The Communist Nuclear Era

2 The Communist Nuclear Era

This publication is made possible by Eindhoven University of Technology and the Foundation for the History of Technology.

isbN 978 90 8964 653 8e-isbN 978 90 4852 319 1

© 2014, ivaylo Hristov

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Design and typesetting: Ellen bouma, Alkmaar, the Netherlands

Cover picture Loading a Reactor originates from the personal archive of Mitko iankov.

Amsterdam University Press, Herengracht 221, NL-1016 bG Amsterdamwww.aup.nl

Acknowledgments 3

The Communist Nuclear Erabulgarian Atomic Community during the Cold War,

1944-1986

PROEFsCHRiFT

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, op gezag van de

Rector Magnificus, prof.dr.ir. C.J. van Duijn, voor een commissie aangewezen door het College voor Promoties in het openbaar te verdedigen

op donderdag 23 januari 2014 om 16.00 uur

door

ivaylo Tsvetanov Hristov

geboren te Plovdiv, bulgarije


Dit proefschrift is goedgekeurd door de promotor:

Prof.dr. J.W. schot

Copromotoren:Dr. i. TchalakovDr.ir. E.b.A. van der Vleuten

Acknowledgments 5

Acknowledgements

The thesis is done. After more than four years of work, the entire text is ready. Writing a PhD dissertation was a very long journey, during which i met many people who did not understand what i was doing, many of whom asked me if i am a physicist. Dealing with nuclear technology seemed scary enough to forget that my main purpose was to reveal only the historical part of the story. Fortunately, i also met people and friends who attempted to understand the topic. Undoubtedly, the most fruitful contacts i had were with my colleagues and supervisors.

Travelling to many places in Europe gave me a richer perspective and a better view of the European nature of my research, while summer schools in Greece, Germany, and Finland enriched my knowledge of many historical topics and approaches. in addition to being part of such a wonderful professional commu-nity, i also adopted the European manner of living. in this way, my work received a “lived” sense of open borders and thoughts. Of course, this would have been impossible without sharing the experience with my colleagues Jíra Janác, Emiliya Karaboeva, and Elitsa stoilova, with whom i had very fruitful discussions.

My three supervisors – Johan schot, ivan Tchalakov, and Erik van der Vleuten – contributed significantly to this dissertation. Their advice, patience, and regular discussions helped guide my thoughts to what is now the complete version of this work. Particularly influential was my bulgarian supervisor, ivan Tchalkov, who regularly reviewed my draft chapters and gave me guidance on how to write a good thesis. His interaction with my bulgarian writings, from which this dissertation was actually born, was very important. in this respect, Erik van der Vleuten and Johan schot provided useful comments and comprehensive explanations on the English versions of the chapters. My three supervisors significantly influenced the last stages of my writings. This reflected the most serious aspect of my work, which required methodological clarity and conceptualization.

i would like to thank all of the colleagues i met at Eindhoven Technical University, including Alexander badenoch, Vincent Lagendijk, suzanne Lommers, Gijs Mom, Ruth Oldenziel, Frank schipper, and M. Luísa sousa. Of course, these were not the only colleagues who supported my work. i am also grateful to Dobrinka Parusheva and iliana Marcheva for their comments and supportive discussions in sofia and Plovdiv. i would also like to thank the EDF Foundation


for awarding me with a research grant, which enabled me to spend one and a half years in sofia and fulfill my research at the archives there. in addition, the sHOT organization gave me the opportunity to be an international scholar and partici-pate in a professional community of historians of technology, which was a very useful part of my scientific experience. My project was part of the PhD Program on Hidden integration in Central, Eastern and south Eastern Europe, organized and managed by the Foundation for the History of Technology. Therefore, i owe special thanks to the foundation and its staff, particularly Jan Korsten and sonja beekers.

My special thanks are due to the people from the nuclear centers and the nuclear plant, who were extremely kind and created a friendly atmosphere. The most supportive person was Professor Nikola balabanov from the Physical faculty in Plovdiv University, who connected me with people from the bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Agency, the nuclear experimental base near sofia, and the Kozloduy nuclear power plant. During these meetings, i met such individuals as Natalia ianeva, sergei Tzotchev, Mitko iankov, stoian stoianov, Rangel simov, Over Tadjer, and Kiril Nikolov, among many others.

During my journey, i also received support from my friend Elena Raykova and from my colleague Tihomir Mitev, as well as my family, my parents, my brother, and my son Kaloyan. All of these people were patient and waited with me until the end of this long journey.

Acknowledgments 7

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements 5

introduction 9 Nuclear Power Relations in Eastern Europe 10 Concepts and Research Focus 13 A brief Historiography of Nuclear Power 15 sources 17 Thesis Outline 19Chapter 1 Techno-political Revolutions in the soviet bloc 23 The bulgarian Communist Party’s Techno-politics 25 Company Pathways for Techno-politics 33 The Case of bulgaria’s Communist Electrification 39 CMEA Techno-politics 42 interpretation: Communist Techno-political Regimes 47 Conclusion 55Chapter 2 Nuclear science Networks in Eastern Europe 57 A Non-aggressive soviet Nuclear Program 58 High Power Channel-type Reactors (RbMK) 62 bulgarian Nuclear scientists and their international Relations 66 Nuclear Technology Transfer 69 international Organization 77 Conclusion 82Chapter 3 bulgarian Nuclear Power: socialist internationalism in Action (1962-1975) 85 Nuclear internationalism in the CMEA 86 Constructing the CMEA Power Grid 95 bulgaria’s Nuclear Power Program 100 Techno-Political symbols and Cultural Legitimation 109 Conclusion 112


Chapter 4 Momentum and Decline of the East European Nuclear Power Network (1970-1986) 115 The Growing Role of international Organizations 116 Nuclear safety in Eastern Europe 124 bulgaria’s Nuclear Program in a New international Context 129 bulgarian Nuclear Power in the Early 1980s 134 Decline of the East European Nuclear Network 138 Conclusion 141

Conclusion 143

Pictures 151 Pictures from the Personal Archive of Mitko iankov 151 Pictures from the information Center of “Kozloduy” NPP 152

Notes 153bibliography 181summary of thesis 203Curriculum Vitae 205

introduction 9

introduction

On March 4, 1977 a devastating earthquake hit Romania’s Vrancea region in the Eastern Carpathian Mountains. it measured 7.2 on the Richter scale and killed over 1500 people. Across the River Danube, bulgarians too felt the quake in their houses; in the bulgarian town of svishtov, three concrete apartment blocks col-lapsed, killing more than a hundred people. in Kozloduy, some 150 kilometers east of svishtov and slightly closer to the epicenter, bulgaria’s first nuclear power plant had been inaugurated three years earlier. its soviet-made reactors were running at full power on the night of the quake. Although the operators and experts were not prepared for such natural catastrophes, the engineers on duty remained calm and stopped only one of the reactors while the other continued working. in actual fact, the earthquake did not seriously damage the nuclear plant and no radiation leaked. Kozloduy’s reactors, over-dimensioned by their soviet designers to with-stand unexpected calamities, had survived.

Nevertheless the earthquake stirred up the nuclear community. The global International Atomic Energy Agency (iAEA) organized a meeting in salzburg, Austria, on the problems facing nuclear energy. Former bulgarian Vice Minister of Electrification Oved Tadzher recalls:

After a month, both the director Dichev and i were in salzburg on a meet-ing of iAEA. salzburg is in Austria, where Mozart was born. i was sitting on a bench, just like that, on the last row and i thought: All these people are gathered here and talk about nuclear energy only because of one rea-son, because Kozloduy resisted the earthquake. if the nuclear plant did not resist, it would put an end to the nuclear energy.1

Tadzher understood that if the possibility of a nuclear accident became a reality, not only bulgaria, but the entire planet would suffer the consequences. Decades of joint work in the field of nuclear technology would become meaningless. Existing plans for mass-producing nuclear power would be revised, and many countries might abandon nuclear energy altogether. Eastern Europe especially would suf-fer the dire consequences of radiation pollution. in this part of Europe, commu-nist governments, nuclear experts, and communist international organizations all reacted to the Vrancea quake: The bulgarian government postponed the launch of


two additional soviet-made reactor blocks in Kozloduy and demanded additional safety measures, which were developed in close consultation with soviet scientific advisors and other East European nuclear power authorities and experts. A few years later at an international conference in Dubrovnik, former Yugoslavia, on ‘Problems in making nuclear plants resistant to seismic activity’, the East European experts reported on progress.2 These reactions to the Vrancea quake suggest that the nuclear power sectors in East European countries were highly interrelated.

As we know, nine years later a nuclear catastrophe did occur in Chernobyl in soviet Ukraine.3 This disaster indeed dealt a serious blow to nuclear energy world-wide. Though involving a different type of reactor (one that also served military purposes and which the soviet Union did not export), Chernobyl shook the con-fidence in soviet nuclear technology throughout Eastern Europe. For almost four decades, East Europeans had come to believe in the supremacy of soviet technol-ogy, and nuclear technology had been one of its most prominent successes. by the mid-1980s, East European nuclear energy programs were at their peak. Citizens marveled at soviet nuclear capabilities, and communist governments celebrated their productive nuclear collaboration with each other and with the soviet Union in particular, which had supplied reactors and organized East European knowl-edge development and funding. soviet leader Leonid brezhnev had stated when bulgaria’s nuclear power plant first became operational, that East European nuclear power signified the unbreakable socialist camaraderie.4 The Chernobyl accident seemed to foreshadow that this camaraderie could break after all; by 1989-1990, nuclear energy as well as political relations in Eastern Europe were imploding. This book traces the rise and fall of bulgaria’s large nuclear power system and its embedding in the soviet bloc’s nuclear power relations.

Nuclear Power Relations in Eastern Europe

The Cold War saw East European political and technological relations becoming deeply interwoven. Most Central and East European states had come under the soviet political and ideological umbrella during and after the second World War. Faced with the immense task of rebuilding their devastated economies and politi-cal systems after the war, soviet leaders strengthened these new political relations with massive technological and economic aid programs, which would become a key strategy in developing a socialist community.

‘Europe’ and ‘Eastern Europe’ are not easy to define. Cold War relation-ships complicated familiar perceptions of what ‘Europe’ was. if the notion

introduction 11

of Europe followed the confrontation of one against the other, such as Christianity against islam or modern civilization against barbarians, then for Western historians, Europe’s borders were becoming narrower: “Europe during the Cold War was understood to be Western Europe, where Eastern Europe belonged to the hostile Other.”5 Russian historiog-raphy, for its part, increasingly emphasized the contrast of “the slavophil versus the Westernizing trends.” in this era it became increasingly true that “whether ‘Europe’ was defined as big or small, on cultural, geographi-cal or political criteria, largely depended on national vantage points.”6

While exact definitions are problematic, we can observe how for over forty years, soviet dominance influenced societies, economies and populations in countries liberated by the Red Army. Western observers called the soviet bloc “some alien world.”7 indeed ideologies and forms of government in communist states differed significantly from the West European social order. in ideological and political terms, Greece, geographically situated in Europe’s south-Eastern corner, became more of a West European country than some of its Western and Northern neigh-bors – Yugoslavia, Albania, and bulgaria. The most advanced prewar econo-mies in Central Europe, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, faced collectivization and nationalization and increasingly came to resemble the less-developed states such as Romania, bulgaria, and Poland. All these countries had traditionally been inte-grated with the Western part of the continent; now they had to break these Western links and build new ones towards the Russian communist empire in the East.

A further complication arose because communist Europe was far from being a homogeneous entity. Alliances were formed between its members, but they could also compete with each other within the bloc, and even form alliances beyond. Tito’s Yugoslavia cooperated less with the soviet rulers and successfully conducted an independent road to communism; in ivan berend’s formulation: “Yugoslavia, although not controlled by the soviet Union, followed a special road of ‘national Communism’ under Tito.”8 The sino–soviet split and the Albanian decision for self-isolation also demonstrated internal tensions within the communist bloc. Romanian rulers were known for tacitly opposing soviet interference, whereas the bulgarian government attempted to maintain a warm relationship with their soviet counterparts.

in communist Europe, these political relationships often resulted in techno-logical associations, for instance when soviet rulers enforced industrialization policies at home and in allied states to reverse economic backwardness and catch up with Western economies.9 Nuclear technology embodied high-profile soviet aid to its allies. in his memoirs, boris L. Joffe, a prominent Russian physicist and


member of the soviet Academy of science, revealed the soviet government’s offi-cial position at the launch of the first nuclear plant in Czechoslovakia: “in this time, the Central Committee of the soviet Union Communist Party and the Czechoslovakian government took a decision that underlined the special impor-tance of starting the station: it must be an example demonstrating soviet aid to Czechoslovakia.”10 Communist propaganda never tired of repeating how soviet politicians, scientists and engineers made nuclear science and nuclear power tech-nology available throughout Eastern Europe. bilateral and multilateral treaties specified that the UssR transferred technical artifacts (such as nuclear reactors) as well as knowledge, organizational models, standards, and specialists to its socialist allies; as a result, collaboration on the communist atom followed the frontiers of soviet political dominance.

Political and technological relations, however, were not necessarily identical. Despite reducing political relations with soviet rulers, the Yugoslavian govern-ment started negotiating relationships with the leading international communist organization, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in the late 1960s. in the field of energy this resulted in cooperation agreements with various soviet bloc countries.11 Thus Yugoslavia participated in the soviet bloc’s techno-logical rather than political arena. Unlike Yugoslavia, bulgaria became one of the soviet Union’s closest political allies, a relationship reflected in many scientific and technological exchanges; yet this book shows that even bulgarian politicians, sci-entists and engineers attempted to modify nuclear exchanges and frontiers to their own advantage, at times weakening nuclear relations with the UssR and forging such relations with others.

Arne Kaijser and Erik van der Vleuten describe the processes of technologi-cal change as “messy, negotiated, often contested and intertwined with hopes and agendas of many historical actors, negotiations, and conflict-ridden economic or political contexts.”12 This is especially true with infrastructure technologies or ‘large technical systems’ for nuclear power; local nuclear plants were embedded in geographically extended networks for knowledge production and distribution, equipment manufacturing and trade, financing, labor, uranium and spent fuel cir-culation, electricity supply, and so on.13 Taking into account this historically con-tingent nature of technological change, this book does not presuppose that East European nuclear frontiers simply followed political borders. its main research question is: how did bulgaria’s large nuclear system develop in the context of its transnational nuclear connections between, beyond, and within the soviet bloc.

introduction 13

Concepts and Research Focus

several concepts guide this investigation into the nuclear integration of Eastern Europe from a bulgarian perspective and help to focus on the research issues: hid-den integration and fragmentation, techno-politics, transnational history, nuclear system builders and techno-economic networks. i will discuss these and how they interrelate.

The opposing concepts of hidden integration and fragmentation as introduced by Thomas Misa and Johan schot are central.14 They argue that historians and citi-zens often see European integration as “a political entity that took form through treaties and the resulting international organizations” such as the 1951 Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and steel Community in Western Europe, the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA in Eastern Europe. studying instead how European integration materialized in the design and use of technologies, Misa and schot proposed focusing on the linking and delinking of infrastructure networks and the circulation and appropriation of knowledge, artifacts and practices to demonstrate how territories and peoples were integrated or fragmented as a result of material, institutional, or organizational practices. such processes were always loaded with tensions and struggles over inclusion and exclusion. This book studies such pro-cesses in the case of bulgaria and its East European nuclear power linkages.

The closely related notion of circulation “refers to the movement of people, knowledge, and artifacts between cities, companies, and nation states”15 and is complemented by the concept of appropriation: Historical actors at the receiving end of such circulation (say bulgaria in the case of nuclear technology transfer from the soviet Union) did not passively adopt technologies developed elsewhere, but participated actively in the transfer process. in doing so they might have changed the technology involved to suit domestic goals. During such appropria-tion processes “governments, companies, organizations and citizens – variously explore, signify, reproduce, communicate, and integrate knowledge and artifacts.”16 An important aim of this book is to investigate if and how bulgarian politicians, scientists and engineers, nominally the closest foreign allies of the soviet Union, diverted soviet nuclear intentions for their own domestic purposes, for example in their dealings with the United Nations iAEA.

A second key concept informing this study is the notion of techno-politics, described by Gabrielle Hecht in her book on the French nuclear power program, The Radiance of France. The notion refers to “the strategic practice of designing or using technology to constitute, embody, or enact political goals.” 17 it focuses our attention on historical actors who use technology to achieve political aims, thereby


actively shaping the relationship between political and technological integration. in communist Europe in particular, technological and political processes were diffi-cult to separate. soviet leaders set up scientific and technological programs for their communist allies, not only to provide economic assistance, but also to bind their allies closer to the communist superpower. Allied communist governments for their part also imbued technology with political aims; in the case of bulgaria, the three main Party leaders Georgi Dimitrov, Valko Tchervenkov, and Todor Zhivkov tried to create different kinds of political, ideological and technological relationships with the soviet Union.

A third guiding concept is transnational history. Though for the most part study-ing international relations, transnational history scholars have shown that hidden integration and fragmentation are intimately connected to processes within indi-vidual states. As Arne Kaijser and Erik van der Vleuten state in Networking Europe: “the idea of such a transnational history is, of course, not to exclude the national (or the global for that matter), but rather to link the international to the national.”18 The point is that intra-national and international integration processes influenced each other and were often mutually constitutive. As we shall see, the bulgarian nuclear power program owed as much to domestic as to international nuclear relations. Prominent bulgarian nuclear scientists and engineers, working on both domestic and international fronts, were at the same time building and aligning domestic and international relations. This book therefore traces the formation of nuclear relations in such different arenas as bilateral soviet-bulgarian negotiations and treaties, mul-tilateral communist organizations such as the CMEA, and domestic bulgarian pro-cesses and conflicts.

Thomas Hughes an American historian of technology introduces the concept of nuclear system builders, which allows a more effective investigation of these research questions. in his inspirational work Networks of Power, Hughes describes the estab-lishment of the electricity supply system by following ‘system builders’ – centrally positioned historical actors who sought to integrate technical, organizational, eco-nomic, political, cultural, scientific, and legislative components into a functioning system.19 This study follows major nuclear system builders as they engaged in nuclear linking and delinking processes, organized circulation appropriation, connected to global processes, inscribed techno-political aims in nuclear power programs, and aligned national and international nuclear relations. in subsequent chapters we will meet many kinds of nuclear system builders, be they leading politicians, individual scientists or engineers, international organizations such as the CMEA Commission on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, EURATOM, or the Central Dispatch Organization that coordinated Eastern Europe’s electricity exchanges.20

introduction 15

Finally, the thesis uses ivan Tchalakov’s theory of techno-economic networks under socialism. ivan Tchalakov is a bulgarian sociologists who specialized in sTs studies. His theory helps to tailor the notions of techno-politics and system build-ers to their communist context. He stresses the role of the so called communist nomenclature, especially economic and political, in communist techno-political regimes with their internal struggles and divisions. Tchalakov argues that system builders in socialist economies could never rely on a stable network. instead he defines communist industry “neither as an emergent nor as a stabilized network.”21

A Brief Historiography of Nuclear Power

National case studies dominate the existing historical literature on nuclear power. Despite the highly international character of nuclear technology, historians have scarcely studied the establishment of transnational nuclear networks; more often they focus on atomic developments and their effect on a particular state and dis-cuss interaction with other countries in the margins. several of these national case studies are, however, relevant to the present study. Most important, the study of East European nuclear relations requires knowledge of the soviet nuclear program. A prominent study is Paul Josephson’s Red Atom. Russia’s Nuclear Power Program from Stalin to Today, which describes the fate of the soviet Union’s nuclear pro-gram from a recent Western perspective.22 Josephson takes into consideration not only technological developments, but also the specific ideological, social, and political environment that existed in the UssR. We shall return to these develop-ments and Josephson’s brief elaboration on soviet international nuclear relations in Chapter 2.

Hecht’s study introduces the notion of techno-politics mentioned above. in her book The Radiance of France, Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II, she describes a traumatized France trying to recreate its identity as a world power and as a proud and strong nation through the development of its own nuclear power technology. Technical and scientific experts who promised to restore the nation’s glorious reputation enabled that process; they were motivated by the techno-polit-ical goals of “industrial, scientific, and technological development [that] would not only rebuild the nation’s economy but also restore France to its place as a world leader.”23 Other nation state-oriented nuclear histories confirmed the strong inter-relations between national politics and nuclear power. Lagaaij and Verbong did so for nuclear technology in the Netherlands and Cathryn Carson for West Germany.24 Kaijser includes the role of public opinion in swedish atomic history.25 Even in


countries where nuclear power failed, such as Denmark, technological nation-alism was strong and politics and nuclear technology were heavily intertwined; Henry Nielsen and Henrik Knudsen show how “the utilities, Risø [the national nuclear research institute], and the politicians finally joined forces”, but too late. The public opinion against nuclear power had become too strong.26

There are important exceptions to the national focus on nuclear history. Especially in her later work, Hecht demonstrated that the French nuclear program required elaborate international networks, and she studied the problematic French links to uranium mines in for instance Madagascar and Gabon.27 in his book American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe, John Krige reveals the American government policy for rebuilding science in Western Europe.28 ideologically reliable scientists were chosen to serve American and West European political interests during the Cold War. Particularly interesting for the study of East European nuclear relations is the third chapter of Krige’s book, in which he investigates the development of the European Organization for Nuclear Research CERN as a Cold War policy instrument. The Us government stimulated the establishment not only of EURATOM financially and technologically, but also of nuclear power plants in Western Europe.29 These publications provide a com-parison of what was happening on the Western side of the iron Curtain.

sonja schmid has recently opened up the study of nuclear tension inside the soviet bloc.30 Her article examines soviet nuclear techno-politics in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and examines if this was a case of ‘nuclear colonization’ by the ‘soviet empire’. However, she concludes that receiver countries profited sig-nificantly from nuclear cooperation with the superpower while East Germany and Czechoslovakia found their own way of dealing with soviet technological and sci-entific assistance. schmid does not delve into either the specifics of the socialist political system or its links with technology, and calls for more detailed study of national nuclear programs in Eastern Europe.

When studying nuclear technology in individual countries, historians usu-ally do not refer to the role of international nuclear organizations. For instance, David Fischer’s History of the International Atomic Energy Agency, The First Forty Years, is rarely cited or used. Yet the iAEA was a key arena for negotiating inter-national nuclear relations and enabling national nuclear power programs, while at the same time constraining military uses of nuclear technology.31 Unfortunately Fisher describes only the internal institutional evolution of the Agency; he does not mention how other actors such as national governments, scientific organi-zations, engineering organizations, individuals, or worker organizations shaped the international nuclear community. soviet publications on international nuclear

introduction 17

cooperation have the same bias; they primarily contain strong propaganda claims of the great soviet role in providing technical aid to other communist economies; volumes such as International Collaboration – Members of CMEA in the Nuclear Energy Area and Nuclear Science and Technology in the USSR only describe the organizational path for implementing nuclear programs in Eastern Europe, without considering how other actors experienced, resisted, or diverted these programs.32 The official propaganda obscures rather than illuminates the techno-political complexities of nuclear collaboration.

Finally this book builds on publications on nuclear science and technology in bulgaria. Nikola balabanov’s People in Physics considers the personal stories of leading nuclear scientists in bulgaria and their connections to the international nuclear community.33 Nikolina sretenova’s The University and the Physicians simi-larly reveals sofia University researchers’ personal accounts.34 sazdo ivanov and Penka Lazarova have written about Georgi Nadzakov, one of bulgaria’s key nuclear system builders; this biography shows how Nadzakov simultaneously formed domestic and international relations with politicians, scientists, and organizations in order to facilitate bulgarian nuclear activity. Finally, ilia borisov and Todor Lambov’s propaganda volume on First Nuclear in Kozloduy, bulgaria’s nuclear power plant, illustrates neatly how the communist literature looked at large tech-nology projects and nuclear power in particular and the exemplary role of the soviet big brother.35

Sources

To a large extent the establishment of peaceful nuclear programs was supported by national governments. in East European communist states, private or citizen involvement was minimal and private sector and free public opinion was severely restricted. There were plenty of other historical actors who did play important roles in the communist system, however.36 Unfortunately practical limitations force the researcher to narrow the search. For example, the CMEA archive in Russia is not easily accessible.

This book relies primarily on the bulgarian Central state Archives and the Archives of the bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. searching these two archives was the first step in determining bulgarian activities in the field of nuclear development and their link with CMEA and the soviet Union. studying the inter-national links in this triangle also provided information on other East European countries; the bulgarian case can indeed be used to illustrate the creation of a


communist nuclear network in Eastern Europe. in the thesis some of the primary sources are quoted in text boxes. These demonstrate the specific discourse in the communist period.

The bulgarian Central state Archives have three main catalogues that contain useful information. The first record group [fond] is on the CMEA, which contains over five thousand files in bulgarian and Russian relating to all the organizational activities. This rich data source seemed to make a visit to the Moscow archives rather superfluous. The next record group consulted for this book contains files from the bulgarian nuclear regulatory body, the Committee for Peaceful Usage of Atomic Energy CPUAE. This Committee was internationally recognized and connected to the other agencies. its files show how the nuclear network in Eastern Europe functioned in practice. Third, looking closer at bulgaria’s domestic affairs, the Ministry of Electrification’s records contain many details on the bulgarian nuclear power program, supplemented with the bulgarian journal Energy. The bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, especially International Relations and Contracts, helped to explain why bulgaria and the other communist countries needed to communicate with international organizations such as the iAEA. This source was used along with the iAEA bulletin, which has been published regularly since the organization was established.

This book also makes use of literature on the East European nuclear network, including Russian language propaganda and technical literature on nuclear power plants. These sources provide a soviet perspective on nuclear achievements in Eastern Europe, but obviously have limitations and biases. in the Cold War period, every successful technical project was used for propaganda in the public media and the scientific literature. ideological, political, and technological failures were usually concealed. bulgarian publications in these domains were similarly biased, but did contain many valuable details on technical and organizational nuclear work.

An important part of the research was oral history. This book uses information from twelve respondents in the bulgarian nuclear community. in addition, it draws on two interviews with electricity sector actors conducted by ivan Tchalakov. The respondents were chosen based on the period when they participated in bulgaria’s nuclear program and the institute where they worked. They were also selected because of their personal experiences, their international contacts, or their ear-lier careers and positions. The interviewees ranged from scientists such as Natalia Yaneva, former senior researcher at the bulgarian experimental reactor, to the former Vice Minister of electrification Oved Tadzher. interviews were conducted with bulgarian Regulatory Agency officials, including its director sergei Tzochev, as well as officials and engineers from Kozloduy nuclear power plant. These living

introduction 19

memories contributed significantly to the insights of this thesis.Together, these sources provided a view of East European communist nuclear

relations and large technical systems from a bulgarian perspective. The lack of details on other national cases in the region does of course leave many gaps in the understanding of the communist nuclear network; nevertheless, the bulgarian case provides intriguing insights into both the dynamics and configuration of East European nuclear techno-politics.

Thesis Outline

This book has four empirical chapters. Chapter 1 sets the stage. it describes the bulgarian transition to communism, the new accompanying domestic and inter-national relations and the techno-political implications of these changes. All of these would later become crucial for the nuclear power program. The chapter focuses on the pathways that soviet techno-politics followed in Eastern Europe. bulgaria’s Communist Party leaders played a leading role in appropriating the soviet model for technological development. Their personalities were important for the techno-political choices they made, the links they forged with their soviet colleagues, and the articulation of domestic technological priorities. in practical terms, multinational companies were an important vehicle of technology transfer. This had been so before the second World War, when German capital financed much of bulgarian industry; after the war, the soviet Union took over Germany’s role. in the electrification sector, which provided the direct context for the later nuclear power program, there was also serious tension between the legacies from the prewar period and radical changes informed by soviet-style techno-politics, which triggered major domestic conflicts – and even prosecution – among leading party members. The chapter shows the techno-political relevance of domestic ten-sion between political party members and the economic and scientific nomencla-ture. in terms of international techno-political relations, soviet leaders or advisors were always involved in domestic bulgarian choices, either informally through party leader contacts or formally in bilateral agreements. in addition, CMEA had a significant role in soviet technology transfer to its communist allies and the cre-ation of stable techno-political relations in the soviet bloc.

The next three chapters deal chronologically with the creation of large techni-cal nuclear systems in bulgaria and Eastern Europe. Chapter 2 traces the build-ing of an East European and bulgarian nuclear science infrastructure that would pave the way for Eastern Europe’s later transition to nuclear power. The hidden


integration and fragmentation of nuclear research relations also started before the second World War. The chapter describes the development of soviet nuclear sci-ence relating to the soviet nuclear plant program, the shaping of pre-war bulgarian nuclear physics and its post-war connection to the soviet nuclear science infra-structure; also the role of two new international organizations that interconnected national research institutes into socialist and global nuclear science communities, respectively: The socialist Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna, Russia, and the global International Atomic Energy Agency. Leading bulgarian nuclear sci-entists forged international and domestic scientific institutes and relations into a working transnational nuclear science research infrastructure, culminating with the transfer of an experimental nuclear reactor from the soviet Union to bulgaria’s capital sofia. The reactor became operational in 1961.

Chapter 3 discusses the establishment of a nuclear power network in Eastern Europe. in bulgaria, this entailed the step from nuclear research to a full-scale nuclear power plant. The chapter analyses the institutional efforts by the UssR and socialist international organizations, notably the CMEA Permanent Commission on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, to make nuclear energy available in social-ist Europe. The integration of East European electricity grids under CMEA coor-dination also provided a crucial context for large-scale nuclear power plants; as did communist techno-political programs to accelerate heavy industry, which caused structural electricity shortages. The chapter traces how bulgarian domestic concerns and conflicts tied in with these international efforts to transfer nuclear power ultimately resulted in the inauguration of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant in 1974.

Chapter 4 covers the period when East European nuclear power gained momentum and maturity in the 1970s and early 1980s. it ends with its decline in the late 1980s. international organizations such as iAEA, EURATOM, CMEA, and the new socialist organizations Interatomenergo and Interatominstrument had greatly strengthened the intergovernmental dimension of nuclear power sector development, which now focused on up-scaling and safety. The communist efforts at nuclear safety are particularly noteworthy in view of the later Chernobyl acci-dent and the collapsing reputation of soviet nuclear engineering. As we shall see, in the wake of the Vrancea quake, bulgarian nuclear system builders were heav-ily involved in safety issues while at the same time preparing to import the larg-est soviet reactor outside the soviet Union to date. The 1986 Chernobyl accident triggered a new round of domestic and international safety debates; even though bulgaria and other communist governments initially followed the soviet Union by declaring their support of the ongoing nuclear power program, political and nuclear relations quickly deteriorated in the late 1980s.

introduction 21

The conclusion of this book discusses the establishment of large technical nuclear systems in Eastern Europe; it examines the communist political environ-ment and focuses on the various actors involved in creating these nuclear systems. They were not only nation state governments and international organizations with their techno-political agendas, but also political, economic, scientific and techno-logical groups within the communist state. Their perpetual interactions and con-flicts ultimately shaped a large technical system characterized by specific patterns of linking and delinking, integration and fragmentation, within and beyond the communist bloc.

Techno-political Revolutions in the soviet bloc 23

Chapter 1 Techno-political Revolutions in the soviet bloc

“There exists no more sublime, rich and fertile topic than that of Soviet Science and Technology – the largest, most advanced and most humane in the world … [and] our cooperation with this

science and technology, with the comprehensive Soviet assistance, under whose gracious rays our country goes further. For everything good and great that we have given to our nation, to the

socialist community, which we can boast with pride to the world, is primarily a result of this coop-eration and this assistance.”

Nacho Papazov, bulgarian Politbureau, 197537

immediately after the second World War, communist regimes rose to power in most East European countries. These new regimes received support from the soviet Union to carry out political, social, and economic reforms.38 This support took different forms, including the presence of soviet special advisers organizing the implementation process of communist rule. The soviet Union also provided financial and technological assistance, in some cases free of charge and in other cases in the form of loans or barter trade contracts. Meanwhile, the military pres-ence of soviet troops guarded the loyalty of the satellite governments.

bulgaria was part of this so-called soviet bloc from 1944 and became one of the UssR’s closest allies in Eastern Europe. The new political line forced a number of transformations on its economic and technological development, which also changed bulgaria’s socio-economic structure. The new order removed free mar-ket relations, private property, and many other former capitalist features. More broadly, “socialism existed long enough to develop its behavioral patterns” as János Kornai notes in his authoritative study on the socialist system.39 These changes in turn created new conditions for soviet-bulgarian techno-politics and technology transfer.

The main purpose of this chapter is to elaborate on the techno-political impli-cations of this transition to communism that would become crucial for bulgarian nuclear relations. First it discusses the introduction of communism to bulgaria, the new international relations that came with it and the implications for bulgaria’s technological systems. Particularly important were the country’s powerful new


political leaders, who pushed new technological priorities in close contact with domestic elites and ruling circles in the soviet Union. 40 Their domestic and for-eign economic and scientific advisors also had an important say in bulgaria’s new industrial developments and alliances.

in terms of international technology relations, these changes triggered a disrup-tion of bulgaria’s prewar orientation toward Germany and other Western European states as a source of technology and industrial investment, and a re-orientation towards soviet bloc allies.41 There were important continuities though; for instance, prewar German-bulgarian enterprises and electrification efforts served as the basis for post-war industrialization launched by the Communist Party. Prewar technology transfer structures thus left a lasting mark on bulgaria’s postwar techno-politics as it did on its nuclear program, as we shall see in the next chapter.

We will also explore the formation of an additional network of political, ideo-logical, and technological ties in the ‘soviet bloc’ through the multilateral activi-ties of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The CMEA was established in 1949 to create ‘the necessary conditions for successful cooperation’ between communist countries. Within this organization, soviet leaders aimed to build a network of complementary economic partners, which could facilitate the differentiation and division of labor in the manufacturing sectors as well as technology transfer between various CMEA countries. The aims, priorities, strate-gies, and dynamics in different phases in the organization’s evolution reshaped the map of technology transfer in Eastern Europe, and the organization would play an active role in forging nuclear community among soviet bloc partners. For instance, the CMEA actively developed personal contacts among experts from member countries. soviet officials used the organization to form a series of profes-sional communities in the field of science and engineering through the exchange of personnel and fellowships abroad. irrespective of the efforts to develop a socialist brotherhood cooperation between members within the CMEA framework, soviet specialists remained the dominant players.42 Moreover, the flow of students and experts to the soviet Union for technological and scientific training far exceeded visits to other industrialized member states such as the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.

Finally, the chapter considers how these changes aggregated in two key ele-ments of the new techno-political regime that greatly affected the later introduc-tion of nuclear power in bulgaria. A first significant outcome of the techno-political changes was a focus on the accelerated development of heavy industry to compete with capitalist countries. 43 Massive investment in heavy industry “means of pro-duction” in turn led to chronic energy shortages, which would later surround the


issue of nuclear power.44 secondly, the newly reorganized structure of the politi-cal, economic, and scientific “nomenclature” had important implications for the communist patterns and problems of technological innovation, which we will also encounter in the case of nuclear power.

The Bulgarian Communist Party’s Techno-politics

The radical political changes in bulgaria began on september 9, 1944. The soviet Union had declared war on the country a few days earlier, on september 5, and soon the Red Army crossed the River Danube that constitutes bulgaria’s northern border. On taking power, the new government then declared war on Germany; bulgaria entered the second World War for the second time, now on the Allied side.45 After the end of the hostilities, bulgaria remained in the soviet zone of influ-ence. soviet interests in bulgaria, informed by the country’s strategic geographical position, proved greater than those of Great britain and the United states; the lat-ter ceded the region to their communist ally.46

The bulgarian Communist Party took power after the 1946 elections, and began building and staffing an organizational structure similar to the soviet model. bulgarian communist activists who had emigrated to the soviet Union before the war, came back to help implement the necessary organizational mechanisms they had studied in the UssR. Up to 1944, over one hundred bulgarian Party members had lived in or visited the soviet Union; their return constituted one of the most common ways of replicating the soviet management structure in bulgaria.47 After the 1946 elections, the Party organized the structure and activities of the Central Committee that in theory elected the executive Politburo at Party congresses, as in the soviet model (though in practice, power was centralized in the Politburo).48 in early 1947 the Politburo officially approved its first “nomenclature of the staff ”, a classification of people holding key positions in government, industry, educa-tion and so on; bulgaria was the first soviet ally to introduce this system, which in turn determined other ruling structures.49 ivo Možny compares the nomencla-ture to club bosses: “... all the bosses were there and the party worked for them as club bosses. it was not possible to obtain any leading role without being a member of this club. All power components of social life were mutually and inextricably linked to it through personal unions: Party and state apparatuses, economic man-agement and power components”.50 This merger of party and state was one of the main features of the communist ruling system. by the end of 1948, the bulgarian communists had established a functioning one-party government, though


the organizational work continued; in 1949, for instance, a specially appointed bulgarian party delegation went to study the work of the soviet party apparatus in Moscow and Minsk.

The close connections between UssR leaders and the bulgarian communist government also determined the choice of bulgarian party leader, who was also the First secretary of the Central Committee and head of its Politburo. The per-sonality of the party leader was extremely important for country’s future course. Particularly in the years after the second World War, but even in the much later period of the early 1980s, he played a major role in economic, political, and social life. Accordingly, the personal preferences of the main party leaders who ruled bulgaria between 1946 and 1989 had important implications for the country’s techno-political priorities. Their individual policy approaches also reflected their relationships with the soviet rulers: For the subject of this book, the most impor-tant soviet leaders were stalin (in power from 1928 to 1953), Khrushchev (1953-1964), and brezhnev (1964-1982). All embodied the classical socialist system, though their management styles might be very different.51

The power of the bulgarian party leaders was also mitigated by other members of the Politburo and the economic and scientific elite. Their roles became visible particularly during changes of government leaders or chairs of important govern-ment departments. still, the leading figure in the communist state was a barometer and driver for political, social, economic, and technological development.52

The internal differentiation of bulgarian communist elites happened immedi-ately after they took power in 1946. The first conflict saw prewar emigrants to the soviet Union opposing communists who had stayed behind in bulgaria.53 Georgi Dimitrov, the first state leader, represented the former group. He had fled bulgaria after a communist uprising in the early 1920s and was even sentenced to death in absence. After further training in the UssR, he worked in Germany as an agent for Komintern, the international collaboration of communist parties. in 1933 the German police arrested Dimitrov in berlin for setting the Reichstag on fire; during the so-called Leipzig Trial, Dimitrov’s calm conduct and defense won him inter-national renown. Dimitrov then returned to Moscow as Komintern’s secretary-general. in 1946 he became the bulgarian Communist Party’s first leader, which “reflected the attitude of Moscow to the various figures in the bulgarian leadership – political emigrants with preference versus the internal functionaries”.54 Moscow sought fidelity to the soviet ally, and Dimitrov’s unshakable faith in stalin’s model and personal contacts with the soviet leader gave the “international hero from the Leipzig process” an advantage over other candidates.55 The new Party leader in turn compiled the names of the members of the Politburo and Central Committee


in close contact with the Kremlin.56 immediately after Dimitrov in ranking was Traicho Kostov, a Partisan war hero who represented the non-emigrant fraction in the Party and now became Politburo member and Minster of Electrification (thus underscoring the prominence of energy in communist techno-politics). The Dimitrov government was short-lived though, for the party leader died in 1949. Despite their short time in power, in addition to a new party structure and nomen-clature, Dimitrov and his associates introduced the basics of the soviet techno-political model in bulgaria.57

The new government’s industrial, economic, and technology policies were also based on soviet leaders’ experiences. Like their soviet counterpart, bulgarian techno-politics were ideologically framed in terms of the superiority of the com-munist system compared to the capitalist world.58 However, this superiority came only at the cost of “sacrifices for achieving higher growth”.59 Dimitrov articulated his techno-political priorities in a speech to the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party in December 1948: “As i said … it is necessary through industrialization and electrification of the country and the mechanization of agriculture to achieve in about 15-20 years what has taken other countries under other conditions an entire century”.60 These words expressed the desire of the communist leaders to achieve growth based on competition with capitalist countries and industrial development. in 1947 Dimitrov approved a two-year economic plan that included economic changes, recovery of the country’s prewar economy, establishment of international relations, and the nationalization of major economic enterprises.61 it also nationalized the existing foreign trade companies. The establishment of state foreign trade organizations started in 1947 and lasted until 1948, when the new Ministry of Foreign Trade was founded. This Ministry completely stifled private foreign trade companies.62

Given bulgaria’s status as a defeated state in the second World War, most other allied governments refrained from contractual relations with the new government. Only the soviet Union carried out a limited turnover of goods primarily from agriculture. bulgaria’s economy was predominantly agricultural in nature, and German-owned enterprises passed into soviet control. Moreover, stalin forced the country to supply products to the soviet Army, which hampered its already struggling economy.

Only in 1949 did a significant improvement in the economic, social, and polit-ical situation occur. several events from the previous years caused this change. Firstly, the communist totalitarian regime had now secured its position, destroyed the opposition and established a single-party government. A second important event was the deepening of bulgarian-soviet relations, as expressed in trade


agreements and the receipt of a number of cash and stock loans.63 For example, in 1947 the two governments signed a credit agreement under which bulgaria received the necessary funds for economic development: “... the Government of the Union of ssR agrees to grant to the Government of the People’s Republic of bulgaria credit amounting to 5 [five] million Us dollars for payment of the appro-priate part of the goods, intended for delivery by the Union of ssR to bulgaria in 1947 under the Protocol to the Convention for the flow of goods and payments between the Republic of bulgaria and the Union of ssR from today”.64 Repayment was made through the supply of tobacco and other commodities. interest on the loan was 3 percent, as that rate, as agreed, would be redeemed with the first contri-butions.65 such agreements accompanied bulgarian-soviet relations until the late 1980s, when the totalitarian regimes in both countries lost their influence. An important part of such loan agreements was to provide technical assistance and industrial facilities. These agreements formed the basis for technology transfer between the two countries. The soviet government provided similar credit agree-ments to the other communist countries to compensate its allies for war damages; this was the soviet version of the Marshall Plan proposed by the Us government to rebuild economies in Western Europe.66

bulgarian domestic policies for economic and technological development were articulated in draft programs to be adopted at Party congresses. The party line was clear by December 1948: The Fifth Congress of the Communist Party adopted a tone of pro-soviet sentiment and planned economic, social, and economic tasks for a period of ten years.67 One of the main elements was re-orienting the bulgarian economy to central planning and the development of heavy industry.68 The work of the Fifth Party Congress definitively associated state ownership with economic assets: The program included the full nationalization of all industrial enterprises, foreign trade companies, mining, shipbuilding, railways, handicrafts, agricultural property owners’ production as a last resort. The communist literature celebrated these measures as “foundations” on which will rise “the building of socialism”.69 The communists intended to develop heavy industry and a new public strata of industrial workers. The latter change was possible thanks to the previously high concentration of labor in agriculture; party policy diverted these agricultural laborers to the industrial workforce to supply construction works.70

The policy line of the Fifth Party Congress resulted in the new five-year plan. The plan focused primarily on the development of machine building, mining, metal processing, the chemical industry, production of building materials and wood. it also prioritized mining and electricity as key ancillary sectors that would literally fuel the industrialization process. According to the congress directives,


the path to a new communist society was through the promotion and massive funding of these branches, which would then produce the desired socioeconomic changes: “The main economic and political task ‒ stated the Central Committee draft of the projected ressolution concerning the five-year plan ‒ is building the foundations of socialism in bulgaria on the path of industrialization and electrifi-cation of the country, cooperation, and mechanization of agriculture”.71

The directives also included measures to improve communist public relations. Propaganda blamed the low economic status of the country on the inadequate policies and shortcomings of the previous capitalist system. As a basis for build-ing a modern communist society, Party rhetoric adopted several new social policy categories. For instance, the new order ‘released the rural masses from their means of labor’. Also, communist policy called for a change in the status quo of the female population, making their emancipation part of economic progress.72 in the cre-ation of bulgarian communist society, women played a key role alongside men in building new industries. Mass education was another measure and the new gov-ernment provided training courses and access to education.73

The five-year plan thus ultimately aimed to change the structure of bulgarian production forces. in Georgi Dimitrov’s words, “during the first Five-Year Plan we can put the task to lay the foundations of socialism both in industry and in agricul-ture”.74 The Party’s economic and scientific elites placed economic and production mechanisms at the heart of social change and the construction of a new type of society.75 There was an important continuity though: The program sought to boost industrialization using the limited technical means inherited from the past. We shall elaborate on this point below. New and old techno-politics, then, were fun-damental to the communist project in the early years of its existence.

After Georgi Dimitrov died, Vasil Kolarov took his place, but he too died sev-eral months later. Valko Chervenkov, who promoted the “New Course”, was next to assume power in bulgaria.76 Chervenkov was a direct follower of stalin’s politi-cal line. indeed, after stalin’s example he introduced into the party propaganda a cult of his own personality, after which he became known as bulgaria’s “little stalin”. While Chervenkov served as chief party secretary, numerous “awkward elements” in party circles were purged. After the death of Joseph stalin in 1953, soviet ruling circles would fiercely criticize the bulgarian leader’s policies.77

in response to the change of leadership in the soviet Union, Chervenkov and his followers attempted to identify their views with those of stalin’s intended suc-cessor Georgi Malenkov, who articulated the UssR’s ”new course”.78 Chervenkov’s version of the new economic course was debated at the sixth Party Congress in 1953, where bulgarian officials attempted to change economic policy. The main


goal was to put greater effort into developing light industry and consumer good production at the expense of a one-sided focus on heavy industry. The agricultural sector also needed reforms. Underinvestment in these branches was now a major concern for socialist system builders.79

This alignment with Malenkov’s new course, however, made Chervenkov vul-nerable to the outcome of the internal strife between Malenkov and Khrushchev for the succession of stalin in the soviet Party – particularly when Khrushchev managed to sidetrack Malenkov in 1955. Also, despite increased investment in consumer sectors in the wake of the sixth Party Congress, and the reduction of credits for heavy industry by the soviet Union, the “new course” failed to meet the expectations of the ruling elites.80 in 1956 the Kremlin initiated the replacement of Valko Chervenkov by Todor Zhivkov.81 The end of Chervenkov’s leadership meant the end of the initial formation of the communist model in bulgaria.

Todor Zhivkov’s new government immediately took steps to address the crisis in the country. This marked the beginning of a 33-year period of leadership char-acterized by many positive and negative achievements. Notwithstanding Nikita Khrushchev’s opinion, which was that bulgaria did not have the potential to develop heavy industry on a large scale, political instability in Hungary and Poland in 1956 and a special visit of a bulgarian delegation to Moscow in 1957 convinced the soviet leader of the country’s potential in many sectors. Khrushchev decided to grant credit and technical assistance to bulgaria for key industries such as min-ing, nonferrous metallurgy, chemical, coal, and electricity.82 The bulgaria delega-tion also negotiated better conditions for soviet imports of bulgarian agricultural products and raw materials. The light industry sectors in bulgaria had to imple-ment these contracts. Through such measures, Zhivkov’s government aimed to reduce social tension caused by large-scale unemployment, and by the late 1950s, vast improvements were visible in bulgarians’ living standards.83

Zhivkov further strengthened his position in 1961 when, in a special plenum, he suppressed his political opponents, who argued that Zhivkov’s stalinist man-agement model had failed to solve the country’s economic problems.84 Zhivkov’s political victory cleared the road for his new economic reform policy modeled after the so-called “Great Leap Forward” in the soviet Union and China.85 Five-year plans were now re-scheduled for completion within three years.86 The main objective of the “Great Leap Forward” program was to achieve high economic per-formance in all areas of the national economy by investing massively in energy pro-duction: Energy abundance would in turn boost heavy industry, consumer goods production, and living standards. During the Eighth Party Congress in 1961, the bulgarian leaders elaborated these policies in their twenty-year perspective plan


for the country’s development.87 The focus on energy did not diminish the ambi-tions for heavy industry development: “The party has set the task to increase the volume of production in industry by 1980 to 6.5-7 times that of 1960 with priority development of heavy industry”, noted the Congress Directives.88 in addition to energy and heavy industry, the Eighth Party Congress emphasized scientific and technical knowledge as a driver of economic development.89

in 1964 Leonid brezhnev overthrew Nikita Khrushchev as UssR party leader.90 subsequent events in bulgarian higher political circles once more reflected the close connection that existed between the two countries.91 Zhivkov was now accused of pursuing a Khrushchev policy, which seriously shook his leadership position. However, unlike his predecessor Chervenkov, Zhivkov managed to maneuver himself out of the crisis caused by soviet leadership change and became known as a friend of brezhnev.92 Moreover, in the same period, the separatist poli-cies of China and Romania created fertile ground for bulgarian politicians to show their loyalty to Moscow and earn victories in the economic policy field: bulgarian leaders’ loyalty to brezhnev enabled them to secure significant soviet loans and the promise of assistance with the construction of “a number of large industrial enterprises”.93 As a result, bulgarian national income increased steadily from 1966 to 1971. Prominent sociologist Niko Yahiel, who was Todor Zhivkov’s advisor, cit-ing the National statistical Yearbook, observed a significant increase in growth in the 1960s and 1970s.94 The pledges made for the “Great Leap Forward” seemed fulfilled. The planned industrial facilities were completed and began to produce output. in addition, the country had educated a nucleus of engineers and tech-nicians able to cope with the technological challenges of industrialization. The collectivization and establishment of cooperative farms were also completed. The political regime was relaxed, liberated from years of the “cult of personality” and the associated repressions.

Throughout his leadership, Zhivkov saw science and technology as drivers for these economic successes. in 1961 Zhivkov had emphasized the role of science and technology at the national meeting for innovators and inventors, and Party policy would increasingly support the so-called science-technical revolution to achieve its economic and social aims.95 According to Zhivkov’s report from the Ninth Party Congress of 1966, bulgaria ranked high among advanced countries with a rapid pace of development.96 To improve even further, the Congress desired “rapid technical reconstruction” and “wider deployment of science and technol-ogy in the national economy”.97 science and technology would eventually deliver the advantages of socialism: “On the basis of the extensive use of the achievements of modern science and technology and the consistently applied new system of


guidelines, branches of the national economy should be intensified and modern-ized, its branch structure upgraded, and productivity and efficiency of the economy increased in order to achieve better satisfaction of the material and cultural needs of the people”.98 in the new industrial structure, a so-called “group A” of heavy industry still dominated and would receive the necessary large investments.99 in addition, congress directives expressly noted that the “group b” of light industries would develop branches related to consumption.100

Zhivkov’s personal role in such techno-political changes was huge; Martin ivanov calls him the bulgarian leader who was “the engine of the most reform ini-tiatives during the three decades before 1989”.101 The following example illustrates the personal influence of the first Party secretary, who in the bulgarian case was also a chair of the Ministerial Council.102 in his memoirs, Zhivkov’s advisor Niko Yahiel described the manner in which decisions were issued by the state leader for implementing the economic changes of the ‘Great Leap Forward’: “...Zhivkov did not say a word, just changed his face color. After five minutes he called me to read what i wrote in my two or three introductory pages. Just mad. i started to read and yet in the first sentence he interrupts me: “What nonsense that you wrote”. i con-tinue to read and again: “What nonsense!” in all the reports, the first person plural was used: we set ourselves the task... we think... This “we” was used as long as any-one could remember to express the collective opinion of the Politburo. Precisely this “we” was what annoyed him: “What is this “we”,” we”, “we”?..”.103 instead of “we”, the Party leader wanted to see his personal attitude reflected in Party docu-ments. Otherwise punishment would probably follow. Punishment was normal if directives were not followed and could be performed by persons directly associ-ated with the Party or its leader.104 The type and intensity of punishment depended on the offender’s place in the hierarchy and the extent of his “mistake”.105 Luckily for Yahiel, his special position in Zhivkov’s office allowed him slight deviations from the normal order.

Zhivkov’s belief in science and technology as drivers for economic and social development and his influential position also boosted the development of elec-tronic computing in bulgaria, which would become the success story of the 1970s.106 According to Yahiel, Zhivkov discovered electronics at the World Expo ‘70 in Osaka and immediately made it an economic priority.107 The Party lead-ership now aimed to turn bulgaria into the East European center for electron-ics manufacturing. in his memoirs, Zhivkov openly admitted his passion for the electronics branch: “i will admit wholeheartedly one of my weaknesses. i have paid attention to all sectors, but i could not hide my hot bias towards electronics. The manifestations of this bias sometimes even went beyond my responsibilities.


Formally speaking, probably i exceeded my rights. but did not that mean actually faster, more durable, more effective promotion of bulgaria’s economy”. 108

bulgaria’s successes in electronics primarily served CMEA markets, but its elec-tronics relations extended into the non-socialist world. Many of the technological innovations implemented in this sector were indebted to imports from Western Europe and the United states. in addition, the bulgarian government deepened its contacts with Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany to improve the com-petitiveness of its electronic products.109 The electronics industry became one of bulgaria’s most profitable branches: The per capita growth in exports of electronic computing machines in 1977 was comparable to the Japanese.110 bulgarian elec-tronics now even gained a place on Western markets.111 in addition to electronics, the 1970s also saw the rise of industrial truck manufacturing and light weapons production as leading sectors nationally and internationally. Last but not least, these Party techno-politics were an important driver for bulgaria’s nuclear power project that also took off and became a leading sector in the 1970s.

Company Pathways for Techno-politics

The techno-politics of the bulgarian communist state were implemented through different forms of technology transfer and technological capability building. in some cases, technology transfer built on established links with traditional partners. in other cases it built on new structures for technological learning and exchange between recently associated communist partners, whether in the form of bilateral agreements or multilateral work. These various international relationships shaped the ways technology transfer actually took place. Thomas P. Hughes describes technology transfer as a key process or phase in the development and spread of large technical systems, involving active adaptation to the new environment.112 in this case, bulgaria was usually the receiving environment. The same was true, as we shall see in later chapters, for the transfer of the nuclear power system.

The next sections will discuss various pathways of technology transfer to bulgaria. To understand bulgarian technological relations, it is necessary to first specify the transfer channels that the country used before the second World War. Here mul-tinational production companies played a key role. bulgaria’s prewar technology transfer links and strategies greatly influenced postwar developments. Next we will discuss postwar pathways such as large foreign trade companies, research and train-ing infrastructures, and international organizations such as the CMEA.


The outcome of the First World War gave bulgaria a surprising push in tech-nology transfer. bulgaria and Germany were both defeated countries, which stimulated their collaboration. Close political contacts and technology transfer coincided, particularly in the 1930s. German heavy industry was developing rap-idly, and the German economy increasingly used bulgarian raw materials and agricultural inputs. As a result, bulgarian agriculture showed significant growth rates.113 bulgarian historians iskra baeva and Evgenia Kalinova claim that in these years, “economic dependence created favorable conditions for closer political links”.114 in addition, German entrepreneurs increasingly invested directly in the bulgarian economy. From a German perspective, these foreign direct investments were less important than in Poland and Czechoslovakia. From a bulgarian per-spective, however, they were crucial and laid the foundation for some of the most important industries after the second World War. For example, a major share of German investments was in bulgarian mining companies to satisfy German heavy industry demand. German entrepreneurs also made major investments in the bulgarian shipbuilding and construction industries. in twenty-two of bulgaria’s largest joint-stock companies, German capital exceeded fifty percent.115 For example in bulgarian mining, Pirin was the largest company with over a fifty-percent German stake, while several smaller mining companies also operated with German capital. Koralovag was the key shipbuilding company, located in bulgaria’s major sea port Varna. German shares constituted no less than ninety-eight percent of its stock capital of an estimated twenty-one million levs. The Koralovag yard built small to middle class vessels, and during the second World War constructed and renovated German Navy vessels in the black sea.116 Another bulgaria-based German shipbuilding company, Neptune, had over three hundred workers and operated as an auxiliary unit during the war to support Koralovag’s activities.117 in this period, businesses in the ironware, beer, and canning industries with German assets also operated in bulgaria. Joint-stock companies with German capital thus covered a variety of branches.

some of these enterprises with German capital participation operated in a number of industries throughout the country. A good example is the largest joint-stock company in bulgaria at that time, Granitoid, in which German capital made up twenty percent. This company operated coalmines, power plants, cement fac-tories, and others.118 it employed prominent bulgarian engineers such as Philip Zlatarov and Victor samsarov, whose contribution to hydropower plant construc-tion in the Rila Mountains showed the hydropower potential of the country that the first communist leaders would pick up later.119


German participation in the construction industry, however, may have had an even greater impact on bulgaria’s prewar economy. Three large construction enterprises in bulgaria operated with German capital. The largest of these, Cyclop, participated in the construction of Vrazhdebna airport in sofia and a new thermal power plant also in sofia. Calculations in 1947 suggested that the work carried out by this organization was worth 270 million levs.120 Cyclop also had significant technical expertise and a construction machinery park. The second largest com-pany, Rella and Nefe, was in a similar situation and its work was valued at eighty-nine million levs. The third construction company, Arge Davidag, was engaged in underground and port construction.121

This brief survey suggests two conclusions about the prewar bulgarian econ-omy that the later communist literature deliberately concealed. Firstly, communist ideological propaganda emphasized the industrial backwardness of the country. János Kornai analyzed the uniformity of the promises made by the communists when they came to power in Eastern Europe: Throughout the region, the same propaganda proclaimed the superior nature of communist economic development to capitalist development.122 in bulgaria, too, communist propaganda based on messianic faith in the new social order, manipulated information and dramati-cally lowered estimates of prewar production volume, blaming the low output on the shortcomings of the capitalist system, and exaggerating the economic achieve-ments of communism.123 However, while bulgaria’s prewar economy indeed lagged behind that of advanced capitalist countries, this does not mean that the country had no industrial growth; rather, through German-bulgarian joint stock compa-nies, the bulgarian economy was developing rapidly.124

The second feature of the bulgarian prewar economy that communist literature deliberately concealed was the transition of German capital. it emphasized “revo-lutionary” change and “new beginnings” under communism, and concealed tech-nological and business continuities with the old regime.125 in reality, the postwar technology transfer model built on prewar practice. After the second World War, as noted, German property in bulgaria was confiscated to compensate the soviet Union for war damages. The fate of German property in bulgaria was decided during the Potsdam Conference, held in 1945 from July 17 to August 2, by the heads of the governments of the three victorious great powers: the UssR, the Us, and the UK. The parties decided that “German companies in bulgaria and other countries [are] to be transferred into ownership of the soviet Union as partial compensation for the enormous destruction that Hitler’s army committed on the UssR’s territory”.126 The final transition of former German enterprises and com-panies to soviet jurisdiction took place from 1946 to 1947. The property now in


the hands of the soviet Union included “... 156 business enterprises and other prop-erty, buildings, concessions, securities, deposits and others”. 127 Note that in these enterprises, German capital had been shared, as bulgarian individuals or companies had owned significant parts of the assets. Thus, the passing of German property into soviet hands was also made in consideration of bulgarian equity. in most cases this eventually led to the establishment of joint bulgarian-soviet companies. soviet officials now managed the companies in which German capital had formerly domi-nated, while bulgarian officials led those companies where bulgarian capital had dominated (though soviet advisers influenced their company policies).128

The potential of the new bulgarian-soviet enterprises in 1947 was significant. The archives mention 3,617 employees, including 221 engineering staff.129 by con-trast, in his speech to the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party, Georgi Dimitrov estimated the number of employed “workers, peasants and intellectuals in the Union of bulgarian-soviet companies to be nearly one million”.130 This figure should be considered suspect, since early communist governments deliberately exaggerated soviet aid and the results of mass mobilization of the poor rural and urban popula-tion in the field of politics, economy, and industry.131 still, the growth of bulgarian-soviet enterprises is unquestioned.

The first established bulgarian-soviet enterprise is of particular interest to this thesis. This enterprise was formed at the end of 1945 and inscribed in the commercial register as the soviet-bulgarian mining company. Later, the company was acquired by the largest organization, Gorubso, which is discussed below. The soviet-bulgarian mining company succeeded the German stock companies ERC and Heinz Günther as well as several smaller bulgarian companies that held con-cessions to search for ores and minerals. Just a few months after the establishment of the company, the National Assembly passed a special Act for its institutional existence.132 The Act exempted companies from paying taxes and import/export duties for shipment to the UssR.133 The next year the company imported machin-ery, equipment, vehicles, electric motors, tools, materials, and other items from the soviet Union.134 The company employed primarily soviet specialists, and its core business became discovering and developing uranium deposits in bulgaria. The activity of the bulgarian-soviet mining company was suspended in June 1956 because, at that time, an agreement was reached “...under which bulgaria would continue supplying the soviet Union with uranium ore at fair and mutu-ally advantageous prices, contributing to the successful development and future of this valuable resource”.135 After this agreement, bulgaria became the sole owner of the deposits. Rumors spread that the first soviet atomic bomb was made with bulgarian uranium from these deposits.


Other examples include the Tabso airline company. before the war, a small aircraft industry existed in bulgaria, supported by German and Czechoslovakian capital.136 After the war, the soviet and bulgarian partners participated equally to further develop the company. The soviet side brought in airplanes, machinery, radio equipment and other technical facilities as well as twenty-seven million levs. The bulgarian side was obliged to provide “land areas, runways, airports, garages, petrol depositories, the radio station buildings and other facilities at airports in sofia, burgas and Varna”.137 The agreement also included bulgarian maintenance of these facilities and use of the aircraft for agricultural, forestry, and disaster response services. in 1952 Tabso ran scheduled flights on the sofia-Warsaw-sofia, sofia-budapest-Prague, and sofia-budapest-Warsaw air routes and flew to berlin and Vienna.

in 1950 the remaining soviet enterprises based on predominantly German capital were formally turned into bulgarian-soviet companies. For instance, the presidium of the National Assembly issued a Decree for the registration of the major soviet-bulgarian companies sovbolstroy, Korbso, and Gorubso. The Decree neatly illustrates the essence of the arrangement:

The presidium of the National Assembly, on the basis of article 35, paragraph 5 from the Constitution of the People’s Republic of bulgaria and article 5, letter “a” and “b” of the Presidium Law of the National Assembly issued the following Decree for registration and operation of the soviet-bulgarian parity companies “sovbolstroy”, “Korbso”, and “Gorubso” based in sofia.§ 1. Hereby approved to be registered as legal entities under article 5 of the Law on state enterprises incorporated under agreements between the Governments of the People’s Republic of bulgaria and the Union of soviet socialist Republics companies, namely: bulgarian-soviet parity construction company “sovbolstroy”, soviet-bulgarian parity shipbuilding company “Korbso” and soviet-bulgarian parity ore mining company “Gorubso”.§ 2. Relationships between the parties, management and representation companies, and all matters relating to their activities are regulated under these agreements in § 1.§ 3. Companies are exempt from income taxes but also from paying taxes, levies and general duties for all the facilities and materials imported into the People’s Republic of bulgaria as a contribution from the soviet side in the capital stock of the companies.This Decree shall enter into force on June 30, 1950.138

Korbso was the successor of the German-bulgarian firms Neptune and Koralovag, the shipbuilding plant “Georgi Dimitrov”, and other smaller facilities provided by the bulgarian side and became the basis of bulgaria’s shipbuilding industry.139


Gorubso took over the former German-bulgarian mining company Pirin, and through Gorubso, the soviet Union invested technical, personnel, and financial capital in bulgarian mining. New lead and zinc ores deposits were developed in the Rhodope Mountains; the company’s uranium mining remained classified through-out the communist era.140 The development of the mining company came with the construction of new towns to house specialists, workers, and administrators. by 1955 the company employed about 17,200 people.141 sovbolstroy deserves the most attention of these new companies. The soviet Union brought in the assets of the former German construction companies Cyclop, Rella & Neffe, Lignum, and Arge Davidag.142 With new equipment and specialized staff and workers, the company began to participate actively in the realization of Communist Party objectives for heavy industry. sovbolstroy had construction departments in every region of the country and one could say that it actually built bulgaria’s postwar economy. its list of projects covers heavy industry plants, roads, docks, airports, dams, power plants, and even cultural and residential buildings. in 1954 its headquarters employed over 12,700 people, and the company held over two thousand construction machines of different types.143

soviet participation in these enterprises contributed significantly to their devel-opment through specialists, technical documentation, licenses, technology, and organizational processes. During the formation of these enterprises, the soviet party also injected additional cash capital that helped increase technological capa-bilities. in effect, roughly the same companies that previously carried out German-bulgarian technology transfer now handled soviet-bulgarian technology transfer. bulgaria’s prewar hidden integration with Germany in terms of markets, production structures, technological “know-how”, and machinery had redirected these on the soviet Union, but its carriers by and large remained the same.144

There was yet another legacy from the prewar period. if we look at the bulgarian engineers engaged in technological innovation in the first years after the war, we find that they drew heavily on their prewar training. The new communist regime had needed a quick restoration of economic potential and could not do without well-trained staff. Notwithstanding the subsequent purge of the opposition and rul-ing officials from previous years, many of the intellectual and technically educated elite of the country survived and found employment in the new companies and construction projects. As ivaylo Znepolski states in his analysis of the Communist rule, there “appeared a huge staffing vacuum. That was the reason why several years later, old officials or professionals in economy sphere were left in place”.145 The words of Konstantin Kostov illustrate this point: “in general, i had very good, very good


teachers in state Polytechnics, i cannot twist my soul, then they were at better level than some of them now ... Yes, these were graduates of German schools. Let’s speak honestly how it is, it’s a German school”.146

in the next chapter we will see how this continuity played out in nuclear science and technology. Here it suffices to observe that the introduction of soviet techno-politics in bulgaria relied heavily on the country’s prewar technological potential. The dominant geography of technology flows, however, had indisputably changed.

The Case of Bulgaria’s Communist Electrification

The electrification of bulgaria, which provided the direct context for the develop-ment of nuclear power, was also characterized by a mix of old and new during the communist transition. As we shall see, however, in this case the tension between old and new turned out to be highly conflictual.

When the communist government took power in bulgaria in 1944, the coun-try had 784 electrified villages.147 Over ninety-eight percent of the urban popula-tion, between nine and thirty percent of the rural population, and approximately forty percent of the total population had electricity access.148 Two years later, the new Ministry of Electrification, Water and Natural Resources was established and Traicho Kostov was appointed Minister of Energy. As mentioned earlier, Kostov ranked second in importance after Georgi Dimitrov in the Communist Party. His appointment as energy minister illustrates the importance of the electricity industry in the new government’s plans. Regardless of his communist orientation, Kostov assessed the country’s electrical progress under prewar capitalism posi-tively.149 He elaborated a two-year electrification plan for 1947–1949 that included twenty-four new power stations with a total capacity of 160,185 kW.150 The plan also suggested a survey for the construction of twenty-eight other stations and completion of the national grid.

The next step was the nationalization of the existing electricity sector. The new organization Energoobedinenie would handle “unified management of gen-eration, transmission, and distribution of electricity”, while Energostroy handled construction and maintenance of energy facilities.151 With the help of soviet and Czechoslovak specialists, the Ministry also established the design company Energohidroproekt.152 The bulgarian electrification process is summarized in the table below.


Table 1.1 – Number of electrified settlements in Bulgaria 1944-1954153

Year Growth of settlements Total settlements19441945194619471948194919501951195219531954

–236

92211288262401163240

6183

7841047103913501638190023012464270427652849

The bulgarian communist electrification policy followed the soviet model. Lenin’s slogan, “Communism is soviet power plus electrification of the whole country” was taken literally. Accelerated electrification became a major target for the gov-erning elites. However, the Ministry did not meet the construction scale goals set out in the two-year economic plan.

According to Kostov’s critics, this failure was rooted precisely in organizational and technical legacies from the prewar era. in the first place, they emphasized the role of (Western) foreign capital in the electrification of bulgaria and in the con-struction of power plants. Until 1948, when nationalization was completed, the state had participated in only twenty percent of its electrical power companies, and the rest belonged to municipalities, unions, banks, and private investors.154 Almost no production of electrical equipment and components for the grid took place, except for a few small factories. instead equipment was imported from Western Europe, which in many cases was accompanied by the necessary specialists. in the scientific field, the new government established several departments at sofia Polytechnic only after the end of the second World War. Merely five secondary technical colleges existed in bulgaria and most senior engineering personnel, who by 1946 numbered about five hundred, were trained in Western “higher technical schools and universities, mainly German”.155 These examples once again show the commitment of one of the most important sectors of bulgarian industry to West European countries.

A second critique concerned Kostov’s electrification strategy, which built on prewar ideas building comparatively small-scale power plants based on indige-nous power sources such as hydropower and local coal deposits.156 This critique became the formal motive for a show trial against Kostov. The context was that the Communist Party itself was going through a period of reorganization, dic-tated by Moscow: The main reason for the actions against bulgarian officials was


Josef stalin’s distrust of Traicho Kostov and his entourage, caused by their strong nationalist stance. Alarmed by Tito’s actions in Yugoslavia, stalin decided to elimi-nate such hazardous elements. in bulgaria, Party leader Dimitrov now organized a “People’s Court”, which accused Traicho Kostov and the deputy ministers in his cabinet, of incompetent management of the electricity sector.157 Kostov was sen-tenced to death, and his aides Manol sakelarov, Marin Kalburov, and Lubomir Kayrakov received years in prison. Regarding the electrification policy itself, Dimitrov (also on quite explicit instructions from stalin) enforced a radical break with the past in the form of a large scale electrification program based on large scale power plants and imported soviet coal. Thomas Hughes has conceptual-ized these opposing electrification strategies as “evolving” and “planned” regional electricity systems; in bulgaria, a similar competition between the indigenous and tradition-based “evolving systems” strategy and the more radical “planned system” approach was settled by much more extreme means.

The new large-scale electrification strategy materialized in the “perspec-tive electrification plan” for the period 1954-1962. The Ministry of Power Plants of the UssR had consulted on the plan. During this period began the constant short-age of electricity caused by ever expanding large industrial facilities. in the mid-1950s, the Politburo also developed the “general electrification plan of bulgaria for 1957-1970”. it envisaged accelerated development of the electricity sector to ensure the future development of heavy industry and scientific-technological progress. The “general plan” provided further increases of thermal capacity and completion of ongoing hydroelectricity projects.158 The lack of sufficient electricity to cover the needs of industry and the population continued to be a problem for communist bulgaria, however. According to calculations by specialists, by 1980 the country’s demand would rise to seventy billion kWh, an unattainable level given available energy resources. The following quote from 1962 reflects the chronic electric-ity shortage and the continuing debate about domestic versus imported energy sources:

it is now known that with our energy resources, we will be able to produce in the years of this perspective period only about 45 billion kWh of elec-tricity annually, consisting of about 35 billion kWh of coal and about 10 billion kWh of hydropower, and at nearly the limit strain of coal mining and almost limit construction of water sources.159

Thus specialists estimated that in 1980, bulgaria would have “about a 20-25 bil-lion kWh shortage”, which would increase by about another 20 billion kWh. The electricity shortages in the country’s balance were “an essential characteristic and


the basic starting point in framing further development of the wiring system”. 160

in the 1960s, bulgarian energy politics sought solutions such as large-scale coal and electricity imports and the construction of a nuclear power plant.161 We will return to the development of bulgaria’s electric power system in later chapters. Here it suffices to observe how the communist transition affected energy techno-politics and eventually the nuclear power program.

CMEA Techno-politics

state policies and companies oriented towards the soviet Union were not the only channels and sources of bulgarian technology transfer. Another important chan-nel was the CMEA. Of course, soviet rulers were also in charge of this organiza-tion, which they had designed to establish deeper integration between member states in trade, technology connections, differentiation of production, exchange of technical documentation, specialists, and others.

According to the CMEA charter, East European governments created the Council in response to their refusal to participate in the American financial sup-port scheme known as the Marshall Plan. since trade relations between the soviet bloc and the Western capitalist world were frozen, East European countries needed aid from the soviet Union to rebuild their economies. The following quote from the official creation of the Council shows how the superpower tied East European countries together:

in January this year in Moscow, there was an economic conference of represen-tatives from bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, UssR, and Czechoslovakia ... ...in order to achieve greater economic cooperation between countries with a people’s democracy and the soviet Union, the meeting considered the necessity for establishing a Council for Economic Assistance with representatives from the countries participating in the meeting, on the basis of equal representation, with the task of exchanging economy experience for providing technical assis-tance to each other, for mutual assistance with materials, supplies, machinery, installations and such. The Conference agreed that the CMEA is an open organi-zation in which can enter other countries in Europe, which share the principles of the Council for mutual aid and wish to participate in a broad economic coop-eration with the above-mentioned countries.162


Technical assistance in the form of equipment and material donations was an inte-grated part of the organization’s mission statement, and the UssR’s role as provider of technology as well as reconstruction funds to the other members was clear. From a soviet perspective, this was just another pathway for soviet techno-politics in Central Eastern and Eastern Europe.

Documentation of the CMEA activities for the period 1946-1956, which is kept in the bulgarian Central state Archives, states that the UssR gave loans to CMEA member states worth twenty-eight billion rubles. This amounted to 6-8 percent of all investments made by the UssR from 1946 to 1956. The soviet government pro-vided such loans in the form of free currency, equipment, and grain. For example, Poland built seventy large enterprises with soviet aid, and soviet loans comprised approximately nine percent of all investments made in the Polish economy from 1950 to 1957. in bulgaria, soviet loans made up no less than twenty-five percent of all investments in the national economy from 1948 to 1956; in Albania, the soviet share even reached twenty-six percent by 1956 (intriguingly, these loans equaled 212 percent of Albania’s industrial output in 1938).163 Czechoslovakia also received significant financial support amounting to twelve tons of gold in 1957. in 1953, East Germany received an interest-free loan to purchase one thousand trac-tors, eight hundred trucks, and other equipment, and another loan of 585 million rubles consisting largely of freely convertible currency.164 Hungary received credit in merchandise amounting to more than one billion rubles, including two hun-dred million rubles in free convertible currency. in 1955 Yugoslavia also received credits in gold and hard currency worth Us$30 million.165 On the one hand, all these support measures demonstrate the soviet Union authorities’ desire to par-ticipate in the reconstruction of East European economies. On the other hand, the process of reconstruction was used to strengthen connections between these countries and communist rulers in Moscow.166

The CMEA did not merely channel financial aid. For example, “on July 31, 1951 in Moscow, representatives of the UssR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, bulgaria and Romania signed a protocol to construct the ‘bridge of Friendship’ over the Danube”.167 This bridge between the Romanian and bulgarian banks of the River Danube became a major international link and the infrastructure symbol for communist integration in Europe.

in addition to the CMEA, the Warsaw Pact ‒ the soviet bloc’s military orga-nization ‒ also helped strengthen the connections between East European coun-tries.168 The contract was signed on May 14, 1955 among the same states that established the CMEA plus Albania. This military organization again showed its pro-European orientation:


Contracting Parties, reaffirming their desire to create a system of collective security in Europe with the participation of all European countries regardless of their social and state system that would allow them to unite their efforts in the interest of ensuring peace in Europe, tak-ing into account at the same time the situation, created in Europe, in consequence of the ratification of the Paris agreements, which provide formation of a new military group in the form of a “Western European Union”, involving remilitarization of West Germany and its inclusion in the North Atlantic bloc, which increases the risk of new War and threatens the national security of peace-loving countries, convinced, that under these conditions peace-able European states must take the necessary measures to ensure their safety and to main-tain peace in Europe, guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of further strengthening and development of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance in accordance with the principles of respecting the independence and sovereignty of states, and non-interference in their internal affairs, decided to conclude this Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance....169

The major source of contention in the relationship between the Eastern and Western blocs was the division of former German territory. As is shown later in this thesis, the German question also informed nuclear technology issues between the two blocs.

Deeper integration processes within the CMEA started at this time. The death of Joseph stalin inspired a new approach to the relationships between the soviet Union and its satellite countries in Eastern Europe, and accordingly created a new course within the CMEA framework. After a long break, given the change in the political line in the UssR, the fourth CMEA session was held in March 1954. The members decided to increase the mutual coordination of their national economic development plans and capital investments. Along this line, the Fifth session of the Council held in Moscow in June of the same year extended coordination from economic planning and investment to foreign trade activities: “Upon recom-mendation from the same session, all countries with a People’s Democracy must create sectorial committees to coordinate plans for bilateral co-construction and development of various economic sectors”.170 in 1955 the sixth session debated cooperation in machine building in connection with states’ plans for rapid indus-trialization.

The hand-written notes by Georgi Tchankov, a member of the bulgarian Politburo, at the Fourth CMEA session illustrate how CMEA operated. These notes are kept in the bulgarian Central state Archives. An interesting note describes the manner in which soviet officials made changes and proposals for rearranging the organization’s structure. According to Tchankov, soviet Minister of Foreign Trade


Anastas Mikoyan verbally dictated the new CMEA directives. Representatives from other communist countries took notes, which were compared after the meet-ing to eliminate mistakes.171 in terms of content, Mikoyan’s main concern was to avoid construction at too large a scale in heavy industry, providing examples of excessive investment in Romanian and soviet canal building. Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary had recently cancelled the construction of proposed large metallurgical plants. The soviet minister attributed these failures to poor plan-ning. According to the notes, one of the most significant drawbacks that Mikoyan identified was parallelism:

Everybody wants to develop lathe factories, bulgarian comrades say that they, Hungary and Romania produce the same types of lathes. it is neces-sary for bulgaria and the other countries to agree on the cooperation of production, to build one type of lathes in bulgaria and another in Hungary and Romania, so in that way to have corporate mass production and sup-ply of quality lathes, capable to withstand the capitalist competition, to be better than the capitalist on quality and cost. similar situations exist in the other countries. All states want to produce everything themselves. We, the soviet Union are a large country, but we do not manufacture all we need.172

Mikoyan painted a similar picture for electrical industry machinery, textile machinery, locomotives, wagons, trucks, and bearings, among other things. in conclusion, he recommended the organization of the international division of labor in “our socialist camp”. He also spoke about the necessity “to have such a plan of division of labor in our camp, to obtain a general effect”. The socialist countries “have to know what is needed where, what needs to be developed and in what amounts”. Thus they would know “which certain country has the best conditions, and at a minimum, has the means of subsistence production. These are simple things, but we do not consider them”, Mikoyan concluded.173

The soviet Minister also addressed the issue of commercial trading with capi-talist countries. A major argument in his speech was the mitigation of the external environment and the recovery of Western countries’ interest in commercial con-tacts within the soviet camp. Mikoyan called foreign trade contacts with countries outside the communist community a “lever for peace.” He stressed that the objec-tives of the countries with a people’s democracy “should be directed towards the expansion of trade relations”.174 At the end of this Fourth session, the soviet hosts distributed a statement written for participants from visiting countries to help them understand and follow the prescribed recommendations. soviet leaders were


clearly in charge, even though the message was cooperation: “From the applied protocol of the iVth session of the Council, it is revealed that the CMEA’s main task in the future, will be to coordinate plans for the development of the Council’s individual member states; to promote cooperation and standardization of uniform production among the countries; to coordinate plans for capital investment and foreign trade issues”.175

During its seventh session in berlin in May 1956, the CMEA introduced special-ized standing committees for economic and scientific-technological cooperation. These committees would henceforward institutionalize the Council’s integration activities. The berlin session, which aimed to coordinate member states’ activities in the three-year period from 1957 to 1960, also advocated larger investments in the sectors of group “A” heavy industry and smaller investments in sectors in group “b” light industry that bulgaria also adopted.176 Also, soviet officials remained in leading positions in the new standing committees. subsequent chapters show how soviet politicians also directed the committees relevant to promotion and implementation of peaceful uses of nuclear power.

CMEA techno-politics, however, faced various obstacles. Regardless of meetings and approved development plans, cooperation between member states was often strained. Member states might be reluctant to implement CMEA agreements, and – as a tacit mode of resistance – were slow to share vital information on the main technology industries. This situation arose because national political bodies feared they would lose control over economic agents involved in CMEA schemes. Member state regimes preferred to have enterprises and production lines that they could eas-ily manipulate and control, which implied less freedom for these economic agents themselves. indeed, political leaders used their secret security services to regulate economic sectors.

Hungarian Permanent CMEA Representative Antal Apro expressed his concerns over specialization progress, stating that little specialization occurred in Hungary except for some production areas. Apro added that the specialization recommen-dations adopted at the berlin session in 1956 were temporary; moreover, “special-ization in foreign trade was insufficiently reflected in plans and agreements”. The standing committee on machine building, for instance, appeared to have no author-ity to resolve the problem. in theory, all member states supported the division of labor; in practice, virtually every state wanted to retain its production profile, an issue that the “first secretaries should note”.177 The bulgarian delegation had a similar opinion. its representatives also accused other member states of attempting to meet their own needs without complying with the agreements for long-term contracts.178 These problems among the CMEA countries were the result of mistrust, hidden competition, and national self-interest.


The Eighth session of the Council at the end of 1957 signaled the advent of a new period in the organization’s progress. First, this session established new standing committees that worked on long-term plans until 1975. second, the soviet Union began to participate in the meeting discussions along with the rest of the member states, rather than simply dictating them. soviet representatives also began to share information about the soviet Union more openly; after this session, soviet experts began to provide “the necessary reporting and perspective data on its economic development”.179

Interpretation: Communist Techno-political Regimes

in order to understand Eastern Europe and bulgaria’s techno-political relations in the communist era, this section suggests how the techno-political elements described above add up in “techno-political regimes”, which would later shape the development of bulgaria’s nuclear relations and power program. For example, industrialization, mechanization, and heavy industry were seen throughout the socialist bloc as means to implement a new social order; this Party line, which János Kornai calls “classical socialism”, was introduced in the stalinist era of the new communist countries but continued during the communist leadership of Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid brezhnev.180 Thus, after stalin’s death, the commu-nist critique of the “cult of personality” and excessive purges of political opponents did not fundamentally change communist economic and technological paradigms. The following paragraphs elaborate on the ideological and organizational dimen-sions of the early communist techno-political regimes in bulgaria.

significant ideas and priorities such as: Competition, “forced growth”, heavy industry, and “stagnation” marked the communist ruling regime. One of the main features of the communist government with respect to economy and industry was its characteristic of catching up.181 stalin formulated the notion of being in compe-tition with capitalist economies, and Khrushchev openly declared that the task of the soviet Union was to become the leading economic power.182 Like soviet lead-ers, bulgarian communist rulers perceived competition with the West as the basis for the emerging economy. Following the soviet example, they widely promised the impending overtaking of developed capitalist countries. Kornai argues that these promises could not be upheld: “During the whole period of classical social-ism, a great tension was created between the promises made by the official ideol-ogy and actual economic performance of the system. Over time, failure in fulfilling the original promise becomes burdensome”.183 in the 1960s and 1970s, communist


societies in Eastern Europe indeed achieved significant economic growth rates; socialist countries were among the top twenty in the world for investment and economic growth in that period.184 Kornai argues that the absence of free market relations and successful innovations in the public sphere triggered the subsequent slowdown in economic growth; but the next section shows that the process was not so simplistic.

in his study on the Velvet Revolution in the Czech Republic, ivo Možny raised the question of economic reasoning concerning the dispossessed property of the elite. Property in theory belonged to all, that is, the entire population; but in fact, property ended up in the hands of middle and lower-level managers who dis-played a “possessive attitude”.185 Of course the distribution of property changed with the different periods of economic development; for example, the early notion of “forced growth” initially came with enthusiasm and deep ideological beliefs, whereas the emancipation of technocratic and economic elites later on led them to be more concerned with their personal welfare, which paved the way for more pragmatic behavior towards production facilities and funds.

in bulgaria, the techno-political regime of “forced growth” was elaborated at the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party in 1948, when Dimitrov formulated the tasks for the economy as follows: “For this purpose it is necessary to create a powerful energetic economy through the use of water and the fuel sources in the country, rapid development of mining, building our own steel industry and enough developed machinery and other heavy industry as well as development, modernization and consolidation of the light industry”.186

Already in these early years, communist leaders prioritized heavy industry and capital good production that would later be known as “sector A” investments.187 industry was related to means of production, which in turn ensured rapid growth of the economy. This priority stayed in place at all the stages of bulgaria’s com-munist development. The directive in the twenty-year perspective plan, setting economic growth ambitions for 1960-1980, was indicative: “The Party gives a task, the volume of industrial output by 1980 to increase 6.5-7 times compared with 1960, with priority being given to the development of heavy industry”.188

several waves of political focus on the lack of light industry and consumer goods could not disguise these priorities. in the years when the socialist system in bulgaria was stable, investments in heavy industry sectors had already created a vacuum in other sectors. in his study of Todor Zhivkov’s management, Niko Yahiel showed that the idea of implementing the Great Leap Forward “... led to exceptional pressure in the economy”.189 The leader’s policy increased produc-tion levels for several years “... not with individual rates, but two, three or more


times”.190 This policy was conducted with a firm hand in the 1950s and in practice led to the neglect of the light industry sectors and of consumer goods. However, in the early 1960s, a slight change occurred in the Communist Party and its leaders’ attitude toward production sectors and satisfying people with so-called consumer goods. This new attitude increased the investment share in light industry and sec-tors related to consumer goods. However, despite this rhetoric, the tasks set by the twenty-year perspective plan clearly revealed the priorities, which were: “on the basis of the high development of the productive forces, within the period of twenty years to create opportunities for meeting basic rational needs of the population for food, clothing, housing and other items of consumption”.191

The construction of large-scale production facilities came with specific notions of profitability, which were linked to the communist international market and var-ious arrangements for raw material imports. Dependencies on foreign raw materi-als, however, also created economic vulnerabilities.192 in addition, these large-scale facilities were highly energy intensive, which created serious difficulties especially for smaller countries with limited fuel reserves. These drawbacks proved critical bottlenecks in the early 1980s when the communist economies entered a period of “stagnation”, followed by the decline of the East European nuclear program.

significant parts of the communist system related to innovations and techno-economic networks. As we have seen above, an important step in organizing com-munist rule was the establishment of the Communist Party nomenclature. How did party members’ hierarchy affect communist innovation and techno-politics in practice? This hierarchical structure strongly empowered the top leadership who stood alone at the top of the organizational pyramid; ivo Možny, inspired by Pierre bourdieu’s work on the Kabile tribal organization, appropriately called the communist leaders “pharaohs”.193 The bulgarian economist Georgi Petrov, in his advanced-for-its-time study of 1990, likened the totalitarian system to a feudal one.194 Thus the actions of the Party and economic leaders in various departments, ministries, and organizations were under the direct control of the state leader and the Politburo.195 in response, engineers, scientists, and other professional groups in the lower levels of the pyramid made their own alliances in order to influence the leader’s decisions.

Yet the hierarchy alone does not help us understand the dynamics of com-munist innovation. ivan Tchalakov’s theory of techno-economic networks under socialism helps explain the role of communist nomenclature in commu-nist techno-political regimes.196 Tchalakov’s theory is based on the economic model proposed by schumpeter for the role of entrepreneurs in modern techno-logical society. According to this model, the economy operates under two basic


conditions or “regimes”: in a stationary state, the economy functions on the beaten tracks of past cycles. schumpeter also calls this regime a “circular flow”.197 To enter into a second regime of “development”, or “creative destruction”, one needs entre-preneurs. However, for entrepreneurs to begin to destroy the stationary phase is hardly achievable because they need resources to innovate and break up the circu-lating economy. if successful, their innovations may develop into a new industry that enters into a cyclic stationary regime. Capitalist entrepreneurs gain access to resources through the financial system – banks and bourses. in communist societ-ies, schumpeter argues, communist leaders also acted as entrepreneurs and used their unlimited power over capital and means of production to direct resources in innovative ways; they were capable in a “planned manner to update entire branches” and, theoretically, to build the most advanced innovative economy. 198

The situation in the UssR, the source of the techno-political model in Eastern Europe, was characterized by two main ways of creating techno economic net-works as defined by Michel Callon.199 Michel Callon is a French sociologist one of the developers of Actor-network theory. On the one hand, these networks were a legacy from before the revolution, while on the other hand, they were novel networks made and implemented internationally. Tchalakov therefore defines the situation of communist industry “neither as an emergent nor as a stabilized network”.200 in an innovative emergent network, industry is still at a level where the connections between the players are not well established and no uniform or symmetrical channels of access to information, skills, and artifacts exist. in a sta-bilized network, industrialization processes did not take place in the scheme of “unique and newly emerged sets of ‘statements + artifacts + embodied skills’, but in well-established networks about which we already know”.201 Well-established and entrenched networks are usually associated with slow change and lower innovative potential. in the case of communist innovation, however, stability was important too because it protected communist entrepreneurs from the risk of not knowing what technology can bring and in which direction political leaders would develop state industrialization programs.

To create a more accurate view of communist innovation that combines fea-tures of both emergent and stabilized networks, Tchalakov adds the intermediate phase of the so-called “initial period”. This is a stage that preceded and prepared for the other stages in the communist economy as defined by Kornay: “Taking in mind the contribution of the TEN approach to the schumpeterian model of socialist economic development, it is possible to distinguish also an initial stage of creating the necessary educational, scientific, and technological infrastructure prior to the phase of forced growth”, notes Tchalakov.202 To be able at all to copy


Western innovations, in this intermediate phase the bulgarian communist gov-ernment made large-scale investments in the training of specialists, engineers, and researchers, in laboratories, engineering departments, and in information infrastructure. Additionally, the government established facilities for the industry including a vast energy program.203 Through these new capabilities, the commu-nist economy was able to successfully copy already proven innovations. it now had the potential to decode technical information, which was a success factor behind the significant innovation results achieved by communist countries up to the mid-1970s.204

in addition, while schumpeter focused on “communist leaders” or the “central organ” as entrepreneurs, Tchalakov also takes into consideration the non-homo-geneous nature of the communist nomenclature with its contradicting interests and hidden or open conflicts, as brought to attention by recent studies in the his-torical sociology of socialism.205 This complexity helps us understand the inner processes of achieving successful socialist innovation. While the management of industry, including innovation, was in the hands of the economic nomenclature, the political nomenclature and the supreme leader of the country were owners of investment capital – the banks in schumpeterian original theory. The latter also controlled the law enforcement apparatus, which made them the sanctioning body for failed investment decisions. Hence socialist economic managers have been controlled too, not only by the bankers, but also by their comrades in the politi-cal nomenclature: that is, Communist Party organizational departments and their “right hand” state security officers.

Hence all business sectors lobbied and used their party networks to gain the favor of their political leaders and be included in state investment plans. As Kornai states, lobbying was not foreign to the socialist system, as each professional group attempted to protect its interests.206 The following excerpt from a speech by bulgarian Party leader Zhivkov, held in the bulgarian state Archives, simultane-ously reveals the role of the political leader, the struggles in professional circles, and the mechanisms for punishing technocrats in communist innovation:


Four years ago, there was a big dispute over our oil industry. Comrade Vladimir Medarov, candidate member for Central Committee of bCP, who is here, in the meeting, went out and proved that it is not necessary to build a new plant, since the current platform in bourgas may lead to 14-15-16 million tons of oil processed yearly, and not with 220 million, but with about 100 million ‒ the details i do not remember. Then we loaded an authoritative panel of experts to assess the proposal from the comrades of bourgas. They unanimously rejected the project. Much of the comrades in the Ministry headed by the Minister opposed. They came to me and tried to convince me that Comrade Medarov must be sent to an asylum, in the psychiatric ward, as if he was not in good mental condition. (Excitement)i heard them. i said: i agree with you that he should be investigated. but i must go with him, and as well the majority of the members of the Politburo must go, as we stood behind Comrade Medarov. Comrade Medarov is not the main culprit. The main culprit is the one who encouraged him intellectually. i encouraged him. Our people said: The one who eats the pie is not crazy, but rather the one who gives it to him. Therefore, you propose to prove that at the head of our party are mentally unbalanced people. (Excitement)but we stood behind this project, supported it. Here are the results: The task was overachieved brilliantly. in only four years facilities have been put in place for processing, not 6 million tons as was foreseen in the project, but 7 million tons of oil. A capital investment of 120 million was predicted, and they have achieved all this for 117 million. Further, staff recruitment is not 510 people but 110 people. We were approved a cost of 5 levs, they reached 4 levs. Here, see how a ‘crazy’ idea is realized in life, even though our best capacities and our ministry, with very few exceptions, were opposed. 207

Zhivkov’s speech reveals the tensions that existed during the political height of communist rule. it also reveals that economic managers faced real threats. The role of the political leader and his entourage appears crucial in making a particular technological decision. Moreover, the fate of the obviously talented professional who was threatened with involuntary hospitalization in a psychiatric institution for his innovative idea depended on this leader (in other situations – as the above case of Traicho Kostov and his deputies shows – they could be blamed for “sab-otage” and possibly executed or jailed).208 The quote also demonstrates another essential feature of the late “classical socialist system”: The lack of a clear develop-ment direction. if the goal in the early years of catching up with and overtaking the capitalist countries had a clear direction, and if the resources needed to achieve this goal were also clear, then during and after the mid-1970s, the demand for innovative solutions applied in industry was proving to be a serious obstacle to future development.209 The centralized administrative system now hardly allowed


for implementation of spontaneous innovation. The example suggests that the heavy bureaucratic apparatus of the techno-political nomenclature itself blocked attempts at innovation, and instead prioritized existing technologies. in this case, only the personal interests of the head of state allowed the implementation of the proposed innovation. such examples of successful innovation were exceptions rather than the rule in communist societies and particularly in bulgaria.

As we shall see in the next chapters, similar processes played out around nuclear power. individual professionals used personal contacts within the Communist Party network to introduce nuclear power on the agenda; higher level officials feared that change might affect their power positions, and only a statement from the highest political level could support nuclear innovation in a thoroughly con-servative regime environment.210

An important feature of the socialist system was the massive attraction of human resources to implement development plans. Regardless of the repressive measures against some supporters of the opposition forces, communist lead-ers valued human potential. As noted above, addressing unemployment in the late 1950s proved important for stabilizing social relations in the countryside. Unemployment resulted from the consolidation of the agricultural sector, leaving many workless people to seek a livelihood in the larger settlements. This urbaniza-tion process was accompanied by an ever-increasing demand for labor in industry. Large industrial facilities required the mobilization of much of the population, who had no alternative. To attract labor, the communist government simulta-neously used the methods of propaganda and coercion. As a result, the number of new towns grew quickly and existing towns expanded significantly. in 1965, industrial workers comprised 42.2 percent of the population and by 1975, their numbers reached 59.2 percent.211 importantly, the need for labor also included a need for scientific and technological specialists: The state began setting up special-ized schools and universities. in the early years of the socialist system, short train-ing courses provided basic knowledge.

At the same time, the system for rewarding and evaluating work changed. in a society where cash incentives were not a major driving force and where the people suffered from a shortage of consumer goods, ideology partly replaced the lack of incentives: “in our state, labor will have to become more a matter of honor, of valor and heroism”, noted Georgi Dimitrov in the late 1940s. 212

This ideological structure of labor had a dual nature. Attracted by promises of a new identity, many young people from the countryside willingly flocked to the ranks of the Communist Party. Their reward for this effort had moral value. The enthusiasm with which they participated in the construction of large industrial


projects was dictated by the opportunity to change their status. Young people felt involved in building something new, and this involvement filled their monoto-nous rural lifestyle devoid of perspective. in this way, young people felt part of the international reformist movement that embraced the whole world, whose ultimate goal was the welfare of the workers.213 However, not all participants in communist projects experienced the same enthusiasm. The mobilization of people in the early years of communist development was also a result of coercive methods. This coer-cion worked because ordinary people presumed they would be punished if they declined to participate. ivaylo Znepolski, in his study on the socio-cultural traits of communism, posed the problem of forced mobilization of the masses as the main feature of communist rule: “The individual is seen as a possession of the regime and the use of this possession as deemed appropriate does not in any way have to comply with its own will”.214

Money, too, remained important in the valuation of labor and in the commu-nist economy. The communist transition had mostly preserved commodity-money relations. The problem was that money might be difficult to spend in an economy short of consumer goods. This did not affect the workers’ pursuit of higher wages throughout the entire life of the classical socialist system.215 in addition to mon-etary incentives, other forms of labor rewards such as housing, access to public services, or private car priority occurred.216 We should remember that, in its clas-sic form of existence, the socialist system provided a significant level of economic existence, relatively low pressure in the housing sector, virtually full employment, very low crime rates, free education, and many other social advantages.

These different incentives later mobilized bulgarians to participate in the nuclear program. interviews with experts and workers involved in constructing the bulgarian nuclear power industry revealed their support of mass mobilization and the ideology of the early period: Experts nostalgically described the time as full of enthusiasm and willingness to pursue the predefined scheduled tasks. From their position, they often condemned contemporary economic relations based on free labor markets as unprofitable because young people were granted the freedom to pursue their orientation in the service sector and in less labor-intensive sectors. Twelve interviews at the experimental reactor, Kozloduy NPP and the Regulatory Atomic Agency revealed that elderly participants in the process of building the nuclear industry in bulgaria considered the mobilization of the country’s labor potential a positive step for industry development.

As for financial and other labor incentives, nuclear experts earned higher wages in their sector and acquired an esteemed place in the social structure of the communist state.217 Martin ivanov compared the technology sector in bulgaria as


equal in importance to the military; people who developed scientific and technical complexes enjoyed a higher position in the hierarchy than workers in other sec-tors.218 This is not to say that they, too, suffered restrictions attributable to the lack of private property. in addition, even experts and managers were not free to run socialist enterprises and the available resources as they saw fit.

Conclusion

The establishment of communist regimes in Eastern Europe after the end of the second World War opened up new pathways for techno-politics in bulgaria. And yet these new postwar dynamics also built on prewar techno-political legacies. The shaping of the country’s political, economic, and technological bilateral relations with the soviet Union presupposed absorption of the communist political model, which developed in three stages: The “initial”, “forced growth”, and “stagnation” periods. The new political elite introduced soviet-style planning and development of heavy industry and structural agricultural changes. bulgarian communist activ-ists who had emigrated to the soviet Union before or during the second World War came back and took an active part in building these new relationships and opening new routes for technology transfer. As for practical implementation, the prewar technology transfer model of bulgarian-German companies was reori-ented towards the soviet Union when the soviet state took over the German shares. Technical assistance and experts provided by the soviet state further smoothened the absorption of the soviet techno-political model. This combination of prewar legacies and new impulses produced a communist techno-political system that would significantly influence the creation of the bulgarian nuclear program. Multilateral collaboration in the CMEA provided yet another, additional, pathway for communist techno-politics.

With the new system came new conflicts. in industry, the bulgarian central party leadership and the scientific and technological nomenclature struggled for ultimate control over the economic resources and directions of technological and economic development. As formal owners of the means of investment, the political nomenclature participated in the financial, industrial, and technological branches of the economy, taking the role of entrepreneurs together with the economic nomenclature that provided the clearing house for new innovations. As later chap-ters will show, this would also be the case with the bulgarian nuclear power plant. Meanwhile, the communist innovation system suffered from weaknesses such as lack of autonomy of economic managers and technocrats to experiment, and a


heavy bureaucratic apparatus that hardly allowed for spontaneous innovation. in response, various industrial lobby fractions engaged with the new political man-agement structure in order to protect their specific interests. The scope of their interests included attracting finances from the state, but also influencing plan-ning priorities and preserving the industrialists’ decisive positions in political and industrial organizations. investigating the internal tensions within the state elite helps to explain inclusion or exclusion of industrial sectors in a planned economy and their manner of governance.

Large scale industrialization required lots of energy, and electrification became a priority for bulgarian policy makers. Here, conflicts arose between different nomenclature on whether the new power supply system should break with past legacies. As we saw, bulgaria’s first postwar Minister of Electrification Traicho Kostov based his postwar electrification strategy on prewar and wartime legacies, i.e. relatively small-scale power plants using indigenous power sources such as hydropower and local coal deposits. However, on explicit instructions from stalin, Party leader Dimitrov enforced a radical break with the past in the form of a large scale electrification program based on large-scale power plants and imported soviet coal. several decades later, the bulgarian nuclear power program would be yet another addition to this techno-political line.

We then investigate how prewar and postwar techno-politics shaped bulgarian nuclear relations during the transitional and “initial period” of communist rule. While communist governments spent significant resources on reinforcing the educational, scientific, and technological infrastructure, bulgarian nuclear scien-tists who came of age in the prewar period struggled to handle the transition to communism. The resulting nuclear infrastructure and community set the stage for the nuclear power plant program, which later chapters study as an example of communist techno-political relations in Eastern Europe.

Nuclear science Networks in Eastern Europe 57

Chapter 2 Nuclear science Networks in Eastern Europe

“Using nuclear energy for the cultural needs of mankind, instead of weapons, will be one of the most pressing tasks for scientists and technicians. The establishment of nuclear power plants in the

near future is not impossible. That would be a great achievement, given that the current [energy] sources – coal and oil – are not unlimited.”

Georgi Nadjakov, 1946219

in the wake of the second World War and the detonation of the first atomic bombs, nuclear scientist Georgi Nadjakov knew the tasks that lay ahead of his discipline: Nuclear physics was to constitute the link between theoretical and experimental physics on the one hand, and its technological application in the form of nuclear power for public electricity supply on the other. bulgaria’s nuclear science relations would prefigure its nuclear power relations.

The transition from science to technology was a defining moment in the devel-opment of nuclear power. However, as sergio sismondo concludes from decades of scholarly debate on the “science-technology relationship”, this relationship is more complicated than a simplistic one-directional causal link between scientific theory and technological application: “scientific knowledge is one resource on which engineers and inventors can draw”, next to many others, while at the same time “it is clear that science draws on technology for its instruments”.220 As we shall see, we may better understand the shaping of bulgarian nuclear science and its international relations as a form of sociotechnical system building, simultane-ously involving activities traditionally labeled as “scientific”, “technological”, and “organizational”. Moreover, creating a nuclear science infrastructure was the first step in transnational nuclear system building; it was the “intermediary stage” or “initial period” in communist innovation discussed in the previous chapter, which later carried over into bulgaria’s nuclear power system and its international rela-tions. Nadjakov became bulgaria’s most prominent nuclear physics system builder.

The context in which Nadjakov and his colleagues operated, however, was com-plex. bulgaria’s capabilities and resources for nuclear science were severely limited; besides, bulgaria’s prewar international physics relations had been oriented on Western Europe. As we have seen in the previous chapter, this could be both a point


of departure and a problem during the communist transition; bulgaria’s nuclear sci-entists would have to resolve this. Meanwhile on the international scene, the Cold War was gaining momentum, and the United states and the soviet Union competed in organizing scientific assistance programs and collaborations. The soviet nuclear research program had boomed during and after the war, and so soviet scientists and policy makers now faced the challenge of building a transnational nuclear research system in Eastern Europe; for them, too, this was a step towards the “peaceful use of atomic energy” for public electricity supply purposes, but the process was compli-cated given the very different and often underdeveloped state of nuclear science in their partner countries.

This chapter traces these first steps to build bulgarian and East European nuclear systems. it starts with the development of the soviet nuclear science infrastructure. Next we take a closer look at the shaping of bulgarian nuclear physics as a research infrastructure at the receiving end of this techno-scientific technology transfer pro-cess. Then we move on to a key event in bulgarian nuclear science which united the bulgarian and soviet research infrastructures: The transfer of an experimental nuclear reactor from the soviet Union to sofia. Finally the chapter discusses the role of two new international organizations, the socialist Joint institute for Nuclear Research (JiNR) and the global international Atomic Energy Agency (iAEA), in the bulgarian and East European nuclear science networks. Together, these develop-ments paved the way for bulgaria’s transition to nuclear power that we will discuss in the next chapter.

A Non-aggressive Soviet Nuclear Program

in the first half of the twentieth century, nuclear physics had rapidly gained momen-tum. in the late 1890s, Henri becquerel, his doctoral student Marie Curie, and her husband Pierre Curie were working on spontaneous radioactivity in Paris; by 1903 their joint Nobel Prize signaled the excitement and prestige of the nascent field, which attracted top scientists and research centers in Europe. The new research network skewed towards North-Western and Central Europe, with leading research centers in Paris, Cambridge, berlin, Copenhagen and other university cities. Leningrad was one of these. initially the political changes of 1917 seemed to put the UssR out-side this international nuclear physics collaboration. However, Lenin’s program of industrialization and modernization favored scientific research, including nuclear scientists and their institutes. in 1918 Abram ioffe founded the Leningrad Physical Technical institute to restore the international reputation of soviet physics research;


igor Kurchatov, one of the soviet Union’s most prominent nuclear physicists and later director of the soviet atomic bomb and atomic power programs, graduated and worked here with Kirill sinelnikov, Aleksander Leipunskii, and others.221 Prominent new institutes were the state Radium institute in Leningrad (1922) and the Physics Research Laboratory in Kiev (1921, later Ukrainian Physical Technical institute). in the 1920s, soviet nuclear scientists were internationally active and maintained fruitful contacts with West European colleagues, laboratories, and research centers. Only the stalinist terror of the 1930s interrupted their Western relationships, putting some of them in personal danger. it was in the second half of the 1930s, however, that Western work on nuclear physics accelerated once more; in perpetual interac-tion, the groups with James Chadwick in Cambridge and Liverpool, Frédéric and irene Joliot-Curie in Paris, Enrico Fermi in Rome, Niels bohr in Copenhagen, Lise Meitner, Otto Hahn, and Fritz strassman in berlin, and others worked on artifi-cial radioactivity; the fission of uranium was demonstrated and theorized in 1938 and 1939. soviet scientists remained informed though, and continued to work on the subject; in Leningrad, Kurchatov and Yakov Frenkel published their theoretical explanation of the fission process in uranium.222

During the second World War, Western nuclear science gravitated around the Manhattan Project in the United states. Fearing the Nazis might use nuclear fusion to make an atom bomb, Europe’s nuclear scientists in exile – notably the Hungarian physicist Leo szilard and Albert Einstein – convinced President Roosevelt and his administration to start this atom bomb project. in this con-text, Fermi directed the construction of the world’s first nuclear reactor pro-totype, which went critical in 1942. Despite a modest capacity of 200 watts, it produced the desired by-product of plutonium. soon larger reactors produced enough plutonium for a bomb, and on July 16, 1945, the Us military detonated its first nuclear device in the desert of New Mexico.223 in the same period, the Nazi invasion had scattered the soviet nuclear physics society, which then reas-sembled to build a nuclear bomb under the direction of igor Kurchatov.224 by 1946, Kurchatov’s team had developed its own operational reactor, the 4000 kilo-watt F1 reactor, to turn uranium into plutonium; three years later, in 1949, the Russian military detonated its first nuclear bomb. Nuclear physics had taken center stage in Cold War techno-politics. Meanwhile soviet nuclear science split into two branches.225 One was called nuclear physics and focused on fundamen-tal research and applications in other scientific fields. The other was the new discipline of reactor physics, which signified the interweaving of nuclear science and the electricity power sector in nuclear power technology.

Electricity development in the UssR, to which nuclear power technology is


closely linked, owed its growth to Vladimir i. Lenin, who had greatly boosted the soviet Union’s electrification process. As in bulgaria, soviet electric power devel-opments had been inherited from the previous political regime; the technical elite of Tsarist Russia had started the electrification project. Not incidentally, Pyotr Neporozhni, who served as the soviet minister of electrification for three decades, used 1913 as the starting point for his comparative analysis of communist electrifi-cation. in his history of soviet electrification, Neporozhni emphasized that electric output had increased twenty-four fold from 1913 to 1940.226 However, the soviet Union’s electrification program was greatly boosted by Lenin’s state Commission for the Electrification of Russia (Plan GOELRO), which initiated the construction of very large power plants exploiting energy sources distant from consumption centers. Hydropower in particular had been ignored in the previous electrification regime.227 Through extended regional high-voltage power grids, these very large power plants were connected to major cities and industrial zones. Neporozhni estimated that by 1935, the intended end date for Plan GOELRO, the soviet Union was producing more power than countries such as France, britain, and italy, and ranked second in Europe and third in the world.228 Thanks to its planned large-scale systems, the soviet Union had become a major electrical energy player.

Nuclear power fitted well in the soviet top-down, large-scale electrification approach. indeed, in 1954, soviet reactor engineers inaugurated the world’s first nuclear power plant for public power supply. The plant was located in the city of Obninsk, near the soviet capital Moscow. soviet specialists had been planning to build a nuclear center in Obninsk even before the detonation of their atomic bomb. The small village of Pyatkino was turned into Obninsk science city, a settlement for nuclear scientists and engineers. Nikolay Dollezhal, one of Kurchatov’s researchers, designed the project as a five megawatt channel-type reactor with a graphite mod-erator.229 Later generations of this reactor type became both the pride and the shame of the soviet nuclear program: pride because such reactors carried the soviet electri-fication miracle, and ranked among the largest power plants in the world. However, the Chernobyl accident of 1986 in retrospect turned this reactor technology into the greatest failure of Russian engineers and technicians in public perception.

Let us stick with the pride for a moment. in the atmosphere of a rapidly escalat-ing Cold War, Pravda newspaper announced the world’s first nuclear power plant as a major achievement for communism:

…soviet scientists and engineers have successfully completed work on the design and construction of the first industrial power plant in nuclear energy, having a useful capacity of 5,000 kilowatts. On June 27, 1954, the


nuclear power plant was put into operation and delivered electricity for industry and agriculture to the adjacent regions. The first industrial tur-bine works not by burning coal or other fuels, but on nuclear power - in splitting the nuclei of the uranium atoms. With the start of a nuclear power plant, a real step in the peaceful use of atomic energy had been made.230

soviet officials also presented the plant at the First United Nations international Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy at Geneva in August 1955. Their presentation “astounded Western physicists, who had assumed that their soviet colleagues were as backward as the peasants in the collective farms”.231 Apparently the stalinist regime had erased the traditional relationships and infor-mation exchanges between East and West in the international nuclear commu-nity. britain would open its first nuclear power plant in 1956 and the Us in 1957. Meanwhile the UssR launched its second plant already in 1958.232

The plant in Obninsk became a prominent center of research and engineering for subsequent generations of nuclear power plants. As point of departure for this trajectory, the Obninsk plant used slightly enriched uranium as fuel. As noted, it used a graphite moderator and distilled water as heat exchanger (see the diagram in Figure 1). The water circulated through the core in a closed tube system and carried heat at a very high pressure, an advantage over reactor units with a gas coolant that early british and French reactor programs used. The Obninsk plant had a relatively small active zone because of the superior properties of the heat exchanger: The active zone was up to 7 meters in diameter and 2 meters high, as opposed to british and French gas-graphite reactors that might measure 15 meters in diameter and 7-10 meters in height. 233 The smaller size was not the only reason

Figure 2.1 – Diagram of a Nuclear Power Plant showing the type of graphite-water reactor used at the first station in Obninsk. 1. Fuel, 2. Moderator, 3. Heat exchanger, 4. Pump, 5. Steam gen-erator, 6. Turbine, 7. Power generator, 8. Condenser.235


why soviet specialists chose this technology; the plant was also built for the dual purpose of producing electricity for the soviet economy and plutonium for the military. The Obninsk reactor could produce particularly large quantities of pluto-nium for atomic weapons.234

High Power Channel-type Reactors (RBMK)

The 1955 conference in Geneva had further boosted the Russian nuclear engi-neers’ confidence: “No reporter from the United states or the United Kingdom could contend with it. The 5000-kilowatt nuclear power plant played a crucial role in building the confidence among the soviet scientists and engineers”.236 inspired by their initial success, soviet nuclear engineers now worked on improved reactors with a graphite moderator that would become known as the “High Power Channel-type Reactor RbMK” (Реактор Большой Мощности Канальный - РБМК).

The first of these improved reactors was the sibirskaya nuclear power plant in a secret location near Tomsk in 1958. The siberian plant had a two-loop-based channel-graphite reactor type called ‘Ei-2’, and a capacity of no less than 100 megawatts ‒ twenty times the Obninsk plant. The two-loop system improved the physical quality of the active zone, and aluminum alloys were used for the first time in the tube system. This plant, too, was optimized to produce large amounts of plutonium; Arkady Petrosiants defined it as “a classic example of using the heat generated in the plutonium production, for obtaining electricity”.237 The efficiency of the reactor was rather low, but most of the waste heat could be used for heating the nearby town.238 in 1964 the plant would be equipped with additional reactors to reach a capacity of 600 megawatts.239

soviet engineers built their next graphite-channel reactor in the beloyarsk plant, which they named after igor Kurchatov; following his programs for the Russian atomic and hydrogen bombs, Kurchatov had turned to the peaceful application of nuclear energy, but died before the beloyarsk plant was ready. The 100 megawatt reactor went critical on April 27, 1964. Communist propaganda announced the plant as the pride of soviet technical thinking, marking the evolutionary develop-ment of RbMK reactors as well as the emergence of the new social group of nuclear sector workers. This was the first power plant to use a mixed coolant comprised of seventy-three percent water and twenty-seven percent steam.240 Other innovations included replaceable thermal channels, which allowed operators to replace fuel in the active zone more easily, and the production of superheated steam in the active zone.241 in addition, new terms such as “Atomic city,” “biological defense,” “reactor


shaft,” and “atomic worker” entered the soviet lexicon.242 After the successful com-missioning of this nuclear plant, soviet experts declared that nuclear power now had a major impact on electrification: “soviet nuclear power plants have already been beneficial in areas remote from natural [power] sources”.243

From now on, engineers aimed the trajectory of the RbMK reactor at scale increase. The Leningrad nuclear power plant was designed to work with a 1,000 megawatt graphite-channel reactor; its first power bloc entered into service in 1973, the second in 1975.244 soviet nuclear technology propaganda called this sta-tion the “flagman”.245 From 1975, soviet engineers worked on a 1,500 megawatt graphite-channel, first operational in Lithuania’s ignalina nuclear power plant in 1983.246 They even designed a 2,400 megawatt version, but this was aborted due to technical difficulties and the political turmoil of the early 1990s.247 Meanwhile the soviet government had built several other RbMK reactors, such as the Kursk nuclear power plant (1977), the bilibino plant (1974), the smolensk plant (1983), and the Chernobyl plant in Ukraine (1978).248

As the RbMK reactors were a partially military technology, soviet rulers did not allow them to be constructed outside soviet territory. Even the most loyal satellite countries such as bulgaria did not get access to this dual-use reactor. Here a second line of soviet reactors came on the scene. in the early 1960s, soviet reactor engineers worked on the so-called Vodo-Vodyanoi Energetichesky Reactor or “water-water energy reactors” (WWER), known as “pressurized water reactors” (PWR) in the Western world. The Us Navy had already launched such a reactor to power sub-marines in the mid-1950s. This revolutionary step, proposed by Admiral Hyman Rickover under the umbrella of the shippingport nuclear plant project, paved the way not only for developing nuclear ships but also for approving one of the most successful nuclear reactors ever built.249 by the early 1960s, this type of reactor was a priority in the Us energy program.250 Two major firms, Westinghouse and babcock & Wilcox, were awarded the contracts to establish nuclear plants with pressurized water reactors. Westinghouse’s Yankee Rowe reactor (1961) became paradigmatic for this line of reactor design worldwide, and Westinghouse became the major exporter of this reactor.251 The French and belgian atomic energy programs cooper-ated to establish their own PWR based on Westinghouse’s design, and West German engineers constructed their first PWR with Westinghouse technical support. The first German reactor went critical in 1965.

soviet engineers followed this trajectory. According to a bulgarian nuclear spe-cialist who worked at the Kozloduy nuclear power plant, soviet intelligence had “copied the water-water nuclear technology from the Us firm Westinghouse”.252 Compared to RbMK technology, technical details of pressurized water reactors


were accessible through scientific conferences and publications. For instance, the 1960 soviet bulletin “Nuclear Energy Abroad” published discussions from a conference in Vienna concerning PWR problems, and included several techni-cal sketches.253 This reactor type was one of a range that Us and soviet engineers were now working on. For instance, while many soviet engineers were trying to improve RbMK graphite-channel reactors, since 1949 Aleksandar Leipunskii had directed a project on fast breeders that resulted in power plants in 1964, 1965, and 1978. in the far north, other engineers worked on a mobile power station (ТЭС-3), a transportable station (АБВ-1,5), a boiling water reactor (ВК-50), reactors based on heavy water, and the water-water energy reactor (WWER).254

From 1959, soviet engineers worked on the 210 megawatt Novovoronezh plant that served as a water-water energy reactor prototype. The entire power produc-tion body, equipped with reactor, steam turbine, generators, and condensers, was named the “energy bloc”.255 The nuclear power plant went critical in 1964. Up to 1978, five more energy blocks were added in Novovoronezh. The first block exem-plified the main technical principles: Water-water energy reactors used slightly enriched uranium as fuel, which was shaped as small bricks ordered in so-called cassettes that facilitated easy reloading. These fuel cassettes were placed in a steel body filled with chemically treated natural water. This highly pressurized “light water” in the reactor core (hence the terms “pressurized water reactor” and “light water reactor”) simultaneously served as neutron moderator (instead of the RbMK’s graphite bars) and as heat exchanger (instead of the tube system); hence the Russian name of water-cooled, water-moderated energy reactor. This pressur-ized water in the hermetically closed, so-called “first loop” was fed into a heat exchanger, where it exchanged heat with the water in a second water loop. This water turned into steam and moved the steam turbine, which in turn drove the power generator.256

Figure 2.2 – Diagram of a Nuclear Power Plant with a PWR or WWER reactor 1. Fuel, 2. Moderator, 3. Regulating rods, 4. Pump, 5. Steam generator, 6. Turbine, 7. Condenser, 8. Generator, 9. Pump.257


besides their non-military character, water-water reactors had other features that made them attractive on the commercial market. First, they combined rela-tively high capacity with small size. second, while the reactor used uranium fuel that had to be transported over long distances, at least it used (chemically treated) natural water. since nuclear power stations were invariably built on river banks, water access was no problem.258 Third and most important, water-water energy reactors had very high safety parameters thanks to the separate loops. Other safety features in both Eastern and Western designs included self-power supply as well as high-pressure circulation pumps (including back-up devices) for the first loop to ensure permanent flow and prevent the reactor from overheating (though evi-dence from the Armenian nuclear power plant suggested that the reactor body regularly operated without running water in the first loop for hours without seri-ous damage).259 One last safety measure separated Western from soviet designs: in response to American safety debates and public concern, and safety parameter tests on experimental reactors in the Argonne National Laboratory, U.s. policy makers and engineers decided that pressurized water reactors needed a concrete containment of the reactor corpus to protect the population in the event of an emergency.260 soviet engineers, by contrast, avoided embedding their water-water energy reactors in a clumsy concrete shell; instead they opted to use more steel to make the reactor’s corpus “inherently safe”. The thicker steel should allow for pressures over thirty percent more than the possible maximum. interestingly, when in early 1990 iAEA officials and engineers measured the steel corpus of Kozloduy’s first reactor, which was a water-water energy type of reactor, this is what they found of the “inherent safety” strategy of its soviet designers: The over-dimensioned reactor body had hardly decayed though it had been in operation for almost thirty years.261

The case of the bulgarian Kozloduy station illustrates that because of their non-military character, water-water energy reactors also became the soviet Union’s export reactor. However, even before the export of commercial nuclear power plants throughout Eastern Europe, soviet officials had taken other steps to facili-tate their allies’ adoption of nuclear programs for research purposes. For instance, after the Obninsk nuclear power plant had gone critical in 1954, the soviet Union and East European allies signed a set of bilateral contracts in 1955, whereby the soviet Union would assist with the construction of nuclear research reactors in its partner countries. in 1957 such experimental reactors became operational in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Romania; Poland and Hungary soon followed, and the bulgarian nuclear research reactor went critical in 1961.262 The construc-tion of an East European nuclear technology network had begun.


Bulgarian Nuclear Scientists and their International Relations

When soviet engineers started to transfer nuclear technology to East European partner states, they were not starting from scratch. As in other techno-political domains, they could build on structures that had developed in the receptor coun-tries over the previous decades. Among these nuclear scientists, their capabili-ties and connections perhaps played the most prominent role, as they did in the Western world.263

bulgarian experimental physics had begun in the late nineteenth century, when the prominent Russian Porfirij bahmetiev founded a physics-mathematics department at sofia University. in 1907, however, he became implicated in the sofia university crisis; students protested against the nondemocratic behavior of the bulgarian ruler Prince Ferdinand, who in response closed the university and fired all its lecturers. A new bulgarian government solved the crisis, but bahmetiev was extradited for his activities during the crisis, and the physics-mathematics department had no director for twelve years.264 Only in 1919 did Petar Pentchev’s appointment as department director bring new life to bulgarian physics. Pentchev had been trained in Paris at the sorbonne, one of the most prestigious European universities, and his research had focused on radioactivity in bulgarian thermal springs. in 1928, when experimental physics had become a separate department from mathematics, Pentchev began lecturing and continued his chair of depart-ment role until 1937. Under Pentchev’s leadership, Georgi Nadjakov entered the department in 1921; together with Elisaveta Karamihailova, Nadjakov would be a crucial proponent of bulgarian nuclear capabilities. The biographies of several lead scientists illustrate some of the difficulties and effort required to establish nuclear physics as a science in bulgaria, especially during the communist transition.

Elisaveta Karamihailova counts as one of the most prominent women in the history of bulgarian science; after a few unsuccessful attempts to become part of the bulgarian scientific elite, she was appointed in 1939 as lecturer in the experi-mental physics department. six years later she headed the first department at sofia University explicitly dedicated to nuclear physics.265

Karamihailova, too, embodied bulgarian prewar scientific connections to the West. Her scientific career had begun at Vienna University, where she stud-ied mathematics in the philosophy department from 1917 to 1920. in 1922 she defended her dissertation on “Electric figures on various materials, especially on crystals” at Vienna’s institut für Radiumforschung under Karl Pshibram. For the next two years she applied for a position in bulgaria, but sofia University’s policy on women prevented a permanent position; she received only a small attic for


temporary research work. When the institut für Radiumforschung offered her a postdoc position, she returned to Austria and stayed there for ten years, though in 1926 she applied again for a position in sofia – in vain. in Austria, Karamihailova studied the activity of the nucleus; in the 1930s she published an article on the radi-ance of plutonium, and her results were quoted in specialized books on nuclear physics. Another article on plutonium radiance led her in the footsteps of James Chadwick’s discovery of neutrons in 1932, but her position at the Radium institute was abolished in 1933 and she continued her research with her own funds. in 1935 Karamihailova co-published an article “About the artificial transformations of thorium by using neutrons” and was granted a position in Rutherford’s team at the prestigious Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge University, England. Here she worked with many prominent scientists, including Nobel Prize winners such as Chadwick, John Cockroft, Max born, Edward Appleton, and Patrick blackett. she also visited researchers in other countries and expanded her research network.266

in 1939, with her appointment as lecturer in nuclear physics and radioactivity, Karamihailova finally became a member of the experimental physics faculty at sofia University.267 initially there was no equipment for practical work and teach-ing, which forced Karamihailova to improvise and construct her own models. in addition, she had brought her equipment from England. Karamihailova also intro-duced practical classes in the department for the first time. Last but not least, she trained several assistants who would participate in bulgaria’s nuclear power pro-gram, such as Nikolai Karabashev, Hristo Hristov, Maria Moldovanova, Lubomir Pophristov, Parashkeva simova, Milko borisov, and Leon Mitrani.268

in his memoirs, Nikola balabanov recalls that Karamihailova faced serious problems when the bulgarian communists took power in 1946. because of her past and her links with countries in Western Europe, she fell under communist suspi-cion. she felt that she met great opposition from the bulgarian authorities and was only reluctantly allowed to continue her work. For her part, Karamihailova was not very fond of the new leaders, whom she referred to in class as “peasants” and “boors”.269 in 1955 Karamihailova left the nuclear physics department in sofia to her former student Hristo Hristov and became Director of the Department of Nuclear Physics at the Physical institute (see below).270 Four years later, Karamihailova retired, simultaneously receiving the title of professor.

Rashko Zaikov also made an ambivalent transition from prewar to postwar com-munist nuclear science. Like Karamihailova, he had been trained abroad. initially Zaikov had studied mathematics in Germany at the University of Göttingen, and in 1923 he began attending Einstein’s courses in berlin.271 in berlin he also knew Nobel laureates such as Leó szilárd, Eugene Wigner, and Erwin schrödinger.


Zaikov also read lectures at Robert College in Constantinople and wrote an article on the “Application of Hilbert’s theory”, which he sent to Einstein, who recom-mended him for a Humboldt scholarship at his laboratory. After returning to bulgaria, Zaikov taught at sofia University and various high schools. At the begin-ning of the second World War, he worked in secret laboratories in Nazi Germany, allegedly on missile and nuclear technology. After the war, the KGb investigated Zaikov’s work in Germany; only after a six-month stay in the soviet Union, did he return to bulgaria. Here he could carry on working at the bulgarian Academy of sciences, but still faced personal restrictions.272

Karamihailova’s assistant Leon Mitrani had defended his dissertation on cos-mic radiances well after the communist transition in 1954. He worked at the nuclear physics department in sofia and the Physical institute. Among his suc-cesses was the joint project of the latter institute with the Hungarian Academy of sciences to establish a cosmic research station on the highest top of the balkan Peninsula, Musala, at 2,925 meters; in 1959 Europe’s second station for investigat-ing cosmic radiance was operational. Meanwhile, in 1957 Mitrani was promoted as a lecturer at sofia University.273 in 1961, however, Mitrani was dismissed from the bulgarian Communist Party and had to leave the University of sofia. He now accepted an invitation from the High Nature-Mathematical institute in Plovdiv, where he started a new nuclear physics department.274 balabanov, whose memoirs are often quoted in this book, was one of Mitrani’s students and later inherited the director’s position in the department.275

Undoubtedly, the most influential bulgarian physical science infrastructure builder was Georgi Nadjakov. Unlike Karamihailova, Nadjakov was able to adapt to the new political atmosphere and contribute to the international connections in bulgarian nuclear science also after the communist transition. As noted pre-viously, Nadjakov had joined the experimental physics department in sofia in 1921. Yet he too had started out by building links with the West: in 1925 he went to specialize at the sorbonne in Paris, where he joined Paul Langevin’s team and met Frederic Juliot-Curie; their friendship lasted until Joliot-Curie’s death.276 importantly, however, Juliot-Curie and Langevin, like Nadjakov, were sympathetic to Marxism. back in bulgaria, Nadjakov published a number of significant papers and was elected head of the Experimental Physics Department at sofia University in 1937.277 Most scientists in his team had been trained or specialized at presti-gious Western universities; Victor Vransky had worked in Prague, Emil Djakov and Assen Datsev in France, and ivan stranski in Germany. in addition to phys-ics, Nadjakov organized a printing press for sofia University’s academic needs that began operations in 1940 “in the basement of the University and had been


equipped with new machines with all kinds of letters and characters for the most complex mathematical and other set”, and actively engaged in the establishment of a Higher Technical school (later state Polytechnic) in sofia that would later host a nuclear institute of its own.278

Though Nadjakov was more of a scholar and academic entrepreneur than a revolutionary, his commitment to both nuclear science and Marxism enabled him to make a comparatively smooth transition to communist rule. in addition, Nadjakov became part of the international peace movement and president of the UN society in bulgaria; these positions gave him ample cause to travel and maintain his international networks.279 back home, good relationships with the new political leaders helped him to further expand the bulgarian infrastructure for nuclear science. Most important perhaps was his leadership of the bulgarian Academy of sciences’ institute of Physics inaugurated in 1946, which from 1962 would host the bulgarian experimental nuclear reactor and later became the institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy. Most equipment for the new institute came from the soviet Union, but Nadjakov used his personal contacts to ensure additional funds for the delivery of equipment from the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia. Nadjakov also played an essential role in signing the bulgarian agreement with the soviet Union for nuclear assistance on June 14, 1955, and was responsible for the implementation of its terms, including the construction of the experimental reactor. Nadjakov thus became a prominent link in the transfer of nuclear technology between the UssR and bulgaria.280

Nuclear Technology Transfer

The soviet nuclear program and bulgarian nuclear science became firmly entwined in the mid-1950s, when the most prominent soviet physicist igor Kurchatov pro-posed the establishment of a communist nuclear physics society and bulgaria, like most East European soviet satellites, signed bilateral agreements with the UssR on nuclear science cooperation. Todor Pavlov, president of the bulgarian Academy of sciences, sent this telegram to his colleague Nesmeyanov of the soviet Academy of science:

With great interest, the bulgarian scientific community follows session on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes of the UssR Academy of sciences. bulgarian scientists and the entire bulgarian country are proud that soviet scientists, maintaining a solid position at the forefront of


peace for all freedom-loving nations, are struggling to use the enormous achievements of modern physics for the benefit of the peoples and the full development of human culture. Here i use the opportunity to explain the deep gratitude of the bulgarian Academy of sciences to the soviet Government and the Academy of sciences of the UssR for their readiness to give assistance to our Academy for the establishment of a research insti-tute for nuclear energy for peaceful purposes ... July 4, 1955.281

The bilateral agreements of 1955 created an opportunity for nuclear scientists and research institutes in bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, the GDR, and Hungary to access recent soviet research results and connect to the larger soviet research centers.282 At the same time nuclear physics became exceed-ingly popular among students; at sofia University “studying nuclear physics was fashionable at the time, for that reason we had 50-60 students in [a] single course”, notes Tzvetan bonchev in his memoirs.283 How did the creation of this large nuclear technological system for research purposes come about? This will become clear once we examine soviet nuclear integration politics.

The soviet Union was not the only government willing to provide scientific assistance in the mid-1950s. During the Cold War, both superpowers sought to integrate their allies through different forms of economic, technical, and scien-tific assistance. Us policy makers saw scientific research as a key arena for Cold War politics and tried to organize the pro-American West European scientific environment. Even in small countries such as Denmark, the Ford Foundation funded the development of different disciplines at Danish research institutes.284 At the international level, historian of science and technology John Krige notes that Us foreign policy supported the formation of international organizations such as the European Organization for Nuclear Research CERN (1954), the international Atomic Energy Agency iAEA (1957), and EURATOM (1957): “by pooling finan-cial, industrial and human resources in a supranational organization dedicated to building nuclear power stations and installations integral to the nuclear fuel cycle (like isotope separation and chemical reprocessing plants), American foreign policy objectives would be satisfied, and European nation-states would collectively be able to capitalize more efficiently and rapidly on the promise of the peaceful atom than they could individually”.285

Nevertheless this Us science policy effort was contested. Western pro-com-munist intellectuals such as Frédéric and irene Juliot-Curie, Pablo Picasso, Paul Eluard, and others openly criticized Us integration policy, which they associ-ated with geopolitics and the use of atomic weapons. To make the public aware of their concerns, they organized the World Congress of intellectuals for Peace


in Wroclaw in 1948, where the bulgarian nuclear scientist Georgi Nadjakov also participated.286 Western Marxist intellectuals managed to reach millions of citizens with their fears of American Cold War policy, and praised soviet proclamations of peaceful development during this period. Many people believed soviet propa-ganda until the soviet interventions in Poland and Hungary.

As we have seen, the soviet Union attempted to integrate the East European countries in its orbit. in nuclear physics, the Khrushchev government sought to turn its advanced research facilities into centers for East European nuclear sci-ence. Most importantly, the secret nuclear science city in Dubna north of Moscow had been founded in 1947 to facilitate the construction of a large cyclotron by Kurchatov and his team, and by the mid-1950s it hosted some of the most promi-nent soviet nuclear science centers. in 1956, however, the Dubna facilities were opened up and transformed into the Joint institute for Nuclear Research to form an international socialist counterpart to Western Europe’s CERN. This move was also highly successful: for East European scholars, acquiring a professional educa-tion in the UssR and particularly in Dubna, counted as the best move for a career in nuclear and experimental physics.

international exchanges were facilitated by bilateral agreements that had been signed earlier, specifying the conditions under which students could study in the UssR. For example, since 1947 a contract existed between bulgaria and the soviet Union for the exchange of students and professionals. in the same year another contract specified the “procedures for training” and the “reimbursement of main-tenance cost” of bulgarian citizens who studied at higher soviet institutes.287 One of the most important points in this agreement, № 5, was the soviet provision of fixed salaries of five hundred rubles per month for bulgarian students and nine hundred rubles per month for postgraduate students. The next clause in the con-tract required bulgaria to cover forty percent of the paid scholarship and teaching fees, if applicable. The students, who usually did not speak Russian, attended a training course lasting six months to a year. Graduates received a qualification in the soviet educational model.288 Alongside scientific and language subjects, stu-dents received the obligatory ideological training. For instance, when the rector of the sofia Polytechnic institute evaluated the bulgarian student Hristo Varbanov, who received his PhD in Moscow, in a letter to the Director of the Moscow Civil Engineering institute in 1950, he found Varbanov “comprehensively trained in scientific-pedagogical and ideologically-political worker attitudes”.289

While scientists from the socialist world increasingly visited the soviet Union, the 1955 bilateral agreements on nuclear assistance exemplified another venue for nuclear integration of the communist bloc. A review in 1970 stated that: “With the


help of the soviet Union, nine research nuclear reactors, six cyclotrons, and seven physical and radiochemical laboratories had been built and were operational in socialist countries, equipped with modern instruments”.

in the review are also listed starting dates of the first research institutes in social-ist countries. “in August 1957 the nuclear reactor in Romania was put into opera-tion, in October and December [followed] the Czechoslovak socialist Republic and the GDR. in 1958 research reactors became operational in the People’s Republic of Poland and in China, in 1959 in the People’s Republic of Hungary and Yugoslavia, in 1961 in the People’s Republic of bulgaria, etc. in July 1958 the first particle accelerator was introduced in the GDR”.290

simultaneously new iRT type research reactors were built in the soviet Union in Georgia (near Tbilisi, 1959), Latvia (salaspilis, 1962), and belarus (near Minsk, 1962). Within half a decade after the 1955 agreements, the soviet Union had cre-ated a network of interlinked and coordinated research institutes in experimental and nuclear physics in Eastern Europe.

To facilitate the construction of scientific installations in partner countries, partner governments usually received cheap, long-term soviet credits. The soviet Union then provided technological equipment in the form of “fraternal assistance” subject to payment through highly stringent lending.291 These loans further deep-ened the interdependency of East European countries. Often such technology flows and study flows coincided: technological and scientific assistance agreements often included the deployment of young specialists to the UssR. After their return, they would work in the new research centers. A study by Dolores Augustine on the development of the engineering community in East Germany suggests that in the wake of such exchanges, the soviet Academy of sciences commissioned scientific work to be researched by partner country academies; the results, including “spe-cialized instruments and equipment”, would then return to the soviet Union.292 bulgaria’s scientific and technological relationships with the soviet Union fol-lowed the same pattern; the literature from that period estimated that soviet-bulgarian scientific collaboration was very fruitful, but the potential for bulgarian knowledge and products to reach world markets (rather than soviet markets) was limited. For instance, Martin ivanov estimates that more than 70 percent of all bulgarian electronics exports went to the UssR.293 bulgaria’s attempts to involve Western partners in the country’s scientific and technological efforts mostly failed; soviet leaders often pressed bulgarian officials to stop contacts with Western firms and institutes.294

A milestone in the UssR scientific integration policy was the commission-ing of soviet specialists to partner countries. These specialists provided technical


plans, drawings, and other documentation and assisted in construction, work-ing with new equipment, and so on. For example, the first Czechoslovak nuclear power plant in the town of Yaslovski bogunici in 1957 required the joint effort of a soviet-Czechoslovak team.295 similar collaborations characterized the devel-opment of all nuclear physics and energy installations in the satellite countries. soviet specialists even mediated the construction of non-soviet technologies, as in the case of the Czechoslovakian reactor A1, the only East European reactor that was not entirely soviet-made.

back to the soviet-bulgarian nuclear science assistance agreement of 1955, co-signed by the ideologically reliable Georgi Nadjakov. The agreement specified the delivery of an iRT-1000 (1000 kilowatt) experimental reactor with possible upgrad-ing to 2000 kilowatts, hence its name iRT-2000. in fact, Nadjakov had made earlier requests to the bulgarian Academy of sciences for an experimental reactor in his Physical institute; the Academy’s administrative body had continuously postponed responding to his demands ‒ until the international environment changed and the soviet government decided to step in. The later director of the Physical institute and its experimental reactor, Hristo D. Hristov, wrote that the bulgarian govern-ment “accepted the proposal with gratitude”.296 Notably, from a design perspec-tive, the bulgarian experimental reactor was similar to other iRT reactors built on soviet territory. This particular type of research reactor had first been inaugurated at the institute of Atomic Energy in Moscow in 1957; igor Kurchatov’s assistant V. V. Goncharov headed the division of research reactors and reactor technolo-gies, and shared the credits for designing the reactor with Yu. G. Nikolaev and Yu. F. Chernilin. The literature described the reactor as having “structural simplicity, operational safety, low cost, and operational reliability”.297 Now this nuclear tech-nology was transferred to bulgaria and other satellite countries without substan-tial technical changes. At the ten-year anniversary of the reactor, Nadjakov further emphasized the decisive role of soviet support: “we must confess that the initia-tive for delivering a reactor to the Physics institute of the bulgarian Academy of sciences, we owe entirely to the fraternal soviet people”.298 He reminded his audi-ence that the research topics as well as the educated specialists were a “result” of the establishment of the JiNR in Dubna and the institute of Physics in sofia, both possible only with soviet help.299

in 1956 Russian specialists came to bulgaria and started constructing the facili-ties for the institute of Physics and the reactor. These new facilities were erected in an open field seven kilometers outside the bulgarian capital.300 soviet specialists kept a close watch on the construction process. They also elaborated on the safety and exploitation rules to ensure that the device would be installed and handled


properly. Given the urgency of the project, the bulgarian scientists did not wait for its overall finalization; instead, they took their old equipment and moved into the new buildings during the construction process already.

At the same time, several bulgarian scientists were required to go to the UssR for specialization. The bulgarian government assembled two groups of researchers in 1956 and early 1957 from different educational centers in bulgaria. These groups had to specialize in the most important fields of nuclear physics. The first group specialized in nuclear processes and nuclear physics; it included Georgi bliznakov, ivan Mitev, Lenko Kalchev, Milko borisov, Nikifor Kashukeev, stanka Vaklinova, and Hristo Hristov. The second group studied iRT-1000 services and functions and included Anton Markov, Vasil Hristov, Dimitar Vatev, ivan Pandev, ivan Traikov, ilia Mishev, Kirkor sakalian, Nikolai bachvarov, and simeon Ruskov.301 A number of these researchers would later work on bulgaria’s first commercial nuclear power plant.

The bulgarian iRT-1000 (2000) went critical on september 18, 1961. Dmitrii blohincev, director of the JiNR in Dubna and a corresponding member of the soviet Academy of science, set in motion the first nuclear fission in the reactor and entered its time and date in the reactor diary.302 On his command, the spe-cialists put a polonium-beryllium starter into the active zone of the experimental reactor; after that, the active zone emanated neutrons. From that moment until its decommissioning in 1989, the reactor served scientific purposes. As for safety, it is noteworthy that the reactor had the technical characteristics of a water-water reac-tor; distillated water slowed down the neutrons and acted as a bearer of heat and a protector. For additional protection, the reactor had a two-meter thick concrete shell. it was fed with uranium dioxide enriched with ten percent uranium 235.303

The establishment of the reactor was a large step in the development of nuclear science and technology in bulgaria. Hristo D. Hristov notes in his memoirs that “The years that followed consisted of very interesting, systematical and hard work because it was a completely new field from physics. The personnel examined this complicated device deeper and deeper”.304 The initial studies included using a “diffusion Wilson chamber and laser-streaming spectrometer with gas chamber-targets” to complete measurements of “rare nuclear neutron reactions”.305 in a pub-lication ten years after the reactor had become operational, Nadjakov enumerated the later research directions: “experimental and theoretical research in high ener-gies, experimental and theoretical research of the atomic nucleus, examination of isotopes and experiments with them, research of condense systems with atomic radiances, spectroscopy of all wavelengths, reactor physics and technique, [and] nuclear power”.306


bulgarian reactor research often involved international cooperation projects. Vasil Hristov, who had specialized in the Kurchatov institute in Moscow and later in the JiNR at Dubna, founded a reactor-physics measurements laboratory to investigate the characteristics of the iRT-2000 (and later to study materials used in the Kozloduy nuclear power plant). His team also worked on a mechanical selector for researching neutron behavior in heterogeneous spaces together with the Polish institute for Nuclear Research. Natalia ianeva and her team contributed inter-nationally to the field of fast breeder research; this team concentrated on heavy nuclei-fission in cooperation with the JiNR in Dubna and the institute of Physical Energy in Obninsk.307 At the same laboratory, Nikifor Kashukeev, who had spe-cialized in Dubna for eight years or so, continued his work on the production of heavy, cold and ultra-cold neutrons in bulgaria. Others worked on nuclear spec-troscopy, neutron activation analyses, physical and biological radiation, biochemi-cal investigations, and isotopes production. The laboratory and other departments in the institute of Physics also worked with the East German, Polish, Hungarian, Czechoslovakian, and Romanian Academies of science and the iAEA.308

Notably, the iRT-2000 also enabled investigations into the characteristics of nuclear reactors for public power supply. in the beginning, bulgarian and soviet teams in close cooperation experimented with neutron diffusion in WWER reactors. The results were compared to those of the experimental ZR-6 system researched in Hungary, a system designed to investigate the properties of a new type of WWER reactor.309 bulgarian specialists proposed various programs and mathematical equations on the active zone in WWER that were later used to improve this reactor technology.310 The next chapter further discusses the techno-logical trajectory of WWER reactor technology.

Reactor researchers often complained of equipment and staffing problems that hampered their work. in his memoirs, Ruskov remembered how he started work after his return from Dubna: “in the beginning in bulgaria, i had to start alone. but as people say ‘a single man in the field is a soldier’. i had to agitate, to look for followers and assistants. There was a need for establishing a laboratory in the reactor building, which was recently launched. i received a room, but it was empty. in spite of the laboratory tables and three chairs there was not even a single voltmeter. so a lot of things were needed.”311 According to the “perspective plan for the periods 1960-1965 and 1966-1975” for nuclear physics in bulgaria, elabo-rated by Emil Djakov, the country is “seriously behind with trained specialists”. Additionally, the number of workers “is at least 5 times smaller than the necessary for normal work” of a nuclear reactor like iRT-1000. The number of staff available in the nuclear physics laboratories, according to Djakov, was so small that it was


“difficult to send people for specialization, without affecting the implementation of the planning tasks”. The insufficient amount of positions in nuclear physics, con-tinued the scientist, was a serious obstacle to “the full usage of the existing facilities and the expansion and deepening of the researching work”.312 He also spoke about the 2965 perspective plan, which predicted: “the institute for Nuclear Physics and Reactor services, without the Committee for Peaceful Usage of Atomic Energy, to reach 120 people, and 300 people in 1980”. Djakov also claimed that “these num-bers are not so high, given that nuclear institutes in other socialist countries such as Romania, Poland, Yugoslavia employ between 1200 and 2000 people”. 313

Table 2.1 shows how the number of people working on the experimental reac-tor grew over the years.

Table 2.1 – Increase in personnel at the Institute of Physics with a nuclear research background from the Bulgarian Academy of Science314

Year 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960Number of staff 73 119 110 127 213 318

The bulgarian experimental reactor remained active until the political changes of 1989. in the late 1980s, several scientists had suggested enlarging the device to five megawatt capacity, but bulgarian–soviet cooperation faltered in the politi-cal turmoil. Moreover, bulgaria’s green and human rights movement Ecoglasnost, founded on April 11, 1989, organized opposition to the Communist Party as well as the bulgarian nuclear program. starting out with 110 people during the first public demonstrations in forty-four years on November 3, ultimately at least 10,000 people rallied in front of the Parliament shouting the word “democracy”. The Zhivkov government fell several days later; the experimental reactor, for its part, was closed.315

in retrospect, senior researcher Natalia ianeva claimed that the reactor had been pivotal in establishing a nuclear science community in bulgaria. it had helped many bulgarian specialists to start their career and provided contacts with foreign colleagues and research centers.316 Moreover, in science and technology studies, social constructivists argue that “the success of [an] artifact depends in large part upon the strength and size of the group that takes it up and promotes it”.317 in the case of bulgarian nuclear technology, the momentum of nuclear science would successfully carry over into the bulgarian nuclear power plant project that we will address in the next chapter. However, let us first take a closer look at the interna-tional organization of nuclear science from a bulgarian perspective.


International Organization

We saw above that bulgarian experimental reactor scientists collaborated with for-eign colleagues through two international organizations in particular: The JiNR in Dubna and the iAEA. both were international intergovernmental organizations, and both played a crucial role in the East European nuclear power network.318 They were organized differently, however, with due consequences for the ways bulgarian scientists drew on these networks.

The idea of an international Atomic Energy Agency had been brought to pub-lic attention with Us President Dwight Eisenhower’s famous “Atoms for Peace” speech at the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 8, 1953.319 With this proposal, the Us government reacted to the loss of its nuclear weapons monopoly by creating an international supervisory body for nuclear technology. by now the Us, the UssR, Canada, and the UK already possessed nuclear weap-ons, and a number of governments across the world contemplated the secret con-struction of their own atomic weaponry. Thus, Eisenhower reasoned, the world community needed an agency to enable all countries to participate in the peaceful development of nuclear energy, while at the same time containing and control-ling the proliferation of nuclear weapons. in response, the soviet government pro-posed an international body to also oversee the production of nuclear weapons, but the United states government rejected that idea, referring to its domestic secu-rity situation and the threat posed by an increasing number of countries owning a nuclear arsenal. This disagreement inspired both superpowers to start nuclear weapon control based on bilateral agreements with selected countries. The 1955 nuclear assistance treaties between the soviet Union and its allies can also be inter-preted as part of the soviet nuclear control program.

The negotiations on an international atomic agency were further complicated, as Gabrielle Hecht has shown, when postcolonial governments contested the superpower-centered structure of the organization; countries like south Africa claimed a privileged position to strengthen their status on the future international uranium market.320 The first eight countries to participate in the negotiations were the Us, the UK, Canada, France, Australia, belgium, Portugal, and south Africa; at the initial stage of the negotiations, the UssR, brazil, india, and Czechoslovakia joined in. Finally, on July 29, 1957 the iAEA was formally established and nomi-nally associated with the United Nations.321 The agency supported nuclear research by providing scientific scholarships to research centers all over the world, devel-oping a uniform system for nuclear safeguards for all nation states, and limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. The distributed decision-making structure of the


organization made it initially rather weak regarding this last issue, but later its nuclear non-proliferation policies strengthened.322

Eastern Europe’s soviet Union-centered bilateral nuclear relations had implied that most East European governments simply followed soviet leadership in iAEA negotiations. Only the most technologically advanced country in the Eastern bloc, Czechoslovakia, had been an independent negotiating partner from the begin-ning, though it too had signed a collaboration agreement with the soviet Union in 1955.323 The rest of the socialist camp later found a place in the institutional structure of the organization. The new Agency was directed by a Council of Governors, which included the most advanced nuclear powers but – on indian initiative – also followed the principle of regional representation. The Agency divided the European continent into east and west, and Eastern Europe was ini-tially represented by the UssR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Romania, Hungary, and bulgaria periodically assumed relatively modest functions in the administra-tive structure.324 Unsurprisingly, Georgi Nadjakov represented bulgaria in Agency work.

To further improve collaboration between the Agency and its member states, each member created its own national atomic energy authority. The bulgarian government founded the Committee for Peaceful Usage of Atomic Energy (CPUAE) by decree № 603 of June 4, 1957. The Committee was placed under the bulgarian Council of Ministers, the executive body of the bulgarian govern-ment.325 During the early years of its existence, individuals such as ivan Mihailov, Valko Chervenkov, Mincho Neychev, ivan Popov, and Nacho Papazov held the Committee’s chairmanship; most also held senior level posts in the bulgarian Communist Party.326 The link between the Committee and the Party suggests the political importance of the organization in the eyes of the ruling elite.

in the beginning, the control and supervising functions of the new Committee were limited to domestic research applications in medicine, industry, and agricul-ture.327 After the opening of the experimental reactor near sofia, the duties and responsibilities of the regulatory body expanded. An important domestic prob-lem that the bulgarian nuclear authority faced was building a repository for waste radioactive materials in 1963 near the town of Novi Han. Construction work had been delayed, creating a problem for radioactive materials from medical centers and the new reactor. Until then, radioactive waste had been treated as normal waste and was simply discarded. bulgarian experts from the institute of Physics and members of the state regulatory committee now set out to organize the trans-port and disposal of radioactive materials. The Committee not only demanded the finalization of the waste deposit site, but also proposed to purchase modern


transport vehicles from France and switzerland - given the increased number of nuclear facilities.328

As for the coordination between bulgarian nuclear developments and inter-national organizations, the Committee appointed a sub-committee responsible for iAEA issues as well as cooperation within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) organizational framework.329 The committee interacted with both international organizations, which had no direct contact with each other. This status quo was maintained until the mid-1970s, when a formal contract was signed for cooperation between the iAEA and the CMEA.330 We shall return to CMEA nuclear collaboration in the next chapter.331

As noted, in 1954 Western governments had also started to cooperate on nuclear research in CERN at Geneva; soon European Community members would also cooperate in EURATOM. 332 in response, the soviet Union and its social-ist partners created the JiNR in Dubna that as we saw above, became a popular destination for bulgarian scientists. The institute was based on two prominent UssR research laboratories, the institute for Nuclear Problems and the Electro Physical Laboratory of the soviet Academy of sciences.333 They had some of the largest research facilities in the world, including a 680 mega-electronvolt syn-chro-cyclotron to accelerate thermal neutrons.334 in 1956 the intergovernmental Joint institute was formally founded. Member governments shared the institute’s annual budget relative to the participation of scientists from their country; larger countries had more participating researchers and paid a larger share of the budget. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 below show the institute’s budget and the member states’ shares for 1968. They show that though the Dubna institute was crucial for bulgarian nuclear capabilities, the bulgarian importance to the institute’s budget was minor – less than 4 percent. soviet and Chinese participation carried the lion’s share of the budget and thus provided the majority of researchers. After the sino-soviet split, Chinese participation ceased and the other members covered the Chinese share of the budget. interestingly, Dubna institute reports for 1979 and 1980 kept in the bulgarian archives suggest that East European expenses for nuclear research were lower than their Western counterparts: “The amounts of money set aside for the JiNR and nuclear physics in the socialist countries are large. but in other advanced countries these amounts are even larger”.335


Table 2.2 – Budget for the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna336

1968 (in thousand rubles) 1967Financing from member statesProductionOther

23,193.85,120.0

400.0Total income 28,713.8 29,693.3scientific R&D activities Equipment Construction works

16,646.52,021.35,076.0

Total Expenditure 23,743.8

Table 2.3 – Member States’ Participation in Dubna in 1968337

bulgariaHungaryEast GermanyChinaPolandThe soviet UnionCzechoslovakiaRomaniaMongolia and VietnamAlbania and Korea

3.59%3.99%6.47%20%5.74%47.25%5.74%5.74% counted also as 1%0.05%0.05%

Young researchers from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, China, and other communist countries worked at the institute in the first years of its existence. Western researchers could also visit Dubna, but their presence was limited. Nikola balabanov remembers meeting an Austrian representative. Natalia Yaneva also remembered a rare occasion of West European visitors to Dubna.338 in addition to scientific exchanges, leading partner country scientists participated on Dubna institute committees. For example, in 1956 Georgi Nadjakov was immediately appointed – again – the first bulgarian representative director of the Dubna institute.339 Nadjakov’s multiple positions thus constituted a personal connection between bulgarian domestic and international nuclear science organizations such as the Dubna institute and the iAEA.

Despite the multinational character of the Dubna institute’s collaboration, soviet scientists and officials dominated in the senior management of the institute’s research sections and in its administration. in Nadjakov’s words, “in this interna-tional center for nuclear research every year work several hundred researchers from other socialist countries under the guidance of major soviet scientists”.340 A 1980 report kept in the bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives confirms the high results achieved in Dubna due to the soviet leadership:


For nearly a quarter century the united efforts of scientists from the socialist countries have achieved remarkable scientific results, and built devices unique in global perspective. The JiNR owes these successes to the dynamic development, to the broad opportunities of socialist inte-gration, to the noble scientific competition and cooperation with other international research centers, and primarily to the competent and unself-ish assistance of the soviet country, which assumes the overall scientific leadership and the burden of the material costs.341

Following the foundation of the Dubna institute, socialist collaboration in nuclear science was further strengthened by the integration of the Academies of sciences in the communist bloc. For example, in 1958 the bulgarian Academy of sciences and the soviet Academy of sciences signed an agreement for the “coordination of research on the most important problems, working together on topics of mutual interest, and providing scientific assistance”.342 The agreement further regulated exchanges of scholars from both sides. The 1958 agreement was the basis for later generations of bulgarian nuclear scientists to visit and collaborate with the Dubna institute, for “of course, our relationship with Dubna does not end with the work of our research associates sent there. When they come back home they continue working on the themes already started, and often they use materials from Dubna”.343 For example, Natalia Yaneva started working on fast breeder reactors thanks to the bulgarian relationship with the Dubna institute. Her international career in nuclear physics had begun with an iAEA proposal for specialization in italy, but truly took off after her five years specialization in Dubna, where she worked with famous nuclear physicists such as Dmitrii blohintsev and Fedor Lvovich shapiro. The bulgarian authorities then proposed a permanent rep-resentative position for her on the Dubna committee for fast breeder reactors. While working at the experimental reactor laboratory in bulgaria, she continued her research in the soviet Union, where two fast breeders were in operation.344 Yaneva’s career, like Nadjakov’s, illustrates the complex transnational configura-tion of bulgarian nuclear research, in which national research competences and institutes, the socialist countries’ research infrastructure, and global iAEA rela-tions intermingled and mutually reinforced each other – and in which bulgarian and soviet techno-political agendas were dominant.


Conclusion

Nuclear physics began as a spontaneous activity full of enthusiasm and experi-mentation and rapidly became a leading scientific discipline. Though the new dis-cipline was geographically skewed towards North-Western and Central Europe, the pre-WWii personal links between researchers in Europe facilitated intense collaboration between East and West. Then global political processes profoundly influenced the direction of developments and triggered the invention of the most dangerous weapon in human history. From now on, Cold War tensions between the world’s two superpowers would be part and parcel of nuclear scientists’ rela-tionships and strongly influence the shape and course of bulgaria’s nuclear net-works.

in Eastern Europe, the soviet Union initiated a process of scientific integration among its socialist allies. The UssR nuclear program had been highly successful and led to the launch of the world’s first industrial nuclear power plant; now, soviet officials promoted a wide-scale nuclear program for the “peaceful purposes” of sci-ence and energy supply. Tellingly, the soviet Union itself was now developing dif-ferent types of nuclear reactors for different uses: At home, dual-purpose RbMK reactors facilitated ample production of plutonium for military purposes, while “water-water energetic reactors” became the export reactor.

Many of the soviet Union’s satellite countries, however, lacked nuclear capa-bilities. building them required heavy investments in nuclear science, which would set the stage for the subsequent diffusion of nuclear energy plants. Though the bulgarian capabilities for nuclear science were also poorly developed, there was some physics infrastructure to build on. bulgaria’s leading physicists had begun their careers before the second World War, had mostly been trained at Western research centers, and had succeeded in institutionalizing physics at sofia University. immediately after the war, they started building a research infrastruc-ture dedicated to nuclear science. scientists like Elisaveta Karamihailova, Rashko Zajkov, and Leon Mitrani had ambivalent attitudes to the new communist regime. Yet they managed to make the communist transition, set up new research facilities and train young enthusiastic scientists who later replaced them. Georgi Nadjakov, whose prewar Western network had included Marxist sympathies that he shared for instance with the Joliot-Curies, remained a live link between the West-oriented old generation and East-oriented new generation of nuclear scientists. With key positions in domestic research institutes as well as international organizations for nuclear science, he became bulgaria’s most prominent builder of nuclear research systems.


Meanwhile, the large-scale integration program in nuclear research developed by soviet specialists began to produce results. bulgaria and most East European countries built research centers to host soviet-made experimental nuclear reac-tors, and soviet specialists designed, manufactured, and installed these reac-tors. The Joint institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna coordinated socialist work on nuclear science. Thus nuclear technology networks in Eastern Europe were strongly dependent on soviet political, institutional, and technological power. At the same time, bulgarian nuclear physics was embedded in the global international Atomic Energy Agency (iAEA), which again followed soviet leader-ship. This dependence on soviet political and technological priorities would only soften in the 1980s, when the iAEA’s influence on national nuclear authorities and committees strengthened and soviet political, scientific, and technological influ-ence diminished. Additionally, the brezhnev government allowed its communist allies to form technological contacts with the West.

building a nuclear science infrastructure was only the first step in bulgarian and East European nuclear system building. We shall now turn to the subsequent development of full-scale nuclear power plants.

bulgarian Nuclear Power: socialist internationalism in Action (1962-1975) 85

Chapter 3 bulgarian Nuclear Power: socialist

internationalism in Action (1962-1975)

“We are building ‘First nuclear’ ‘First nuclear’ is building us.”

The workers’ slogan at Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, 1974345

by the time bulgaria’s experimental reactor went critical in 1961, a few power com-panies in the East and West had started to connect nuclear plants for power pro-duction to their public electricity grids. bulgarian Party leaders now envisioned the same step, and in 1966 signed a bilateral treaty with the soviet Union for the construction of a full-scale nuclear power plant on bulgarian soil. As in other East European satellite states, however, the implementation of this project faced various obstacles. The bulgarian nuclear community was still young and compara-tively small. Moreover, even if government leaders desired domestic nuclear power capabilities, the electricity supply sector was dominated by state power companies that had invested massively in, and developed competences and good experiences with, large scale coal and hydro-electric power plants. Third, nuclear power tech-nology was still in its infancy and far from the cheap and efficient power source it had promised to be. it still needed lots of technological experimenting and improvement. For these reasons, various stakeholders in the bulgarian political and power supply nomenclature disagreed on the necessity of nuclear power and the way to proceed. Their disagreements culminated in a 1969 Party plenum, when the political elite claimed prevalence over technocrat nomenclature arguments. in 1974, bulgaria’s so-called “First Nuclear”, the Kozloduy nuclear power plant, became operational. by then it had already claimed a prominent slot in bulgarian propaganda and national high-tech prestige, as illustrated by the workers’ slogan “We are building First Nuclear – First Nuclear is building us”.

The bulgarian nuclear power program followed a trajectory similar to the nuclear science program a decade earlier: it followed in the tracks of the “initial phase of socialist innovation”, the scientific infrastructure. Thus the nuclear power program crucially hinged, as mentioned above, on domestic as well as foreign


relations: in the words of soviet leader Leonid brezhnev, the Kozloduy nuclear plant was “one of the brightest confirmations of unbreakable camaraderie” and “to be viewed as socialist internationalism in action”.346 Again, bilateral relations with the soviet Union had made the project possible. As with bulgaria’s nuclear sci-ence infrastructure, the soviet Union supplied the reactor and provided technical assistance. in addition, the bulgarian nuclear power program drew on multilateral organizations. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) now took on an increasingly important role: it established its Permanent Commission on Electric Power (PCEP) in 1956, which greatly stimulated the interconnection of member state power grids into one centrally controlled supergrid. such a shared grid had in turn the potential to make very large nuclear power plants techni-cally and economically feasible. in 1960 the CMEA also established a Permanent Commission on Peaceful uses of Atomic Energy (PCPAE) to coordinate member states’ nuclear energy plans and activities.347

We have previously seen that soviet leaders used the CMEA to create a soviet-centered East European economy and techno-political space, but that member states found ways of resistance to guard their respective national interests.348 such resistance was also possible because of what János Kornai calls the lack of “disci-plinary measures for implementing the shared plans”.349 in this chapter we shall discuss how this power game played out in bulgaria’s nuclear energy relations, and how bulgarian nuclear system builders drew on bilateral relations with the soviet Union and CMEA commissions in order to move from nuclear science to full-scale nuclear power supply.

Nuclear Internationalism in the CMEA

Within the CMEA, the strong soviet leadership had to confront the unwillingness of some countries to follow central directives. Even the bulgarian political leader Todor Zhivkov considered the organization ineffective and unreliable. Although his country was a close follower of the soviet line, Zhivkov did not agree with the allocated economic role of the bulgarian economy in the CMEA structure.350 He wanted to improve his country’s position beyond CMEA agreements, for instance by changing from agricultural to industrial exports.351 Kornai also shows the inef-ficiency of the organization, characterizing the planning process as “slow” and “clumsy”.352 such problems with CMEA collaboration repeatedly inspired member states, including the UssR, to establish separate institutions inside and outside the CMEA administrative system in order to improve multilateral coordination.


For example, in 1969, the UssR, bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania founded the so-called interbranch Governmental Commission on Computing Technology (iGCCT).353 similar maneuvers took place with nuclear power, as we will see below.

Meanwhile, the CMEA Permanent Commission on Peaceful uses of Atomic Energy began its work in 1961, with active participation by bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, the UssR and Czechoslovakia. While all sent repre-sentatives, soviet officials clearly had a leading role: The Commission was founded in Moscow and its first director was Artiom Gregorianc, who also directed Glavatomenergo ‒ a state organization within the UssR Ministry of Electrification. in the 1980s he was succeeded by Feodor Ovchinnikov, deputy minister of soviet electrification.354 The formal tasks of the commission director were to “lead the ses-sions of the Commission; organize the Commission’s work in the period between its sessions according to the working plans of the Commission; and represent the Commission before other bodies of the CMEA”, but in reality he also enjoyed an agenda setting power.355

The Commission distributed its work over various subcommittees. Two main sections – simply named section One and section Two – worked on various aspects of nuclear power. section One was dedicated to reactor science and techniques. it organized CMEA cooperation for the production and development of power reactor blocs, the reactor physics of research reactors, problems of safety in nuclear plants, and plans for future development of nuclear power technology in the CMEA. section Two worked on instrumentation and propulsion systems. it organized cooperation in nuclear instrumentation, electricity, medicine, industry and scientific research. it also dealt with standardization. The Commission had three science-technical coun-cils: science-Technical Council One worked on Fast breeder Reactors. Council Two worked on the reproduction and disposal of nuclear products. Council Three dealt with nuclear safety. it organized CMEA cooperation on ionizing radiation preven-tion in industry and for the general public by setting standards and providing doc-umentation. Finally the Commission had temporary working groups, such as the international Research Group for WWER Reactor Physics Tests.


Box 3.1 – Aims of the CMEA Permanent Commission on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, formulated at its second meeting May 30 to June 2, 1961:

A) Helping countries to develop production of nuclear technology devices; production of radioactive and stable isotopes and chemicals; production of protective gear and clothing for the people who work with radioactive materials.

b) A better use of the varied economic situation in CMEA member states, leading to a more efficient socialist division of labour.

C) Coordination of the work in unification and standardization of the devices, isotope production, and protective technology and facilities.

D) Exchange of information in the field of production and utilization of isotopes and ionizing rays, devices, protective technologies as well as the organization of radiological protection and labour safety during work with ionizing materials.

E) The facilitating of interactions between the CMEA and its members countries, including: – preparation of projects for multilateral agreements between the member countries; – organization of the study of the economical and technical problems related to the use

of atomic energy for peaceful uses; – organization of scientific and technical meetings of specialists; – organization, together with other bodies of the Council, of consultations on the plans

of development of nuclear power for peaceful uses in the member countries; – regulation of the implementation of the recommendations and support the implemen-

tation; – creation of auxiliary bodies for preparation of materials and projects; – decision making on the organization of procedures on the questions of the work of the

Commission. 356

After the main structure and work program were outlined, regular meetings set goals for the partners and accounted for the work done so far. some difficulties in the Commission’s operations surfaced already at its second meeting: The Albanian representatives did not show up and without any formal notice. They did not come to subsequent meetings either.357A more substantial difficulty in the Commission’s initial years was the lack of good communication among members. The main problem was information provision: member countries produced nuclear instru-ments and equipment, but did not provide information on the types and amount of output.358 Another problem was that member states provided the Commission with equipment lists that only included quantities allocated for export and import, but concealed domestic production, trade, and requirements. This practice pre-vented a transparent picture of the entire bloc’s needs.359 Moreover, this informa-tion was crucial since lack of specialized equipment constituted a key problem for


member states planning new nuclear facilities.360 For example, working group № i complained in October 1961, that the agreement for providing technical docu-mentation and information necessary for implementing the comparative equip-ment estimate had still not been fulfilled.361 This illustrates the role of information in CMEA politics. On the one hand, member state representatives promised at meetings to implement the Permanent Commissions’ recommendations. On the other hand, most members did not deliver sufficient information on their real production capacities.

The planning and coordination of member state nuclear programs did not go smoothly either. The first Commission session decided already that bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, UssR, and Czechoslovakia should create perspective nuclear plans until 1980.362 However, this recommendation was not implemented; only bulgaria and Romania were able and/or willing to elaborate such plans within the agreed period.363

such difficulties persisted during the entire lifespan of the Permanent Commission. One important reason why member governments collaborated poorly was their domestic techno-political ambitions. The Romanians, for instance, refused to establish a nuclear plant based on technology produced within the soviet bloc. instead, the Romanian Party leader, Nicolae Ceauşescu, began negotiations with Canada. These too were unsuccessful; Romania did not build a nuclear power station during its communist period.364 below we will see how other CMEA members tried to act independently within the CMEA organiza-tional structure.

CMEA member states also elaborated plans to establish an organization in nuclear equipment called ‘interatominstrument’ but these endeavors had their own history. in 1964, Professor ivan Popov, chairman of the bulgarian Committee for Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, prepared a report to Party leader Todor Zhivkov regarding the production of equipment for nuclear measurements. Popov’s report contained a negative evaluation of the delayed bulgarian production of such equipment, and a positive evaluation of the rapid advances made by other coun-tries. in response, Zhivkov’s government took two steps. Firstly, it sent a group of bulgarian scientists to the soviet Union to examine the possibilities for producing such equipment. secondly, it initiated the creation of a separate facility “for the research and production of devices for nuclear measurements”.365 A 1964 Council of Ministers special decree created the state company isotope.366 This response was typical for CMEA partner countries: While nominally participating in the CMEA division of labor, member governments in practice invested in domestic capabilities. The remaining role for the CMEA was to exchange information and


coordinate the production of nuclear devices, not to realistically create an efficient division of labor. standards were an important tool for such coordination. in 1966 the XiV CMEA session decided to accelerate the unification of the standards in order to create better conditions for collaboration, and established the Permanent Commission of standardization and the CMEA institute of standardization.367

in the early 1970s, the CMEA once more attempted to upgrade member gov-ernment collaboration beyond mere information exchange and standardization. The impulse came in 1971 from the so-called “Comprehensive Program for the Further Extension and improvement of Cooperation and the Further Development of socialist Economic integration by Comecon Member Countries”. in the realm of nuclear power, this policy package led to the establishment of interatominstrument (iAi) on February 22, 1972. its main purpose was, as before, “the practical realiza-tion of the socialist economical integration in the field of instruments and devices of nuclear technologies”.368 its set-up was different, however: interatominstrument was a multinational organization within the CMEA under the direct management of the Permanent Commission on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.

interatominstrument was officially an initiative of bulgaria, the GDR, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the soviet Union. its administrative body was based in the city of Warsaw, Poland.369 its main areas of application were scientific, economic (production), and commercial cooperation in the field of equipment for metrics, radiometrics, and nuclear physics including polymetric and multichannel systems for nuclear research and nuclear energy.370 The major aims were to create joint equipment production facilities and establish a division of labor. The new set-up allowed for commercial contacts within the soviet bloc as well as with countries outside the community; the interatominstrument charter explicitly specified that the organization could participate in “third party” con-tracts. The organization also contributed to obtaining and spreading expertise among member countries and provided services and repairs for members or third parties.371 Financing was initially through a fund to which all members contrib-uted, but the organization would increasingly finance itself through the contracts it generated.372

However, despite the fresh start, old problems reappeared. soon interatom-instrument specialists complained again about the lack of adequate information on nuclear equipment production and demand in member states.373 in addition, management attempts to create channels for self-finance did not really work out; an assessment of interatominstrument’s operations until 1975 revealed its inabil-ity to exist without member funding.374 Member states again preferred to export equipment without the administrative cooperation of the new multinational body,


just as they had previously bypassed the Permanent Commission. The bulgarian state, for instance, arranged exports through the state enterprise isotope, which was expanded in 1973 and renamed United Economy Enterprise Nuclear Techniques (“Nuclear Techniques”). This company not only arranged the import and export of nuclear devices, but also entered bilateral agreements with other parties and rep-resented bulgaria within interatominstrument. National players such as Nuclear Techniques remained the gravity centers of CMEA nuclear equipment trade.375

To regain the initiative, in 1976, interatominstrument’s management initiated an Agreement for multilateral international specialization to produce 28 nuclear equipment products. in 1977 interatominstrument members signed a supple-mentary agreement for another 44 products, and in 1979 added another 76. This, finally, seemed to work: the share of self-financing increased from under ten per-cent in 1973 to about a hundred percent in 1978.376

Table 3.1 – The Interatominstrument budget, showing the growth in self-financing from 1973 to 1978

1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 19789.3% 35.5% 34.4% 42.4% 76.9% 100%

Sources: Bulgaria and Comecon. “Interatominstrument” and “Interatomenergo” International Relations and Contracts, Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Sofia.

Another key aspect of this success was interatominstrument’s initiative to estab-lish subsidiary service companies in member countries. At the end of 1975 and the beginning of 1976 it established such subsidiaries in bulgaria, Poland and the UssR. These almost immediately managed self-financing and soon expanded. For example, within two years the Polish subsidiary in Zelena Gura created two addi-tional operations in Krakow and Warsaw and expanded its employees from 21 in 1976 to 96 in 1980. in the same period, the soviet subsidiary in Dubna increased its staff from 19 to 51.377 in comparison the bulgarian company made a slow start, caused by repeated management changes and reorganizations. Nonetheless, by the late 1970s two bulgarian state firms “Electron” and “Electroimpex” achieved satisfactory results.378 in the first half of the 1980s, interatominstrument and its national subsidiaries produced and delivered nuclear equipment for the CMEA market and continued to function until the collapse of the soviet bloc.

in the meantime, nuclear power plant production inside the soviet Union rap-idly increased its momentum and much effort went into improving its efficiency. improving efficiency was a key factor in the nuclear development trajectory in Western market economies, where the profitability of light water reactors was a major point of critique.379 soviet nuclear plant designers partly followed the same


trajectory. in addition, the demand for nuclear power plants was boosted by soar-ing energy demands in socialist industrialization programs; the development of other energy resources could hardly keep up.380 Finally, nuclear power plant own-ers found that they profited from the commercial, military, and symbolic gains of nuclear power; the latter was in the form of national pride and prestige for this high-tech energy technology.381 it was in this context of increasing profitability, need, and prestige that soviet leaders drafted a plan for the diffusion of water-water reactors to satellite countries in Eastern Europe. And as in the case of con-structing a common socialist infrastructure for nuclear science in the 1950s, the transfer of nuclear power reactors in the 1960s followed the two track approach of multilateral collaboration and bilateral agreement.

The establishment and intensivation of the CMEA joint nuclear plant program more or less coincided with the bilateral construction of the first soviet nuclear power plant in Eastern Europe. The governments of the soviet Union and the GDR had signed a bilateral agreement to construct the Rheinsberg nuclear power plant in 1956. While the plant was under construction in the early 1960s, the soviet chair of the Permanent Commission, Valery Emelyanov, convinced CMEA member states to accept “closer operative cooperation among the CMEA mem-bers in the field of the use of nuclear energy”.382 The XVi session of the CMEA in 1963 further stipulated that “the Commission on the use of nuclear energy need[s] reinforcement by highly qualified professionals”.383 These specialists came from CMEA members and became part of the Commission’s structure.384 soon after the Rheinsberg plant was completed, it started commercial power production on October 11, 1966 and became the first and leading example of nuclear power plant transfer in the soviet bloc. The 70 megawatt plant had been designed by the soviet bureau Toploelektroproekt and exported by the same bureau.385 East Germany provided complementary equipment, construction, and subsidiary facilities.386 Rheinsberg served as an experimental center for further developing WWER reactor technology. Later it acquired training facilities to educate engineers from CMEA partner countries.387 Conversely, the construction of Rheinsberg was an important learning experience for Toploelektroexport; it was only the second WWER ever (after Novovoronezh in the soviet Union), and Toploelektroexport’s first experience with non-soviet construction workers, design studios, and com-panies. such joint projects later became standard practice for constructing soviet nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe. in 1965, one year before the completion of Rheinsberg, the GDR and soviet Union governments agreed to construct two further nuclear reactors in the projected nuclear power plant “Nord” (Greifswald), which started commercial operations in 1974.


bilateral agreements and CMEA collaboration continued to co-exist. in 1965 the CMEA Permanent Commission for the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy created a new working group on “reactor science and technology and nuclear energy”.388 Three years later, a “working group on projects, facilitating, and exploitation of nuclear power plants” began operating within the Commission.389 simultaneously the soviet government offered its bulgarian and Hungarian counterparts bilat-eral agreements for the construction of nuclear power plants on their territories. signed in 1966, these bilateral agreements were neither final nor indisputable, as we will see below. They did, however, illustrate the importance of bilateral relation-ships outside the formal CMEA framework.

The CMEA continued to perform important auxiliary functions, which even-tually materialized in the elaboration of a common plan for scientific and technical research for the period 1966-1970. This knowledge production effort included 37 main issues, 10 of them on “reactor science and nuclear energy”.390 The Permanent Commission for the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy created a specialized body for implementing the plan from 1967 to1970. it organized a range of conferences in Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, and the UssR. This effort involved some 100 research institutes, and over 800 specialists attended the events, presenting over 400 reports. Representatives from Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and the international Atomic Energy Agency (iAEA) also participated at these conferences.391 The lead-ing role of the UssR is worth noting, along with the strong participation by the CMEA member countries. The quotation below lists the topics at the CMEA con-ferences on nuclear issues in Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, and the UssR 1967-1970:

– The state of the art work on the creation of NPP with fast breeders and future perspectives – Research in the field of recycling of nuclear fuel – Research on the problems related to protection from radiation – The state of development and the perspectives for WWER nuclear power plants – Research on the problems of protection from penetrating radiation – Control and management of nuclear reactors and NPP equipment – Water regimes of WWER reactors, radiation control of the heat carriers and decreasing

the radiation danger of the heat carrier – Atomic energy, heat cycles, radiation material science392

in the two-track approach of nuclear power reactor transfer from the soviet Union to its socialist allies, soviet decision makers tended to set out the course


in visible and less visible ways. The operations of soviet techno-politics can be further illustrated through the example of negotiating iAEA safeguards. This safe-guard system aimed at controlling nuclear deposits, facilities, and reactors in order to prevent the diversion of nuclear material to military use. in 1966 the Polish and Czechoslovakian governments, permanent members of the iAEA board of Governors, negotiated with their iAEA partners on this issue. They made it clear that they would only accept iAEA administrative control over their nuclear reac-tors, if the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) would do the same.393 At the time, West Germany had American reactors and refused to accept iAEA standards and control because they feared soviet influence via this organizational arrange-ment. Even the U.s. government found this West German opposition went too far. Yet West German negotiators were probably right that Moscow orchestrated Czechoslovakia and Poland’s demands. The evidence is circumstantial. Firstly, soviet policy makers increasingly felt the need for such a safeguard system in order to access the increasing number of nuclear power programs in Western and social-ist countries. in 1958 they had still rejected the idea of common safeguards, but five years later, in the wake of FRG and Chinese nuclear programs, the soviet Union had become their strongest supporter. secondly, soviet policy makers influenced bulgarian politicians in the same way they probably did with Czechoslovakia and Poland. When bulgarian politicians had to take a stance on the iAEA safeguards conflict, they first consulted soviet Nikolai Maslennikov, special advisor at the soviet embassy in sofia. After that meeting, bulgaria’s negotiators supported the two communist states in their demands for West German openness.394

similar hidden soviet techno-political influence appeared in the Treaty of Non-Proliferation negotiations. This Treaty was one of the main topics in the late 1960s, and likewise a priority policy aim for soviet negotiators. The soviets proceeded by organizing special meetings to align the various partner government positions, before the issue was finally discussed in official CMEA meetings.395 in practice, soviet spokespersons would dictate the main line of reasoning. For example, dur-ing one of these meetings in sofia, permanent soviet iAEA representative Georgi Arkadiev dictated the stances that all communist country officials should take. The topic itself is quite trivial to this book, but Arkadiev’s method is most telling of soviet techno-political maneuvering. The meeting discussed paragraph Vi of the iAEA statute on the number of members on the board of Governors.396 in response to very strong pressure from Western countries, Arkadiev stipulated that socialist countries should prevent further extensions of the board.397 in Arkadiev’s words, the communist states needed to defend their position against the “demand of the Federal Republic of Germany to receive a permanent seat”, and to insist on


admitting East Germany. Furthermore Arkadiev proposed a change in the rota-tion principle of the iAEA framework.

Ten days after this unofficial meeting in bulgaria, the official CMEA meeting in Warsaw turned Arkadiev’s recommendations into formal CMEA resolutions.398 Only the Romanian state refused to accept the resolutions, requiring explicit for-mal consent by the Romanian government.399 The Romanian representatives went even further and disputed the status of Czechoslovakia and Poland as permanent members of the iAEA board. The soviet officials, however, rejected the Romanian demands, arguing that only countries developing nuclear capabilities should be on the board; Romania was not amongst these, and its protests were bypassed. 400 The soviet techno-political line prevailed.

Constructing the CMEA Power Grid

With the transition from nuclear science’s experimental reactors to nuclear power reactors, nuclear plants became components of the public electricity supply sys-tem. Consequently Eastern Europe’s nuclear integration needs to be understood in the context of power system development. As we shall see, socialist power grid development and nuclear power development intersected and resembled each other in several ways.

We have already seen that the electricity sector was central to communist eco-nomic planning programs. Lenin’s dictum that communism equaled “soviet power plus electrification” had resonated throughout the socialist world. in bulgaria, too, large scale electrification programs were to energize the industrial boom.401 in order to keep up with demand, particularly from heavy industry, bulgarian policy makers and electric utility leaders combined initiatives. As we shall see, the soviet Union was always involved.

The first bulgarian strategy, namely to build additional conventional power plants, faced various problems. Tano Tsolov, secretary of the bulgarian Communist Party’s Central Committee, drafted a report analyzing bulgaria’s electricity short-ages, which he submitted to the National Meeting on the Questions of the industry, Construction, and Transport on December 9, 1961. The report, which became a standard reference document, when published in the bulgarian journal Energy, opposed the claim that “The current state of the electricity balance requires the constant search for new opportunities to develop our energy capacity”. “Nothing of the kind!” retorted Tsolov, “the machines and the equipment of the Power Plant near the Azoth Fertilized Combine (AT3) – stara Zagora – arrived long ago, but


their assembly is delayed without any good reasons. The construction of the elec-tric power plant at the metallurgic factory Kremikovtsi is also behind schedule.... it could definitely be said that there are almost no energy facilities where construc-tion is not falling behind schedule! This is disturbing considering the state of our electricity balance”.402

in the report Tsolov further noted the lack of qualified professional staff at the thermal-electric power plants under construction on the banks of the River Maritza, called Maritza iztok (Maritza-East).403 Meeting participants should “observe and absorb the experience of the soviet specialists who took part in the construction of the power plant”.404

still, because of bulgarian industries’ dire energy needs, the construction of large scale thermal power plants continued.405 Coal would remain the domi-nant fuel for electricity production until the late 1980s; it was defined as a “main national source for the satisfaction of the need for energy resources of the coun-try”, which could be attributed to its comparatively low hydropower potential.406 bulgarian power planners did not use the River Danube for energy production at all.407 instead they constructed two types of thermal power plants. The first e used domestic low calorie lignite coal for fuel. According to contemporary insights, ninety one percent of all coal deposits in bulgaria consisted of lignite. bulgarian engineers realized the need for innovative solutions to maximize the exploita-tion of these domestic resources.408 On this basis, they built the huge power plant Maritza iztok in the eastern part of the country, where lignite deposits were con-centrated. The complex consisted of three lignite power plants. in addition, the bulgarian project organization Energoproekt built the bobov Dol lignite plant in the west in the early 1970s. A large part of the plant’s equipment was imported from CMEA member countries, and the rest was produced in bulgaria. A few smaller thermal power plants also started operating in the late 1960s and the first half of the 1970s.

The second type of thermal power plant in bulgaria used imported soviet hard-coal. such high quality anthracite power plants were established in Varna, Devnya, Russe, Vidin, svishtov, and Gabrovo in northern bulgaria following the signing of commercial agreements with the soviet Union, which specified the conditions for importing coal from the Donbas industrial region in soviet Ukraine.409

These plants were mostly built with financial aid from the soviet Union, which also delivered equipment and construction support. For instance, financing for the plants at Varna and Maritza-iztok ii and iii was arranged through a bilateral agreement of February 19, 1964, which provided soviet credit to bulgaria in the amount of “300 million rubles with an interest of 2 percent per year”. The credit

Figure 3.1 – Bulgaria’s electric power system in 1980.410


their assembly is delayed without any good reasons. The construction of the elec-tric power plant at the metallurgic factory Kremikovtsi is also behind schedule.... it could definitely be said that there are almost no energy facilities where construc-tion is not falling behind schedule! This is disturbing considering the state of our electricity balance”.402

in the report Tsolov further noted the lack of qualified professional staff at the thermal-electric power plants under construction on the banks of the River Maritza, called Maritza iztok (Maritza-East).403 Meeting participants should “observe and absorb the experience of the soviet specialists who took part in the construction of the power plant”.404

still, because of bulgarian industries’ dire energy needs, the construction of large scale thermal power plants continued.405 Coal would remain the domi-nant fuel for electricity production until the late 1980s; it was defined as a “main national source for the satisfaction of the need for energy resources of the coun-try”, which could be attributed to its comparatively low hydropower potential.406 bulgarian power planners did not use the River Danube for energy production at all.407 instead they constructed two types of thermal power plants. The first e used domestic low calorie lignite coal for fuel. According to contemporary insights, ninety one percent of all coal deposits in bulgaria consisted of lignite. bulgarian engineers realized the need for innovative solutions to maximize the exploita-tion of these domestic resources.408 On this basis, they built the huge power plant Maritza iztok in the eastern part of the country, where lignite deposits were con-centrated. The complex consisted of three lignite power plants. in addition, the bulgarian project organization Energoproekt built the bobov Dol lignite plant in the west in the early 1970s. A large part of the plant’s equipment was imported from CMEA member countries, and the rest was produced in bulgaria. A few smaller thermal power plants also started operating in the late 1960s and the first half of the 1970s.

The second type of thermal power plant in bulgaria used imported soviet hard-coal. such high quality anthracite power plants were established in Varna, Devnya, Russe, Vidin, svishtov, and Gabrovo in northern bulgaria following the signing of commercial agreements with the soviet Union, which specified the conditions for importing coal from the Donbas industrial region in soviet Ukraine.409

These plants were mostly built with financial aid from the soviet Union, which also delivered equipment and construction support. For instance, financing for the plants at Varna and Maritza-iztok ii and iii was arranged through a bilateral agreement of February 19, 1964, which provided soviet credit to bulgaria in the amount of “300 million rubles with an interest of 2 percent per year”. The credit

Figure 3.1 – Bulgaria’s electric power system in 1980.410

was to pay for the project and for “the delivery of equipment for the construction of the industrial facilities by the UssR”.411 soviet participation in the bobov Dol plant was financed similarly. After an agreement signed on November 22, 1968, the soviet Union took responsibility for drafting the project, delivering three tur-bines and assembly equipment, sending specialists, and training bulgarian spe-cialists. Payment for the cooperation was made under a credit agreement signed four years earlier (July 4, 1964).412 in sum, the soviet Union was heavily involved in the electrification of bulgaria with conventional power plants, which greatly increased bulgarian electricity production and consumption (table 3.2).

Table 3.2 – Electricity consumption in Bulgaria according to consumer categories (GWh)Year Industry Transport

and commu-nications

Agricultural industry

Building Public sector

Population Self losses Transpor-tation losses

Total con-sumption

1952 686 2.1 7 4 341 135 114 206 1,3791955 1,055 52 70 61 390 206 166 312 2,1061960 2,491 96 164 74 906 530 317 637 4,6851965 5,555 253 455 135 2,054 1,180 1,047 786 10,2851970 11,550 404 691 272 3,405 2,595 1,636 1,448 19,616

Source: Spirov, Georgiev and Tsonev, Bulgarian Electrification. Concise History.

bulgarian techno-politics’ further strategy to supply energy to the rapidly grow-ing domestic industry was to import electricity from abroad. in order to meet its members’ electricity demands, the CMEA had already envisaged interconnect-ing member states’ power grids in the 1950s. in this way, state power companies could transfer electricity from places with excess capacity to places with energy shortages.413 such cross-border cooperation began in 1953, when the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian governments signed an agreement to connect their power grids with a 110 kV transmission line. in February 1956, the CMEA established its Permanent Commission on Electric Power. bulgarian engineers and Party leaders


viewed such initiatives with enthusiasm, for cross-border power lines would enable them to import the additional power that domestic industry so badly needed.414

At its Xith session, the CMEA Permanent Commission on Electric Power pro-posed to create CMEA “integrated electricity systems” managed by the Central bureau of Dispatching, founded in 1962 in Prague. The officials decided to build a system using 220 kV intersystem transmission lines to create this joint CMEA power pool.415 The East European system would also be connected to the Lviv energy network, which provided access to the giant soviet power grid.416 in 1962 the Mukachevo (Ukraine)-schaioseged (Hungary) connection went operational, synchronizing the emerging East European grid with the soviet grid. in 1963 Romania joined the initiative with a 220 kV transmission line.417 Two years later, the first European connection with a capacity of 400 kV was created between Mukachevo, Ukraine and Ludus, Romania.418 Thus, by the mid-1960s, the com-munist countries in Europe had established a unified electricity transfer network.

The managing Central Dispatch Organization (CDO) based in Prague, Czechoslovakia, was governed by the “Agreement for Organization of the CDO”, the “Proposal for the CDO”, and “The Multilateral Agreement for Mutual Delivery of Electricity in the Conditions of Parallel work of the Energy systems of the CDO Member Countries”.419 The coordination of the power pool in theory occurred under the conditions of equality and mutual benefit. The CDO was managed by a council mandated by the governments of the participating countries to discuss questions and decide on the organization’s activities. The member countries sent the necessary specialists to organize the CDO’s administration. A Czechoslovakian director and a deputy-director led this international team.420

Despite participation in the organization since its creation, bulgaria’s state elec-tricity network only joined in 1967. Up to this moment, bulgarian electricity users had relied solely on domestic power plants. The 220 kV long-distance transmis-sion between bulgaria and Romania began on April 17, 1967 and served primarily

Figure 3.2 – The expansion of Eastern Europe’s electricity collaboration and maxi-mum transfer capacities (in MW) from 1963 (left) to 1972 (right).421


to import energy from the soviet Union via Romania. The line connecting the substations of boichinovtzi (bulgaria) and Craiova (Romania) was based on a trilateral agreement among the bulgarian, Romanian, and soviet governments, and officially signed within the CMEA framework. According to the agreement, Romania was only a transit country. Each country developed the projects and was responsible for construction within its territory. The Russians constructed the connection across the River Danube.422

bulgaria’s growing energy needs inspired increasing electricity imports from the UssR in the early 1970s. Note that in 1970, full electrification of the country was completed and 99.6 percent of the population had access to electricity in their homes.423 bulgarian planners had anticipated this increase and on December 17, 1964 signed another trilateral agreement for the construction of a higher-capac-ity 400 kV connection with the UssR via Romania. This transmission line con-nected the thermal power plant in soviet Moldavia with the dispatching station “Mizia” in north east bulgaria; the 735 km line traversed 211 km of soviet ter-ritory, 155 km of Romanian territory, and 369 km of bulgarian territory.424 The soviet Energosetproekt designed most of the line.425 The Mizia transformer station was delivered by the GDR.426 This connection enabled bulgaria to import 3 billion kilowatt hours a year.427

The bulgarian situation was illustrative of the CMEA electricity cooperation. As the CMEA interconnected power grid expanded in the late 1950s and 1960s, the soviet Union became by far the main exporter of electricity in Eastern Europe (see figure ?). The role of most other member countries was largely limited to receiving or transmitting soviet electricity, and aiding neighboring countries in case of accidental black-outs and other power emergencies. in effect, these coun-tries found themselves integrated in a joint, soviet-dominated network.

Figure 3.3 – Electricity imports and exports (in GWh) within the CMEA integrated electricity sys-tems in 1980.428


Table 3.3 – Average annual growth rate (in percentages) of electricity in European CMEA countries (taken from publications and United Nations data)Countries 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990bulgariaHungaryDDRPolandRomaniaUssRCzechoslovakia

15.36.75.38.2

16.39.86.3

6.05.13.96.66.85.84.9

5.33.8

2.6-3.6 (1)

1.3 (1)

5.04.0-4.7

2.6(1) 1981-1985.Source: Savenko and Samkov, Unification of electro-energetic systems of the Comecon members.

Bulgaria’s Nuclear Power Program

The third bulgarian strategy for energizing domestic industry, of course, was nuclear power. The CMEA nuclear energy debate and the soviet Union’s offer to construct a nuclear power plant on bulgarian soil, specified in the 1966 soviet-bulgarian treaty, made the bulgarian leadership consider the use of nuclear energy. However, these preparations did not conclude the issue. Rather they trig-gered furious domestic debates within bulgaria’s government on the attractiveness of atomic energy.

bulgarian energy specialists had received the news of the world’s first nuclear power plant for public energy supply, the 1954 Obninsk plant, with enthusiasm. in the journal Energy that same year, st. Karadziev and D. Lalov explained the design and principles of the Obninsk reactor in detail. They predicted a future mass use of such reactors.429 The next year the journal published another enthusiastic description of the Obninsk plant, and an article by a Czechoslovakian specialist on the projected A1 nuclear power plant in Czechoslovakia.430 A 1955 publica-tion relayed the optimistic predictions of the First international Conference on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy in Geneva on future nuclear energy use.431 in 1957 the matter came closer to home when a new Energy article discussed the application of nuclear energy in bulgaria, evaluating the possibility for bulgaria to have an experimental nuclear power plant.432 in the same year another paper suggested that the country needed two nuclear stations “no later than 1961-1962”, possibly with support from the soviet Union and Czechoslovakia; the stations would “become operational in 1970”.433 in 1958, Nikola Nikolov’s paper with the telling title “The need for the construction of atomic power plants in our coun-try” promoted the argument that has often been heard since: Nikolov evaluated


bulgaria’s available energy sources and other means of meeting domestic electric-ity needs. His calculations highlighted that domestic energy sources could satisfy the growing power need until 1975; by then, nuclear power plants would have to take over.434 bulgarian energy specialists continued to follow the developments in the nuclear industry worldwide and to consider bulgaria’s options; nuclear power was clearly on their mental map.

The establishment of the iRT-2000 research reactor in sofia in 1962 had brought nuclear power yet a step closer, and in 1964 stanka Nozharova, chief designer of the state design body Energoproekt, concluded that pressurized water reactors were the most appropriate reactor to meet future bulgarian energy needs.435 Her initial report had two parts. The first reviewed ongoing nuclear programs world-wide. The second concerned the techno-economic conditions for nuclear power in bulgaria. Nozharova suggested that by then, industrialization and modernization in bulgaria had reached an advanced phase, and nuclear power would speed up these developments. Domestic nuclear power would supply industry’s electricity need, and could even become a source of profit if electricity was exported; this argument foreshadowed the creation of bulgaria as a balkan energy hub later on. in 1966 another article concluded that “nuclear power has entered a phase of wide industrial development”.436 During that year, the iX Congress of the bulgarian Communist Party announced the agreement with the soviet Union to construct a nuclear power plant in bulgaria.437

The agreement was signed on July 15, 1966 and stipulated “collaboration in the construction and starting of a nuclear power plant with a total capacity of 800 megawatts within the People’s Republic of bulgaria in the period of 1973-1974”.438 The soviet and bulgarian parties shared the responsibility for the project (see text-box): The soviet Union would supply the design, technology, specialists, construc-tion management, training, and uranium fuel, while bulgaria would choose and prepare the building site and execute construction under soviet leadership.

in addition the agreement obliged the soviet Union to grant credit worth fifty million rubles at two percent interest per year. These funds covered the delivery of specialized equipment and project design provided by soviet organizations. The bulgarian state was to repay within a period of ten years; payments should be made in commodities produced in bulgaria based on a previous agreement. if the loan was insufficient to cover all the expenses, bulgaria was to pay for additional costs. Notably, the agreement also specified the secrecy of technical information: None of the organizations involved was to reveal “the provided documentation to entities or organizations of other countries”.441


As the implementation of this nuclear power project was approaching, opposi-tion voices became stronger. This opposition was rooted in the struggle between different groups, in particular the political, economic, and scientific nomencla-ture.442 Like in other cases, Party leader Todor Zhivkov would have to decide. As noted in Chapter 1, the head of state’s passion for innovation and technical prog-ress often helped overcome administrative resistance in communist bulgaria. Zhivkov ruled by favoring the interests of different nomenclature from case to case. sometimes he defended political nomenclature against economic nomenclature attacks. in other cases he was in favor of the economic nomenclature and oppressed political Party members. in addition, struggles for successful innovation in commu-nist societies might also include tensions among representatives within one kind of nomenclature. Either way, Zhivkov would have to make the final choice.443

Regarding nuclear power, former vice-minister of electrification Oved Tadzher remembers that his Ministry of Electrification officials were not convinced bulgaria was ready to operate a nuclear station.444 According to Tadzher, these officials con-sidered the nuclear plant too expensive and too sophisticated for bulgaria’s existing technological capabilities. Accordingly the Minister of Electrification, Konstantin Popov, and the vice-chair of the Council of Ministers, Tano Tzolov, attempted to convince Todor Zhivkov and other Politburo officials to delay the nuclear power decision. Tadzher, himself a proponent of nuclear power, remembers: “There were, as now, different opinions on the need for establishing a nuclear industry in bulgaria, and these opinions wander in the government – then the Politburo and the Council of Ministries. There were people in favor of nuclear energy and people against nuclear energy. One of them was the vice chair of the Council of Ministries. The Minister of Energy was hesitant”. 445

Opponents of bulgarian nuclear power referred to the achievements in conven-tional power supply during the second half of the 1960s. Firstly, vast investments had been made in thermal power plants since 1964. New power plants were pro-jected and established based on local coal resources, such as “Maritza-East iii”, and imported Ukrainian coal, such as the “Varna” plant.446 in addition, the 440 kV transmission line from the soviet Union had been decided. 447 These projects seemed sufficient to meet bulgaria’s electricity need for the time being. by the late 1960s, electricity sector leaders and thermal power engineers competed for the final word from the Communist Party leadership with a younger nuclear educational, scien-tific, and engineering community. The latter had ascended to high positions in Party structures, but was still a relatively young group.

such confrontations were not unique. At an international symposium in London in 1969, officials from all over the world discussed the use of nuclear power in small


countries. in his report preserved in the bulgarian archives, R. Krim concluded: “The established committees for nuclear energy in the developed countries, in

which mainly specialists from the universities and from the research institutes are involved, have caused confrontations between the supporters of nuclear energy and the chairpersons of the electricity supply sector.”448 The latter would have to finance and operate the future nuclear stations. This was not a unique situa-tion as scientific society was often divided: “the lack of specialists for evaluation, the safety regulations, and the real working of the nuclear power reactors caused uncertainties for the leaders of the electricity supply sector”.449 The specialists were not certain whether the new power stations, of which they knew little, would actu-ally work. They were also afraid that the new power plants needed large funds, and the conditions for construction and launch were uncertain. “Fuel delivery, safety problems and the choice of the building platforms”, represented additional unde-sirable burdens for electricity sector specialists.450

in retrospect, the crucial moment of choice was the Party plenum of November 25 and 26, 1969. The meeting attendees discussed a wide range of issues relat-ing to electricity requirements. Experts presented estimates of future needs, talked about the use of domestic energy sources like lignite and water, and the search for new fossil fuel deposits.451 They also considered future relationships with the soviet Union and the import of soviet “petroleum, petroleum products, natural gas, coals, and electricity”.452 However, the gap between electricity production and the projection of future needs made the plenum participants decide in favor of building a nuclear plant. The plenum decision read as follows: “A concrete pro-gram shall be elaborated for the construction of the first nuclear power plant near the town of Kozloduy as well as the research, project design and construction of nuclear power plants up to 1980.”453

Communist leaders at the plenum decided that: “The first nuclear power plant shall be of the highest technological quality, and shall correspond to the new phase in the development of the energy industry of the country”. in addition they claimed the plant to be “a school where highly qualified professionals gain experience in project design, construction, and exploitation of nuclear power plants”.454 it was also decided that the two reactors would start up in 1974 and 1975. The plenum participants decided that by 1980, nuclear energy would make up 50 percent of bulgaria’s electricity production. They also planned to start the necessary research for the storage and reuse of nuclear waste.455

The plenum’s final decision to build a nuclear power plant, however, had been precooked. As Alexander Vezenkov, who studied the power structures in communist bulgaria, argued, “Never have unorchestrated decisions been made


on important issues at the plenums and congresses of the Party”.456 before the November plenum, two promoters of the nuclear option, Oved Tadzher and Pencho Kubadinski, had taken the key plenum decision in advance, which should be interpreted as a move to influence the decision-making process itself. Tadzher represented the economic nomenclature and was one of the best known construc-tion engineers in communist bulgaria; later the Politburo chose him to establish the nuclear plant. Pencho Kubadinski was one of the most influential Politburo members with direct access to Todor Zhivkov; he was part of the political nomen-clature and Minister of Construction Works. According to Tadzher’s memoirs, he and Kubadinski made a decisive move a month before the plenum meeting. On October 14, 1969, they staged the first dig for the Kozloduy nuclear plant. This event was only made known in narrow official circles; Tadzher and Kubadinski were top-level participants and their presence signaled high level support. At the plenum a month later, they presented the first dig as a fait accompli: They sug-gested firmly that construction had already begun.457

With this quick act, they also managed to avoid an open and deeper debate on the safety and technical parameters of WWER-440 nuclear reactors. such a debate could have led to a different outcome, as the Hungarian and Finnish examples show. in Hungary, nuclear experts felt the need to implement additional “towers of silence” as safety measures, which caused serious delays. These towers contained cooling systems and had to prevent the spill of radioactive steam from the first loop. These “towers of silence” served as a substitute for the concrete cover that the Americans placed on their PWR reactors.458 it took several years of research before the engineers were certain that they could build а safe plant. The Hungarian “Paks” nuclear power plant was equipped with the same WWER-440 reactors and went critical in 1982, eight years after the bulgarian station. Finland presents another example. After intense debates, the Finnish government decided to buy two soviet WWER-440 reactors and built devices similar to the Hungarians to ensure a safer plant.459

The safety issue, of course, would continue to haunt nuclear power across the globe until the present day. it is therefore intriguing that Western governments persistently questioned the safety of soviet nuclear technology. in their book on light water reactors in the Western world, irvin C. bupp and Jean-Claude Derian present another opinion: in their view, promoting PWR in Western Europe was more advertising than any real estimate of economic and safety parameters. The promotion of this reactor technology by Us companies happened in the form of quasi-scientific presentations such as at a Geneva conference in 1971, where Us scientists claimed that the PWR’s “manufacturing and construction capabilities


are now well developed”.460 The problems that appeared after this seemingly scien-tific but effectively commercial promotion of light water reactors, “fully matched” these insufficient safety considerations.461 in sum, nuclear safety was an important but problematic and highly contested issue in both East and West.

The November plenum became a turning point in bulgarian nuclear history. Now the Party set in motion a number of initiatives. Among these, the bulgarian energy design organization Energoproekt was given responsibility for creat-ing the nuclear station. Energoproekt had been founded in 1948 with the name Energohydroproekt, to design and construct hydro power plants.462 in 1959 it changed its name to Energoproekt as its responsibilities expanded into thermal power plants. From their early years, Energoproekt designers benefitted from rela-tions with soviet colleagues at Toploelektroproekt, who as we have seen, partici-pated in many bulgarian electricity projects.463 Led by Dimitar Dimitrov, Radko Popov and Nikola Kolev, Energoproekt had over two thousand employees by 1968.464 The institute had a design department with R&D groups on thermal and hydro power plants, and a department for scientific energy industry research. Yet another department specialized in engineering, geological, and hydrogeological studies. The institute drafted the national bulgarian electricity balance and pre-pared techno-economic reports for the construction of power units.465

Energoproekt had become involved in the exploration of the nuclear option early on, including the choice of a suitable construction site. in contrast with ther-mal power stations that relied on nearby coal deposits or coal transport facilities, nuclear plants particularly needed access to water for cooling down the reactor bodies. Hence Energoproekt experts chose a site close to the River Danube, which was sparsely populated.466 it took two years to find the most appropriate site. in 1965-1966 Energoproekt researchers conducted extensive hydrological, geologi-cal, and hydro-geological measurements, and studied meteorological conditions, radiation safety, and the environmental protection of twenty-one potential sites in different regions of the country.467

Once the location had been roughly determined, other Energoproekt staff completed the preparatory works. The chief architect was Maria Traykova. she designed the administrative building and the housing facilities, and attempted to make the plant look like an assembly of “modesty and beauty, simplicity and elegance”.468 Others made sketches for the station’s subsidiary equipment. This included the water pumping station that supplied cold Danube water through two artificial canals with very high throughput. Each canal was four km long and served to bring fresh water in and lead the used water back to the river. Energoproekt also designed and later constructed a diesel generator facility that, at first, powered the


construction works. Later it was used in the station’s safety system to supply back-up power. The institute also designed the electricity distribution installations con-necting the station to the bulgarian power grid.469 Meanwhile, Toploelektroproekt designed the machine hall and the reactor facilities. The soviets already had expe-rience with the WWER stations Novovoronezh, Rheinsberg, and Nord.470

Another task for the bulgarian government was to provide skilled nuclear workers. so far, only the experimental reactor near sofia had been operational. Few bulgarians had been trained in reactor technology before 1969. Despite many scientists participating in Dubna and CMEA research projects, the lack of engineers versed in reactor technology challenged the Kozloduy project. Nuclear physicists played a significant role; tellingly, simeon Ruskov, one of the scientific researchers working on the experimental iRT-2000 reactor, became the first direc-tor of the Kozloduy NPP.471 Faced with insufficient numbers, the government’s first task was therefore to educate specialists in reactor science.472

On one hand, the experimental reactor iRT-2000 and the Physical institute of the bulgarian Academy of science where it was located, became a training center for future nuclear reactor operators. bulgarian planners perceived the institute as the locus for knowledge development. According to Dimitar borisov, general director of the state enterprise Energy and Coal, “The specialists chosen for edu-cation in the foreign high schools are not enough in number to satisfy the needs of nuclear energy”. 473 This led to the need to set up new major courses of study in the universities as early as 1973-1974, like: nuclear heat-energy, nuclear electron-ics, engineering physics and radio-chemistry. before starting at the plant, every specialist had to undergo an additional and specialized six month training course. This condition, according to borisov, applied even after the plant became opera-tional. The Physical institute was the most appropriate place to conduct future courses to improve the specialists’ qualifications and refresh their knowledge.474

Additional staff training was carried out in the soviet Union. The operators of the nuclear reactors, trained specifically for the first two reactors installed in Kozloduy, graduated from the Moscow Power Engineering institute. These stu-dents left bulgaria in 1969, were trained in Moscow, and after graduating, some went for a six-month specialization at the Novovoronezh nuclear power plant. Others went to the Rheinsberg plant in the GDR that also served as a training center.475 These specialists recall how young and inexperienced they were when they “jumped” into the nuclear reactor technology field, leaving their country and studying completely new and unknown disciplines. some spent more than thirty years at the bulgarian plant. in their own words, their education never ended.476

Despite these initiatives, bulgarian planners still needed more skilled nuclear


workers. The lack of these might relate to the fact that membership of the Communist Party was required. in any case, as borisov pointed out, recruiting power station staff turned out to be difficult:

The previous experience in recruiting and training of staff shows that the number of specialists who wish to sign up for the nuclear plant, is lim-ited. Until now we have recruited only 70 of the necessary 580 special-ists with higher secondary education, with only 16 specialists joining the last course. According to the plan, 50 new specialists should be appointed before the end of the year, but there are no such candidates.477

According to borisov, a key issue was the fear of working with nuclear materi-als. Prospective students and their relatives were worried about radiation and its effects. Another problem was that two-year military service was mandatory for young people in bulgaria. The solution was obvious: involve a special conscript army engineering unit in the construction of the plant. These future plant engi-neers remembered doing their military service under a light regime; they practiced on reactors and did not need to engage in army activities.478 This policy of lighter military duty for young specialists was also common practice in other branches of industry. in addition, young trainees were offered improved living standards and apartments in the town of Kozloduy. They gained “easy access to citizenship, admittance to high school, improvement of domestic and cultural services, com-mercial services, vacations etc”.479 Eventually the combination of measures enabled the recruitment of sufficient numbers of skilled personnel. However, the future specialists’ political affiliation was very important: Party membership remained obligatory.

There was plenty of work for unskilled labor as well. Thus the plant construc-tion management invited brigades from all over the country to work at Kozloduy for comparatively attractive wages. The official propaganda literature noted that workers spent three days on the platform without rest.480 The propaganda machine explained such self-sacrifice with the “depth of the feeling for comradeship and responsibility” of the workers. They heralded the presence of “the true working hero”.481 in addition, thousands of high school students were brought in to make a seasonal contribution to their communist country.482 in the spring of 1972 the government promoted the Kozloduy NPP as a construction object of national importance for young people. After that, more than 3,500 students participated in its creation.483 Meanwhile the media informed audiences on every step.484

The construction of the nuclear power plant turned out to be a huge chal-lenge. The first brigades for plant construction arrived at the beginning of 1970


and started work in extremely bad weather conditions. There was no temporary housing in the region. The workers had to sleep in tents while the directors and officers used abandoned farm buildings. These farm buildings served as makeshift headquarters based in the closest village located seven km from the platform.485

The groundwork for the reactor hall was done during the first months, and had colossal dimensions for its time. it was 246 meters long, 102 meters wide, and the excavation was more than nine meters deep.486 However, the builders immediately faced new difficulties. After the first excavation works, the loess soil in which they were digging became visibly unstable; it was inadequate for such heavy weights. in general loess ground is unstable for buildings, but the situation is even more complicated for a nuclear plant. For this reason, the builders had to take emergency action to solve the problem. No similar cases were known in practice because all the power stations, especially those of soviet design, were built on more solid ground. The bulgarian Academy of science took responsibility for finding a solution. initially, the specialists came up with various proposals but these could not be applied.487 Finally, the working solution included strengthening the soil, a method patented by bulgarian scientist Minko Minkov and his assistant Dimcho Evstatiev.488 The principle was to establish a so-called concrete-loess pillow consisting of a mix of loess and concrete in lay-ers, simultaneously giving the ground flexibility and strength.489 After solving the soil problem, the bulgarian and soviet constructors faced another significant challenge. The time limit for implementing the nuclear station was very short, requiring the builders to speed up the construction of the reactor hall. For this purpose they applied “climbing shuttering”.490 They fitted the roof on the ground then raised the roof and built the walls at the same time. These two innovative approaches significantly shortened the launch time.

The builders used “heavy concrete” to protect the nuclear plant. The design of the concrete components, selection of materials, and techno-physical mea-surements were carried out in the Energoproekt laboratories. A joint bulgarian-soviet team developed the defense component of the plant, testing the heavy concrete for the qualities necessary to prevent nuclear radiation outflow. To pro-duce the concrete, the builders used heavy scrap materials and ferriferous ores. They also added “iron sand”, sand rich in iron to the concrete. The resulting concrete was rendered by applying physical methods “based on the principle of penetration of radioactive isotopes, ultrasound waves etc”.491

in addition to the two water supply canals mentioned previously, a harbor was built on the banks of the Danube. This harbor was used to unload equip-ment shipped from the soviet Union. The constructors also built a special pillar


crane with significant hoisting capacity for discharging the reactor.492 The chem-ical water treatment for the first and second loop was also part of the bulgarian team’s task. Moreover, the technologists who worked on the chemical processes to desalinate the water developed a new, high quality method.493

The first two reactors established in the plant were of the 230 model, which had already been tested in Novovoronezh. An interesting detail is that the reac-tor that became operational was originally made for the Hungarian nuclear plant. However, since the Hungarian government postponed the start of its nuclear plant for safety reasons, the device went to the bulgarian station. Although the reactor model was already operational in the soviet Union, the specialists made numer-ous changes when it was installed in Kozloduy. Oved Tadzher noted: “Many things which had already been built there, came to us changed. After they started the plant, they observed the things, measured, estimated the disadvantages etc”.494

in early 1974, bulgarian specialists trained in the UssR were on the construc-tion platform and performed the preliminary testing of the reactor body, the so-called obkatka. The first nuclear fission reaction in the Kozloduy plant was set in motion by a joint bulgarian-soviet team on June 29, 1974.495 On the bulgarian side, the engineers on duty were Zahary boiadjiev, Dianko Dobrev, Milka Lukanova, and Georgy Aleksandrov. The Russians were Viktor smutnev, Viktor sveshtnikov, and Walerii baritkin. This joint team meant they discussed who should take the lead in starting the reactor. The final decision was that the team of bulgarian spe-cialists would do the actual work, while the soviet team would have a controlling and observing role.496 it is clear that the young bulgarian specialists had a lot of respect for their soviet supervisors; they amply praised soviet professionalism and said they learned very much from it.497

The second reactor at the Kozloduy plant went critical a year after the first one. The overall capacity of the plant now reached 880 megawatts. During the official opening of the second reactor on March 27, 1976, two more reactor bodies with equal capacity were under construction. According to the perspective plan, these had to start in 1978 and 1979.

Techno-political Symbols and Cultural Legitimation

The construction of a nuclear power plant in bulgaria had great symbolic value. Of course, bulgaria was not the only country attempting to use nuclear power for boosting prestige and power. This was for case for all countries involved in nuclear energy production.


Henry Nielsen and Henrik Knudsen coined the notion “technological nation-alism” to underscore this aspect. They argue that many policy actors had come to believe that a nation can only survive as technologically advanced through the development of, among other things, nuclear and space technologies. They even claim that nation-states had to emphasize the national nature of their nuclear power plants in order to counterbalance the interests of the large number of trans-national organizations in the field serving as “instrumental mediators for across-the-border flow, circulation, diffusion and distribution of knowledge, technologies, people, and items”.498 in the Danish case described by these authors, “nuclear sci-entists and scientifically trained engineers became Denmark’s new heroes”, who “wanted to create a unique Danish nuclear future by aiming at solutions that were clear manifestations of technological nationalism”.499

similarly Gabrielle Hecht has provided a rich and seminal account of how the French nation used nuclear technology to boost its position in the world.500 she argued that “many of the criteria that shaped their technical choices were con-sciously political in character”.501 Likewise Arne Kaijser has shown that for swedish experts, nuclear development represented the creation of a specific “swedish path”.502 in bulgaria the situation was complex since it was clear that the soviet Union had played a tremendous role in the development of the bulgarian plant. Yet, bulgarian leaders also used their plant to emphasize bulgaria’s technological strength.

The creation of a highly developed technological society was one of the pillars of bulgarian Communist Party propaganda. At first, as we have seen in Chapter 1, communist leaders aimed at reconstructing the country’s economy after the war. At a later stage, influenced by the aspirations of the soviet Union to catch up with the developed economies of the world and take their place among them, the com-munist governments’ politicians in Eastern Europe started paying specific atten-tion to large technical projects. The bulgarian government also considered these as pillars of progress.

state leaders’ strong belief in scientific and technological progress as the basis of national development became clearly visible in the early 1960s. The Eighth Congress of the bulgarian Communist Party set goals for mechanization and automation of the national economy.503 At the Ninth Congress, these goals were taken one step further. The entire development of the national economy was made dependent on technology.504 in this context, the decision to construct a nuclear power plant was presented as one of the crucial building blocks for this national modernization project.


The media continually promoted this message, in particular after the November 1969 plenum decision. The development of nuclear energy worldwide was presented as “a real revolution”. speaking on behalf of the bulgarian people, the Communist Party proclaimed: “it is our duty to realize the great role of this revolution in energy and its consequences and to prepare our economy in that direction”.505 Communist Party officials promoted the government’s prospective plans to construct a nuclear power plant near Kozloduy as a “revolutionary turn-around in our energy industry”.506 They used the argument that the backward-ness of bulgaria in the previous political period could be solved by constructing a nuclear power plant. The new government emphasized economic and technical progress as a mechanism for legitimatizing the national state as well as the com-munist ideological regime. in propaganda material the power plant was regularly called “First Atomic”. The government and party wanted to highlight that the power plant in Kozloduy was only the first in a series of nuclear plants to be built within the country. They also emphasized it was the first on the balkan Peninsula.

The plant was also tied rhetorically to the heroic fights for independence. The choice of construction site coincided with an important moment in bulgaria’s his-tory and its strife for liberation and independence from Ottoman rule. in the nine-teenth century, one of bulgaria’s most legendary freedom fighters, Hristo botev, had crossed the Danube with his troops near Kozloduy. This fact was used in the propaganda as follows: “First Atomic. There is something symbolic in the fact that you were built here...., where the legendary squadron of Hristo botev set foot on native soil”.507 The Party also involved artists in their propaganda. The work of Naiden Petrov is an example. He created portraits of state and party leaders against the background of the power plant and also incorporated “scenes from the con-struction of the nuclear plant Kozloduy” in his paintings. in 1978, the artist held a special exhibition in sofia. The same year the head of state personally congratu-lated him for his creative work.

Finally, in its attempt to turn the construction of a nuclear power plant into a site of national importance, communist propaganda also aimed to define it as a site of labor enthusiasm and self-sacrifice among the workers and inhabitants of the region. in the manner used at other large technological sites, communist leaders announced competitions, gave rewards and medals, and mobilized youth brigades.

Although promoted as a bulgarian achievement, it was clear that the nuclear program’s success depended fully on the link with the soviet Union. The par-ticipation of soviet and foreign specialists in the construction of the bulgarian nuclear power plant was integral to the project. Without them, assembly would


have been impossible. soviet specialists were present at the bulgarian power plant until 1989.508 The bulgarian authorities built apartments blocks for them and their families. These blocks also housed the bulgarian engineers. A common practice at the power plant was to link up one or more bulgarian specialists with a soviet specialist to make the training more comprehensive.

The media and specialist publications at the time had to address this soviet participation, and balance it against the story of bulgarian national leadership in nuclear development. This was accomplished through the language of socialist brotherhood and collaboration, in which bulgaria was put on an equal footing with the soviet Union. The propaganda literature called the nuclear power plant in bulgaria “the child of the camaraderie between bulgaria and the UssR”.509 it described the participation of soviet specialists and machines with great enthu-siasm and listed the names of the Russians who took part as well as their contri-bution to the construction of the different parts of the plant. One of the soviet engineers named stepanov was quoted as saying that in bulgaria, he “felt like he was at a site in the soviet Union”.510 in this context, the words of Leonid brezhnev were frequently cited, when he described the Kozloduy nuclear plant as “one of the brightest confirmations of unbreakable camaraderie” that was “to be viewed as socialist internationalism in action”.511 At a symbolic level, then, the bulgarian nuclear power plant confirmed the bulgarian Communist Party policy for closer relations and integration with the soviet Union.512

Conclusion

Although Leonid brezhnev described the Kozloduy nuclear plant as the culmi-nation of a very close relationship between the two states and socialist interna-tionalism, the picture was slightly more complicated. First of all, as bulgarian nuclear science infrastructure builders had done in the 1950s, nuclear power system builders in the 1960s simultaneously fostered domestic as well as foreign relations. indeed bulgaria’s nuclear power relations followed in the tracks of its nuclear science relations: bulgarian nuclear scientists had prefigured bulgarian nuclear power relations in the “initial stage” of communist nuclear innovation. secondly, socialist internationalism was not simply a harmonious socialist broth-erhood achievement as brezhnev’s propaganda suggested. in multilateral settings such as the CMEA, bilateral soviet-bulgarian agreements, and domestic bulgarian techno-political decision making, different interests and conflicts played out and ultimately produced a soviet-centered bulgarian energy system.


Of course, the mid-1960s agreements between the soviet government and its East German, Hungarian, and bulgarian counterparts implied a dependency of satellite states on soviet nuclear technology, expertise, and fuel. in addition, CMEA policy programs provided arenas for negotiating national interests. The CMEA Permanent Commission on Energy and its creation of a united communist power grid were significant steps towards CMEA integration. A survey of electric-ity flows in this grid, however, shows that the soviet Union had become by far the dominant electricity exporter, while most satellite states became dependent on soviet electricity. The CMEA Permanent Commission on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Power created an opportunity for a multilateral process of nuclear power development in Eastern Europe, but became a road not taken; member coun-tries preferred to go through bilateral agreements outside the CMEA framework, focusing on developing a “national” path. This was the case for the construction of nuclear power plants in Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany as well as bulgaria.

As part of the CMEA framework and one of the closest soviet allies, bulgaria was ready to upgrade its nuclear program. The 1966 agreement for establishing a nuclear power plant in bulgaria was a big step in this direction, but between 1966 and 1969, internal disagreement erupted in the bulgarian Communist Party. The political elite and the nuclear scientific community believed in a bulgarian nuclear path, while the economic nomenclature, with vested interests in conven-tional electricity supply, was skeptical. The November 1969 plenum brought all the stakeholders back in line. When bulgarian and soviet specialists launched bulgaria’s first power reactor in 1974, they seemed to have forgotten earlier strife and celebrated communist integration in action. in the following decades, how-ever, bulgarian leaders would work at increasing energy independence from the soviet Union and towards becoming a leading energy exporter themselves.

Momentum and Decline of the East European Nuclear Power Network (1970-1986) 115

Chapter 4 Momentum and Decline of the East European

Nuclear Power Network (1970-1986)

“One of the main objectives is to speed up nuclear power production, which will strongly enhance the quality of the power sector of the CMEA member countries’ economies”.513

stanka Nozharova, Chief Designer of the Kozloduy NPP, 1986

in the 1970s and first half of the 1980s, nuclear power programs in bulgaria and other CMEA member states rapidly gained momentum. Chief designer of the Kozloduy plant stanka Nozharova and her CMEA colleagues considered increased nuclear energy production the key to economic development: The stated objective was to “speed up nuclear power production”. While national nuclear system build-ers stepped up their efforts as part of domestic “forced growth” doctrines, interna-tional nuclear organizations also became increasingly prominent and influential. The international Atomic Energy Agency (iAEA) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) increasingly supported and coordinated domestic nuclear expansion programs. in addition, they addressed a major new issue that might eventually threaten the prospects of nuclear power: While the non-prolif-eration of military nuclear capabilities had been a major concern from the 1950s, nuclear safety became a key topic in the 1970s and 1980s. influential accidents such as Three Mile island (1979) and Chernobyl (1986) were tremendously signifi-cant for this debate. in bulgaria, the 1977 Vrancea earthquake in the Romanian-bulgarian border zone was an important trigger for safety considerations. Nuclear system builders had to deal with these safety challenges while expanding their nuclear capabilities, which in the case of bulgaria would peak with the first 1000 megawatt WWER reactor outside soviet territory.

This chapter traces the responses of socialist nuclear system builders to these challenges, and the implications for bulgarian and East European nuclear rela-tions in this period of maturing nuclear technology. it also describes the rise of a technological nationalism movement which started in the beginning of 1980s. The chapter follows the story up to the Chernobyl catastrophe, which triggered East European governments to prominently proclaim their support for the now


controversial soviet nuclear technology, but – as we shall see ‒ inspired the subse-quent decline of East European nuclear relations after the political revolutions of 1989 and 1990.

The Growing Role of International Organizations

international organizations such as the iAEA, the CMEA, Euratom (the European Atomic Energy Community), and their many subsidiary bodies and commis-sions created networks that transcended and embedded member states’ domes-tic interests and activities. As Vincent Lagendijk states, “examining international organizations enables one to look further than only the national objectives”.514 The influence of international organizations on Eastern Europe’s nuclear community is unquestionable. Even nominally worldwide organizations such as the iAEA strengthened the ties among partner countries in Eastern Europe, particularly in the Cold War era.

in the early 1970s, the activities of such multilateral organizations gained momentum. in the 1960s many countries had developed domestic nuclear pro-grams, and by the 1970s, nuclear power plants began to compete in efficiency and cost with conventional coal and oil power plants. The construction of nuclear power plants boomed worldwide, especially after the 1973 and 1979 oil crises made oil power units more expensive.515 Nuclear power rose to prominence, and the nuclear sector’s international organizations followed suit. The mutual rela-tions between various organizations were complex though, as they simultaneously cooperated and competed.

The global iAEA, to start with, was boosted by the improvement in interna-tional political relations, exemplified by the peaceful solution to the Cuban Missile Crisis in the early 1960s and Us President Richard Nixon’s visit to the UssR at the end of that decade. After 1963, American and soviet representatives attempted to keep hostile Cold War rhetoric and sterile disputes out of the iAEA meeting rooms, while stepping up their engagement in the organization’s work.516 Yet the relative warming up of the Cold War did not mean that conflicts disappeared, as the continued story of iAEA nuclear proliferation safeguards shows.

As mentioned briefly in Chapter 3, the iAEA aimed at uniform safeguards to check nuclear proliferation for all member states, but this idea proved controver-sial from the start. Representatives of the two Cold War ideological blocs as well as non-aligned developing countries repeatedly questioned the role, scope and cov-erage of iAEA safeguards.517 For instance, when the Federal Republic of Germany’s


government declared the iAEA charter valid for West berlin in 1958, the UssR government officially responded that West berlin could not adopt the iAEA char-ter because of berlin’s special postwar status – formally it was still governed by the four occupying Allied Powers in the Allied Control Council. The Us then sug-gested that the Allied Control Council decide on the matter, instead of the West German government.518 This solved the problem for the time being, as it had done earlier with the issue of berlin air traffic control. Yet the episode marked a long period of distrust between Western and Eastern Europe regarding iAEA activities.

The safeguard system made gradual progress. initially the member states of the European Community of Euratom (West Germany, the Netherlands, France, italy, belgium and Luxembourg) elaborated their own system of safeguards for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons vis-à-vis the iAEA system. simultaneously in 1960, the iAEA proposed a safeguard system for small size reactors (up to 100 megawatts); despite UssR hesitation and opposition, it was accepted in 1961. The

Table 4.1 – Operational reactors in twenty-six countries, 1987Country Number of UnitsUsAUssR FranceJapan UK Germany, Fed. Rep.Canadasweden spain belgiumKorea, Rep. of CzechoslovakiaTaiwan, China indiaswitzerlandGermany, Dem. Rep.Finland bulgariaitalyHungarysouth AfricaArgentinaNetherlandsYugoslavia brazil Pakistan

10353493638211912

887766554433222111

Source: N. L. Char and B. J. Csik, “Nuclear Power Development: History and Outlook,” IEAE Bulletin (March 1987).


existence of a Euratom safeguard system caused difficulties for iAEA to inspect reactors in Euratom. The situation was only solved in the late 1970s when iAEA inspectors were allowed to visit Euratom’s nuclear sites. Moreover in 1963, both the soviet Union and third world countries asked for a review of iAEA’s safeguard system. The second attempt by the board was far more successful and entailed an extension of coverage. safeguards would henceforward apply to any kind of nuclear reactor (June 1965), reprocessing plants (1966), and fuel fabrication plants (June 1968). These changes were accepted because the soviet Union had changed its standpoint and voted in favor of common safeguard regulations; one of the main reasons for this turnaround was the soviet desire to apply international safeguard systems in the Federal Republic of Germany. As we saw in Chapter 3, during the third General iAEA Conference in 1966, Polish and Czechoslovakian representatives proposed that their countries accept the iAEA safeguard system on the condition that West Germany did likewise. The latter declined, but this did not stop the process. in 1964 the iAEA had safeguarding agreements with eleven countries covering 36 nuclear reactors; by 1970 it had concluded agreements with thirty-two states.519 East European nuclear states could of course easily accept non-proliferation agreements, since under the soviet umbrella, none of them had an opportunity to develop their own nuclear armaments.520

Euratom’s position became another bone of contention between Western countries and the socialist bloc.521 The conflict initially arose from the ques-tion whether Euratom should have observer status at the second iAEA General Conference. soviet representatives argued against it since “no argument could cancel out the military character of Euratom”. 522 However, by a vote of 15 to 3, the iAEA Governing board decided to issue the invitation. but now the design of the safeguard system became a bone of contention. Euratom had developed its own system before the iAEA system was in place. The Euratom system implied that member states conducted self-inspection without foreign interference. some members, such as the West German and italian governments that did not pos-sess nuclear weapons, refused to accept foreign iAEA inspectors. Their refusal in turn was unacceptable to UssR officials. in this case the United states and Great britain supported the soviet stance.523 The issue became a major problem in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty negotiations. After lengthy consultations on the preliminary texts, the member states decided that it was important that all coun-tries should sign the agreement; they therefore accepted that a Euratom member could join the Treaty as a single body with its own safeguard system.524 They would not have to allow visits by non-Euratom inspectors. in return, the soviet bloc also


declined iAEA inspector visits — in fact they managed to keep out any interna-tional inspectors until the late 1970s, when the Euratom issue was finally solved.525 Now each Euratom member signed a separate agreement with the iAEA, in which the latter’s safeguard system was considered superior; henceforward Euratom and iAEA inspections of Euratom member installations would co-exist. At the same time, the iAEA and Euratom agreed that Euratom representatives would be invited to the iAEA general assembly, but were not entitled to vote.526 These agreements finally solved the tensions.

Another important iAEA initiative was the international Nuclear information system iNis. The fully computerized system aimed to spread scientific information about the latest discoveries in the field of nuclear technology. A special effort was made to have this information reach developing countries.527 The system was later regarded one of the most successful iAEA initiatives. it had first been proposed in 1966 by L. isaev of the soviet Union and R. Wakerling of the United states, and a year later the iAEA Governing board had established a special working group for the issue.528 The group included experts from the Us, the UssR, Great britain, West Germany, the Euratom countries, and the iAEA. This international team of scientists studied the issue for two years; the board of Governors approved its final report in 1969, and the system became operational in the early 1970s already. At first, the new information system lacked the capacity to meet member country needs; the amount of information collected and redistributed was rather small. The national centers responsible for the data input were still being organized, and the iAEA secretariat was still developing procedures for handling the contributed information. From the mid-1970s onwards, the system began to produce useful results. it delivered nuclear information in three languages – English, French, and Russian.529

bulgaria joined the new information system in 1970, when computing machines and a dictionary of bibliographic terms arrived in the country; it became one of the thirty-eight countries connected to the network. At the time, the major pro-viders of information were the soviet Union and the United states: UssR scientists and engineers wrote 18 percent of all publications, Us authors 26 percent.530 The system used one of the world’s most powerful computers, the ibM 370/158, which was connected to several auxiliary centers.


Table 4.2 - Countries and organizations participating in INIS (The International Nuclear Information System), 1972.

Countries:a

+ Argentina+ Australia+ Austria+ belgium+ bulgaria belarusian soviet Republic brazil+ Canada Chile+ Czechoslovakia+ Denmark+ Finland+ France

+ Fed Rep of Germany+ Hungary+ india + israel+ italy+ Japan Korea Mexico+ Netherlands+ New Zealand+ Norway+ Pakistan+ Philippines+ Poland

Portugal Romania+ south Africa+ sweden switzerland Thailand Ukrainian soviet socialist Republic+ UssR+ Arab Republic of Egypt+ UK+ UsA Vietnam+ Yugoslavia

Organizations: CERN (European Organization for Nuclear Research) ENEA/ OECD (European Nuclear Energy Agency/Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development)+ Euratom (European Atomic Energy Community)+ FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations)+ iAEA (international Atomic Energy Agency)+ iCRP (international Commission on Radiological Protection)+ isO (international Organization of standardization) OAU (Organization of African Unity)+ UN (United Nations Organization) WEC (World Energy Conference)+ WHO (World Health Organization)

a As of August 1971.+ Those joining the INIS.Source: C. Pelzer, Zh. Tukov, and J. E. Woolston, “The International Nuclear Information System (INIS). An Exercise in International Cooperation and a Service in Nuclear Scientists and Engineers,” Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Jointly Sponsored by the UN and the IAEA and held in Geneva, 6-16 September 1971.

Meanwhile also the CMEA stepped up its nuclear activities. The context was the Comprehensive Program for the Further Extension and improvement of Cooperation and the Further Development of socialist Economic integration by Comecon member countries adopted at the 25th session of the CMEA in bucharest in July 1971. This program was the result of efforts by the UssR’s new head of state, Leonid brezhnev, to intensify the processes of integration within the CMEA. A special note by the Communist Party and the Council of Ministers of the UssR described the Comprehensive Program as a document of great political


significance. its implementation would allow the CMEA member countries to apply more fully the socialist system of government. in particular the soviet Union pushed for the utilization of the international socialist division of labor.531 The ini-tial decision to create the Comprehensive Program was made at the organization’s unscheduled 23rd session in Moscow 23-26 April 1969. it was further developed at the regular 24th session in Warsaw in May 1970, and finally accepted in 1971, when the member countries unanimously adopted a fifteen-to-twenty-year plan for the program’s implementation.532

The Comprehensive Program covered the full scope of the organization. As for nuclear power, member state representatives in the organization’s Permanent Commission on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy had already sought to antici-pate the upcoming Comprehensive Program in an unofficial meeting in 1969.533 The participants focused on specialization and cooperation regarding the produc-tion of equipment for nuclear power plants, including work on WWER-440 reac-tor equipment needed in bulgaria. The special meeting discussed new forms of scientific cooperation for creating experimental and industrial research facilities. it mapped nuclear equipment exports and imports, and where, how, and what was produced, which countries had production facilities, and which members were interested in future production. The relationships in the field of nuclear medicine were considered as well, including the elaboration of appliances, equipment, and isotopes. so were implemented recommendations on standardization, possible future recommendations, and the required correction of each country’s national standards. Most importantly, perhaps, was the suggestion to create international commercial scientific companies. One of them was interatominstrument, which specialized in special research equipment and which we described in Chapter 3. Another new enterprise was interatomenergo (iAE), specializing in nuclear power and nuclear machinery. it was officially established by the CMEA member coun-tries and the socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in December 1973, and it explicitly stated its intention to transfer the aim of the Comprehensive Program to nuclear energy.534

From 1973 interatomenergo worked on defining and planning nuclear power activities, aiming to maximize the development of nuclear power plant machin-ery in CMEA member countries and associate member Yugoslavia (which would eventually construct its own nuclear plant in present-day slovenia). 535 interatomenergo’s program to maximize member state production of nuclear machinery was presented and approved at the 31st session of the CMEA in July 1977. it also helped prepare the multilateral CMEA Long-Term Agreement on Multilateral specialization and Cooperation in the Production and Mutual


Deliveries of Equipment for Atomic Power stations (June 28, 1979) that targeted the period 1981-1990; and close cooperation was required with the international Commission on Mutual Coordination to implement the Agreement.536 it thus took interatomenergo, like other CMEA organizations, a number of years to develop a plan – for although interatomenergo was a separate organization, it was obliged to work through the complex administrative CMEA structure.

The organizational problems encountered by interatomenergo were not spe-cific to the CMEA. in Western Europe, Euratom faced similar problems in fulfill-ing its aims. Euratom was not subordinate to another organizational structure. Yet, bulgarian analysts observed, its members often did not collaborate fast enough, if at all.537 Euratom’s four research institutes at ispra (italy), Karlsruhe (Western Germany), Geel (belgium), and Petten (The Netherlands) also faced organiza-tional and political difficulties. Their chief problem was the unwillingness of mem-ber states to participate in joint research, as each government was busy developing its own nuclear power program.538 France was especially persistent in this policy. in the late 1960s, however, Euratom member states voted in favor of additional funding for the organization; this would finally strengthen its position.539

Though slower than hoped, interatomenergo managed to engage in a wide range of activities (box 4.1).

Box 4.1 – Interatomenergo activities and achievements. Excerpt from a 1980 report.

– The preparation of a plan for a detailed specialization and cooperation in the production of equipment for nuclear power plants;

– The development of a program for the creation of uniform norms and requirements (standards) for production and exploitation of energy equipment of a nuclear power plant. This led to the establishment of more than 150 regulations;

– The establishment of a program for cooperation in the field of scientific research and projecting and constructing the creation of new types of equipment for nuclear power plants;

– Work on the creation of experimental facilities for testing nuclear equipment; – The coordination of purchases and sales of technological equipment, licenses and know-

how for the production of nuclear equipment; – The development of a plan for the creation of a training center for the personnel of a

nuclear power plant with WWR reactors; – The preparation of technical documentation and technical-economical reports; – The development of an agreement for the creation of an international reserve fund of

crucial spare parts of nuclear equipment for unscheduled repairs; – The organization of exchange of experience in the field of nuclear technology and the

construction of nuclear machinery, which included questions on exploitation, construc-tion, assembly, and operation of a nuclear power plant, as well as the production of nuclear power equipment and the technology necessary for this production in the form of annual international seminars. 540


interatomenergo organized regular meetings and conferences to exchange mem-ber experiences. bulgarian nuclear specialists from the Kozloduy nuclear power plant found these exchanges very useful. in addition, visiting other nuclear plants in the soviet bloc kept these engineers informed about new technologies and innovation. besides support on concrete topics, these exchanges created a sense of unity and belonging to a community. 541 it helped of course that the “Agreement on Multilateral international specialization” made available significant funding for new production facilities and the reconstruction of existing ones, and that these now could be supplied with the latest equipment.542 Thus emerged the new specialized production facility Atommach in the UssR, while other specialized soviet facilities such as the Podolski machinery factory, the Harkov turbine fac-tory, and the Leningrad metallurgic factory were upgraded and expanded. The Czechoslovakian government established a special department for nuclear equip-ment in the Škoda factories, while the Vitkovits factory and the slovak machinery factory also started producing nuclear plant equipment. in Poland, the Rafako and Fakop factories gained additional nuclear facilities, as did the Ganz-MÁVAG fac-tory in Hungary. Overall, interatomenergo organized the operations of approxi-mately fifty enterprises.

interatomenergo also managed to implement a certain division of labor. Czechoslovakia produced reactors, steam turbines, steam generators, and pipe-lines. bulgaria added equipment for biological protection, condensers, and axial and artesian pumps. Hungary contributed vehicles, machinery and equipment for water cleaning. Poland produced volume compensators, heat exchange equip-ment, spare parts for diesel generators, and systems for internal control, while Romania focused on emergency cooling tanks and main circulation pipelines.543 For WWER reactors, this collaboration supplied about fifty percent of the nuclear power plant machinery in the CMEA. The UssR supplied the rest.544 Consequently, from the 1980s onwards, member state nuclear power plants used machinery pro-duced in various member countries. This was even the case for the soviet Union: For example, the Rovenska plant received volume compensators, pipelines, and starting valves from Czechoslovakia, heat exchangers from Poland, water clean-ing equipment from Hungary, and equipment for biological protection from bulgaria.545 Evidently the plans for joint activities within interatomenergo began to show results, and the division of labor policy began to bear fruit. Meanwhile the number of nuclear power plants in the region steadily expanded (table 4.3).


Table 4.3 - Nuclear power plants in CMEA member countries before 1983546

Country and plant Power capacity in megawatts

Type of reactor

Bulgaria, “Kozloduy” 1760 WWER-40Hungary, “Paks” 440 WWER-440East Germany “Nord” “Rheinsberg”

176070

WWER-440WWER

USSR“sibirskaia”“Novovoronezhaia”“beloiarskaia”“Kolskaia”“shevchnkovskaia”“Armenskaia”“Leningradskaia”“Kurskaia”“Chernobilskaya”“smolenskaia”“south – Ukrainskaia”“Rovenskaia”

6002455900132015081040002000300010001000880

Canal type under pressureWWER, WWER-440, WWER-1000Canal with overheated steam, bN-600WWER-440bN-350WWER-440RbMK-1000RbMK-1000RbMK-1000RbMK-1000WWER-1000WWER-440

Czechoslovakia“bogunice” 880 WWER-440

Source: United Group of Experts and Temporary Scientific Collective and Specialists in Nuclear Energy, Scientific Technical Prognostication for Solving Heat-Energy Problems of the Comecon Member States for the Period up to 2000 and Long-term Perspective (Moscow: Comecon, 1984).

Nuclear Safety in Eastern Europe

Next to increasing nuclear power production, nuclear safety became an impor-tant issue for socialist nuclear power system builders. before the 1970s, safety problems had predominantly been dealt with locally. Policy makers left the search and implementation of safety solutions to project designers and engineers in the nuclear power plants concerned, though as we saw in Chapter 3, national com-missions tackled the issue of safe handling of radioactive materials. in the 1950s and 1960s, the engineering community considered nuclear power plants among the safest and most environmentally friendly means of producing electric energy, and rarely questioned safety solutions. besides, the number of plants was limited, and plant design was subject to rapid and continuous change and improvement on both sides of the iron Curtain.547

by the late 1960s and early 1970s, safety problems increasingly became an issue for national regulators as well as international organizations. American nuclear


system builders invested tens of millions of dollars in reactor safety research because they now produced commercially, and because they had to comply with public reg-ulations. The American Energy Commission monitored the safety parameters of their pressurized water reactors. Yet they did not yet address what we consider the major danger today ‒ the melt-down of the reactor core. On the other side of the iron Curtain, communist governments followed a policy of secrecy; this prevented any open discussions on nuclear safety. in 1968, igor D. Morohov, First Deputy Chairman of the UssR Council of Ministers’ state Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy and the UssR Member of the iAEA board of Governors, analyzed the soviet safety situation in a report for the iAEA; after listing the advantages of nuclear power, Morohov concluded that nuclear technology was “completely safe for both the personnel in the plant as well as for the surrounding population.”548 Only major failures would change this overall engineering approach to reactor safety: it was the 1979 Three Mile island accident that triggered the Us National Reactor Testing station to start simulating the worst possible scenario, and that greatly raised nuclear accident anxieties.

in soviet practice, the safety problem was considered reactor-specific. As we have seen in Chapter 2, the soviet Union produced two main types of nuclear power reactors: The export WWER reactor and the dual-purpose RbMK reactor. soviet leaders classified the latter type of reactor non-exportable because of its military uses; these reactors were part of the East European nuclear power net-work and supplied electricity to the grid, but were never built in satellite coun-tries. safety problems with this type of reactor were not a topic for international CMEA discussions. As we shall see, the safety issue for WWER export reactors did become part of CMEA work.

in the 1970s soviet nuclear system builders repeatedly stepped up their safety activities. in 1973 soviet officials produced a new report on how to regulate nuclear power plant safety in design, construction and operations. The provisions of this document concerned all types of reactors produced in the UssR. However as boris semenov, head of the iAEA Department of Nuclear Energy and safety, later stated, “in most cases the general regulations only prescribe tasks that have to be done to ensure safety (what must be done); they do not determine the solutions (how it should be done)”.549 However soviet officials created a series of regulations that included procedures and guidelines, such as “Regulations on the design and safe operation of components for nuclear power plants, test and research reactors, and installations” and “Nuclear safety regulations for nuclear power plants”; both were issued by the UssR state Nuclear safety inspection, and dealt with reactor opera-tion, refueling, transportation, and nuclear fuel storage. They specified technical


and organizational requirements for nuclear safety in the design, construction, and operation of nuclear power plants, as well as training requirements for reactor operators.550 Radiation safety standards were based on the recommendations of the international Commission on Radiological Protection.551 The state Committee on standards Gosstandart added further specifications for nuclear components, materials, processes, etc. by the early 1980s, this national regulatory system was governed by the state Nuclear safety inspection Gosatomnadzor responsible for “nuclear safety in design, construction, and operation of nuclear power plants”; the state Committee on supervision of safe Operations in industry and Mining Gosgortekhnadzor under the UssR Council of Ministers for the “regulations and standards of engineering safety in design, construction, and operation of nuclear power plants”; and the state sanitary inspection under the Ministry of Public Health for “radiation safety in design, construction, and operation of nuclear power plants”.552

by interacting with the development of nuclear safety regulations in the UssR, the CMEA also increasingly engaged in nuclear safety issues. A milestone was the 1972 recommendation of the Permanent Commission for the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy to establish a so-called Provisional international Research Collective of scientists for Reactor and Physical investigations on Critical Assembly of WWER. it was set up in the Central institute for Physical investigations of the Hungarian Academy of sciences in budapest.553 One of the budapest team’s main goals was to create “instruments to ensure the operational safety of the reactors of WWER type”.554 by the early 1980s, the team claimed that Eastern pressurized water reactors had achieved worldwide recognition for their safety levels.

in 1971 the Energy standing Commission of the CMEA had also established a special body called the “scientific and Technical Co-ordination board” to focus on “treatment and burial of radioactive waste and deactivation of equipment”; later it also discussed the issues of transport and storage of nuclear fuel in “Regulations for the safe Transport of spent Nuclear Fuel from Nuclear Power Plants in CMEA Member states” (1977), including the creation of special containers to fulfill the need for mechanical and thermal stability, permeability, and radiation and nuclear safety.555 such CMEA regulations were synchronized with iAEA regulations, which stipulated that the country in which the nuclear power plant or reprocess-ing plant was located should ensure Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and other Agency requirements for cross-border nuclear material transports.556 From 1975, the standing Commission also addressed nuclear power plant engineering and opera-tions. The international CMEA Conference in Czechoslovakia in september that year focused on “site selection for nuclear power plants; safety planning, technical


aspects of environmental protection, evaluation of accident impact, increase of radioactive waste, radiation monitoring of the population, exposure to radiation of the personnel of the nuclear power plant, etc”.557 After this conference, the issue was written into the General Extended Program of the CMEA Member Countries and Yugoslavia in the Period to 1980 in the Field of Environmental Protection and improvement and the Related Rational Use of Natural Resources.

The General Extended Program related nuclear safety to other environmen-tal protection issues. it defined the problem of nuclear safety as one of utmost importance. in this context, officials established the scientific and Technical Co-ordination board on Radiation safety to coordinate the CMEA countries’ nuclear safety efforts. This board took on a host of activities (box 4.2).

Box 4.2 – Activities carried out by the Scientific and Technical Co-ordination Board on Radiation Safety (excerpt):

– environmental radiation monitoring (sampling methods to assess water contamination by radionuclides; recommendations on radiation monitoring in the vicinities of nuclear power plants; recommendations on outer environmental monitoring of iodine-i3i released into the atmosphere, etc.);

– development of regulatory and methodological papers on radiation safety to be used for the design, construction and operation stages of nuclear power plants (recom-mended basic principles and criteria for the selection of construction sites for nuclear facilities; general principles of nuclear power plant safety at the design, construction and operation stages; radiation protection regulations for various types of concrete and concrete structures, etc.);

– development of the technical aspects of radiation safety (standard technological substantiation of safety in the construction and operation of nuclear power plants; development of non-destructive methods for remote control of basic metal, pipe lines, welded joints and nuclear facilities in the process of operation, etc.);

– development of measures aimed at preventing accidents at the nuclear power plants and at eliminating its consequences(classification of emergency situations at the nuclear power plants and methods for assessing emergency factors; regulations con-cerning environmental protection in case of radiation accidents at the nuclear power plants with water-water reactors and recommendations on basic measures to be carried out following the radiation accident connected with the loss of heat-transfer medium at the nuclear power plants, etc.);

– development of measures aimed at the decreasing of personnel irradiation at the nuclear power plants during their normal operation on the basis of the experience of the nuclear power plant operation (recommendations on decontamination of techno-logical equipment used in nuclear power engineering; development of basic principles on water operating conditions and on methods for purification of radioactive water formed during the operation of nuclear power plants with water-water reactors, etc.).558

The board regulations aimed to serve as basis for national research programs.559 This principle suggested independent implementation of common regulations by


individual CMEA members. Each country had to practically solve the problem of safety on its own, drawing on common CMEA standards and regulations. They also had to pay for their own safety measures, which could be costly. The third and fourth blocks of the bulgarian nuclear power plant would be a case in point; the prescribed anti-seismic measures were initiated and paid for by the bulgarian state. Later in this chapter we shall look into how bulgarian nuclear system build-ers handled safety issues.

The iAEA approach to safety had a significant impact. Although focusing chiefly on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the iAEA had already worked on nuclear safety in the 1960s. indeed it published its first health and safety measures as early as March 31, 1960. These measures focused on topics such as the safe operation of the nuclear reactors, the safe use of radioactive isotopes, the disposal of waste in the sea, and the transport of nuclear materials. These measures were not formally accepted because many iAEA members opposed visits by nuclear safety inspectors. However they were used regularly in CMEA countries to define national safety standards.

Only in the mid-1970s would nuclear safety become a key iAEA policy domain. in 1974, the Agency initiated the creation of the new Nuclear safety standards (NUss) Program. This was a comprehensive series of Codes and safety Guides intended to ensure the safe design, siting and operation of the current genera-tion of nuclear power reactors and enhance their reliability. some safety experts in Western Europe initially resisted the secretariat’s proposal to create the NUss series; there were even some unfounded suspicions that NUss was a disguised attempt to constrain the burgeoning nuclear industry of France and Germany by imposing Us standards.560 East European countries, however, ratified the program.561 Also bulgaria adopted the Agency regulations and organized regu-lar courses and exams on nuclear safety in order to maintain a high level of staff professionalism.562 The concerted response of East European countries to iAEA activities was not a coincidence. it was coordinated through the CMEA and its standing Commission for Nuclear Energy. This Commission also adopted the standards suggested by the iAEA and put them into practice through their own recommendations.

importantly, a 1976 iAEA health and safety measures amendment canceled the right of the Agency to conduct inspections by default, replacing it with the country’s agreement to such inspections.563 This removed much of the tension and paved the way for iAEA safety regulations, which were further stepped up after the 1979 Three Mile island accident in Pennsylvania. The Agency now became proactive in nuclear safety, in launching binding international conventions, and in


providing a very broad range of services for member states’ nuclear safety activi-ties.564

Up until 1979, several other nuclear accidents had occurred. in 1957 there was a major accident in a reactor at the Windscale plant in the United Kingdom, which involved the release of radioactive fission products. in 1959 some of the nuclear fuel elements in a reactor at santa susanna, California, UsA, melted. in 1961, there was an explosion in a reactor at idaho Falls, UsA. in 1966, a partial core meltdown occurred in the Enrico Fermi reactor in Detroit, UsA.565 These are only a few of the examples of accidents from 1971 to 1985. Data quoted in the iAEA bulletin indi-cated that “151 accidents of varying degrees of seriousness happened in fourteen countries of the world, and that these accidents had consequences – some of which were quite serious – for the people and for the environment”.566 Yet these early acci-dents did not trigger a great iAEA response. The Three Mile island accident did.567

Communist governments deliberately hid all information on nuclear accidents from the public. For example, just a few moments after the Kozloduy power plant went operational, an accident caused by human failure occurred with Reactor Unit 1. it led to an emergency stop of the power plant.568 several more accidents occurred during the following year, one of which led to a work accident.569 The communist government covered up these accidents. Yet such accidents did force the government to invest more time and effort in safety issues, and they collabo-rated on this within CMEA and iAEA contexts and coordinated activities between both international organizations.

Bulgaria’s Nuclear Program in a New International Context

How did bulgarian nuclear system builders relate to these international networks and efforts to increase nuclear production and nuclear safety? As elsewhere in the socialist bloc, the bulgarian energy authorities prioritized the expansion of their nuclear power production capacity in the 1970s and 1980s. it is telling that as the first two reactors at the Kozloduy nuclear power plant were starting up in 1974, simultaneously the construction of another two reactor blocks had commenced. in March 1972 the governments of the People’s Republic of bulgaria and the UssR had signed a new agreement for another bulgarian nuclear plant.570 The soviet Union would once more supply the basic equipment for two 440 megawatt water-water reactors, nuclear fuel, and technical support.

initially the bulgarian government had planned to build two additional nuclear power plants in the north; one of these would feed a new metallurgic factory in


north-eastern bulgaria.571 When bulgarian nuclear system builders instead opted to expand the existing Kozloduy plant, they were hoping to keep expenses low while increasing their electric power output tremendously. The expansion made Kozloduy the undisputed center of electricity production in bulgaria, and inspired the opening of new factories in the region. Moreover, the completion of this proj-ect helped overcome the country’s perpetual energy crisis: instead of structural energy shortages, bulgaria could now export electricity to neighboring non-com-munist countries and thereby tap into an important source of exchangeable hard currency income.572 This collaboration in turn implied nuclear power contracts and relations outside the communist bloc. Regardless of the political Cold War tensions, bulgarian nuclear specialists also began opening up to Western com-panies and increasingly participated in non-communist international exchange programs.

in addition to the commercial considerations of electricity exports, bulgarian nuclear system builders soon found yet another reason to contemplate Western technology: in some cases, soviet technology was incapable of meeting the need for safe and efficient exploitation.573 This domestic realization originated in a process of international circulation of experts and information organized through iAEA and CMEA, and was accelerated by domestic responses to the Vrancea earthquake of 1977. After that, bulgarian engineers would call for security arrangements via the CMEA network and interatomenergo, but also non-socialist companies and experts.

The safety issue at Kozloduy was triggered in the mid-1970s. in 1975 the iAEA created a special working group to study the cooperation among the countries bordering on the River Danube. its first meeting took place in belgrade with rep-resentatives from Czechoslovakia and Hungary. bulgaria only sent a written report to the participants of this meeting.574 Representatives from Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Czechoslovakia prom-ised to be present at a second meeting in bucharest two years later; bulgaria planned to send an expert, Zdravka Pechenikova. The bulgarian government first discussed this decision with its soviet advisors, since bulgarian officials expected that Pechenikova’s Romanian colleagues would ask questions about the safety of the Kozloduy plant at the bulgarian-Romanian border; they sent Pechenikova, but only after the soviet government promised to attend the meeting as well.575

At this second conference, the delegates discussed statements and reports on the radiation pollution of the Danube. They asked questions about how bulgaria organized radiation protection for its population. Regarding these issues, the Romanian delegates wanted an informational body to be set up to share radiation


safety data among member countries. The conference ended with a call for other interested organizations to participate in these matters. in her report to the bulgarian government, Zdravka Pechenikova stated that she had found the con-ference a positive experience; she valued exchanging experiences with the other countries on nuclear safety approaches and concluded that “through our partici-pation, we showed that we also work on these questions, as well as our interest and the serious attitude of our country in the protection of the Danube basin and its population from radiation fallout and exposure to radiation”.576

The Romanian government, however, sought more direct channels to keep up the pressure. it approached bulgarian Foreign Minister Petar Mladenov directly, and also involved the CMEA Permanent Commission for the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, asking the Committee to “specify the procedure of timely infor-mation in case of a nuclear accident of a nuclear power plant with the aim to enable efficient measures on the territory close to our borders”.577 The Romanian gov-ernment wanted to include this procedure in a bilateral agreement with bulgaria. The chairman of the bulgarian Nuclear Committee, Konstantin Konstantinov, responded that including such a topic in the plan for bilateral cooperation with Romania was improper; this was a legal matter involving foreign policy, and hence should be solved at CMEA level. Regardless of this critique, the bulgarian gov-ernment agreed to allow Romanian specialists to investigate the Danube region for radiation. Yet the bulgarian nuclear energy bodies were not willing to inform Romanian authorities about accidents in the Kozloduy nuclear plant; bulgaria was ready to send information only through the CMEA, and refused to reveal anything unofficially or bilaterally.578

in CMEA discussions, Romanian delegates then suggested to step up nuclear safety cooperation among the Danube countries. They proposed uniform methods for measuring and observing radiation pollution in the environment of nuclear power plants, in border areas, and near water bodies. They also requested proce-dures for timely informing neighboring countries in case of a nuclear accident.579 The Permanent Commission accepted this proposal, including bulgaria, and stipulated that the assignment of teams competent for this work was to happen through the organizational structure of the CMEA.580

Another important mechanism for sharing information and international col-laboration was the organization of study tours. bulgaria took part in the study Tour on Nuclear Power Development conducted between November 10 and December 9 in 1975 organized by the iAEA. The meeting included a visit to the soviet Union and other East European countries in possession of nuclear power plants by a large group of scientists from various countries. They had to be engineers or specialists


in the field of nuclear technology. The formal goal was to give twenty-eight rep-resentatives from developing countries the opportunity to obtain information on the following aspects:

– Methods of electric power industry planning in the countries of visit; – Technical specifications of industrial electric plants in the countries of visit –

already constructed and planned for construction; – Possibilities and conditions for the export of electric plants, equipment and

fuel; – The order of participation of the countries in nuclear power projects relating

to the export of electric plants (technical organization, industry, research labo-ratories);

– Training and preparation of the personnel who would take part in the nuclear power projects;

– A program of the research and construction works in the field of nuclear power technology in the countries of visit;

– National principles of nuclear safety and their use for the planning of power plants.581

The meetings included lectures and discussions on various issues. The iAEA officials suggested the visits to nuclear plants and research institutes in the host countries. The tour began in Vienna, Austria (10-11 November) and proceeded to bulgaria (12-15 November), the soviet Union (16-29 November), the German Democratic Republic (30 November-2 December), and Czechoslovakia (3-6 December), before returning to Vienna (7-9 December).582 Twenty-two guests from eighteen different countries and three iAEA representatives came to bulgaria, which was the first country on the list. The iAEA had programmed two lectures for that visit. The first lecture was on “Methods of Planning the Power supply of the Republic of bulgaria”, and the second on “The Participation of bulgaria in the Design of Nuclear Power Plants”.583 During their visit, the foreign specialists became acquainted with the exploitation of the working reactor blocks as well as the blocks under construction.

in the soviet Union the specialists visited the world’s first nuclear plant in Obninsk, the fast breeder in Dimitrovgrad, the beloyarsk nuclear power plant, the Novovoronezh nuclear power plant with WWER, and met representatives of the soviet Foreign Trade Corporation Atomenergoexport.584 The fact that the soviet Union opened up these plants and institutions to foreign experts signaled its interests and aspiration to expand its foreign trade. At the next stops on the study tour, the GDR shared its experience in training staff for nuclear power plants and in licensing. Participants also became acquainted with the ways radiation safety


control was performed. Finally, Czechoslovakia shared its experience in the elabo-ration of equipment for nuclear reactors in Škoda factories.585 The group also vis-ited the country’s nuclear plant.

For the socialist bloc, the study tour was an opportunity to demonstrate its level of competence. The various countries wanted to expand their activities through the export of technology. The growing readiness to collaborate internally also became clear during the construction of the third and fourth blocks of the Kozloduy nuclear plant.

The new safety awareness also affected the expansion of bulgarian nuclear plants, especially when on March 4 1977 an earthquake with its epicenter in the Vrancea Mountains, Romania, interrupted the construction of Kozloduy’s third and fourth reactor blocks. The earthquake had a magnitude of 7.2 on the Richter scale and inflicted serious damage in the region. in the town of svishtov near Kozloduy, two apartment blocks collapsed and over a hundred people died. This accident underscored the seismic vulnerability of the region, and raised a call for political measures to avoid future disasters.

in the Kozloduy nuclear power plant itself, the operator on duty had stopped one of the operational reactor units, whereas the other continued to operate until morning. The earthquake moved part of the main equipment, but did not affect its functioning. it did create the theoretical danger of nuclear fallout from water spilling from the first loop, but in practice the construction of the plant had pre-vented this: The soviet “internal safety rule” of thirty percent over dimensioning of the steel reactor corpus proved its value, and bulgarian experts continued to trust this rule. Later they would refer to another accident at the Armenian power plant in the mid-1980s caused by an electric cable fire, which meant one of the reactor blocks had no cooling water supply for six hours; this reactor also carried on working.586 To bulgarian specialists, this event again confirmed the sturdiness and reliability of the soviet reactors, though they did replace the cables with new ones from the French company Alcatel after iAEA approval.587

in response to the 1977 earthquake, the bulgarian authorities postponed the launch of the two additional reactor blocks and demanded additional safety measures. They presented the key features a few years later at a special confer-ence in Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia.588 The topic of the conference was “Problems in the creation of nuclear plants resistant to seismic activity”. Over a hundred repre-sentatives from bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, the UssR, and interatomenergo participated. The bulgarian specialists explained that they had set out to determine the maximum strength of poten-tial earthquakes in the region, which was calculated to be “seven degrees on the


Medvedev-sponheuer-Karnik scale with the probability of occurrence of once in 10,000 years”.589 With the help of soviet colleagues, they had then defined a set of measures to enhance the seismic resistance of the third Kozloduy block, which they intended to apply to the other blocks as well. These included the fixation of the reactor corpus to the construction frame by means of a bearing ring, addi-tional metal constructions for the volume compensator, and four fifty-ton hydro shock absorbers for the steam generators. The main circulation pumps were rein-forced with another three hydro shock absorbers of twenty-five tons. The main stopping sliding rules were reinforced with two hydro shock absorbers of twenty tons, and the main pipelines were reinforced.590 After consultation with specialists from the UssR, the bulgarian government had decided to buy the hydro shock absorbers from Japan.591 Finally the bulgarian delegation presented a report on the psychological stress on workers during an earthquake. This report provided suggestions on how to prepare workers, and how authorities should react in the event of an earthquake.

The purchase of hydro shock absorbers from Japan, with soviet approval, opened the door for additional improvements to the nuclear power plant through trade with non-communist countries. Thus the bulgarian government bought sempel valves from West Germany that were installed on the 440 MW reactor blocks, and it ordered additional ball cleaning systems to cleanse the condens-ers.592 Another important improvement after the earthquake was the installation of an automatic shutdown system; no such system had previously existed for the first two reactors.593

The delay in the construction of the third and fourth blocks reveals the will-ingness of the bulgarian nuclear specialists and the communist government to improve the overall construction of the nuclear power plant. They invested mas-sively in devices to improve its safe exploitation. in addition, the country intensi-fied its participation in international forums on nuclear safety. At these meetings bulgarian officials shared their experiences and acquired new knowledge about potential safety measures. However, regardless of the many improvements, the Kozloduy reactors continued to work with one constructive flaw in Western eyes: They lacked the additional concrete containment of Western nuclear plants.

Bulgarian Nuclear Power in the Early 1980s

The early 1980s saw a great increase in nuclear power plants and output through-out the communist bloc. New plants designed in the previous decade became


operational, while existing power plants were expanded with additional reactor blocks. As in the case of bulgaria’s Kozloduy, the Nord nuclear plant in Greifswald, East Germany, had had two operational WWER-440 reactors since 1974; now two more reactors doubled its capacity to some 1,700 megawatts. The East German government’s future plans were interrupted by the political changes.594 The Czechoslovakian authorities constructed four nuclear power plants. Two of them, Dukovani and Temelin, remained part of the Czech Republic after the political changes of 1989; the other two, Jaslovské bohunice and Mochovce, con-tinued to operate in slovakia. The construction of most of these power plants started after 1980 and was based on improved versions of the soviet reactors.595 Hungary was the third country that successfully started an improved soviet reac-tor. its new nuclear power plant became operational with two blocks in 1983, and two more blocks were added in the second half of the 1980s.596 Poland and Romania started constructing nuclear plants but never finished them; the nuclear plant near the town of Żarnowiec in Poland was halfway built in the 1980s, but after the Chernobyl disaster, the authorities cancelled the project.597 in Romania, Communist Party leader Nicolae Ceauşescu eventually abandoned the nuclear power project for financial reasons. When the berlin Wall fell in November 1989, twenty-one WWER units operated in Eastern Europe. With the exception of the fifth reactor block of one-thousand megawatts at Kozloduy in bulgaria, all of them were 440 megawatts reactors – fourteen were the older Model V230 and six were the newer model V213.598 As we can see in table 4.4, there were more than sixty soviet type reactors in Eastern Europe, baltic states, Ukraine and Russia in 1990.

Table 4.4 – Nuclear power plants with Soviet-type WWER reactors in 1990Design Type Site of nuclear power plants (no. of units)V-1 WWER-210 Novovoronezh (1)V-2 WWER-70 Rheinsberg (1) V-3M WWER-365 Novovoronezh (2)V-179 WWER-440 Novovoronezh (3,4)V-230 WWER-440 Kola (1,2), Kozloduy (1-4), Nord (1-4), bohunice (1,2) V-270 WWER-440 Armenian V-213 WWER-440 Kola (3,4), Rovno (1,2), Loviisa (1,2), Paks (1-4), bohunice (3,4),

Mochovce (1,2), Dukovany (1-4), Nord (5) V-187 WWER-1000 Novovoronezh (5)V-302 WWER-1000 south Ukraine (1) V-338 WWER-1000 south Ukraine (2), Kalinin (1,2) V-320 WWER-1000 balakovo (1-4), Zaporozhe (1-6), Rovno (3,4), Khmelnitsk (1,2),

south Ukraine (3), Rostov (1,2), Temelin (1,2), Kalinin (3), Kozloduy (5,6)


These examples show that the development of nuclear power plants in the soviet bloc was booming in the early 1980s. This was not only thanks to new national ambi-tions and soviet expertise, but also to the work of international organizations such as interatomenergo and the iAEA. bulgaria, however, would move one step further with the third Kozloduy extension based on WWER-1000.

in the early 1970s bulgarian nuclear system builders had prepared “a technical-economic report on the construction of a second nuclear power plant of 2,000 MW capacity”, and presented it in 1973 before the bulgarian Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. back then they had concluded that state-of-the art reactor technology did not allow the delivery of the requisite 1,000 megawatt reactors called WWER-1000, any time soon.599 The report underlined that this was also the conclu-sion of other CMEA partners; the nuclear authorities in the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak socialist Republic planned instead to expand their nuclear power sectors with WWER-440 reactors.600 The Commission added that another major problem was the lack of qualified and dedicated personnel for nuclear power plants. incidentally, up to 1973 the Commission used terms such as “ther-mal power station with a nuclear reactor” or “atomic thermal power plant”; now it proposed to replace these terms with “nuclear power plants” and “nuclear power engineers”.601

The CMEA countries, however, continued working on the envisioned WWER-1000 reactor. The Agreement for multilateral specialization and cooperation of the production and mutual shipments of equipment for nuclear power plants for the period of 1981-1990, was signed in 1979, and part of this agreement included the creation of a price list of WWER-1000 equipment. The CMEA partners reviewed the state-of-the art in reactor development once more at a meeting on June 30, 1980 in Hradec Králové in Czechoslovakia. This led to the signing of another agreement with a very long title, the Agreement for multilateral cooperation of CMEA mem-ber countries in the research and construction works on the problem of utilization of energy blocks with water-water reactors of 1000 megawatt capacity and the fur-ther perfection of the reactors of this type.602 The Agreement was based on a list of key pieces of WWER-1000 machinery. The partners also elaborated safety regula-tions for the larger WWER-1000, concerning the design, construction and assembly works, equipment repair, methods for deactivation of the active zone, and construc-tion technology, including the construction of a protective concrete containment in response to the Three Mile island accident.603 Only the bulgaria authorities, how-ever, managed to build this type of reactor before the fall of the berlin Wall.


in 1981 the bulgarian government signed an agreement with the soviet Union for the construction of two WWER-1000 reactor blocks. The agreement was signed on October 1 in the town of Plovdiv and prepared the construction of the third part of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant.604 soviet organizations helped the bulgarians to select a site, because the seismic activity of the region now was a primary consid-eration. Of course the soviets also specified and coordinated the project, provided the reactors and spare parts, delivered technical documentation, assisted in assem-bly, trained personnel in soviet educational institutions, and so on.605 This agree-ment showed that the soviet Union still had a leading role in East European nuclear techno-politics. some equipment would be provided by other CMEA partners, but these would have to be checked and cleared by soviet experts. bulgarian engineers were once more involved in plant construction, and this time they could also assem-ble the reactor – with soviet assistance – and the other power block components, then start the plant. The emancipation of the bulgarian nuclear engineering staff was also signaled by the fact that they began translating system elements, such as hous-ing shields, into bulgarian.606 Although some soviet specialists still remained in the country, their numbers were significantly lower than in the earlier reactor projects.

in addition, the 1981 bilateral soviet-bulgarian Agreement no longer specified all the conditions for material and equipment. For example, the prices of several elements were determined by CMEA regulations in compliance with the Decree of the 93rd Meeting of the Executive Committee on questions of the contract prices for 1981-1985, and in compliance with the price list for the nuclear power plant equip-ment for WWER-1000 reactors stated in Article 6 of the June 1979 Agreement for multilateral specialization and cooperation of the production and mutual delivery of equipment for nuclear power plants for the period between 1981-1990.607

The 1981 agreement thus suggests the strength gained by the CMEA. it also reveals the increased role of the iAEA, for it stipulated that the bulgarian party shall guarantee that “the nuclear material, equipment and installations, imported from the soviet Union, the materials and installations produced using the afore-mentioned items shall not be applied to purposes incompatible with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as for any military purposes and shall be under the iAEA safeguards for the whole duration of their possible use”.608 Finally the 1981 agreement hints at a change in the confidentiality of soviet nuclear technologies: Whereas previous bilateral nuclear reactor agreements relied on secrecy, the 1981 agreement stressed the intellectual property of the soviet Union. Nuclear technol-ogy had become a patented commercial product instead of a top-secret military project.609


Kozloduy’s new WWER-1000 blocks began operating in 1987 and in 1991, respectively. The technology transfer process was not influenced by the Chernobyl catastrophe, which, however, had a major impact on the East European nuclear energy network.

Decline of the East European Nuclear Network

by the mid-1980s, Eastern Europe’s nuclear integration was a matter of fact; it was characterized by a division of labor, the transfer of technology, knowledge, equipment, and managerial techniques, along with common standards and prod-uct names. ironically this successful East European integration process caused a gradual emancipation of nuclear CMEA satellite states from the soviet Union. by the mid-1980s these states were producing approximately half of the required nuclear machinery, were near to or had achieved electric power self-sufficiency, and possessed the domestic educational infrastructure to train nuclear experts. soviet-satellite relations were further eroded by the political changes of the mid and late 1980s. CMEA partner countries responded in different ways to new soviet Party leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of “glasnost” (openness) and “perestroika” (restructuring). Countries such as Poland and Hungary pushed for political and economic reform, while Todor Zhivkov and the bulgarian Party elite rejected these changes. in his memoirs, the former bulgarian communist leader spoke openly about his disagreement with the soviet policy of restructuring.610

On top of that, the 1986 Chernobyl disaster severely shook East European engineers’ trust in soviet nuclear policies and technologies. Undoubtedly the Chernobyl accident was the greatest nuclear disaster to date. it affected the nuclear power industry worldwide. Up to that moment, nuclear power was overwhelm-ingly regarded as one of the safest and most ecological methods of electricity pro-duction. Existing safety measures seemed adequate and the construction of nuclear plants increased throughout the globe. The vast majority of these new reactors was pressurized water reactors (WWER in socialist terminology). Even though the Chernobyl accident occurred in a RbMK dual-purpose graphite reactor, not a WWER reactor, nuclear plant construction plummeted worldwide. Countries like italy completely abandoned nuclear power.

in Eastern and Western Europe alike, trust in soviet authorities was harmed by the initial soviet attempts to cover up the accident; only after alarming radioactiv-ity measurements in down-wind sweden, did the soviet government acknowledge what had happened. Next it tried to repair the breach of trust: After an on-site


iAEA visit, the soviet government and iAEA representatives agreed to monitor environmental radioactivity and exchange information in the accident region.611 A joint communiqué stated that the international agency was given full infor-mation about the status of the Chernobyl nuclear plant after the accident.612 The communiqué also declared that the Chernobyl accident would not affect soviet nuclear planning, despite Western pleas and recommendations to stop its nuclear program: “Finally, it should be stressed once more that while the Chernobyl acci-dent was very serious, it will have no effect – as some voices from abroad have vainly tried to suggest – on the further development and growth of the nuclear power generating capacity of the UssR”.613 Communist governments in Eastern Europe backed the soviet government’s position and continued the construction of already planned plants. in bulgaria, the fifth Kozloduy reactor block became operational in the same year, and the government continued to prepare a second nuclear plant near the town of belene. Czechoslovakia had four operational power blocks under construction, and planned to increase its nuclear industry still fur-ther.614 The Hungarian government started the expansion of its nuclear plant Paks in september 1986 and August 1987. Poland continued with the construction of its planned nuclear plant. At first glance, the nuclear cohesion between the soviet Union and its satellites seemed to have tightened.

Yet, feelings of uncertainty about the future of nuclear energy were expressed within the CMEA, and member states extended the period for implementing existing plans. Like the Three Mile island accident of 1979, the Chernobyl disaster stimulated the development of additional safeguards and intensified international collaboration. both nuclear accidents urged the nuclear authorities of CMEA member states to consult the iAEA more frequently regarding safety issues. Until 1986 they had already joined the new iAEA incident Reporting system, and in 1987, bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland also joined the iAEA Waste Management Advisory Program WAMAP initiative. WAMAP included visits from the inter-national agency’s external experts to check the “development of the safe radioac-tive waste management systems”.615 Requests for such cooperation intensified after Chernobyl. in 1988 Hungary also joined the OsART program for improvement of safety practices at nuclear facilities.


Table 4.5 –Participants in the nuclear plant Incident Reporting System (IAEA-IRS)Participants sinceArgentina brazil bulgariaCzechoslovakiaFinlandGerman Dem. Rep.Hungaryindia Korea Rep. of Netherlands PakistanspainUKUssRYugoslavia

May 1983November 1983February 1983January 1985May 1983January 1984October 1984June 1984February 1983June 1983August 1984January 1983March 1986september 1984May 1986

Participants through NEA/OECD sincebelgiumFranceGermany, Fed. Rep.italy sweden United statesCanada

February 1983June 1983July 1983March 1985October 1983August 1985July 1986

Reporting and meeting participantsJapanswitzerland

Source: N. L. Char and B. J. Csik, “Nuclear Power Development”

More importantly, the strengthened nuclear cohesion among CMEA governments backfired when popular protest movements targeted the association of communist governments with nuclear power and sought to abolish them both. in bulgaria, for instance, the construction of the second nuclear power plant in belene had started with the usual soviet-bulgarian Agreement signed on March 27, 1984; by 1989, eighty percent of the equipment had been supplied and about forty percent of the first reactor had been completed. This reactor had been built in the Škoda factories in Czechoslovakia, from where it was shipped to belene. but by November that year the bulgarian “green” movement singled out the nuclear plant as a site for protesting against the government; its demonstrations quickly broadened to a


general call to end communist rule. The communist party replaced Todor Zhivkov but to no avail, for street protests continued until it promised free elections. The belene project was cancelled.

The belene plant still remains unfinished, despite later attempts to complete it. The Polish nuclear power plant project met a similar fate. Only the Czechoslovak government managed to resist the pressure from the public and Austrian environ-mental organizations, and finished its nuclear power plant soon after 1989. The fate of the East German nuclear plants was decided immediately after the unification of West and East Germany: The new German government stopped all soviet reac-tors. On the international scene, the CMEA was officially abolished on January 1, 1991 and its Permanent Commission on nuclear power ended its activities.

Table 4.6 - Projected and established reactors in Bulgaria up to 2011

Name Type Status LocationCapacity (MWe) Date

ConnectedNet Gross

bELENE-1 PWRUnderconstruction

953 1000

bELENE-2 PWRUnderconstruction

953 1000

KOZLODUY-1 PWRPermanentshutdown

KOZLODUY 408 440 1974/07/24


KOZLODUY 408 440 1975/08/24


KOZLODUY 408 440 1980/12/17


KOZLODUY 408 440 1982/05/17

KOZLODUY-5 PWR Operational KOZLODUY 953 1000 1987/11/29KOZLODUY-6 PWR Operational KOZLODUY 953 1000 1991/08/02

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2011, PRIS database, http://www.iaea.org/pro-grammes/a2/

Conclusion

in the 1970s and 1980s, the governments of nuclear states, from the superpowers to smaller countries, defined nuclear power as an energy policy priority. Nuclear power reached a phase of increasing momentum, and as part and parcel of this process the influence of international nuclear organizations steadily increased: They aided and coordinated national nuclear expansion programs, and tackled


a new obstacle to nuclear power development, the issue of nuclear safety. Within the soviet bloc, nuclear relations were strengthened with the establishment of interatomenergo and interatominstrument. The division between the capital-ist and the communist world had previously complicated international nuclear relations across the iron Curtain, but by the mid-1970s, the iAEA Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was in place and relations between the Agency, the East European CMEA, and West European Euratom had been clarified. CMEA mem-bers could increasingly draw on CMEA as well as non-communist partners to develop their nuclear programs. For instance, after the 1977 Vrancea earthquake, the bulgarian government could purchase safety equipment such as hydro shock absorbers in Japan and valves in West Germany with soviet consent. The 1981 soviet-bulgarian agreement for the third expansion of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant included iAEA safety measures and stipulated that the bulgarian state could purchase nuclear equipment from non-CMEA countries.

it is ironic that the very success of soviet-led nuclear integration in Eastern Europe entailed a gradual emancipation of CMEA satellite states from the soviet Union in this period of increasing momentum. Countries such as bulgaria now possessed domestic nuclear capabilities, had their own nuclear education infra-structure, replaced massive electricity imports with electricity abundance (bulgaria would even become the major power exporter in the balkans), and cooperated with other countries than the soviet Union that had totally dominated its nuclear relations in the 1960s. Of course the bulgarian energy balance still depended heav-ily on uranium imports from the soviet Union. Moreover the Chernobyl accident, which coincided with the East European nuclear power collaboration reaching its zenith, initially seemed to strengthen communist nuclear integration when com-munist governments stood together in continuing their respective nuclear pro-grams. The second major irony of this period, however, is that this stepped-up association of communist governments with nuclear power backfired in 1989 and 1990, when popular movements rallied to abolish communist rule. Nuclear power became a major rallying point against the sitting governments. in bulgaria, the scientific research reactor in sofia and the plans for a second nuclear power plant in belene were the first to go.

Conclusion 143

Conclusion

This book has studied the development of bulgaria’s nuclear system as a trans-national system building effort. in this concluding chapter i will summarize my answer to the main research question: How did bulgaria’s large nuclear system develop in the context of its transnational nuclear connections within and beyond the soviet bloc? The second part

it is hard to deny that bulgaria’s entry into the community of nuclear energy-producing nations was a direct result of its entry into the soviet bloc and its posi-tion as one of the soviet Union’s closest political allies. 616 it was the soviet Central Committee of the soviet Union Communist Party that decided to make its nuclear science and technology available throughout Eastern Europe, with the intention of supporting the forced industrialization policies of its allies. Nuclear power fitted well in the soviet large-scale electrification approach. The help of the soviet Union was also used in propaganda that expressed its contributions to peaceful nuclear development and help to its allies. it was yet another expression of Cold War com-petition, but one in a highly symbolic area in which the soviet Union could show off with its accomplishments.

in 1954, the soviet Union inaugurated the world’s first nuclear power plant for public power policy in Obninsk and in 1955 presented its results at the first United Nations international Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. The achievements impressed the delegates. in the same year, the soviet Union signed a number of bilateral contracts to help its allies construct nuclear research reac-tors. Over the next few years, these reactors were built in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Romania, Hungary, Poland and finally in bulgaria in 1961. This meant that the necessary research infrastructure had been created which was an impor-tant precondition for subsequent developments in the nuclear field.

However, one could not claim, as communist propaganda stressed, that bulgaria had to begin from scratch. During the interwar years, German investments had laid the foundation for several important industries, such as mining, electric power production, shipbuilding and construction. As a consequence, bulgaria had already experienced substantial industrial growth upon which postwar com-munist efforts could be built. After the war, the Allied Forces agreed that, as a compensatory measure, the German companies in bulgaria would be transferred


to the ownership of the soviet Union. This led to the creation of a large number of bulgarian-soviet enterprises with significant economic potential. by the time the communist government took power in bulgaria, the country had also undergone a process of electrification. This was made visible in the first two-year electrification plan for 1947-1949 that assessed the country’s electrical progress under prewar capitalism positively. Later propaganda ignored these prewar developments and credited the communist turn for all technical and economic achievements.

bulgaria also profited from available human capital trained in higher techni-cal schools in Western Europe. This was certainly the case for nuclear science. For example, two leading nuclear scientists, Georgi Nadjakov and Elisaveta Karamihailova, had received their training abroad during the interwar years. Karmaihailova had been trained in Austria and at Cambridge, England, where she worked with many prominent scientists. Nadjakov had attended the sorbonne in Paris, where he had become connected to a wide network of nuclear scientists, including some Nobel laureates. in 1939, Karamihailova had returned to bulgaria with an appointment as lecturer in nuclear physics and radioactivity at sofia University. Although she would go on to train a host of nuclear scientists who would become important for the development of bulgaria’s nuclear power pro-gram, she herself faced serious problems in the development of her career because of her links with Western scientists and her non-committal relationship to com-munism. Nadjakov’s position was very different. He had come back earlier and became the head of the experimental physics departments of sofia University in 1937. More importantly, he was a supporter of communism and became the most influential bulgarian nuclear scientist and continued to establish international connections. He became the head of the bulgarian Academy of sciences’ institute of Physics, which hosted the first experimental nuclear research reactor. He con-tinued to travel a lot, using his foreign connections, and he became bulgaria’s rep-resentative in nuclear international organizations. These connections and travels facilitated domestic nuclear system building

Despite the continuities, the period after second World War should be seen as a key time for reorientation of the economic and political developments. Many connections between bulgaria and Western Europe were broken and the soviet Union became the crucial and dominant partner. This raises the question of how important the soviet Union has been for the development of the bulgarian nuclear system. On one hand, it is difficult to overestimate the role of the soviet Union, whose influence, both direct and indirect, profoundly shaped the development of the system. On the other hand, independent and endogenous bulgarian contribu-tions to the developments should not be overlooked. bulgarian nuclear scientists

Conclusion 145

such as Nadjakov embraced the soviet model voluntarily, so it would be wrong to state that the soviet Union imposed all measures completely against the will of bulgarian actors. On the contrary, soviet scientists received a warm welcome from many bulgarian scientists and engineers. soviet scientists did not always inter-fere and bulgarian scientists asked them for assistance. The development of the nuclear system was co-produced by soviet and bulgarian actors. This assessment should gloss over the fact that bulgarian scientists who did not approve the new developments paid for their actions in terms of reduced opportunities for making a career, as was the case for Karamihailova. Many others were even killed, includ-ing Traicho Kostov, who was appointed as energy minister after the war but was soon put on a show trial in which he was accused of building the electrical sys-tem on prewar ideas. Ultimately, the relationships between the soviet Union and bulgarian nuclear scientists were highly asymmetrical and the latter had to follow the soviet example or face grim consequences.

by the early 1960s, the soviet Union had not only provided a research reac-tor and equipment to bulgaria, but also training. soviet specialists and advisors came with the imported research facilities and kept a close watch on the construc-tion process. However, the research reactor became a pivotal part in the establish-ment of a nuclear science community in bulgaria. Nevertheless, this community remained a part of international network. For example many specialists from bulgaria and from other East European countries visited and collaborated with the Joint institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna in the soviet Union.

by the time bulgaria’s experimental reactor began operating, power compa-nies in both the East and the West had started to explore whether they could use nuclear plants for electricity production. in 1966, the soviet Union signed a bilat-eral treaty with bulgaria that aimed to construct a full-scale nuclear power plant in bulgaria. However, opinions were divided within bulgaria’s nomenclature (elite) on the issue of whether the country needed such a plant. This led to a domestic power struggle that was eventually won by the supporters of the nuclear option. This example showed that the soviet Union did not enforce nuclear power pro-duction on bulgaria in an autonomous fashion: bulgarian officials played a key role in the nuclear decision-making process. Therefore, the building of the plant depended as much on soviet approval and technical help as on domestic priori-ties and relationships. The domestic conflict was about the need for nuclear plants that solved a pressing need for more electricity production. The opposition to the nuclear option, led by the economic wing of the nomenclature, was in favor of building more conventional plans and using imports. Furthermore, Ministry of Electrification officials were not convinced that bulgaria had developed the


capability to actually operate a nuclear plant. However, the most significant part of the political and scientific nomenclature believed in a bulgarian nuclear path. They announced a predetermined decision in favor of building a nuclear plant at the Party plenum of November 25 and 26, 1969.

bulgarian specialists were responsible for site selection, construction, and train-ing of sufficient personnel, while the operators of the nuclear plant were trained in Moscow and East Germany, but also underwent brief training sessions on the exper-imental reactor. The nuclear plant to be built in bulgaria was already operational in the soviet Union. However, it soon became clear that numerous changes were necessary in order to use it in Kozloduy, the site chosen by the bulgarian specialists. The first nuclear fission reaction in the Kozloduy plant was set in motion in 1974 by a joint bulgarian-soviet team representing the process of mutual cooperation that was now in operation. The bulgarian communist party celebrated the construction of the nuclear power plant as a national achievement, but it also had to acknowledge the contribution of the soviet Union. it did this by emphasizing the importance of socialist brotherhood and collaboration, in which bulgaria was placed on an equal footing with the soviet Union. This propaganda reflected the new realities in the Eastern bloc in which the soviet Union was still dominant, but had to recognize that the nuclear power programs of its allies had come of age.

by the 1970s, the activities of several multilateral organizations, including the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the international Atomic Energy Agency (iAEA), had gained momentum. The official purpose of the CMEA was to coordinate production and economic plans among its member states, which also meant promoting a policy of specialization. Each country should produce knowledge, components or machinery that would serve the entire soviet bloc. East European countries perceived the CMEA as a potential obstacle for pursuing their own technology path and they sometimes hid information and developed inde-pendent domestic activities. For example, Romanian officials and scientists refused to participate in the Dubna activities. instead they attempted to develop their own research capabilities based on reactors produced in Canada. Romania ignored the soviet proposal to build nuclear power plants with pressured water reactors.

Within the iAEA, during the first decade of its existence, many East European countries simply followed soviet leadership and all standpoints were coordinated through the CMEA. The CMEA did perform important auxiliary functions for national developments, since it allowed nuclear specialists to network and exchange information on a regular basis. in the 1970s, the CMEA and iAEA stepped up their activities. both organizations managed to develop standardized safety and operation measures that were implemented in several countries, both in the East and West.

Conclusion 147

East European specialists began to open up to the iAEA, share more information, and participated in non-communist exchange programs. bilateral soviet-bulgarian agreements no longer specified all the conditions, leaving more room for bulgarian specialists. standard conditions of material delivery were made dependent on agree-ments within the CMEA and iAEA, a further indication that these organizations had gained greater leverage. This elaboration of the role of the soviet Union gener-ates the necessary input for my final discussion of the main research question of this book: how did bulgaria’s nuclear system develop in the context of its foreign connec-tions between, within, and beyond the soviet bloc.

From the above appraisal of the role of the soviet Union, it is clear that foreign relations were crucially important for the development of the bulgarian nuclear system. However, domestic developments also played a role. in fact, the bulgarian nuclear system developed at the junction of both transnational and domestic devel-opments. both constituted each other in a technopolitical process in which nuclear system builders developed the nuclear option to realize their political goals of enforced industrialization and electricity production. The system-builders consisted of collaborating nuclear engineers and scientists and party leaders, including the main party leader, whose personal support was crucial. The network was unified by an acceptance of the ideological tenets of communism. Consequently, as had been the case in Western European countries such as France, nuclear scientists gained prestige, power, and funding that far exceeded those of their colleagues in other areas.617 They supplied and developed a nuclear power plant site. in sum, bulgarian nuclear system building was a transnational technopolitical process which drew simultaneously on international, national and local agents, elements and actions. The nuclear system builders involved foreign (bilateral as well as multilateral) and domestic relations in order to get the project realized.

The system development went through three phases. The first was an initial period in which the system-builders reorganized the scientific institutions and cre-ated a new scientific and technological basis that culminated in the building of a nuclear experimental reactor that became operational in 1962. These efforts were deeply embedded in an East European transnational network that was dominated by the soviet Union and had the Joint institute for Nuclear Research (JiNR) in Dubna as its center. The network building was effective and brought bulgarian nuclear sci-entists and engineers up to speed with the latest developments. it served as a research facility and training device.

The early 1960s saw the start of the second phase – the forced growth phase – in which the nuclear scientific network greatly expanded, both nationally and transnationally. The CMEA member countries managed to develop a scheme


for connecting their power grids, and the integrated electricity system reached a substantial higher capacity by the end of the 1960s. This made the exploration of the nuclear option more urgent. in the late 1950s and early 1960s, research was focused on the pressurized-water reactor. This reactor was considered to be very reliable, and since the residual material was less suitable for military use, the soviet leaders decided to offer this reactor for export to Eastern Europe. The first nuclear reactor outside the soviet Union was built in Reinsberg in East Germany. it became a training center and experimental base for further developments in Eastern Europe. Within the CMEA context, nuclear scientists and engineers elaborated plans for nuclear instrumentation and equipment. New organizations were set up, such as interatominstrument, which specialized in special research equipment; and interatomenergo, which specialized in nuclear power and nuclear machinery. in addition, specialized teams were created to study problems associ-ated with pressurized-water reactors. in 1965 and 1966, the soviet Union con-cluded agreements with bulgaria, Hungary and, at a later stage, Czechoslovakia to build nuclear power plants. This eventually led to the opening of the first plant in bulgaria in 1974.

by that time, the CMEA had strengthened its activities further. in 1971, it initiated a new plan: “The Comprehensive Program for Further Extension and improvement of Cooperation and the Further Development of socialist Economic integration by CMEA”. This can be seen as a second stage within the forced growth phase, which eventually led to a great increase in the number of nuclear power plants and output throughout the soviet bloc. While the soviet Union continued to dominate the developments, the CMEA became a basis for more independent and multilateral exchanges among East European countries. in particular, it helped to construct safer nuclear power plants and better operating standards. safety had also been a major issue within the framework of the iAEA, but bulgaria and other East European countries had followed the soviet recommendations. it is only in this second stage, after 1971, that these countries began to develop their own safety and operation parameters. For example, nuclear specialists in Hungary called for additional safety measures, referred to as ‘towers of silence’, to prevent leakage of radiation steam from pressurized water reactors.

After the Chernobyl disaster during the collapse of the soviet bloc, the bulgarian nuclear power system entered a stagnation phase. soviet technology was no longer trusted in many East European countries. Feelings of uncertainty about the future were rampant, and social movements protested successfully against any further expansion. in bulgaria, for example, a new plant in belene had been planned, and eighty percent of the equipment had been supplied, but the entire

Conclusion 149

project was eventually canceled due to the protest. The newly united Germany abandoned soviet nuclear technology entirely. According to the German govern-ment and its experts, WWER reactors did not meet the necessary conditions for nuclear safety. However, other countries such as bulgaria did not have this choice since nuclear power production was crucially important for the country’s electric-ity supply. However, the continuing choice for nuclear technology not only reflects economic needs, it also expresses the wishes and influence of a community of nuclear experts who were united not only by communist ideology, but also by their professional background and beliefs in the power and safety of nuclear energy. This community was a transnational one. Experts traveled frequently and were in regular contact with experts from other countries. This had created a real sense of a community, and a hidden integration process that was not destroyed by the Vrancea earthquake or the Chernobyl accident.618 After 1989, with help of iAEA and foreign nuclear experts, bulgaria modernized its reactors. They are still the backbone of bulgaria’s electric power system.

Pictures 151

Pictures

Pictures from the Personal Archive of Mitko Iankov

Loading a reactor. Manifestation with the workers from “Kozloduy” NPP and party officials.

Official visitation at the plant. The Vice-Minister, Oved Tadjer, explains the achieved results.

Engineer explains a working scheme to Communist Party leaders.

Command ‘shield’ of the plant.

152 The Communist Nuclear Era152 The Communist Nuclear Era

Pictures from the Information Center of “Kozloduy” NPP

The fifth reactor block of “Kozloduy” NPP.

Early work on the plant.

The plant in 1974: the first pair of reac-tors and construction of the second pair of reactors.

In 1974, the Soviet and Bulgarian teams work on fixing the ‘shield’.

Initial work on the fifth reactor, the first WWER-1000 outside the Soviet Union.

Initial stage of construction of the first buildings of the Bulgarian NPP.

Notes 153

Notes

1 ivaylo Hristov, interview with the former Vice Minister of bulgarian electrification, Oved Tadzher, February 2, 2009.

2 see Chapter 4.3 Gerard Wagemaker, “Clinically Observed Effects,” IAEA Bulletin (March 1996): 29-30; Manfred V.

banaschik and Karl-Heinz berg, “steps for safety,” IAEA Bulletin (Autumn 1986): 35; Fred A. Mettler, “Chernobyl’s Living Legacy,” IAEA Bulletin 47, no. 2 (2006): 4-6; L. J. brinkhorst, “Nuclear safety and the European Community: broadening Perspectives,” IAEA Bulletin (February 1992): 41-43; Prof. E. D. Williams, “Thyroid Effects,” IAEA Bulletin (March 1996): 31-32; The Lord Marshall of Goring, “United Kingdom. Chernobyl ‒ the Aftermath. What Can the industry Learn from the Accident?” IAEA Bulletin 28, no. 3 (1986): 36-38.

4 see Chapter 3.5 Mikael AF Malmborg and bo stråth, The Meaning of Europe. Variety and Contention Within and

Among Nations (New York: Oxford, 2002), 6 and 11.6 ibid., 11.7 Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen, eds., The History of the Idea of Europe (London and New York:

Routledge, 1995), 154.8 ivan berend, “What is Central and Eastern Europe,” European Journal of Social Theory, Sage Publica-

tions: London 8, no. 4 (2005): 401-416.9 János Kornai, The Socialist System. Political Economy of Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1992). i use the bulgarian edition (sofia: Marin Drinov Academic Publishers, 1996), 66-67.10 boris Joffe, “something from the History of the Nuclear Project in UssR,” Siberian Physical Journal no.

2 (1995): 67-87. 11 N.N. Antoshin, “Cooperation between the Member Nations of the Comecon and the Federal Republic

of Yugoslavia in the Hydropower Field,” Gidrotechnicheskoe stroitel’stvo, no. 11 (November 1974): 1-6.12 Erik van der Vleuten and Arne Kaijser, Networking Europe. Transnational Infrastructures and the Shap-

ing of Europe 1850-2000 (sagamore beach: science History Publications, 2005).13 On Large Technical systems: Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power, Electrification in Western Society,

1880-1930 (baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 140.14 Thomas Misa and Johan schot, “introduction – inventing Europe: Technology and the Hidden inte-

gration of Europe,” History and Technology 21, no. 1 (2005): 1-20. For the hidden integration of large technical systems: Erik van der Vleuten and Arne Kaijser, “Networking Europe”, History and Technol-ogy 21, no. 1 (2005): 21-48.

15 Misa and schot, “introduction – inventing Europe”, 9.16 ibid., 10.17 Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France. Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II

(Cambridge, MA: The MiT Press, 1998).18 Van der Vleuten and Kaijser, Networking Europe. Transnational Infrastructures. see also: Erik van der

Vleuten, “Toward a Transnational History of Technology. Meanings, promises, pitfalls,” Technology and culture 49 (October 2008), 974-994.

19 Thomas Hughes, Networks of Power, 29.20 Erik van der Vleuten, irene Anastasiadou, Frank schipper, Vincent Lagendijk, “Europe’s system build-

ers. The contested integration of transnational road, electricity, and rail infrastructures”, Contemporary European History 16, 3 (2007), 321-347.

21 ivan Tchalakov, “The socialist Entrepreneurs Viewed from the Joint Perspective of Joseph schumpeter, Actor-Network Theory and Historical sociology of socialism.” in Research in Social Change no. 3/1 (January 2011): 15-51.

22 Paul Josephson, Red Atom. Russia’s Nuclear Power Program from Stalin to Today (New York: W. H.


Freeman and Company, 1999).23 Hecht, The Radiance of France, 2.24 J. Lagaaij and Geert Verbong, “Different Visions of Power. The introduction of Nuclear Power in the

Netherlands 1955-1970,” Centaurus 41 (1999): 37-63; Cathryn Carson, Nuclear Energy Development in Postwar West Germany: struggles over Cooperation in the Federal Republic’s First Reactor station,” History and Technology 18, no. 3 (2002): 233-270.

25 Arne Kaijser, “Redirecting Power: swedish Nuclear Power Policies in an Historical Perspective,” An-nual Review of Energy and the Environment 17 (1992), 437-462.

26 Henry Nielsen and Henrik Knudsen, “The Troublesome Life of Peaceful Atoms in Denmark,” History and Technology 26, no. 2 (June 2010), 91-118.

27 Gabrielle Hecht, Being Nuclear. Africans and the Global Uranium Trade (The MiT Press, 2012).28 John Krige, American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe (Cambridge, MA

and London: The MiT Press, 2006).29 John Krige, “The Peaceful Atom as a Political Weapon: Euratom and American Foreign Policy in the

Late 1950s,” Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences 38 (Winter 2008): 5-44.30 sonja D. schmid, “Nuclear Colonization: soviet Technopolitics in the second world” in Entangled

Geographies. Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War, ed. Gabrielle Hecht (Cambridge, MA and London, England: The MiT Press, 2011).

31 David Fischer, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty Years (Vienna, Aus-tria: iAEA, 1997).

32 F. Ofchinnikov, K. Toot, and W. solovev, International Collaboration – Members of CMEA in Nuclear Energy Area (Moscow: Energoatomizdat); i. Morohov and A. Zadikyan et al. (eds.) Nuclear Science and Technology in USSR (Moscow: Atomizdat); see also M. Petrosiancev, Nuclear Science and Technol-ogy in USSR (Moscow: Energoatomizdat).

33 Nikola balabanov, “The Physics of Leon Mitrani – From the space to the Human,” in People in Physics (Plovdiv University Press, 2000); see also Nikola balabanov, From “The Rabbit-Farm” in Cambridge to Geneva’s Titan (Plovdiv: University Press “Paisii Hilendarski”, 2007).

34 Nikolina sretenova, The University and the Physicians. Beginning (sofia: Heron Press, 2000).35 Todor Lambov and ilia borisov, First Atomic in Kozloduy (sofia: Partizdat, 1981).36 The term “socialist system” comes from János Kornai. in the other cases, the thesis uses the term

“communist.” see Kornai, The Socialist System. 37 Начо Папазов, “Доклад“ в Научно-техническо сътрудничество между Съветския Съюз и НР

България (София: Комитет за наука, технически прогрес и висше образование, 1975): iii. Nacho Papazov, “Report” in Science and Technological Partnership Between USSR and PR Bulgaria (sofia: Komitet za nauka, tehnicheski progress i visshe obrazovanie, 1975): iii.

38 While there were significant differences among socialist countries in the twentieth century, János Kornai focuses on understanding their similarities. because the term “socialist country” is contested, i use Kornai’s definition based on the terminology used by the officials themselves, who insisted the party led the people to a future “communist society,” while they were still living in a socialist order. see Януш Корнай, Социалистическата система. Политическа икономия на комунизма (София: Академично Издателство “Професор Марин Дринов, 1996): 31. János Kornai, The Socialist System. The Political Economy of Communism (sofia: Academy Press, 1996): 31.

39 ibid., 34.40 Ивайло Знеполски, Българският комунизъм. Социокултурни черти и властова траектория

(София: Изд. “Сиела,” Института за изследване на близкото минало и Институт Отворено общество, 2008): 197-198. ivaylo Znepolski, Bulgarian Communism. Social and Cultural Features and Power Trajectory (sofia: institute for Near Past Research and Open society institute, 2008): 197-198.

41 Exchanges existed with other Western countries, but Germany’s role was of greater significance be-cause the contacts were more regular. Moreover, bulgaria had been Germany’s ally during the second World War.

42 For example, according to the report by soviet engineer P. Grigoriev, the UssR provided its political allies with approximately sixty-one percent of their aid in 1974, including traveling specialists and training in the soviet Union. see Papazov, Science and Technological Partnership, 5-6.

43 Господинка Никова, “СИВ и Българо-съветските стопански отношения” в Българо-съветски отношения и връзки (София: Издателство на БАН, 1987): 170. Gospodinka Nikova, “CMEA and bulgarian-soviet Economy Relationships,” in Bulgarian-Soviet Relationships and Connections (sofia:

Notes 155

bulgarian Academy of science Press, 1987): 170.44 Kornai defines the entire socialist economy as an economy of shortage. see Янош Корнай,

Трансформация след социализъм. Опитът на Унгария (София: Агенция за икономически анализи и прогнози, 1998). János Kornai, Transformation After Socialism. The Hungarian Experience, (sofia: Agency for Economy Analyses and Prognoses, 1998).

45 bulgaria never sent troops to the front line against the Allies. The only purpose of its army was to maintain order in the occupied territories in Greece and Yugoslavia. Only the state economy served the Nazi regime by producing necessary goods.

46 Искра Баева и Евгения Калинова, Следвоенното десетилетие на българската външна политика (1944-1955) (София: Издателство ПОЛИС, 2003): 32-33. iskra baeva and Evgenia Kalinova, Post War Decade of Bulgarian Foreign Policy (1944-1955) (sofia: POLis Press, 2003): 32-33.

47 Илияна Марчева, Тодор Живков, Пътят към властта. Политика и икономика в България (1953-1964) (София: Институт по история – БАН, 2001): 21-22. ilyana Marcheva, Todor Zhivkov. The Road to Power. Policy and Economy in Bulgaria (1953-1964) (sofia: Historical institute, bulgarian Academy of science, 2001): 21-22.

48 Александър Везенков, Властовите структури на българската комунистическа партия (1944-1989) (София: Изд. “Сиела“ Института за изследване на близкото минало и Институт Отворено общество, 2008): 45. Alexander Vezenkov, Governmental Structures of the Bulgarian Communist Party (1944-1989) (sofia: institute for Near Past investigation, Open society institute, 2008): 45.

49 Vezenkov, Governmental Structures, 45-46. in 1949, states such as Romania, Hungary, and East Germany were in the initial stages of establishing a soviet nomenclature system, whereas bulgarian officials were reordering the already existing one. see ibid., 41.

50 Иво Можни, Защо така лесно…Някои основания за нежната революция (София: Издателство Изток-Запад, 2003): 96-97. ivo Možny, Why So Easy… Some Family Reasons for the Velvet Revolution (sofia: East-West Press, 2003): 96-97.

51 Kornai, The Socialist System, 40.52 ibid., 60-61.53 From 1878 to 1946, bulgaria was a constitutional monarchy.54 The struggles and transformations at the top of bulgarian Communist Party are described in detail by

the author, who argues that immigrant elites from the UssR had more power than local elites. How-ever, local elites also spent time in the soviet Union. it is conventionally argued that party members who spent time there before september 9, 1944 differed in their outlook from those who came later to bulgaria. Marcheva, Todor Zhivkov, 21-22.

55 ee Marcheva, Todor Zhivkov, 20-21. bulgarian party leader Valko Chervenkov lost his position in front of the soviet leaders after the death of his main supporter.

56 Alexander Vezenkov, The Power Structures of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 133-134.57 ibid., 134. Reliable evidence for Dimitrov’s role is his own saved drafts and “some documents from the

time after his death.” intentionally following the soviet political model was also “widespread practice in organizational development of communist parties in the satellites of the soviet Union after World War ii”.

58 Kornai, The Socialist System, 66-67.59 ibid., 69.60 Георги Димитров, Политически доклад на Централния комитет на Българската

комунистическа партия пред Петия конгрес на партията (София: Партиздат, 1974): 115. Georgi Dimitrov, Political Report of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party in Front of the Fifth Congress (sofia: Partizdat, 1974): 115.

61 in these years, the shipbuilding industry was nationalized, and the agricultural sector was reformed by setting up over one thousand cooperative large-scale farms; a tobacco and spirits monopoly, meat central, etc. were also established. Добри Терпешев,“Пет годишния държавен стопански план,”” Работническо дело 304, (24/12) (1948): 1. Dobri Terpeshev, “Five-Year state Economy Plan,” Rabotnichesko delo 304, (24/12), (1948): 1.

62 Through a system of licenses, the socialist government in bulgaria ceased private initiatives in the international trade sector. see Александър Марукян, Външнотърговската политика на НРБ – Основни направления и държавен монопол (София: Академия за обществени науки и социално управление при ЦК на БКП (АОНСУ), 1982): 14. (Aleksander Marukian, The


International Trade Policy of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria – Main Streams and State Monopoly (sofia: Academy for social sciences and social management at Central committee of the bulgarian Communist Party (AONsU), 1982): 14.

63 Златко Златев, Българо-съветски икономически отношения (1944-1958) (София: Издателство на БАН, 1986):35-36.( Zlatko Zlatev, Bulgarian-Soviet Economy Relationships (1944-1958) (sofia: bAs Press, 1986):35-36. see also Българска академия на науките и Академия на науките на СССР. Българо-съветски отношения. Документи и материали Том ii, Септември 1944 - Декември 1958 (София, Издателство на БАН, 1981): 18-19. (bulgarian Academy of science and Academy of science of the UssR Bulgarian-Soviet Relationships and Connections. Documents and Materials. Volume II, September 1944-December 1958 (sofia: bulgarian academy of science Press, 1981): 18-19 ; Marukian, The International Trade Policy,13; Даниел Вачков и Мартин Иванов, Българският външен дълг 1944-1989 (София: Института за изследване на близкото минало и Институт Отворено общество, 2008): 78. (Daniel Vachkov and Martin ivanov, The Bulgarian Depth 1944-1989 (sofia: institute for Near Past investigation, Open society institute, 2008): 78.

64 bulgarian Academy of science and Academy of science of the UssR Bulgarian-Soviet Relationships and Connections, 255.

65 ibid., 256.66 Vachkov and ivanov, The Bulgarian Depth, 68.67 Dobri Terpeshev, “Five-Year state Economy Plan,” 1. 68 Kornai, Socialist System, 120.69 Dimitrov, Political Report of the Central Committee, 123.70 Znepolski, Bulgarian Communism, 202; Нико Яхиел, Тодор Живков и личната власт. Спомени,

документи, анализи (София: Издателство М&М, 1997): 100. (Niko Yahiel, Todor Jivkov and His Monocracy. Memories, Documents, Analyses (sofia: M&M Press, 1997): 100.

71 Dobri Terpeshev, “Five-Year state Economy Plan,” 2.72 Georgi Dimitrov, Political Report of the Central Committee, 121.73 ibid., 121.74 ibid., 123.75 ibid., 123.; see also CORPORATE AUTHOR Директиви на осмият конгрес на БКП за развитието

на Народна Република България за периода 1961-1980 (София: Издателство на БКП, 1962): 5. (CORPORATE AUTHOR Directives of the VIII Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party about the Development of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria in the Period 1961-1980 (sofia: bCP Press, 1962): 5).

76 Yahiel, Todor Jivkov and His Monocracy, 68-70. Niko Yahiel, as section Head under Todor Zhivkov, participated in creating a socialist society in bulgaria. The insider’s perspective not only enabled him to assess the management of the Zhivkov era in the following years, but for his biography he also mined the Communist Party archives in depth.

77 Marcheva, Todor Zhivkov, 31.78 Nikita Khrushchev, when he came to power in the soviet Union, criticized Malenkov’s attempts to

reform the agricultural sector, which had suffered badly under stalinist governance. Khrushchev was a skilled politician, who used economic problems for political gain. in this way, he removed Malenkov from the Politburo in January 1955. ibid., 31.

79 Kornai, The Socialist System, 1996, 172.80 Marcheva, Todor Zhivkov, 31, 87-88.81 Chervenkov was however not removed entirely from government circles, remaining in significant

positions until 1961, when Zhivkov strengthened his power and redefined the economic aims of bul-garian socialist society. ibid., 143.; “Разговорите на Централния комитет на партията,” Вестник Работническо дело, но. 99 (Април 8, 1956): 1; “Communication of the Central Committee of bulgarian Communist Party,” Rabotnichesko delo Newspaper, no. 99, (April 8, 1956): 1; “Вчерашната сесия на петата специална среща на народното събрание,“ Вестник Работническо дело, но. 109 (Април 18, 1956): 1. “Yesterday’s session of the Fifth Extraordinary session of the National Assembly,” Rabotnichesko delo Newspaper, no. 109 (April 18, 1956): 1.

82 Marcheva, Todor Zhivkov, 105-106.83 ibid., 108-111.84 ibid., 143.85 ibid., 143.86 “Директивите на централния комитет на БКП по четвъртата петилетка за развитието на НРБ

Notes 157

за периода 1961-1965,” Вестник Работническо дело, но. 133 (Май 13, 1962):1 “Directives of the Central Committee of bulgarian Communist Party on the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan for the Republic of bulgaria during the Period 1961-1965,” Newspaper Rabotnichesko delo Newspaper, no. 133 (May 13, 1962): 1.

87 Станко Тодоров, “Доклад за основните показатели на четвъртата петилетка” Работническо дело, но. 132 (Май 12, 1962): 13. stanko Todorov, “Report on Core indicators of the Fourth Five-Year Plan,” Rabotnichesko delo Newspaper, no. 132 (May 12, 1962): 1.

88 CORPORATE AUTHOR Directives of the VIII Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 13.89 ibid., 13.90 Yahiel, Todor Zhivkov and His Monocracy, 163.91 Marcheva, Todor Zhivkov, 258.92 ibid., 258.93 ibid., 259.94 Yahiel, Todor Zhivkov and His Monocracy, 153.95 ibid., 154.96 CORPORATE AUTHOR, Девети конгрес на БКП, 14 ноември-19 ноември 1966, Стенографски

протокол (София, Издателство на БКП, 1967): 36-37. CORPORATE AUTHOR, (IX Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 14-19 November 1966, Verbatim Report (sofia: bulgarian Communist Party Press, 1967): 36-37.

97 CORPORATE AUTHOR IX Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 38.98 ibid., 40.99 Group ‘A’ industries refer to ‘manufacture of production tools’, i.e. machinery producing finished

goods. Power industry, heavy chemical industry, mining, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, air-craft, truck, and agricultural machinery also fall under group ‘A’. ‘b’ group industries included produc-ing consumer goods like clothing, food, etc.

100 CORPORATE AUTHOR IX Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 42-43.101 Мартин Иванов, Реформаторство без реформи. Политическа Икономия на българския

комунизъм (София: Института за изследване на близкото минало и Институт Отворено общество, 2008): 27. Martin ivanov, Reformation Without Reforms. The Political Economy of Bulgarian communism. 1962-1989 (sofia: institute for Near Past investigation, 2008): 27.

102 Vezenkov, in his study on the power structures of the bulgarian Communist Party, shows how the party leaders in bulgaria seized ultimate power for themselves by taking the top-level positions. in fact, since 1971, a different person primarily responsible for the economy was chosen as an example, despite political governance. However, a review of Zhivkov’s responsibilities clearly shows his leading role. For example, since 1979, Zhivkov was responsible for: organizing Politburo activities, defense, state security, directing foreign and internal affairs, science technical policy issues, main management cadres, the security and defense commission, the currency committee, and the military-administrative sector. Although he had fewer responsibilities in previous years, this did not affect his influence at all. see Vezenkov, The Power Structures of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 236-237.

103 Niko Yahiel, Todor Jivkov and His Monocracy, 117.104 The analyses by ivo Hristov revealed that socialist jurisprudence had almost no function in practice.

This assumption is due to the fact that socialist governance removed any kind of “alternative political subjects.” in this way, the party used the state or its administrative apparatus as a kernel for such a social organization. it also absorbed the economic structures by stopping, in this way, any growing opposition. The administrative governance united with the party is the only subject that had power in socialist governance. The might of jurisprudence exists only between independent social subjects. see Иван Чалъков, Иво Христов, Лиляна Деянова, Нина Николова, Деян Деянов, Тихомир МИтев, Боян Славенков, Огнян Симеонов, Пламен Чипев, Веселин Стойнев, и Стилия Фелиси, Мрежите на прехода. Какво се случи в България след 1989г (София: Издателство Изток-Запад, 2008): 28. (ivan Tchalakov, ivo Hristov, Liliana Deianova, Nina Nikolova, Deian Deianov, Tihomir Mitev, b-oian slavenkov, Ognian simeonov, Plamen Tchipev, Veselin stoinev, and stilia Felisi, Networks of Transition. What Happened in Bulgaria after 1989 (sofia: East-West Press, 2008): 69-70).

105 Party control also included coercive measures, such as dismissal, moral punishment (discipline), or even prison sentences. For example, the Politburo member Mako Dakov, in his appeal to the members of the Ministry of Electrification, openly voiced his judgment: “However, someone must be held responsible! if someone started the power plant and he did not follow the regulations, then he must


be held accountable by the court! This can’t be allowed!” see Централен държавен архив, Протокол № 4/12 iii 1976 относно състоянието на АЕЦ Козлодуй, и изводи от едногодишната и дейност и протокол № 5/ 19 iV 1976г., фонд 521, опис 4, а.е.24, 1-29, here 7. (Central state Archives, Fund 521, inventory 4, File 24, Protocol № 4/12 III 1976 about the condition of Kozloduy NPP, and conclusions of its one year working period and protocol №5/ 19 IV 1976, 1-29, here 7).

106 Евгени Кандиларов, “Електронната промишленост в икономическата политика на България през 60-те – 80-те години на ХХ век,” Годишник на Софийски университет, Исторически факултет, издание 96/97, (2003/2004): 431-503, here 1.; (Evgeny Kandilarov, “The Electronic issue in the bulgarian Economic Policy During 60s-80s of the Twentieth Century,” sofia University Year book, Historical Faculty, issue 96/97, (2003/2004): 431-503, here 1); see also Евгени Кандиларов, България и Япония. От студената война към XXi век. (София: Издателство Дамян Яков, 2009): 192. (Evgeny Kandilarov, Bulgaria and Japan. From the Cold War towards XXI Century (sofia: Damian Yakov Press, 2009): 192).

107 Niko Yahiel, Todor Jivkov and His Monocracy, 155.108 Тодор Живков, Мемоари (София: Издателство Абагар, 1997): 218. (Todor Zhivkov, Memoirs

(sofia: Abagar Press, 1997): 218). 109 Yahiel, Todor Jivkov and His Monocracy, 155; see also Иван Чалъков, Да направиш холограма

(София: Академично издателство “Професор Марин Дринов,” 1998): 26-28. ivan Tchalakov, Making a Hologram (sofia: Academy Press, 1998): 26-28; Kandilarov, “The Electronic issue,” 29.

110 Kandilarov, “The Electronic issue,” 47.111 ibid., 47.112 Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power, Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (baltimore: Johns

Hopkins University Press, 1983): 66.113 Мартин Иванов, “Чудото на зачатието. Или как България беше “обременена с

комунизъм,”Социологически проблеми 3-4 (2007): 332. Martin ivanov, “The Miracle of Concep-tion, or How bulgaria was ‘Pregnant with Communism’,” Sociological Problems 3-4 (2007): 332.

114 baeva and Kalinova, Post War Decade, 25.115 Златко Златев, “Българо-съветски стопански дружества. 1949-1955“. публикувано в Българо-

съветски отношения и връзки (София: Издателство на БАН, 1987): 132. Zlatko Zlatev, “bul-garian-soviet Economy Companies. 1949-1955,” in Bulgarian-Soviet Relationships and Connections (sofia: bulgarian Academy of science Press, 1987): 132. The research by Zlatev was based primarily on materials from the bulgarian Central state Archives. it consists of passages from original documents and, for this reason, is very detailed and valuable.

116 Чони Чонев, Корабите. Морска България. Том 5 (София: Издателство Литера прима, 1997): 213. Tchoni Tchonev, The Ships. Bulgaria on the Sea. Vol. 5 (sofia: Litera Prima Press, 1997): 213.

117 ibid., 213.118 Zlatev, “bulgarian-soviet Economy Companies,” 133.119 Zlatarov and samsarov established their own joint-stock company Orion in 1922 which also had a

partnership with the Granitoid joint-stock company. However, in 1926, Orion was closed and its capital was bought by Granitoid, which continued to build three hydro power stations in the Rila Mountains and other electricity projects to satisfy the needs of the capital city of sofia. Transportation was easily achieved given the close location to the mountains. The complex built by samsarov and Zlatarov was the first water cascade in bulgaria and was completed in 1940. Мире Спиров, Атанас Георгиев, и Младен Цонев, Българската електрификация. Кратка история.(София: Издателство Херон, 1998), 102-103. Mire spirov, Atanas Georgiev, and Mladen Conev, Bulgarian Electrification. Concise History (sofia: Heron Press, 1998), 102-103.

120 Zlatev, “bulgarian-soviet Economy Companies,” 133.121 ibid., 133.122 Kornai, The Socialist System, 68. Of course we have to bear in mind that all the countries in which

communist governments took power exhibited backwardness, and conditions had to be met for trans-ferring power from the capitalist elites to the working class. However, in most East European coun-tries, socialist governance appeared after the soviet intervention, which is the only piece of evidence no dominative social environment existed that was friendly to the communist idea.

123 For the messianic (or messiah) belief within communist official circles, see Kornai, The Socialist System, 66.

124 This thesis underlines that industrial enterprises and joint stock companies did not only have German

Notes 159

investments. Germany had the largest participation, but bulgarian and other foreign capital were also used. Moreover, as Martin ivanov claimed, bulgaria had a very respectable economic per capita growth in the 1930s, attributable to “intensive factors (accumulation of capital and technological renovation).” see Martin ivanov, “The Miracle of Conception,” 308.

125 Note that the bulgarian communist propaganda very often claimed that governance in the state was taken by revolution. see: Georgi Dimitrov, Political report of the Central committee of the Bulgarian workers (communist) party in front of the Fifth congress of the party, Partizdat, sofia, 1974; CORPO-RATE AUTHOR Directives of the VIII Congress; Yahiel, Todor Jivkov and His Monocracy, 107.

126 Zlatko Zlatev, “bulgarian-soviet Enterprises,” in Bulgarian-Soviet Relations and Links, 135. 127 ibid., 135; baeva and Kalinova, Post War Decade, 222.128 Joint enterprises with soviet participation were not just established in bulgaria. in fact, mixed-share

stock companies in various branches were also founded in Romania, such as a soviet-Romanian bank, the soviet-Romanian river sea transport company, a Romanian-soviet petrol company, a joint com-pany in the forestry industry, and a Romanian-soviet airline company. see Zlatev, Bulgarian-Soviet Economy Relationships, (1986): 167.

129 see data in Zlatev, “bulgarian-soviet Enterprises,” 135.130 Dimitrov, Political Report of the Central Committee, 133.131 ivaylo Znepolski described the period from 1944 to 1956 as very dynamic for establishing a com-

munist regime in the state. His arguments were related to the fast and large-scale changes made by the communists in many social spheres, affecting almost all the old capitalist relationships. New governance achieved these changes on the one hand by force, while on the other hand Znepolski talked about the feeling of “involvement” among the poor social circles. in many cases, this feeling was powerful. For example, Mire spirov described how enthusiastic people were to have electricity in their homes: “The population with enthusiasm worked for the electrification. With spontaneous local initia-tives, with its own labor, with unforced donations of copper from their households for conductors and others they contributed for the state electrification.” see spirov, Georgiev, and Conev, Bulgarian Electrification. Concise History, 219; Znepolski, Bulgarian Communism, 24.

132 bulgarian Academy of science and Academy of science of the UssR, Bulgarian-Soviet Relationships and Connections, 161.

133 ibid., 161.134 ibid, 167-168.135 ibid., 190, 208.136 The soviet Union’s plans did not include either an aircraft industry or an automobile industry in

bulgaria. The former was destroyed at the end of the second World War, while the latter was stopped after modest attempts by bulgarian engineers to produce Renault cars. As a whole, the soviet policy for technological development in Eastern Europe was marked by interventions of states’ industrial plans. see, Интервю с Константин Костов проведено от Иван Чалъков, 10 Юни, 2006. interview with Professor Konstantin Kostov by ivan Tchalakov, June 10, 2006; see also Dolores L. Augustine, Red Prometheus. Engineering and Dictatorship in East Germany 1945-1990 (Cambridge, MA and London: MiT Press, 2007): 144.

137 ibid., 172.138 bulgarian Academy of science and Academy of science of the UssR bulgarian-Soviet Relationships

and Connections, 399-400.139 Zlatev, Bulgarian-Soviet Economy Relationships, 182.140 “The soviet-bulgarian mining organization” was part of the “Gorubso” administrative system, but its

activities were not officially declared and were camouflaged behind the overall work of the enterprise.141 Zlatev, Bulgarian-Soviet Economy Relationships, 185.142 ibid., 186.143 ibid., 188.144 Thomas Misa and Johan schot, “introduction – inventing Europe: Technology and the Hidden

integration of Europe,” History and Technology 21, no. 1 (2005): 1-20, here 11.145 Znepolski, Bulgarian Communism, 172.146 Интервю с Константин Костов проведено от Иван Чалъков, 10 Юни, 2006. interview with Profes-

sor Konstantin Kostov by ivan Tchalakov, June 10, 2006.147 Кимон Георгиев, “Електрификацията на НРБ,” Електроенергия но.3 (Март, 1953): 1-2. Kimon

Georgiev, “The Electrification of the bulgarian People’s Republic,” Energy no. 3, (March, 1953): 1-2.


148 “Електрификация на селищата в НРБ,” Електроенергия но. 8-9 август –септември (1954): 37-39. “Electrification of settlements in the People’s Republic of bulgaria,” Energy no. 8-9 (1954): 37-39.

149 spirov, Georgiev, and Conev, Bulgarian Electrification, 203-204.150 ibid., 204.151 ibid., 221-222.152 Кимон Георгиев, “Десет години народна власт в областта на електрификацията,”

Електроенергия, но. 8-9, август-септември (1954): 1-2. Kimon Georgiev, “Ten Years of People Power in the Field of Electrification,” Energy no. 8-9 (1954): 1-2.

153 ibid., 1.154 spirov, Georgiev, and Conev, Bulgarian Electrification, 220.155 ibid., 207.156 Högselius et al (eds.), Europe goes Critical. The Making of Transnational Infrastructure Vulnerabilities.

in this issue, Tchalakov, Mitev, and Hristov, “becoming a Power Hub in the balkans”. (Palgrave Mac-Millan, forthcoming.)

157 The court actually eliminated uncomfortable elements from Communist Party circles, precisely those of representatives that remained in bulgaria during the second World War.

158 “По въпроса за перспективното развитие на електроенергетиката в България,” Електроенергия но.6 (Юни, 1957): 1-10, here 5. (“On the issue of Perspective Development of Electricity in bulgaria,” Energy no. 6 (June, 1957): 1-10, here 5).

159 Нанчо Нанчев, “Насоки за развитие на нашата електропроводна система високо и много високо напрежение,“ Електроенергия но.8 (август, 1962): 1. (Nancho Nanchev, “Directions for Future Development of Our Electric Transmission Network High and Very High Voltage,” Energy no. 8 (August, 1962): 1).

160 Nancho Nanchev, “Directions for Future Development of Our Electric Transmission Network”, 1.161 ibid., 2-3.162 in the same year, Albania also joined the Council and left it in 1962. During the following decades, a

few more states became part of the organization: East Germany in 1950, Mongolia in 1962, Cuba in 1972, and Vietnam in 1978. in 1964, Yugoslavia entered into an agreement with the organizational body to participate in its framework for shared value issues. Document quoted from: Edit Team, bulgarian-soviet Relationships, 347-348.

163 Централен държавен архив, Фонд 1244, Опис 1, а.е. 5748, Комиссия по экономическим въпросам СЭВ. Развитие экономики стран-участниц Совета экономической взаимопомощи за 1950-1957, Москва, 1959, 4-10. (Central state Archives, Fund 1244, inventory 1, file 5748, Commission for Economy Questions in COMECON. Economy Development of the COMECON Member States for 1950-1957, Moscow, 1959, 4-10).

164 Zlatko Zlatev, Bulgarian-Soviet Economy Relationships, 150-151. The most used currency was the Us dollar.

165 ibid., 151.166 The Chinese and the Mongolian governments also received financial aid in these early years. ibid., 150.167 Gospodinka Nikova, “CMEA and bulgarian-soviet Economy Relationships,” 163.168 The Warsaw pact served simultaneously to deal with internal and external problems of the social-

ist bloc. This fact again shows the violent character of the communist regimes in the involved states. importantly, Albania withdrew from the pact in the early 1960s, whereas a similar attempt made by Romania in the 1970s was interrupted.

169 bulgarian Academy of science and Academy of science of the UssR bulgarian-Soviet Relationships and Connections, 583.

170 Gospodinka Nikova, “CMEA and bulgarian-soviet Economy Relationships,” 166.171 Централен държавен архив, Фонд 1244, Опис 1, а.е. 4820, Предложения на СССР за

реорганизация в бъдещата дейност на СИВ, 117. Central state Archives, 1244, inventory 1, file 4820, Suggestions made by the USSR for Reorganizations in the Future COMECON Activity, 117.

172 ibid., 111.173 ibid., 113.174 ibid., 116.175 ibid., 117.176 Gospodinka Nikova, “CMEA and bulgarian-soviet Economy Relationships,” 170.177 Central state Archives, 1244, inventory 1, file 4820, 55.

Notes 161

178 ibid., 47.179 Nikova, “CMEA and bulgarian-soviet Economy Relationships,” 172.180 János Kornai defines three main models that characterize the development of the socialist system. The

first is the revolutionary transition system when a particular society transforms from a capitalist to a communist style of governance. The second model is the classic system, or classic socialism. The third model is the reformed system, or reformed socialism. As he stated, no case in the history of a particu-lar country exhibited any of these models being completely fulfilled. For example, East Germany and Czechoslovakia failed to fulfill the last model and went straight to a capitalist system in the late 1980s. The models were created “to ensure abstract summary of the historical realizations of socialist system.” see Kornai, The Socialist System, 39-40.

181 At least this was true about countries such as bulgaria, Romania, and Albania.182 Kornai, The Socialist System, 69.183 ibid., 69-70.184 Tchalakov et al., Networks of Transition, 28.185 Možny, Why so Easy…, 46.186 Dimitrov, Political Report of the Central Committee.187 According to Marxist terminology, a difference exists between the means of production and consumer

goods. The priority is that the first trend (sector A) has to receive more investments than the second (sector b). see Kornai, The Socialist System, 172.

188 CORPORATE AUTHOR Directives of the VIII Congress, 13.189 Yahiel, Todor Jivkov and His Monocracy, 117.190 ibid., 118.191 CORPORATE AUTHOR Directives of the VIII Congress, 11.192 The case of the bulgarian thermal power station in the town of Varna shows how difficulties can ap-

pear when such a large energy enterprise depends on imported coals. The station had six large bodies and used Ukrainian anthracite coals. However, when the black sea ports were frozen in the severe winters, the enterprise had to stop working, causing serious problems for the state power supply. see Högselius et al. (eds.), Europe goes Critical. Tchalakov, Mitev, and Hristov, “becoming a Power Hub”, forthcoming.

193 Možny, Why so Easy…, 78.194 Георги Петров, Крахът на тоталитарната икономика (София: Изд. Наука и изкуство, 1990): 25.

Georgi Petrov, The Collapse of the Totalitarian System (sofia: science and Art Press, 1990): 25.195 Vezenkov, The Power Structures of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 191-192.196 Tchalakov, et al. (ed.) Networks of Transition, 30.197 ivan Tchalakov, “Joseph schumpeter Rethought: The Classic ideas on the innovations in Non-

exchange Economies at Light of some Recent studies of the Communist Economy,” Theorie Vĕdy, Journal for Theory of Science, Technology and Communication Xii, no. 3 (2003): 77-106, here 102.

198 Relating to the two periods in socialist economies, ivan Tchalakov also defines two phases in their development. The first was when the socialist economies achieved a relatively high growth level up till the late 1970s. in the second phase, stratification started within the party elites, which also affected the population, named “the second networks.” see Tchalakov et al. (ed.) Networks of Transition, 27-28; Andrei boundjoulov, “What Comes in the Place of… (Artificial Joints and Networks Under social-ism),” Sociological Problems Journal no. 38 (2006): 388-412, here 402.

199 Michel Callon defines the dynamics of techno-economy networks in: Michel Callon, “Le statut économique des activités de recherche et développement. Éléments pour une analyse dynamique des réseaux technico-économiques,” in: Paris: Représenter, Hybrider, Coordonner. Csi-Ecole des Mines, 1996.

200 boundjoulov, “What Comes in the Place of ”… , 365.201 ibid., 365.202 ivan Tchalakov, “The socialist Entrepreneurs Viewed From the Joint Perspective of Joseph schum-

peter, Actor-Network Theory and Historical sociology of socialism,” in: Research in Social Change, no. 3, issue 1, January (2011), 15-52, here 32.

203 ibid., 31.204 Tchalakov, “socialism as society of Networks,” 28.205 Tchalakov et al. (ed.), Networks of transition, 28.206 The elaboration of the investment plan included directives for reinforced growth formulated from


the top of the political pyramid. inclusion in the plan was also possible for political reasons. in many cases, this was a better strategy for convincing the top-level communist leaders. Finding that inad-equate funds existed for investments was not uncommon, and the administrative apparatus needed to grow; therefore, the apparatus always asked for more funds. Consequently, many projects were started that consumed serious capital but they were not stopped. in this way, the time to finish the projects was always extended, resulting in the consumption of more and more funds. Furthermore, to start a particular project, the state administrative firms had to undergo lengthy terms of negotiations and harmonization with each other. This basic model made the investment policy in the socialist state a laborious and expensive activity. see Kornai, The Socialist System, 129-131, 163-164.

207 Централен държавен архив, фонд 1Б Пленуми и срещи на БКП, Опис 58, а.е. 124, Стенографски протокол от партиен пленум 1975. Заключителна реч на Тодор Живков, 132-133. Central state Archives, Fund 1b Plenums and Meetings of the bulgarian Communist Party, inventory 58, file 124, stenographic protocol from the party plenum 1975. Concluding speech of Todor Zhivkov, 132-133.

208 such steps against economic actors were common in socialist society. Tchalakov et al. (ed.), Networks of Transition, 29.

209 As Tchalakov revealed, a GOELRO electrification plan in the UssR would not have existed without earlier fundamental research in this field. Lenin was able to formulate his slogans because he knew the instruments and he was sure there would be no mistakes. ibid., 30.

210 Kornai, The Socialist System, 61.211 Znepolski, Bulgarian Communism, 211.212 Dimitrov, Political Report of the Committee, 116.213 Znepolski, Bulgarian Communism, 202-205, here 203.214 ibid., 204; the investigator’s assessment of the attitudes of those deployed to construct industrial

objects. This assessment is based on the accounts of the participants in these events. Their terms coincided with the formal adoption of this process in modern historical science. Generally, over the years, the communist propaganda lost its meaning, which was even noted in the official discourse in the media and the press. The author’s observations, on studying the journal “Energy” and the official Communist party organ “Rabotnichesko delo,” also show a mitigation of the ideological propaganda over the years.

215 Možny, Why so Easy…, 69.216 Access to a new automobile during the socialist governance was a matter of waiting for your serial

number on a list, sometimes for 10 to 15 years. 217 ivan Tchalakov also found comparable statements in his conversation (interview) with the former

vice chair of TPP Maritsa East 2, Hristo Hristov. Obviously, the salary rates were important issues in the classical socialist system. see Иван Чалъков, Интервю с Христо Христов бивш заместник директор на ТЕЦ Марица Изток 2. Tchalakov, Interview with Hristo Hristov.

218 ivanov, Reformation Without Reforms, 240-241.219 Георги Наджаков и Кирил Драмалиев, Атомният проблем, (София: Научно-популярна

библиотека, Камара на народната култура, 1946): 30. Georgi Nadjakov and Kiril Dramaliev, The Atomic Problem, (sofia: Popular Library. Chamber of People’s Culture, 1946): 30.

220 sergio sismondo, An Introduction to Science and Technology Studies (Oxford: blackwell Publishing, 2004): 78.

221 Paul Josephson, Red Atom. Russia’s Nuclear Power Program from Stalin to Today (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1999): 13.

222 Josephson, Red Atom, 14; Robert Jungk, Brighter than a Thousand Suns. A Personal History of the Atomic Scientists (New York: Harcourt, brace and Company, 1956): 262; Michio Kaku and Jen-nifer Trainer, Nuclear Power: Both Sides. The Best Arguments for and against the most Controversial Technology (London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1982): 16.

223 Kaku and Trainer, Nuclear Power: Both Sides. see also Jungk, Brighter than a Thousand Suns, 115; Никола Балабанов, От „зайчарника“в Кеймбридж до женевския титан (Пловдив: Университетско издание „Паисий Хилендарски“, 2007): 96-97. Nikola balabanov, From “The Rabbit-Farm” in Cambridge to Geneva’s Titan (Plovdiv, bulgaria: University Press, 2007): 96-97.

224 The laboratories later became famous research centers, №1 as the Ukrainian Physics Technical institute, №2 the Kurchatov institute for Atomic Energy, and №3 the institute of Experimental and Theoretical Physics. ibid., 16.

225 Of course, this was not a unique situation for the socialist bloc. All over the world, the newly emerging

Notes 163

field of nuclear power was emancipated from fundamental nuclear physics, yet both reactor physics and nuclear physics remained linked. The two disciplines ran together under the responsibility of the iAEA. The workings of the organizational umbrella are described below.

226 Пьотр Непорожни (ред.), Электроэнергетика европейских стран-членов Совета Экономической Взаймопомощи (Москва: Энергия, 1978): 129. Pyotr Neporozhni (ed.), Power Development in European States Members of COMECON (Moscow: Energy, 1978): 129.

227 ibid., 130.228 ibid., 131.229 Josephson, Red Atom, 21.230 “О пуске в СССР первой промышленной электростанции на атомной энергии”, Правда но. 182

(Юли, 1954), 1. “For the start of the first industrial nuclear power electricity station in the UssR,” Pravda 182 (July 1954): 1.

231 Josephson, Red Atom, 21.232 Т. Маргуловой (ред.), Атомная энергетика сегодня и завтра (Москва: Высшая школа, 1989): 17.

T. Margulovoi, ed., Nuclear Energy, Now and Tomorrow (Moscow: High school, 1989): 17.233 Живка Гъдева, “Тенденции в развитието на атомната енергетика,“ Електроенергия но. 2

(Февруари, 1962): 23. Zhivka Gadeva, “Tendencies in the Nuclear Power Development Field,” Energy no.2 (February, 1962): 23.

234 Margulovoi, Nuclear Energy, 34; Аркадии Петросьянц, Современные проблемоы атомной науки и техники в СССР (Москва: Атомиздат, 1976): 119. Arkadii Petrosianc, Contemporary Problems of Nuclear Science and Technology in the USSR (Moscow: Atomizdad, 1976): 119.

235 Gadeva, “Tendencies in Nuclear Power,” 23.236 Atsushi Takeda, The Early Days of Nuclear Power Development (Tokyo: Japan international Coopera-

tion Agency, Fundamental Course for Nuclear Power Generation, First edition, 1986): 9.237 Petrosianc, Contemporary Problems, 123.238 Игор Морохов, А. Задикян, и др. (ред.), Атомная наука и техника в СССР (Москва: Атомиздат,

1977): 30. igor Morohov, A. Zadikyan, et al. (eds.), Nuclear Science and Technology in the USSR (Mos-cow: Atomizdat, 1977): 30.

239 Станка Ножарова, „Развитие на съветската ядрена програма,“ Електроенергия 10 (Октомври, 1967): 26. stanka Nozharova, “The Development of the soviet Nuclear Power industry,” Energy no. 10 (October, 1967): 26.; see also Живка Гъдева и В. Цветков, “Съвременно състояние на атомната енергетика,” Електроенергия no. 3 (Март, 1966): 14. Zhivka Gadeva and V. Tzvetkov, “Contempo-rary Conditions of the Nuclear Energy Field and Future Perspectives,” Energy no. 3 (March, 1966): 14.

240 Nozharova, “The Development of the soviet Nuclear Power industry,” 25.241 Josephson, Red Atom, 30.242 ibid., 32.243 Живка Гъдева и А. Велков, „Относно перспективите за развитие на атомната енергетика у нас,“

Електроенергия 6 (1964): 9. Zhivka Gadeva and A. Velkov, “Estimating the Perspectives for Develop-ment of Nuclear Energy in bulgaria,” Energy no. 6 (1964): 9.

244 Morohov, Zadikyan, et al. (eds.) Nuclear Science, 33-34.245 Josephson, Red Atom, 33.246 Morohov, Zadikyan, et al. (eds.) Nuclear Science, 37. see also Takeda, The Early Days, 10; Josephson,

Red Atom, 35.247 Morohov, Zadikyan, et al. (eds.) Nuclear Science, 38-41.248 Source Book: Soviet Designed Nuclear Power Plants in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Armenia, the Czech

Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary and Bulgaria (Fifth edition) (Washington, DC: Nuclear Energy institute, 1997).

249 David bodansky, Nuclear Energy. Principles, Practices and Prospects (New York: springer Press, 2004).250 David bodansky speaks about the dominance of the light water reactors in the Us orders after 1960.

see bodansky, Nuclear Energy, 33.251 Takeda, The Early Days. Thomas b. Allen and Norman Polmar, Rickover, Father of the Nuclear Navy

(Tokyo: Potomac books, 2007); irvin bupp and Jean-Claude Derian, Light Water – How the Nuclear Dream Dissolved (New York: basic books, inc., 1978): 49.

252 Ивайло Христов, Интервю с Митко Янков в АЕЦ Козлодуй, 4 Април, 2008. interview with Mitko iankov at Kozloduy NPP, April 4, 2008.


253 Юрий Митяев, „Проекты реакторов для атомных электростанций,“ Атомная енергия, вып. 1, Том 10, (1960): 86-91, here 89-90. Yurii Mitiaev, “Reactor Projects for Nuclear Power stations”, Nuclear Energy, no 1. January, vol. 10 (1960): 86-91, here 89-90.

254 Morohov, Zadikyan, et al. (eds.) Nuclear Science, 59.255 A nuclear bloc contains not only a reactor but also steam turbines, generators, and other subsections

depending on the type of power reactor. To a great extent, the reactor serves as the center, around which complementary equipment is arranged. Power blocs can be used with RbMK or PWR reactors, among others.

256 The high pressure keeps the water from changing its operating condition (steam), which is important especially due to high temperatures of over 230 °C.

257 Gadeva, “Tendencies in Nuclear Power,” 23.258 For example, graphite reactors need large amounts of graphite as moderator and, in some cases,

helium gas as heat exchanger. The heavy water reactors produced in Canada need heavy water (deute-rium), which is expensive and requires special equipment for extraction. These conditions put PWR in first place based on price, as the main working materials remain cheaper compared to other reactors.

259 interview with engineer Mitko Yankov, 2008.260 At the idaho testing station, an experiment was conducted named bORAX, whereby nuclear reactors

were intentionally destroyed under sub-cooled conditions. such experiments collected important safety data and improved reactors’ characteristics. see Takeda, The Early Days, 14.

261 interviews conducted at Kozloduy NPP. On safety concerns in the soviet Union: Paul Josephson, “Proletarian Aesthetics: stalin and Technology in East Central Europe.” Lecture presented at Plovdiv University workshop, Technology and the Making of Europe, south East European perspectives, February 28, 2008.

262 Morohov, Zadikyan, et al. (eds.) Nuclear Science, 328.263 Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France. Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II

(Cambridge, MA: The MiT Press, 1998); Morohov, Zadikyan, et al. (eds.) Nuclear Science; Josephson, Red Atom; Henry Nielsen and Henrik Knudsen, “Troublesome Life of Peaceful Atoms in Denmark. History and Technology 26 (June 2010): 91-118; Clivia M. sotornayor Torres and Wolfgang Rudig, “Nuclear Power in Argentina and brazil,” Review of Radical Political Economics 15 (1983): 67-82; Henry Nielsen, Keld Nielsen, Flemming Petersen and Hans sigaard Jensen, “ Risøand the Attempts to introduce Nuclear Power into Denmark,” Centaurus 41 (1999): 64-92; J. Lagaaij and P. Verbong, “Different Visions of Power, the introduction of Nuclear Power in the Netherlands 1955-1970,” Centaurus 41 (1999): 37-63; Cathryn Carson, “Nuclear Energy Development in Postwar West Germany: struggles over Cooperation in the Federal Republic’s First Reactor station, History and Technology 18 (2002): 233-270; Arne Kaijser, “Redirecting Power: swedish Nuclear Power Policies in Historical Perspectives,” Annual Review of Energy and the Environment 17 (1992): 437-462.

264 Николина Сретенова, Университетът и физиците. Началото. (София: Херон Прес, 2000): 150-151. Nikolina sretenova, The University and the Physicians. Beginning. (sofia: Heron Press, 2000): 150-151. see also Научен симпозиум, Развитие и разпространение на физическите знания в България (Пловдив: Университетско издателство „Паисий Хилендарски, 2005):36. scientific symposium, Distribution and Development of Physical Knowledge in Bulgaria (Plovdiv: Paisii Hilen-darski University Press, 2005): 36.

265 Elisaveta Karamihailova was born in 1897. Her father, ivan Karamihailov, graduated from Robert College in Constantinople then specialized in medicine in Vienna. There he met and married Mary slade, who was English. Elisaveta’s family lived in Vienna until 1907, when they returned to bulgaria. Her father bought a large house in sofia and started practicing medicine at a private clinic. He also es-tablished a Red Cross hospital, which later became the best hospital in the country. Karmihailova was primarily educated by her mother. she, her brother, and her sister, had lessons in German, English, art, piano, and bulgarian. After being taught at home, Elisaveta attended the First sofia Gymnasium for girls.

266 Elisaveta Karamihailova’s biography was generously placed at my disposal by Professor Nikola balabanov, now Director of the Nuclear Physics department at Plovdiv University. He was one of her students during the 1960s, and his personal memoirs are also part of this volume. The biography is also published in: Никола Балабанов, По магистралите на българската физика (Пловдив: Университетско издателство „Паисий Хилендарски”, 2010): 139-140. Nikola balabanov, Over the Nuclear Physics Highways (Plovdiv: Paisii Hilendarski University Press, 2010). Also: Nikolina

Notes 165

sretenova, The University and the Physicians, 139-140.267 sretenova, The University and the Physicians, 139-140.268 Ани Минкова, „ 60 години катедра ядена физика,“ Годишник на СУ „Климент Охридски“,

Физически факултет 100 (2007): 39. Ani Minkova, “60 Years Nuclear Physics Department,” Annuaire de l’Université de Sofia “St. Kliment Ohridski” Faculté de Physique 100 (2007): 39.

269 During the meetings, balabanov quoted the memoirs of his supervisor, Leon Mitrani, also one of Karamihailova’s PhD students.

270 interestingly, none of the first postgraduate students from the department who went to Moscow continued their work. The second generation, N. Vasileva, sl. Ormandziev, and Tz. bonchev, who found a good research environment in Moscow, after their return did more for the department. Until the 1970s, the nuclear physics department had fewer than twenty people. by 1980, the number had grown tomore than forty. in 1985, a new Nuclear Technology and Nuclear Energy department was established to meet the needs of the bulgarian nuclear program. Minkova, “60 Years Nuclear Physics Department,” 40.

271 Rashko Zaikov was born in the town of burgas in 1901. His father was highly trained in forestry in Poland, while his mother graduated as a dentist in Prague. Zaikov was a very intelligent youngster who at first applied to the military college in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. However, after his first year, he decided that military education was not for him and went to study physics and mathematics in Germany. information on Rashko Zaikov, in: Милен Замфиров, “Професор Рашко Зайков и професор Георги Манев – нов поглед върху конфликта между двамата учени. Годишник на СУ „Климент Охридски“, Физически факултет 101 (2008): 3-4. Milen Zamfirov “Prof Rashko Zaikov and Prof Georgi Manev – a New Point of View on the Conflict between the Two scientists,” Annuaire de l’Université de Sofia “St. Kliment Ohridski” Faculté de Physique 101 (2008): 3-4.

272 Саздо Иванов и Пенка Лазарова, Георги Наджаков (София: Университетско издание „Климент Охридски“, 1989): 151-152. sazdo ivanov and Penka Lazarova, Georgi Nadjakov (sofia: “Kliment Ohridski” University Press, 1989): 151-152.

273 ibid., 152.274 Later, the institute became the University of Plovdiv. 275 in 1968, Leon Mitrani crossed over to the Physiological institute at the bulgarian Academy of science,

where his research was related to human physiology and psychology. His achievements in the field led to his promotion to senior researcher, a title equal to professor. Professor Mitrani was awarded the title Honorary Doctor at the University of Plovdiv in 2001, and the highest bulgarian order, stara Planina. balabanov, Over the Nuclear Physics Highways, 151.

276 ivanov and Lazarova, Georgi Nadjakov, 24.277 ibid., 61.278 ibid., 65.279 Пламен Дамянов, Приносът на БАН за изграждането на ядрената енергетика в България (1954-

1974) (София: Херон Прес, 2008): 77. Plamen Damianov, Bulgarian Academy of Science Contribution for Establishing Nuclear Energy Industry in the State (1954-1974) (sofia: Heron Press Ltd., 2008): 77.

280 Damianov, Bulgarian Academy of Science, 76-78.281 Българска академия на науките и Академия на науките на СССР. Българо-съветски отношения.

Документи и материали Том ii, Септември 1944-Декември 1958 (София, Издателство на БАН, 1981). bulgarian Academy of science and Academy of science of the UssR Bulgarian-Soviet Relationships and Connections. Documents and Materials. Volume II, September 1944-December 1958 (sofia: bulgarian Academy of science Press, 1981): 295.

282 Morohov, Zadikyan, et al. (eds.) Nuclear Science, 331.283 Annuaire de l’Université de Sofia, 34.284 John Krige, American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe (Cambridge, MA

and London: The MiT Press, 2006): 170-171.285 John Krige, “The Peaceful Atom as a Political Weapon: EURATOM and American Foreign Policy in

the Late 1950s,” Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences 38 (Winter 2008): 5-44, here 7.286 ibid., 154; Damianov, Bulgarian Academy of Science, 77.287 bulgarian Academy of science and Academy of science of the UssR, Bulgarian-Soviet Relationships

and Connections, 456.288 ibid., 456-457.289 ibid., 458.


290 Morohov, Zadikyan et al. (eds.) Nuclear Science and Technology, 328.291 The bulgarian state used this soviet policy by taking credit with low interest and extended terms for

liquidation. see Даниел Вачков и Мартин Иванов, Българският външен дълг 1944-1989 (София: Института за изследване на близкото минало и Институт Отворено общество, 2008): 128-129. Daniel Vachkov and Martin ivanov, The Bulgarian Depth 1944-1989 (sofia: institute for Near Past investigation, Open society institute, 2008): 128-129.

292 Dolores Augustine, Red Prometheus. Engineering and Dictatorship in East Germany, 1945-1990. (Cam-bridge: The MiT Press, 2007): 85.

293 Мартин Иванов, Реформаторство без реформи. Политическа Икономия на българския комунизъм (София: Института за изследване на близкото минало и Институт Отворено общество, 2008): 246-247. Martin ivanov, Reformation without Reforms. Political Economy of the Bulgarian Socialism. 1962-1989 (sofia: institute for Near Past investigation, 2008): 246-247.

294 in Revolution of the Proletariat vs. Revolution of the Technocracy, Martin ivanov gives examples of how Moscow influenced negotiations for signing contracts between the bulgarian Government and firms from Japan, Western Germany, or other capitalist states. see ibid., 228-271.

295 М. Грон и М. Воришек, „Чехословашкият реактор с твърда вода на нулева мощност,“ Ядрена енергетика 38 (1975): 263-269. M. Gron and M. Vořišek, “Czechoslovakian Heavy Water Reactor of Zero Power,” Atomic Energy 38 (1975): 263-269. The idea for establishing such a station originated be-cause of the rich natural uranium sources in Czechoslovakia and the state’s vast experience in nuclear physics. Although the Czechoslovakians lacked the know-how to develop the station on their own, their efforts to build the station gave their specialists very valuable experience for other projects.

296 25 Години български атомен реактор (София: Издателство на БАН, 1986): 12. 25 Years Bulgarian Nuclear Reactor (sofia: Publishing House of the bulgarian Academy of science, 1986): 12.

297 E. Ryazancev, “Anniversaries. 50th Anniversary of the iRT Reactor. (History of Creation and Develop-ment),” Atomic Energy 104, no. 6 (2008): 359.

298 Христо Христов, ред., Десет години български атомен реактор (София: Издателство на БАН, 1972): 3. Hristo Hristov, ed., Ten Years Bulgarian Nuclear Reactor (sofia: bulgarian Academy of sci-ence Press, 1972): 3.

299 Hristov, Ten Years, 5.300 Currently, it is inside the city.301 25 Years Bulgarian Nuclear Reactor, 6.302 ivanov and Lazarova, Georgi Nadjakov, 88. see also: 25 Years Bulgarian Nuclear Reactor, 12.303 ibid., 12-13. see also http://www.inrne.bas.bg/fce/001/0069/files/irt-2000_brochure.pdf 304 25 Years Bulgarian Nuclear Reactor, 17.305 ibid., 37.306 Hristov, (ed.), Ten Years, 5.307 25 Years Bulgarian Nuclear Reactor, 46.308 Plamen Damianov, Bulgarian Academy of Science, 43-53; 25 Years Bulgarian nuclear reactor, 152.309 ivaylo Hristov, interview with senior researcher Natalia ianeva at the bulgarian experimental reactor

iRT-2000, sofia, on April 20, 2008. see also: Proceedings of an International Conference on Nuclear Power Experience held by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, 13-17 September 1982. Volume I (Vienna: iMEA, 1983): 373.

310 Damianov, Bulgarian Academy of Science, 54.311 25 Years Bulgarian Nuclear Reactor, 89.312 Централен държавен архив, Перспективен научно-изследователски план на ФИ с АНЕБ при

БАН за периодите 1960-1965 г. и 1966-1975 г. План за перспективното развитие на ядрената физика, Фонд 978, Опис 1, а.е. 35, 13. Perspective Research and Scientific Plan of the Physical Institute with Nuclear Research Base under Bulgarian Academy of Science for the Periods 1960-1965 and 1966-1975. Plan for Perspective Development of Nuclear Physics, bulgarian Central state Archive, 978, inven-tory 1, file 35, 13.

313 ibid., 20.314 ibid., 13.315 Лиляна Александриева и Александър Каракачанов, Независимо сдружение Екогласност 1989

(София:Издателство Сиела, 2009): 50-51. Liliana Aleksandrieva and Aleksandar Karakachanov, Independent Society of Ecoglasnost 1989 (sofia; siela Press, 2009): 50-51.

316 Damianov, Bulgarian Academy of Science, 43-54.

Notes 167

317 sergio sismondo, An Introduction to Science and Technology Studies, 81.318 These organizations can be studied as transnational system builders, see e.g. Erik van der Vleuten

and Arne Kaijser (ed.), Networking Europe. Transnational infrastructures and the shaping of Europe (sagamore beach: science History Publications, 2006): 305; Erik van der Vleuten, irene Anastasiadou, Vincent Lagendijk & Frank schipper, “Europe’s system builders: The Contested shaping of Transna-tional Road, Electricity and Rail Networks,” Contemporary European History 16, no. 3 (2007): 321-347.

319 David Fischer, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: the First Forty Years (Vienna: iAEA, 1997): 1.

320 Gabrielle Hecht, “Negotiating Global Nuclearities: Apartheid, Decolonization, and the Cold War in the making of the iAEA,” in John Krige and Kai-Henrik barth, eds., Global Power Knowledge: Science, Technology, and International Affairs, Osiris 21 (University of Chicago Press, 2006): 47.

321 Архив на Министерство на външните работи, МААЕ и някои въпроси свързани с нашето участие в нея, Фонд Международни отношения и договори, Опис 16, а.е. 253, (1970): 1. IAEA and Some Questions Related to our Participation in it, international Relations and Contracts (iRC), inventory 16, file 253 (sofia: bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, 1970): 1.

322 The iAEA’s official historian, David Fisher, describes in more detail the organization’s main aims. Those that significantly affected the East European socialist states are important for this research. For the full list of aims, see David Fischer, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty Years (Vienna: iAEA, 1997): 35-36.

323 On June 30, 1955, the Czechoslovakian Government issued a decree for “Research and Peaceful Utilization of Nuclear Energy Establishment.” The decree came after the agreement with the UssR for mutual assistance in nuclear energy and only two years later, Czechoslovakia’s experimental reac-tor VVR-s went operational. see Jana Frydryšková, “importance of Peaceful Utilization of Nuclear Energy,” Acta Polytechnica 49 (2009): 86-89, here 88.

324 The eight regions were North America, Latin America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Africa and the Middle East, south Asia, south East Asia and the Pacific, and the Far East. see David Fisher, His-tory of the International Atomic, 39.

325 Централен Държавен архив, Фонд 978, Исторически преглед, 1. bulgarian Central state Archives, 978, Historical Preview, 1.

326 ibid., 1-2.327 ibid., 2.328 Централен държавен архив, Протоколи, доклади, справки и други от ръководители

на делегации участвали на заседания на ПК на СИВ за сътрудничество в областта на използването на ядрената енергия за мирни цели 1961-1967, Фонд 521, Опис 1, а.е. 385, 1-118, here 44-45, 50. Protocols, Reports, Information etc. from Delegation Leaders that Participated in the Standing Commission on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 1961-1967 inventory 1, file 385 (sofia: bulgarian Central state Archives, 521): 1-118, here 44-45, 50.

329 Архив на Министерство на външните работи, Разпореждане на министерски съвет за създаване на КМИАЕ и правилник за дейността му. Фонд Международни отношения и договори, Опис 18, а.е. 236 (1972): 1-2. Order from the Ministry Council for Establishing the Committee for Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy and Regulations for its Activity, international Relations and Contracts (iRC), inventory 18, file 236 (sofia: bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, 1972): 1-2.

330 Централен държавен архив, Спогодба за сътрудничество между СИВ и МААЕ Виена, Австрия 26 септември 1975, Фонд 1244, Опис 1, а.е.1582. (1975): 1-5. Agreement on Cooperation between CMEA and IAEA. Vienna, Austria,September 26, 1975, bulgarian Central state Archives, 1244, inven-tory 1, file 1582, (1975): 1-5.

331 The political issue was also a problem for spreading and appropriating the iAEA safeguards dur-ing this initial period. see M. Kratzer, “Historical Overview of international safeguards,” in Nuclear Power Experience, Proceedings of an International Conference on Nuclear Power Experience held by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, September 13-17, 1982, Volume V (Vienna: iAEA, 1983): 280.

332 UK speaker D.E.H. Peirson commented at the Fourth international Geneva conference, “CERN, as it has been frequently remarked, is fortunate in generating information which has no commercial value; moreover, its creation and its continuance have been largely the concern of Governments and to hardly any extent of industry.” see D. Peirson, “international Cooperation in Nuclear Projects and


Exchange of information,” in Nuclear Power Experience, Proceedings of an International Conference on Nuclear Power Experience held by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, September 13-17, 1982. Volume I (Vienna: iAEA, 1983): 656.

333 see the official site of the Joint institute in Dubna, http://wwwinfo.jinr.ru/dubna-e.htm February 2, 2013.

334 Morohov and Zadikyan, et al. (eds.) Nuclear Science, 328-329.335 Архив на Министерство на външните работи, България и СИВ. „Интератоминструмент“ и

„Интератоменерго“, Фонд Международни отношения и договори, Опис 26, а.е. 147 (1980): 70. Bulgaria and COMECON. “Interatominstrument” and “Interatomenergo”, international Relations and Contracts (iRC), inventory 26, file 147 (sofia: bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, 1980): 70.

336 Protocols, Reports, Information 521, inventory 1, file 385 (sofia: bulgarian Central state Archives): 50.337 ibid. Romania’s share depended on its participation in this year as the state opposed the organizational

framework.338 Ивайло Христов, Интервю с Наталия Янева в Българския експериментален реактор, София, 20

Април, 2008. (ivaylo Hristov, interview with Natalia ianeva, April 20, 2008). On the other hand, the political situation forced the Chinese specialists to cut their relationships with the scientific com-munity in Dubna. such examples demonstrate clearly the significant influence of policy on nuclear scientific work.

339 ivanov and Lazarova, Georgi Nadjakov: 86.340 Hristov, ed., Ten Years, 5.341 bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, Bulgaria and COMECON. “Interatominstrument” and

“Interatomenergo,” 66.342 bulgarian Academy of science and Academy of science of the UssR Bulgarian-Soviet Relationships

and Connections, 808-809.343 Bulgaria and COMECON. “Interatominstrument” and “Interatomenergo,” 70.344 Hristov, interview with Natalia Yaneva, April 20, 2008.345 slogan of the workers at Kozloduy NPP. see: Лили Парлапанова, “Интервю с Овед Таджер.

Перспективите на ядрената енергетика в нашата страна,”Електроенергия, но. 8-9 (август-септември, 1976): 1-5, here 3. Lili Parlapanova, “interview with Oved Tadzher. Perspectives of Nuclear Energy in our Country,” Energy no. 8-9 (August-september, 1976): 1-5, here 3.

346 Петър Данаилов, „Доклад оносно АЕЦ Козлодуй,“, Електроенергия, но.9 (септември, 1974):6-8, here 7. Petar Danailov, “Report about Kozloduy NPP,” Energy no. 9 (september, 1974): 6-8, here 7.

347 Централен държавен архив, Трето заседание на постоянната комисия за мирно използване на атомната енергия. Протокол 3. Фонд 1244, Опис 1, а.е. 1523, (30 ноември-3 декември 1961): 62-71. Third Meeting of the Permanent Commission on the Peaceful uses of Atomic Energy. Protocol 3 Fund 1244, inventory 1, file 1523 (bulgarian Central state Archives, Moscow, 30 November-3 December 1961): 62-71. see also D. Morohov, G. Afonin, Yu balasanov, b. semenov, and i. smolin, i., “international Cooperation by the UssR in the Peaceful Utilization of Atomic Energy.” in Nuclear Power Experience, Proceedings of an International Conference on Nuclear Power Experience held by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, 13-17 September 1982. Volume I (Vienna: iAEA, 1983): 667-681, here 668.

348 The problems within the organization relating to its commercial and economic activities caused tensions that remained till the end. For more information, see Marie Lavigne, International Political Economy and Socialism (Cambridge, Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 1991): 171; Paul Marer, “Prospects for integration in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance,” International Organization 30, no. 4 (Autumn, 1976): 631-648, here 635; Darko beckich, “soviet Goals in Yugoslavia and the bal-kans,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 481 (september, 1985): 81-91, here 87. Януш Корнай, Социалистическата система. Политическа икономия на комунизма (София: Академично Издателство “Професор Марин Дринов, 1996): 332. János Kornai, The Socialist System. The Political Economy of Communism (sofia: Academy Press, 1996): 332.

349 see Kornai, The Socialist System, 332-333.350 Нико Яхиел, Тодор Живков и личната власт. Спомени, документи, анализи (София:

Издателство М&М, 1997): 191. Niko Yahiel, Todor Zhivkov and His Monocracy. Memories, Docu-ments, Analyses (sofia: M&M Press, 1997): 191.

351 ibid., 192.

Notes 169

352 Kornai, The Socialist System, 334-335.353 ivan Tchalakov and Peter burton (eds.), Project Tactics. Final Reports Prepared for the European Com-

mission (sofia: LiK Publishing House, 2001): 268.354 Станка Ножарова, “Българското участие в Секция 5 на постоянната комисия на СИВ по

Електроенергия,” Електроенергия но. 4 (aприл, 1981): 30-31. stanka Nozharova, “bulgarian Par-ticipation in section 5 in Comecon Permanent Commission for Electricity” Energy no. 4 (April, 1981): 30-31.

355 Централен държавен архив. Положение о Постоянной Комисии Совета Экономической Взаймопомощи по использванию атомной энергии в мирных целях. Фонд 1244, Опис 1, а.е. 1525, (Москва, 1963):1. Status. The Permanent Commission on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Fund 1244, inventory 1, file 1525 (bulgarian Central state Archives, Moscow, 1963): 1).

356 Централен държавен архив, Вторая сесия ПКИАЕМЦ Протокол 2, Фонд 1244, Опис 1, а.е.1522 (Москва, 1961): 16-17. second Meeting of the Permanent Commission on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. Protocol 2 Fund 1244, inventory 1, file 1522 (bulgarian Central state Archives, Mos-cow 1961): 16-17.

357 Централен държавен архив, Доклад: Постоянной Комиссии по использованию атомной энергии в мирных целях о проделанной работе за истекший период (октябрь 1960-октябрь 1961) и направлении ее деятельности на 1962 год.,Фонд 1244, опис 1, а.е.1523 (Москва, 1961): 3. Report: The Permanent Commission on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy about the Implemented Work for the Period (October 1960-October 1961) and Directions for Future Activities for 1962 Fund 1244, inventory 1, file 1523 (bulgarian Central state archives, Moscow, 1961): 3.

358 ibid., 5.359 Постановление: Постоянной Комиссии по использованию атомной энергии в мирных целях

по докладу Председателья Комисий об итогах работы Комисии за 1962 и задачах, вытекающих из решений XVi сессии Совета Экономической Взаимопомощи, Фонд 1244, Опис1, а.е. 1524 (Дубна, 1962): 12. Тhe Permanent Commission on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy for 1962 and Future Tasks Coming From the Decisions Made During the XVI CMEA Session Fund 1244, inventory 1, file 1524 (bulgarian Central state Archives, Dubna, 1962), 12.

360 ibid., 13.361 Report: The Permanent Commission on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy about the Implemented Work

for the Period (October 1960-October 1961) and Directions for Future Activities for 1962 Fund 1244, inventory 1, file 1523 (bulgarian Central state archives, sofia, 1961), 67.

362 ibid., 70.363 ibid., 70.364 see: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf93.html February 7, 2013.365 Централен държавен архив, Доклад от председателя на КМИАЕ проф. Иван Попов до

председателя на МС др. Тодор Живков относно развитието на ядреното приборостроене,Фонд 978, Опис 1, а.е. 36 (София, 1965): 1. Report from the Director of the Bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Agency Professor Ivan Popov to the President of the Ministry Council Todor Zhivkov about the Develop-ment of Nuclear Equipment Building Fund 978, inventory 1, file 36 (bulgarian Central state archives, sofia, 1965): 1.

366 ibid., 2-3.367 Централен държавен архив, Основные направления работы органов СЭВ в Области

стандартизации на 1966-1970 г. Доклад, Фонд 978, Опис, а.е. 283 (Москва, 1964): 5. Main Working Directions of the CMEA Organizations in Standardization Sphere 1966-1970 Fund 978, inventory 1, file 283 (Moscow: bulgarian Central state archives, 1964): 5. The standardization problem appeared in the mid-1960s in most CMEA branches. To resolve the problem between the XiV and XViii CMEA sessions, various steps were taken to unify and standardize production in the socialist bloc. important recommendations by the CMEA administration and leaders were to examine and apply the experi-ence of worldwide organizations in the field, such as the international standardization Organization (isO), international Electrotechnical Commission (iEC), European Committee for standardization (CEN) in the CMEA framework. ibid., 22-23.

368 Централен държавен архив, Протокол совещания экспертов стран-членов СЭВ о многостороннем сотрудничестве системе “CAMAC” состоялись в 1976 году, Фонд 978, Опис 1, а.е. 204 (Москва, 1976): 98. Protocols from CMEA Member States Conferences of the Specialists Con-cerning Questions about International Cooperation in “CAMAC” System Sphere, Implemented in 1976,


Fund 978, inventory 1, file 204 (bulgarian Central state Archives, Moscow, 1976): 98.369 Централен държавен архив, Съглашение, устав, правила, списък и др. от второто заседание

на Подготвителния комитет за създаване на международно стопанско обединение по ядрено приборостроене „Интератоминструмент” (МСО „ИАИ”) състояло се през 1971 от 12 до 23 януари във Варшава, Фонд 978, Опис 1, а.е. 201 (Варшава, 1971): 17. Agreement, Organization Chart, Rules, List and Others from the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for Establishing International Economy Union for Nuclear Equipment “Interatominstrument” (IAI) Launched in 1971 from 12 to 23 January in Warsaw Fund 978, inventory 1, file 201 (bulgarian Central ssate Archives, Warsaw, 1971): 17.

370 ibid., 35-36.371 ibid., 37.372 ibid., 39.373 Protocols from CMEA Member States Conferences of the Specialists Concerning Questions about Interna-

tional Cooperation in “CAMAC” System Sphere, Implemented in 1976, Fund 978, inventory 1, file 204 (bulgarian Central state Archives, Moscow, 1976): 103.

374 ibid., 104-105.375 Централен държавен архив, Доклад, предложения, и докладна записка, относно създаване на

научно-производствено обединение „Ядрена техника” към Комитета за наука и технически прогрес и висше образование. Фонд 978, опис 1, а.е.40 (София, 1975): 33. Report, Recommenda-tions and Report Note Concerning the Establishment of Scientific Production Union “Nuclear Technique” under the Scientific and Technological Committee for Progress and High Education Fund 978, inventory 1, file 40 (bulgarian Central state archives, sofia, 1975): 33.

376 Архив на Министерство на външните работи, България и СИВ. „Интератоминструмент“ и „Интератоменерго“, Фонд Международни отношения и договори (МОД), Опис 26, а.е.147, (1980): 72-73. Bulgaria and Comecon. “Interatominstrument” and “Interatomenergo” Fund internation-al Relations and Contracts (iRC), inventory 26, file 147 (sofia: bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, 1980), 72-73.

377 ibid., 72-73.378 ibid., 76.379 irvin bupp and Jean-Claude Derian, Light Water. How the Nuclear Dream Dissolved (New York: basic

books inc., 1978): 7-8.380 The question reappeared at the first conference in Geneva in reports comparing the profitability of

thermal and nuclear power stations. based on these reports, bulgarian engineer D. Lalov concluded in his overview on the future of nuclear power plants that “nuclear plants will be applied during the initial period of their existence in areas without coals or with small deposits of coals”; Д. Лалов, “Бъдещите атомни електроцентрали по докладите изнесени на женевската конференция,” Електроенергия но. 3-4 (март-април, 1956): 7-11, here 11. D. Lalov, “The Future of the Nuclear Power stations, based on the Reports from the First Geneva Conference,” Energy no. 3-4 (March-April, 1956): 7-11, here 11.

381 in some cases, with particular types of reactors, the residual plutonium was used for producing mili-tary weapons. in other situations, such as in bulgaria, the extra amount of electricity was exported.

382 Report about the Work of the Permanent Commission on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in 1962 and the Tasks from the XVI Session of CMEA Fund 1244, inventory 1, file 1524 (bulgarian Central state archives, sofia, 1962), 19; Vasilii Emelianov was also vice-chair of the soviet Committee for the Peace-ful Uses of Atomic Energy.

383 ibid., 20.384 ibid., 20.385 Г. Ермаков, “Строительство атомных электростанций в странах- членов СЭВ,” Атомная техника

за рубежом но.4, (1970): 3-9, here 5. G. Ermakov, “The Establishment of Nuclear Power stations in CMEA Member states,” Nuclear Energy Abroad no. 4 (1970): 3-9, here 5.

386 M. Щенбек, “Ядерная энергетика ГДР,” Атомная техника за рубежом но.4 (1970): 9-12, here 12. M. shtenbek, “Nuclear Energy in GDR,” Nuclear Energy Abroad no. 4, (1970): 9-12, here 12.

387 Д. Морохов, А. Задикян, и др. (ред.), Атомная наука и техника в СССР (Москва: Атомиздат, 1977): 331. D. Morohov, A. Zadikyan, et al. (eds.) Nuclear Science and Technology in USSR (Moscow: Atomizdat, 1977): 331.

388 “The Activities of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Connected with the Use of Atomic

Notes 171

Energy for Peaceful Purposes.” in Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. Proceedings of the Fourth Interna-tional Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Jointly Sponsored by the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency and held in Geneva, 6-16 September 1971. Volume I (New York: United Nations, Vienna: iAEA, 1972): 695-705, 698.

389 ibid., 698.390 ibid., 698.391 ibid., 699.392 Архив на Министерство на външните работи, Предварително съвещание на

социалистическите страни в Берлин, относно 4 международна конферениция в Женева и XV генерална конференция на МААЕ във Виена.Фонд МОД, Опис 18, а.е. 220 (София, 1972): 20. Preliminary Meeting among the socialist states in berlin Concerning the Fourth international Conference in Geneva and the XV General Conference of IAEA in Vienna Fund iRC, inventory 18, file 220 (bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sofia Archive, 1972): 20.

393 David Fischer, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty Years (Vienna, Aus-tria: iAEA, 1997), 249-252.

394 Архив на Министерство на външните работи, НРБ приема системата за гаранции на МААЕ по отношение на Физическия институт на БАН, Фонд МОД, Опис 15, а.е.17 (София, 1969): 1. Peo-ple’s Republic of Bulgaria Accepts the Safeguard System of IAEA on the Experimental Reactor IRT – 2000 inventory 15, File 17 (bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, sofia, 1969): 1.

395 Архив на Министерство на външните работи, Сесия на комитета по изменения на чл. 6 на устава на МААЕ и консултация между предствители на страните на социалистическия лагер, Фонд МОД, Опис 16, а.е.210 (София, 1970): 76. Sessions of the Committee for Appropriating Changes of Paragraph VI of IAEA Statute and Consultations between Socialist States Members (iRC), inventory 16, file 210 (bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, sofia, 1970): 76.

396 At that time, the italian representatives proposed expanding the board of Governors with two more positions: italy and West Germany.

397 Sessions of the Committee for Appropriating Changes, 10.398 ibid., 33-38.399 ibid., 34.400 ibid., 36.401 Högselius et al (eds.), Europe goes Critical. The Making of Transnational Infrastructure Vulnerabilities.

in this issue, ivan Tchalakov, Tihomir Mitev, and ivaylo Hristov, “becoming a Power Hub of the bal-kans”. (Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming).

402 “Основни задачи на нашата електроенергетика през 1962,” Електроенергия, но. 11-12 (ноември-декември 1961): 1-2. “Main Tasks of our Electricity industry for 1962,” Energy no. 11-12, (November-December, 1961): 1-2.

403 The Maritza is the largest river in south bulgaria. it also serves as a border between Greece and Euro-pean Turkey.

404 “Main Tasks of our Electricity industry for 1962,” Energy, no. 11-12, 2.405 During the eighth congress of the bulgarian Communist Party, a “twenty-year perspective plan” was

approved. One of the plan’s main directives in the energy sector was to increase production from thermal power stations and lignite coal mining. CORPORATE AUTHOR Директиви на осмият конгрес на БКП за развитието на Народна Република България за периода 1961-1980 (София: Издателство на БКП, 1962): 15. CORPORATE AUTHOR Directives of the VIII Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party about the Development of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria in the Period 1961–1980 (sofia: bCP Press, 1962): 15.

406 Пётър Непорожни (ред.), Электроэнергетика европейских стран-членов Совета Экономической Взаймопомощи (Москва: Энергия, 1978): 24. Peter Neporozhni (ed.), Power Development in European States Members of COMECON (Moscow: Energy, 1978): 24.

407 Despite bulgaria’s low hydro potential, major hydro stations with relatively high potential were es-tablished, most of them in the south, in the Rilo-Rodopian mountain region. The state’s hydro power capacity reached 1,718 megawatts at the beginning of 1976. see Peter Neporozhni, Power Develop-ment, 30.

408 Högselius et al (eds.), Europe goes Critical. . in this issue, Tchalakov, Mitev, and Hristov, “becoming a Power Hub,” 19.

409 ibid., 18.


410 Ю. Савенко и М. Самков, Обьединенные электроэнергетические системы стран-членов СЭВ (Мсква: СЭВ, 1983): 35. Y. savenko and M. samkov, Unification of Electro-energetic Systems of the Comecon Members (Moscow: Comecon, 1983): 35.

411 Авторски колектив, Българо-съветски отношения и връзки. Документи и материали. 1948-1970 (София: Партиздат, 1982): 582-583. Edit Team, Bulgarian-Soviet Relationships and Connections. Documents and Materials. 1948-1970 (sofia: Partizdat, 1982), 325-326.

412 Министерство на Външните работи на НРБ и Министерство на Външните работи на СССР. Българо-съветски отношения. Документи и материали. 1948-1970 (София: Партиздат, 1982). (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of bulgaria and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of UssR. Bulgarian-Soviet Relationships and Connections. Documents and Materials. 1948-1970 (sofia: Partizdat, 1982): 582-583.

413 savenko and samkov, Unification of Electro-energetic Systems, 10.414 in February 1981 the bulgarian journal Energy celebrated the Commission’s 25th year. see:

Георги Блъсков, “Българското участие в Секция 1 на Постоянната комисия на СИВ по Електроенергия,” Електроенергия, но. 2 (февруари, 1981): 31-33. Georgi blaskov, “bulgarian participation in section i of the CMEA Permanent Commission on Electric Power,” Energy no. 2 (February, 1981): 31-33.

415 savenko and samkov, Unification of Electro-energetic Systems, 10.416 Vincent Lagendijk, Electrifying Europe. The Power of Europe in the Construction of Electricity Networks

(Amsterdam: Aksant Academic Publishers, 2008): 181.417 ibid., 11.418 ibid., 2-3.419 “Централното диспечерско управление на обединените енергосистеми на европейските страни

– членки на СИВ,“ Електроенергия но.1 (януари, 1979): 28-30. “Central Dispatch Organization of the integrated Power systems of the European Countries – CMEA members,” Energy no. 1 (January, 1979): 28-30.

420 Генчо Калайков, “Десет години диспечерско управление на обединените енергийни сиситеми МИР,“ Електроенегия, но. 9 (септември, 1972): 1-5, here 2. Gencho Kalaykov, “Ten Years Central Dispatch Organization of the integrated Power systems Peace,” Energy no. 9 (september, 1972): 1-5, here 2.

421 Kalaykov, “Ten Years Central Dispatch Organization,” 2.422 Г. Методиев, “България се свързва с обединените енергийни системи на страните – членки на

Съвета за икономическа взаимопoмощ,“ Електроенергия, но. 6 (юни, 1967): 22-24. G. Metodiev, “Connecting bulgaria with the integrated Power systems of the European countries – CMEA Mem-bers,” Energy no. 6 (June, 1967): 22-24.

423 Мире Спиров, Атанас Георгиев, и Младен Цонев, Българската електрификация. Кратка история. (София: Издателство Херон, 1998): 335. Mire spirov, Atanas Georgiev, and Mladen Tso-nev, Bulgarian Electrification. Concise History (sofia: Heron Press, 1998): 335.

424 Никола Минев, и др., “Електропреносната връзка 400kV Съветския съюз – Народна република България,” Електроенергия но. 7-8 (юли-август, 1972): 5-11. Nikola Minev, et al., “400 kV Power Connection soviet Union – People’s Republic of bulgaria,” Energy, no. 7-8 (July-August, 1972): 5-11.

425 ibid., 5.426 “Тържествено откриване на електропровода 400kV Съветския съюз – Народна република

България,“ Електроенергия, но 7-8 (юли-август, 1972): 1-2. “inauguration of the 400 kV Power Line soviet Union – People’s Republic of bulgaria,” Energy no. 7-8 (July-August, 1972): 1-2.

427 Minev, “400 kV Power Connection,” 11.428 Ростислав Гринюк и Витолд Витев, “Централното диспечерско управление на Обединените

енергийни системи,“ Електроенергия но. 5 (май, 1981): 53. Rostislav Griniuk and Vitold Vitek, “Central Dispatch Organization of the integrated Electricity systems,” Energy no. 5, (May, 1981): 53.

429 Ст. Караджиев и Д. Лалов, “Атомната енергия и нейното използване,“ Електроенергия, но. 10 (Октомври, 1954): 5-15, here 15. st. Karadjiev and D. Lalov, “Nuclear Energy and its Usage,” Energy no. 10 (October, 1954): 5-15, here 15.

430 “Атомната електроцентрала на академията на науките на СССР,“ Електроенергия, но. 7-8 (юли-август, 1955): 3-5. “soviet Academy of science NPP,” Energy no. 7-8 (July-August, 1955): 3-5. see also: В. Петражилка, “Перспективи за използване атомната енергия за добиване на електроенергия,” Електроенергия, но. 7-8 (юли-август, 1955): 5-14, here 14. Petrajilka, “Perspectives for Using Nu-

Notes 173

clear Power for Producing Electricity,” (July-August, 1955): 5-14, here 14.431 Lalov, “The Future of the Nuclear Power stations,” 7-11, here 7.432 И. Пандев, И. Tрайков и С. Русев, “Атомните електроцентрали – бъдещето на световната

енергетика,“ Електроенергия но. 6 (юни, 1957): 10-12, here 12. i. Pandev, i. Traykov, and s. Ruskov, “Nuclear stations – the Future of Worlds Energy,” Energy no. 6 (June, 1957): 10-12, here 12.

433 М. Калбуров, “Нашата енергетика в най-близка перспектива,“ Електроенергия, но.8, (август, 1957): 11-14, here 12. M. Kalburov, “Our Energy industry in the Nearest Perspective,” Energy no. 8 (August, 1957): 11-14, here 12.

434 Никола Николов “За необходимостта от изграждането у нас на атомни електрически централи,“ Електроенергия но. 10-11 (октомври-ноември, 1958): 3-7, here 5. Nikola Nikolov, “For the Necessity of Establishing in our Country Nuclear Power Plant,” Energy, no. 10-11 (October-November, 1958): 3-7, here 5.

435 Part of the report was published in Energy by engineer Zhivka Gadeva and economist A. Velkov. see: Живка Гъдева и А. Велков, “Относно перспективите за развитие на атомната енергетика у нас,” Електроенергия но 6 (Юни, 1964): 5-9. Zhivka Gadeva and A. Velkov, “Estimating the Perspectives for Development of Nuclear Energy in bulgaria,” Energy no. 6 (June, 1964): 5-9.

436 Живка Гъдева и В. Цветков, “Съвременно състояние на атомната енергетика и перспективи за развитие,” Електроенергия но 3 (Март, 1966): 13-18, here 13. Zhivka Gadeva and st. Cvetkov, “Contemporary Condition of the Atomic Energy and Perspectives for its Development,” Energy no. 3 (March, 1966): 13-18, here 13.

437 CORPORATE AUTHOR, IX конгрес на Българската комунистическа партия. 14 Ноември-19 Ноември 1966. Стенографски протокол (София, Издателство на БКП, 1967): 49. CORPORATE AUTHOR, IX Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party. 14-19 November 1966. Stenographic Proto-col (sofia: bulgarian Communist Party Press, 1967): 49.

438 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of bulgaria and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of UssR. Bulgarian-Soviet relationships 1948-1970, 420.

439 ibid., 420-421.440 ibid., 421.441 ibid., 421-424.442 ivan Tchalakov, “The socialist Entrepreneurs Viewed from the Joint Perspective of Joseph schumpeter,

Actor-Network Theory and Historical sociology of socialism,” Research in Social Change, no 3, issue 1, January (2011): 15-51, here 44.

443 ivan Tchalakov described a case for creating a laboratory for research on holographic computer memory. Again, Todor Zhivkov was personally involved in the final decision. The obviously heavy ad-ministrative apparatus was reluctant to accept changes easily. see ivan Tchalakov, Making a Hologram (sofia: Academy Press, 1998), 11; see also ivan Tchalakov, “Control, More Control: studying Practical Forms of scientific Rationality in a bulgarian Holographic Laboratory,” Almagest. International Jour-nal for the History of Scientific Ideas, Brepols 1, no. 1 May (2010): 21-48, here 24-25.

444 Oved Tadzher was vice minister of electrification in the 1980s, and prior to that served as party repre-sentative in the Kozloduy NPP.

445 interview with Oved Tadzher, February 2, 2009. 446 Högselius et al (eds.), Europe goes Critical. Tchalakov, Mitev, and Hristov, “becoming a Power Hub.” 447 “Братска помощ за нашата енергетика,” Електроенергия, но. 2 (февруари, 1964): 1. (“brotherly

Help for our Energy,” Energy no. 2 (February, 1964): 1).448 Централен държавен архив, Доклад за ядрената енергия на симпозиум “Икономически аспекти

на производството на енергия и по-специално на ядрена енергия” Лондон 1969, Фонд 521, Опис 1, а.е. 371 (София, 1969): 151. Report for nuclear energy “Economy Aspects for Energy Produc-tion and Precisely for Nuclear Energy” London 1969, Fund 521, inventory 1, file 371 (bulgarian Central state Archives, sofia, 1969): 151.

449 ibid., 151.450 ibid., 151.451 Живко Живков, Насоки за развитие на енергетиката и за усъвършенствуване топливно-

енергийния баланс на Народна република България. Доклад пред пленума на Централния комитет на Българската комунистическа партия, състоял се на 25-26 ноември 1969. Решение на пленума. (София: Издателство на БКП, 1969): 91-92. Zhivko Zhivkov, Directions for Energy Development and Perfecting Heat-energy Balance of Peoples Republic of Bulgaria. Report in Front of Ple-


num of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party Conducted on 25-26 November 1969. Resolution of the Plenum (sofia: bulgarian Communist Party Press, 1969): 91-92.

452 ibid., 93.453 ibid., 95.454 ibid., 95.455 ibid., 96.456 Александър Везенков, Властовите структури на българската комунистическа партия (1944-

1989) (София: Изд. “Сиела” Института за изследване на близкото минало и Институт Отворено общество, 2008): 159. Aleksander Vezenkov, Governmental Structures of the Bulgarian Communist Party (1944-1989) (sofia: institute for Near Past investigation, Open society institute, 2008): 159.

457 ivaylo Hristov, interview with Oved Tadzher, February 2, 2009.458 ibid.459 K.E. Michelsen (forthcoming), “Transgressing boundaries: Cold War and the Finnish Nuclear Power

Program 1945-1970”, submitted to History and Technology. see also: Högselius et al (eds.), Europe goes Critical. in this issue, K.E. Michelsen, “An Uneasy Alliance: Negotiating transnational infrastruc-tures at the European border,” (Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming).

460 irvin bupp and Jean-Claude Derian, Light Water – How the Nuclear Dream Dissolved (New York: basic books, inc., 1978): 83.

461 ibid., 102.462 Кимон Георгиев, “Българската електрификация,“ Електроенергия но. 3 (март, 1958): 3-5, here 3.

Kimon Georgiev, “bulgaria’s Electrification,” Energy no. 3 (March, 1958): 3-5, here 3.463 Йордан Грозев, “Братската помощ на Съветския същз и сътрудничеството ни със страните

членки на СИВ – могъщ фактор за развитието на нашата енергетика,” Електроенергия но. 4-5 (април-май, 1975): 70-72. Jordan Grozef, “brotherly Help of the soviet Union and our Cooperation with the Comecon Member states,” Energy no. 4-5 (April-May, 1975): 70-72.

464 Милко Тодоров, “Двадесет години Енергопроект,” Електроенергия но. 11 (ноември 1968): 1-2. Milko Todorov,“Twenty Years Energoproekt,” Energy no. 11 (November, 1968): 1-2.

465 ibid., 1.466 Добри Добрев, “Ролята на Енергопроект в проектирането на АЕЦ Козлодуй,” Електроенергия

но. 8-9 (aвгуст-септември, 1976): 46-49, here 46. Dobri Dobrev, “The Role of ‘Energoproekt’ in projecting NPP Kozloduy,” Energy no. 8-9 (August-september, 1976): 46-49, here 46.

467 Dobrev, “The Role of ‘Energoproekt’,” 46.468 ibid., 49.469 ibid., 47.470 Тодор Ламбов и Илия Борисов, Първа атомна козлодуйска (София: Партиздат, 1981): 89. Todor

Lambov and ilia borisov, First Atomic in Kozloduy (sofia: Prtizdat, 1981): 89.471 25 Години български атомен реактор (София: Издателство на БАН, 1986): 7. 25 Years Bulgarian

Nuclear Reactor (sofia: Publishing House of the bulgarian Academy of science, 1986): 7.472 Централен държавен архив, Доклад на генералния директор на ДСО „Енергетика и въглища”

относно набиране, подготовка и поддържане на кадри за експлоатацията на АЕЦ „Козлодуй” (София,1972): 1. Report of the General Director of the State Company “Coal and Energy”. About Per-sonal Recruitment, Training and Supporting Specialists for Kozloduy NPP Exploitation, 978, inventory 1, file 30 (sofia: Central state archives, 1972): 1.

473 ibid., 2-3.474 ibid., 3.475 ibid., 2.476 ivaylo Hristov, interviews with engineers at Kozloduy in April 2008.477 Report of the General Director of State Firm “Coal and Energy”, 3.478 ibid, 3-4.479 Access to citizenship was one of the problems for the population in the communist regime. Free

movement from one place to another and especially to larger cities was restricted. Every new resident was registered and anyone without such citizenship was not allowed to live in the settlement. For this reason, obtaining free citizenship required a specific attitude. see ibid., 4.

480 Lambov and borisov, First Atomic in Kozloduy, 69.481 ibid., 69.

Notes 175

482 These “brigade duties” included help from students on national projects and in the agricultural sector. The duties were paid symbolically and lasted around sixty days. The Communist government used the students to reinforce industry.

483 Петър Данаилов, “Доклад на министъра за АЕЦ Козлодуй,” Електроенергия но. 9 (септември, 1974): 6-8, here 7. Petar Danailov, “Report about Kozloduy NPP,” Energy no. 9 (september, 1974): 6-8, here 7.

484 Parlapanova, interview with Oved Tadzher. “Perspectives of Nuclear Energy,” 2.485 Hristov, interview with Oved Tadzher, February 2, 2009. 486 Lambov and borisov, First Atomic in Kozloduy, 46.487 This ground could be reinforced using sand bags or concrete pylons but both options were too expen-

sive for the bulgarian government.488 Lambov and borisov, First Atomic in Kozloduy, 48.489 spirov, Georgiev, and Tsonev, Bulgarian Electrification, 367.490 The method was not innovated by the bulgarian or soviet specialists; however, this was the first time

it was used for a nuclear power plant building, allowing builders to finish the machine hall and reac-tor compartment in only one year. see: Parlapanova, interview with Oved Tadzher, “Perspectives of Nuclear Energy,” 3.

491 Dobrev, “The Role of ‘Energoproekt’,” 48-49.492 spirov, Georgiev and Tsonev, Bulgarian Electrification, 368.493 ibid., 368.494 ivaylo Hristov, interview with Oved Tadzher.495 ivaylo Hristov, interview with Zahary boiadjiev at Kozloduy NPP, 2008.496 Parlapanova, interview with Oved Tadzher, “Perspectives of Nuclear Energy,” 4.497 ivaylo Hristov, interview with engineer Rangel simov on December 20, 2007; Rangel simov was on

duty at the start-up of the second reactor. 498 Henry Nielsen and Henrik Knudsen, “The Troublesome Life of Peaceful Atoms in Denmark,” History

and Technology 26, no. 2 (June 2010): 91-118, here 112.499 ibid., 112.500 Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France. Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II

(Cambridge, MA: The MiT Press, 1998): 7.501 Hecht, The Radiance of France, 15.502 Arne Kaijser, “Redirecting Power: swedish Nuclear Power Policies in Historical Perspectives,” Annu.

Rev. Energy Environ. 17 (1992): 437-62, here 443.503 Directives of the VIII Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party about the Development of the People’s

Republic of Bulgaria in the Period 1961-1980 (sofia: bCP Press, 1962): 10-11.504 CORPORATE AUTHOR, IX Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 14-19 November 1966. Ver-

batim Report (sofia: bulgarian Communist Party Press, 1967): 12-13.505 “Пленум на Централния комитет на Българската комунистическа партия. Продължение от

доклада на другаря Живко Живков,” Работническо дело но.331(Ноември 27, 1969): 4. “Plenum of the Central Committee of the bulgarian Communist Party. Continuation of Zhivko Zhivkov’s report,” Newspaper Rabotnichesko delo, no. 331 (November 27, 1969): 4.

506 ibid.507 Lambov and borisov, First Nuclear Station in Kozloduy, 40.508 Hristov, interview with Rangel simov, December 20, 2007.509 Lambov and borisov, First Nuclear Station in Kozloduy, 40.510 ibid., 80.511 Petar Danailov, “Report about Kozloduy NPP,” 7.512 ibid., 7.513 Станка Ножарова, “Атомната енергетика – стратегическо направление в изграждането на

енергетиката,“ Електроенергия но. 2 (Февруари,1986): 18. stanka Nozharova, “Nuclear Energy – strategic Direction in the Energy industry Establishment,” Energy no. 2 (February, 1986): 18.

514 Vincent Lagendijk, Electrifying Europe. The Power of Europe in the Construction of Electricity Networks (Amsterdam: Aksant Press, 2008), 31. Also http://www.ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/theories-and-methods/transnational-history. November 1, 2012.

515 N. L. Char and b. J. Csik, “Nuclear Power Development: History and Outlook,” IAEA Bulletin 3 (1987): 19.


516 David Fisher, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The First Forty Years (Vienna: iAEA, 1997), 12.

517 Chapter 3 and Fisher, History of the International, 243.518 Архив на Министерство на външните работи, Мерки предприети от държавите във връзка с

устава MAAE. Претенции на ГФР за разпространение действията на Устава на МААЕ върху Западен Берлин, Фонд Международни отношения и договори МОД, Опис 16, а.е. 255 (София, 1970): 25. Measures Undertaken by the States in Relation to the Statute of IAEA. Claims of GFR for Spreading the Actions of the IAEA Statute over West Berlin, international Relations and Contracts (iRC), inventory 16, file 255 (sofia: bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, 1970): 25.

519 ibid., 251.520 Архив на Министерство на външните работи, Система за гаранциите на МААЕ, Фонд МОД,

Опис 18, а.е. 228 (София, 1972): 64. System of the IAEA Safeguards, international Relations and Contracts (iRC), inventory 18, file 228 (sofia: bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, 1972): 64.

521 ibid., 64.522 Fisher, History of the International, 78.523 George bunn, “Nuclear safeguards. How Far Can inspectors Go?” IAEA Bulletin 48, no. 2 (March

2007): 49-50.524 Fisher, History of the International, 94.525 ibid., 245.526 Архив на Министерство на външните работи, Информация за работата на ЕВРАТОМ с МААЕ,

Фонд МОД, Опис 22, а.е. 5421г (София, 1976): 3-4. Information about the Cooperative Work of Euratom and IAEA, international Relations and Contracts (iRC), inventory 22, file 5421g (sofia: bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, 1976): 3-4.

527 Joyce Amenta and Alexander sorokin, “iNis at 25: Pioneer of the Nuclear information Highway. Marking its silver Anniversary of service, the iAEA’s international Nuclear information system is Carving Out some New Directions,” IAEA Bulletin (March 1995): 36-37.

528 Amenta and sorokin, “iNis at 25”, 39.529 ivan Zheludev and Hans W. Groenewegen, “iNis: The international Nuclear information system,”

iAEA bulletin 20, no. 4 (1978): 10. 530 ibid., 10-11.531 ibid., 3.532 Антал Апро, Международные организации стран – членов СЭВ в условиях социалистической

экономической интеграции, (Москва, Издательство Экономика, 1972): 3. Antal Apro, International Organizations of the CMEA Member States in the Conditions of Socialist Economy Integration (Moscow: Эkonomika Press, 1972): 3.

533 Централен държавен архив, Протокол от извънредното заседание на ръководителите на делегации за Постоянната комисия за използване на атомната енергия за мирни цели, Фонд 1244, Опис 1, а.е. 1552 (София, 1969): 4-5. Protocol from the Unscheduled Meeting of the Delegation Cheerleaders of the Standing Commission on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 1244, inventory 1, file 1552 (sofia: bulgarian Central state Archives, 1969): 4-5.

534 ibid., 5-9.535 Krško NPP is based on the Westinghouse reactor, as the project for its establishment was shared

between slovenia and Croatia.536 Архив на Министерство на външните работи, България и СИВ. „Интератоминструмент“ и

„Интератоменерго“, Фонд Международни отношения и договори (МОД), Опис 26, а.е.147, (1980): 77. Bulgaria and Comecon. “Interatominstrument” and “Interatomenergo” international Relations and Contracts (iRC), inventory 26, file 147 (sofia: bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, 1980): 77.

537 Архив на Министерство на външните работи Ситуацията в Евратом, Фонд МОД, Опис 19, а.е. 170 (София, 1973): 1-8, here 4. Тhe situation in Euratom iRC, inventory 19, file 170 (sofia: bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, 1973): 1-8, here 4.

538 ibid., 4.539 http://www.ena.lu/establishment_eec_Euratom-020102505.html January 21, 2013.540 bulgaria and Comecon“Interatominstrument” and “Interatomenergo”, 77-78.541 ivaylo Hristov, interview with engineer strahil balev at Kozloduy NPP, April 3, 2008.

Notes 177

542 V. sichev, Yu Krohmalev, K. Menzel, V. Tolpigo, V. shtregober, and A. bilbao, “Collaboration between Comecon Member states in the Nuclear Power Field.” in Nuclear Power Experience, Proceedings of an International Conference on Nuclear Power Experience held by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, 13-17 September 1982. Volume V (Vienna: iAEA, 1983), 495-509, here 496.

543 sichev et al., “Collaboration between Comecon Member states,” 498.544 ibid., 499.545 ibid., 500.546 United Group of Experts and Temporary scientific Collective and specialists in Nuclear Energy,

Scientific Technical Prognostication for Solving Heat-energy Problems of the Comecon Member States for the Period up to 2000 and Long-term Perspective (Moscow: Comecon, 1984), 155-156.

547 Michio Kaku and Jennifer Trainer, Nuclear Power: Both Sides. The Best Arguments for and against the Most Controversial Technology (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1982): 83; David bodansky, Nuclear Energy. Principles, Practices and Prospects (New York: springer Press, 2004): 42-43.

548 igor Morokhov, “safety, Efficiency and Economy of Nuclear Power in UssR,” IAEA Bulletin 10 (1968): 3.

549 boris A. semenov, “Nuclear Power in the soviet Union,” IAEA Bulletin no. 25 (1983): 54.550 ibid., 54.551 “iCRP was established in 1928 as a Commission linked to the international Congresses of Radiology.

Formally, its parent organisation is still the international society of Radiology, but its field of work has widened from protection in medical radiology to all aspects of protection against ionising radiation.” information from http://www.icrp.org/docs/Histpol.pdf February 22, 2013.

552 semenov, “Nuclear Power in the soviet Union, 53-54.553 i. barbur, A. barchenkov, W. Hake, L. Molnar, A. Panasenkov, b. shckerbinln, and V. Tolpygo,

“Cooperation of the CMEA Member Countries in Developing Power Reactors of Various Types, including some Aspects of their Nuclear Fuel Cycles,” international Conference on Nuclear Power and its Fuel Cycle, salzburg, Austria, (May 2-13, 1977): 8. From http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionstore/_Public/08/303/8303847.pdf January 23, 2013.

554 barbur et al., “Cooperation of the CMEA Member Countries,” 8.555 A. Panasenkov, “Cooperation among CMEA Member Countries in the Development of Nuclear En-

ergy its Role in the implementation of the NPT,” IAEA Bulletin 22, no. 3-4 (1980): 97.556 ibid., 97.557 barbur, barchenkov, Hake, Molnar, Panasenkov, shcherbinin, and Tolpygo, “Cooperation of the

CMEA Member Countries,” 21.558 ibid., 20-21.559 ibid., 21.560 ibid., 188.561 sanislav Havel, “Report from Czechoslovakia. Nuclear Power Today and Tomorrow. An Update of

Operations and Plans,” IAEA Bulletin 1 (1987): 32-33.562 interview with engineers Mitko iankov and Zahary boiadzhiev, April 1, 2008, Kozloduy NPP.563 Fisher, History of the International, 184.564 ibid, 220.565 Andranik Petrosyants, “The soviet Union and the Development of Nuclear Power. An Overview of

Plans and the Chernobyl Accident,” IAEA Bulletin 28, no. 3 (1986): 4-8, here 7.566 ibid., 7.567 A series of apparent errors and equipment malfunctions, coupled with some questionable instrument

readings, resulted in loss of reactor coolant, overheating of the core, damage to the fuel but probably no melting, and limited external releases of radioactive noble gases and iodine. see G. R. Corey, “A brief Review of the Accident at Three Mile island,” IAEA Bulletin 21, no. 5 (1979): 54-59.

568 Централен държавен архив, Протокол № 4/12 iii 1976 относно състоянието на АЕЦ Козлодуй, и изводи от едногодишната и дейност и протокол № 5/ 19 iV 1976г., фонд 521, опис 4, а.е.24 (София, 1976): 1-29, here 4. Central state Archives, 521, inventory 4, File 24, Protocol № 4/12 III 1976 about the condition of Kozloduy NPP, and conclusions of its one year working period and protocol №5/ 19 IV 1976 (sofia, 1976): 1-29, here 4.

569 ibid., 4.570 Министерство на Външните работи на НРБ и Министерство на Външните работи на СССР.

Българо-съветски отношения. Документи и материали. 1971-1976 (София: Партиздат, 1982):


102-103. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of bulgaria and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the UssR. Bulgarian-Soviet Relationships. Documents and Materials. 1971-1976 (sofia: Partizdat, 1982): 102-103.

571 Централен държавен архив, Становище на КМИАЕ за АЕЦ Козлодуй. Заповед от 05.04.1973 на МС за назначаване на Експертно-технико-икономически съвет за разглеждане на идейния проект за АЕЦ Козлодуй, Фонд 978, Опис 1, а.е. 28 (София, 1973): 1-2. Attitude of the Bulgarian Regulatory Committee for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy to Kozloduy NPP Ministry Council Order for Appointing “Expert-Technical-Economy Advisory Body for Going into the Preliminary Design of NPP Second Phase” 978, inventory 1, file 28 (sofia: bulgarian Central state Archives, 1973): 1-2.

572 bulgaria exported electricity to Turkey and Greece. see Högselius et al (eds.), Europe goes Critical. The Making of Transnational Infrastructure Vulnerabilities. in this issue, Tchalakov, Mitev, and Hristov, “becoming a Power Hub in the balkans” (Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming).

573 such was the case with ball-cleaning system implemented on the fourth reactor of Kozloduy NPP. it was bought from Western Germany and built in the late 1970s. Hristov, interview with strahil balev, April 3, 2008.

574 Архив на Външно министерство, Писма и доклади на МААЕ за сътрудничество в Дунавския регион, Фонд МОД, Опис 23, а.е.62в (София, 1973): 12. iAEA Letters and Reports Concerning the Collaboration in the Danube River Region, (iRC), inventory 23, file 62v (sofia: bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, 1977): 12.

575 ibid., 12-14.576 ibid., 23.577 Архив на Външно министерство, Писма, доклади, записки, информации и др. Румънско

предложение за сътрудничество по изследванията на река Дунав и природната среда около АЕЦ Козлодуй, Фонд МОД, Опис 25, а.е.134 (София, 1979): 1-28. Letters, Reports, Notes, Information, etc. The Romanian Proposition for Collaboration Concerning the Research of River Danube and Environment in the Region around Kozloduy NPP, (iRC), inventory 25, file 134 (sofia: bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, 1979): 1-28.

578 ibid., 28-62.579 ibid., 78.580 ibid., 78-81.581 Архив на Външно министерство, Научно посещение на АЕЦ за група от 28 специалисти от

развиващите се страни, Фонд МОД, Опис 21, а.е.245 (София, 1975): 16. scientific Visit to Kozloduy NPP for Group of 28 Representatives from the Developed Countries (iRC), inventory 21, file 245 (sofia: bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, 1975): 16.

582 ibid., 17.583 ibid., 33-34.584 ibid., 38-109 (the whole report).585 ibid., 38-109 (the whole report).586 Hristov, interview with engineers Mitko iankov and Zahary boiadzhiev, April 1, 2008, Kozloduy NPP. 587 ivaylo Hristov, interview with Tziviatko Tzvetkov, April 2, 2008, Kozloduy NPP. 588 “Международен семинар по създаването на сеизмоустойчиви атомни

електроцентрали,“Електроенергия но. 2 (февруари, 1982): 31-32. “international seminar for the Establishment of seismic stabile Nuclear Power Plants,” Energy no. 2 (February, 1982): 31-32.

589 ibid., 31.590 ibid., 32.591 Овед Таджер, “Атомният енергиен комплекс „Козлодуй“ – мащаби и перспективи за развитие,“

Електроенергия но. 2 (февруари, 1980): 9-15, here 10. Oved Tadzher, “The Nuclear Power Complex “Kozloduy” – scales and Development Perspectives,” Energy no. 2 (February, 1980): 9-15, here 10.

592 Hristov, interview with engineer strahil balev, April 3, 2008. 593 Мардик Папазян, “Повишаване недеждността на системите за електрозахранване на iii и iV

блок на АЕЦ Козлодуй,“ Електроенергия но. 1 (януари, 1984): 28. Mardik Papazian, “increasing the Reliability of the Power supply systems of iii and iV block of NPP Kozloduy,” Energy no. 1 (Janu-ary, 1984): 28.

594 source book. Soviet Designed Nuclear Power Plants in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Armenia, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary and Bulgaria Fifth edition (Washington, DC: Nuclear Energy institute, 1997): 304.

Notes 179

595 stanislav Havel, “Nuclear Power Today and Tomorrow,” 32-33.596 source book. Soviet Designed Nuclear Power Plants, 304.597 ibid., 261.598 ibid., 260.599 Централен държавен архив, Становище на Комитета за мирно използване на атомната енергия

за АЕЦ Козлодуй, Фонд 978, Опис 1, а.е.28 (София, 1973): 1. Attitude of the Bulgarian Regulatory Committee for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy for Kozloduy NPP, (sofia: bulgarian Central state Archive, fund 978, inventory 1, file 28, 1973): 1.

600 ibid., 1.601 ibid., 2.602 Фьодор Овчинников, “Сътрудничеството на страните-членки на СИВ в областта на атомната

енергетика и перспективите за развитието му,“ Електроенергия но. 5 (май, 1981): 67-70, here 67. Feodor Ovchinnikov, “Co-operation between Member states of Comecon in the Nuclear Energy Field and the Perspectives for its Development,” Energy no. 5 (May, 1981): 67-70, here 67.

603 ibid., 69.604 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of bulgaria and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the

UssR. Bulgarian-Soviet Relationships. Documents and Materials. 1971-1976 (sofia: Partizdat, 1982): 541.

605 ibid., 536-537.606 Hristov, interview with engineer Mitko iankov, April 1, 2008.607 ibid., 538.608 ibid., 539-540.609 ibid., 539.610 Todor Zhivkov, Memoirs (sofia: Abagar Press, 1997), 343-344.611 Petrosyants, “The soviet Union,” 8.612 ibid., 8.613 ibid., 9.614 stanislav Havel, “Report from Czechoslovakia,” 32-33.615 Char and Csik, “Nuclear Power Development”, 24-25.616 The relationship between the soviet Union and its allies is often framed as a process of sovietization.

This concept, however, led to many debates. see Jiří Janáč, European coasts of Bohemia. Negotiating the Danube-Oder-Elbe Canal in a Troubled Twentieth Century (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2012):

133-145. 617 For France see Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France. Nuclear Power and National Identity after

World War II (Cambridge, MA: The MiT Press, 1998): 94.618 interview with Pavlin Peev, Kozlodui NPP, April 2, 2008.

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establishment of Kozloduy NPP, 14.08.1969).Опис 51: 1970. (inventory 51: 1970)А.е 263: Одобряване спогодба за електропровод с Румъния, 29.04.1970. (File 263,

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енергия. Протокол № 2 (Москва, 1961) (File 1522: Second Meeting of the Permanent Commission on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Protocol 2 Moscow, 1961).

А.е. 1523: Трето заседание на Постоянната комисия за мирно използване на атомната енергия. Протокол № 3 (Москва, 1961). (File 1523: Third Meeting of the Permanent Commission on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Protocol 3 Moscow, 1961).

А.е. 1524: Доклад с изводи за работата на Постоянната комисия за мирно използване на атомната енергия през 1962 г. и задачи произтичащи от решенията на XVi сесия на СИВ (Дубна, 1962). (File 1524: Report about the Work of the Permanent Commission on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in 1962 and the Tasks from the XVI Session of CMEA. Dubna, 1962).

А.е. 1525: Ръководството на Постоянната комисия за мирно използване на атомната енергия (Москва, 1963). (File 1525: The Leadership of the Permanent Commission on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Moscow, 1963).

А.е. 1552: Протокол от извънредното заседание на ръководителите на делегации за Постоянната комисия за мирно използване на атомната енергия (Москва, 1969). (File 1552: Protocol from the Unscheduled Meeting of the Delegation Cheerleaders of the Standing Commission on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. Moscow, 1969).


А.е. 1582: Спогодба за сътрудничество между СИВ и МААЕ (Виена, 1975). (File 1582. Agreement for Cooperation between CMEA and IAEA. Vienna, 1975).

А.е. 5748: Комиссия по Экономическим вопросам СЭВ. Развитие экономики стран-участниц Совета экономической взаимопомощи за 1950-1957 (Москва, 1959). (File 5748: Commission for Economy Questions in Comecon. Economy Development of the Comecon Member States for 1950-1957, Moscow, 1959).

А.е.4820: Предложения на СССР за реорганизация в понататъшната дейност на СИВ (Москва, 1958). (File 4820. Suggestions made by USSR for Reorganizations in the Future Comecon Activity, Moscow, 1958).

Фонд 978: Комитет за мирно използване на атомната енергия КМИАЕ. (Fund 978: Committee for peaceful usage of atomic energy (CPUAE)

Исторически преглед (Historical Preview)

Опис 1 (inventory 1)А.е. 28: Становище на КМИАЕ за АЕЦ Козлодуй. Заповед от 05.04.1973 на МС за

назначаване на Експертно-технико-икономически съвет за разглеждане на идейния проект за АЕЦ Козлодуй. – ii етап (София, 1973). (File 28: Attitude of the Bulgarian Regulatory Committee for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy to Kozloduy NPP Ministry Council order from 05.04.1973 for Appointing Expert-Technical-Economy Advisory Body for Going into the Preliminary Design of NPP Second Phase (sofia, 1973).

А.е. 30: Доклад на генералния директор на ДСО „Енергетика и въглища” относно набиране, подготовка и поддържане на кадри за експлоатацията на АЕЦ Козлодуй (София, 1072). (File 30: Report of the General Director of the State Company “Coal and Energy” about Personal Recruitment, Training and Supporting Specialists for Kozloduy NPP Exploitation, sofia, 1972).

А.е. 34: Информация, списък, писма и други относно учебната обиколка на АЕЦ „Козлодуй” от представители на развиващите се страни (София,1975). (File 34: Information, list, letters and others about study tour of Kozloduy NPP from representatives of the developing countries, sofia, 1975).

А.е. 35: Перспективен научно-изследователски план на ФИ с АНЕБ при БАН за периодите 1960-1965 г. и 1966-1975 г. План за перспективното развитие на ядрената физика (София, 1961). (File 35: Perspective Research and Scientific Plan of the Physical Institute with Nuclear Research Base under Bulgarian Academy of Science for the Periods 1960-1965 and 1966-1975. Plan for Perspective Development of the Nuclear Physics, sofia, 1961).

А.е. 36: Доклад от председателя на КМИАЕ Иван Попов до председателя на МС Тодор Живков относно развитието на ядреното приборостроене (София, 1965). (File 36: Report from the Director of the Bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Agency Professor Ivan Popov to the President of the Ministry Council Todor Zhivkov about the Development of Nuclear Equipment Building, 1965).

А.е. 40: Доклад, предложения, и докладна записка, относно създаване на научно-производствено обединение „Ядрена техника” към Комитета за наука и технически прогрес и висше образование (София, 1975). (File 40: Report, Recommendations and Report Note Concerning the Establishment of Scientific Production Union “Nuclear Technique” under the Scientific and Technological Committee for Progress and High Education, sofia, 1975).

А.е. 171: Съображения за възможни форми на сътрудничество на страните от СИВ при проектиране, изграждане и експлоатация на АЕЦ (София, 1972). (File 171: Considerations about possible forms of cooperation of the CMEA member states for designing,

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building and exploitation of nuclear stations, sofia, 1972).А.е. 201: Съглашение, устав, правила, списък и др. от второто заседание на

Подготвителния комитет за създаване на международно стопанско обединение по ядрено приборостроене „Интератоминструмент” (МСО „ИАИ”) състояло се през 1971 от 12 до 23 януари във Варшава (1971). (File 201. Agreement, Organization Chart, Rules, List and Others from the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for Establishing International Economy Union for Nuclear Equipment “Interatominstrument” (IAI) Launched in 1971 from 12 to 23 January in Warsaw, 1971).

А.е. 204: Протоколи от съвещания на специалистите на страните-членки на СИВ по въпросите на многостранното сътрудничество в областта на системата “САМАС”, състояли се през 1976 (1976). (File 204: Protocols from CMEA Member States Conferences of the Specialists Concerning Questions about International Cooperation in “CAMAC” System Sphere, Implemented in 1976, 1976).

А.е. 283: (File 283: Main Working Directions of the CMEA Organizations in Standardization Sphere 1966-1970, Moscow, 1964).

Фонд 521: Министерство на енергетиката и горивата (Fund 521: Ministry of Energy and Fuels)

Опис 1 (inventory 1)А.е. 371: Доклад за ядрената енергия на симпозиум „ Икономически аспекти на

производството на енергия и по-специално на ядрена енергия” (Лондон, 1969). (File 371: Report about nuclear energy held on symposia “Economy Aspects for Energy Production and, Precisely for Nuclear Energy”, London, 1969).

А.е. 385: Протоколи, доклади, справки и др. от ръководители на делегации, участвали на заседания на Постоянната комисия на СИВ в областта на използването атомната енергия за мирни цели (1961-1967). (File 385: Protocols, Reports, Information etc. from Delegation Leaders that Participated in the Standing Commission on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, 1961-1967).

А.е. 536: Отводняване на Козлодуйската долина. Трети вариант (София, 1967). (File 536: Screening and Draining Actions in Kozloduy Valley. III Variation, sofia, 1967).

Опис 2 (inventory 2)А.e. 123: Централно диспечерско управление на СИВ (1975). (File 123: Central Dispatch

Organization of CMEA, 1975).

Опис 3 (inventory 3)А.e. 24: Протоколи, дневен ред, паметни записки, програма, справки и приложени

материали от срещи на Комисията по икономическо и научно техническо развитие между НРБ и ГДР в областта на енергетиката (София, 1973). (File 24: Protocols, Day Order, Notes, Program, Informations, and Enclosed Materials from Meetings of the Commission for Economy and Scientific and Technological Development between P.R.Bulgaria and DDR in Energy Sphere, sofia, 1973).

Опис 4 (inventory 4)А.е. 24: Протокол № 4/12 iii 1976 за състоянието на АЕЦ Козлодуй, и изводи от

едногодишната и дейност и протокoл № 5/ 19 iV 1976. (File 24: Protocol № 4/12 III 1976 about the Condition of Kozlodui NPP, and Conclusions of its One Year Working Period and Protocol №5/ 19 IV 1976).

А.е. 162: Заповеди за Експертния техническо-икономически съвет (ЕТИС) и протоколи от заседанията му през 1974 г. за АЕЦ Козлодуй (1974). (File 162: Orders of the


technical economy commission of the experts and protocols of its sessions in 1974 for Kozloduy NPP, 1974).

Фонд 1Б: Пленуми и срещи на Българската комунистическа партия (Fund 1B: Plenums and Meetings of the Bulgarian Communist Party)

Опис 58 (inventory 58)А.е. 124: Стенографски протокол на пленума на ЦК на БКП. Заключителна реч на Тодор

Живков, (1975). (File 124: Stenographic Protocol from the Party Plenum. Concluding Speech of Todor Zhivkov, 1975).

Фонд 565: Енергетика и въглища (Energy and coals)Опис 1 (inventory 1)А.е. 88: Доклад до министерски съвет относно ситуацията в АЕЦ Козлодуй (1972). (File

88: Report to the Ministry Council about the Situation in Kozloduy NPP, 1972).

Архив на Българското Министерство на външните работи (Archive of Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Фонд „Международни договори и организации“ (Fund “International Organizations and Agreements”)

Опис 15 (inventory 15)А.е. 207: НРБ приема системата за гаранции на МААЕ по отношение експерименталния

реактор, 1969. (File 207: Peoples Republic of Bulgaria Accepts the Guarantee System of IAEA over the Experimental Reactor, 1969).

Опис 16 (inventory 16)А.е. 210: Сесия на комитета по изменения на член VI на устава на МААЕ и консултация

между представители на страните на социалистическия лагер, 1970. (File 210: Sessions of the Committee for Appropriating Changes of Paragraph VI of IAEA Statute and Consultations between Socialist States Members, 1970).

А.е. 253: МААЕ и някои въпроси свързани с нашето участие в нея, 1970. (File 253: IAEA and Some Questions Related to our Participation in It, 1970).

А.е. 255: Мерки предприети от държавите във връзка с устава, претенции на ГФР за разпространение действията на Устава на МААЕ върху Западен Берлин, 1970. (File 255: Measures Undertaken by the States in Relation to the Statute of IAEA. Claims of GFR for Spreading the Actions of the IAEA Statute over West Berlin, 1970).

Опис 18 (inventory 18)А.е. 220: Предварително съвещание на социалистическите страни в Берлин, относно

Четвъртата международна конференция в Женева и XV генерална конференция на МААЕ във Виена, 1972. (File 220: Preliminary Meeting among the Socialist States in Berlin Concerning the Fourth International Conference in Geneva and the XV General Conference of IAEA in Vienna, 1972).

А.е. 228: Система за гаранциите на МААЕ, 1972. (File 228: System of the IAEA Safeguards (Guaranties), 1972).

А.е. 236: Разпореждане на министерски съвет за създаване на Комитета за мирно използване на атомната енергия и правилник за дейността му, 1972. (File 236: Order from the Ministry Council for Establishing the Committee for Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy and Regulations for its Activity, 1972).

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Опис 19 (inventory 19)А.е. 170: Ситуацията в ЕВРАТОМ, 1973 (File 170: Тhe situation in Euratom, 1973).Опис 21 (inventory 21)А.е. 245: Научно посещение на АЕЦ Козлодуй за група от 28 специалисти от

развиващите се страни, 1975. (File 245: Scientific Visitation of Kozloduy NPP for Group of 28 Representatives from the Developed Countries, 1975).

Опис 22 (inventory 22)А.е. 5421г: Информация за работата на ЕВРАТОМ с МААЕ, 1976. (File 5421g: Information

about the Cooperative Work of Euratom and IAEA, 1976).

Опис 23 (inventory 23)А.е. 62в: Писма и доклади на МААЕ за сътрудничество в Дунавския регион, 1977. (File

62v: Letters and Reports of IAEA Concerning the Collaboration in the Danube River Region, 1977).

Опис 25 (inventory 25)А.е. 134: Писма, доклади, записки, информации и др. Румънско предложение за

сътрудничество по изследванията на река Дунав и природната среда около АЕЦ Козлодуй, 1979. (File 134: Letters, Reports, Note, Information etc. The Romanian Proposition for Collaboration concerning the Research of River Danube and Environment in the Region around Kozloduy NPP, 1979).

Опис 26 (inventory 26)А.е. 147: България и СИВ. Интератоминструмент и Интератоменерго, 1980. (File 147:

Bulgaria and Comecon.“Interatominstrument” and “Interatomenergo”, 1980).

Congresses and plenumsДимитров, Георги. Политически доклад на Централния комитет на Българската

комунистическа партия пред Пети конгрес на партията (София: Партиздат, 1974). (Dimitrov, Georgy. Political Report of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party in front of the Fifth Congress (sofia: Partizdat, 1974).

CORPORATE AUTOR, Directives of the VIII Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party about the Development of the Peoples Republic of Bulgaria in the Period 1961-1980 (sofia: bCP Press, 1962).

CORPORATE AUTOR IX Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 14 November-19 November 1966 Verbatim Report (sofia: bulgarian Communist Party Press, 1967).

CORPORATE AUTOR XI Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Main directions of the XIth congress of BCP abuot social-economy development of Peoples Republic Bulgaria during the seventh five-year plan 1976-1980 (sofia: bulgarian Communist Party Press, 1975).

Живков, Живко. Насоки за развитие на енергетиката и за усъвършенствуване топливно-енергийния баланс на Народна република България. Доклад пред пленума на Централния комитет на Българската комунистическа партия, състоял се на 25-26 ноември 1969. Решение на пленума. (София: Издателство на БКП, 1969). (Zhivkov, Zhivko. Directions for Energy Development and Perfecting Heat-energy Balance of Peoples Republic of Bulgaria. Report in front of Plenum of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party Conducted on 25-26 November 1969. Resolution of the Plenum (sofia: bulgarian Communist Party Press, 1969).


Bulletins and conference papers of IAEA“Dubna: Twenty Years of international Research in Nuclear Physics.” IAEA Bulletin 18 no. 5/6

(1976).“The Activities of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Connected with the Use of

Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes.” in Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Jointly Sponsored by the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency and Held in Geneva, 6-16 September 1971. Volume I, 695-705. New York: United Nations, and Vienna: international Atomic Energy Agency, 1972.

Amenta, Joyce, and Alexander sorokin. “iNis at 25: Pioneer of the Nuclear information Highway. Marking its silver Anniversary of service, the iAEA’s international Nuclear information system is Carving out some New Directions.” IAEA Bulletin no. 3 (1995).

banaschik, Manfred V., and Karl-Heinz berg. “steps for safety.” IAEA Bulletin 28, no. 3 (1986).barbur, i., A. barchenkov, W. Hake, L. Molnar, A. Panasenkov, b. shckerbin, and V. Tolpygo.

“Cooperation of the CMEA Member Countries in Developing Power Reactors of Various Types, including some Aspects of their Nuclear Fuel Cycles.” International Conference on Nuclear Power and its Fuel Cycle, Salzburg, Austria, 2-13 May 1977.

barker, R. “safety in Transport of Radioactive Materials ‒ the Next 10 Years.” IAEA Bulletin 23, no. 1 (1981).

brinkhorst, L. “Nuclear safety and the European Community: broadening Perspectives.” IAEA Bulletin no. 2 (1992).

bunn, George. “Nuclear safeguards. How far can inspectors Go?” IAEA Bulletin 48, no. 2 (March 2007): 49-51.

Char, N. L., and b. J. Csik. “Nuclear Power Development: History and Outlook.” IAEA Bulletin no. 3 (1987).

Corey, G. R., “A brief Review of the Accident at Three Mile island.” IAEA Bulletin 21, no. 5 (1979): 54-59.

Dobrev, b., and L. spasov. “Experience and Prospects in bulgaria.” IAEA Bulletin 28, no. 3 (1986): 55-56.

Havel, stanislav. “Report from Czechoslovakia. Nuclear Power Today and Tomorrow. An Update of Operations and Plans.” IAEA Bulletin no. 1 (1987).

Kratzer, M. “Historical Overview of international safeguards.” in Nuclear Power Experience, Proceedings of an International Conference on Nuclear Power Experience Held by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, 13-17 September 1982. Volume V. Vienna: international Atomic Energy Agency, 1983.

Mettler, Fred. “Chernobyl’s Living Legacy.” IAEA Bulletin 47, no. 2 (2006).Morohov, i., G. Afonin, Yu balasanov, b. semenov, and i. smolin. “international Cooperation

by the UssR in the Peaceful Utilization of Atomic Energy.” in Nuclear Power Experience, Proceedings of an International Conference on Nuclear Power Experience Held by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, 13-17 September 1982. Volume I, 667-681. Vienna: international Atomic Energy Agency, 1983.

Morokhov, i. “The First Atomic Power station and international Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.” IAEA Bulletin 16 no. 3 (1974).

Morokhov, i. “safety, Efficiency and Economy of Nuclear Power in UssR.” IAEA Bulletin no. 10 (1968).

Nuclear Power Experience, Proceedings of an International Conference on Nuclear Power Experience Held by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, 13-17 September 1982. Volume I. Vienna: international Atomic Energy Agency, 1983.

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Panasenkov, A., W. stregober, and A. bilbao. “Co-operation among the CMEA Member Countries in Radiation Protection Matters.” IAEA Bulletin 25, no. 3 (1983).

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Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Jointly Sponsored by the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency and Held in Geneva, 6-16 September 1971. Volume VIII. (New York: United Nations and Vienna: international Atomic Energy Agency, 1972).

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Peirson, D. E. H. “international cooperation in nuclear projects and exchange of information.” in Nuclear Power Experience, Proceedings of an International Conference on Nuclear Power Experience Held by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, 13-17 September 1982. Volume I. Vienna: international Atomic Energy Agency, 1983.

Petrosyants, A. “The soviet Union and the Development of Nuclear Power. An Overview of Plans and the Chernobyl Accident.” IAEA Bulletin 28, no. 3 (1986): 4-8.

sabo, F., Erdeg, M., sabo, E., and Forzac, b. “The Role of a Research Reactor in science, Technology and Training in Hungary.” in Nuclear Power Experience, Proceedings of an International Conference on Nuclear Power Experience Held by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, 13-17 September 1982. Volume I. Vienna: international Atomic Energy Agency, 1983.

semenov, b. A. “Nuclear Power in the soviet Union.” IAEA Bulletin no. 25 (1983).sichev, V., Yu Krohmalev, K. Menzel, V. Tolpigo, V. shtregober, and A. bilbao. “Collaboration

between Comecon Member states in the Nuclear Power Field.” in Nuclear Power Experience, Proceedings of an International Conference on Nuclear Power Experience Held by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, 13-17 September 1982. Volume V, 495-509. Vienna: international Atomic Energy Agency, 1983.

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Wagemaker, Gerard. “Clinically Observed Effects.” IAEA Bulletin no. 3 (1996).Zheludev, i. and L. V. Konstantinov. “Nuclear Power in UssR.” IAEA Bulletin 22, no. 2 (1980).Zheludev, ivan s., and Hans W. Groenewegen. “iNis: The international Nuclear information

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Newspaper and magazine articles“Централното диспечерско управление на обединените енергосистеми на европейските

страни – членки на СИВ.“ Електроенергия но.1 (януари, 1979): 28-30 (“Central Dispatch Organization of the integrated Power systems of the European countries – CMEA members.” Energy no. 1 (January, 1979).


“Двадесет години от старта на пети енергетичен блок.“ Първа атомна но 4 (2007). (“20 Years from the start of the Fifth Power bloc.” First Nuclear no. 4 (2007).

“Електрификация на селищата в НРБ.” Електроенергия но. 8-9 (август -септември, 1954): 37-39 (“Electrification of settlements in the People’s Republic of bulgaria.” Energy no. 8-9 (August-september, 1954).

“По въпроса за перспективното развитие на електроенергетиката в България.” Електроенергия но.6 (юни, 1957). (“On the issue of Perspective Development of Electricity in bulgaria.” Energy no. 6 (June, 1957).

“Директивите на централния комитет на БКП по четвъртата петилетка за развитието на НРБ за периода 1961-1965.” Вестник Работническо дело но. 133 (май 13, 1962) (“Directives of the Central Committee of bulgarian Communist Party on the Fourth Five-year Development Plan for the Republic of bulgaria During the Period 1961-1965.” Rabotnichesko delo no. 133 (May 13, 1962).

“Вчерашната сесия на петата специална среща на народното събрание.“ Вестник Работническо дело, но. 109 (април 18, 1956) (“Yesterday’s session of the Fifth Extraordinary session of the National Assembly.” Rabotnichesko delo no. 109 (April 18, 1956).

“Братска помощ за нашата енергетика.” Електроенергия но 2 (февруари, 1964). “brotherly Help for Our Energy.” Energy no. 2 (February, 1964).

“Разговорите на Централния комитет на партията.” Вестник Работническо дело, но. 99 (април 8, 1956): “Communication of the Central Committee of bulgarian Communist Party.” Rabotnichesko delo no. 99 (April 8, 1956).

“Някой фактори който влияят върху научното развитие на източноевропейските страни. Научен живот но. 13 (октомври-декември, 1969). (“some Factors that influence science Development between the European socialist Countries.” Scientific Live no. 13 (October-December, 1969).

“Тържествено откриване на електропровода 400kV Съветския съюз-Народна република България.“ Електроенергия, но. 7-8 (юли-август, 1972). (“inauguration of the 400 kV Power Line soviet Union-People’s Republic of bulgaria.” Energy no. 7-8 (July-August, 1972).

“Пленум на Централния комитет на Българската комунистическа партия. Продължение от доклада на другаря Живко Живков.“ Работническо дело но.331(ноември 27, 1969). (“Plenum of the Central Committee of the bulgarian Communist Party. Continuation of the Zhivko Zhivkov’s Report.” Rabotnichesko delo no. 331 (November 27, 1969).

“Атомната електроцентрала на академията на науките на СССР.“ Електроенергия, но. 7-8 (юли-август, 1955) “soviet Academy of science NPP.” Energy no. 7-8 (July-August, 1955).

Данаилов, Петър. „Доклад относно АЕЦ Козлодуй.“ Електроенергия, но. 9 (септември, 1974). (Danailov, Petar. “Report about Kozloduy NPP.” Energy no. 9 (september, 1974).

Добрев, Добри. “Ролята на Енергопроект в проектирането на АЕЦ Козлодуй.“ Електроенергия но. 8-9 (август-септември, 1976). (Dobrev, Dobri. “The Role of Energoproekt in Projecting NPP Kozloduy.” Energy no. 8-9 (August-september, 1976).

Гъдева, Живка и А. Велков. “Относно перспективите за развитие на атомната енергетика у нас.“ Електроенергия но 6 (юни, 1964). (Gadeva, Zhivka, and A. Velkov. “Estimating the Perspectives for Development of Nuclear Energy in bulgaria.” Energy no. 6 (March, 1964).

Гъдевa, Живка и В. Цветков. “Съвременно състояние на атомната енергетика и перспективи за развитие.“ Електроенергия но. 3 (март, 1966). (Gadeva, Zhivka, and V. Tzvetkov. “Contemporary Conditions of the Nuclear Energy Field and Future Perspectives.” Energy no. 3 (March, 1966).

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Георгиев, Кимон. “Десет години народна власт в областта на електрификацията.” Електроенергия, но. 8-9 (август-септември, 1954). (Georgiev, Kimon. “Ten Years of People Power in the Field of Electrification.” Energy no. 8-9 (August-september, 1954).

Георгиев, Кимон. “Електрификацията на НРБ.” Електроенергия но.3 (март, 1953). (Georgiev, Kimon. “The Electrification of bulgarian Peoples Republic.” Energy no. 3 (March, 1953).

Георгиев, Кимон. “Българската електрификация,“ Електроенергия но. 3 (март, 1958). (Georgiev, Kimon. “bulgaria’s Electrification.” Energy no. 3 (March, 1958).

Гринюк, Ростислав и Витолд Витев. “Централното диспечерско управление на Обединените енергийни системи.“ Електроенергия но. 5 (Май, 1981). Griniuk, Rostislav, and Vitold Vitek. “Central Dispatch Organization of the integrated Electricity systems.” Energy no. 5 (May, 1981).

Грон, М., и М. Воришек, „Чехословашкият реактор с твърда вода на нулева мощност,“ Ядрена енергетика 38, но. 4 (1975). (Gron, M., and M. Vořišek. “Czechoslovakian Heavy Water Reactor of Zero Power.” Atomic Energy 38, no. 4 (1975).

Грозев, Йордан. “Братската помощ на Съветския съюз и сътрудничеството ни със страните членки на СИВ – могъщ фактор за развитието на нашата енергетика,“ Електроенергия но. 4-5 (април- май, 1975). (Grozev, Jordan. “brotherly Help of the soviet Union and Our Cooperation with the Comecon Member states.” Energy no. 4-5 (April-May, 1975).

“Международен семинар по създаването на сеизмоустойчиви атомни електроцентрали.“ Електроенергия но. 2 (февруари, 1982). (“international seminar for the Establishment of seismic stabile Nuclear Power Plants.” Energy no. 2 (February, 1982).

Калайков, Генчо. “Десет години диспечерско управление на обединените енергийни сиситеми МИР.“ Електроенегия, но. 9 (септември, 1972). (Kalaykov, Gencho. “Ten Years Central Dispatch Organization of the integrated Power systems ‘Peace’.” Energy no. 9 (september, 1972).

Калбуров, М. “Нашата енергетика в най-близка перспектива.“ Електроенергия, но.8 (август, 1957). (Kalburov, M. “Our Energy industry in the Nearest Perspective.” Energy no. 8 (August, 1957).

Караджиев, Ст. и Д. Лалов. “Атомната енергия и нейното използване.“ Електроенергия, но. 10 (октомври, 1954). (Karadzhiev, st., and D. Lalov. “Nuclear Energy and its Usage.” Energy no. 10 (October, 1954).

Карпенко, Г. “Използване на атомната енергия за енергетически цели.“ Електроенергия но. 3-4 (март-април, 1956). (Karpenko, G. “Usage of Nuclear Power for Energy Aims.” Energy no. 3-4 (March-April, 1956).

Лалов, Д. “Бъдещите атомни електроцентрали по докладите изнесени на женевската конференция.“ Електроенергия но. 3-4 (март-април, 1956). (Lalov, D. “The Future of the Nuclear Power stations, based on the Reports from the First Geneva Conference.” Energy no. 3-4 (March-April, 1956).

Методиев, Г. “България се свързва с обединените енергийни системи на страните – членки на Съвета за икономическа взаимопoмощ.“ Електроенергия но 6 (юни, 1967). (Metodiev, G. “Connecting bulgaria with the integrated Power systems of the European Countries – CMEA Members.” Energy no. 6 (June, 1967).

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Николов, Никола. “За необходимостта от изграждането у нас на атомни електрически централи.“ Електроенергия но. 10-11(октомври-ноември, 1958). (Nikolov, Nikola. “For the Necessity of Establishing in Our Country Nuclear Power Plant.” Energy no. 10-11 (October-November, 1958).

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“Основни задачи на нашата електроенергетика през 1962.“ Електроенергия, но. 11-12 (ноември-декември 1961). (“Main Tasks of Our Electricity industry for 1962.” Energy no. 11-12 (November-December, 1962).

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Published documentationБългарска академия на науките и Академия на науките на СССР, Българо-съветски

отношения. Документи и материали Том II, Септември 1944-Декември 1958 (София, Издателство на БАН, 1981). (bulgarian Academy of science and Academy of science of the UssR. Bulgarian-Soviet Relationships and Connections. Documents and Materials. Volume II, September 1944-December 1958 (sofia: bulgarian Academy of science Press, 1981).

Министерство на Външните работи на НРБ и Министерство на Външните работи на СССР. Българо-съветски отношения. Документи и материали. 1948-1970 (София: Партиздат, 1982). (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peoples Republic of bulgaria and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of UssR. Bulgarian-Soviet Relationships and Connections. Documents and Materials. 1948-1970 (sofia: Partizdat, 1982).

Министерство на Външните работи на НРБ и Министерство на Външните работи на СССР. Българо-съветски отношения. Документи и материали. 1971-1976 (София: Партиздат, 1982). (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peoples Republic of bulgaria and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of UssR. Bulgarian-Soviet Relationships. Documents and Materials. 1971-1976 (sofia: Partizdat, 1982).

Министерство на Външните работи на НРБ и Министерство на Външните работи на СССР. Българо-съветски отношения. Документи и материали.1977-1982 (София: Партиздат, 1985). (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peoples Republic of bulgaria and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of UssR. Bulgarian-Soviet Relationships and Connections. Documents and Materials. 1977-1982 (sofia: Partizdat, 1985).

Министерство на Външните работи на НРБ и Министерство на Външните работи на СССР. Българо-съветски отношения. Документи и материали.1983-1986 (София: Партиздат, 1989). (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peoples Republic of bulgaria and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of UssR. Bulgarian-Soviet Relationships and Connections. Documents and Materials. 1983-1986 (sofia: Partizdat, 1989).

Совместная группа экспертов (СГЭ, сводная) и Врененный коллектив ученых и специалистов по ядерной энергетике (ВКУС), Научно-технический прогноз решения топливно-энергетических проблем стран – членов СЭВ на период до 2000 г. и более длительную перспективу (Москва: СИВ, 1984). (United Group of Experts and Temporary scientific Collective and specialists in Nuclear Energy, Scientific Technical


Prognostication for Solving Heat-energy Problems of the Comecon Member States for the Period up to 2000 and Long-term Perspective (Moscow: Comecon, 1984).

I-net sitesbulgarian nuclear experimental reactor http://www.inrne.bas.bg/fce/001/0069/files/irt-2000_

brochure.pdf international Atomic Energy Agency, 2011, PRis database, http://www.iaea.org/programmes/

a2/ Kozloduy nuclear power plant http://www.kznpp.org/ Online archive European relationships http://www.ena.lu/establishment_eec_eura-

tom-020102505.htmlOpen society archives http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/128-3-15.shtmlPioneers of Nuclear Medicine, http://www.radiochemistry.org/nuclearmedicine/pioneers/

joliot-curie.shtml Joint institute in Dubna, http://wwwinfo.jinr.ru/dubna-e.htmTheories in transnational history http://www.ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/theories-and-methods/

transnational-historyWorld nuclear association, http://www.world-nuclear.org/

Interviewsinterview with Professor Konstantin Kostov, by Dr. ivan Tchalakov, June 10, 2006.interview with Hristo Hristov, Former Vice Chair of Maritsa East 2 TPP, by Dr. ivan Tchalakov.interview with the Quality and safety Director by NPP Kozloduy engineer Mitko iankov in

Kozloduy NPP by ivaylo Hristov, April 1, 2008.interview with senior Researcher Natalia ianeva in the bulgarian Experimental Reactor iRT-

2000, by ivaylo Hristov, sofia, April 20, 2008.interview with Former Vice Minister of bulgarian Electrification Oved Tadjer, by ivaylo

Hristov, February 2, 2009.interview with senior Expert stoian stoianov in the bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Agency, by

ivaylo Hristov, December 12, 2008.interview with engineer Rangel simov of the bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Agency, by ivaylo

Hristov, December 20, 2007.interview with engineer ionko Gledachev in the bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Agency, by

ivaylo Hristov, January 10, 2008.interview with Dr. sergey Tzotchev, chair of the bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Agency, by

ivaylo Hristov, sofia, December 17, 2007.interview with engineer strahil balev in Kozloduy NPP, by ivaylo Hristov, April 3, 2008.interview with engineer Mitko iankov and engineer Zahary boiadzhiev, in Kozloduy NPP, by

ivaylo Hristov, April 1, 2008.interview with Tziviatko Tzvetkov in Kozloduy NPP, by ivaylo Hristov, April 2, 2008.interview with Milena Dimitrova, Former secretary of Oved Tadjer in Kozloduy NPP, by

ivaylo Hristov, April 2, 2008.interview with engineer Kiril Nikolov, Executive Director of Kozloduy NPP, by ivaylo Hristov,

April 1, 2008.interview with engineer Pavlin Peev in Kozloduy NPP, by ivaylo Hristov, April 2, 2008.

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summary of thesis 203

summary of thesis

This thesis explores the development of the bulgarian nuclear power system in the context of its transnational nuclear connection, between, beyond and within the soviet bloc. its draws on a recent strand of scholarly literature which focuses on the relationship between political and diplomatic interactions on the one hand and scientific and technology related ones on the other hand. in this literature it is claimed that scientists, engineers and experts create room for maneuvering and building transnational connections not controlled and managed by political rela-tions. This thesis proves that such a room also existed in bulgaria (and Eastern Europe) despite the coercive technopolitics of the soviet Union.

This book has four empirical chapters. Chapter 1 sets the stage. it describes the bulgarian transition to communism, and the new accompanying domestic and international relations. The chapter shows that soviet leaders or advisors were always involved in domestic bulgarian choices, either informally through party leader contacts or formally in bilateral agreements. The next three chap-ters deal chronologically with the creation of large technical nuclear systems in bulgaria and Eastern Europe. Chapter 2 traces the building of an East European and bulgarian nuclear science infrastructure that would pave the way for Eastern Europe’s later transition to nuclear power. The chapter also analyses the role of two new international organizations that interconnected national research institutes into socialist and global nuclear science communities, respectively: The socialist Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna, Russia, and the global International Atomic Energy Agency. Chapter 3 discusses the establishment of a nuclear power network in Eastern Europe. in bulgaria, this entailed the step from nuclear research to a full-scale nuclear power plant. Chapter 4 covers the period when East European nuclear power gained momentum and maturity in the 1970s and early 1980s. it ends with its decline in the late 1980s. The conclusion of this book discusses the establishment of large technical nuclear systems in Eastern Europe; it examines the communist political environment and focuses on the various actors involved in creating these nuclear systems. They were not only nation state gov-ernments and international organizations with their techno-political agendas, but also political, economic, scientific and technological groups within the communist state. Their perpetual interactions and conflicts ultimately shaped a large technical


system characterized by specific patterns of linking and delinking, integration and fragmentation, within and beyond the communist bloc.


Curriculum Vitae

ivaylo Hristov (1978) graduated in sociology in 2005 at Plovdiv University (bulgaria), Faculty of Philosophy and History. in 2006 he received his MA degree Entrepreneurship and innovation Management at the same university. in his master thesis he examined a case study of former socialist enterprise in laser cut-ting industry. The master thesis focused on the transition period when the enter-prise was privatized and its development during the early years of democracy in bulgaria. important part of this case study was the way laser cutting enterprises were able to implement innovations and use them as a tool for surviving in the competitive environment of the free market.

After receiving his master degree ivaylo Hristov started research in the field of history of technology. He was admitted to the PhD Program the Hidden Integration in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe. This program was initiated in 2006 by the Foundation for the History of Technology (the Netherlands) to stimulate research in the field of history of technology in Central, Eastern and southeastern Europe. He started a PhD project at Eindhoven University of Technology (the Netherlands) and Plovdiv University (bulgaria). in his PhD research he focused on the peaceful nuclear power development in Eastern Europe during the Cold war period. The bulgarian nuclear power program was used as an exemplary case through which Eastern European relations are examined. The role of the soviet Union is one of the central topics in his thesis The Communist Nuclear Era: Bulgarian Atomic Community during the Cold War, 1944-1986.

in 2008 he was awarded a research grant from the Fondation Électricité de France. in the same year he became part of the Tensions of Europe network within the EUROCRiT project. in 2010 he was awarded an international scholarship of the American society for the History of Technology (sHOT). From 2008 until 2013 he was involved in three projects for young scholars in the Philosophy and History Faculty at Plovdiv University. since 2012 he is leading a teaching course on History and sociology of the bulgarian nuclear program at Plovdiv University.


Foundation for the History of Technology & Aksant Academic PublishersTechnology and European History series

Ruth Oldenziel and Johan schot (Eindhoven University of Technology)Series Editors

The Technology and European History series seeks to present scholarship about the role of technology in European history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The series focuses on how technical communities, nation-states, businesses, social groups, and other actors have contested, projected, performed, and reproduced multiple rep-resentations of Europe while constructing and using a range of technologies. The series understands Europe both as an intellectual construct and material practice in relation to spaces inside as well as outside Europe. in particular, the series invites studies focus-ing on Europe’s (former) colonies and on the two new superpowers of the twentieth century: the United states of America and the soviet Union. interdisciplinary work is welcomed. The series will offer a platform for scholarly works associated with the Tensions of Europe Network to find their way to a broader audience. For more infor-mation on the network and the series see: www.tensionsofeurope.eu

Books in series1. Judith schueler, Materialising identity. The co-construction of the Gotthard Railway and Swiss national identity (Amsterdam, June 2008)2. Vincent Lagendijk, Electrifying Europe. The power of Europe in the construction of electricity networks (Amsterdam, August 2008)3. Frank schipper, Driving Europe. Building Europe on roads in the twentieth century (Amsterdam, september 2008)4. Adri Albert de la bruhèze and Ruth Oldenziel (editors), Manufacturing Technology, Manufacturing Consumers. The Making of Dutch Consumer Society (Amsterdam, January 2009)5. irene Anastasiadou, Constructing Iron Europe. Transnationalism and Railways in the Interbellum (Amsterdam, March 2012)6. Milena Veenis, Material Fantasies. Expectations of the Western Consumer World among East Germans (Amsterdam, March 2012)7. suzanne Lommers, Europe – On Air, Interwar Projects for Radio Broadcasting (Amsterdam, April 2012)8. Valentina Fava, The Socialists People’s Car: Automobiles, Shortages, and Consent on the Czechoslovak Road to Mass Production (1918-1964) (Amsterdam, November 2012)9. Jiří Janáč, European Coasts of Bohemia. Negotiating the Danube-Oder-Elbe Canal in a Troubled Twentieth Century (Amsterdam, November 2012)10. Elitsa stoilova, Producing Bulgarian Yoghurt. Manufacturing and Exporting Authenticity (Amsterdam, November 2013)11. ivaylo Tsvetanov Hristov, The Communist Nuclear Era. Bulgarian Atomic Community during the Cold War, 1944-1986 (Amsterdam, November 2013)


Foundation for the History of TechnologyThe Foundation for the History of Technology (sHT) aims to develop and commu-nicate knowledge that increases our understanding of the critical role of technology in the history of the Western world. since 1988 the foundation has been supporting scholarly research in the history of technology. This has included large-scale national and international research programs and numerous individual projects, many in col-laboration with Eindhoven University of Technology. sHT also coordinates the inter-national research network Tensions of Europe: Technology and the Making of Europe. For more information see: www.histech.nl

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