This month's edition of The CIP Report is focused on theissue of Public Trust and Confidence, a topic of great rele-vance in the wake of after action reports from the previoushurricane season. The issue of public trust and confidencehas been fundamental to all discussion related to criticalinfrastructure protection, and is in fact called out in CriticalFoundations: Protecting America's Infrastructures, the reportof the President's Commission on Critical InfrastructureProtection. This decisive document clearly defined publicconfidence as the "trust bestowed by citizens based ondemonstrations and expectations of: 1) Their government's ability to provide fortheir common defense and economic security and behave consistent with the inter-ests of society; and 2) their critical infrastructures' ability to provide products andservices at expected levels and to behave consistent with their customers' bestinterests."1

To those who have responsibility and accountability for the effective managementof our response process, maintaining public trust and confidence is an essentialelement to successful incident management. In my past life as a trained US CoastGuard Incident Commander for oil and hazardous material spills, this was known asthe 'oily duck' principle. No matter how well an incident was managed from a tech-nical, operational or fiscal perspective, if pictures of one unattended oily duckappeared in the media, the overall response would be considered a failure by thepublic at large. Clearly, we saw this principle in the extreme during HurricaneKatrina. Haunting images of the Superdome, submerged school buses, and crum-bling levees will always overshadow the many things that went right with theresponse.

This issue includes an overview of the sources on public trust and confidence, pro-viding insight into recent reports such as the White House's Federal Response toHurricane Katrina. Our Legal Insights column examines the continuing activity sur-rounding the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS) as it relates topublic trust and confidence, and we provide a write-up of our recent CFIUS event,which featured a keynote by Stewart Baker, Assistant Secretary for Policy for DHS.Finally, we feature an article examing the impact of public trust on charities and thepotential impact this might have on their ability to respond to disasters, and a sur-vey on public confidence in CIP.

Public Trust and Confidence

Sources on Public Trust andConfidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Legal Insights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Confidence in CharitableOrganizations . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

CFIUS Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Survey on Public Confidencein CIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Newsletter Editorial StaffEEddiittoorrss

Jessica Milloy

Jeanne Geers

SSttaaffff WWrriitteerrss

Amy Cobb

Randy Jackson

Colleen Hardy

Maeve Dion

JJMMUU CCoooorrddiinnaattoorrss

John Noftsinger

Ken Newbold

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Zeichner Risk Analytics

Contact: cipp01@gmu.edu703.993.4840

If you would like to subscribe toThe CIP Report please click here.Visit us online for this and otherissues at http://cipp.gmu.edu

The Critical Infrastructure Protection Program

THECIPREPORTMay 2006 / Volume 4, No. 11

John A. McCarthyDirector, Critical Infrastructure Protection ProgramGeorge Mason University, School of Law

1 Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructures, The Report of the President'sCommission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, October 1997, availablehttp://www.ciao.gov/CIAO Document Library/PCCIP Report.pdf.

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THE CIPREPORT May 2006 / Volume 4, No. 11

Sources on Public Trust and Confidence

FFiivvee PPrriinncciipplleess ffoorr PPrroommoottiinngg TTrruusstt aanndd CCoonnffiiddeennccee

1. Develop and disseminate key contacts - including communication chains. 2. Pre-canned messages to the public, employees, customers, suppliers, and others.3. Coordinate clear and unambiguous messages; coordinate these messages with partners.4. Proactively manage fear. 5. Implement public awareness programs in areas where the public is potentially impacted

by a hazard.

Public Trust & Confidence:Traditions and Definitions

Managing public trust and confi-dence has evolved into one ofthe more complex aspects ofcritical infrastructure protection.Trust issues are of growing rele-vance to the critical infrastruc-ture community. The NortheastBlackout and Hurricane Katrinarepresent two events not involv-ing terrorist attacks and yetrequired deployment of publictrust and confidence programs.

Both the public and private sec-tors should carefully considerstrategies for managing public

trust and generating confidencein infrastructure service deliveryin advance of a catastrophicnatural disaster or security inci-dent.

Public trust and confidence hasbeen thoroughly studied anddefined in other policy contexts.In judicial circles, for example,Federal and State organizationshave examined the public's per-ception of our judicial institu-tions. The National Center forState Courts regularly assessesthe extent to which citizens havetrust and confidence in courtdecisions - to measure the pub-lic's willingness to comply, aswell as to gauge perceptions offairness, accessibility to thecourts, and speed of review.The most recent survey identi-fies four aspects of trust andconfidence, which constitute auseful definition for a variety ofpublic policy contexts:

(1) Interpersonal Respect: Being treated with dignity and respect, and having one's rights protected;

(2) Neutrality: Decision makers who are honest and impartial and base decisions on facts;

(3) Participation (voice): The opportunity to express one's views to decision makers; and

(4) Trustworthiness: Benevolence of the motives of authorities.1

Researchers and governmentagencies have also consideredtrust and confidence in areasperceived to be especially dan-gerous by the public. Over adecade ago, for instance, anadvisory committee for theSecretary of Energy examined thepublic's trust and confidence inthe clean-up of radioactive waste.The committee ultimately con-cluded that public trust and con-fidence is the foundation uponwhich American governancestructures rest:

Although the relationship is by nomeans straightforward or uncom-plicated, high levels of trust andconfidence buttress the legitima-cy of action in the public sphere.In addition, low levels erode thatlegitimacy and call into funda-mental question the bondbetween those who govern andthose who are governed.2

(Continued, Page 3)

The White House Report onHurricane Katrina

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THE CIPREPORT May 2006 / Volume 4, No. 11

Sources on Public Trust (Cont.from Page 2)

Legal Foundations: Public Trustand Confidence in CriticalInfrastructure

First the bad news: Congress hasfailed to statutorily define or dele-gate activities to promote publictrust and confidence relating tocritical infrastructure protection.Similarly, Congress attempts topromote trust indirectly - throughfunding and other pre- and post-disaster activities - by adoptingdisaster-related authorities, suchas the Stafford Act and theDefense Production Act. TheStafford Act's emphasis on partic-ular governmental actions --reducing immediate threats to life and property, providing warn-ings, and removing debris are allexamples of public sector effortsto return life to normal after a

major disaster. These and otherauthorities do not, however,direct the development of publictrust strategies in close concertwith State officials and criticalinfrastructure owners.

Arguably, the public has paid aprice for the lack of clear authori-ty and Congressional direction.

Infighting across the US-Canadian border during theNortheast Blackout, while of lim-ited duration, could have led towidespread confusion and asense that neither governmentwas managing an essential citi-zen service - reliable supplies ofelectric power. Ultimately, thelack of panic during theNortheast Blackout, especially inNew York City, reflected not onlya belief that Federal, State, andlocal government officials werefirmly in control of issues (likesecurity), but also demonstratedthe public's confidence in theelectric power sector's ability torestore service across a widegeographic expanse and to focuson customer needs.

Clearer direction from Congresscould have covered such issuesas: (1) Congressional expecta-tions and findings on the impor-tance of public trust and confi-dence during a catastrophic dis-aster; (2) Delegation of authority(such as to the Department ofHomeland Security (DHS)) tomanage (Continued, Page 4)

The House Bipartisan CommitteeReport on Hurricane Katrina

The Senate Committee onHomeland Security and

Governmental Affairs Report onHurricane Katrina

The NNaattiioonnaall RReessppoonnssee PPllaann creates procedures to disseminate andrespond to requests for pre-disaster, disaster, and post-disaster informa-tion, including procedures for providing information to internal and exter-nal audiences, including the media, and dealing with their inquiries.

The NRP institutes an integrated concept, termed "incident communica-tions," as the approach used to manage communications with the publicduring Incidents of National Significance. Incident communications incor-porates the following processes:

CCoonnttrrooll:: Identification of incident communications coordinating, primaryand supporting departments and agency roles, and authorities forrelease of information.CCoooorrddiinnaattiioonn:: Specification of interagency coordination and plans, notifi-cation, activation, and supporting protocols.CCoommmmuunniiccaattiioonnss:: Development of message content such as incidentfacts, health risk concerns, pre-incident and post-incident preparednessrecommendations, warning issues, incident information, messages, audi-ences, and strategies for when, where, how, and by whom the messageswill be delivered. General guidance on the authority to release informa-tion is in accordance with existing plans, operational security, lawenforcement protocols, designated coordinating and primary agencyassignments, and current procedures.3

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THE CIPREPORT May 2006 / Volume 4, No. 11

Sources on Public Trust (Cont.from Page 3) trust issues duringan interstate infrastructure inci-dent; (3) Requirements to clarifyroles and responsibilities for pub-lic messaging as part of theNational Response Plan (NRP);and (4) Allocation of resources tocreate robust public-private trustand confidence programs.

Notwithstanding the lack of statu-tory frameworks, Congress, theAdministration, and the criticalinfrastructure sectors are gener-ating new strategic foundationsas well as specific practices topromote public trust and confi-dence for critical infrastructurepreparedness and response.

While there is no single, one-size-fits-all approach, an assortmentof lessons learned, planning doc-uments, and homeland securitystandards reveal particular princi-ples that promote trust and confi-dence. When read together,these documents offer at leastfive principles that apply in an all-hazards environment - whichincludes a terrorist incident or acatastrophic natural disaster.

1. Develop and disseminate keycontacts - including communica-tion chains.

The work efforts of the NorthAmerican Electric ReliabilityCouncil (NERC), which represents

the electric power sector, reflecta good example of preparednessfor public trust and confidence.NERC studied and documentedpreparedness options specificallyfor a pandemic influenza out-break. The guidance includesseveral recommendations for pro-moting trust and confidence,including emergency communica-tions strategies and planning.Such planning, the authors con-clude, should include key con-tacts, back-up contacts, and com-munication chains.

2. Pre-ccanned messages to thepublic, employees, customers,suppliers, and others.

A more proactive practice is todevelop messages in advance ofa disaster. Critical infrastructurecompanies and governmentagencies can then refine mes-sages and garner institutionapprovals in advance of an emer-gency. An even more sophisticat-ed approach is to coordinatethese pre-approved messagesacross the infrastructure sector,with other critical infrastructuresectors, and with the government(refer to the 3rd principle, below).

3. Coordinate clear and unam-biguous messages; coordinatethese messages with partners.

One of the more sophisticatedstrategies is to prepare communi-cations (Continued, Page 13)

TThhee WWhhiittee HHoouussee NNaattiioonnaall SSttrraatteeggyy ffoorr PPaannddeemmiicc IInnfflluueennzzaa IImmpplleemmeennttaattiioonn PPllaann emphasizes the need for main-taining public confidence by providing unambiguous, coordinated and consistent messages to the public. Theplan's guidance for employers suggests the development of platforms for communicating pandemic status andactions to employees, vendors, suppliers, and customers inside and outside the worksite in a consistent andtimely manner, including redundancies in the emergency contact system. The guidance also instructs employersto anticipate employee fear and anxiety, rumors, and misinformation and to plan communications accordingly.4

The BBuussiinneessss RRoouunnddttaabbllee''ss SSeeccuurriittyy TTaasskk FFoorrcceehas published an extensive security guide for thenation's Chief Executive Officers. Chapter 5underscores the importance of managing fearand shoring up confidence not only in the mar-kets, but also with employees, customers, suppli-ers, and vendors: "Leadership on the part ofcorporate executives is key to making employeesfeel safe in the event of a disaster. Coming outearly with appropriate information can preventpanic among both company employees and the

public in the affected community."5

The Business Roundtable considers public trust and crisis communica-tions in the business community so important, the group published a sec-ond volume dedicated solely to the issue. The organization suggests that:"when an actual crisis strikes, the CEO's role often includes serving as[the] chief morale builder, providing leadership and reassurance toemployees, the community and shareholders."6

Both publications address an all-hazards environment, which includes aterrorist incident or a catastrophic natural disaster.

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THE CIPREPORT May 2006 / Volume 4, No. 11

Legal Insights

Trust & Confidence & CFIUSby Randall Jackson, Esq., CIP Program

The Committeeon ForeignInvestment in theUnited States(CFIUS) was oncea rather obscureoffice dealingwith transactionsinvolving foreign-

owned entities investing in theUnited States. Its work was car-ried out quietly and received verylittle media attention. Certaindeals, such as Lenovo or CNOOC,was picked up by mainstreammedia, but CFIUS remained most-ly unknown to the public.

That all changed a few monthsago when Dubai Ports World, acompany owned by the govern-ment of the United Arab Emirates(UAE), purchased Peninsular &Oriental Steam Navigation, aBritish company which holds con-tracts to provide some servicesat sections of major ports aroundthe United States such as NewYork, Baltimore, Miami, and NewOrleans.

The deal was initially cleared byCFIUS within the 30-day reviewperiod. A 45-day investigationwas not deemed necessarydespite the fact of governmentownership. Some members ofCongress were upset by this deci-sion and questioned why a 45-day investigation was not under-

taken. The fact that the UAE isan Arab country then carried thedebate into a larger public arenaas questions of homeland securi-ty and terrorism were brought tobear.

CFIUS's power to conduct investi-gations and make decisions isbased on a congressionally dele-gated power. Congress has rec-ognized that the executivebranch can more efficiently andeconomically carry out the over-sight of foreign investment in theUS and so created CFIUS andgave it the authority it needed.Crucial to the decision to give thispower to CFIUS, and thus theexecutive branch of the govern-ment, was the implicit trust thatthe duties would be carried out ingood faith. For some membersof Congress, the Dubai PortsWorld deal was a breach of thattrust.

Since the Dubai Ports World con-troversy, a lot of legislation hasappeared. All have sought in oneway or another to take back intoCongress some degree of controland/or oversight of the process-es over which CFIUS has been incharge. Some have looked tochange the structure, rules or thename of CFIUS, while moreextreme bills have tried to banforeign ownership of critical infra-structure outright. All bills have

sought to re-inject members ofCongress into the vetting processof foreign investment. The confi-dence and trust Congressexpressed by delegating thisfunction to the executive branchappears to have evaporated.Congress seems to be saying thatit can no longer trust the execu-tive branch to properly weigh thecompeting interests of gain frominternational commerce againstpossible security threats. Andthey seem to be supported by thepublic. According to a CBS Newspoll,1 70% of Americans said thatthe Dubai Ports World dealshould not be allowed (including58% of Republicans asked). Asrepresentatives of the Americanpeople, Congress felt a need toact.

Yet it is widely agreed that foreigninvestment in the US is not only agenerally positive thing, but infact a very helpful and necessaryaspect of the US economy. WithUS debt approaching $1 trillion,foreign investment is crucial. It isalso a provider of significantemployment, including high-wageemployment, across the US econ-omy.

The loss, or lowering, of the levelof trust held by the public andthe Congress as regards theCFIUS process will inevitablymake it (Continued, Page 11)

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THE CIPREPORT May 2006 / Volume 4, No. 11

Confidence in Charitable Organizations Could Impact Disaster Relief

We inevitably see a great out-pouring of charitable giving fol-lowing large scale disasters,such as the recent hurricaneseason of 2005 and the tsunamirelief efforts initiated inDecember of 2004. In each ofthese disasters, the outpouringof charitable donations from theprivate sector and citizensenabled non-profit organizations,such as the American Red Cross,the United Way, and other reli-gious and secular groups toassist federal disaster relief pro-grams. With over one millioncharitable organizations in theUS, the significant contributionsmade by these volunteers andnon-profits greatly impactresponse and recovery efforts.However, with recent polls show-ing that public trust and confi-dence in charitable organizationsis dwindling, will these organiza-tions continue to play such avital role in future disasters?

As of February 28, 2006, the sixmonth mark following landfall byHurricane Katrina, theDepartment of HomelandSecurity reported that more than16,000 federal personnel havebeen deployed to the Gulf Coastto assist state and localresources and some $88 billionin federal aid has been allocatedfor relief, recovery, and rebuild-ing, with additional billionsrequested.1 The extent of dam-age to the Gulf Coast was over-whelming, with approximately90,000 square miles damagedby the storm and 1.5 million peo-ple impacted. Immediately follow-ing the storm, charitable contri-butions towards recovery andreconstruction began arriving;with nearly $3 billion donated byprivate individuals, businessesand groups in support of faith-based and community organiza-tions and disaster relief agen-cies. Following the example of

the tsunami relief efforts, formerPresidents Bush and Clintonorganized private fundraisingefforts that yielded more than$100 million in aid for the affect-ed region. Additional contribu-tions of nearly $125 million inaid arrived via international enti-ties to the State Department,which then transferred those con-tributions to FEMA and theDepartment of Education (forrebuilding schools).

However, beyond the picture offederal aid, the American RedCross alone expended $2.116 bil-lion in relief efforts, aid that pro-vided nearly 500,000 peoplewith temporary shelter and morethan 34 million meals.2 In addi-tion to the food, shelter andmeals provided, the Red Crossalso offered emergency financialassistance, enabling victims topurchase clothing and otherdestroyed personal items, physi-cal and mental health services,and has an ongoing HurricaneRecovery Program that will con-tinue to address the long-termneeds of these communities.Beyond these vital contributions,the Red Cross also boasts a twohour response and mobilizationtime for all 1,300 chaptersaround the country.

Organizations such as the RedCross have historically seen giv-ing levels rise in the past 39 of40 years, with 89% of US house-holds reporting donations withthe average contribution around$1620.3 And while the overallperception (Continued, Page 7)

The American Red Cross set up operations in a former WalMart in BatonRouge, LA, to provide aid to Hurricane Katrina victims.

Photo by Robert Kaufmann /FEMA

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THE CIPREPORT May 2006 / Volume 4, No. 11

Charities (Cont. from Page 6) ofnon-profits, including charities,foundations and philanthropicorganizations, is generally posi-tive, confidence in financial man-agement of charitable organiza-tions has suffered sinceSeptember 11, 2001. In a studyreleased by Paul C. Light of NYURobert F. Wagner GraduateSchool of Public Service inOctober of 2005, following thecontroversies related to the dis-bursement of funds for victims ofSeptember 11, 2001, the surgein giving spurred by the tragedyhad quickly diminished byDecember of the same year.Furthermore, Wagner states that"in addition to the loss of anypotential surge, confidence (infinancial management) fell dra-matically during the first quarterof 2002, and remained fixed atthe lower level through the sum-

mer."4 In a Harris Poll conductedon November 28, 2005 on atti-tudes towards non-profits afterKatrina and the tsunami (Poll#86), the public was divided fair-ly evenly between those that feelthe non-profit sector is on theright track (34%), those that feelthe sector is on the wrong track(30%), and those that are unsure(37%).5 To further expand uponthese feelings, when the pollspecifically asked "based on whatyou have read, seen or heardabout the response to HurricaneKatrina, how has your opinion ofAmerica's non-profit organiza-tions been impacted? Do youview non-profits…?", 27% ofrespondents felt more positively,19% felt more negatively, andabout 54% remained the same.Light translates these feelings tothe bottom-line- "charitableorganizations have every reason

to worry about the current levelof confidence in their organiza-tions, especially given the rela-tionship between confidence andgiving and volunteering."6

Added to the objective numbersprovided by polls are allegationsthat both the Red Cross and theHumane Society of the UnitedStates misused some of the mil-lions of dollars, resulting in thedismissal of 3 Red Cross employ-ees and inquiries by theLouisiana Attorney General'sOffice.7 And while these allega-tions draw further attention towhere donations are actuallybeing used, they are but a smallpart of the greater scrutiny anddesire for greater oversight cur-rently being felt by charitableorganizations and non-profitsnationwide. As Light discusses,only 19% (Continued, Page 11)

Figure provided by the American Red Cross in their report, "Challenged by the Storms: The American Red Cross Response toHurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma", retrieved from http://www.redcross.org/sponsors/drf/stewardship/HurrStewRep06.asp.

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THE CIPREPORT May 2006 / Volume 4, No. 11

Panelists Discuss Foreign Investment, CFIUS at GMU EventOn Friday, April 28, the CIPProgram hosted a panel discus-sion on the Committee onForeign Investment in the US(CFIUS). The panel consisted ofleading thinkers on the CFIUSissue, including three authorsfrom the CIP Program's recentlyreleased CFIUS monograph (link:http://cipp.gmu.edu/archive/CFIUS_monograph.pdf).

The panel was moderated byProf. William Lash of the GeorgeMason School of Law and con-sisted of Dr. Edward M. Graham,Senior Fellow, Institute forInternational Economics; DavidMarchick, Esq., Covington &Burling; The Hon. Patrick Mulloy Commissioner, United States-China Economic and SecurityReview Commission; andKristen Verderame, Esq., ChiefCounsel, BT Americas and VP,Commercial, Legal & RegulatoryBT Global Services.

Panelists reflected on the variousbills currently before Congress,as well as the recent Dubai PortsWorld case, looking at CFIUS

from historical, economic, legaland private sector points of view.The debate was spirited asregards the role of foreign invest-ment, trade policy and invest-ment strategy (both foreign anddomestic), and the need to pro-tect US security and competitive-ness. Some panelists arguedthat CFIUS has worked well as isand should be left alone before itcauses undue damage to foreigninvestment, an important part ofthe US economy. Others arguedthat foreign competitors are gain-ing dangerous access to USexpertise and knowledge, poten-tially undermining long-term UScompetitiveness. Each panelistbrought considerable CFIUS-relat-ed experience and insight to thetable. Important questions wereraised such as: Should CFIUSapply equally to all foreignnations, friend or foe? Shouldthere be some similar oversightof domestic industry involved incritical infrastructure? Can wemeasure the marginal increasein risk of a foreign-owned compa-ny as regards critical infrastruc-ture? Perhaps more fundamen-

tally, in thecurrent glob-al economy,what is a for-eign-ownedcompany?And regard-ing CFIUSspecifically,whereshould thechair belocated?

At theconclu-sion ofthe paneldiscus-sion, par-ticipantsheard alunchkeynoteaddressfromStewartBaker,Esq.,AssistantSecretaryfor Policyfor DHS.AssistantSecretaryBakergave an insider's perspective onthe CFIUS process, something helikened to "a fish's perspectiveon fishing." He took participantsthrough the events surroundingthe Dubai Ports World case, anddiscussed moving forward withthe CFIUS process and its impacton US security. The opportunityto hear first hand from a keyplayer within DHS was wellreceived by participants.

The event proved to be an inter-esting and insightful morningthanks to the quality of thekeynote speaker, panelists andmoderator. Attendees represent-ed a wide range of CFIUS andhomeland security stakeholders.The CIP Program wishes to thankall who took part for their timeand support.

Stewart Baker, DHS Asst.Secretary for Policy, delivers

keynote address.

Panelists discuss their experiences with foreign investment.

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THE CIPREPORT May 2006 / Volume 4, No. 11

Trust and Verify - A Survey on Public Confidence in CIPby Christine Pommerening, CIP Program

Who do people trust - and whodo they blame - when it comes toproviding critical infrastructuresand services? What do citizensand customers expect from pub-lic officials and private sectorleadership - and what do deci-sion-makers need to know aboutthe expectations of the public atlarge? These questions wereaddressed in two surveys (onenationwide, one for theWashington, DC area) conductedby Professor Todd M. La Porte forthe CIP Program.

Public confidence in government,emergency response and recoveryagencies, and critical infrastruc-ture service providers is vital toassuring order and calm in theevent of large-scale disruption dueto extreme events, either terroristattacks or major natural or tech-nological disasters. Trust is alsothe foundation of the social pactbetween citizens and the state -the social capital of society.

This also means that weakened

or destroyed public confidence inthe most critical public and pri-vate institutions would likely leadto diminished support for publicpolicies, lower private invest-ments, and result in calls forpolitical and institutional reform.Thus understanding and measur-ing public confidence in publicand private institutions is vital tothe successful design and imple-mentation of new policies ofsecuring infrastructures.

The following major findings givean impression of the public opinionregarding CIP and related home-land security issues. This state ofmind explains people's perceptionsof government and private sectorperformance, and can help antici-pate the response to disasterssuch as Hurricane Katrina.

1) Public experience with terror-ism and disaster: The terroristattacks experienced in theNational Capital Region (NCR)have left their mark on the public:46 percent said that their lives

have been somewhat or signifi-cantly changed as a conse-quence. 61 percent said that theDC-area sniper shootings alsochanged their lives. But severeweather and major essential serv-ice outages were not far behind:37 and 39 percent said thesetypes of events changed theirlives. National averages for theseevents were markedly lower.

2) Public preparations for emer-gencies: Between 50 and 90percent of both the NCR and thenation believe they have ade-quate preparations for a shortperiod of interrupted services,such as having battery-poweredradios, emergency medical sup-plies or food and water for threedays. Nearly twice as many resi-dents of the NCR, 48 percent,have specific emergency planscompared to the rest of the coun-try. About 40 percent of people inboth the region and the nationhave no plan for communicatingin the event of a disaster, and themajority (Continued, Page 10)

A great deal or a

good amount Some or very

little Don't know/

Refused United States

Prevent further terrorist attacks 22 68 9 Manage effectively during terrorist attacks 34 57 10 Recover from terrorist attacks 47 45 9

National Capital Region Prevent further terrorist attacks 20 74 6 Manage effectively during terrorist attacks 22 68 9 Recover from terrorist attacks 34 57 10

Confidence in private utilities to help prevent, manage and recover from terrorist attacks

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THE CIPREPORT May 2006 / Volume 4, No. 11

Trust and Verify Survey (Cont.from Page 9) have neither dis-cussed nor made any plans at allfor meeting or evacuating.

3) Public confidence in essentialor critical infrastructure services:About 40 percent of respondentsnationally and regionally are notconfident about the reliability ofelectric power and standard land-line telephone services. Fewerwere concerned about water, cellphones and television, and natu-ral gas. Radio instilled the mostconfidence of all essential servic-es. At the same time, from 33 per-cent to 62 percent of respondentsin the United States said theycould go for a week or more with-out one or more critical infrastruc-ture service. NCR results wereabout 9 percentage points lowerin each category than results fromthe country as a whole.

4) Public willingness to pay forincreased service reliability: Onlya relatively small percentage ofpeople say they are willing tospend a good deal or even twiceas much or more to assure criticalinfrastructure services. Water (11percent), electricity (10 percent)

and access to health care facili-ties (16 percent) are the servicesfor which the largest number ofpeople would pay extra. Within theNCR, however, almost twice asmany respondents are willing tospend a good deal or somewhatmore to keep critical servicesfunctioning reliably than nation-wide - but overall still less thanone quarter of the population.

5) Public trust and confidence ingovernment and homeland securi-ty agencies: 63 percent of the USpopulation, and 58 percent of theNCR, trusts the "government inWashington" only some of thetime or never. Respondents varyconsiderably in their confidence inlocal, state and federal agencies:local emergency medical unitsenjoy the greatest confidence, atmore than 80 percent, while theDepartment of HomelandSecurity, and its agencies(Customs and the TransportationSecurity Administration) have thelowest ratings, at about 30, 20and 25 percent, respectively. TheUS Coast Guard however, which isalso part of DHS now, receivedvery high marks of more than60%. And at the time of the sur-

vey, FEMA received positiveevaluation from about 45 per-cent - but this was beforeHurricane Katrina.

6) Public trust and confidencein non-ggovernmental emer-gency response agencies: Ofnon-governmental organiza-tions, the Red Cross was seenfavorably by 71 percentnationally and 69 percentregionally. NCR residents seelocal community organiza-tions, such as a local food

bank or homeless shelter, in apoorer light than their nationalcounterparts do: 61 percentnationally vs. 37 percent region-ally have a great deal or a lot ofconfidence in such organizations.

7) Public trust in protection,response and recovery activities:The majority of national andregional respondents think thatthe prevention of terrorist attacksis difficult--54 percent of thenation and 62 percent of theregion has only some or very littleconfidence in the government toprevent further attacks. Managingthe response during an event issomewhat better regarded, andlong-term recovery is regarded bet-ter still: 57 percent of the nationand 54 percent of the region areconfident in the government's abili-ty to help recover.

For more detailed results fromthis survey, as well as findingsfrom other studies on the state ofinfrastructure and communityresilience in the National CapitalRegion, please refer to the proj-ect website at http://cipp. gmu.edu/ncrproject

Confidence in Government (U.S. in %)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Prevent furtherterrorist attacks

Manageeffectively duringterrorist attacks

Recover fromterrorist attacks

Great deal/ good amount

Some/ very little

Don't know/ No answer

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THE CIPREPORT May 2006 / Volume 4, No. 11

Charities (Cont. from Page 7) ofAmericans believe that charitableorganizations do a very good jobrunning their programs and serv-ices, only 11% believe money isbeing spent wisely, and 66%believe that these organizationswaste a great deal or fair amountof money.8 Although organiza-tions such as the Red Cross pro-vided greater transparency inexactly where donations arebeing spent, not all organizationsprovide such measures ofaccountability, a move that manyfeel is required to rebuild theshaky trust that currently exists.

With these polls showing that asubstantial portion of theAmerican public lacks confidencethat charitable organizations areon the right path, the impact ongiving has yet to be seen. If givingis impacted, we may face a reali-ty where the non-profit responseto disasters is far less than it hasbeen previously, for even if givingjumps in response to a particular

event, the infrastructures ofthese organizations may be toowithered to support the types ofmobilization efforts seen post-Katrina. And while $2 billion mayseem like a drop in the bucketcompared to the federalresponse, 34 million meals, 30million snacks, 500,000 beds,and the 1.4 million families thatreceived emergency financialsupport from the Red Crosswould beg otherwise. Perhapswe'll know better the full impactmade by charitable contributionswhen non-profit volunteers fail toarrive on the disaster scene, butwe simply have to trust that daywill never come.

1 Department of Homeland Security.Hurricane Katrina: What Government isDoing. http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/katrina.htm2 American Red Cross. Challenged bythe Storms: The American Red CrossResponse to Hurricanes Katrina, Ritaand Wilma. http://www.redcross.org/sponsors/drf/stewardship/HurrStewRep06.asp

3 National Philanthropic Trust. PhilanthropyStatistics. http://www. nptrust.org/philan-thropy/philanthropy_stats.asp4 Light, Paul C.(2005, October).Rebuilding Public Confidence inCharitable Organizations. PublicService Brief, Brief #1, p.2. RetrievedMay 4, 2006 fromhttp://wagner.nyu.edu/news/wpb1_light.pdf. 5 Harris Poll #86, November 28, 2005.Retrieved from http://www.harrisinterac-tive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=615 6 Light, Paul C.(2005, October).Rebuilding Public Confidence inCharitable Organizations. PublicService Brief, Brief #1, p.4. RetrievedMay 4, 2006 fromhttp://wagner.nyu.edu/news/wpb1_light.pdf. 7 Salmon, J.L. (2006,March 26). RedCross, Humane Society UnderInvestigation. Washington Post.Retrieved May 4, 2006 fromhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/25/AR2006032501002.html. 8 Light, Paul C.(2005, October).Rebuilding Public Confidence inCharitable Organizations. PublicService Brief, Brief #1, p.1. RetrievedMay 4, 2006 fromhttp://wagner.nyu.edu/news/wpb1_light.pdf.

Legal Insights (Cont. from Page5) more difficult for foreign com-panies to invest in the US. Ofcourse, this is a good thing asregards those companies lookingto do so for nefarious reasons(i.e. inappropriately obtainingtechnology or access to the US).But for the vast majority of com-panies that are simply looking tomaximize their profits and gener-ate wealth, this will hurt the USby blocking the positive economiceffects produced by such compa-nies. Furthermore, too large arole for Congress can only serve

to strangle any deal in its infancy.Indeed, there are those who seethe Congress' lost trust as noth-ing more than a ploy to regaininfluence in a process that canhave huge economic impacts onlawmakers' constituents. It isthis kind of interplay that makessome business leaders quitewary of a too-active congression-al role.

It is a careful balance that mustbe struck between security andeconomic openness in regard toforeign investment. If the bene-

fits of that balance are to bemaximized, a high degree oftrust and confidence amongstthe branches of governmentinvolved and the American publicis crucial. Whatever legislationfinally settles in, let us hope thatit will serve to restore public trustand confidence and do so withoutgreatly damaging foreign invest-ment and the important role itplays in the US economy.

1 February 27, 2006, seehttp://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/poll_bush_022706.pdf

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THE CIPREPORT May 2006 / Volume 4, No. 11

The White House report, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, is especially rich with detailed rec-ommendations on developing an appropriate public affairs strategy. Recommendations, many of whichare included below, detail a wide range of changes that must take place as part of the NationalResponse Plan. These include each of the following:

DHS should revise the NRP to improve the Public Affairs Support and External Affairs annexes to ensure a better coordinated, more effective response.

DHS should revise standing operating procedures, command relationships, training, organizational structure, and communications between Federal Public Affairs Offices (PAOs) and their State and local counterparts.

DHS should revise the NRP to delineate a clear structure for a fully coordinated, integrated, and syn-chronized public communications strategy, across the Federal government and with State and locals.

DHS should establish rapidly deployable Public Affairs teams, able to operate self-sufficiently, in aus-tere conditions. These deployable Public Affairs teams should be established across all Federal departments and agencies with key Homeland Security responsibilities. These teams should be capable of providing Public Affairs assistance within hours to incident locations. These teams could be used to form the Incident Joint Information Center (JIC). All Federal departments and agencies with domestic operational responsibilities should establish programs to use embedded media whereappropriate.

DHS should expand Federal partnership programs with State and local Public Affairs Officials (PAO).

Develop a Public Communications Coordination capability for crisis communications at the White House. Designate a senior White House Communications official to be responsible for the HomelandSecurity Council and crisis communications portfolio. In close collaboration with DHS' Office of Public Affairs, this official would be responsible for:

Coordination of public communications and public affairs within the homeland across all relevantFederal departments and agencies;

Establishing a permanent strategic communications capability, to facilitate messages to the pub-lic, the media, and all departments and agencies;

Developing a national public communications and public affairs strategic plan;

Develop "Risk Communications" to communicate pre-incident expectations to private citizens. This may be carried out by identifying credible spokespersons who can frequently update the public on preparedness, current threats and crisis communications.

DHS should establish an integrated public alert and warning system in coordination with all relevant departments and agencies.

Federal, State and local levels of government must have the means to communicate essential and accurate emergency information to the public prior to, during and after a catastrophe.

Source: The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, Recommendations 73-77, February2006. http://www.whitehouse.gov /reports/katrina-lessons-learned/

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THE CIPREPORT May 2006 / Volume 4, No. 11

Sources on Public Trust (Cont.from Page 4) that are clear,unambiguous, and coordinatedacross multiple stakeholder com-munities. The Federal govern-ment's NRP, for example, outlinesa process to ensure multipleorganizations are singing fromthe same sheet of music, in tune,and at the right tempo. However,lessons learned form HurricaneKatrina, captured in theAmerican Bar Association's (ABA)Katrina Task Force report, pin-point the lack of clear legal guid-ance in disaster legislation sothat Federal and State officialsare directed to coordinate suchmessages. This lack of legalprocess arguably led to a publicdisplay of disagreement andblame, which undermined trustand confidence in significantways.

4. Proactively manage fear.

Managing fear is at the core ofpublic trust and confidence. Areview of public and private sec-tor strategies, plans, and guid-ance reinforces the importanceof considering not only employ-ees, but also customers, suppli-ers, and vendors. From a publicsector perspective, officials reas-sure and calm anxieties. Theprincipal focus of these recom-mendations is the necessity toanticipate fear and anxiety, dispelrumors, and minimize the spreadof misinformation. Plans shouldaccount for these issues andneeds.

5. Implement public awarenessprograms in areas where thepublic is potentially impacted bya hazard.

Hurricane Katrina underscoresthe importance of community-based awareness programs. TheReport of the Senate Committeeon Homeland Security and

Government Affairs highlights theimportance of outreach and edu-cation to the public. The reportadditionally promotes the valueof community-based awarenessprograms and an obligation bygovernment to coordinate mes-sages consistent with these pro-grams. The House ofRepresentatives BipartisanReport includes similar findingson the damage that occurredduring Hurricane Katrinagiven the lack of a publicawareness and communica-tions program.

The White House's study ofKatrina Lessons Learned offersan even more exhaustive list ofchanges for the NRP. If adopt-ed, the recommendationswould lead to a well-coordinat-ed public awareness and affairscapability.

Lee M. Zeichner, President,Zeichner Risk Analytics

(Sources Continued on Page 14)

The AABBAA HHuurrrriiccaannee KKaattrriinnaa TTaasskk FFoorrcceeSSuubbccoommmmiitttteeee RReeppoorrtt assesses laws and regula-tions at Federal, State, and local levels to deter-mine authorities under existing laws including if

and how these authorities coordinate and cooper-ate during all stages of emergency management.The report also reaches conclusions and recom-mendations to guide legislators, regulators, andresponders as they prepare for future catastro-

phes and emergencies. The report stresses theneed for the private sector and government to

jointly communicate clearly and consistently withthe public. The authors suggest coordinating messages across Federal,

State, and local jurisdictions and pre-planning collaborative processes andmessages in advance of a catastrophe.8

The FFiinnaanncciiaall SSeerrvviicceess SSeeccttoorrCCoooorrddiinnaattiinngg CCoouunncciill (FSSCC) pro-vides guidance to over 20,000financial institutions on the devel-opment of business continuityplans for an influenza pandemic.Paragraph 14 of the statementsuggests that "effective communi-cation strategies during a catas-trophe are essential to maintainemployee morale and to informexternal parties, such as regula-tors, customers, suppliers, count-er-parties, and the public of thecondition of the organization andmeasures that are being under-taken to address any potential dis-ruptions in critical operations."FSSCC notes that some financialfirms have "crafted carefully word-ed statements to be distributedvia emails, press releases or post-ings on intranets or websites inthe event of an "avian flu" out-break."7

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THE CIPREPORT May 2006 / Volume 4, No. 11

The CIP Program is directed by John A. McCarthy, a member of the faculty at George Mason University School of Law.The CIP Program works in conjunction with James Madison University and seeks to fully integrate the disciplines oflaw, policy, and technology for enhancing the security of cyber-networks, physical systems and economic processessupporting the nation's critical infrastructure. The CIP Program is funded by a grant from The National Institute ofStandards and Technology (NIST).

The CIP Report is published by Zeichner Risk Analytics, LLC on behalf of the CIP Program. ZRA is the leadingprovider of risk and security governance knowledge for senior business and government professionals. ZRA’s visionis to be a consistent and reliable source of strategic and operational intelligence to support core business process-es, functions, and assurance goals.

If you would like to be added to the distribution list for The CIP Report, please click on this link: http://techcenter.gmu.edu/programs/cipp/cip_report.html.

Sources on Public Trust (Cont.from Page 13)

1 Refer to http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/FAQs/PubTruFAQ.htm foradditional details. 2 Refer to http://www.seab.energy.gov/publications/trust.pdf#search='Public%20Trust%20and%20COnfidence3 Source: http://www.dhs.gov /inter-web/assetlibrary/NRP_FullText.pdf4 Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/nspi_implementa-tion.pdf5 Source: http:// www.businessround-table.org/pdf/20050503002CrisisPrepare.pdf6 Source: http://www.businessround-table.org /pdf/20050503003CEORiskMgmtGuideFINAL.pdf7 Source: http://www.fsscc.org/reports/avianflu.html8 Source: http://www.abanet.org/natse-curity/scolns_hurricane_katrina_report_feb_2006_2.pdf