolicyTask Team(PTT), chairedbyMelissaBrownfromtheBureauofPolicy,PlanningandLearning(PPL),producedUSAIDsPolicyonTheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtrem-ismandInsurgency.ThePTTconsistedofsevenindividualsselectedfromacrosstheAgencyfortheirrecognizedknowl-edgeandexpertiseontheseissues:
BrianBacon(BureauofPolicy,PlanningandLearning), LisaChandonnet-Bedoya(BureauforDemocracy,Con-
flictandHumanitarianAssistance(DCHA)/OfficeofConflictMitigationandManagement),
StaciaGeorge(DCHA/OfficeofTransitionInitiatives), AngelaMartin(AfricaBureau), CraigMullaney(OfficeofAfghanistanandPakistan
Affairs), Leah Werchick(DCHA/OfficeofTransitionInitiatives),
and OliverWilcox(MiddleEastandAsiaBureaus).
TheseUSAIDstaffworkedintensivelyandcollaborativelyinservicetothiscriticalpolicywork,andwillcontinuetoserveasimportantresourcesinthepolicysimplementation.ThePTTwaslaunchedinSeptember2010withaUSAIDEvi-denceSummitthatbroughttogetherrepresentativesfromtheinteragency,donor,andacademiccommunitieswhospecializeinviolentextremismandinsurgency-related researchandevalua-
tion.ThePTTconsultedwithUSAIDexpertsservingbothinWashingtonandthefield. OutsideofUSAID,thePTTcon-ductedconsultationsandbriefingswithkeyinteragencypartners, interestedCongressionalstaff, andexternalexperts.Theircontributionssubstantiallyimprovedandinformedthefinalpolicy.
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ExecutiveSummary USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency
EXECUTIVESUMMARY
ThispolicyonTheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgencyisthefirstofitskindproducedbyUSAID. Itspur-poseistoprovideapolicyframeworkthatUSAIDcanusetoimprovetheeffectivenessofitsdevelopmenttoolsinresponding
toviolentextremismandinsurgency,aswellasitscapacitytointeractconstructivelywithitsinteragencyandotherpartnersin
thesechallengingenvironments.ThepolicywillalsohelpUSAIDfocusmoretightlyoncapacitybuildingandsustainabilitywhicharecriticaltoourlong-termsecurityanddevelopmentgoals.ThepolicydefinestermsnecessaryforasharedunderstandingwithinUSAIDofthesechallengesanddifferentiatesatagenerallevelbetweenadevelopmentresponsetoviolentextremismandadevelopmentresponsetoinsurgency.Atthesametime,itacknowledgesthateachsituationisdifferentandthatthese
termsandthedevelopmentresponsewillneedtobedefinedandunderstoodintheirparticularcontextandguidedbyU.S.foreignpolicy.Buildingonagrowingknowledgebase,thepolicyidentifiesthosefactors,ordrivers,thatcanfavortheriseofviolentextremismorinsurgencyaswellasthosethatcaninfluencetheradicalizationofindividuals. Broadly speaking, these include structuralpush fac-
tors,includinghighlevelsofsocialmarginalizationandfragmentation;poorlygovernedorungovernedareas;govern-mentrepressionandhumanrightsviolations;endemiccorruptionandeliteimpunity;andculturalthreatperceptions. Simultane-ously,pullfactorsthathaveadirectinfluenceonindividuallevelradicalizationandrecruitmentincludeaccesstomaterialresources,socialstatusandrespectfrompeers;asenseofbelonging,adventure,andself-esteemorpersonalempowerment
thatindividualsandgroupsthathavelongviewedthemselvesasvictimizedandmarginalizedcanderivefromthefeelingthattheyaremakinghistory;andtheprospectofachievinggloryandfame.ThepolicyidentifieswhatUSAIDhaslearnedstrategicallyandprogrammaticallyabouttheroleofdevelopmentassistancetocounterthesedriversandaffectacountrysdevelopment.
InthecontextoftheU.S.GlobalDevelopmentPolicyandtheQuadrennialDiplomacyandDevelopmentReview(QDDR)onenhancingcivilianpower,thepolicyidentifieswaysthatUSAIDcanworkwithitsinteragencypartnersandamplifythedevelop-mentvoicewithintheUSG. Italsoemphasizestheimportanceoflocalpartnershipwithcommittedstakeholdersandenhancedengagementwithbilateralcounterpartsandmultilateralinstitu-
tions.Thepolicyaffirmstheimportanceofthedevelopmentdiscipline
to,andUSAIDsdistinctandcriticalrolein,addressingthesecriti-calnationalsecurityanddevelopmentchallenges.ThisincludesUSAIDsfocusonsustainabilityandbuildingownershipandcapacityatalllevels. Ifappliedcorrectly,adevelopmentresponsecanserveasaneffectivetooltoaddresstheseissues.Specifically,thepolicydirectstheAgencyto:(1)Considerkeyengagementcriteriaattheearliest
stageofprogramdevelopment,recognizingthatthedevelopmentresponseispartofabroaderUSGeffort.Thesecriteriainclude: anassessmentofthedriversofviolentextremismand
insurgency,hostcountry(governmentandpopula-tion)commitment,andpotentialdevelopmentresponses;
adeterminationofanappropriateandcriticalrolefordevelopmentassistance;
adeterminationthatanadequatelevelofsecurityexiststopermitimplementingpartnerstooperateandcommunicatewithUSAID;
identificationofrisksto the Agency, ourpartners andrelateddevelopmentinvestments,aswellasaplantomitigaterisk;and,
considerationofprogram,management,andresourceplans.
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USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency ExecutiveSummary
(2)Applyacorebodyofprogramprinciplesatallstagesoftheprogrammingcycle.Thefollowingprinci-pleswillguideUSAIDsdesignandimplementationofdevelopment
programming
targeted
at
violent
extrem-
ismandinsurgency.TheseareinformedbyourknowledgebaseaswellasUSAIDsbroaderstabilizationexperience.ForAnalysis,Planning,andDesign Focusonthedriversofviolentextremismandinsurgency.
USAIDwillidentifyandprioritizedrivers,setclearobjectives,designafocusedsetofinterventions,andsystematicallyevaluaterelatedmeasuresofprogressandimpact.
Promoteinclusivecountryownership.USAIDwillengageawiderangeofcountrystakeholderscommittedtoaddressingtheseissues.
Exerciseselectivity.USAIDwillinvestwhereitcanachievethegreatestimpact,avoidprogramsthatcouldhaveadestabilizingeffect,andtargetresourcesdemo-graphically,sectorally,andgeographically.
Takeacoordinatedandintegratedapproach. Inclosecoordinationwithinteragencyandotherpartners,USAIDwillcoordinateandintegratesuchprogramswith
other
assistance
efforts.
Tailorandcoordinatecommunications.USAIDwill
effectivelycommunicatelocalownershipandpartner-shiptoachieveprogramobjectives.
Thinklocallyandbringanentrepreneurialapproach.USAIDwillspecificallytailorprogrammingtothelocalenvironment,scaleupsuccessfulapproaches,anddis-continueineffectiveinvestments.
Considertransnationalstrategies.USAIDwilltakeadvantageofappropriateopportunitiesforcross-bor-derorregionalprogrammingandcoordination,asthedynamics
driving
extremism
and
insurgency
often
crossnationalboundaries.
ForOperationalandManagementResponsiveness Flexibility,agilityandprocurementspeed.USAIDwill
increaseitscapabilitytoprocurerapidly,adjustascon-ditionschange,andexpanditsworkwithandthroughlocalpartners.
Intensiveprogrammanagement.USAIDwillensurestaffaretrainedandequippedtoprovidehands-onmanagementandoversightrequiredforresults.
Innovation,evaluation,andlearning.USAIDwillpro-moteinnovation,createmechanismsforon-goingreviewandadaptation,andactivelysharelessonslearned.
Informed
risk-taking
and
experimentation.
USAID
will
encouragestafftotakerisks,informedbythebestavailableinformationandmitigationpractices.
(3) EstablishandempoweraSteeringCommitteetooverseethepolicysimplementation,providetechnicalleader-ship andsupport, particularlyto Missions, drive USAIDknowledgemanagement,andsupportAgencyandinteragencyplanning,strategyandcoordination.Thispolicywillbefollowedbyimplementationguidelinesandasystematic
approach
for
knowledge
management,
staff
training
andmentorship.
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USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency IntroductionandContex
INTRODUCTIONAND1 CONTEXTWheregovernmentsareincapableofmeetingtheircitizensbasicneedsandfulfillingtheirresponsibilitiestoprovidesecuritywithintheirborders,theconsequencesareoftenglobalandmaydirectlythreatentheAmericanpeople.Toadvanceourcommonsecurity,wemustaddresstheunderlyingpoliticalandeconomicdeficitsthatfos-terinstability,enableradicalizationandextremism,andultimatelyunderminetheabilityofgovernmentstomanagethreatswithintheirbordersandtobeourpartnersinaddressingcommonchallenges.
-2010NationalSecurityStrategy3Throughdevelopment,weseektoinvestincountrieseffortstoachievesustainedandbroad-basedeconomicgrowth,whichcreatesopportunitiesforpeopletoliftthemselvesoutofpoverty,awayfromviolentextremismandinstability, andtowardamoreprosperousfuture.
-2010QuadrennialDiplomacyandDevelopmentReview4Theevents,andaftermath,ofSeptember11,2001broughtintosharprelieftheimportanceofviolentextremismandinsurgencypracticedbyal-Qaidaanditsaffiliates.Thesephenomenacon-
tinuetoimpactpartsoftheMiddleEast,SouthAsia,andsub-SaharanAfrica,amongotherregions.Whileal-Qaidaanditsaffili-atesposethegreatestdirectthreattotheUnitedStates,violentextremismandinsurgencypracticedbyotheractorsandmoti-vatedbyotherideologiessuchastheFARCinColombiaarechallengesinnumerousdevelopingcountries.Thedriversandeffectsofviolentextremismandinsurgencyvaryacrosscontext.
Whileintertwinedwithpoliticalandsecuritydynamics,manyofthedriversofviolentextremismandinsurgencyaredevelop-mentchallenges. Indeed,factorssuchassocioeconomicinequalities,repression,corruption,andpoorgovernanceoftencreateanenablingenvironmentforradicalizationandviolentextremism.InformedbyUSAIDsdecadesofexperienceinconflict-affectedcountries,agrowingbodyofknowledge,evidence,andpracticeisemergingfromUSAIDsdevelopmenteffortstocounterviolentextremismandinsurgency. Itaffirmsthateffectivedevelopment
responsestothesephenomenatargetspecificfactorsinspecificsettingsbasedonsounddevelopmentprinciplesandinamannerconsistentwiththeUSGsbroaderpromotionofuniversalvaluesincludingdemocracyandhumanrights.Thispolicy,consistentwithUSAIDForwardprinciples,providesUSAIDwithguidanceonthedevelopmentresponsetoviolentextremismandinsurgencyby:
outliningkeyconcepts,drivers,anddevelopmentresponses;
elaboratingspecificengagementcriteriaandprogram-mingprinciples;and
identifyinginstitutionalenhancementstosupportUSAIDsdevelopmentrole.
ThepolicysintendedresultisthatUSAIDdesignsandimplementseffective,evidence-baseddevelopmentprogrammingtargetingdriversofviolentextremismandinsurgencywhilesystemicallylearningfromandadaptingitsapproaches.DevelopmentisoneofseveraltoolsofU.S.nationalpower.As
the2011NationalStrategyforCounterterrorismstates,Weareengagedinabroad,sustainedandintegratedcampaignthathar-nesseseverytoolof Americanpower-military, civilian, andthepowerofourvalues-togetherwiththeconcertedeffortsofallies,partnersandmultilateralinstitutions.Theseeffortsmustalsobecomplementedbybroadercapabilities,suchasdiplomacydevelopment,strategiccommunications,andthepoweroftheprivatesector.5 ImplementingthispolicyshouldalsoservetostrengthenUSAIDsinteragencyvoiceondevelopmentscontri-butiontoaddressingthesecriticalnationalsecurityissues.3 2010NationalSecurityStrategy,http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf,p.264 QuadrennialDiplomacyandDevelopmentReview,http://www.usaid.gov/qddr/QDDR_FullReportLo.pdf, ExecutiveSummary,p.ix5 NationalStrategyforCounterterrorism, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterror-ism_strategy.pdf,p.2
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KeyConcepts USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency
2 KEYCONCEPTSWhileprecisedefinitionshaveeludedmanyexperts,thispolicydrawsonUSGelaboratedterminologyandUSAIDsownengagementwithexpertstodefineviolentextremismandinsurgency. Definingtermsisnecessaryforasharedunder-standingwithinUSAIDofthesechallengesandpotentialdevelopmentresponsestothem. Atthesametime,eachsitua-
tionisdifferent,andthesetermswillneedtobedefinedandunderstoodin theirparticular contextand guidedby U.S. for-eignpolicy.
Violentextremismreferstoadvocating,engagingin, preparing, or otherwisesupporting ideologicallymotivated orjustifiedviolencetofurthersocial, eco-nomicandpoliticalobjectives.
Insurgencyistheorganizeduseofsubversionandviolencetoseize,nullifyorchallengepoliticalcontrolofaregion. Itisprimarilyapoliticalandterritorialstrug-gle,inwhichbothsidesusearmedforcetocreatespacefortheirpolitical,economic,andinfluenceactivi-
tiestobeeffective. Insurgencyisnotalwaysconductedbyasinglegroupwithacentralized,mili-
tary-stylecommandstructure,butmayinvolvedifferentactorswithvariousaims,looselyconnectedinnetworks.6
Whileviolentextremismandinsurgencysharemanyofthesame drivers, they differin theirdegree of organization, supporbase,anduseofviolence.Violentextremism,forexample,oftemanifestsitselfattheindividuallevelandinhighlyinformal,dif-fusenetworks. Suchnetworksareoftentransnationalincharacter,whileinsurgenciesareoftendelimitedbygeography.Also,violentextremismcanexistinquitestableenvironments,aswellasinsemi-permissiveandnon-permissivecontextsassociatedwithinsurgencies. Incertaincases,violentextremismaninsurgencycanoverlap.
6 U.S.GovernmentCounterinsurgencyGuide, January2009,p. 2.
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KnowledgeBase USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency
Culturalthreatperceptions.Thisincludestheoftendeeplyheld,existentialperceptionofdominationbyanothergroup,theWest,oranoppressiveinternationalorder.
Cultural
drivers
also
include
more
broadly
per-ceivedthreatstorelatedcustomsandvalues,including
genderrolesandeducation.Simultaneously,USAIDhasseenthatpullfactorsareneces-saryforpushfactorstohaveadirectinfluenceonindividual-levelradicalizationandrecruitment. Pullfactorsareassociatedwith
thepersonalrewardswhichmembershipinagroupormove-ment,andparticipationinitsactivities,mayconfer. Suchpotentialbenefitsinclude:
access
to
material
resources,
social
status
and
respect
frompeers;
asenseofbelonging,adventure,andself-esteemorper-sonalempowermentthatindividualsandgroupsthathavelongviewedthemselvesasvictimizedandmargin-alizedcanderivefromthefeelingthattheyaremakinghistory;and,
theprospectofachievinggloryandfame.Socialnetworkscomprisedofrelatives,friends,orneighborscanalsodrawotherssimilarlyaffectedbysocialmarginalizationorfrustrated
expectations
into
the
orbit
of
violent
extremist
ideas
andnetworks. Otherpullfactorsinclude:thepresenceofradicalinstitutionsorvenues,serviceprovisionbyextremistgroups,andextremistinvolvementinillegaleconomicactivity.GapsremaininUSAIDsunderstandingofviolentextremismandinsurgency.Thisincludestheroleofgender.Womenmayactasbothapotentialbrakeon,aswellasadriverof,violentextrem-ism. Somesuggestthatfamilyties,andwomensrolesinfamilies,createpsychologicalbarriersforhusbands,sons,orothermalerelativestojoinviolentextremistgroups. Othershaveasserted
thatwomen
may
serve
as
motivators
for
male
family
members
tojoin. Understandingtheroleofgenderatthelocallevelisfundamental.RespondingtoViolentExtremismandInsurgency9USAIDsresponsestoviolentextremismareoftenpreventiveaimedatpreemptingradicalizationbymitigatingspecificdrivers.Programmingusuallytargetsspecificgeographicareasand/orsub-populationsdeemedvulnerabletotheextremistappeal. Inmanycontexts,USAIDprogramminginthisarea issmall-scale
anddistinct,andoftenaccompaniesalarger,ongoingdevelop-mentportfolio.Developmentprogrammingdirectedatcounteringinsurgency,ontheotherhand,tendstobereactiveinnature,seekingtocon-
tainandreduceactivesupportforanongoinginsurgency. Sucheffortstendtobelarger-scale,morecomprehensive,andmulti-sectoral.Theyoftenareundertakenaspartofabroader,interagencystabilizationeffort.Ourcurrentunderstandingofdrivers,andexistingdevelopmentresponses,hasyieldedsomestrategiclessons. Atagenerallevel,notalldriversofviolentextremismandinsurgencyareappropri-atelyaddressedthroughadevelopmentresponse.ThesebroadlessonsechowhatUSAIDalreadyknowsaboutsounddevelop-mentprinciples,andrefinethedevelopmentresponsetoviolentextremismandinsurgency.Whilepreliminary,keylessonsinclude
Developmentassistancecandirectlyaddresssocioeconomicdrivers. Pushfactors,suchasmarginalization,frustratedexpectations,andunmetbasicneeds,oftenhavespecificdevelopmentresponsesthatcanaddressconcreteunderlyinggrievances. Pullfactors,particularlysocialnet-works,canalsobeaddressed,particularlywhentheyincludefacilitatingaccesstoeconomicopportunityandservices,aswellasenhancingthevoiceofmarginalizedpopulationsintheircommunitiesorsocieties. USAIDsexperiencewithintegratedyouthprogrammingoffersexamplesofcross-cuttingapproachesthatincludevoca-
tionalandtechnicaltraining,lifeskills,employment-searchsupport,andpositive,peer-group,civicengagement.
Politicaldriversarealsoresponsivetodevelopmentassis-tance.Whilegeneraldemocracyandgovernance(DG)approachesmayhaveindirecteffectsoncounteringvio-lentextremism,DGinterventionstargetingat-riskcommunitiescanbemoredirectlyeffective. Forexamplepoliceharassmentandintimidationcanimpactat-riskurbanandperi-urbancommunities.Thiscanbemitigatedbyactivitiessuchascommunitypolicing,NGOadvocacy,andmediacoverage. DGandotheractivitiescanalsodirectlyaddresspoorlyorun-governedareasbybuilding
9 Thispolicydoesnotdirectlyaddresscounter-terrorism (CT)approachesbasedonintelligence,lawenforcementandmilitaryassets;otherUSGdepartmentsandagenciesaregenerallybetterplacedtoengageinsuchCTprogramming. However,USAIDsdevelopmentresponsetoviolentextremismaninsurgencycontributestoCTgoalsbymitigatingthespecificdriversthatencouragetheuse,advocacyof,andsupportforviolence.
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USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency KnowledgeBase
confidencebetweenlocalcommunitiesandgovernment.Forexample,assistinglegitimategovernmentactorstoorganizetown-hallmeetingsandconductsmall-scaleinfrastructure
projects,
as
in
some
parts
of
Afghanistan,
canincreasesuchinteractionanddemonstrategovern-mentresponsiveness.
Culturaldriversshouldnotbeignored.Whilelessamenabletoinfluencebydevelopmentassistance,thereareprinciplesthatshouldbeconsideredtoaddresscul-
turaldrivers,forexample,byrespectingindigenousand/orreligiouscustoms.Thesemightbeaddressed,inpart,byengagingindigenousreligiousleadersorothergroupsandsupportingalternativevoices. (Missionsshould
consult
with
USAIDs
Regional
Legal
Advisor
(RLA)orGeneralCounsel(GC)inadvanceofprogram-mingtoensurecompliancewiththeEstablishmentClauseoftheFirstAmendmentconcerningseparationofchurchandstate.)
Preventionisessentialandmoreeffectivethanmitigationofactivedrivers.Institutions,actors,andprocessesrelevant
toat-riskpopulationscanbesourcesofresilienceagainsttheinfluenceofviolentextremistnarrativesandprovideyouth,inparticular,withapositiveroleandvoiceincom-munitygovernanceanimportantoptionforturningapotentialsourceofinstabilityintoanasset. Oneexampleisthewidespreadexistenceoffadas,informalassocia-
tionsofyoungpeopleinNiger. Fadasprovideanon-violentoutletforexpressinggrievances,anetworkforaddressingneeds,andapositivemechanismforsocialrelationshipsandcollectiveaction. Insomecases,therewillbetensionsbetweensupportingthestatusquoofmoretolerant,buthierarchicaltraditions,andempower-ingyouthfulvoicesforchange.
Local,customaryauthoritiesarekeypartners. Giventheinstabilityininsurgencyenvironmentsinparticular,work-ingwithexistinglocalauthoritiesthatplaygovernanceroles(e.g.disputeresolutionandsecurity)isimportant.Acommonapproachinsuchacontextistobuildtheeffectivenessandlegitimacyofstateinstitutions. How-
ever,supportingtheprojectionofcentralgovernmentpresenceinplaceswhereithasbeenhistoricallyweakornon-existentmaybedestabilizing. Itmayactuallyweakencustomary,
local
authorities
(i.e.
tribal
leaders)
by
affectingtheirabilityand/ordesiretostandagainstinsurgents.10
Communicationsisadevelopmentassistancepriority.Giventheroleofperceptionsinradicalizationandrecruitment,mediaandcommunicationsarecentraltodevelopmentresponsestothedriversofviolentextrem-ismandinsurgency. Thisincludessupportforlocalmediadevelopmenttofosterindependentvoicesasacounterweighttoextremistones. Forexample,USAIDprovidedaninitialgranttoToloTVinAfghanistanin2002.Tolo
has
since
become
ahighly
influential
moderate
voice
inAfghanistanand,with45%marketshare,isAfghanistansmostpopulartelevisionstation.11 Providinginformationaboutdevelopmentactivities,whichismoreeffectivelydonebylocalcommunicationsnetworks,isanotherapproach. USAIDsprogrammingexperiencein
WestAfricaindicatesthatcommunityradiocanbeapar-ticularlycost-effectivemediumwithsignificantreach.
10Tribalism,GovernanceandDevelopment,September2010,ManagementSystemsInternational11AfghanMediain2010, pp.111-113,AltaiConsulting, researchconductedfromMarchto August
5
2010
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USAIDsDistinctandCriticalRole USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency
USAIDSDISTINCTAND4 CRITICALROLEOneUSGagencyalonecannotachievecriticalU.S.nationalsecurity objectives.The DepartmentofState(DOS), Depart-mentofDefense(DOD),USAID,andotheragenciesdrawon
theirrespectivestrengthstocreateanintegratedresponse.USAID
applies
the
development
discipline
to
its
worldwide
developmenteffortsaswellastoitsresponsestoviolentextremismandinsurgency. Itsstrengthsinclude:Developmentandtechnicalexpertise.USAIDhasdevelopmentexpertiseinareassuchasdemocraticgovernance,health,edu-cation,economicgrowth,agriculture,andothersectors. ManyUSAIDstaffareserving,orhaveserved,incountriesdealingwithviolentextremismand/orinsurgency.TheAgencyhasdevelopedexpertiseincommunity-based,multi-sectoralstabi-lizationprogramming. USAIDisincreasinglydrawinglessonsfrom
such
experience
to
apply
to
longer-term
initiatives.
For
example, USAIDapplieditsstabilizationexpertisein apilotprogramtohelptheColombiangovernmentconsolidateits
territorialgainsagainsttheFuerzasArmadasRevolucionariasdeColombia(FARC),andreducecocacultivation.Theprogramresultedinasignificantconsolidationofstatepresenceintar-getedmunicipalities,whichsaw,forexample,an85%reductionincocaanda56%increaseinelectoralparticipation.ThisapproachhasnowbeenadoptedmorebroadlybytheU.S.EmbassysColombiaStrategicDevelopmentInitiativeaswellas
theColombiangovernmentsNationalConsolidationPlan.Research,assessmentandprogramdevelopmenttools.USAIDhasdevelopedassessmentframeworksandprogrammingguidesrelatedtoconflictmanagementandmitigationandpolit-icaltransitionthatarealsoapplicabletoviolentextremistandinsurgencyenvironments. Morerecently,USAIDhasdevel-opedTheGuidetotheDriversofViolentExtremismandDevelopmentAssistanceandCounter-Extremism:AGuidetoPro-gramming,aswellastheDistrictStabilizationFramework(DSF),anintegratedcivilian-militarytoolnowusedinpartsof
Afghanistan.Theseandothertoolsoffersystematicwaysofanalyzingissuesrelatedtoviolentextremismandinsurgencyaswellascraftingdevelopmentresponsesbasedonlocalcondi-
tions.Fieldpresence,localstaff,andpartners.USAIDMissionsarelocaplatformsforU.S.,international,andlocalstaffwithcontextualknowledgeandlanguageskills,whomonitoron-the-grounddevelopmentsandengagegovernmentalanddirectnon-gov-ernmentalcounterpartsinprogramimplementation.Withlocal expertise andlong institutionalmemories, ForeignServiceNational staff is a particularly strong Agency field asset. Finally,ourimplementingpartnersadddepthtoourknowledgebaseandreachoutsidecapitals.Mobilizationmechanisms.USAIDhasuniquecapabilitiesfortar-geted,rapid-responsefieldanalysis,programdesignandimplementation.Thishasprovenparticularlyadvantageousinvolatileinsurgencycontexts. Recentprocurementreformsgiv-ingUSAIDMissionsaddedflexibilitywillfacilitatesmallergrantsforlocally-specificdevelopmentresponsestoviolentextremismandinsurgency.Focusonsustainability. Evenasitmanagesbothshort-termsta-bilizationandlong-termassistance,USAIDfocusesonsustainability. Althoughnotallstabilizationimpactswillrequiresustainedprogram support, manywill, particularlyto buildcapacityandsystemstostrengthenresiliencytoviolentextremismandinsurgency.Thisfocusonlonger-termcommit-menthashelpedUSAIDtoforgewide-ranging,lastingpartnershipscriticaltoeffectivedevelopmentprogrammingin
theseandothersettings.
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USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency InteragencyIntegrationandCooperation
INTERAGENCY INTEGRATION5
AND
COORDINATION
AdevelopmentresponseisonlyonecomponentofbroaderUSGeffortstocounterviolentextremismandinsurgency.Insomecases,thesuccessofdevelopmentassistanceiscontingentonotherUSGassets,suchassecurityassistance,which
can
create
greater
stability
for
development
programs
totakehold.Inthefield,interagencyintegrationisincreasinglythenormunderChiefofMissionauthority. USAID,DOD,andDOSdevelopstrategiesandcoordinateprograms;eachbringsdiffer-entassetstoacommonmission.WhileperhapsmostrobustlydevelopedinsettingssuchasAfghanistan,Iraq,andColombia,suchintegrationisalsohappeninginlargelystablecontexts,suchas West Africa.Thebenefitsofintegration, particularlyfield-based,applynotjusttolarger-scale,well-resourcedMis-
sionscounteringinsurgency,butalsotosmall,finitely-resourcedeffortscounteringviolentextremisminlargelystablesettings.USAIDMissionshavedevelopedcloserelationshipswithDODcountry-levelcounterpartstojointlyplanandcoordinate. InAfghanistan,jointinterventionshavebeeneffectivewhenUSAIDisinvolvedinpre-operationplanningforquickmobiliza-
tionofdevelopmentresourcesalongsidemilitaryoperations.Inmanycases,coordinatingwhileidentifyingdistinctrolesthatmaximizeinteragencycomparativeadvantagesiskey. More-over,asUSAIDbuildsupitslearningcapacity,ourinteragencypartnerswillbesignificantresourcesfor lessonslearned, whichcancontinuetoinformeffectiveintegration,coordinationand/ordifferentiation.
PROVINCIALRECONSTRUCTIONTEAMS(PRTs): INTERAGENCYFIELDINTEGRATIONDesignedtooperateinsemi-permissiveenvironments,aPRThelpstostabilizeanareathroughitsintegratedcivilian-militaryapproach. Itcombinesthediplomatic,military,anddevelopmentalcomponentsofUSGagenciesinvolvedinlocalstabilizationandreconstructionefforts.ThePRTaimstoimprovestabilitybybuildinghostnationcapacitytogovern;enhancingeconomicviability;anddeliveringessentialpublicservices,suchassecurity,lawandorder,justice,healthcare,andeducation. USAIDwillworkwithitsinteragencypartnerstoassessthelessonsandbestpracticesassociatedwithPRTs.
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PolicyGuidance USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency
6 POLICYGUIDANCEEngagementCriteriaRecognizingthatthedevelopmentresponseisonepartofabroaderUSGefforttoaddressthesenationalsecurityconcerns,
thefollowingserveasengagementcriteriathatUSAIDwillcon-siderpriorto,andreassessindesigning,implementingand,ifneeded,adjustingprogrammingintheseareas. Dependingoncontext,decision-makingmaybefield-based,Washington-based,orboth.
Assessmentofthedriversofviolentextremismandinsur-gencyandidentificationofpotentialdevelopmentresponses.AnalysiswillbeconductedincoordinationwithUSAIDregionalandfunctionalbureausinWash-ington,usinginput from theDepartment ofState, and
theengagement
of
other
interagency
partners.
Itwill
beinformedbyUSAIDanalyticandtechnicalguides.
Considerationofhostcountry(governmentandpopula-tion)commitmentandcapacitytoaddressthedevelopmentrelateddriversofviolentextremismandinsurgencyandforpossibleprogramresponses.
Determinationthatthereisanappropriateandcriticalrolefordevelopmentassistanceinpreventingormitigatingdriversofviolentextremismorinsurgency.Thisdetermi-nationincludesCountry Team leadership, particularlytheUSAIDMissionDirectorandAmbassador,aswellasWashington-basedinteragencyleadership.
Determinationthatanadequatelevelofsecurityexiststopermitimplementingpartnerstooperate,monitorpro-grams,andcommunicatewithUSAID.
IdentificationofriskstotheAgency,itspartners,andthedevelopmentinvestment(i.e.thatitcouldbeunderminedbydestabilizingelements),anddeterminationthatreason-ablestepscanbetakentomitigatethoserisks. Riskscanbephysical,programmatic,andfinancial.
Considerationofprogram,resource,andmanagementplansrequiredforimplementation.Thiswillbecon-ductedbyMissionleadership,andotherAgencyandinteragencystakeholdersatPostand/orinWashington,andwilloftenincludeUSAIDRLAsand/orGC,whomMissionswillengagepriortoprogramdesignforcom-pliancewithappropriatelegalstatutesandauthorities.
ProgrammingPrinciplesThefollowingprincipleswillguideUSAIDsdesignandimple-mentationofdevelopmentprogrammingtargetingdriversofviolentextremismandinsurgency.TheseareinformedbyUSAIDsknowledgebase,theU.S.GlobalDevelopmentPolicy,includingitsfocusontailoringdevelopmentstrategiesinstabiliza-
tionandpost-crisissituations,theUSAIDPolicyFramework2011-2015,aswellasUSAIDsbroaderstabilizationexperience.Here,stabilizationreferstotheprocessofmakingacountryor
territorylesslikelytodescendinto,orreturnto,astateofconflictorinstabilityandcontributingtoconditionsthatwilladvancesus-
tainabledevelopment.12USAIDpursuesstabilizationwhereviolenceisrecurrentandreachessignificantlevelsincludingwhereinsurgencyismanifest;stabilizationalsocanapplyinessentiallystablesettingswherevio-lentextremismistheissue. Stabilizationispartof,andnotseparatefrom,anoveralldevelopmentresponse. Operationally,
12Stabilizationisalsousedinconflictprevention,management,andmitigation, aswellaspost-conflictreconciliation andreconstructionbutisdistinctfromhumanitarianassistance. Stabilizationdoesnotimplypreservingthestatusquo. Political,socialandeconomictransformationcanbeunstable,butmayleadtomorepropitiousconditionsfordevelopment.
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however,stabilizationgenerallyrequiresdifferentobjectives,bene-ficiaries,modalities,andmeasuresthanthosemoreorientedtolonger-termdevelopment. Butlinkingbothundertheframeworkofanoveralldevelopmentresponseiscriticalforcraftingeffec-tive,ultimatelysustainabledevelopmentprogrammingtocounterviolentextremismandinsurgency.Becausetheseenvironmentsareoftenfluidandcomplex,therearechallengesassociatedwithimplementingtheseprinciples.Thispolicyacknowledgesthosechallengesandidentifiesareasforfur-
theraction.Theywillbesubjecttoregularreviewandupdating.
FORANALYSIS,PLANNINGANDDESIGNFocusonthedriversofviolentextremismandinsurgency:Informedbylocalresearchandassessment,USAIDMissionswillidentifyandprioritizedrivers,setclearobjectives,designafocusedsetofinterventions,andsystematicallyevaluaterelatedmeasuresofprogressandimpact. Intheirassessments,Missionsshouldconsidertheroleofwomenvis-a-visdriversandanyrelevantdevelopmentresponses. Noteverydevelopmentalneedleadstoviolentextremismorinsurgency,andcommitting
largeresourcestocountriesaffectedbyviolentextremismand/orinsurgencyisnotasolutioninitself.In these contexts, analysisusuallymust be conductedin shorttimeframes. Inaddition,itcanbechallengingtoensurethatallstakeholderspointsofviewareincorporatedintoanalysiswhilealsoavoidingbiases. Moreover,operatinginsemiornon-permissiveenvironmentscanreducemobilityandlimitopportunitiesforspeakingtovariedaudiencesandunderstand-ingrealitiesontheground.USAIDwillcontinuetorefineits
toolsforrapid,on-the-groundanalysisthatinformsprogramdesignandimplementation.Promoteinclusivecountryownershipatalllevels:In
program
assessment,
design,
implementation
and
evaluation,
USAIDwillengageawiderangeofcountrystakeholdersfromthecommunitytothenationallevelwhoarecommittedtoaddressingthedevelopmentrelateddriversofviolentextremismandinsurgency. Countryownershipisakeyingredientofeffec-
tive,sustainabledevelopment.Thiscanincludehostgovernmentinstitutions,civilsociety,customarylocalauthorities,communitiesand/orlocalpopulationseachofwhichcanhaveanimportantroletoplay.
TOOLSFORASSESSINGDRIVERSTheDistrictStabilityFrameworkinAfghanistan. Toincreasetheeffectivenessofdevelopmentassistanceincounteringinsurgency,USAIDandtheCounterinsurgencyTrainingCenter-Afghanistan(CTC-A)developedtheDistrictStabilityFramework(DSF),acomprehensive,data-drivenframeworktoensurethatprogrammingiscontinu-allyinformedbyongoinganalysisofon-the-grounddevelopments. DSFassistsin(a)identifyingsourcesofinstability;(b)targetingactivitiestodiminishormitigatethedriversofinstability;and(c)monitoringandevaluatingoutcomesagainstspecificstabilityobjectivesinaparticulararea.TheDSFprocessisiterative,aslessonslearnedfromshort-
termactivitiesarefedbackintoanalysisandre-design. USAIDisimplementingDSFineasternAfghanistan. InSarkanidistrict,forexample,DSFallowedUSAIDtomoreeffectivelyaddressthebroadproblemoflackoflegiti-mategovernmentbydistinguishinggovernmentrepresentatives'inabilitytocirculateduetoinsecurity,versusalackofcapacity,andtailoringinterventionsbyvillage.FocusGroupsinYemen. SomeUSAIDMissionshavealsoreliedonlocalorganizationstoconductfocusgroupsandsurveystoinformbroaderanalysis. Suchanapproachallowsformoreopinionstobeaccessed,reducestheriskofbias,andprovidesreal-timedata. In Yemen,USAIDsupportedlocalresearcherstoorganizeandconductapproxi-mately20youthfocusgroupsandadditionalyouthstakeholderfocusgroupdiscussions.Theresultsofthatassessmentexercisedemonstratetheutilityofsuchappliedresearchforprogramdevelopment:youth,forexample,stressedseveraldriversofviolentextremismthatadultyouthstakeholdersdidnot.
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INCLUSIVECOUNTRYOWNERSHIP
InWestAfrica. USAIDprogramsinChadandMaliaredevelopingpartnershipswithlocalgovern-ment,religiousandtraditionalleaders,andnascentNGOs.Throughtrainingforlocalofficials,youthemploymentandcommunityimprovementprojects,keylocalactorsaredevelopingincreasedcapability
torespondtodriversofinstability.FATASecretariatinPakistan. USAIDcoordi-nates
overall
strategy
and
priority
areas
for
interventionwiththeFATASecretariatandtheUSGinteragency.Toencourageandensurecommunityinvolvement,USAIDworkscloselywithlocalgovern-mentrepresentativestoengagetheirconstituentcommunitiesinprojectselection,design,andimple-mentation. LocalandregionalgovernmentrepresentativeengagementiskeytoUSAIDssuccessinincreasingcommunityparticipationandbuy-in.
Inmany
places,
poor
governance
is
amajor
factor.
USAID
oftenengageswithgovernmentsthatlackthecapacityforfullcountryownership,evenifthereispoliticalwilltoaddressthedevelopmentchallengesfomentingviolentextremismand/orinsurgency. Inotherplaces,capacitymayexistbutdemon-stratedpoliticalwillislacking. Ultimately,USAIDmustleverage
andfurtherdeveloplocalcapacityrelatedtoservicedeliveryandgoodgovernanceprinciples,suchastransparencyandaccountability,torespondtodriversofviolentextremismand/orinsurgency. USAIDwillusecasestudyanalysistofur-
therunderstandhowbesttopromoteinclusivecountryownershipincounteringviolentextremismandinsurgency.Exerciseselectivity:USAIDwillmakechoicesaboutwhereitsinvestmentswillachievethegreatestimpact,avoidprogramsthatcouldhaveadestabilizingeffect,andtargetitsresourcesdemo-graphically,sectorallyandgeographically. Radicalizationandrecruitmentareoftenhighlylocalizedandconcentratedinspe-cificpopulationsand/orcommunities. Notalldriverspresentinagivencontextmaybeamenabletodevelopmentassistance.USAIDwilltakeintoaccounttheplansofotherUSGagenciesanddonorsactivelyengagedinspecificprogramstocounterviolentextremismandinsurgency. Conductingamappingexerciseisessentialtoidentifyareasofoverlapandpotentialareasforintegration.ThisincludesUSAIDsaccessto,andabil-itytouse,informationandanalysisgeneratedbyotheragenciesSelectivitycanbechallengingbecausemultipleimperatives(hostcountry,USG,unmetdevelopmentalneeds)oftenrequireUSAIDresponsivenesstoamuchbroaderarrayofneedsthan
targetedanalysismaysuggest.Tobetterguidedecision-making,USAIDwillusecasestudyanalysistoidentifybestpracticesassociatedwithapplyingtheprincipleofselectivityintheseenvironments.
SELECTIVITYVIATHETRANS-SAHARACOUNTERTERRORISMPARTNERSHIP(TSCTP)
TSCTP,amulti-countryinteragencyeffortthataimstocombatviolentextremism(VE)intheSahelregionofAfrica,involvesstrengtheningbothmilitaryandciviliansecurityforces,conductingoutreachcampaignsonnon-violenceand
tolerance,andconfidence-building,community-developmentprogramsforregionsidentifiedthroughinteragencyassessments.USAIDcontributionstothePartnershipinclude:theregionalPeaceforDevelopmentprograminNigerandChad;communitydevelopmentactivitiesinMali;andaresearchagendaexaminingthedriversofVEintheSahelandprovidingaframeworkfordevelopmentprogrammingtocounterVE. Inthiscontext,USAIDprogram-mingtargetsspecificcommunitiesandgroupswithintheseregionstomitigatethedriversthatcanleadtosupportforextremistideologiesandorganizations.
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STABILIZATION,COORDINATIONANDSUSTAINABILITYINAFGHANISTAN
Bothcivilianandmilitaryactorshaveusedcash-for-worktosuccessfullyachieveneartermstabilizationobjectivesinAfghanistan. Butthesustainabilityoftheseprogramshasbeenalong-standingconcernbytheAfghanGovernmentanddonors when shorttermjobsare notconnected topotentialfuture employment (i.e., clean-up campaignsorrefurbishingcanalsthatcommunitieswouldotherwisedothemselves).USAIDhasmadesustainabilityafundamentalobjectiveforcash-for-workactivitiesinstabilizationenvironments. Recog-nizingthatthegovernmentmustbeactivelyinvolvedintheimplementation,wehaveincreasedthecoordinationbetweenourprojectsandthelineministries,connectingtheprojectstosuccessfulruraldevelopmentprojectsthatarealreadybeingimplementedbyGIRoA.Toimprovehumanresourcecapacity,USAIDcash-for-workprogramsworkwithlocal
communities
through
job
skill
training
and
mentoring,
which
can
be
through
their
own
skilled
citizens
or
through
externalresources. ThroughacollaborativeGIRoA-ledcommunityconsultation,communitiesidentifychallenges,ownandresolvetheirproblems,andlinktocommunityandlocalgovernmentinstitutions.Thecommunityprojectsthatthecommunitydecidesuponnotonlyaddresssourcesofinstabilitybutalsosupportlonger-termeconomicgrowth(i.e.insteadofjustclearingcanals,communitiesarebuildingmoreefficientcanalstogetwatertonewfarmland).Thereisalsoawageanalysisthatmustaccompanyeveryapprovedprojectsoweavoiddistortionoflocaleconomies.
Takeacoordinatedandintegratedapproach:Aspartofearlyprogramplanningandincloseinteragencycoordi-nation,USAIDMissionswillestablishaplanforcoordinatingandintegratingprogramsdirectedatdriversofviolentextremismand/orinsurgencywithotherformsofassistance. Planningwillneedtotakeintoaccountrequirementsforlonger-termdevel-opmentprogrammingtoreinforceearlygainsandsustainability.ThisincludescaseswhereUSAIDconductsrapid,discreteactivitiesforstabilizationeffectsforexample,howalarge-scale,cash-for-workprogramcouldbettersupportmedium-termeconomicdevelopment.Stabilizationdoesnotalwaysprecedelonger-term,sector-basedapproaches;simultaneousimplementationmayberequired.
Whethersequentialorconcurrent,differenttypesofassistancemustbecontinuouslycoordinatedandstrategicallylinked.Criteriashouldbeestablishedearlyfortransitioningamongthedifferenttypesofassistance,basedoncontext-specificfactorssuchaspermissivenessoftheoperatingenvironment. Amini-mallevelofsecurityisrequiredforstabilizationandlong-termdevelopmenttotakehold.ThisplanningwillneedtobeconductedinclosecoordinationwiththeDepartmentofStateandotherinteragencypartners
toensureacommonunderstandingofeachothersoperational
INTEGRATIONINIRAQFrom2006to2008,USAIDpromotedstabilityincommunitiesmostaffectedbytheincreasingviolenceinthecountrybyprovidingjobs,training,andsmallgrantstoat-riskyouthwhomightotherwisebeattractedtotheinsurgency. Alongwiththesurge,
jointcivilian-militaryProvincialReconstructionTeams(PRTs)weredeployedthroughoutthecountrytoimproveU.S.engagementwithIraqis. Beginningin2009,USAIDbeganconsolidatingthegainsitachievedsincethesurge.USAIDcontinuestosupportprivate-sectordevelopmentandimprovingtheIraqiGovernmentsabilitytodeliveressentialservicestoitspeople. InApril2010,theIraqiGovernmentreleased
theNationalDevelopmentPlan. USAIDhelpedtheIraqiMinistryofPlanningformulatetheplan,animpor-
tantmilestonethatoutlinestheIraqisownprioritiesandvisionofhowtoachievethem.
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PolicyGuidance USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency
needs and capacities, particularly as relates to security. Percep-tionsofsufficientsecurityoftendifferamonginteragencypartners. Integrationandsequencingrequiresintensiveeffortand
management
by
USAID
and
implementing
partner
person-
nel;integrationfirstrequirescoordinationonastrategicandthenonanimplementationlevel. Agencystaffinghasnotcon-sistentlybeenconfiguredand/orsufficientlyresourcedtoaddressthisimportantrequirement, and specificguidancehasbeenlacking. USAIDwillreviewlessons,developguidelinesandreconsiderresourcerequirementstopromotecoordi-natedandintegratedplanninginbothWashingtonandthefield.Tailorandcoordinatecommunications:USAIDwilleffec-tivelycommunicatelocalownershipandpartnershiptoachieveprogram
objectives.
This
will
include
how
USAID
incorporates
hostgovernmententitiesintothepublicfaceofitsprograms,whetherthroughorganizingofficialeventsorcommunicatingto
themediathelocalcommunitysroleinaprogram. BrandingistypicallyoneelementofUSAIDscommunicationseffortsandisimportanttotransparency. Bystatuteandpolicy,USAIDwillgenerallybrandorco-brandUSAID. However,localcontextmaymakesuchbrandingorco-brandingcounterproductiveforadevelopmentresponsetoviolentextremismandinsurgency. Incoordinationwithinter-agencypartners,theAgencywillconsidercreativeornuancedmethodstobalancesecurity,political,andcommunicationsgoalssothatoverallprogramobjectives,suchasstrengtheninggovernancepresenceoramplifyingthevoiceofcommunityleaders,areachieved.WorkingwithGCandtheBureauforLegislativeandPublicAffairs(LPA),USAIDwillreview
TAILOREDCOMMUNICATIONSINCOLOMBIA
InColombia,USAIDworkswiththeColombianPres-identsCenterforConsolidatedandIntegratedAction(CCAI),whichleadsthedesignandoversightoftheGovernmentofColombias(GOC)counterinsur-gencyprogramintheregionalcapitalsthatserveasgatewaystoremote, neglectedregions.AllCCAI-relatedactivitiesarebrandedGOCinitiativeinorder
to build support fortheGOCinthose areas. Com-munitieshaveviewedtheseactivitiespositivelyand,
therefore,havebeenpositivetowardstheGOCforbringingthemtotheirrespectiveareas.
existingregulationsandcraftspecificrecommendationsrelatedtobrandingandmarkingwhenappropriateandnecessary.Morebroadly,theAgencywillseekinnovativeapproachestodevelopment
outreach
and
communications
in
these
environ-
mentsandcapturetheseapproachesincommunicationsstrategiesandplans.Thinklocallyandbringanentrepreneurialapproach:Informedbylocalactors,USAIDwillspecificallytailorprogrammingtothelocalenvironment, scaleupsuccessfulapproaches,anddiscon-tinueineffectiveinvestments. Everylocalityhasvaryingdriversofextremismorinsurgency,aswellasspecificresourcesandpoten-
tialpartnershipsthatcanmitigatethosedrivers. Successes
LOCALENTREPRENEURIALAPPROACHINCHAD
TheTSCTPprograminChadhasprovidedexten-sivetrainingandtechnicalassistancetofivenationalcivilsocietyorganizations,strengtheningtheirtechni-calandinstitutionalcapacity.OneexampleistheChadianAssociationofHerdersandNomads(AEN)whichhasdemonstratedasignificantleapincapacity,movingfromavolunteer-drivenassociation
toonethatincludesdedicatedfull-timestaff. USAIDpartnerssuchasAENprovidetrainingforcommu-nityleaderstosupporttheirroleinmobilizingcommunitymembersandfacilitatingparticipatoryproblem-solvingtoensurethatlocalinitiativesareappropriate,conflict-sensitive,andsustainable.
cannotautomaticallybereplicatedelsewherewithoutadjustmentfordifferentcontexts. Localactivitiesdonothavetobebig;smalamountsofresourcesatthecommunitylevelcanhaveasignifi-cantimpact. Bystartingsmall,riskcanbediversifiedandmitigated,allowingforexperimentalapproachesortestingnew,non-traditionalpartnerssuchasdiasporagroupsandprivatesec-
toractorswhomaybroadenUSAIDsreachandimpact.Anentrepreneurialapproachrequiresadifferentriskmanagementapproachandintensivemonitoringandevaluationeffortstolearnquicklyfromefforts,toexpandeffectiveinterventions,andlimitunsuccessfulprojects.Alongwithsupportinginformedriskmanagementandinnovativemonitoringandevaluationpractices,USAIDwillcontinuetoreviewanddisseminatebestpractices
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associatedwithalocallydriven,entrepreneurialapproachtorespondingtoviolentextremismandinsurgency.Considertransnationalstrategies:USAIDwilltakeadvan-tageofappropriateopportunitiesforcross-borderorregionalprogrammingandcoordination,asthedriversofviolentextremismandinsurgencyoftencrossnationalboundaries. Thiscouldincludecomplementaryprogrammingoneithersideofabor-der,oronecross-borderprogram. Sometimes,USGand/orhostcountrypoliciesoneithersideofthesamebordercouldbedifferentenoughtochallengetheexecutionofacoordi-natedapproach.TransnationalstrategiesrequirestrongcoordinationbetweenUSGandhost-governmententitiesinvolvedineachofthecountries. CoordinationwithUSGregional
actors
in Washington, Department
of
State Regional
Bureaus,aswellastheappropriateCombatantCommandisalsoessential. USAIDwillusecase-studyanalysistoexaminefurtherthelessonsandbestpracticesassociatedwithcross-borderorregionalprogrammingintheseenvironments.
WORKINGTRANSNATIONALLYINTHEHORNOFAFRICA
Counteringviolentextremism(CVE)programmingintheHornofAfricapromotesstabilityinastrategiccrossborderareathroughprovisionofcommunicationequip-menttolocalcommunitieswherepeacecommitteeshavebeenestablishedtoserveasafirstresponsetosta-bilizearegionaffectedbyviolentextremism,causedinpartbyal-Shabaabfighters.Thiscross-borderprogramisacriticalcomponentofanearly-warningandearly-responseapproachtothedriversofviolentextremism.
FOROPERATIONALANDMANAGEMENTRESPONSIVENESSFlexibility,agility,andprocurementspeed:USAIDwillincreaseitscapabilitytoprocurerapidly,adjustasconditionschange,andexpanditsworkwithandthroughlocalpartners.At
times,USAIDneedsmechanismsthatcanrespondinweeks,ifnotdays. Existing,pre-competedcontractingandgrant-makingmechanismsareexamplesofmorerapidprocurement. In
RAPIDPROCUREMENTCAPABILITY
Insituationswheretherearerapid-responseandprogram-start-uprequirements,USAIDsOfficeofTransitionInitiatives(OTI)pre-competedSWIFTcontractingmechanismallowsforamoremanage-ablecompetitionamongagroupofsevenorganizationsforspecificprograms. Onenewpro-curementcanbecompletedinanaverageoffourweeks,orevendaysifrequired. Inaddition,thecon-
tractrequirestheawardeetobeabletostartimplementingactivitieswithin48hoursofaward.
somesituations,exceptionstofullandopencompetitionmayberequired. Becausetheoperatingenvironmentisoftenhighlyfluid,flexibilityiscriticaltoallowforprogrammaticchange.USAIDwilldevelopavarietyofprocurementmechanismstoberesponsive,withflexibilitybuiltintoscopesofworkandoptionsforworkingwithavarietyoflocalandinternationalpartners.13 Contractingwithandprovidinggrantstomoreandvariedlocal partners, andcreatingtheconditionswhereaid isnolongernecessaryforthecountrieswherewework,isanobjectiveofUSAIDsImplementationandProcurementReform(IPR). Itisalsoanimportantelementofaneffectivedevelopmentresponsetoviolentextremismandinsurgency.AspartofIPR, USAIDwillcontinueto review itsprocurementpracticesandensurethatthereareoptionstoaddresstheneedforflexibility,agility,andrapidresponseinthesetypesofenvironments.Intensiveprogrammanagementandsystematicmonitoringandreportingofmeasuresofprogressandimpact:USAIDwillensurestaffisequippedtoprovidesubstantialdirectionandhands-onmanagementrequiredforresults,andthatprogramoversightisacloselysharedresponsibilitybetweenthefieldandheadquarters. Intensivemanagementandoversightrequirestafftimeandfieldvisits,whichMissionscan-notalwaysaccommodatewithlimitedoperatingexpensebudgetsand/orwhereUSAIDofficersmaynotbeabletodirectlyobserveprojectsgivensecurityrestrictions. Innovative13WorkingcloselywiththeappropriateandrelevantprocurementspecialistsinWashingtonandthefield.
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PolicyGuidance USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency
USINGDRIVERSBASEDRISKANALYSIS
SeveralUSAIDmissionsinAfricahaveusedtheprevi-ouslyreferencedGuidetotheDriversofViolentExtremismandDevelopmentAssistanceandCounter-Extremism: AGuidetoProgramming. Metricsderivedfromtheriskanalysiswereincorporatedintotraditionalandnon-tra-ditionalprogrammanagementtools,suchasbaselinestudies,mediaassessments,youth-ledcommunitymap-ping,andindependentpollingtoguideprogramimplementation.
MONITORINGINCHALLENGINGENVIRONMENTS
SomemissionssuchasIraq, Pakistan, andYemenhaveintroducedmulti-layeredmonitoringsystemsincludingindependentthird-partymonitoring,useofgeospatialinformationsystems(GIS)andphotography,interagencysupport,andlocalstakeholderengagement. Geospatialanalysis,inparticular,providesacommonlyunderstoodandpowerfulsystemsframeworktocollect,organizeandanalyzeplace-baseddata. Forinstance,spatialanaly-sisprovidesthecapabilitytolookattheeffectivenessofvariousaidprogramsandprojectsonstabilizationofdif-ferentcommunities.
usesoftechnology,includinggeospatialinformationsystems(GIS),canhelpovercomethesechallenges. Independent,third-partymonitoringandlocalstakeholderfeedback,whereappropriate,
can
also
be
useful.
Anotherimportantelementofmanagementandoversightisconsistent,appropriatecollectionof,andreportingon,measuresofprogressandimpactrelatedtocounteringdriversofviolentextremismandinsurgency.Whererelevant,USAIDwilltrackoutcome-levelindicatorsinthegeographicareasthatitspro-gramsaretargetingtomonitorwhetheritsactivitiesarehelping
toreducetheemergenceandseverityofviolentextremismandinsurgency. Learningfrominnovationsinthefield,USAIDwillcontinuetorefineitsmonitoringandevaluationplatformsand
tools,particularlywheresecurityisaconcern,toensuretheAgencyadaptsandretargetsitsprogramminginrealtime.USAIDwillalsoreviewitsoperating- expenseneedsrelatedtoeffectiveprogrammanagementandoversight.Innovation,evaluation,andlearning:USAIDwillpromoteinnovation,createmechanismsforself-critiqueandcontinuousadaptation,andsharelessonslearned.Arangeofmethodsareoftenrequiredtoensurereal-timeanalysisandlearninginclud-ingrapidappraisal,indicatorstiedtodrivers,andattitudeandbehavior-changemeasures.ThesemethodsrequireresourcesfromMissionsthatarefrequentlyunderstaffedand/orhavelim-itedbudgets. Inaddition,thestateoftheartforevaluatingactivitiescounteringviolentextremismandinsurgencyisstillnas-cent. USAIDwillfurtherresearchinthisfieldinthecontextofUSAIDsnewEvaluationPolicy.Thatpolicycallsforhigherstan-dardsofmethodologicalrigor,greatertransparencyaboutevaluationfindingsand,onaverage,dedicatingtoexternalevalu-ationatleastthreepercentoftheprogrambudgetmanagedbyanoperatingunit. USAIDwillexplorewaystoadaptitsreport-ingrequirementsandmonitoringandevaluationsystemstoenableresultsforecastinginshortertimeframesandprograms
LEARNINGBYEVIDENCESUMMITUSAIDsponsoredanEvidenceSummitinSeptember2010thatbroughttogetherrepresentativesfromtheinteragency,donorandacademiccommunitieswhospe-cializeinviolentextremismandinsurgencyrelatedresearchandevaluationtolauncheffortstoexaminemethodologiesforevaluatingprogrammingandtoinformthispolicy. Specifically,theSummitfocusedon
threeproblemareaswhereongoingdevelopmentprac-ticeandevidenceintersect:dampeningprocessesofradicalizationeitherattheindividualorsocietallevel;dis-ruptingtheformationofgroupswillingtoemployterrorandotherformsofpoliticalviolencetoachievetheiraims;andpromotingstabilizationonceaninsurgencyhasemerged.TheSummithighlightedUSAIDsownefforts
tolearnfromits engagementsinIraq,Afghanistan,Colombia,andtheSahelanddemonstratedwhatandhowtheagencyislearning,whilealsopointingoutmeas-urestheagencycantaketoimproveitspractices.
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USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency
tobeadjustedaslocalcontextsevolve. USAIDsBureauforPolicy,PlanningandLearning(PPL)willdevelopspecificguidanceandhighlightgoodpracticesforevaluationsincomplexsettings,wherealackofabilitytomeasureimpact, shorttimeframes, andevaluatorsafetymaybeconcerns.Informedrisk-takingandexperimentation: SupportedbyimprovedAgency-widepracticesandinformedbythebestavail-ableinformationandmitigationpractices,USAIDstaffwillbeencouragedtotakerisks,adapttoincorporatelessonslearned,andbuildonsuccess. Thereisahighdegreeofphysical,psychological,programmaticandfinancialriskinherentintheseofteninsecureenvironments.TheseenvironmentscanputAgencyandimple-mentingpartnerstaffatphysicalandpsychologicalrisk,andAgencyresourcesandpracticeshavenotkeptpace. Program-matically,therearechallenges:itcanbedifficulttoidentifydriversandprogrammingoptions;thereremainsneedforexperimenta-
tionandnotallprogramswillsucceed;and,insomecases,takinganyorcertainactionsmaybecounterproductive.
PolicyGuidance
USAIDwillimproveitspracticesandresourcesdirectedattheserisks.TheAgencywillsupportstaffwithtraining,confidentialcon-sultations,physical-fitnessopportunities,andbenefits. Missionmanagerswillensurethatimplementingpartnersreceiveappro-priateresourcesandhavemethodsforpromotingstaffwell-being. USAIDwilldevelopflexible,creativestandardstodefineprogramsuccesstoincludedecidingnottoact,aswellasadapting,basedoncontinuouslearningofwhatdoesanddoesnotwork.USAIDwillalsoconsideradditionalmechanismstoverifythatintendedbeneficiariesareusingresourcesforintendedpurposes. Wherenecessary,MissionswillavailthemselvesofscreeningmechanismsavailablethroughUSAIDsOfficeofSecu-rity,andwillconsultwiththeRLAorGC,asappropriate. Thisensuresthatacontext-appropriatevettingsystemnotonlyaddressestheimpactonprograms,butisalsothoroughandmeetstheregulatoryandlegalrequirementsalreadyaddressedbyestablishedsystems.
MITIGATINGRISKIn-KindGrants:In-kindratherthancashassistancetolocalorganizationsallowstheAgencytoworkwithnon-tra-ditionalpartnerswhoeitherarenotformalorganizationsorwouldnotnecessarilymeetrequirementsforreceivingcashgrants. In-kindassistanceprovidestheAgencyamodalitythroughwhichtotakeariskbysupportingactorswhoarenewtoreceivingassistance,buthaveimportantideasthatneedtobesupported.InAfghanistan:A3(AccountableAssistanceforAfghanistan)isaUSAIDinitiativetopreventdiversionofassis-
tancebyextortionorcorruption. Somechangesincluderestrictingthenumberofsubcontracttiers;tighteningfinancialcontrolstoestablishauditingproceduresfor100percentoflocallyincurredprojectcosts;advocatingincreaseduseofelectronicfundstransfers;performingadditionalprojectoversightinhigh-riskareas;anddelegatingmoreoversightauthoritytoUSAIDfieldstaff.
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USAIDInternalChanges USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency
7 USAID INTERNALCHANGESToadvancetheAgencysdevelopmentresponsetoviolentextremismandinsurgency,thispolicydirectsUSAIDtoimple-mentthefollowingchangessomeimmediately,othersover
time.FormalizeseniorleadershipinvolvementUSAIDseniorleadersandmanagerswillengageinrelevantpol-icy,strategy,andprogramdecision-makingandoversight,asappropriate. EachrelevantBureau/OfficewilldesignateoneDeputyAssistantAdministrator(DAA)/equivalenttoberesponsibleforrelevantstrategicandinteragencyengagementandforthispolicysimplementationatthoselevels. Similarly,MissionDirectorswillberesponsibleinthefieldastheyengageonprogramdevelopment,management,andrelatedopera-
tionalissues.Thispolicysengagementcriteriawillframeseniorleader/managerinvolvementontheseissues.EstablishandempoweranAgencySteeringCommitteeUSAIDwillestablishandempoweraSteeringCommittee.RelevantBureau/Officeheadswilldesignatestaffto,andsup-port theirserviceon, theSteeringCommittee,whichwill:
Overseethispolicysimplementation; Provide technical leadershipand support, particularly to
Missions;
DriveAgencyknowledgemanagement;and Support Agency andinteragencyplanning, strategy, andcoordination.
AnarticulationoftheSteeringCommitteesstructureandopera-tionwillfollowthispolicy. USAIDwillalsodesignateafull-timeSeniorPolicyAdvisortoserveacontinuouscoordinationfunctionontheseissues.
CraftnewpolicyguidanceUSAIDwilldevelopnewguidancetofacilitateprogramanalysisdesign,andimplementation,inaccordancewiththispolicy. Pri-orityactionissuesinclude:
Riskmanagementinhigh-threatenvironments; Procurementflexibilityforeffectiveandtimelyresponse
informed by on-goingefforts; and, Effectivecommunicationstrategies,includingupdated
brandingguidance.ExecuteappliedresearchagendaUSAIDwillcoordinateanappliedresearchagenda,anddisseminatefindings,asappropriate. Possibleresearchareasinclude:genderincounteringviolentextremismandinsurgency;useofmediaandcommunications;and,programmeasurementandevaluation.TheAgencywillmineexistingUSGandexternalinformation, research, andapproachesin itsresearchefforts.Designandimplementknowledge-management systemUSAIDwillsystematicallycollectanddisseminatecasestudiesandlessonslearnedcriticaltoengagementontheseissues.USAIDwilltrainstaffonthispolicy,relatedtoolsandthemostrecentfieldexperienceandlearning.TheAgencywillprioritize
trainingforseniormanagersoperatingintheseenvironments,fieldandWashingtonstaffwhodesignandmanageprograms,aswellasnewDevelopmentLeadershipInitiative(DLI)ForeignServiceOfficers.Whereappropriate,trainingshouldincluderelevantstudyoflanguage,culture,andpolitics. USAIDwilladaptpoliciesandsystemstoensurepersonnelreceivenotonlytrainingbutfieldmentorshipandtechnical support.
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USAIDPolicy/TheDevelopmentResponsetoViolentExtremismandInsurgency USAIDInternalChanges/Conclusion
TheAgencywillalsoseekcollaborative,USG-widetrainingopportunities.Thisincludes expanding Agency participationinForeignServiceInstitute(FSI)coursesandDODpre-deploy-mentprograms. USAIDwillseekgreaterinteragencyinclusioninitsowntrainings.StrengtheninteragencyleadershiproleUSAIDwillrobustlyparticipateinrelevantinteragencyprocesses. USAIDwillproactivelyengagethePresidentsNationalSecurityStaff(NSS),DOS,DOD,andotheragencies
tofurtheritsinteragencyintegrationontheseissues.TheAgencywillsystematicallyengageitsSeniorDevelopmentAdvi-sorstotheCombatantCommands,andthelattersUSAIDLiaison Officers, in these efforts. USAID will strengthen intera-gency
sharing
of
its
growing
technical
expertise
in
countering
thedriversofviolentextremismandinsurgency,andwilllearnfromhowtheinteragencyanalyzesandprogramsvis--vis
thesechallenges.Enhancebilateral,international,andnon-traditionalpartnerengagementIncoordinationwiththeinteragency,USAIDwillincreaseitsengagementwithotherdonoragenciesonthedevelopmentresponsetoviolentextremismandinsurgency.Whereappro-priate,USAIDwillmovebeyondinformationsharingtocountry-based,
joint
strategy
development
and
program
plan-
ning. Multilaterally,USAIDwillalsodrawonandsharebestpractices.The Agencywillengagenon-traditional partnersincounteringlocaldriversofviolentextremismandinsurgency.Diasporagroups,theprivatesector,andlocalreligiousleadersoftenpossessareachthatmakethempotentiallyeffectivepart-nersinamplifyingUSAIDslocalimpact.14
CONCLUSIONInformedby broaderUSG effortsincludingtheU.S. GlobalDevelopmentPolicyandQDDR,thispolicyservesasafounda-tiononwhichUSAIDwilldesignandimplementeffective,evidence-baseddevelopmentprogrammingtargetingdriversofvio-lentextremismandinsurgencywhilesystemicallylearningfromandadaptingitsapproaches.USAIDisindispensibletoanyUSGdevelopmentresponsetocounterviolentextremismandinsur-gency. ThepolicywillalsofortifyUSAIDsdevelopmentvoiceastheUSGdevisesandimplementspolicies,strategiesandprogramsinsupportofoursharednationalsecurityobjectives.
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