The Challenges of Accountability for International

Nongovernmental and Civil Society Organizations

Margaret P. Karns, Timothy J. Shaffer, and Richard K. Ghere

The University of Dayton

Paper prepared for the Kettering Foundation Symposium on Accountability,

May 22-23, 2008

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The Challenges of Accountability for International Nongovernmental and Civil Society Organizations

Abstract: There are more than 6,000 international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) addressing issues such as human rights, the environment, education, health care, development and other issues around the globe. Although accountability in government is synonymous with “red tape” for some; for others, it is synonymous with democratic practices and transparency. NGOs for the most part are not subject to the same provisions and checks that bureaucracies have; even those that are membership organizations are rarely accountable to their members. With respect to the accountability of bureaucracies, legislation such as the Administrative Procedure Act, Freedom of Information Act, and Government in the Sunshine Act are examples of measures taken by the United States government to help frame policy decisions within an environment that asks that four types of accountability be met: bureaucratic, legal, professional, and political.

There is no counterpart for establishing accountability mechanisms for INGOs. Yet, these entities are often seen as the embodiment of “global civil society.” They also have assumed growing importance within global governance as a result of their roles in delivering international humanitarian relief, development assistance, health aid, and other public goods. There are particular challenges of accountability for locally-based NGOs within many developing countries that draw resources from large INGOs such as CARE, and Oxfam, from intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), as well as from donor governments. In Bangladesh, for example, there are large numbers of INGOs present, thousands of locally-based NGOs, and one, in particular, called Proshika that has become so large that it has assumed many functions that would normally be filled by government agencies and has increasingly come to be seen as a political actor. This paper examines the challenges of accountability for NGOs and provides a case study of NGOs in Bangladesh to illustrate how some of those challenges are currently being addressed. Introduction

The growth of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and NGO networks in the 1990s

has been a major factor in their increasing activity at all levels of human society and governance

from global to national and local. These private voluntary organizations are generally formed by

individuals or associations to achieve a common purpose. Some are formed to advocate a

particular cause such as human rights, peace, or environmental protection. Others are established

to provide disaster relief, humanitarian aid in war-torn countries, or development aid. The

literature on NGOs generally distinguishes between not-for-profit groups (the great majority) and

for-profit corporations. In reality, terrorist and liberation groups, as well as drug cartels and

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crime syndicates are also NGOs, but they represent the “dark side” of the phenomenon and are

therefore usually studied separately. Exclusively national NGOs are estimated to number over

26,000 and grassroots organizations number in the millions. National and grassroots groups are

sometimes linked to counterparts in other countries through transnational networks or

federations; the majority, however, are not part of formal international networks, but may have

informal links to international development or human rights groups from which they may get

funding for local programs or training assistance. Women have been particularly active in

organizing many small, grassroots NGOs in developing countries.

Truly international NGOs (INGOs) are identified by the nature of their membership or

their commitment to conduct activities in several countries. The Yearbook of International

Organizations identifies approximately 6,000 such INGOs currently. Examples of large INGOs

include the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Oxfam,

CARE, Doctors without Borders, Transparency International, Greenpeace, and Amnesty

International.

Reimann (2006, p. 48) explains how both states and international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have promoted the growth of NGOs

by providing new political opportunities and incentives to organize. More specifically, as the international system has expanded over time it has increasingly offered two types of international opportunities that are also crucial factors for the growth of citizen groups at the national level: (1) resources in the form of grants, contracts and other kinds of institutional support (food aid, transportation costs, technical assistances, etc.) and (2) political access to decision-making bodies and agenda-setting arenas.

Numerous international relations scholars and sociologists have studied and analyzed

NGOs and INGOs over the past fifteen years. Where previously much of the NGO

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literature was written by activists, there is now some excellent scholarship, including

recent work on the challenges and issues of NGOs’ accountability.

NGOs’ governance functions have increasingly come to parallel many functions provided

provided by IGOs such as the various agencies within the UN system. They create and mobilize

global networks, gather information on local conditions, mobilize to put pressure on

governments from both within states and transnationally. They are often key sources of

information and technical expertise on a wide variety of international issues, particularly

environmental and human rights issues. They have increasingly been provided opportunities to

participate in IGO-sponsored conferences by submitting documents, drafting sections of law-

creating treaties, and providing expertise. Indeed, UN-sponsored global conferences such as

those on the environment and development (Rio, 1992) and women (Beijing, 1995) have

provided a great deal of impetus to the growth of NGOs and grassroots groups as well as

transnational networks.

In a few countries, NGOs have taken on many of the functions not being filled by a weak,

inept, or failed state. Bangladesh is a particularly interesting example for purposes of studying

the roles of NGOs and the challenges of NGO accountability. It hosts the largest NGO sector in

the world (over 19,000 by one count), responding to what one Bangladeshi describes as “the

failure of government to provide public goods and look after the poor, and the failure of the

private sector to provide enough gainful employment opportunities” (quoted in Waldman 2003,

p. A8). NGOs have taken on roles in education, health, agriculture, and microcredit, all of which

were originally government functions. Some attribute the decline of Bangladesh’s poverty rate

since 1971 from 70 percent to 43 percent to this nonstate sector. The role of NGOs in

Bangladesh has also been extensively studied which provides more information for examining

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the issues of accountability than is available in most other countries. In this connection, we

utilize the case of Proshika which has become almost an NGO “conglomerate.”

Why NGO Accountability Matters

Accountability in government is synonymous with “red tape” for some; for others, it is

synonymous with democratic practices and transparency. NGOs, for the most part, are not

necessarily subject to the same provisions and checks that governmental bureaucracies have.

Even INGOs that are membership organizations are rarely accountable to their members. With

respect to the accountability of bureaucracies, legislation such as the Administrative Procedure

Act, Freedom of Information Act, and Government in the Sunshine Act are examples of

measures taken by the United States government to help frame policy decisions within an

environment that asks that four types of accountability be met: bureaucratic, legal, professional,

and political. There is no counterpart for establishing accountability mechanisms for NGOs or

INGOs. Because of their increased roles, however, NGO accountability is important.

Regarding accountability, NGOs are regularly answerable to at least four different

authorities: to their boards of governors or executive committees, and then to the general

members (if they are membership organizations); to governments in countries where they

operate; to the people (both recipients and nonrecipients of the benefits and services provided);

and to the donors that provide resources. Yet, it is important to note that “accountability” has

many different connotations and meanings (Karim 1996, p. 139). Lee (2004, p. 3) suggests that

“their commitment, values and good intentions…[is no longer] a sufficient basis for

accountability.” Rapid growth, increased funds, and increased power are three of the factors that

have raised the issue of accountability for NGOs. With the measures to demonstrate

accountability, NGOs stand to benefit from an increase in trust and commitment from

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stakeholders, increased organizational performance and learning, and counter criticisms that

NGOs are secretive and undemocratic (Lee 2004, p. 7).

A United Nations Development Dossier from the Non-Governmental Liaison Service

addresses in detail numerous issues of accountability such as regulatory action by the

government, voluntary accountability, organizational accountability, donor accountability, and

other issues connect with NGOs and their growing role in global governance and development.

Bendell, 2006) It raises important questions about the “skills and power of many NGOs” while

also recognizing the “concerns about opportunities for the misuse and abuse of humanitarian

funds” (Bendell 2006, p. ix).

Although governments and IGOs are able to satisfy questions of accountability through

their highly structured guidelines, constitutions, and charters, there is much more ambiguity

when considering transnational civil society and the role that NGOs play within that dynamic.

Because civil society is still emerging as a legitimate player in governance both at the national

and international level, the ways of identifying and defining accountability continue to be

established. Assessing accountability, therefore, requires discerning how NGOs sort through a

broad array of interests among stakeholders, recipients, governments, and other groups with

respect to particular contextual needs (i.e. to demonstrate transparency, to satisfy donors, to

answer to host governments etc.).

Managing Expectations in Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

Romzek and Dubnick’s (1987) inquiry into the “lessons from the 1986 Challenger

tragedy” focuses upon alternative approaches for managing diverse expectations within a public

sector context. These scholars understand that accountability questions—even those appearing to

hinge upon narrow technical and managerial questions—need broader scrutiny within the

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institutional context of a wider social system. To Romzek and Dubnick, accountability in the

public sector thus extends beyond technical and managerial “answerability” to the institutional

question “involv[ing] the means by which public agencies and their workers manage the diverse

expectations generated within and outside the organization” (228). These researchers identify

alternative systems for managing diverse expectations as dependent upon two inter-related

control issues: (1) whether the ability to define and control expectations resides within or outside

the organization and (2) “the degree of control that entity is given over defining those agency’s

expectations” (228). Thus, four alternative systems emerge—

• Bureaucratic accountability systems (internal source of control; high degree of

control over expectations)—Expectations are managed by those “at the top of the

bureaucratic hierarchy” (228);

• Legal accountability (external source of control; high degree of control over

expectations)—accountability is based on relationships with a controlling party

outside the organization in a position to impose legal sanctions;

• Professional accountability (internal source of control; low degree of control over

expectations)—accountability based on deference to skill and expertise within the

organization; and

• Political Accountability (external source of control; low degree of control over

expectations)—accountability corresponds to responsiveness to various consti-

tuiencies and stakeholders outside the organization.

The study of NGO accountability can significantly augment Romzek and Dubnick’s

“managed expectations” framework, provided that certain fundamental themes particular to

NGO missions and contexts can be accommodated. NGO governance, for example, falls

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obviously outside the formal structure of a governmental entity. Second, some NGOs may

commit to norms and values (for example, those related to “conscious-raising”) that require some

insularity, autonomy, or “buffered discretion” in conflict with stakeholder expectations that fuel

“accountability” demands. And third, the NGO accountability contexts include a variety of

national governance arrangements that extend beyond the U.S. political system—assumed as a

given in the Romzek and Dubnick approach (1987, p. 230). Thus, one cannot assume that NGOs

enjoy constitutional or legal protections against aggressive, controlling actions on the part of host

regimes.

Romzek and Dubnick’s institutional perspective appears especially helpful in

understanding the cross-pressure of stakeholder demands exerted on NGOs in assuming

particular roles in a variety of settings. The remainder of this section explores the utility of their

managed expectations perspective for understanding accountability issues that nongovernmental

organizations confront. First, discussion centers upon whether and how Romzek and Dubnick’s

four accountability systems (bureaucratic, legal, professional, and political) relate to selected

issues that affect how NGOs function. Second, since NGOs operate internationally in varying

political contexts, attention turns to how matters of political legitimacy (in varied national

settings) affect the management of expectations host governments place upon them in relation to

other stakeholder interests. Finally, this section considers how NGO attention to accountability

dilemmas facilitates ongoing strategic management efforts in programmatic decision-making.

Accountability Systems to Manage Expectations on NGOs

The expectation management perspective moves past the futility of asking if a particular

NGO “is accountable”—simply ‘yes’ and ‘no,’ depending upon the stakeholder, circumstance,

definition of accountability, etc.—to questions of how a diversity of expectations are mediated

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around the NGO’s mission and role. Edwards and Hulme (1996, pp. 260-60) in fact conclude

their edited book Beyond the Magic Bullet stressing “the management of accountability” as a key

theme that emerges in studying NGOs. This approach extends the accountability question

beyond reaction to imposed demands, standards, and constraints to proactive initiatives related to

strategic action. As Biggs and Neame (1996, pp. 48-49) suggest, “It might seem that the more

accountable NGOs are, the less autonomy they have. Pure autonomy and multiple accountability

are clearly incompatible. However, by increasing the number and types of arenas in which NGOs

are accountable, they may create greater room to maneuver as they gain spheres in which to

negotiate.”

The following assesses some selected topics addressed in an emerging literature on NGO

accountability—stakeholders, performance criteria, functional versus strategic accountability,

hemispheric region, the New Policy Agenda, internal structure and roles, and self-regulation.

Explicitly or implicitly, each of these issues raise accountability demands that NGOs must

somehow address. It is instructive to understand the accountability implications of these selected

themes in terms of Romzek and Dubnick’s four accountability systems.

Stakeholders

NGOs need to manage the expectations of a diverse array of constituents, support groups,

and regulating authorities—each with varying capacities to demand and appraise reports and

information, as well as operate sanctions on NGOs. Edwards and Hulme (1996, p. 10) list the

following among that stakeholder mix: (1) beneficiaries and members, (2) trustees, (3) private

contributors, (4) NGO networks, (5) nations, (6) donors, and (7) other supporting (funding)

NGOs. Clearly some of these constituents reside outside the host nation, while others represent

regime authorities and beneficiary groups within that setting.

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Performance Criteria

Accountability typically presupposes tangible definitions and standards of performance.

Nonetheless, ideas about NGO performance can be ambiguous as well as contestable within the

cross-pressures of expectations from multiple stakeholders. For example, investors may demand

productivity in turns of output-cost ratios, host nations may expect conformity with regime laws

and agendas, and beneficiaries and/or mission-committed contributors could seek out evidence of

“results” as desired change or improvement from the status quo. To the extent that

“improvement” is understood as social or political change (for example, “democratization”),

adverse reaction might be anticipated on the part of governmental authorities.

Functional Versus Strategic Accountability

According to Avina (1993), NGO accountability can be differentiated between functional

reporting on resource use and short-term outcomes and longer-term impacts that affect the wider

environment. Performance as impact, as assessed by strategic accountability, contends with the

reality of pertinent forces outside of NGOs control. To the extent that strategic accountability

informs subsequent NGO action, impact studies imply that the NGO benefits from some

“negotiating room [in which] to maneuver” (Biggs and Neame 1996) or “insulation” to facilitate

learning from the process of being held accountable.

Hemispheric Region

The NGO literature differentiates between “Northern” and “Southern” NGOs, a distinction

relevant to performance-related issues. First, Northern NGOs (such as Oxfam USA or Care

International) often function as donor agencies that disburse funds for particular projects (for

example, rural development) undertaken by Southern NGOs, typically in poor settings. As

Chambers (1996) points out, both the “Northern” disbursement- and the “Southern”

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recipient/project implementation-functions suggest actions that presumably attest to

“appropriate” performance. For example, Northern donor organizations want to be seen as

actively disbursing money, rather than having it languish in banks. Thus, the donor’s need to

“move money” places pressure on recipient NGOs to show timely results, irrespective of critical

timing and other strategic considerations that impinge on the recipient’s program activities.

Chambers details how the interplay between donor and recipient performance imperatives result

in hierarchical relationships with northern NGOs usually at the top. Nonetheless, recipients may

willingly assume this subservient role in seeking out readily available dollars to underwrite their

efforts (Edward and Hulme 1996, p. 6).

New Policy Agenda

Much as the New Public Management influences contemporary public administration, the

New Policy Agenda (NPA) affects the rationales for funding some NGO projects as well as the

accountability standards placed upon them. In essence, these “Northern” donor agencies base

their funding decisions on how NGOs contribute to “good governance” and market efficiency.

As Edwards and Hulme (1998) explain, the neo-liberal thrusts of the NPA encourage NGOs to

assume economic roles as “efficient providers of services” and political agents of

democratization. In some cases, the former attempts to characterize NGOs as “more efficient

providers” of services than counterpart governmental agencies. Such a rationale is clearly

consistent with an ideological preference by which “leaner” governments are assumed better able

to compete in the global market. Regarding the latter, the political expectation that NGOs should

act as “democratizers” may complicate “Southern” NGO project initiatives to promote social and

political mobilization in particular settings. From an accountability standpoint, “good

governance” imperatives impose (what Edwards and Hulme refer to as) “accountancy”

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standards—in essence, business control systems—rather than impact accountability that assesses

project effectiveness. Concerns are that donors strongly committed to the NPA will compromise

NGO performance in institutional development, weaken their legitimacy as independent actors,

and distort accountability away from responsiveness to grassroots constituencies in favor of

quantitative reporting outputs (Edwards and Hulme 1998, p. 8).

Internal Structure and Roles

Those who serve in organizations are typically held accountable by upper-level managers and

executives. Nonetheless, those individuals should be understood as internal stakeholders whose

efforts and conduct have direct impacts upon organizational performance and legitimacy. Of

particular significance in project-oriented NGOs are field-workers who directly interact with

those served, often poor and in remote locals. One account characterizes field-workers in a

southern setting as “underpaid, undervalued, overworked, and unappreciated” (Ahmad 2007, p.

349). As Ahmad notes, strongly-motivated field workers can stimulate client satisfaction. On the

other hand, those engaging in corrupt practices or showing indifference to the poor can

undermine NGO legitimacy (351).

Internal Structure and Roles

NGO efforts toward self-regulation often involve developing codes of conduct or ethics for

individuals and/or organizations either within national settings or partnership associations. In

regard to the former, Antöv et al. (2007, p. 157) discuss the efforts of the Agency for Research,

Education, Economic and Social Development in Indonesia to establish an NGO umbrella

organization as a platform for a code of ethics and Karim (1996, pp. 134-35) tells of the

Association of Development Agencies in Bangladesh undertaking similar activities. Difficulties

in inter-organizational consensus building can lead to minimal standards that counteract the

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intent to gain legitimacy through self-regulation. Callamard (2007, pp. 184-86) chronicles the

efforts of the Humanitarian Project International that involved identifying the following elements

in determining some common principles for self-regulation: Who is accountable? To whom? For

What? How? And for what outcome?

Together, these selected variables coax out an array of institutional pressures on various

types of NGOs that in turn account for diverse expectations placed upon them. Romzek and

Dubnick’s accountability perspective asserts that public organizations prioritize among

alternative accountability mechanisms in accommodating the particular mix of demands they

confront. Table 1 depicts how the variables discussed above activate varying accountability

systems as means of managing expectations. It shows, for example, the underlying tension

(particularly acute among Southern, grassroots organizations) between pressures to impose

hierarchal (bureaucratic) control systems to satisfy investors or donor organizations and the need

for political accountability—that is, the need to be mission responsive to project beneficiaries

and other committed constituents. This tension becomes all the more pronounced in an era of

“good governance” (as manifested in the New Policy Agenda) that in some cases expects NGOs

to replace supposedly “inefficient” government agencies as direct providers of services. Such

pressures to assume “loads shed” are accompanied by expectations that these third-sector roles

mandate NGOs to prioritize business-like control systems.

Table 1 about here

Second, Table 1 suggests that program-implementing NGOs need to offset bureaucratic

“accountancy” pressures to maintain sufficient “insulation” (Johnson 2008) or “maneuvering

room” (Biggs and Neame 1996) for subsequent action in pursuit of mission legitimacy. Although

these demands place priority on political accountability, they also direct attention to

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professionalism, the support for self-regulation and for institutionalizing “good practice” in the

field. And, third, Table 1 stresses legal accountability that, although pertinent generally, takes on

primacy where NGO operations potentially conflict with regime values, leading to aggressive

government regulations and perhaps sanctions. In summary, we assert that Romzek and

Dubnick’s perspective offers a workable framework for understanding both the diversity of

institutional pressures NGOs confront and various types of accountability systems for managing

those pressures.

Stepping Back: The Linkage From Context

Since Romzek and Dubnick develop their accountability perspective within a singular

socio-political context—that is, the American political system, there is little concern for how

accountability systems relate to matters of political legitimacy in varied national settings. As

applied to NGOs, their perspective raises questions regarding the linkages between political

legitimacy (whether based on national regime values, global “good governance” agendas, or

some other authority) and priorities among alternative accountability systems. In the introductory

chapter of their edited volume NGO Accountability, Jordan and van Tuijl (2007, pp. 9-13)

present a “short history of NGO accountability…[in terms of ] an evolving set of syllogisms that

outline the prevailing perception of NGO roles, roughly in the last 25 years. As logician Irving

Copi (1982, pp. 261-68) explains, a syllogism can be understood as a type of “argument in

ordinary language.” As such, the syllogisms offered by Jordan and van Tuijl embrace what

March and Olsen (1989, pp. 21-26) call “logics of [rule-based] appropriateness” or rules to be

learned as “catechisms of expectations.”

Jordan and van Tuijl (2007, p. 20; note 6) use syllogisms to “provide a simple format to

support discussion of the issues at hand”—in this case, informed thinking about what constitutes

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NGO accountability. It should be noted that Jordan and Van Tuijl’s intent is to show a sequence

of developing discourse within the NGO community over twenty-five years, such that one

“paradigm” evolves to challenge that in vogue. (Table 2 below presents that sequence as

numbered.) Yet it appears appropriate as well to cast each of the five syllogisms as

argumentative logics that test the legitimacy of NGO operations within particular regimes or

authoritative contexts. Thus, Table 2 characterizes Jordan and Van Tuijl’s syllogisms as

legitimating logics of appropriateness that call for (or prioritize) certain (of Romzek and

Dubnick’s) accountability systems instead of others. For example, syllogisms 1 (complementing

government) and 2 (the rise of civil society)—both assertions from neo-liberal ideology—

demand bureaucratic accountability mechanisms, although somewhat different. In the first case,

it is reasoned that NGOs (preferable to government agencies) should administer public services

shed from government and that their accountability obligations should primarily focus on

financial reporting. The second line of neo-liberal thinking presumes NGOs as logical engines of

democratic capacity-building and therefore views accountability in the establishment of “good

governance” structures and processes within NGOs.

Table 2 about here

In contrast to the second, syllogism 3 emphasizes “good government” outcomes more

than form and process. As Jordan and van Tuijl note, this thinking provoked “a more heated

discourse on NGO accountability” that pitted self-regulation and accreditation (professional

accountability systems) against imperatives for management controls and governance structures.

“The return to state supremacy” (syllogism 4) constitutes a state-centered reaction to increased

NGO autonomy through self-regulation, thereby imposing legal accountability to governmental

authority. (It should be noted here that Jordan and van Tuijl discuss these paradigm shifts within

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the recent context of globalization. Outside of this context some states may have historically

demanded regime accountability from NGOs, rather than having “returned” to it.) Finally, a

“rights-based approach” (syllogism 5) focuses on balancing stakeholder interests of multiple

constituencies, thus stressing political accountability mechanisms as especially vital. In

summary, the multiplicity of settings emerging from inquiry on NGO accountability encourage

“a step back” from the question of appropriate systems for managing expectations to

consideration of varying logics of legitimacy that support accountability mechanisms.

Stepping Forward: The Linkage to Strategy and Action

Obligations of accountability are typically understood as constraints upon action in the

public sector. Although valid to a point, such thinking tends to understate the inherent

complexity of public matters, complexity that necessitates successive iterations of adjustment—

often referred to as “boundary spanning.” This idea implies that program implementation rarely

flows from the straight-forward execution of tasks in furtherance of a pre-established goal, but

rather as a continuous mission-refining process (see Thompson and McEwan 1968). Adjustment

depends upon the accurate reading of cues from the environment as stimuli for mission

refinement.

In this regard, an NGO’s assessment of its various accountability obligations constitutes a

key step in boundary-spanning, or more specifically, its ongoing strategic management process.

Specifically, accountability matters need consideration as risks (as well as opportunities) in both

mission-setting and decision-making that guides implementation. David Lewis’ (1994, pp. 128-

33) essay on NGO roles in Caribbean development emphasizes the risks various NGOs take—in

the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Haiti, and Barbados—in pursuing programs that

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fundamentally change social and economic conditions rather than merely reinforcing the

political status quo by channeling in outside resources.

Such overt political roles necessitate organizational learning processes that factor in

accountability dilemmas between stakeholder (the state, donor agencies, beneficiaries)

expectations that pit risks against impact opportunities in the strategic management process.

NGO management consultant Ricardo Wilson-Grau (2003, p. 533) characterizes these strategic

efforts as follows:

Typically, once every three to five years, NGOs agree and implement a multi-annual process sharply focused on positioning the organisation to achieve its mission and long- term goals. Increasingly, however, development NGOs are experiencing rapid, accelerating change. Not only do strategic decisions have to be made outside a multi- year cycle, but by the time managers know whether or not a decision has been implemented, they have taken new ones.

Asserting that NGOs are risk-takers to the extent they advance social change and innovation,

Wilson-Grau stresses the need to focus on how those agendas affect the probabilities of success

or failure, asking “What are the positive and negative consequences if I (we) succeed or fail?”

(534) From an accountability standpoint, anticipating how various stakeholders may react to

these consequences in large part drives strategic management processes.

Thus, NGO accountability can be assessed in terms of an elongated model of three

components: (1) state and/or societal legitimacy as the source or sources of compelling

accountability mechanisms; (2) the management of expectations and demands among those

mechanisms (in essence, the Romzek and Dubnick model); and (3) concern for how expectations

management informs strategy and action.

The Case of Bangladesh and Proshika

For exploring the issues of NGOs and the issue of accountability, Bangladesh stands out

for several reasons. Compared to similarly sized nations, Bangladesh has a huge number of

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registered NGOs (nearly 23,000) and some of the largest INGOs in the world are active here

(Haque 2002, p. 412). Thus it is an excellent case study for NGO activity in developing

countries. Finally, Bangladesh’s NGO–government relationship is important to explore because

as the public sector is diminishing in that country and NGOs have gained prominence and

support in multiple ways (Haque 2002, p. 412).

Historical Background

The People’s Republic of Bangladesh was formerly East Pakistan and only gained its

independence in 1971 as a result of war with Pakistan. As a result of the partition of former

British India, this territory became part of Pakistan in 1947 but it was separated from then West

Pakistan by more than 1,000 miles and language differences. At independence Bangladesh was

one of the world’s poorest nations and for many years bore the unfortunate sobriquet of being a

“basket case.”

Many of the issues still being addressed today by NGOs and INGOs operating in

Bangladesh have very clear roots in the struggle for independence in 1971. As the nation was

becoming Bangladesh, efforts were made to provide medical and other humanitarian services to

refugees across the border in India as well as within the country to help address the suffering of

war. After Bangladesh gained independence, several relief and rehabilitation programs were

started both with and without international assistance. This alternative relief process then led to

development initiatives that are still apparent with the tremendous number of both NGOs (local

and national) and INGOs operating in Bangladesh. In the mid- 1990s, according to one study,

NGOs in Bangladesh operated in “more than 50 percent of all villages in the country, involving

over 3.5 million families as beneficiaries of their work” (Karim 1996, p. 132). The country’s

geographic location also makes it extremely vulnerable to natural disasters that produce flooding,

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massive loss of life, and displacement of thousands. This reality has reinforced the continuing

need for international relief aid and the presence of relief organizations. In addition, Bangladesh

is a vibrant democratic society and that has encouraged the growth of grassroots groups.

NGOs in Bangladesh are almost totally dependent, however, on foreign financing. The

total aid to NGOs rose from an average of $232 million (0.7% of GDP) between 1990-1995 to

$326 million (0.7% of GDP) between 1996-2004, while the total aid to Bangladesh fell from an

annual average of $1.62 billion (4.9% of GDP) to $1.35 billion (2.9% of GDP) during this

period. Thus, the share of aid to NGOs as a portion of total aid to Bangladesh has risen from

14.4% in the early 1990s to 24.5% since then as shown in Figure 1 (Zaman 2005).

Figure 1

External Aid to Bangladesh

$0

$200,000,000

$400,000,000

$600,000,000

$800,000,000

$1,000,000,000

$1,200,000,000

$1,400,000,000

$1,600,000,000

$1,800,000,000

NGO Aid Gov't Aid

Raw

US

Do

llar

Am

ou

nt

1990-19951996-2004

Thus, the role of NGOs in Bangladesh continues to expand into areas where typically

government would respond, such as education and economic development. Increasingly, also,

some NGOs in Bangladesh are acting as political entities (Ahmed and Potter 2006, pp. 128-130).

The delicate balance of power between governments and NGOs in nations such as

Bangladesh shows the shift in power and prominence from government agencies to NGOs in

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terms of “societal roles, public image, and [the] capacity to command external support” (Haque,

2002, p. 412). While the elected governmental officials are accountable to the Bangladeshi

public, large NGOs have obligations “mainly to the multilateral institutions, bilateral agencies,

and private foundations financing their activities.” Additionally, the accountability of NGOs to

the public becomes problematic with the growing monopoly of “a few large NGOs in terms of

membership, loans, revenues, and funds.” Haque (2002, p. 426) contends that the monopolistic

nature of these large NGOs “makes them too powerful for their poor and powerless members to

hold their NGOs accountable to them.” That is to say, as small NGOs mature into larger entities,

the connection with those they seek to serve is severely diminished because there are more

internal organizational issues and less participation by members. Building on the work of Hulme

and Edwards, Haque (2002, p. 429) notes the importance of not “overemphasizing the

contribution of NGOs to society while overlooking the vested interests behind the ‘big business’

of NGOs.” Another important point is the need to adopt “practical measures, especially to

monitor the relationship between local NGOs in Bangladesh and global players such as bilateral

and multilateral agencies and donors.” These measures include closer scrutiny of foreign

linkages and funding sources of NGOs and ensuring that NGOs comply with national rules for

dealing with external forces such as foreign assistance agencies.

In “NGOs and Transnational Accountability in Bangladesh,” coauthors Shamina Ahmed

and David Potter (2006, pp. 126-27) note that NGO accountability is becoming a transnational

problem because of the responsibility to multiple stakeholders (patrons, clients, and the NGO

itself). The influence of donors is important and several scholars suggest that “NGOs are often

willing to change their own goals about participation and community development in order to

fulfill the product demanded by donors.”

21

Even from this brief review of recent literature on NGOs and accountability in

Bangladesh, there are certainly points on consensus. First, there is a recognition of the

tremendous challenges faced in Bangladesh because of extreme poverty as well as political

volatility. Nevertheless, the impact that NGOs have on many rural communities is noted and

continues to increase with the support of external donors. Second, the political tensions between

NGOs and the government are well documented with a number of cases where there have been

crackdowns on NGOs. This tension is likely to increase as more and more financial resources go

to NGOs rather than the government itself. Third, accountability to multiple stakeholders is a

prevalent issue, with divergent views in regards to the level of desired accountability to all

stakeholders. This seems to be a point of contention among scholars and practitioners because

there is such a range of what “accountability” actually requires. The challenge to meeting

stakeholder accountability is that the spectrum of those invested in the work of NGOs ranges

from external donors to the government which has tension with the growth of NGO, and then to

the citizens themselves who benefit from the work of NGOs. Bangladesh differs from many

other nations because it has such an extremely high number of NGOs, both domestic and

international. As will be demonstrated in the case study on Proshika, Bangladeshi culture has

grown to include the increased role of NGOs in the sphere of power and influence, but that does

not mean it has been welcomed with open arms. Although needs remain great, NGOs have lost

some of the luster they had when they first emerged as meaningful players in the country.

The Story of Proshika

In 1976, in a few villages in the Dhaka and Comilla districts, Proshika (a center for

human development) was begun by a group of social workers. Its aims were reducing poverty,

protecting and regenerating the environment, improving the status of women, increasing people’s

22

participation in public institutions, and enhancing people’s capacity to gain and exercise their

democratic and human rights. Proshika emerged from the desire of a small group of social

workers and others to try to address societal issues where they saw the government lacking.

Proshika quickly assumed a meaningful role in rural communities through their multiple

programs which to grow in number and expand in scope as both capabilities and resources

allowed.

To achieve its goals, Proshika has implemented a wide range of activities geared toward

facilitating people’s access to public resources, services, and institutions with the hope these

steps will lead to self-reliance (Karim 1996, p. 135). All Proshika programs are rooted in the

“People’s Organization Building Programme” which is the core of all other programs and all the

achievements and activities emanate from the concepts and methods of organization building

created by Proshika. The poor people living in rural and urban areas are encouraged to organize

themselves into primary groups popularly known as Samitis and to form group federations at

village, union and upazila levels, building a broad organizational network. The process

constitutes the basis of participatory development and spurs the acquisition and strengthening of

human, socio-economic, and cultural resource bases of the poor. Figure 1 shows how Proshika

attempts to accomplish its goals through the People’s Organization Building Programme.

23

Figure 2

Proshika People’s Organization Building Programme

Microcredit and Saving Services: Types of Programs

Social and Natural Resource Development: Types of Programs

1. Employment and Income Generating 2. Practical Skill Development Training 3. Small Enterprise Development 4. Livestock Development 5. Policies for Risk and Vulnerability

Management 6. Fisheries Development 7. Apiculture Development 8. Sericulture Development 9. Organic Agriculture 10. Irrigation and Farm Power Technology

Services 11. Collaborative 12. Research and Demonstration Project

1. Human Development Training 2. Extended Social and Human

Development 3. External Training Division 4. Universal Education 5. Good Governance and Advocacy 6. Social Forestry 7. Health 8. Housing 9. Impact Evaluation and Research

Department 10. Development Support Communication

Program 11. People’s Culture 12. Programme on Liberation War 13. Proshika Legal Aid Services 14. Integrated Multisectoral Women’s

Development 15. Information and Documentation

Resource Cell 16. Computer in Development 17. Disaster Management and Preparedness 18. Human Resource Department

After their formation, the groups go through a process of empowerment involving various

savings plans and much human and skill development training, and engage themselves in

different income-generating activities with credit from Proshika. The group federations play an

effective role in achieving greater alliances among the poor and protecting their interests at all

administrative levels. The federations undertake various socio-economic programs in a

participatory way to strengthen their capacity.

To date, 149,016 primary groups have been formed with 97,562 of these being women’s

groups. This number of primary groups is up from 41,205 in 1996. There are currently 18,231

24

group federations. According to statistics reported by Proshika, work is taking place in more than

24,139 villages and 2,108 slums, up from 6,006 villages and 108 slums in 1996. This is a

considerable increase in little more than a decade. Additionally, the numbers of districts in which

Proshika operates have increased from 35 to 59 during the same period (Karim 1996, p. 135).1 It

is easy to see the increased scope and responsibility of Proshika as it continues to expand its role

in both rural and urban settings, providing necessary programs to empower the poor through

employment and income-generating programs, a universal education program, and disaster-

management programs (Ahmed and Potter 2006, p. 132). These programs are geared toward

both adults and children, providing the necessary training to move individuals and families

beyond a dependence upon on Proshika and its funds.

The Internal Structure of Proshika

Mokbul M. Ahmad (2002, p. 23) writes that “Although PROSHIKA says that it has a

democratic management system and has no system of bosses, it was found…that there is a

hierarchy in the management of PROSHIKA.” And, while field workers within Proshika call

each other and their superiors “bhai” (brother), a hierarchical structure is also present within

Proshika.

Thinking about NGOs and their roles and relationships often is oriented toward those

who support the work (external donors), those that receive benefits (the poor of Bangladesh), or

those who govern their impact (the government). However, it is important to look at Proshika’s

internal relationships, especially those who serve as the first contacts with those they hope to

help. Field workers are the individuals who are “on the ground” and make the multiple programs

happen. Field workers are the lowest level of Proshika’s organizational structure and have

1 Current statistics are available at http://www.proshika.org/at_glance.htm.

25

commented in interviews that there is little opportunity for promotion and that a change in pay or

elevation from one post to another “does not require any examinations, as promotions are on the

basis of evaluation of the field workers by the area co-ordinator,” but for a change of duty (e.g.

for promotion from economic development worker to training coordinator) all field workers

“have to sit for a two-hour written test and face an interview.” Some workers complained of

irregularities in the promotion and posting system. For the first twenty years of its existence,

Proshika did not a system of evaluation and only introduced it in 1996 after years of demands

(Ahmed 2002, p. 24).

There is a clear structure with Proshika beginning with field workers, to area

coordinators, to zonal coordinators, and then to central coordinators based out of the Dhaka

office. Each level supervises and monitors the activities of those immediate below within the

organization. With this structure, there is a direct supervisor for those below in the organizational

structure, allowing for ongoing supervision to ensure that mission and responsibilities of

Proshika are met. This type of supervision is foundational to ensuring that all workers within

Proshika are working toward organizational goals and expectations. This hierarchical

relationship carries over to the relationship between the field worker and clients.

In Ahmad’s (2002, p. 120) assessment of field worker/client relationships, Proshika

ranked highest because, until recently, Proshika “was a different type of NGO.” The recent push

for NGOs to become more involved in microcredit has taken Proshika away from its roots of

motivating and organizing the landless poor. This shift, albeit only one aspect of Proshika’s

overall mission, has changed issues of accountability because now there is much more concern

for recordkeeping of finances in contrast to simply serving as the catalyst for communities to

become involved in political and social issues for their own benefit. As NGOs such as Proshika

26

continue to grow and become more bureaucratic, there are both positive and negative impacts.

Negatively, there is an increased disconnection from the poor Proshika is aiming to help.

Positively, there is increased professionalization that leads to a system with better accountability

than what currently exists.

Increased Political and Social Activity

In 2002, following October 2001 general elections, the Bangladeshi government

intervened in Proshika’s work and halted $50 million in funds from foreign donors. The

crackdown on Proshika was over alleged concern that it was engaged in “anti-government

activities.” Proshika’s president, Dr. Ahmed, and the vice president were detained along with

hundreds of Proshika employees, often times without being charged with any specific crime. The

most common reason cited for these actions was the increased political involvement of Proshika

and its desire to raise awareness of issues for the poor and encourage them to become politically

active. The government also charged the organization with alleged financial irregularities. Yet,

there were serious concerns about the lack of transparency in the investigations. Donors

expressed concern to the government that they saw no grounds for blocking Proshika’s entire

program while this investigation was carried out, as this would cut off thousands of people from

assistance, but Proshika’s funds were not unblocked.

Regardless of the authenticity and legality of the charges, Proshika must provide

measures of accountability in response to them. Bangladesh’s government agencies are key

stakeholders in the work of Proshika because the NAB functions as a gatekeeper between donors

and the NGO itself. And, unlike many of the thousands of grassroots groups in Bangladesh,

Proshika functions more like a governmental entity, because of both its size and range of

programs. Its increased role, however, affects the power relationship with the government. In

27

addition the variety of inputs and services related to “microfinance, small industry, livestock,

fisheries, sanitation, basic education, and health care…state monopolies are facing formidable

challenges from large NGOs in areas such as printing and computer software. Proshika, for

example, has programs dealing with both of these areas” (Haque 2002, p. 420). It also has

developed a transport company of 28 buses at a cost of 30 million Taka ($437,000) in addition to

a printing press and garment industry with a cost of 15 million Taka ($219,000) (Ahmed 2002, p.

13). These types of ventures blur the lines between the tax exempt work of NGOs and the

market-oriented work of private companies.

The government of Bangladesh, not surprisingly, has grown very concerned about the

role and influence of Proshika in the political arena. By using police forces to disrupt the work of

Proshika, the government is able to directly affect the impact Proshika has on those who stand to

benefit from increased involvement in the political process.

Proshika’s most recent annual report for the fiscal year of July 2006 to June 2007

addresses the effects of the government crackdown on its work. The chairman notes,

In spite of the continued blockage of donor fund and crackdown (sic) on the organization by the government as well as a turbulent political environment, PROSHIKA has made considerable achievements in almost all the programme areas during 2006-2007. The programme activities in this period have been implemented with PROSHIKA's own resources against the targets set on the basis of the cash-flow situation (Proshika, 2007, p. Foreword).

The Impact of Microcredit

The ability to provide microcredits to individuals and families is one of the primary

methods for addressing societal issues facing Bangladeshis. Indeed, microcredit was invented in

Bangladesh by Mohamed Yunis who founded the Grameen Bank. As Proshika has become

involved in microcredit lending, however, it is becoming more like a business rather than a

development organization. The growth of microcredit lending requires lenders to become

28

performance-oriented through routine checks from supervisors to ensure that individuals are

repaying their loans in a timely manner. The outcomes sought include meeting goals for the

delivery of services as well as maintaining appropriate repayment schedules for microloans.

With its workers being dependent on their performance in service delivery, Proshika has had to

become more business/market-oriented (Ahmed 2002, p. 183).

One of the biggest issues of accountability comes from Proshika’s role in microcredit and

the ways that this new area poses challenges for its mission. Although not as strict as some of the

other large NGOs (e.g. the Grameen Bank), Proshika must also seek repayments from its clients.

Proshika has changed its system for access to funds to curb someone from embezzling from a

group savings account for beneficiaries by having the savings of clients deposited in a bank

account that cannot be operated without the consent of the relevant field workers assigned to that

group of beneficiaries. While addressing the old problem of relying on one individual to manage

the money of the group savings account, it has created a new problem where clients are now

completely reliant upon the field workers. This diminishes the empowerment that has been

foundational to Proshika’s mission (Ahmed 2002, p. 159). For accountability, this change is a

positive one, but it does run counter to the purpose of Proshika’s existence which is to give the

poor the ability to manage their own lives.

Let us turn, then, to examine some of the other issues of Proshika’s accountability and the

general challenges associated with NGO accountability. These include the multiple stakeholders

to whom NGOs are accountable for their performance—not only the delivery of goods but also

the results; for NGO donors there is the necessity to demonstrate good stewardship. There is

legal accountability to governments of countries where NGOs operate – in the case of Proshika,

29

Bangladesh. Clearly, Proshika’s increased range of activities and political role poses a threat to

the government and raises questions about its legal status as well as the legitimacy of its mission.

Proshika and The Challenges of NGO Accountability

The Proshika case presents a diverse array of expectations placed on an NGO that has

assumed key roles that (1) provide basic public services complementing or in lieu of those

provided by the government; (2) offer means of integrating and empowering emerging “civil

society” groups in Bangladesh; and, thereby, (3) promote “good governance” that obligates

Proshika to model principles of transparency, financial discipline and political responsiveness.

Each of these roles speak to accountability as related to the broader context of political

legitimacy.

Legitimacy and Accountability

Proshika’s roles in providing public services, promoting civil society development, and

modeling “good governance” both enhance and threaten the political order in Bangladesh.

Indeed these three roles represent alternative logics of NGO legitimacy based upon Jordan and

van Tuijl’s syllogisms as represented in Table 2 (see columns 1, 2, and 3). To the extent that

these activities could be taken as political mobilization, it is apparent that Proshika runs afoul of

state supremacy (logic 4 in Table 2), a traditional interpretation of political legitimacy. Thus,

Proshika is challenged to manage expectations in ways that recognize that its ongoing activities

coincide with new logics of appropriateness that are to an extent welcomed by the state, yet also

elicit aggressive state reactions in the form of NGO regulation.

Managing Expectations

Within this national context of cross-cutting logics of legitimacy, Proshika confronts

numerous pressures. Some of these are internal to Bangladesh society; others are products of

30

the extensive presence of INGOs and other international donors. This presents a serious

challenge for managing the diverse expectations of all stakeholders and must be managed by the

various accountability systems in the Romzek and Dubnick (1987) typology.

Legal Accountability

Proshika is registered under the Societies Registration Act of 1860 in addition to the

NGO Affairs Bureau (NAB) which functions out of the prime minister’s office. The NAB is the

governmental agency that is charged with controlling the activities of NGOs that operate with

foreign funds in Bangladesh. If an NGO receives foreign funding, it must be registered with the

NAB. To do this, the NGO must operate under the Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities)

Regulation Ordinance of 1978 and the Foreign Contributions (Regulation) Ordinance of 1982.

According to these rules, no NGO is allowed to implement any activity using foreign funds

without the NAB’s prior approval of both the budget and the overall project itself (Karim 1996,

pp. 133-134).

As one considers the regulatory role the government plays in the operation of NGOs such

as Proshika, there is a need to recognize the power dynamic taking place within Bangladesh

between the government and power of NGOs with substantial financial support for their

initiatives. Nevertheless, Proshika is accountable to the state and must satisfy the requests of the

government when it comes to issues of accountability and finances.

Professional Accountability: Self-Regulation

In 1993, the Association of Development Agencies in Bangladesh (ADAB) adopted a

code of ethics as a step toward self-regulation for its member NGOs. The code was prepared in

consultation with its members, which at that stage was viewed as a positive response to many of

the problems confronting NGOs. The code is an excellent innovation, providing a detailed

31

framework of nonprofit sector ethics defined at four levels in relation to the poor people for

whom the nonprofit sector works: the government and the state, other private volunteer

development organizations in Bangladesh, development partners (or donors), and NGO staff. In

terms of commitment, the document promises high standards and practices including self-

regulation, efficiency, transparency, and accountability. It raises the importance of checks

against political influences, factionalism and divisiveness within NGOs. The code also commits

NGOs to strong collaboration with the government, and an independent and transparent

relationship with donors. The objectives of NGOs laid out in the code are to raise the standard of

living of the poor and to help them become worthy citizens of Bangladesh. The code posits that

aside from generating their own funds, NGOs can “accept resources and services from the

public, the business community, the government of Bangladesh, and external development

partners. But these resources are to be used exclusively for the development of the poor and not

for any personal profit” (Karim 1996, p. 134).

Members of ADAB (Proshika included) commit themselves to “working for solidarity

among the poor, democratic leadership, and self-reliance, irrespective of caste, creed, religion

and gender.” The NGOs must also be accountable and transparent to the government with regard

to their funds and activities. The code calls for “the highest standards of transparency and

honesty” (Karim, 1996, p. 134-135)

Yet, there are no means of ensuring compliance with all these lofty goals. There is no

incentive system within the sector to encourage good practices, nor any mechanism to prevent

non-compliance. Any prospect of introducing effective measures to implement such instruments

and to promote internal self-governance has suffered a serious setback. Thus, the code of ethics

32

that was regarded as a means for the ADAB to have a standard for NGOs in Bangladesh

functions in that capacity only as much as each NGO chooses to comply.

Multiple Stakeholders: Performance and Political Accountability

The complexity of NGOs and relationships with their multiple stakeholders are a

challenge from the standpoint of accountability. Northern donors include the World Bank, UN

development agencies, major INGOs such as CARE and Oxfam, as well as the United States, the

United Kingdom, the European Union, Canada, and Japan. Proshika must conform to the goals

and procedures of these donors in order to secure funds. Additionally, the restrictions of donor

funding require proposals for work on particular issues for a particular set of time (Ahmed and

Potter 2006, pp. 136-137).

Figure 2 illustrates the multiple levels of accountability when dealing with internal and

external funding, governmental oversight, and accountability to those who are beneficiaries of

the services and programs provided by Proshika.

Figure 3

The NGO Chain: Proshika’s Accountability to Multiple Stakeholders

International Donors INGOs Beneficiaries Government of Proshika Bangladesh

The complexity of multiple donors is part of what makes Proshika an interesting NGO to

probe more deeply. One example of INGOs partnering with Proshika was on a project aimed at

addressing the exploitation of women. Since exploitation has a central role in perpetuating

poverty, Proshika has a program that provides training for self-help groups as well as providing

33

microcredit loans. This project included the Canadian International Development Agency

(CIDA), the Netherlands Organisation for International Development Cooperation (NOVIB,

which is associated with Oxfam), and the British Government’s Department for International

Development (DFID). CIDA, for example, contributed $11.4 million to this project that lasted

from 1999 to 2006. (CIDA) Each partner had its own guidelines for how its funds were to be

used and reported. This is only one example of how international donors and INGOs have a stake

in the work of Proshika and it illustrates the challenges of accountability with multiple donors.

One of the most important methods for Proshika providing accountability to all

stakeholders is through the publication of its annual report. The most recent report available on

the Proshika website is for July 2006 to June 2007. The report is provided to all stakeholders and

to those who have interest in the work of Proshika. As Chairman Qazi Faruque Ahmed notes in

the foreword to the most recently available annual report, “We take much pleasure in presenting

it [the annual report] to the members of PROSHIKA, its development partners, members of civil

society and all those who have inspired and stood by us in our fight against poverty” (Proshika

2007, Foreword).

Although Proshika’s annual report includes highly detailed information regarding the

programs for 2006-2007, it lacks information regarding funding and the organization’s

relationship with donors. Donors are able to see what their financial support contributed to

during the year, but there is no detail on funding from particular donors. This is not atypical.

According to Ahmad (2002, p. 11), “Most NGOs in Bangladesh maintain a high level of secrecy

about their documents, staff salary and budgets.” This is important to note because NGOs tend to

identify themselves as participatory grassroots groups. Yet, in reality, this is illusory. (Ahmad,

2002, p. 11) It also is a point of concern because transparency helps to address concerns about

34

accountability and without access to this funding information, one is only able to guess about the

relationships that Proshika has with its donors. Still, from the standpoint of performance

accountability, the activity report for Proshika shows different levels of measurement for

programs, ranging from the amount of income generated for the Employment and Income

Generating Programme to the number of bee colonies established for the Apiculture

Development Programme. By providing tangible numbers for the various programs it operates,

Proshika demonstrates a level of transparency that allows one to assess its performance.

The requirements for Proshika from international donors and INGOs are not spelled out

in material that is publicly available. This is does not negate the accountability to those who

supply funds for the work of Proshika, but this lack of transparency does demonstrate the secrecy

of the relationship between Proshika and its donors. Nevertheless, donors continue to fund

projects and see the objectives and programs implementing them in the activity report. The

Information and Documentation Resource Cell within Proshika publishes the annual activity

report in addition to preparing six-month progress reports for Proshika’s governing body, senior

management, and donors, detailing the accounts of the overall achievements as well as the

reasons for either over-achievements or under-achievements for all of the programs (Proshika

2007, p. 62).

Finally, Proshika is fundamentally accountable to its beneficiaries. Through the field

worker/client relationship, Proshika engages citizens and encourages them to feel empowered in

order help address societal issues which marginalize a considerable portion of the population.

Yet, as it has been noted, the hierarchical structure of Bangladeshi culture pervades Proshika.

The challenge for Proshika is to allow its beneficiaries to take responsibility for their own lives

35

and the health of their communities while also getting the support necessary to make and sustain

meaningful impacts.

From Accountability to Strategy and Action

Accountability for NGOs, particularly those such as Proshika with many different

stakeholders, is clearly challenging. Likewise, the issues may be very different in a developing

country where an NGO “conglomerate” comes to be seen as a threat to the legitimacy and

authority of the government because of the wide range of services it provides and roles it plays.

Proshika’s role in promoting microcredit can be taken as a classic example of goal succession in

response to several governmental reactions than its previous efforts in mobilizing “civil society.”

In essence, by emphasizing political accountability as responsiveness to program beneficiaries

and donors Proshika has strained its relationship with the government of Bangladesh. The

relatively recent microcredit role provides Proshika with opportunities to adjust its strategy in

ways that allow some room for subsequent negotiation with the government. It also shifts its

priorities away from the political rationales of accountability toward increased emphases on

bureaucratic control and professional self-regulation. For some, these developments are

troubling since it appears that Proshika has abandoned its programmatic role in serving

Bangladesh’s poor and marginalized to that of monitoring microcredit loan repayment. The

case, therefore, also illustrates how government actions can force NGOs to reassess their

strategies and tactics in reference to their understanding of the need for accountability.

What is also striking about the case of Proshika is how the government crackdown and

resulting block on foreign funds has hindered the organization from carrying out many of its

activities that benefit the poorest citizens of Bangladesh. In this way, legal and political to

36

accountability to the government trumps accountability to the beneficiaries (and to some extent

donors).

Table 1

Romzek and Dubnick’s Four Accountability Systemsa Related to Selected NGO Issues

ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS Selected NGO Variables Bureaucratic Legal Professional Political Performance -investor, donor

demands for productivity

-regulation by host (government) regime

-responsiveness to direct program beneficiaries

Functional vs. Strategic Accountability

-Functional: Need to report on resource use and short-term impacts

-Strategic: Need to (re-)assess direction to make long-term impacts vis-à-vis forces outside NGO control; need to maintain negotiating room in which to maneuver.

North/South; New Policy Agenda

-need to impose management control systems to report on services “shed” by government.

-NGOs pressured to assume “third sector” roles.

Internal Structure and Roles

-“Northern” NGOs, top executives in “Southern” NGOs focus on “account-tancy,” reporting systems

-some roles (parti-cularly in field work) subject to government regulation

-employee (especially field worker) conduct a determinant of NGO legitimacy

Self-Regulation

-need for codes of conduct, principles of practice (especially for field workers); training important.

-Associational consensus on account-tability standards; practice supports NGO’s legitimacy

a. Barbara S. Romzek and Melvin J. Dubnick. 1987. “Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons from the Challenger Tragedy.” Public Administration Review. 47, no. 3: 227- 238.

37

Table 2 Contextual Logics of Accountability Legitimizing or Prioritizing

Alternative Accountability Systems Jordan and Van Tuijl’s Syllogismsa Related to Romzek and Dubnick’s Accountability Systemsb (1)

Complementing government (1980-1989)

(2) The rise of

civil society (1989-1995)

(3) The rise of

good governance (1995-2002)

(4) The return to

state supremacy (2002 onwards)

(5) A rights-based

Approach (2002 onwards)

Syllogisms: Logic of Argument

1. Governments are not good at delivering public services

2. NGOs are closer to the public

3. NGOs are good at delivering public services

1. Civil society is necessary for democracy

2. NGOs are civil society

3. NGOs are good for democratic development

1. Good governance is necessary for development

2. NGOs are not different from other organi-zations in civil society

3. NGOs need to apply principles of good gover-nance

1. Government is essential to ensure safety and devel-opment.

2. NGOs’ influ-ence is not in proportion to their credentials

3. NGOs need to be kept in check by legitimate government frameworks

1. There is no democratic global governance supporting universal human rights

2. NGOs assert and solidify human rights in different political arenas… regardless of governance

3. NGOs contribut to democratic governance by articulating public policy needs and practicing solution resolving public needs

Alternative Accountability System

Bureaucratic

Professional

Legal

Political

a. Lisa Jordan and Peter van Tuijl. 2007. “Rights and Responsibilities in the Political

Landscape of NGO Accountability: Introduction and Overview.” In NGO Accountability. London: Earthscan.

b. Barbara S. Romzek and Melvin J. Dubnick. 1987. “Accountability in the Public Sector:

Lessons from the Challenger Tragedy.” Public Administration Review. 47, no. 3: 227- 238.

38

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