The Decline of Latin American Student ActivismAuthor(s): Daniel C. LevyReviewed work(s):Source: Higher Education, Vol. 22, No. 2, Student Political Activism and Attitudes (Sep., 1991),pp. 145-155Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3447249 .Accessed: 28/10/2012 20:57

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

.

Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Higher Education.

http://www.jstor.org

Higher Education 22: 145-155, 1991. ? 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

The decline of Latin American student activism

DANIEL C. LEVY Department of Educational Administration and Policy Studies, State University of New York at Albany, Albany, N.Y. 12222, U.S.A.

Abstract. If Latin America once represented a worldwide reference point for potent student activism, the region now stands out for the decline of activism. While other regions experience new forms and impacts of activism, Latin America's decline should be understood within two broad contexts: macropolitical and higher educational.

The macropolitical context subsumes at least three major causal factors. One is the role of authoritarian rule, especially powerful in the 1970s but leaving a legacy that itself works against activism. Second, we must consider the more complex and mixed impacts of the redemocratization that has swept the region. The third factor is the general decline of the left both domestically and internationally.

On the higher education side, decades of unprecedented growth in student numbers have fragmented the student body, especially as growth is accompanied by extraordinary institutional proliferation. Many of the newer institutions are inhospitable for student activism. Privatization has had an especially strong demobilizing effect. The institutional changes are accompanied by a changing profile of fields of study, away from some most associated with student politics. Finally, the concentration of top social scientists in research centers apart from the universities - and from the students - is also crucial.

Introduction

As other regions witness increased student activism in the closing years of the century, Latin America - long seen as the extreme in such activism - witnesses a notable decrease. This article explains the decrease in terms of two clusters of factors. The first is the macropolitical context. The second, surer in its limiting effects, is the higher education context. Both clusters will show how diversification is crucial in understanding the decline.

Perception of decline stems partly from images of extraordinary activism that were formed when most of the literature on Latin American students was written, in the 1960s and early 1970s. The literature was itself a response to what can now be interpreted as a temporary peak in student politics. Since that time, however, very little has been written, so that extant literature would leave readers with either false impressions or, at best, a lack of explanation for the changes.' And these changes involve not just a fall from the peak but a longer-term transformation that requires attention.

Macropolitical context

Too often works on student activism consider the macropolitical context only insofar as it is the object of protest; yet the context also largely determines propensities, orientations, and, crucially, permissible bounds of activism.

146

Authoritarian rule

The point about bounds was made painfully clear in recent times, particularly in the 1970s. It has already been analyzed (Levy 1981) but must be summarized here, despite the fact that democracies have subsequently swept the region, because extended military rule was so crucial to the decline of activism in the 1970s and also the 1980s and because the legacy of that rule still has a telling effect.

Historically, authoritarian rule in Latin America usually allowed for pockets of autonomy, of which the university was a leading example. Starting with Brazil in 1964, however, militaries assumed power with intentions not just to save the status quo and quickly turn government back to trustworthy civilians but to remake society through extended rule. Repression and exclusion were central characteristics of their policy toward the university and beyond. So on the one hand student activism on campus was prohibited while, on the other, related structures in which students had participated beyond the campus (e.g., political parties) were also outlawed. Violations of prohibitions were often dealt with brutally. The impact on student activism was especially profound because repression came in precisely those nations where activism had gone furthest in the years just before the coups and because these nations (Brazil, Argentina 1966 and 1976, Chile and Uruguay 1973) accounted for well over half the higher education enrollments; and the figu :'es would expand if we include aggressive military rule in Central America and, at times, certain other South American nations in the 1970s.

As to the chilling legacy of repressive military rule, I would emphasize a few points consistent with a wider literature on political culture. Many youth see politics as dirty, and are apathetic. Accordingly, fewer than half those eligible voted in renewed Argentine student elections (1984), and surveys show distrust of student political leaders (Mollis 1989, pp. 344-345). Then too, long military rule showed many the ultimate weakness of student activists, particularly as most of the latter's goals were diametrically opposed to the military's policies within and beyond the university. Additionally, the military's brutality taught many that leftist activism carries great risks, and that things could indeed be much worse than they are under centrist or even rightist civilian regimes. Finally, extended military rule helped the development of some rightist student groups: juxtaposed to groups of decidedly different tendencies, these contribute to fragmenting diversification.

Democratization

To be sure, democratization has allowed renewed student activism. To deny that would be to deny the obvious in pursuit of an unqualified thesis about decline. Even in the opening up process, while militaries still governed, student activity increased. Regime power and legitimacy to repress was waning; dynamics were underway in which 'softliners' and realists (about transition) were ascendant within the regimes themselves (O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986). The process was especial- ly long in Brazil; students were demonstrating fairly freely and voting in their

147

universities for a decade before the nation directly elected its president (1989). In fact, Brazil shows how student activists could assume important leadership roles, and set examples, in the wider struggle for redemocratization. Something similar happened in Chile from 1983 to 1990, even though most student goals were of limited institutional scope. (With qualifications we could even cite the role of Mexican student activists since the mid-1980s in demanding unprecedented democratization of their nation's civilian authoritarian regime.) As in Eastern Europe, students in Latin America were spurred by the realization that an impact was possible when regimes were on the ropes.

Once democracies are established, authoritarian restrictions are naturally replaced by ample freedom to be active. Students typically regain some represent- ation within their institutions and a credible power of protest beyond as well. Meanwhile, the re-establishment of other organizations in civil society reopens multiple routes for activism long characteristic of civil regimes (e.g., activism associated with youth wings of political parties, sometimes en route to recruitment to government positions). Additionally, the center-right economic policies of most of the post-military democracies in South America (Brazil, Chile, and Argentina) and, especially by 1990, Central America, are logical targets for criticism by student leftists, a point that applies well also to the rightward flow of the Mexican regime. In Guatemala, national university students protested President Cerezo's austerity policies. In Nicaragua, where a center-right coalition replaced the sandinistas (1990), student activists formed even during the transition to demand demobiliza- tion of the contras, huge pay increases for faculty, and other measures that suggested an active future.2

Granted all this, the new democratic context also carries factors, admittedly more subtle, that cut against student activism.

First, most of the democracies are brittle. Consequently, the authoritarian legacy is especially vivid. Even such relatively developed nations as Argentina and Brazil have had precious little experience with democracy; the former has suffered through repeated periods of military rule, as have many smaller nations. Furthermore, all the new and renewed democracies, with the partial exception of Chile, have assumed power amid terrible economic crisis. While the striking movement toward neoliberal economic policy provokes some student protest, it is also a humiliating illustration of the impotence of student politics on the national scale, as activists have lobbied for quite opposite policies; credibility declines. Then too, the crisis has pushed student groups to focus on corporate self-protection, such as protesting increased prices in the cafeteria, medical services, and public transportation. That may be activism, but hardly the romantic or inspired kind that builds great movements. Beyond that, the crisis leads many to regard activism as a luxury or an irrelevance; many become but part-time students as they work off campus.

Second, democracies have replaced not just modern authoritarian military rule but also oligarchies, at least if we compare 1990 to 1970 and 1960 as well as to 1980. It was under such oligarchies that students often achieved their greatest impact due to the narrowness of the regime alongside the absence of other strong actors in civil society (Silvert 1967). More to the point here, such potential impact, including the

148

heralded cases related to toppling personalistic dictators, encouraged activism. By contrast, students are at best one group among many in today's democracies. Student activity now often flows through other organizations, weakening student movements per se. Albornoz (1989, p. 412) shows how much all Venezuelan groups, including students, are coopted by the main political parties. Silva Michelena (1986) likewise finds that the student movement no longer serves as the voice of national identity, as multiple mass media grow, and he accurately generalizes about the decline of activism in the 'old democracies' (which, for the inclusion of Mexico alongside Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica, I have called 'reconciliation' (Levy 1981) or 'civil' regimes). Thus, activism will not necessarily increase as new democracies institutionalize themselves.

A third factor is how the moderation of the democracies fragments student politics. Widespread revulsion, common for student bodies facing tottering oligarchies and modern militaries, does not materialize here. For example, disagreeement with policies that do not vigorously pursue former human rights violators is not nearly so intense as that over the violations themselves.

Moving the analysis beyond the form of government to the general political climate, we see further reason for declining activism. After all, it is the general population that is electing centrist to conservative governments. A salient political fact is this: the left itself has been weakening.

Events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have reduced the attraction of leftist groups, putting them on the defensive. So have Chinese reforms followed by brutal repression. Closer to home, Cuba appears an embarrassing anachronism more than an inspiration, and the sandinista defeat is another shock. Additionally, I would emphasize: the discrediting of the left during its reign preceding (or, arguably, even partly precipitating) military rule (e.g., Chile, Brazil, Argentina); the relatively conservative drift of West European democracies; and an increasingly favorable view of the United States.

The decline of the left contributes to the decline of student activism as that activism has generally been leftist. The less leftist, the less distinctive. Moreover, the decline of leftism is tied to a decline of beliefs in certainties and in optimistic views about the likelihood of change.3

Of course, some students remain on the activist left. But as others do not, movements diversify politically or are marginalized. Indeed, this marginalization is increasingly accompanied by outright rejection by the bulk of the student body. This is something different from the mix of sympathy and apathy with which many students historically viewed activists. Moncada (1986, p. 366) contrasts the heyday of activist popularity in Ecuador with a contemporary reality of a movement that is 'dispersed, incoherent, confused, weakened and often stuck in violent electoral disputes.' (Silie (1988, p. 179) echoes the idea for the Dominican Republic, where most youth see student organizations as alien, not for them. Albornoz (1989, pp. 407-409) argues that Venezuela's once powerful left is almost gone, as former activists are in the system, and surveys show high school students favoring the status quo, distrusting politics, and disliking student activists. Bernales (1986, pp. 400-401) reports that the terror of Sendero Luminoso (the guerrilla group) has had a

149

discrediting effect in Peru. More generally, Silva Michelena (1986, pp. 293-298) finds moderation breeding hostility to student radicalism. In Chile, it is striking that only the Communist Party has pushed co-government (which involves strong student representation) for universities, and most leftist parties have joined with the center in keeping that party out of the ruling democratic coalition. Finally, in Mexico, students did successfully mobilize to beat back academic reforms at the National University but activists failed in attempts to seize the opportunity to build an ongoing movement and press for co-government and other demands.

Higher education context

A complete division between the macropolitical and higher education context would be artificial as the former has affected the latter. Examples include the ways military repression of public higher education has spurred multiple types of privatization. But none of the higher education changes has been caused solely by macropolitical changes, and some have occurred rather independently. In any event, shifts in the higher education context have been more secular, less uncertain, than the macropolitical ones. Moreover, they have more consistently undermined student activism.

System growth

Tremendous growth in student enrollments from the 1950s at least into the 1970s, depending upon nation, driving the regional cohort percentages from 3% in 1960 to 12% by 1975, has transformed the higher education system. Though military rule sometimes thwarted growth, other regimes and macropolitical forces (e.g., the ideology of development) as well as broad socioeconomic forces promoted it.

Initially, surging numbers may have contributed to activisim and a new sense of power. But the stronger secular effect seems to have been divisive diversification. Students increasingly come from different backgrounds from one another. Commonality, objectively defined and subjectively perceived, has declined. So has the aura of national leadership, and the claim of serving as a national voice. Such settings are more natural for elite systems - and may well explain sharp differences with the African cases discussed elsewhere in this issue. Indeed, Brunner (1986, pp. 279-283) depicts such fragmentation, with the decline of student leadership and unified student culture, as central for explaining diminished activism in Latin America.4

Furthermore, admission of nonelite groups has meant that an increased percentage of students must work outside the university. This obviously undermines any sense of unified community, as it emphasizes the immediate practical needs of many students. The weakening effect on student activism has been powerful in such systems as the Brazilian and the Dominican. And the effect is exacerbated as other university actors have increasingly become full time. For one thing, the core of

150

full-time professors tends to look askance at excessively nonacademic student activities, as seen in their reaction to student demonstrations at Mexico's National University in the last few years. For another, full-time professors have their own concerns and weight within the university, marginalizing students; in these same recent years Venezuelan universities have been closed more from the professoriate's demands regarding salary and benefits than from student activism (Albornoz 1989, p. 407), quite a turn around from the 1960's. Moreover, in these two nations and many others, activist university workers have become the most disruptive dissident political force on campus. Finally, however, Brunner (1986, p. 284) keenly notes how so much of the affairs of large academic institutions are now handled by professional bureaucrats, in routinized and technocratic ways that help make student activism remote.

Growth has also undermined unity in terms of fields of study. The traditional 'big three' of medicine, law, and engineering, now account for only about one-third of total enrollments (Levy 1986, pp. 268-271). Moreover, the literature has always found activism linked with only certain fields (Lipset and Altbach 1967), and a huge proportional decline has occurred in the fields most associated with student activism. Law, with less than one-tenth of contemporary enrollments, is a key example. Likewise, the 'academic' social sciences (e.g., sociology) are now outdistanced three to one by business-related studies. Such diversification is mostly related to broad differentiation processes that help define development. Also relevant is the increasing technification and even conservative drift of government, along with privatization of the economy.

Additionally, field diversification relates strongly to another form of diversifica- tion spurred by student growth: institutional proliferation. Though large uni- versities have gotten larger, most growth has eventually channeled itself into different institutions. Crucially, national universities have lost their role, sometimes held for a century and a half, as either monopolies or at least undisputed center and leader of higher education systems. A country like Venezuela has alongside its national university the following official categories of institutions: other public autonomous universities, public experimental universities, private universities, an open university, pedagogical institutes, polytechnical institutes, both public and private university institutes of technology, and both public and private colleges (CNU 1982, pp. 17-46). Such proliferation has made unified student movements much harder to achieve. Not only do students at different institutions have different backgrounds, aspirations, living conditions, and socializations, they are physically separated. And many find themselves at institutions, such as technical institutes, with no tradition, interest or tolerance for student activism. Even the newer university institutions, however, are somewhat less prone to activism than are their more venerable counterparts, as Argentina shows (Cano 1985, p. 94).

Privatization

The most striking aspect of institutional proliferation affecting student activism has been privatization. A detailed account of how privatization weakens student

151

activism (Levy 1981, pp. 366-374) is updated, summarized, and augmented in the ensuing paragraphs.

Whereas in 1960 still only 15% of total enrollments were in private institutions, by 1975 it was 34% and has held relatively steady since. Every nation except Cuba has a private sector, and three (Brazil, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic) have the majority of their enrollments there. The numbers are significant as private institutions typically allow no or minimal student representation on decision- making bodies. More importantly, they boast a general lack of activism (and certainly disorder) through protest.

Explanations for the lack of activism stem from the reasons actors have created, supported, and chosen private institutions. Many governments have directly or indirectly promoted privatization, partly because of the anti-government bent of student activism in the publics. But, paradoxically, governments promoting public growth have often exacerbated factors that lead others to see the publics as failures, and seek private alternatives. Many families have chosen privates precisely because they promise a lack of disorder. In turn, the private institutions are conservative and themselves would allow little activism. Even in the exceptional cases where private institutions allow student representation and voting, as by law in Peru, no flavor of activism resembles the public sector.

The private sector's political orientations combine with socioeconomic ones. Private students come disproportionately from privileged families disinclined toward leftist politics, and seeking institutions that offer the best routes to the best jobs. Many of these become the most selective institutions, and they specialize in job-oriented fields such as business administration, not normally linked to activism. Again a mutually reinforcing dynamic develops between institutional selection and student self-selection. Then, as privates hold an edge in terms of privileged clientele, job prospects, academic prestige, etc., public institutions - and the student politics at them - become more marginalized. To choose the region's three oldest universities, the national universities of Peru, Mexico and the Dominican Republic is to choose three telling examples. Unlike their predecessors, public student activists there and elsewhere do not speak from the pinnacle. Furthermore, each time activists block academic reform at their public universities, they contribute to the lag behind leading privates. No wonder activists usually fought hard against the creation of growth of private sectors. But today's battle in Costa Rica is but a faint echo of the great battles of recent decades. The activists have lost.

Two trends further bolster the depoliticizing effect. One concerns democratiza- tion. The private-public difference had a less decisive impact when authoritarian regimes blocked activism across-the-board. Inter-sectoral differences have been much more decisive in civil systems, such as Venezuela's and Mexico's, and so could well assume increased significance in the new democracies. The other trend concerns subsectors on the private side. In fact, some Catholic universities of the 'first wave' of privatization have seen, over time, a degree of activism, though rarely has it approached public sector dimensions. And this Catholic phenomenon may be more than counterbalanced by the fact that the private weight has passed increasingly into secular institutions. The elite ones, which some prestigious Catholic institutions

152

increasingly resemble as they lose distinctive religious identity, have been famously incompatible with activism. But the main private growth especially in the 1980s has come in nonelite secular institutions. These do not conform to all the traits elaborated above but they are typically based on commercial fields, are populated by part-time students, and are small and multitudinous - all of which aggravates the fragmentation.

Research centers

A further major fracturing of the system that has hurt student activism is the startling ascendancy of research centers. Many of these, including most that are freestanding outside the universities, are private research centers (prcs), over- whelmingly concentrated in the social sciences (Brunner and Barrios 1987). Others exist within the universities (urcs) themselves, especially the public ones; they cover principally the natural and social sciences.

Prcs have surged largely as responses to authoritarian regimes, which made critical work impossible in most universities. Funding would come overwhelmingly from international sources, with added protection sometimes afforded by church connections. Prcs have dominated the social sciences, except economics, in Argentina and Chile; in Brazil, they would share the scene with universities. But the prcs are not disappearing with redemocratization. And they are increasingly sharing the scene or dominating it in a wide range of other nations including Peru, the Dominican Republic, and most in Central America. The main reason is clear: prcs are a response largely to the difficulties of the main universities, whether or not those difficulties stem from regime repression. Most private universities do not do much academic social science and most public ones suffer from the problems elaborated above, including disorder. On the other hand, urcs (also 'institutes' within universities) reinforce the point about how research centers now exist in nations throughout the region, and about how they grow largely because of the 'micropolitical' and other problems of the universities. They are often at least partial sanctuaries from the difficulties plaguing the mainstream faculties.

Research centers work against student activism in several significant ways. First, overlaying everything else, they lack students. Depending on one's definition of prcs and urcs, they have either no students or few students, or students in but peripheral status. Teaching either does not exist, is limited to nondegree courses, or, even where most prevalent, subordinated to research. No students, no activism. Few students, little activism, especially as these are almost always graduate students, often carefully selected and much more academically oriented than 'undergraduates.' (Indeed, graduate education represents a further fracturing of the student body.) Again we see a mutual selection process that rules out much student activism. Furthermore, the research centers tend to be very serious about academic work, typically emphasizing objective and/or practical or theoretical over pointedly ideological research; prc dependence on performance for its soft money income in fact denies much margin for tolerating disorder. Moderation and professionalism

153

have also been promoted decisively by study in the U.S. and Western Europe, a common experience for those at research centers. Finally, the lack of student activism fits what are actually quite hierarchical organizations. Urcs typically have much less participation by students or even junior professionals than do faculties within the same universities. And prcs, rather ironically given the progressive ideologies of many of the researchers forced out of the public universities, are run in even more markedly top-down fashion; elections, for example, are rare. Overall, most prcs are rather consensual organizations, to which one affiliates by choice, and within which little dissidence emerges.

The College of Mexico, the Corporation of Economic Research for Latin America in Chile (CIEPLAN), the Center for the Study of State and Society in Argentina (CEDES), the Institute for Peruvian Studies (IEP), the University Research Institute of Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ), and other prcs do not have student activists. Nor do the urcs of the natural sciences, or apparently even the social sciences, at national universities in Costa Rica, Mexico, and elsewhere.

But it is not just that those at the research centers eschew activism. It is that they hold such a weight within the system. Unquestionably, Latin America's best research and ideas in the social sciences (in terms of both scholarship and policy relevance), and a vastly disproportionate share of the good professors, students, and physical resources are at the prcs. A parallel exists, though less strongly, regarding the urcs versus mainstream teaching faculties. Consequently, student activists at the public university faculties are once again marginalized.

Conclusion

One way to summarize is to speculate very sketchily in a comparative mode. The decline of Latin American student activism surely has much to do with develop- ment. On the macropolitical side there is the diversity of participatory vehicles in civil society. On the higher education development side there is the enormous differentiation stemming from growth and other factors. From both sides we see not only diminished disposition toward activism but, crucially, diminished political weight for potential activists at the public universities. In a very general way, therefore, Latin America may suggest something about the long-run future of Africa (and less-developed nations in Asia), where civil society is much less developed and higher education remains much smaller, elitist, and undifferentiated than in Latin America. On the other hand, changes within Latin America may make it fit somewhat more than before with the experiences of the First World in terms of lower levels of activism.

But such speculations must remain very loose for now, and very tentative. Experience breeds wariness about even hints of developmental determinism. No clear linear prograssion exists. Furthermore, the macropolitical side analyzed in this article is still in considerable flux, with many consequences for activism still uncertain. Democratization obviously promotes some activism, and austerity may provoke more; so could threats or realities of authoritarian comebacks, or,

154

conceivably, opportunities to dump the remaining dictatorship in Cuba. In Central America and elsewhere not only is formal democracy weak but civil society is fragile. Even on the higher education side, particular features such as the dilution of conservative vigor at some now venerable private universities, while public universities hang onto the clear majority of enrollments, could cut against basic tendencies toward declining activism. And then there are all the factors that are presently unforseen. All the while, student activism is not dead.5

Nonetheless, I conclude by emphasizing that diminished student activism has been a sure fact in Latin American politics over the last two decades. The macropolitical context provides some important explanations for that, even while its effects are mixed. The higher education context, itself shaped by broader political and socioeconomic tendencies, provides another set of explanations and these are overwhelmingly related to diminished student activism.

Notes

1. The only recent sources I know that thematically treat decline in more than one nation are Brunner (1986) and Silva Michelana (1986), both of which make pioneering contributions, especially on

fragmentation within higher education; nonetheless, my work attempts a contribution particularly regarding macropolitics and the role of privatization and research centers. The next most recent piece would be Levy (1981), but it is weak on the higher education context beyond privatization, and its macropolitical analysis was based on the 1970s, with but a sketchy update in Levy (1989). One review article covering earlier work is Peterson (1970); even then, students were not as active as

stereotypes had it. Unfortunately, the present contribution can give but the scantest attention to several related matters including: the evolving forms lingering activism assumes; details on individual nations and enormous variation across nations; comparisons to other regions.

2. In Panama students have also demonstrated for such measures as increased wages for professors, but the most notable point so far has been a low profile both during and immediately after the U.S. invasion, whereas anti-U.S. protests were visible while Noriega was in power.

3. On the other hand, a new belief in certainty has arisen with neoliberal student movements. Argentina's, lacking precedent in the nation's history, blossomed by the mid-1980s and assumed a key role in seeking popular support for the new right. Argentina's conservative parties had previously denounced student politicization, but then welcomed the anti-state ideology and its explanations for public university failures (Gibson 1990).

4. I do not want to exaggerate prior unity. Even among activists, bitter splits (e.g., along national political lines) were common in nations such as Chile by the 1960s. Mexico had hundreds of student unions at one time (Mabry 1982, pp. 289-290).

5. Although this article has not attempted to document where activism persists, even so it has made

passing reference to roles in ending recent military regimes and pressing for democratization, and to effective efforts to block policies (ranging from increased fees for student services to academic reform) that would directly affect individual and corporate interests.

References

Albornoz, O. (1989). 'Venezuela', in Altbach, P. (ed.), Student Political Activism: An International Reference Handbook. New York: Greenwood Press, pp. 405-416.

155

Altbach, P. (ed.) (1989). Student Political Activism: An International Reference Handbook. New York: Greenwood Press.

Bernales, E. (1986). 'Los problemas de la juventud universitaria en el Peru', in Tedesco, J.C. and Blumental, H. (eds.), La juventud en America Latina. Caracas: CRESALC, pp. 383-401.

Brunner, J. J. (1986). 'El movimiento estudiantil ha muerto. Nacen los movimientos estudiantiles', in Tedesco, J. C. and Blumenthal, H. (eds.), La juventud en America Latina. Caracas: CRESALC, pp. 279-390.

Brunner, J. J. and Barrios, A. (1987). Inquisicion, mercado yfilantropia. Santiago: FLACSO. Cano, D. (1985). La educacion superior en la Argentina. Buenos Aires: FLACSO/CRESALC. CNU (Consejo Nacional de Universidades) (1982). Boletin estadistico no. 8. Caracas: Oficina de

Planificaci6n del sector universitario. Gibson, E. (1990). 'Democracy and the new electoral right in Argentina', working paper no. 12 of

Columbia's University's Institute of Latin American and Iberian Studies. Levy, D. (1986). Higher Education and the State in Latin America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Levy, D. (1989). 'Latin American student politics: beyond the 1960s', in Altbach, P. (ed.), Student

Political Activism: An International Reference Handbook. New York: Greenwood Press, pp. 315-338. Levy, D. (1981). 'Student politics in contemporary Latin America', Canadian Journal ofPolitical Science

14 (2), 353-376. Lipset, S. M. and Altbach, P. (eds.) (1967). Students in Revolt. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin. Mabry, D. (1982). The Mexican University and the State: Student Conflicts 1910-1971. College Station:

Texas A & M. Mollis, M. (1989). 'Argentina', in Altbach, P. (ed.), Student PoliticalActivism: An InternationalReference

Handbook. New York: Greenwood Press, pp. 339-350. Moncada, J. (1986). 'Experiencias nacionales de politicas universitarias: el caso ecuatoriano', in Tedesco,

J. C. and Blumental, H. (eds.), La juventud en America Latina. Caracas: CRESALC, pp. 359-368. O'Donnell, G., Schmitter, P., and Whitehead, L. (eds.) (1986). Transitions from Authoritarian Rule.

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Peterson, J. (1970). 'Recent research on Latin American university students', Latin American Research

Review 5 (1), 37-56. Silie, R. (1988). 'Educaci6n superior dominicana: situaci6n y perspectiva', Santo Domingo. Unpublished

manuscript. Silva Michelena, J. A. (1986). 'La participaci6n estudiantil en las actividades politicas', in Tedesco, J. C.

and Blumenthal, H. (eds.), La juventud en America Latina. Caracas: CRESALC, pp. 291-302. Silvert, K. (1967). 'The university student', in Snow, P. (ed.), Government and Politics in Latin America.

New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston. Tedesco, J. C. and Blumenthal, H. (eds.) (1986). La juventud en America Latina. Caracas: CRESALC.