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CHAPTER V:

THE COUP 1953

At the Same time, Britain had been turning the lawsuit over to the Security

Council was plotting to subvert Mossadeq. Soon after, Eden refused American

suggestion over settling Oil issue and told the U.S. Foreign Minister that, there are

more successors are superior for Mossadeq and the Tudeh Party and it is better to

return Mossadeq to his house. 1

Eden was decisive over not reaching any agreement with Mossadeq. British

Embassy intelligence staffs in Tehran and their Iranian agents were mobilized

against Mossadeq’s government. One of the chief strategies of British Foreign

Ministry was to frighten America of the point that Mossadeq was going Iran

towards the Soviet Union. CIA along with Britain collaborated such even

American government was misled and instigated to an inimical enterprise against

Mossadeq. 2

Rigid attitudes of Britain and becoming America’s stance more

rigorous led to spread and intensify Shah and conservative circle opposing with

Mossadeq, because they saw Mossadeq at downfall slope. This inclination was

encouraged when Britain and America pressed Shah to act against Mossadeq.

Vacillating of government on reacting to Shah and the Tudeh Party aggravated the

condition. They openly organized struggle against government. The government

indecisiveness led to terrifying of landowners, clergies and other conservative

groups. Appearing some dissidents inside the movement made the plot circle more

210

complete. Of course, they could not split the movement. However, opposing of

these inner dissidents seemed more legitimate that other groups but their perennial

quarrel -specially Bakhaei- was concerning government more and was making

governing more difficult. When we consider this spread spectrum of Mossadeq’s

opponent forces, we find out its endurance until the verge of 19 August Coup has

been abnormal. Middleton, the British charge d’ affairs in Tehran, had been

encouraging Zahedi from 1952 to act against Mossadeq. C.M. Woodhouse (MI6-

Britain) had been leading Ajax operation for overthrowing Mossadeq’s

government with cipher name. In October 1952, American embassy undertook

direct commanding of the operation in Tehran. Meanwhile, Iran’s government had

closed British embassy for its Plotting enterprises. 3 Attempts and plotting actions

of Britain will be elaborated in detail according to CIA official documents.

28 February of 1952

On 28 February 1952, a rumor was swiftly spread all over city on

Mossadeq had forced the Shah to leave the country. Bakhaei and Kashani united

their forces with military and non-military forces of the dissent right faction for

the first time to act harshly against Mossadeq. Evidences shows that opponents

were going to strike drastically to government, but it is not clear whether they had

Mossadeq’s assassination plot or not. The court interference in political and

official affairs was clear and common. Shah’s mother and his sister Ashraf did

most interference. Each of them had separate office. Ashraf had formed an

influential net of her puppets that was famed to “Ashraf Band”. Ashraf and her

mother started their plots against Mossadeq from the beginning of his premiership.

Mossadeq and the Jebhe Melli leaders warned these two women through Hossien

Ala, the Court Minister, but it had no result. Eventually, Mossadeq threatened to

consult with people, if Shah had no effective enterprise.

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Shah decided to counter act against Mossadeq. He had some reasons for it,

one, he himself was hostile to Mossadeq and had contact with internal and external

forces who were going to overthrow him. So, his mother and sister acts were on

his direction, other, Shah had not enough power in monarchial family and the

country, at the time, So he could do nothing to stop them. Moreover, any serious

action against their operation caused British and Iranian ruling class thought of his

disloyalty. Nevertheless, Mossadeq was frequently reminding that according to the

constitution “Shah should rein not rule”. Hossein Ala during a visit reminded

Mossadeq that Shah was going to go to Europe because he was resented of not

having anything to do. Mossadeq tried to assure Ala and renounce Shah of his

decision. 4 In deed, he did not want to engage with Shah because he wanted

endurance of the Constitutional monarchy system. Many of the Jebbehe Melli

leaders and the movement activists were aware of political dangers over existing

gulf between the Shah and government.

Dr. Abdollah Moazami one of the prominent leaders of Jebhe Melli and

Majles deputy and rich landowner and law professor of the Tehran University who

had mixed a dependent thought with moderate behavior. Mossadeq and the court

both stressed on their relation. Mossadeq had striven to settle existing differences

between Shah and government through several visits with Shah and Ala. As a

result, Parliamentary group of the National Front decided to send a delegation to

the Court in order to reach understanding. Members of this delegation consisted of

Moazami, Shaygan (Monfared), Karim Sanjabi and Ali Asghar Parsa, Haj Seyyed

Javadi, Milani and Jalali Mousavi three cleric parliamentary members of the

National Front. 5 Meantime, Ala reminded Mossadeq again that the Shah and

Queen Soraya were going to Europe for their problem of not having a child.

Mossadeq told Ala that Queen could go alone and if it was necessary Shah joint

her later. 6

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On 24 February, the seven member parliamentary group by head of

Moazami was invited to lunch to the court. This time, Shah also presented in the

party and delegation surprised and became glad of his passionate view towards

Mossadeq and the National Front (Jebhe-Melli). Actor Leaving the Party, they

decided to go directly to Mossadeq’s house & tell him about these good news. It

has been quoted three narrations over immediate consequences of this visit from

Mossadeq, Sanjabi and Moazami, which have differences in detail, but there is no

difference on main points.

Mossadeq said that, “when the seven members were in his house. Court

phoned Moazami. After answering and returning among others, he spoke in

private with Sanjabi. Then, he said it was about Shah’s intention for dispatching to

Europe, however, he did not want his decision became clear. Moazami said that

Ala and other court authorities were coming to Mossadeq’s house to discuss over

this trip. Entering Ala and his accompanies, the seven members went to other

room. Mossadeq recommended the court representatives to dissuade Shah of this

trip but they replied Shah had made his decision. Then, Mossadeq promised to

help them in journey procurement and kept secret it. Shah had insisted on keeping

secret this trip lest it caused concern and agitation among people. According to

Shah’s suggestion, trip was being done with car until Iraq’s border for people

could not prevent his trip. 7

In his book, “Mission for My Country”, Shah claims

his trip suggestion and persisting in keeping it secret both were by Mossadeq.

However, he says nothing about reason of his acceptance. In 6 P.M. of 28

February, subsequent defeat of thug’s attack to Dr. Mossadeq’s house, the Prime

Minister in private meeting Majles rendered elaborated report of that visit. On 6

April 1953, Mossadeq addressed people, expressed the entire event, re-stressed

that Shah himself was desire to going abroad, and insisted on keeping his trip

secret. The court issued a declaration against Mossadeq’s speech and claimed that

Shah’s trip suggestion was posed by three National Front deputies in Majles but it

213

was not mentioned their names. 8 This claim is apparently incompatible with

Shah’s sayings in book. In order to have a logical understanding of 28 February

1952 events, it is necessary to know who has decided and organized Shah’s trip.

On 25 February, Ala informed Mossadeq of Shah’s trip date. It was

ordained that on 28 February at 13:30, Mossadeq went to the court for lunch. Ala

said ministers would be presented in the afternoon. At the same day, Gen Zahedi

was arrested for his complicity in a secret plot of Security operation. His arresting

was not related to Shah’s Journey. He was released without conviction. 9

Morning

of 28 February, Ayatallah Behbahani phoned Mossadeq and asked him about

rumors of Shah’s Journey. Mossadeq replied he had no interference in his decision

and he made this decision himself. Mossadeq surprised more when Shah himself

called him and asked him to come at 12:00 instead 13:30. Mossadeq fell into

suspicion and understood that Shah was not really going to go journey and

changing the program had been for killing Mossadeq in front of the palace by

thugs who were going to gather outside. 10

In the court, Mossadeq understood Shah’s abnormal and stressed behavior.

Shah informed Mossadeq along a delegation from Majles is coming in order to

talk to him over his journey. Short time after, Shah made Mossadeq aware of his

disagreement. Meantime, Mossadeq found Ayatollah Behbahani and Sheiykh

Bahaedin Nouri’s enterance. Kashani and Beghaei also did it on 28 February.

Nevertheless, Mossadeq who was unaware of all events received a message from

his home office about on immediate visit with Henderson, the American

ambassador. When he reached near the gate of Marmar Palace, he heard shouting

out of the palace that was chanting slogans against him. Swiftly, he found

everything and instead going out of main gate, went out of a small door and left

the court. When thugs found it, pursued his car but police prevented them.

Shapour Hamid Reza, Smaller brother of Shah, interfered and asked police not to

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prevent public move. Then, thugs attacked to Mossadeq’s house and his son,

Ahmad’s house. Mossadeq’s house had an iron gate but Shaban Bi Mokh with a

young colonel in a military jeep broke the gate .At this time the Third Force

activists ( Nirouye-Sevom ) by head of Jalal Ale Ahmed entered .So, thugs were

surrounded from inside by Mossadeq guards and from outside by Third Force

activists . On Mossadeq’s son recommendation, he and Fatemi, the Foreign

Minister, escaped from the roof to Army Staff. Mossadeq directly went to Majles

and reported all events to Majles that had been held secretly, and without viewer.11

He reminded in his radio speech on 6 April 1953 about his relations with shah and

said apparently, when the shah had heard his successful escape news had been sad.

Despite Mossadeq’s orders over investigation on insecurity, thugs and

rabbles did not give up to the law. Beside Shaban Bi Mokh and his thugs,

Bakhaie’s thugs, Tayeb Rezari, and Hassan Ramezan Yakhi who were working for

Ayatollah Behbahani were present and active in those events. In addition, some of

army commanders were engaging and present among thugs out of palace .Since

after, Mossadeq become more cautions on his security and health .Later, Ala was

removed from the Court Ministry, and Abolghasem Amini (Younger brother of

Dr. Amini) replaced him. After the event, Mossadeq never had private visit with

shah and in deed, cut off his personal relations with shah .Even for some private

by shah in his son house, Dr. Gholam Hossien Mossadeq , opposed . 12

On 7

March , Majles chose a eight members delegation including Moozami , Sanjabi

from the National Front ( Jebhe Meli ) , Makki , Bakhaie , Haerizadeh and Rafi

from opposition Front and Ganjei and Majd Zadeh from Monfaredin to survey

shah and prime Minister difference . They resulted the core difference was the

Shah’s right cabinet power according to constitution especially related to army

Force” They expressed their opinion as this: “According to the Constitution shah

has no responsibility and cabinet has power and responsibility in all executive

affairs including military and non-military.” However, discussing about this report

215

for approbation, Baghaei and Haeri Zadeh opposed it and said however, the

interpretation of constitution is credible but its approval by Majles is not in the

interest of the country. This report never approved and whenever it was going to

put for vote, opponent deputies had been leaving Majles and Majles had no

enough deputies for vote. 13

Murder of Chief of Police Head quarters

In April, another Plot was executed for Mossadeq forced to vacate.

Informing Shah and CIA interference, it was decided key and political authorities

to be abducted for making insecurity and agitation in the country. It has not found

any complete list of these people’s names, yet, but Afshare Toos, the Chief of

Police Head quarter, has been on the top of the list because of his key position and

his loyalty to Mossadeq. However, for his contact with Baghaei, he was trying to

reconcile Mossadeq and Kashani. So it was too easy to deceive and abduct him. 14

Baghaei and his close friend Hossien Khatibi and retired brigadier- generals

Monnazah, Bayandr and Morteze Zahedi and other mercenary officers of Army

staff had complicity in this plot. Khatibi was whom that Afshare Toos was

abducted from his house on 19 April. Despite their expectation, the plot was

exposed soon and all plotters except Baghaei who had parliamentary immunity

were detained. As soon as police suspected Khatibi, Afshr-e Toos was murdered in

a cave out of Tehran. Brigadier general Mozzayani was accused to issue the

murder order and major Baluch Ghoraei had implemented the order. After the

1979 revolution, Mozzayani arrested and executed but Ghoraei was released after

negation and refusal of Bahaeiat. At that time, nothing was said about inquiries

and trials and People was not informed, but in 1953 trials results were gradually

published in the Press.

216

In hearing, four mentioned brigadier- general illustrated, confessed and

signed the plot. All confessed decision was on Afshar-e Toos murder. Major

general Zahedi was engaged in this crime but as we saw before Ayatollah Kashani

Shield him in Majles. Since Khatibi’s arrest, Baghaei’s attach on government

intensified and claimed he himself had seen lashing of Khatibi in Jail, later, he

claimed it was his servant who was arrested and lashed in which he could not

speak, 15

But accusation against Baghaei was proposed when arrested officers said

his name. Three officers including Monnazah, Bayandar and Morteza Zahedi in a

confession specified that Baghaei had important and chief role in abduction and

murder of Afshar Toos. They had nothing about misbehavior in Prison and had no

objection. Mozzayani denied murder accusation but confessed to Afshar Toos

abduction and said Bayhaei had main role in the crime. Baghaei arrested on 17

August two days before 19 August, but there is no document that shows his

hearings. It was arranged that before fall down of Dr. Mossadeg’s government no

hearing and trial be done. After the Coup he was acquitted because still he had not

been convicted and other were sent to a pro forma trial and all were acquitted in a

funny way. Then nobody tried to find real criminals. In addition, Baghaei denied

abduction and crime accusation. He never said nothing about his contacts and its

nature with khatibi or engaged officers during 1953 until 1987 when he died in

one of Tehran’s hospital as prisoner of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Now, rumors about impending coup had been spreading everywhere .They

was chanting “We will change the coup to anti-coup” and through this slogan of

Tudeh Party they assured the Coup agents. Kashani had been quite and passive

after the 28 February event. The Tudeh Party and its press had overhauled and

adjusted its way towards government. Nevertheless, they did not act as an

opponent democrat Party. Public meetings and demonstration of Tudeh Party was

increased and spread. 16

Now, there are obvious documents of spending much by

CIA to hold these meeting just for proving to Iranians and the U.S. government

217

that Iran was going towards the Soviet Union. Government had largely been

ignoring these movements, maybe it had just passed economic problems and was

thinking now it could continue a gradual conflict with Britain and maybe it was

assured of its public base. Therefore, it was ignoring increasing internal and

external opposing and poisoning propaganda in the army force. Perhaps,

Mossadeq did not believe this situation had total difference with the 27 July case.

The 21 July uprising had caused government ignored realities and it continued

until falldown of the national government.

Referendum

Makki, Baghaei and their small group in majles were hyperactive. In spite

of reducing Mossadeq’s Sympathizers, still he had majority in Majles. One of not

important votes caused to react by Mossadeq and his plotter enemies used it and

led to the 19 August Coup. At the time, high board of Control on printing and

publishing banknotes was being chosen by the Majles to have high supervision on

mentioned operation by Iran’s National Bank. In June 1953, Majles chose Hossein

Makki instead of one of these board members. Later, Mossadeq has said several

times that with coming Hossien Makki to this board, he had been concerned of

Makki’s informing about publishing 3.1 billion rials banknotes during previous 9

months and informed public of it. Publishing banknotes was economically a

deliberate enterprise, legally was a legal act, and had preserved existing relation

between circulating money and foreign exchange supplies. Mossadeq, according

to him, had concerned about action of Makki and his Supporters and increasing

goods price and making inflation. It should be said these have been baseless

concern for Mossadeq.

After interpellalation, which was posed by Ali Zohri, Baghaei continued the

event. They interpellalated government for persecuting accused of Afshar Toos in

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Jail. Mossadeq was thinking that majority who had voted Makki maybe vote for

inefficiency of government and overthrow it. In his opinion, it was the end of

national movement and beginning a dictator ship and giving up on Britain in oil

issue, and even worse than this, legality of all above events. The national

movement was defeating with its weapon that is to say political weapon and

democratic and legal procedure. 17

Mossadeq was going to use his government

downfall by force and Coup as a win but if it was collapsing legally, it was a

disgraceful defeat. Therefore, concerning of non- confidence vote of Majles made

Mossadeq decisive to hold a new plebiscite over dissolution of Majles and

performing new election. He believed many of Present deputies had separated

their way of the National Front (Jebhe Melli). So public vote might make them to

understand and overhaul their Political attitude.

However, Mossadeq was not right. Majles vote in electing Makki for board

of Control on publishing banknotes was quite different with non-confidence vote

of government to it. Also, two third of Majles deputies were protecting Mossadeg

over plebiscite however they had doubt about Mossadeq’s decision over holding

plebiscite. Most of his closest colleagues and protectors including Dr. Gholam

Hossien Sedighi, Khalil Maleki, Dr. Karim Sanjabi, and Dr. Ali Shaygan told him

several times about not doing referendum. They were concern that putsches

manipulated that situation and making practical their intention, when Dr. Sedighi

told Mossadeq that Shah would oust him in absence of Majles, Mossadeq said: He

does not have the Courage. Khalil Maleki who could not dissuade the old man of

referendum stood up and told Mossadeq. This way that you go is to hell but we

will com after you until hell. “Dr. Abdollah Moazami who had been elected as

Majles speaker instead of Kashani resigned and left the capital in objection to the

referendum. 18

Government opponents including kashani, Baghaei, Makki, Haeri

Zadeh and others found an excellent opportunity. Through different

pronouncement and declaration, they called Mossadeq’s decision a dictatorship

219

and illegal decision and Behbahani and Kashani announced it illegal religiously. In

constitution of Iran, there was no article to allow government dissolves Majles

before ending its legal period hold new election. Of course, four years ago, Shah

could achieve Majles dissolution power through the Senate. However, there was

not article indicating opposing to plebiscite and Majles dissolution. Especially,

two third of representatives had voluntarily resigned. Therefore, it was no need to

referendum for dissolution and government should hold new election. If Mossadeq

did not Pay attention to this point and wanted to hold plebiscite, perhaps, he

wanted to show all people’s protection of him and his government. However, it

was another mistake. 19

Referendum was hold in an unsuitable atmosphere.

Achieving swifter results, rural areas were put aside. Because, voting, gathering,

and counting votes in two turns were prolonging. Government did its best to

prevent any election fraud. In addition, constituency of opponents and conformers

was apart. Result of referendum was positive and majority approved government

decision but, before reaching dissolution order to his Majesty, the “Royal Coup” in

17 and 18 August was done.

Coup

The usual story retailed in historical accounts, is that the British tried, but

failed, to convince Harry Truman of the wisdom of their coup plan, and managed

to get the U.S. on board, only after Dwight D. Eisenhower, elected President in

November 1952, had assumed office in January 1953. Nothing could be further

from the truth. As the official documents show, the U.S. decision to go for "regime

change" in Iran was made by Truman in November 1952, long before Ike took

office. In addition, it was the British agents, the Dulles brothers—Allen and John

Foster—who ran the operation with their British collaborate, while Eisenhower

remained in the background, almost in the dark.

220

In June 1951, Truman reported to the National Security Council on the

British-Iranian crisis, arguing that if the British were to invade Iran, there would

be a danger that Iran could turn to the Soviets for help. In July, he dispatched

Averell Harriman to Tehran, to try to persuade Mossadeq to come to terms with

the British, but Mossadeq responded: "You don't know how crafty they are. You

do not know how evil they are. You do not know how they sully everything they

touch." 20

Kashani's response was similar. Mossadeq was right: During the

Summer, the British slapped sanctions on Iran, confiscated Iranian assets,

sabotaged the Abadan refinery, and blocked Iran's trade with European nations. In

October, Truman dispatched Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Assistant

Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs George

McGhee to see Mossadeq, while he was in the United States, to offer a new

compromise: that a "neutral" British company could produce and distribute the oil.

Mossadeq predictably refused.

The turning point came in 1951, when Winston Churchill became British

Prime Minister again. He had no hesitations regarding regime change. Churchill

deployed Anthony Eden to the United States, to inform Dean Acheson of the

British decision to get rid of Mossadeq. In November, according to the

documented record 21

Truman made the decision to go with the British plot. In two

documents, NSC 136 and 136/1, written in November, after extensive debate in

the previous months, the doctrine was laid down that Truman would promote

direct intervention in Iran, through covert operations and even military forces. 22

The document spoke of "special political measures" needed to establish stability in

Iran, which referred to covert operations. A detailed plan for such covert

operations was approved by the Psychological Strategy Board on Jan. 8, 1953,

which was 12 days before Eisenhower was inaugurated. 23

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Planning the Coup

The actual planning of the coup took place beginning November 1952 and

stretching through to June 1953. The events have been chronicled in a book

written in 1954, by one of the protagonists, Donald N. Wilber.24

He was in the

CIA's Near East and Africa Division (NEA). In addition to his 1954 book, he

reviewed the events in his memoirs, published in 1986. Then, there are the CIA

official documents 25

which were in part leaked by the New York Times, on April

16, 2000. 26

A preliminary meeting, in Washington, saw representatives of the

NEA, with British Intelligence. The key personalities were Christopher Montague

Woodhouse, who had been station chief for British Intelligence in Tehran, and on

the American side, Kermit Roosevelt, NEA Division Chief. At this meeting, it

was, in fact, the British who proposed a "joint political action to remove Prime

Minister Mossadeq," according to CIA documents. As noted, Truman okayed the

British plan in November 1952.

In March 1953, Undersecretary of State Gen. Walter Bedell Smith officially

"determined that the U.S. Government could no longer approve of the Mossadeq

government and would prefer a successor government in which there would be no

National Frontists." The NEA and CIA were informed, and $1 million was

allocated to the Tehran station to be used by the Chief of Station and U.S.

Ambassador Loy Henderson. On May 20, the station received authorization to

spend 1 million rials a week (90 rials = $1) to buy up parliamentarians. In April,

the first CIA study was issued, "Factors Involved in the Overthrow of Mossadeq,"

and in it was the idea that a combination of the Shah and Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi,

backed by mobs in the street, could overthrow Mossadeq. The CIA made contact

with Zahedi, initially through his son Ardeshir, then with him directly.

Zahedi was a malleable figure, vulnerable to blackmail. During World War

II, he had supported Nazi Germany. British secret agent Fitzroy MacLean had

222

taken him to a prison camp in Palestine. A search of his residence had yielded a

treasure trove of German weapons, opium, and letters from German agents who

had landed in Isfahan, where he was military governor. Following the war, he was

released, and assumed posts as governor, before becoming Interior Minister under

Mossadeq. The two were political enemies, and Mossadeq tried several times to

jail him. Zahedi was the right man for the job. The first joint Anglo-American

planning session took place in Nicosia in late April 1953. Wilber, the covert NEA

consultant, met with British Special Intelligence Service Officer Norman Matthew

Darbyshire. They set up a three-way communications channel among Washington,

Nicosia, and Tehran, and preceded each to disclose to the other, whatever assets

they had in Iran. The main assets of the British (whose larger network had been

expelled by Mossadeq) centered on the three Rashidian brothers, Seyfollah,

Asadollah, and Qodratollah, who had a network extending to "the armed forces,

the Majlis, religious leaders, the press, street gangs, politicians, and other

influential figures." The NEA gave two names to the Special Intelligence Service,

while keeping their actual assets, Djalili and Keyyan, secret.

By June 1, they had worked up a plan. The basic assumptions they shared

were: "that Zahedi alone of potential candidates had the vigor and courage to make

him worthy of support; that the Shah must be brought into the operation; that the

Shah would act only with great reluctance but that he could be forced to do so; that

if the issue was clear-cut the armed forces would follow the Shah rather than

Mossadeq; that the operation must, if possible, be made to appear legal or quasi-

legal instead of an outright coup; that public opinion must be fanned to fever pitch

against Mossadeq in the period just preceding the execution of the overthrow

operation; that the military aspect would be successful only if the station were able

to review the plan with the Iranians chosen by Zahedi to execute it; that immediate

precautions must be taken by the new government to meet a strong reaction by the

Tudeh Party." 27

223

These "basic assumptions" were to prevail in the following planning

meetings. The next meeting took place in Beirut on June 9, with Kermit Roosevelt,

who was the project chief, George Carroll of the CIA, Roger Goiran, Chief of

Station in Tehran, and Wilber. After meeting from June 10-14, Roosevelt and

Wilber went to London with a copy of the Beirut draft. There they met with

Darbyshire and Commander Maurice M. Firth of Special Intelligence Service, then

left on June 18. An official report was typed up, and known as Appendix B.28

The

final plan, codenamed TPAJAX, okayed by Kermit Roosevelt for the CIA and by

British Intelligence, was presented to CIA Director Allen W. Dulles, the State

Department, and Ambassador Henderson. The Special Intelligence Service

presented it to the British Foreign office. Approval came from the various offices,

on July 1, and July 11, 1953.

The final plan translated the basic assumptions, into a series of operational

thrusts: Propaganda operations must be launched against Mossadeq, accusing him

of corruption, anti-Islamic views, and sympathies with the Tudeh Party

communists. This required purchasing a stable of journalists, editors, and

publishers. Dirty operations were to be orchestrated in the streets, whereby thugs,

who were to be identified with Mossadeq, would beat up Islamic clerics. The aim

of such tactics was to drive a wedge between Mossadeq and his National Front, on

the one side, and his clerical allies, especially Kashani, on the other. In the

parliament as well, MPs were to be bought up, to oppose Kashani and oppose

Mossadeq. Demonstrations against Mossadeq in the streets, were to provide the

pretext for such MPs to hold a vote against him; if he refused to step down, the

plan was to have Zahedi arrest him, and then seize strategic centers in the capital.

To give Zahedi the forces he required, military officers had to be purchased.

224

Implementation of the Plot

CIA agent Carroll went to Iran in mid-July, tasked with studying the

military aspects of the plan. Wilber was responsible for psychological warfare.

This operation had already begun, with the issuance of anti-Mossadeq articles in

the (paid) press, and anti-Mossadeq cartoons, drafted by CIA cartoonists. The gist

of the anti-Mossadeq propaganda was that he was a patsy of the communists, that

the Tudeh Party was gaining strength, and that Iran could fall into the Soviet

sphere of influence. This was mainly for foreign consumption. Internally, the

major thrust was to split Mossadeq from his supporters. This meant to alienate the

religious establishment, especially Ayatollah Kashani, to counterorganize the

Majlis against him, and to whip up mob violence in the streets. As outlined in the

various planning meetings and documents, it was key to ensure the cooperation of

the Shah, in order to give an aura of legitimacy to the overthrow. The specific plan

was to get the Shah to sign two firmans (royal decrees) dismissing Mossadeq,

naming Zahedi, and calling on the Army to maintain its loyalty to the Shah. All

official accounts of the coup show that the Shah represented a serious problem. He

was overridden by fear, vacillating, and weak. He did not trust the British, for

good reason, and was therefore focussed on getting guarantees that the United

States was behind the coup. The British, who had his profile, knew they had to

have U.S. cooperation.

In an attempt to soften him up, it was decided to deploy his twin sister,

Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, who had been living in Paris, to persuade her brother to

play the game. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, father of the "hero" of Operation

Desert Storm, was to get the Shah to sign the firmans, and a leading U.K. agent

was to assure the Shah that the entire endeavor was a joint U.S.-U.K. affair. If this

plan failed, then Kermit Roosevelt, as official representative of the U.S. President,

was to be deployed to get the Shah to put his signature on the dotted line. Once

225

signed, the firmans were to be delivered to Zahedi, who would move to take

power. Getting the Shah to play the game was no easy job. Asodollah Rashidian,

one of the notorious three brothers, called on Princess Ashraf on the Riviera in

mid-July, and, together with two "official representatives," overcame her lack of

enthusiasm about the mission to persuade her twin. Allen Dulles also travelled to

Switzerland to meet the Princess, and prevail upon her to play the game.

Reportedly, a mink coat and $5,000 helped her decide in their favor. 29

Neither the

Shah nor Mossadeq was happy at the news of her arrival, given that she was

known as an anti-Mossadeq figure, and had been banished. The Shah initially

refused to see her, but, once informed that General Schwarzkopf, an American,

was pursuing a similar mission, he relented. The meeting between the siblings

took place on July 29, but bore no fruit.

Schwarzkopf was trusted by the Shah, because of their good relationship

during the general's tenure as head of the U.S. Military Mission to the Iranian

Gendarmerie from 1942-48, a mission Iran had welcomed to counter British and

Russian presence. Schwarzkopf's new mission, as recounted by Wilber, "was to

obtain from the Shah the three papers… (1) a firman naming Zahedi as Chief of

Staff, (2) a letter indicating his faith in Zahedi which the latter could employ to

recruit army officers for the plan in the name of the Shah, and (3) a firman calling

on all ranks of the army to support his legal Chief of Staff. It was felt that it would

be easier to get the Shah to sign such statements than to issue a firman dismissing

Mossadeq." 30

The meeting between Schwarzkopf and the Shah took place on

Aug. 1, after Ashraf's departure. The Shah was so paranoid, that he insisted that

the general go and sit with him on top of a table in the middle of a grand ballroom,

where, he believed, they would be out of the hearing range of planted

microphones. He refused to sign the firmans, saying that he could not be sure of

the Army's loyalty, and that he wanted to determine the makeup of a future

Cabinet. The Shah's continuing preoccupation was to have assurances of American

226

support; he demanded that President Eisenhower indicate in some way that he was

in favor of the removal of Mossadeq. As Wilber relates, "By complete coincidence

and good fortune, the President, while addressing the Governors' Convention in

Seattle on 4 August, deviated from his script to state by implication that the United

States would not sit idly by and see Iran fall behind the Iron Curtain." Kermit

Roosevelt exploited this statement, to put pressure on the Shah, who was still

vacillating. Schwarzkopf left the palace empty-handed, so another American had

to be deployed, this time as official representative of Eisenhower. The story of

Kermit Roosevelt's nightly visits to the Shah, to get him on board, are the stuff of

cheap novels. Kermit, a grandson of Teddy Roosevelt (and loyal to that faction of

the family), came out of the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS), like

Dulles, and was working in the Iran department of the CIA in November 1952. He

was selected to be the project chief for the coup. To enter the Shah's palace

unobserved, he would lie down in the back of a car, hidden under a carpet, and be

driven into the palace, then to emerge to conduct his private soirées with the

monarch. 31

Finally, after many of the visits by Roosevelt, the Shah agreed to sign

two (not three) documents: one firing Mossadeq and the other designating Zahedi

as Prime Minister.

This was Aug. 12. The propaganda campaign against Mossadeq,

orchestrated and conducted by editors and journalists who were richly

remunerated, was reaching a peak. Black propaganda was used to pit the religious

establishment against Mossadeq and the Communist Party. Wilber writes: "CIA

agents gave serious attention to alarming the religious leaders at Tehran by issuing

black propaganda in the name of the Tudeh Party, threatening these leaders with

savage punishment if they opposed Mossadeq. Threatening phone calls were made

to some of them, in the name of the Tudeh, and one of the several planned sham

bombings of the houses of these leaders was carried out." 32

Meanwhile, the

military apparatus of the "Colonels' Conspiracy" was being put into place. Zahedi

227

named one Col. Aban Farzanega as staff planner and liaison with the United

States, in the person of CIA officer Carroll. On Aug. 13, Col. Sarhang Nematollah

Nasiri, a pro-Shah Army officer and chief of the Imperial Guards, delivered the

firmans, signed by the Shah, to Zahedi. The CIA station sent a cable saying the

new Zahedi government would need $5 million.

Coup Day

Aug. 16 was chosen as coup day. By mid-month, the situation in Parliament

had reached a state of chaos, as paid agents among the MPs had escalated their

smear campaign against Kashani, which culminated in calls for his ouster as

speaker of the Majlis. The anti-Kashani camp included several pro-Mossadeq

figures, and the Prime Minister intervened to shut down parliament through a

referendum. 33

Demonstrations were raging in the streets, in a classical gang-

countergang style. Protests against Mossadeq were arranged by the coup

managers, and pro-Mossadeq demonstrators were also encouraged to take to the

streets. Tudeh Party members who joined the latter, unwittingly provided the

pretext to slander Mossadeq as pro-Communist. Paid press agents put out the call

for the Prime Minister's resignation, on these grounds.

On the day designated for the coup, the demonstrations were organized

personally by none other than the U.S. military attaché, Robert McClure. The pro-

Mossadeq, pro-Tudeh demos were peppered with thugs and gangsters, who

launched physical attacks against the other side, again to discredit Mossadeq. The

carefully planned violence was the task of paid thugs, mainly from sports clubs,

and under the direction of one "Shaban the Brainless." 34

At the same time, pro-

Shah, anti-Tudeh demos, were characterized as manifestations of patriotic forces.

Through a lawful process, citizens who had no inkling whatsoever of the

orchestration, joined the protest marches of one or the other camp, to manifest

their political preferences. Thus, if, as documented, the CIA paid 6,000 or more

228

"extras" as in a play, thousands more joined in spontaneously. Mossadeq

responded by issuing a ban on all demonstrations. When the Tudeh Party sent a

delegation to him, asking that he provide arms to the nationalists and the

communists, he refused, saying he would rather be the victim of a lynch mob, than

provoke civil war. One military officer, Chief of Staff Gen. Taqi Riahi, was

informed of the coup plans, and alerted Mossadeq in time. 35

Thus, when Nasiri

went to Mossadeq's house the evening of Aug. 15, to arrest him, he himself was

taken prisoner by the pro-Mossadeq military, while Zahedi managed to flee.

The coup had failed, and the word spread fast. That night, spontaneous

demonstrations filled the streets, supporting Mossadeq and denouncing the Shah.

Seeing the situation compromised, the Shah quickly left, first for Baghdad, then

for Rome, with his wife. The CIA, informed of the fiasco, alerted its top agent,

Kermit Roosevelt, that he should leave the country, for his own safety. But he had

another idea. He believed the coup could work, and determined simply to try it

again after a few days. On Aug. 19, thousands of demonstrators moved obediently

into the streets, chanting "Death to Mossadeq" and carrying symbols of loyalty to

the Shah. The demonstrations were impressive, the result of outlays of much larger

sums of money. Thousands of dollars went to individual protesters, as well as to

larger groups organized through the sport clubs and circles of rowdies. Ten

thousand dollars was made available to Ahmad Aramash, an assistant to Ayatollah

Kashani, although whether or not it reached its destination, has been a matter of

dispute. Not only did demonstrators fill the streets, but violence was high, and the

organized thugs stormed eight government buildings. What proved decisive was

the publication of the firmans. The royal decrees, signed by the Shah, appeared in

the press that day, and radio news announced that Zahedi was Prime Minister,

Mossadeq had been ousted, and the Shah would return soon. General Zahedi

himself appeared on radio soon thereafter, to read out the texts of the two firmans.

Military units were dispatched to Mossadeq's home, where fighting ensued for two

229

hours. His residence was besieged, and in a vicious firefight, 50 people died. He

put up a principled resistance; when a colonel of the opposition tried to secure his

surrender, he had to report that "The old man was adamant in his resistance,

claiming that he was still the lawful head of the government and was not to be

bullied by a handful of rioting hooligans." 36

As his house was being destroyed by

gunfire and tanks, Mossadeq managed to escape. Zahedi ordered that all

demonstrations be banned, the borders closed, and pro-Mossadeq military be

arrested. Mossadeq later turned himself in to the authorities, while news had it,

that the Shah was returning from Rome. The coup had worked. Zahedi was

rewarded his $5 million for the successful operation, and got $1 million more, as

pocket money. Now, the enormously popular Mossadeq had to be dealt with

politically. After a ten-week stint in a military prison, he was tried on charges of

treason, because he had allegedly mobilized for a rebellion and had contradicted

the Shah. He was promptly found guilty and sentenced to death, later commuted to

three years in prison, followed by house arrest. Mossadeq's defense was a mere

statement of fact. "My only crime," he stated, "is that I nationalized the oil

industry and removed from this land the network of colonialism and the political

and economic influence of the greatest empire on Earth." 37

Members of his

government were also arrested, as were the leading military that remained loyal to

him. Six hundred of the 6,000 of them were executed. Despite his defeat, his

illness, and his imprisonment, Mossadeq remained a compelling figure. Even in

death, his influence could not be cut off. He died on March 5, 1967. For fear that

his grave might become the site of political manifestations, he was allowed no

funeral, and was buried underneath the floorboards of a room in his house.

The `Settlement'

And the oil? The British, eager to maintain an aura of legitimacy, did not

take over everything, but moved, with others, into an international "consortium,"

230

which was designated as the contract agent for NIOC. In the consortium, British

Petroleum had 40%, five American oil companies made up another 40%, and the

rest was divided up among the Compagnie Française des Petroles and Royal

Dutch/Shell. The negotiations, led by the United States, since the British had been

so discredited, were handled by Herbert Hoover, then a special U.S. representative

within the State Department. The agreement, reached in August 1954, then ratified

by the Majlis and Okayed by the Shah, gave the consortium power over operations

and exports, through trading companies set up by the single members. Formally

speaking, the assets were said to belong to Iran, although that turned out to be an

empty formula. Two Iranians were allowed to be directors of two operating

companies. The NIOC, which still existed in name, as the Iranian entity, was

allowed access to financial and technical information, and Iranian personnel were

to receive training. The revenues Iran was to receive were much greater than

earlier: The profits were to be divided 50:50, as was the norm by that time in the

oil business. The British came out on top, although their monopoly had been

whittled down to 40%; BP was paid for losses, by both Iran and the other

consortium members, and was compensated by the British government through tax

breaks. Over the years, the Shah began to demand a greater share in his own

country's riches. Through the Iran Petroleum Act of 1957, the country established

the right to open up new kinds of contracts with foreign companies, including joint

ventures, and contracts for explorations done by the foreign entity. Later, Iran

entered state-to-state deals, often on a complicated barter basis, whereby it gained

increasing independence from the international oil companies. It was in response

to this move toward independence that key financial-political interests in the West,

especially under the Carter Administration, moved to support forces seeking to

overthrow the Shah.

231

Reference

1. Eden, Anthony, Memoirs: Full circle; Mc Ghee George, Envoy. And Recollections; Louis

British Empire, and chapter 9 and 11.

2. Richard Cottom’s first-hard witness in Lapping, End of Empire.

3. C.M Woodhouse, Something Ventured (London, Granda,1982): see also Kermit Roosevelt,

Countercoup The struggle for the control of Iran ( New York : Mc Graw- Hill, 1979), Lapping,

End of Empire; Gasiriowski, the 1953 Coup.

4. “Notghha va Maktobat Dr.Mossadeq”and “Mossadeq Memoirs”

5. Gholamreza Nejati “Jonbesh Melli Shodan” Tehran 1985, Mossadeq Memoirs,Vol II

6. Mossadeq Memoirs, Vol II chapter 7

7. ibid Vol II and chapters 2, 7

8. ibid Vol II and chapters 2, 7

9. Niroy seoam (Newspaper) February 26, 1934

10. Mossadeq Memoirs, Vol II chapter 2, 7

11. ibid Vol II

12. ibid Vol II

13. Etlaat, March 14, 1952 and Gholamreza Nejati “Jonbesh Melli Shodan Naf” Tehran 1985;and

Bakaie “Che Kasi Monharef shod”

14. Gholamreza Rahmani “Kohne Sarbaz” Tehran 1988

15.Bakaie “Ankeh Goft Nah”

16. Lapping, End of Empire

17. Mossadeq Memoirs, Vol II

18. Homa Katouzian “political Memoirs of Khalil Maleki” Tehran 1981

19. Mossadeq Memoirs, Vol II

20. Stephen Kinzer, All The Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East

Terror (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003), 105..

21. Francis J. Gavin, Politics, Power, and U.S. Policy in Iran, 1950-1953, p. 58.

232

22. Ibid., p. 80.

23. Sepehr Zabih, The Mossadegh Era: Roots of the Iranian Revolution (Chicago: Lake View

Press, 1982), p. 66.

24. Dr. Donald N. Wilber, "Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran," written March 1954,

published October 1969.

25. "Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953," CIA archives,

iranonline.com

26. The Secrets of History. The CIA in Iran," New York Times, April 16, 2000.

27. CIA archives, op. cit.

28. Appendix B: "London" Draft of the TPAJAX Operational Plan," Wilber, op. cit.

29. Kinzer, op. cit., p. 7.

30. Wilber, op. cit.

31. Kinzer, op. cit.

32. CIA archives, V, p. 37. See Wilber, Appendix B for planned anti-Mossadeq propaganda. It

was to "hammer out the following themes: (a) Mossadeq favors the Tudeh Party and the USSR.

(This will be supported by black documents.) (b) Mossadeq is an enemy of Islam since he

associates with Tudeh . . . etc."

33. Zabih, op. cit., pp. 111-112.

34. Shaban the Brainless met with Kermit Roosevelt, and offered 300-400 of his gangsters,

promising they would beat up or fire upon anyone they were told to. All they needed was money

and weapons.

35. Riahi was asked by McClure what the position of the army was. He responded: "Iran and its

people are more important than the Shah or any government. The army is of the people and will

be supported by the people."

36. Abbas Milani, "Hurley's Dream," Hoover Institution, Hoover Digest, 2003, No. 3. Hurley

reported on a long discussion he had with Roosevelt, as the latter was leaving Tehran.

37. Kinzer, op. cit., p. 193