THE CELALI EFFECT IN 17TH CENTURY-OTTOMAN TRANSFORMATION

A THESIS SUBMITTED TOTHE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

OFMIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

OĞUZ CABAR

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTSFOR

THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTSIN

THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

JUNE 2018

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

_________________________ Prof. Dr. Tülin GENÇÖZ Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

_________________________ Prof. Dr. Ömer TURAN Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

_________________________ Assist. Prof. Dr. Oktay ÖZEL Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assist. Prof. Dr. Oktay ÖZEL (Bilkent Uni.,HIST) _________________________

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Kayhan ORBAY (METU,HIST) _________________________

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Birten ÇELİK (METU,HIST) _________________________

iii

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained andpresented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declarethat, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced allmaterial and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name : Oğuz Cabar

Signature :

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ABSTRACT

THE CELALI EFFECT IN 17TH CENTURY-OTTOMAN TRANSFORMATION

Cabar, Oğuz

M.S., Department of History

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Kayhan Orbay

June 2018, 147 pages

This thesis aims to examine the effects of the Celali Revolts -a series of rebellions in

Anatolia- in the 17th century Ottoman transformation period. The transformationperiod refers to a period in which the empire experienced important difficulties and

changes in military and financial institutions due to the effects of local developments

and external events during the transition from the 16th to the 17th century. In this thesis,the effects of Celali Revolts are examined concentrating especially on demography

and economy by using the concept of “the Celali Effect”. The short and long runeffects of these revolts are examined by focusing on the regions Northern and Central

Anatolia, which were heavily affected by these revolts. The destructive effects of the

Celali Revolts are dealt with between 1576 and 1643 owing to the availability of the

case studies and Ottoman archival sources namely, the mukataa defters (tax-farming

registers), iltizam talepnameleri (records of demands for tax-farms), and mühimmeregisters (records of imperial decrees). Moreover, the reports of the French Embassy

are also used since they provide important information that one can use to follow the

destructive effects of the Celali Revolts.

Keywords: The Celali Revolts, The Celali Effect, The 17th century Ottoman

Transformation, mukataa registers

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ÖZ

17.YÜZYIL OSMANLI TRANSFORMASYONUNDA CELALİ ETKİSİ

Cabar, Oğuz

Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Kayhan Orbay

Haziran 2018, 147 sayfa

Bu çalışma 17. yüzyıl Osmanlı transformasyon döneminde Anadolu’da meydana gelenCelali İsyanları’nın sonuçlarını incelemeyi hedeflemektedir. Bu çalışmada

transformasyon dönemi, imparatorluğun yerel şartlar ve imparatorluk dışında gelişen

olaylardan etkilenerek askeri ve ekonomik alanlarla çeşitli problemlerin ortayaçıkması neticesinde söz konusu alanlarda 16. yüzyıldan 17. yüzyıla geçiş döneminde

meydana gelen değişimlerin görüldüğü dönemi ifade etmektedir. Bu tezde Celaliİsyanları’nın etkileri demografik ve ekonomik alanlarda “Celali Etkisi” kavramı

kullanılarak incelenecektir. Celali Etkisi, Celali yıkımının en etkili olduğu İç Anadolu

ve Kuzey Anadolu bölgelerinde uzun ve kısa vadeli olarak ele alınacaktır.

Literatürdeki mevcut çalışmalar ve tezde kullanılan mukataa defterleri, iltizam

talepnameleri ve mühimme defterleri gibi Osmanlı arşiv belgeleri göze önüne alınarakCelali Etkisi incelemesi 1576 ve 1643 arası dönemi kapsayacaktır. Bunların yanında

Celali İsyanları’nın yıkıcı etkilerini görmek açısından kullanışlı olduğu görüldüğü için

Fransız Büyükelçiliği tarafından tutulan raporlar da kullanılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Celali İsyanları, Celali Etkisi, Osmanlı Transformasyon Dönemi,

mukataa defterleri

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ACKOWLEDGEMENTS

Before all, I would like to thank my advisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Kayhan Orbay, forintroducing me to the world of the Early Modern Ottoman Empire. I am grateful to

him for encouraging me to work with the Ottoman archival sources. His interpretations

of archival data guided me how to handle the defters. Without his patience, support

and encouragement, there would be no such study. Moreover, I would like to thank to

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Birten Çelik and Assist. Prof. Dr. Oktay Özel for their meticulous

readings of my thesis and important critics.

I would also like to thank Assist. Prof. Dr. Selçuk Dursun for introducing me to read

the Ottoman scripture. Moreover, his course on the Environmental History broadened

my perspective on the climatic issues in the Early Modern era. I am also thankful to

Assist. Prof. Dr Özgür Kolçak, who was very kind to help me once I started to workwith mukataa defters. I am thankful to Emine İlke Mankalyalı, instructor of French at

the School of Foreign Languages (METU), for introducing me to French when I was

a sophomore. Thanks to her introduction and support, I could deal with Frenchdocumentation.

Finaly, I would like to thank to the Republic of Turkey Atatürk Supreme Council for

Culture, Language and History-Turkish Historical Society (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti

Atatürk Kültür Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu-Türk Tarih Kurumu Lisansüstü Eğitim

Bursu) for the Master’s Degree Scholarship given to me by this institution during my

MA study.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM………………………………………………………………………iii

ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………iv

ÖZ………………………………………………………………………………..…..v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………………………………..……..vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………...viiLIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………………………..ix

CHAPTER

1.INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………….1

1.1. THE GENERAL CRISIS OF THE 17TH CENTURY………………………….1

1.2. THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE GENERAL CRISIS……..…………….41.3. THE CELALI REVOLTS AND THE CELALIS……………………………….6

1.4.THE CELALI EFFECT AND THE SOURCES………………………………….8 1.4.1 THE CELALI EFFECT…………………………………………………8

1.4.2.THE SOURCES……………………………………………………….101.4.2.a. MUKATAA REGISTERS…………………………….……….10

1.4.2.b. THE OTHER SOURCES.…………………………..………….13

1.5. OUTLINE OF THE STUDY.……………..………..…………………………..132.THE OTTOMAN DEMOGRAPHY IN THE CELALI YEARS..….…..………...15

2.1 THE CELALI EFFECT ON URBAN POPULATION...….….……….….19

2.1.1 AN URBAN “POPULATION PRESSURE”......………………….…....21

2.1.2 INFLATION OF LABOUR…………………………………………….23

2.1.3 THE REVERSAL OF “LABOUR PRESSURE”...…………………….27

2.1.4 CONCLUSION.…………….………………………………………......28

2.2 THE CELALI EFFECT ON RURAL POPULATION…………….…………...30

2.2.1 THE SOURCES AND STUDIES………………………………………30

2.2.2 FILLING THE CELALI GAP………………………………………….322.2.3 THE QUESTION OF LOST PEASANTS……………………………...35

2.2.4 THE CELALI EFFECT: AN ASSESSMENT ON RURAL

POPULATION………………………………………………………...39

2.2.4.1 DRASTIC DECLINE: “A DEMOGRAPHIC CRISIS”….…….462.2.4.2 THE QUESTION OF THE LOST VILLAGES.…….………....54

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2.2.4.2.a AMASYA.……………………………………………...55

2.2.4.2.b TOKAT…………………………………….…………..56

2.2.5 THE NEW CELALI SETTLEMENTS.……………..…………………57

2.3 CONCLUSION.…………………………………………………………..…….603. THE OTTOMAN ECONOMY DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD

BETWEEN THE 16TH AND 17TH CENTURY

AND THE CELALI REVOLTS…………………………………………..………..62

3.1.THE CELALI EFFECT ON THE RURAL ECONOMY…….………..…66

3.1.a. THE TEMPORARY SCARCITY OF BASIC

FOODSTUFF.…………………………………………………………………...….66

3.1.b. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION CRISIS...............................71

3.1.b.1. KONYA…………………………………………………72

3.1.b.2 TOKAT. .…………………………………….……….....75

3.1.c. CONCLUSION.…………………….…………………………...77

3.2. SILK AND MOHAIR INDUSTRY IN THE CELALI YEARS………...793.2.a BURSA SILK INDUSTRY.……………………………………...80

3.2.b. ANKARA MOHAIR.……………………………………………85

3.2.c. CONCLUSION.………………………………………………….883.3 THE ADAPTATION OF THE CENTRAL FINANCE SYSTEM.………89

3.3.1. ON THE TRANSFORMATION OF TAXATION….…………..913.3.1.a. SHIFT FROM TAHRIR SYSTEM TO AVARIZ……….92

3.3.1.a.1.MUKATAA REVENUE COLLECTION

PROBLEMS……………………………………………………………………...…93

3.3.1.a.2. THE CHANGING CONDITIONS OF TAXATION...100

3.3.1.a.3. THE BURDEN OF THE CELALI CAMPAIGNS…...1033.4. CONLUSION…………………………………………………………...105

4. THE GENERAL CONCLUSION………………………………………………110

REFERENCES………………………………………………………………115APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET……………………………...133

B. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU……………………………………….147

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Some Examples of Rural Demographic Changes (Hane) in the

Kâza of Amasya Between 1520 and 1643. Based on Tahrirs of 1520, 1576

and Avarız of 1643………………………………………………………………..48

Table 2: Changes in the Rural Population Between 1576-1643 in Nefer………...50Table 3: A Comparison of the Data Derived from Tahrir of 1576 and Avarız(Mufassal) of 1643 Number of Peasant Households (Hane) in the District

of Bozok................................................................................................................51

Table 4: A Comparison of the Data Derived from Tahrir of 1576 and Avarız(Mufassal) of 1642 Number of Peasant Household (Hane) in the District ofCanik.......................................................................................................................52

1

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The General Crisis of the 17th Century

The prevalent discussion on the 16th century Europe is marked with a general

economic development and the population rise thanks to the expansion of agricultural

production, which entailed commercial and industrial progress.1 Yet, the period of

general expansion started to stagnate in the second half of the century and the 17th

century started with reversal of prosperity. The 17th century was the era of crisis, social

upheavals and revolutions. The attributions to the crisis and rebellions are found as

early as the first decade of the century. The Gazettes and le Mercure françois often

spoke of the upheavals in Europe and the Ottoman Empire.2

Voltaire was the first to interpret these events in a different perspective.3 In this work,

“Essais sur les Moeurs et l’Esprit des Nations”, he claimed that these simultaneous

revolts ranging from England to Europe were parts of a “global crisis”. He examined

revolts in Germany, Poland, Russia, Italy, Spain and France. Voltaire focused on the

General Crisis in Europe; however, he did not confine the crisis to the European

continent. He pointed to revolts and crisis in the Ottoman Empire (Sultan Ahmed I),

1 Ruggiero Romano, “Encore la Crise de 1619-1622,” Annales. Economies, Sociétés, Civilizations. 19e Année, 1 (1964): 32; Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and The Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, vol.1 trans. Sian Reynolds (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 326-327. 2 The Gazettes and Le Mercure françois were two French journals published regularly since the beginning of the 17th century. They in their columns gave priority to the pathbreaking events like wars, disasters, political events and rebellions happened in Europe and the Ottoman Empire. For example, Goubert benefitted a lot from these papers while writing his book Les Paysans français au XVIIe Siècle which is on the 17th century social upheavals in France. Pierre Goubert, Les Paysans français au XVIIe Siècle (Paris: Hachette, 1994). 3 Voltaire, Essais sur les Moeurs et l’esprit des Nations, 17 vols. (Neuchatel: Edition de Neuchatel, 1773).

2

Safavids (Sultan Husayn) and China (Li Tsu-Cheng). 4 He resumed the general

situation in Europe like the following.

The throne of the German Empire was strangled by the famous Thirty YearWar. The civil war desolated France, it forced mother of Louis XIV to escape from her capital with her children. Charles I in London was condemned to death by his subjects. Philippe IV, the king of Spain, after having lost almost all his possessions in Asia, lost Portugal too. The beginning of the seventeenth century was the times of usurper.5

After Voltaire’s claims, Paul Hazard examined the general crisis in Europe and he

stated that this period witnessed “great changes”.6 Hobsbawm put forward that there

was a General Economic Crisis in Europe, and he claimed that the crisis was a

reflection of break between feudal order of society and the capitalist production

forms. 7 Mousnier expanded the realm of crisis and he asserted a demographic,

political, diplomatic and intellectual crisis.

The 17th century is a period of a crisis which affected everybody in all their activities of economic, social, politic, religious, scientific and artistic…Not only they coexisted in the same era in Europe but also in the same states, in the same social groups.8

It was argued that the crisis ended with revolutionary movements in England, France,

Catalonia, Portugal, Naples and in the Netherlands.9

4 Voltaire, Essais sur les Moeurs, vol.7, 339-363, 373-384, 398-413. 5 Ibid., 347-348. 6 Paul Hazard, La Crise de la Conscience Européenne (Paris: Boivin et Cie, 1935). 7 Eric J. Hobsbawm, “The General Crisis of the European Economy in the 17th Century,” Past & Present 5 (May, 1954): 33-53. 8 Rolan Mousnier, Les XVIe et XVIIe Siècles: Les Progrès de la Civilisation Européenne et le Déclin de l’Orient (1492-1715) (Paris: Press Universitaire de France, 1956), 143. 9 See Roger Bigelow Merriman, Six Contemporaneous Revolutions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938).

3

The general crisis was debated for the New World and Asia. It was claimed that trade

and economy entered into a period of depression in the 1620s in Mexico.10 The Central

America suffered from an economic and demographic crisis around the late 1630s.11

It was asserted that China, Japan and Korea were depressed by economic difficulties

and upheavals.12 Dissimilar to East Asia, South Asia witnessed the crisis a bit later.

Indian subcontinent did not signal any great difficulties almost throughout the 17th

century. Mughal Empire faced political crisis and economic disruption between the

turn of the century and the first half of the 18th century.13

Although the courses of crisis seen in a wide geography from the New World to the

East Asia in the mid seventeenth century have been portrayed in detail,14 its causes are

still controversial. Effects of the Price Revolution15 and the Little Ice Age16 are widely

discussed. 17 On the other hand, these events, which are accepted to be globally

effective, are not enough to comprehend the causes of a general crisis. As the each

state is handled within its regional conditions and institutions, the local factors come

forward. For instance, economic burden of the Thirty Years’ War is discussed to

provoke the crisis. Trevor-Roper highlighted that increasing taxation, related to the

oppression and defeats of the war, triggered the revolts in Catalonia, Portugal,

Germany and France.18 On the other hand, the effects of the Thirty Years’ War seem

10 Jonathan Israel, “Mexico and the ‘General Crisis’ of the Seventeenth Century,” Past & Present 63 (May, 1974):33-57. 11 Murdo J. Macleod, Spanish Central America: A Socioeconomic History 1520-1720 (London: University of California Prss, 1973): 264-329. 12 William S. Atwell, “A Seventeenth-Century ‘General Crisis’ in East Asia?,” in The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century, edit. by Geoffrey Parker and Lesley M. Smith (London: Routledge, 1985). 13 John F. Richards, “The Seventeenth-Century Crisis in South Asia,” Modern Asia Studies 24, 4 (1990): 625. 14 Parker’s work is the widest recent study see Geoffrey Parker, Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century (Cornwall: Yale University Press, 2013). 15 For price revolution see Earl Jefferson Hamilton, American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501-1650 (New York: Octagon Books, 1970), 139-283. 16 For climatic changes and cooling period see Le Roy Ladurie, Histoire du Climat depuis l’An Mille (Paris: Flammarion, 1983). 17 See Hugh R. Trevor-Roper, “The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century,” in Crisis in Europe 1560-1660, edited by Trevor Aston (New York: Basic Books, 1965): 59-96. 18 Trevor-Roper, “The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century,” 60-61.

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to be irrelevant to the crisis in Asia. The causes of the crisis should be examined with

global events and local conditions.

1.2 The Ottoman Empire and the General Crisis

Similar to the states in Europe, Asia and the New World, the Ottoman Empire was

dealing with a crisis triggered by the effects of wars, economic difficulties and

revolts. 19 The difficulties were accompanied by an extraordinary event in

administration. For the first time in its history an Ottoman sultan was deposed and

killed by his own military forces in 1622. These events were interpreted as signs of

decline by the contemporary observers. Thomas Roe, English ambassador to the

Ottoman Empire, noted his concern about the decline of the empire and revolts in

1623.20 Once the Ottoman crisis is examined, the question about their causes comes

forward. It seems that the answer is quite controversial because the causes were very

intertwined. There are cases which prove that the crisis was triggered by more than

one reason. For instance, once the rural demographic crisis in the central Anatolia is

discussed, the effects of the population pressure, urban economic developments,

harvest failures and the Celali Revolts should be taken into consideration.

The Ottoman crisis should be handled with the effects of some global and local

developments. It is widely discussed that the effects of the Price Revolution and the

Little Ice Age were the important global events, which influenced Ottoman economic

and demographic crisis.21 However, the global events are not enough to explain the

Ottoman crisis. The local conditions should be taken into consideration. The effects of

19 For the Ottoman case in the context of the General Crisis of the 17th Century see Parker, Global Crisis; Jack Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991) 20 “The fall of this empire; now perhaps it begins. The bassa of Arzerum, whom I have often mentioned, joined with other and a great army is in his march towards Angria…” Thomas Roe, The Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe, in his Embassy to the Ottoman Porte, from the Year 1621 to 1628 (London: Samuel Richardson, 1740), 187. 21 Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History of the Near East,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 6, 1 (Jan.,1975): 3-28; Sam A. White, The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

5

the population pressure, debasements of akçe, increasing war expenditures are widely

discussed.22 While the center was dealing with the effects of these external and local

developments, the Anatolian countryside was exposed to the one of the most violent

era of revolts. The center had to deal with the Celali Revolts which challenged the

central forces destructing social and economic order.

While the central state was dealing with these difficulties, some imperial institutions,

such as tımar system and taxation, were going through a period of adaptation or

transformation. Contemporary Ottoman observers interpreted these events as the signs

of dissolution and they presented their own analysis in their advice books.23 The works

of Koçi Bey24, Katip Çelebi25 and Hüseyin Hazerfen26 are the famous examples of this

genre. Western chronics, mostly under influence of these advice books

(nasihatnameler), depicted a declining empire in internal and external spheres at the

end of the 16th century.27 The classic Ottoman historiography regarded the defeat of

Lepanto (1571) as the major event which started the Ottoman decline.28 Historians

discussed for a long time that the Ottoman Empire entered into phase of military,

economic and administrative decay at the end of the 16th century.29

22 Şevket Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1-31; Michael Cook, Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia 1450-1600 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972). 23 On mirror for princes see Pal Fodor, “State and Society, Crisis and Reform, in 15th-17th Century Ottoman Mirror for Princes,” Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 40, 2/3 (1986):217-240. 24 Göriceli Koçi Bey, Koçi Bey Risâlesi, ed. Yılmaz Kurt (Ankara: Ecdâd Yayınları, 1994). 25 Kâtip Çelebi, Düstûru’l-Amel li Islâhi’l-Halel, ed. Ensar Köse (Istanbul: Büyüyen Ay Yayınları, 2016). 26 Robert Anhegger, “Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi’nin Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilatına Dair Mülahazaları,” Türkiyat Mecmuası X (1951-53): 365-393. 27 See Paul Rycaut, The Present State of the Ottoman Empire (London: John Starkey and Helen Brome, 1670). 28 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford Univeristy Press, 1968), 21-39. 29 Bernard Lewis, “Some Reflections on the Decline of the Ottoman Empire,” Studia Islamica 9 (1958): 111-127.

6

The Ottoman decline paradigm has been challenged severely thanks to new

perspectives since the late 1970s. Inalcık wrote an article on the 17th century finance

and military changes in the context of transformation. 30 Faroqhi highlighted the

elements which made the empire survive more than 300 years and she drew the

attentions of historians to these elements rather than an Ottoman decline.31 These new

approaches led historians to question the ‘declining’ military, administration and

economy.32 These works highlighted that the empire faced a crisis at the end of the

sixteenth century in different fields and it could manage the crisis by readapting to the

new conditions.33 As a result of simultaneous crisis and adaptation, this era is called

“Period of Crisis” and “Transformation Period”.34

1.3 The Celali Revolts and the Celalis

While the center was dealing with difficulties and adaptations in some fields and

imperial institutions, the Celali Revolts35 broke out in Anatolia towards the end of the

16th century, which continued, until the end of 17th century at intervals.36 The revolts

were most destructive particularly in the central and northern Anatolia. The center

squashed the revolts either by violence or through bargain. As the revolts came to an

end, the Anatolian countryside was already in a great disorder, which had started in

the first years of the rebellions. The armies which ranged from hundreds to thousands

30 Halil Inalcık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700,” Archivum Ottomanicum 6 (1980): 283-337. 31 Suraiya Faroqhi, “Crisis and Change, 1590-1699,” in An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, edited by Halil Inacık and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 414. 32 See Linda Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire 1560-1660 (Leiden: Brill, 1996); Baki Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 33 Linda Darling, “Ottoman Fiscal Administration: Decline or Adaptation?” The Journal of European Economic History 26, 1 (1997): 157-179. 34 Inalcık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700,” 284-286; Darling, Revenue Raising, 1-21. 35 Mustafa Akdag, Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası “Celâlî Isyanları” (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2017). 36 The last Celali leader Yegen Osman rebelled between 1685-1688. Oktay Özel, “The Reign of Violence: The Celalis c.1550-1700,” in The Ottoman World, ed. Christine Woodhead (London: Routledge, 2012), 191.

7

of men, who were depended on pillage, destructed the social and economic life

wherever they passed. The Celali Revolts left behind a desolated countryside and

collapsed rural economy.

The human source of the Celali Revolts, the Celalis, was composed of different

members of the society. They should be handled mainly in two categories. Firstly, the

former members of askeri class constituted the most important part. The governors

and lower ranking provincial administrators, who were unsatisfied with their ranks or

offended for any reason by the center, headed the great revolts. The important Celali

leaders like Hüseyin Paşa and Abaza Mehmet Paşa were provincial governors. The

sipahis who lost their tımars and unrecruited mercenaries constituted the basic human

source who were familiar with arms. Secondly, the reaya, both uprooted peasants and

semi-nomadic groups, reinforced the revolts joining the Celali armies. The high degree

of depopulation cannot be associated with deaths and immigration only. A certain part

of deserted peasants became Celali yielding to the rebels. It seems that the border

between being a victim and turning into a Celali was not strict. It is reasonable to claim

that the reaya, who was subjected to the violence, could take its place easily in the

groups inflicting it.37

The sources that are used in this study signal that in the era of unprecedented

violence38, notably between 1598 and the 1620s, the smaller groups which were simply

recorded as eşkiya, could very well be accepted as the branches of great armies or

modest Celali groups. The registers should be handled prudently and the cases, in

which the word Celali is not clearly seen, should not always be a decisive reason for

exclusion. As an addition to the destruction of these groups, there were some examples

which were far to be associated with the Celalis like brigandage and unlawful activities

of ehl-i örf (administrative class), askeri members (particularly janissaries and

sipahis). I argue that the definition of Celali should be broad and inclusive. The Celalis

37 For the most recent evaluation and discussion see Özel, “The Reign of Violence: The Celalis c.1550-1700,” 38 For emphasis on the violence, see Ibid., 193-199.

8

were not composed of the only well known outstanding leaders like Karayazıcı and

Kalenderoglu. The Celali groups do not necessarily mean the great armies.

1.4 The Celali Effect and the Sources

1.4.1 The Celali Effect

This study aims at separating the effects of destruction of the Celali Revolts on

demographic and economic fields from other prominent events which could influence

these areas directly and indirectly in the same era. As the revolts started, the Ottoman

demography and economy were already going through some difficulties and changes.

The increasing Celali violence either exacerbated the crisis or influenced the course of

events. The concern of this study is to question the role of the revolts in the era of

crisis. This thesis discerns the effects of the Celali Revolts using the term “Celali

Effect” on the changing economic and demographic spheres. 39 The effects are

classified into the long and short terms while analyzed in the context of the Celali

Effect. The primary benefit of the Celali Effect is to discuss if the Celali Revolts meant

only destruction and social turbulence or it was a more long lasting and deeper

phenomenon. This study locates the Celali Effect in the era of transition from the 16th

to the 17th century when the center had undergone severe difficulties which resulted

in changing some basic state, finance and military politics as in the example of tax

collection.40

After discussing the Celali Effect, I will argue that these effects showed varieties

according to the regions where they happened and the degree of protection of these

towns. The geographic situation of rural settlements played important role on the

regional Celali Effect. The villages on higher lands were more secure than the

39 For a recent work on the Celali Effect see Kayhan Orbay, “ ‘The Celâlî Effect’ on Rural Production and Demography in Central Anatolia: The Waqf of Hatuniyye (1590s to 1638),”Acta Orientalia 71,1 (March 2018): 29-44. 40 See the “Introduction” chapter. Kayhan Orbay, “Economic Development of the Imperial Waqfs; A Study in the Institutional and Local Economic History in the Transformation Period” (Unpublished Doctorate’s Thesis, University of Vienna, 2006).

9

settlements on lower plateaus. Moreover, the towns which were covered by great

fortress were better defended. Thus demographic and economic activities received the

lesser damage than a town which was not protected. Thus the unprotected settlements

in the regions which were plundered by the Celali bands received greater damage and

experienced violence when compared to the settlements which were protected and

lucky with ist geographic location. However, the current urban demography studies do

not allow, for the time being, to compare Istanbul case with an other town with

numerical indices. On the other hand, regional differences in the rural demography

were indicated with some examples.

This study dealt with the Celali Effect by making a special use and reading of the

existing literature, and by employing some new archival material. Firstly, some studies

are rehandled with respects to the Celali Effect. The wage index of Istanbul and prices

of raw silk of Bursa are examined and it is seen that there were remarkable fluctuations

in the Celali years. Even if the wage and price studies were not prepared with the

primary aim of showing the effects of the rebellions, they can serve to follow the

problems in production and trade. Moreover, the studies which offered data from

tahrir, avarız and waqf defters are used in a comparative way. Secondly, the new

materials from the Ottoman and French archives are employed.

10

1.4.2 The Sources

1.4.2.a Mukataa Registers

In order to elaborate the Celali Effect more productively, the fields in which the effects

are discussed, the geography, the date and primary sources are limited. Firstly, the

abundance of primary sources and studies are taken into consideration as demographic

and economic spheres are considered. The current archival studies are not enough to

cover all aspects of the economic and demographic changes in the Celali years. While

the rural demography is investigated on a larger area with more examples thanks to

abundance of the case studies, mainly based on the tahrir and avarız registers, the

existing literature allows to investigate only Istanbul with numerical indices in the

urban demography. Secondly, the selection of the geography and location was

dependent on the regions where the Celalis were seen most actively and violently,

mainly in the central and norhern Anatolia. The agricultural crisis and stock raising

are examined in this thesis through case studies and mukataa registers concentrating

on the central and northern Anatolia. Thirdly, the limitation of period was decided

according to the important dates that the tax registers were compiled, which were

significant to discuss the demographic trends before and after the Celali Revolts. The

mentioned earliest tahrir defter is from the 1570s and the first comprehensive series

of the avarız registers are from the 1640s. Taking the significance of these defters into

consideration, this study is limited between the 1570s and the 1640s. Fourthly, the

mukataa defters are examined for this study as the most important primary source due

to following reasons.41 Mukataa registers were compiled in shorter periods for the

same regions, which differ from tahrir and avarız registers in this respect, and this

allows to follow demographic and economic changes of a certain area. These registers,

even if not compiled for demographic purposes, give some ideas about depopulation

and Celali destruction. As an addition to the demographic purposes, these defters are

used for their primary reasons in the economy chapter.

Mukataa registers, compared with the avarız, tahrir, waqf, mühimme and kadı sicil

records, are the least used sources of the era. It is persistently emphasized that mukataa

41 For mukataa see Mehmet Genç, “Mukâtaa” Islam Ansiklopedisi, 31 (2006): 129-132.

11

registers offer very rich data on economy and demography. This thesis attempts to

revive their importance by delving into the concept the Celali Effect. The majority of

remaining mukataas is for Rumeli part of the empire. While Rumeli has mukataas

portray a prosperity, Anatolia has mukataas depict various functioning problems and

revenue collection difficulties in the years which are named as the Celali years covers

mainly the end of the 16th and the early 17th century. An extremely low revenue of a

mukataa could be an indicator of some problems when there are many bakis (arrear).

It is possible to see that sometimes the kâtip (scribe) or nâzır (supervisor)42 of mukataa

complains about Celali destruction, which prevented mukataas from functioning

properly.43 There are examples of Celali theft of mukataa goods.44 There are also notes

in derkenars (additional notes on the margins) in defters indicating that has mukataas

could not be sold to mültezims because Celalis had ravaged the region.45 Mültezims

did not want to buy mukataas in the era of destruction.46

In addition to mukataa registers, iltizam talepnameleri are precious sources for this

period. While mukataa registers may not always make references to the past, iltizam

talepnameleri usually make references to the former mültezims and iltizam values,

where a short story of the mukataa can be followed (as old as 3-5 years). Moreover,

the Has Mukataa registers and iltizam talepnameleri can be consulted when the tahrir

and avarız registers are absent since they give information on the important changes

concerning population and economic activities in their localities.47 Mukataa registers

42 Nâzır might be translated as supervisior. On the missions of a nâzır and kâtip of mukataa see Baki Çakır, Osmanlı Mukataa Sistemi (XVI-XVIII. Yüzyıl) (Istanbul Kitabevi, 2003), 124-125,137-138. 43 The general discourse was like this “Celali zühur etmekle vilayet ihtilal üzerinde olup…” BOA.MAD.d,18147/6-7. 44 BOA.MAD.d,04689/70; BOA.MAD.d,18147/6-7; BOA.MAD.d,04684/114; BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/19-29. 45 For a kadı’s complain on a tax collection problem due to the Celali Effect in a derkenar. BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/60. 46 BOA. MAD.d, 04689/5 47 Joseph Goy underlines the significance of tax-farming records to help follow economic trends. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie and Joseph Goy, Tithe and Agrarian History from the Fourteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries: An Essay in Comparative History, trans. Susan Burke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 43-44. The tax-farming records have been used for demographic and economic studies in the European history. Jean-Claude Waquer, “Les Fermes Générales dans l’Europe des Lumières: Le Cas Toscan,” Mélanges de l’école française de Rome 89-2 (1977): 983-1027; Gérard

12

could be found in shorter period of times, which enable us to follow short time regional

changes. These registers signal that the regional differences could sometime be at

surprising levels. Two mukataas, which were situated in the same region, could

experience the Celali violence differently. While a mukataa was damaged severely,

another one in the same area may not signal any problem.

As addition to the Celali Effect, these records could allow to see other causes damaging

mukataa revenues like wars48, epidemics49 and great fires.50 These defters could also

make an important contribution to the argument of the Little Ice Age. Even if

attributions to the climatic conditions are rare, a wide mukataa defter study would help

construct a climate map for the central Anatolia.51

This thesis does not claim to have examined these sources exhaustively and in detail.

However, the defters which are about the central Anatolia, point to the some basic

problems. There is a complex system of recording the collection of taxes. There are

so many calculations on the pages and marginal notes (derkenar). While the scribe

sometime added notes or titles which explained the calculation, there are cases which

do not contain any clues. This complexity causes some problems about evaluating the

defters correctly. Despite these problems the defters of has mukataa of Anatolia and

iltizam talepnameleri proved to be useful. As an addition to the mukataa defters and

iltizam talepnameleri, there are different registers which were compiled to follow the

bakis. These records were not used owing to being very complex, which would surpass

the limits of this study. These problems would be solved in the future studies the

explanation of the recording system of these defters. These registers are found at

Gayot, “La Ferme Générale des les Ardennes en 1738. Le témoignage d’Helvétius,” Dix-Huitième Siècle 3 (1971): 73-94. 48 “(Bursa) mizan-ı harir mukataası Acem Seferi vaki olmağla çatdan? işlemeyüp külli kesirim olmagın…” BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/113. 49 “Reayası dahi ekseri taundan mürd olup iltizam-ı sabıka tahammülü olmamağla kimesne kabul eylemeyüp hali kalmağla…” BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/176. 50 “Samsun kalesi ihrak olmagla…” BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/192. 51 “Tahvilimiz içinde ziyade şiddet-i şita olmağla…mukataa-yı mezburesinde iki yüz akçe kesr idüp külli zaif ve temerrüt olup…” BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/146. “Bu sene ziyade şiddet-i şita vaki olup mukataalar kat’a işlemeyüp…” BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/157.

13

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlügü (General

Directorate of State Archives of the Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey).

1.4.2.b The Other Sources

In this thesis, beside the Ottoman archival sources, the French archival sources were

studied as well since they provided important information on the Celali armies and the

destruction they made in Anatolia. There is a huge collection of the letters and secret

reports sent from Istanbul by the French embassy to the French king. The first

documents are found as early as the 1530s and they continue, at intervals, until the

19th century. These letters and reports were sent from Pera to France regularly once

in a 10 or 15 days. They cover various issues such as trade, diplomatic relations with

France and other states, political tensions, economic situation, military actions and the

Celali Revolts. Among hundreds of letters investigated, the examples presented signal

that a systematic study of them can serve to extend our knowledge on the period.

Moreover, these letters give details about variety of issues such as customs, daily life,

epidemics, great fires, inflation, the attitude of the center towards representative of

foreigns states and so on. It should be reminded that these records might exaggerate

some events and they can present the news with prejudice. There are also manuscripts

resuming the yearly political activities of the Ottoman Empire, copies of capitulations

and agreements. There are also a few voyage manuscripts written by the French

ambassadors. These documents are found at the Center of Diplomatic Archives of

Nantes (Archives Diplomatiques- Centre de Nantes) and Manuscript Department of

National Library of France (Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Département des

Manuscrits).

1.5 Outline of the Study

The Celali Effect is discussed in two main chapters. In the first chapter, the Ottoman

demography is handled and demographic changes under the Celali Effect is revisited

on urban and rural population. Urban population is examined through Istanbul

example and rural population is handled in Amasya and Tokat. In the second chapter,

the Ottoman economy is examined under three headings. The first section discusses

breakdown of rural economy in the central and northern Anatolia. The following

14

section focuses on the silk and mohair industries. While silk is discussed in Bursa case,

mohair is examined in Tosya and Ankara. The last section attempts to discuss the

question of the 17th century Ottoman economic difficulties and the fiscal

transformation through mukataa registers and destruction of the tımar system. These

two main chapters are followed by a general conclusion of the thesis where the

findings and new questions are present

15

CHAPTER II

THE OTTOMAN DEMOGRAPHY IN THE CELALİ YEARS

It is widely accepted that there was a general demographic growth in the 16th century

in the Mediterranean world and in Europe. 52 Fernand Braudel had included the

Ottoman Empire in his thesis of demographic expansion, which was confirmed by

Ömer Lütfi Barkan first time in 1953.53 Local studies revealed that there was almost

a linear increase in the tax paying urban and rural population in the Ottoman Empire.54

The population growth rate was not the same for all regions but it exceeded 100% in

many parts.55 Despite the problems regarding demographic calculations, the Ottoman

population is predicted to be about fifteen million and it kept increasing substantially

until about 1580/87-8. 56 Some historians indicated that the demographic growth

expanded arable lands, which increased total crop yields in rural areas to a certain

degree.57 However, it is widely accepted that the agricultural lands of north-central

52 Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Essai Sur Les Données Statistiques Des Registres de Recensement dans L’Empire Ottoman aux XV et XVIe Siècles,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 1, 1 (1957): 23-30. 53 Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Tarihi Demografi Araştırmalar ve Osmanlı Tarihi,” Türkiyat Mecmuası 10 (1953): 19-23. 54 For instance, Mehmet Öz, XV-XVI.Yüzyıllarda Canik Sancağı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi,1999); Feridun Emecen, XVI.Yüzyılda Manisa Kazâsı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2013); Jennings discusses the urban population increase and he shows the rate of expansion for Kayseri, Karaman, Amasya, Trabzon and Erzurum between 1500-85. He concludes that the level of expansion in these towns confirms Braudel’s thesis. Ronald C. Jennings, “Urban Population in Anatolia in the Sixteenth Century: A Study of Kayseri, Karaman, Amasya, Trabzon, and Erzurum,” Int. J. Middle East Studies 7 (1976): 50-57. 55 Oktay Özel, “Population Changes in Ottoman Anatolia During the 16th and 17th Centuries: The “Demographic Crisis” Reconsidered,” Int.J. Middle East Studies 36, 2 (2004): 184. For some regions the proportion of expansion was much higher. In the example of Bursa, according to the findings of Koç, number of hanes in the rurality of Bursa increased about 98.1% and mücerreds increased round 300% between 1521-1574. Yunus Koç, “XVI. Yüzyılın Ikinci Yarısında Köylerin Parçalanması Sorunu: Bursa Kazası Ölçeginde Bir Araştırma,” in Uluslararası XIII. Türk Tarih Kongresi, 4-8 Ekim 1999, Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler Cilt III, Kısım III (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2002):1962-63. 56 Robert Mantran, La Vie Quotidienne à Constantinople au Temps de Soliman le Magnifique et de Ses Successeurs: XVIe et XVIIe Siècles (Paris: Hachette, 1965), 61-62. 57 For instance, Mehmet Öz indicates a growth in cereal production and he relates it to the demographic growth. He states that the agricultural production increased in Canik region between 1520-1576. Öz, XV-XVI.Yüzyıllarda Canik Sancağı, 89, 179. Inalcık states that 1470-1570 witnessed a general

16

Anatolian districts proved to be insufficient for growing population and the Ottoman

peasants were exposed to population pressure.58 As a result of the pressure, çift units

got fragmented in order to provide arable land to the newly emerging surplus

population.59

The general trend of population growth seems to have reversed at the turn of the

century. Mustafa Akdag was to first to emphasize the remarkable demographic decline

in the Anatolian countryside. 60 The studies of Oktay Özel and Mehmet Öz

demonstrated with numerical indices that the Anatolian countryside witnessed a large

scale abandonment of rural settlements and a drastic decline of tax paying rural

population which occurred some time between the end of the sixteenth century and the

first half of the seventeenth century. Rural lands of central and northern Anatolia lost

70-80% of its tax paying population.61 The high rate of population decline in the early

17th century ended in deserted villages and uncultivated lands. Settled villages in open

plains were abandoned and the peasants either immigrated to large towns or settled

down in secure lands.62

expansion of arable lands. Inalcık and Quataert, eds. An Economic and Social, 159. Some historians claimed a relationship between expansion of cultivable lands and “capitalisation” of the agricultural production. Haim Gerber, Economy and Society in an Ottoman City: Bursa, 1600-1700 (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1988), 28-29, 81-83. See Huricihan Islamoglu-Inan, State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire: Agrarian Power Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia during the Sixteenth Century (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994), 203-237. 58 It is still debated that if 16th century population growth really resulted in a population pressure. See Cook, Population Pressure; Islamoglu-Inan, State and Peasant; Özel, “Population Changes in Ottoman Anatolia During the 16th and 17th Centuries,” 186; Öz, “Population Fall in Seventeenth Century Anatolia: Some Findings for the Districts of Canik and Bozok. 59 For examples of land fragmentation, see Volkan Ertürk, “XVI.Yüzyıl Anadolusu’nda Ziraî Yapı ve Köylülerin Geçim Durumları Hakkında Bir Degerlendirme: Akşehir Örnegi,” Turkish Studies 6/4 (2011): 520-530; Turan Gökçe, XVI. ve XVII. Yüzyıllarda Lazıkiyye (Denizli) Kazası (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000), 334-336, 343; Öz, XV-XVI.Yüzyıllarda Canik Sancağı, 51-52. On the other hand, the kanuns indicate that the center aimed at protecting the entirety of çift lands. “Çiftlik ve baştina paralanub bozulması kat’iyyen câiz değildir.”Halil Inalcık, “Osmanlılar’da Raiyyet Rüsûmu,” Belleten XXIII, 91 (1959): 582. 60 Akdag, Celali Isyanları, 423-463. 61 Özel, “Population Changes in Ottoman Anatolia During the 16th and 17th Centuries: The “Demographic Crisis” Reconsidered,” 192. 62 Oktay Özel, The Collapse of Rural Order in Ottoman Anatolia Amasya 1576-1643 (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 109.

17

The high degree of dispersal of tax paying rural population in the northern and central

Anatolia comes with a bunch of questions about what actually triggered a mass

population movement. The demographic changes in this period were associated with

different reasons. For instance, epidemics could have led population to drop.

According to some research, central and northern parts of Anatolia experienced

epidemics occasionally but these epidemics seem to have been effective in a limited

area. 63 For example, 1604 avarız registers of northwestern Anatolian districts of

Manyas show that a group of villages had been deserted because of a deadly plague

which broke out before 1604.64 There are also traces of a plague in Erzurum region

between 1644-45 which could have possibly culminated in population fall.65 It is clear

that the Anatolian rural population was hit by several epidemics which resulted in

population loss or land desertion.66 However, the effects of epidemics were restricted

in local base and it lacks to explain the huge mass population movements in Anatolia

The question of demographic crisis in Anatolian countryside is still popular in the

Ottoman studies. The pull and push factors as put forward by Inalcık and Islamoglu-

Inan doubtlessly had effects on Ottoman demographic movements. As proposed by

pull factors, the growing towns and commercialization might have offered new

opportunities for peasants who were either landless or in economic difficulties.67

63 For plague in the empire, see Daniel Panzac, La Peste dans l’Empire Ottoman 1700-1850 (Louvain: Editions Peeters, 1985). 64 Özer Küpeli, “Klasik Tahrirden Avârız Tahririne Geçiş Sürecinde Tipik Bir Örnek:1604 Tarihli Manyas Kazası Avârız Defteri,” Belgeler Dergisi XXXII, 36 (2011). 65 Özel, The Collapse of Rural Order, 149. 66 A French chronic written in 1687 defines the plague in Ottoman Empire as something seen very frequently. The plague was an ordinary event and its effects could vary depending on the season. Sieur Du Vignau, L’état présent de la Puissance Ottomane avec Les Causes de Son Accroissement et celles de Sa Décadence (Paris: D.Hortemels, 1687), 214-15. The words of François Savary Brèves (French ambassador in Istanbul between 1591-1605) could be a indicator of frequency of plague. He came to the southern Anatolia (Antalya) with a ship for a mission around 1605 and his companions were afraid of traveling inner Anatolia. The ambassador states that two dangers prevented them from going further, which were any possible plague contamination and the Celali Revolts (la peste… les Rebelles de la Natolie). François Savary Brèves, Relation des Voyages de monsieur de Breves, tant en Grèce, Terre Saincte et Aegypte qu’aux Royaumes de Tunis et Arger, ensemble un Traicté faict l’an 1604 entre le Roy Henry le Grand et l’Empereur des Turcs, et trois Discours dudir Sieur, Le Tout Recueilly par le S.D.C (Paris: Nicolas Gasse, 1628), 21. 67 Murphey puts emphasis on the importance of better economic conditions which triggered peasant immigration. Rhoads Murphey, “Population Movements and Labour Mobility in Balkan Context: A Glance at Post-1600 Ottoman Social Realities,” in Studies on Ottoman Society and Culture, 16-18th Centuries (Burlington: Ashgate Pub., 2007): 90.

18

Enlarging kapıhalkı (retinues) of provincial governors and increasing need for soldiers

using fire arms created new job opportunities that pulled peasants from countryside to

urban areas.68 The push factors are associated basically with population pressure, land

fragmentation and frequent bad harvests related to the weather conditions.

Accepting the effects of pull, push factors, epidemics and forced immigrations on the

Ottoman demography, the Celali Revolts played the major role on the mass

demographic movements and decline of the tax paying population in the Anatolian

countryside. When the Celali terror reached its peak, the Anatolian countryside

experienced one of its biggest demographic movements which is called The Great

Flight (Büyük Kaçgunluk).69 As a result of the Great Flight, a remarkable part of rural

population abandoned their lands and immigrated to either large towns or secure hilly

lands. Some percentage of these fugitive peasants became a part of Celali violence by

joining Celali bands.70

This chapter discusses the relationship between the Celali Revolts and Ottoman

population. The Celali Effect on population will be divided into two main parts. In the

first part, the Celali Effect on the urban population will be dealt. Urban population

changes during the Celali years in Istanbul will be handled in the light of current

archival studies of wages of skilled and unskilled construction workers. In the second

part, rural population will be analyzed. The sharp demographic decline, deserted

villages and newly emerging “Celali settlements” will be handled. The effects on the

urban and rural population will be evaluated on short and long terms.

68 Özel, “Population Changes in Ottoman Anatolia During the 16th and 17th Centuries,”188. Cezar puts emphasis on increasing recruitment of levends. He states that the insecurity in the Anatolian countryside resulted in the expansion of kapı halkı and levends. Mustafa Cezar, Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2013), 180-190. 69 Akdag, Celâlî Isyanları, 423-463; William J. Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1000-1020/1591-1611 (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983), 49-50. 70 Mustafa Akdag, Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası Celali Isyanları (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1995), 493.

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2.1 The Celali Effect on Urban Population

The great Ottoman cities such as Istanbul and Bursa had always been attractive for

rural dwellers thanks to wide urban economic opportunities. The era of insecurity that

Celalis created in the Ottoman countryside around the late 16th century turned the

great towns into safe centers. On the other hand, it seems that the central state desired

the peasants to stay in their settlements and continue to be a part of the rural economic

life. The central state did not permit the peasants to change their status by immigrating

from rural to urban. It is evident that the efforts of the center were related to the

continuity of agricultural production and rural economy because timariots, the

backbone of the Ottoman army, were dependent on the rural taxes extracted from his

subjects in kind and cash.71 The fief-holding sipahi was given certain authority in order

to keep peasants settled down in their localities.72 However, the sipahi did not have

eternal rights on the peasant for the sake of continuation of rural economic activities,

in other words, his authority on the subject was limited. Despite the efforts of the

central state to prevent peasant immigration to towns on paper by the kanunnâmes

(legal codes) or by the legal rights of sipahis, a certain number of immigrant might

have crowded into the cities. Surviving kanunnâmes give an impression that the central

government limited strictly the movements of its subjects; nevertheless, the Ottoman

rural society in 16th and 17th centuries was actually mobile.73

The mobility of Ottoman peasants entered into a different phase as the Celali Revolts

broke out in the second half of the 16th century.74 Celali Revolts drove Anatolian

peasants into a period of immigration and extraordinary mobility. The Ottoman

peasants abandoned their current settlements to arrive in secure urban or rural lands.

71 Nicoara Beldiceanu, Le Timar dans l’Etat ottoman (Début XIVe-Début XVIe Siècle) (Wiesbaden: Harrassowits, 1980), 34, 59-62. The sipahi, whose reayas fled, would lose his income. Halil Inalcık, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600 (New York: Orpheus Publishing, 1989), 111. 72 One of these authorities include that a sipahi had 10-15 years to force a fugitive peasant to return to his land. If the peasant could earn his living in the town, he could have gained the right to change his status from rural to urban reaya by paying certain amount of compensation called çift bozan akçesi, which amounts slightly more than one gold ducat a year. Ibid., 111. 73 Suraiya Faroqhi, Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia: Trade, Craft and Food Production in an Urban Setting, 1520-1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 268. 74 Ibid., 272.

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Some peasants sought refuge in fortifications or fled to Istanbul, Izmir, Rumeli, Syria,

Crimea and even north Africa.75 The remaining peasants tried to provide their own

security in their localities by forming local militants (il erleri) 76 or erecting

fortifications (palanka)77 as it is seen in Turgudlu and Ankara.78 The huge Celali

armies could even threat great fortified cities like Urfa, which was occupied by Kara

Yazıcı, where more than ten thousand inhabitants were living.79

The demographic studies done so far based on the basic sources like tahrirs and avarız

registers provide the size of demographic decline on the countryside. On the other

hand, the absence of these registers for the Celali years makes difficult to follow the

demographic movements. The lack of sources coinciding with the exact dates of

revolts does not necessarily mean that the central administration was not aware of mass

population coming to towns for a livelihood. It seems that the Ottoman statesmen were

75 Özel, “The Reign of Violence: The Celalis c.1550-1700,” 190. Simeon mentions that there were around 200 Armenian households (hane) in Cairo who had fled from Celali violence. Hrand Der Andreasyan, Polonyalı Simeon’un Seyahatnamesi (1608-1619) (Istanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2013), 127. 76 Suraiya Faroqhi, Osmanlı’da Kentler ve Kentiler: Kent Mekânında Ticaret, Zanaat ve Gıda Üretimi 1550-1650, trans. Neyyir Kalaycıoglu (Istanbul, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1994), 335. For more information on il erleri see Mücteba Ilgürel, “Il Erleri Hakkında,” Güney-Doğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi 12 (1998): 125-140. It is understood that the policy of central state about il erleri changed from time to time. While it allowed armement against the Celalis, it could ban the arming and collect all arms from peasants. See Hikmet Ülker, Sultanın Emir Defteri (51 Nolu Mühimme) (Istanbul: TATAV, 2003), 92. Inalcık states that the center could allow peasants to defend themselves under some conditions. Halil Inalcık, “Adâletnâmeler,” Belgeler II, 3-4 (1965): 84. 77 Palanka was a supplementary fortification erected to be protected from Celali attacks. A petition sent from Lâdik in 1603 was asking for a permission to build a palanka against banditry. See Akdag, Celâlî Isyanları, 419. English traveler Sir Henry Blount (1602-1682), states to have seen one in the Ottoman Balkans, describes a palanka (palanga, in the original text) a mud wall constructed against thieves. Henry Blount, A Voyage into the Levant a Brief Relation of a Iourney, Lately Performed by Master H.B. Gentleman, from England by the way of Venice, into Dalmatia, Sclavonia, Bosnah, Hungary, Macedonia, Thessaly, Thrace, Rhodes and Egypt, unto Gran Cairo (London: Andrew Crooke, 1636), 13. Richard Pococke (1704-1765) saw Ankara around the end of 1730s and describes a fortification built of stone and mud to get protected from the Rebellion of Gadick (?) 60 years before his trip. It seems that this was one of the palanka examples constructed to protect the town. “These fortifications were raised 60 years ago against the Revolt of Gadick, who was ravaging the town with his 12.000 men.” Richard Pococke, Voyages de Richard Pockocke: en Orient, dans l’Egypte, l’Arabie, la Palestine, la Syrie, la Grèce, la Thrace, etc, vol.5, trans.la Flotte (Paris: J.P. Costard, 1772-1773), 185. 78 Hülya Taş, Ankara’nın Bütüncül Tarihine Katkı: XVII.Yüzyılda Ankara (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2014), 106; Mustafa Akdag, “Celâlî Fetreti: A.1596 Sırasında Osmanlı Devleti’nin Umumî Durumu 1-Iran ve Avusturya Harblerînin Uzamasından Dogan Hoşnutsuzluk,” Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi 16, 1/2 (1958): 42, 100-103. 79 Selâniki Mustafa Efendi, edit. Mehmet Ipşirli, Tarih-i Selâniki (Istanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1989), 836, 842, 863.

21

well aware that there were huge population movements in the Anatolian countryside

and they tried to comprehend the changes. For example, the Ottoman bureaucracy

proposed their own analysis of peasant flight in an adâletnâme of the years around

1600s.80 Moreover, there are mentions of Celali immigration from rural settlements to

the towns in mühimme, telhis registers and in the works of contemporary Ottoman

intellectuals.81

Despite the lack of direct demographic data, there are other sources which help

investigate the Celali Effect on urban population. The records regarding construction

and repair works can yield some data indirectly on the fluctuations in urban population

during the Celali years. The records contain the wages paid to the workers on daily or

monthly terms and they can provide some clues about remarkable demographic

changes. The wages are expected to be affected by mass demographic movements.

The wages of the construction workers in Istanbul showed signs of decay around the

last decade of the 16th century and the second decade of the 17th century. It seems

that the period of decay did not last very long and once the Celalis were eliminated by

the imperial center, the wages started to rise because a remarkable size of the

newcomers may have started to go back to their lands. The correlation indicates that

the Celali Effect was a short-term result on the urban population in Istanbul.

2.1.1 An Urban “Population Pressure”

In a similar manner to the rural population pressure, newcomers to the big towns

starting from the last decades of the 16th century may have created an urban

population pressure on limited food sources and employment capacity. The towns of

the empire, just like its Early Modern contemporaries, were composed of certain

balance between the inhabitants, production and food sources.The provision issue was

so crucial that one of the most important duties of the grand vizier was to control the

80 Faroqhi, Towns and Townsmen, 269. For adâletnâmes see Inalcık, Adâletnâmeler, 49-142. 81 For instance, Kâtip Çelebi, Düstûru’l-Amel,113.

22

price and quality of the most basic foodstuff, like bread, personally.82 It was a major

task for the government to provide bread at fair prices and on daily bases in Istanbul.83

It is known that the sultan himself used to inspect the bazaars in disguise during severe

food shortages. The Celali immigrants may have disrupted the provision creating a

“pressure” over limited sources. The Ottoman statesmen, who were aware of the

necessity to keep the balance between the sources and dwellers, had already tried to

limit the number of migrants to Istanbul from the late 16th and early 17th centuries.84

Population of Istanbul continued to expand throughout 16th and 17th centuries despite

the measures.85

82 Ismail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Devleti’nin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilâtı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1988), 141-144. For kola çıkmak see Mübahat S. Kütükoglu, Osmanlılarda Narh Müessesesi ve 1640 Tarihli Narh Defteri (Istanbul: Enderun Yayınları, 1983), 19-20. 83 For provisioning of Istanbul see Suraiya Faroqhi, “Istanbul’un Iâşesi ve Tekirdag-Rodosçuk Limanı (16.-17. Yüzyıllar),” ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi. Iktisat Tarihi Özel Sayısı (1980): 139-154. 84 Halil Sahillioglu, ed. Koca Sinan Paşa’nın Telhisleri (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2004), 100-101. A mühimme record from 1567 warns about the newcomers. “Rumeli ve Anadolu’dan bazı reaya yerlerin ve çiftlerin koyub birer tarik ile mahruse-i Istanbul’a gelüb kimi Istanbul’da ve kimi Eyyub ve Kasımpaşa’da derya kenarını mesken idinüp…” Ahmet Refik, On Altıncı Asırda Istanbul Hayatı (1553-1591) (Istanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1935), 141-142. 85 It was claimed that the population of Istanbul was around 400.000 in the first half of the 16th century and it increased to 800.000 in the second half of the century. See Robert Mantran, 17. Yüzyılın Ikinci Yarısında Istanbul: Kurumsal, Iktisadi, Toplumsal Tarih Denemesi, vol.1, trans. Mehmet Ali Kılıçbay and Enver Özcan (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1990), 46.

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2.1.2 Inflation of Labour

New arrivals into the urban life were the poor peasants who deserted their agricultural

lands and immobile properties in rural areas. Once they arrived into towns, the first

problem that the immigrants faced was the question of making a living. These

immigrants were gaining their livelihood from agricultural production and other rural

activities in the countryside, which mean that the majority of peasants arrived without

a specific profession. However, the situation was not that desperate, and the great

urban towns could offer a few job opportunities. Faroqhi categorizes the new job

opportunities for the new comers under three subheads.86 a) The new comers could

earn their livings working as a servant in a household. b) They could be employed in

the construction works as a low-rank construction worker, ırgad.87 c) Selling some

goods as pedlar was a suitable job as well.88 This study discussed only the construction

workers because the records about their wages provide the most detailed data about

the Celali Effect.

Şevket Pamuk and Süleyman Özmucur worked on 5.000 account books of

construction and repair projects and they prepared a wage index of construction

workers who worked in projects belonged either to waqfs or the central state.89 Their

indices show that there was a general drop in the real wages of unskilled workers

around 30%-40% in the 16th century.90 The rates kept changing slightly until the mid

18th century, after which they would increase about 30% up to the mid 19th century.91

The decline in the nominal daily wages (in silver) of skilled and unskilled workers,

86 Faroqhi, Osmanlı’da Kentler ve Kentliler, 340-346. 87 Ibid., 343-344. 88 Ibid., 344. 89 Şevket Pamuk and Süleyman Özmucur, “Real Wages and Standards of Living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489-1914,” The Journal of Economic History 62, 2 (2002): 304 90 Ibid., 305. 91 Pamuk and Özmucur, “Real Wages and Standards of Living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489-1914,” 305.

24

which experienced two periods of decay between 1590-1599 and 1620-1629 in

Istanbul, will be handled in this part.92

There could be different reasons behind the period of decay of the wages in the last

quarter of the 16th century in Istanbul. Ş. Pamuk and S. Özmucur related the decline

partly to the general demographic expansion of the 16th century.93 The 16th century

demographic expansion possibly aggravated the decline of wages like the general trend

seen in some parts of the European and Mediterranean states.94 On the other hand, the

declines between 1590-1599 and 1620-1629 were most likely related to the Celali

immigration. The great rebellion of Karayazıcı in 1598 and Abaza Mehmet Paşa in

1622 might have resulted the surplus labour to rise in Istanbul temporarily which led

the wages to decline.95

The Anatolian countryside was exposed to ravages of different groups in the second

half of the 16th century. The small scale brigand bands, unrecruited levends and groups

of former graduated students of medrese lodges (suhte)96, who could not find any

92 Pamuk and Özmucur, “Real Wages and Standards of Living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489-1914,”301. 93 Ibid., 309. 94 Pamuk, Urban Real Wages Around the Eastern Mediterranean in Comparative Perspective, 1100-2000,” 217. See the chart of fluctuations of builder’s wages and the cost of living in Europe. Rich Edwin Ernest, Wilson Charles and Clapham John Harold, The Cambridge Economic History of Europe IV: The Economy of Expanding Europe in the 16th and 17th Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 482-483. 95 Moreover, despite the effects of the plague at the end of the 16th century, which might have caused a decrease in the population of town, the wages kept declining. A French report dated 14 October 1598 states that the plague broke out in the the town. Anonymous, L’admirable et Heureuse Prince de La Ville de Bude et Hongrie par L’armée Imperiale, sur les Turcs. Ensembe le Retablissement de Battori, Voivod de Transilvanie (Lyon: Thibaud Ancelin and Guichard Jullieron, 1598), 10; Henry Castela (1570? -16..), voyager of the Holy Lands and North Africa between 1600-1601, mentions the plague in Istanbul in 1601. Henry Castela, Le Sainct Voyage de Hiérusalem et Mont Sinay, faict en l’an du grand Jubilé, 1600 (Paris: Lauren Sonnius, 1603), 474. 96 Akdag states that suhte ravages increased remarkably at the end of the reign of Süleyman I (1566). See Akdag, “Medreseli Isyanları” Istanbul Üniversitesi Iktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası 1, 4 (1949):361-387; Çagatay Uluçay, XVII.Asırda Saruhan’da Eşkiyalık ve Halk Hareketleri (Manisa: Manisa Halk Evi Yayınları, 1944), 23-30. A mühimme from 1574 warned the kadı of Istanbul suhte ravages. “Istanbul kadısına hüküm ki Hâlâ Semaniye müderrislerini kendülerine müteallik Tetümmat kapuların gice ile kapatmıyub açuk durmakla suhte tayifesi taşra çıkub fesad ve şenaat etdükleri…” Refik, On Altıncı Asırda Istanbul, 33.

25

position in Ottoman religious and bureaucratic establishments, were plundering the

countryside.97 For instance, kadı of Kütahya reported to the center that the district of

Lazkiye was being ravaged by 50-60 fire armed men and more than 300 suhtes around

1583.98 The big towns like Istanbul can be supposed to have become safer places for

Celali immigrants before the first great Celali rebellions. However, the wage index

shows that the immigration was not in great number because the wages did not show

any serious changes. The first drastic wage decline is seen between 1590-1599, when

the great revolt of Karayazıcı and Hüseyin Paşas in 1598 influenced a wide

geographical area. 99 The great violence of Karayazıcı rebellion pushed Ottoman

peasants to the great towns and the population of Istanbul expanded in this period.100

Polish voyageur Simeon, who visited Istanbul sometime between 1608-1619,

emphasizes that a great part of the Celali immigrants went to Istanbul. He mentions

that the Celali immigrants constituted more than 40.000 hanes (households) and they

were densely situated in Galata and Üsküdar regions.101 It is highly probable that

Simeon had exaggerated the number of households, but statements of an eyewitness is

worth some attention. Katip Çelebi, who was another contemporary witness, mentions

the Celali immigrations to the towns (karyelerden şehre firar itdiler) and he

emphasized the immigrations to Istanbul.102 The Celali immigration is reflected on the

wages. While the daily nominal wages of an unskilled worker were around 3.5 grams

of silver between 1580-1589, it declined to 2.6 between 1590-1599. The skilled

workers experienced a lighter decline than the unskilled. While their nominal wages

were around 5.4 grams of silver between 1580-1589, it decreased to 4.6 between 1590-

97 Mühimme registers mention unlawful actives of suhtes. For some examples see Ülker, Sultanın Emir Defteri, 15, 40-41, 71, 81, 121, 126, 140; 12 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (978-979/1570-1572), Cilt I, Divan-ı Hümayûn Sicilleri Dizisi: IV (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlügü, 1996), 348, 351, 392; BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 78 (h.1018/m.1609-1610): 50/134. 98 Ülker, Sultanın Emir Defteri, 126. 99 Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion, 24-38; Andreasyan, Polonyalı Simeon, 106. 100 Akdag, Celali Isyanları, 358. 101 Andreasyan, Polonyalı Simeon, 5. 102 Kâtip Çelebi, Düstûru’l-Amel, 113-114.

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1599.103 The shrinkage of wages for unskilled ones was around 25% and for the skilled

ones it was 14%.104

The second wave of immigration to Istanbul might have taken place between 1620-

1629. The nominal daily wages of unskilled workers declined from 4.1 (1610-19) to

3.4 (1620-29) grams of silver, which is equal to a 17% decline.105 The skilled workers

experienced a deeper loss in the same period. While their nominal daily wages were

6.6 grams of silver between 1610-1619, it declined to 4.1 between 1620-1629. The

revolt of Abaza Mehmet Paşa in Erzurum region between 1622 and 1628 may have

provoked a second great immigration to Istanbul. Abaza Mehmet Paşa took control of

Sivas, Ankara106, Nigde and Kayseri regions.107 He sacked the region until his final

defeat by the central army in Kayseri.108 The periods of wage decline signal that

Istanbul may have been exposed to two great remarkable immigrations during the

rebellions of Karayazıcı and Abaza Mehmet Paşa between the last quarter of the 16th

and the second decade of the 17th centuries.

103 Pamuk and Özmucur, “Real Wages and Standards of Living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489-1914,” 301. 104 Three mühimme records composed in 1587 and 1588 point that skilled and unskilled construction workers were not content with their daily wages. The wages were not enough for their lives (maişetlerine kifayet etmeyüb) and they were demanding for a raise. When their complaints are taken into consideration before the Celali Effect, it could be assumed that following period of wage decline worsened their situation. “Benna ve naccar ve senk tıraşların yevmiyeleri on ikişer üzre olub maişetlerine kiyafet eylemeyüb on altışar akçe tayin olunmasın arz eyledüğünde…” (1587); “ Neccar ve eğer senk tıraşın yevmiye ücretleri on ikişer akçe olub ırgadlarun altışar iken sen ki mimarsın on altışar akçe olmak lâzımdır deyu arz etdüğün üzre zikrolunan taifeden üstadlara yevmiye ücretleri on altışar akçe verilüb minbaad ziyade olmıya deyu ferman-ı şerifim virilüb ve kadimden ırgad dahi üstadlarun nısıf ücretlerin alagelüb hâliyâ üstadlar on altışar olıcak nihayet ırgadlarun ücreti sekizer akçe ola…”(1587); “Sen ki kadısın mektub gönderüb hâliyâ kadimü’l eyyamdan mahruse-i mezburede neccar ve benna tayifesi yevmî on ikişer akçeye ve ırgad tayifesi yevmî beşer akçeye ücretle işleyügelmişler iken şimdiki halde kaht-ı galâ olduğuna binaen…” (1588). Refik, On Altıncı Asırda Istanbul, 73-74. 105 Pamuk and Özmucur, “Real Wages and Standards of Living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489-1914,” 301. 106 As quoted from the letter of Thomas Roe dated 1 November 1623; “Abaza Paşa had taken Tokat (Tocatt)…and arrived before the city of Ankara (Angria); they opened the gates, all yields to him… He tells them (the dwellers of Ankara) that he is the true slave of the present emperor but he must execute his commission, to revenge the blood of Sultan Osman…” Roe, The Negotiations, 187. 107 Halil Inalcık, Devlet-i Aliyye: Osmanlı Imparatorluğu Üzerine Araştırmalar II Tagayyür ve Fesâd (1603-1656): Bozuluş ve Kargaşa Dönemi (Istanbul: Iş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2016), 194. 108 Inalcık, Devlet-i Aliyye II, 195-196.

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2.1.3 The Reversal of “Labour Pressure”

The two periods of drastic decline show the signs of rise after the central army defeated

the Celali leaders. In the period of 1590-99, nominal daily wage of the unskilled

workers was 2.5 grams of silver. The following period of 1600-1609 it rose to 4.0.109

The skilled workers were influenced similarly in the same period. Their nominal daily

wage was 4.6 grams of silver in 1590-1599 and it increased to 6.5 in 1600-1609. The

rise was around 60% for the unskilled and 41% for the skilled workers. A part of this

increase was influenced by increasing prices after the debasement of 1600. One akçe

was 0,384 gram of silver after 1586 debasement and it was reduced to 0,323 in 1600.110

On the other hand, relating the increasing wages totally to the debasement of 1600

seems questionable. Accepting the effects of the debasement, the Celali campaigns of

Vizier Mehmet Paşa, Sokolluzade Hasan Paşa, Hüsnü Paşa and Kuyucu Murat Paşa

against Karayazıcı and other Celali bands were the main reason.111 After the first great

Celalis were destructed, Anatolia entered into a short period of normalization and a

remarkable part of the immigrants in Istanbul was forced, and might have tended to,

return to their former lands.112 The declining number of immigrants in the town led

wages to rise.

The second fall in the wages is observed during the rebellion of Abaza Mehmet Paşa

(1622-1628). In following period of his elimination, the nominal wages of unskilled

workers rose from 3.4 (1620-1629) to 4.2 (1640-49). The skilled workers experienced

a better rise and their nominal daily wages increased from 4.1 (1620-1629) to 8.2 in

grams of silver (1640-1649). The increase of wages around 23% (unskilled) and 100%

109 Pamuk and Özmucur, “Real Wages and Standards of Living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489-1914,” 301. 110 Barkan, “XVI. Asrın Ikinci Yarısında Türkiye’de Fiyat Hareketleri,” Belleten XXXIV, 36 (1970): 574-575. 111 For details about fights of the pashas against Celalis, see Akdag, Celâlî Isyanları, 357-362. Kuyucu Murat Paşa is known for his cruel actions against Celalis. He was called “Kuyucu” after his Celali massacre in Konya. Joseph Von Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de L’Empire Ottoman depuis Son Origine Jusqu’à Nos Jours, vol.8, trans. J.-J. Hellert (Paris: Bellizard, 1835-1843), 116. 112 Sam White states that Sultan Ahmed I attempted to expulse the immigrants in 1610. There were another attempts in the era of Sultan Murad IV. He handles the immigration with the notes extracted from Venetian relazionis. See White, The Climate of Rebellion, 257-260.

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(skilled) points that a huge part of Celali immigrants might have left the town as the

rebellion was quashed.

2.1.4 Conclusion

The Celali Effect observed through the construction and repair records indicates waves

of migration to Istanbul. The city was receiving immigrants from the second half of

the 16th century but they were not as crowded as the immigrants fleeing from the first

great Celali revolt of Karayazıcı. The town received the first mass immigration

sometime during his revolt and it created a labour surplus which caused wages to

decline between 1590-1599. The index does not indicate the yearly differences, which

could serve to compare the wages before and during his revolt. On the other hand,

Karayazıcı’s destruction in a wide geography at the end of the century was the major

reason, which aggravated the immigration to the town and following fluctuations in

the wages. The surplus labour started to diminish when the remarkable part of

immigrants left the town after the defeat of Karayazıcı by the central army and the

wages increased between 1600-1609. The second mass migration arrived at the town

during the revolt of Abaza Mehmet Paşa (1622-1628). The wage index could not show

the indices year by year, which prevents us from seeing the exact difference in 1622

once his revolt started. The index points that the wages declined between 1620-1629.

This decay was exacerbated during his revolts between 1622-1628. After his

elimination in 1628, which created a safe environment in Anatolian countryside, the

wages increased when the immigrants started to leave the town in the period of 1640-

1649. As an addition to the temporary normalization period created after the

elimination of Celalis, the central state was forcing the immigrants to return back after

the revolts. For instance, Armenians who settled down in the city after the Asia Revolts

(in the original document) in the last 40 years were threatened to return to their former

lands within 20 days in 1635.113 Faroqhi mentions that the center forced the Celali

113 The Armenians who refuse to leave the city in 20 days were threatened with capital punishment. The documents indicate clearly that these immigrants must return to their formers lands and continue their former life. Théophraste Renaudot, Recueil de Toutes Les Gazettes Nouvelles: Ordinaire & Extraordinaire & Autre Relations (Paris: Le Bureau, 1635), 479. Murphey mentions the non-Armenian Christian population coming to Istanbul from the Balkans in the early1640s. Murphey, “Population Movements and Labour Mobility in Balkan Context: A Glance at Post-1600 Ottoman Social Realities,”

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immigrants in different areas to return back in 1610 and 1635 once the destructive

Celali activities ended.114 On the other hand, these actions did not give the expected

results.115

The fluctuations in the wages depict that the Celali Effect on the urban population did

not have a long-term result in the example of Istanbul. A remarkable part of the

immigrants could have left the town as the rebels were eliminated by the central power.

The rise of wages does not mean that all the immigrants left Istanbul. However, a

respectable part of immigrants might have abandoned the town because small size of

immigration would not have been reflected on the wages. As an addition to Istanbul,

the Celali Effect could be questioned in towns like Bursa, Izmir and Kayseri. There

are indices that the population of Bursa increased in the era of Celali destruction.116

The town attracted a part of immigrants because it was regarded secure and it could

offer economic gains thanks to being a center of trade. Izmir was a moderate town in

the 16th century but its population started to expand and the town became an important

trade area in the 17th century. A part of fleeing peasants from Anatolia refuged in

Izmir, which may have made a contribution to the expansion of the town. There are

traces in kadı records that Kayseri attracted so many immigrants from the east that one

of the neighborhoods was called Şarkiyun (the easterners/ones coming from the east).

The revolts and Safavid campaigns pushed the habitants out of their lands. Although

these immigrants were forced to return back, they kept living in the town even after

the revolts.117

91. The Gazettes could sometimes refer to Celali Revolts calling them The Asia Revolts (Les Rebellions d’Asie). The Gazettes (Gazette de France) was a semi-official regular publication. They published outstanding events from France and other great states in European continent including the Ottoman Empire. They had been exploited for different purposes. One of them was the 17th century revolts in France. See Goubert, Les Paysans français. 114 Suraiya Faroqhi, Orta Halli Osmanlılar: 17.Yüzyılda Ankara ve Kayseri’de Ev Sahipleri ve Evler, trans. Hamit Çalışkan (Istanbul: Iş Bankası Yayınları, 2014), 56. 115 Oktay Özel, Türkiye 1643: Goşa’nın Gözleri (Istanbul: Iletişim Yayınları, 2013), 205. See Murphey, “Population Movements and Labor Mobility in Balkan Context: A Glance at Post-1600 Ottoman Social Realities,” 92. 116 See Gerber, Economy and Society. 117 Faroqhi, Orta Halli Osmanlılar, 56.

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2.2 The Celali Effect on Rural Population

2.2.1 The Sources and Studies

The Ottoman demographic history had evolved around tahrir registers since their first

introduction to the Ottomanists by Ömer Lütfi Barkan in the 1940s.118 The tahrir

registers were carried out in the districts where tımar was introduced. The major

function of the tahrirs was to project the potential taxable sources in kind and cash.119

The use of tahrir registers exploded in the 1980s120 and a respectable number of studies

was completed until the early 2000s most of which focused on two aspects a) the

economic activities of the Ottoman peasants, b) the demographic figures of a certain

region.121 The conclusion of these studies signed two general trends for Anatolian

countryside a) the general population growth b) partial increase in agricultural

production related to expansion of cultivable lands. The tax paying Anatolian rural

population expanded respectively and doubled in some regions.122 If we assume that

there was not a significant discovery or invention that increased the productivity or

118 Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Türkiye’de Imparatorluk Devirlerinin Büyük Nüfus ve Arazi Tahrirleri ve Hâkana Mahsus Istatistik Defterleri (1),” Istanbul Üniversitesi Iktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası II, 1 (1940): 20-59. 119 Mehmet Öz, “Tahrir Defterlerinin Osmanlı Tarih Araştırmalarında Kullanılması Hakkında Bazı Düşünceler,” Vakıflar Dergisi 22 (1991), 430. Despite the importance of tahrir registers, there are some significant problems that have not been solved yet like problem of hane (household) or some suspicions about their application and accuracy of the content. For a similar case on the accuracy of tithe records, compare with the French case. Marie-Théresé Lorgin, “Un musée imaginaire de la ruse paysanne: la fraude des décimables du XIVe au XVIIIe siecle dans la région lyonnaise,” Etudes Rurales 41 (1973): 112-124. When the Ottomans started to carry out tahrir registers is not known for sure but the oldest existing tahrir in 1431 indicates that the Ottoman were practicing it in the early 15th century. Barkan states that practice of tahrir goes as old as the first sultans of the empire. See Barkan, Türkiye’de Imparatorluk Devirlerinin Büyük Nüfus ve Arazi Tahrirleri, 31. 120 Erhan Afyoncu, “Türkiye’de Tahrir Defterleri’ne Göre Hazırlanmış Çalışmalar Hakkında Bazı Görüşler,” Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi I/I (2003): 268. 121 For example, Ibrahim Solak, XVI.Asırda Manisa Kazası (Istanbul: Akçag Yayınları, 2004); Nejat Göyünç, XVI.Yüzyılda Mardin Sancağı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991); Mübahat S. Kütükoglu, XVI.Asırda Çeşme Kazasının Sosyal ve Iktisâdî Yapısı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2010). For an assessment and bibliography see Adnan Gürbüz, XV.-XVI. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Sancak Çalışmaları Değerlendirme ve Bibliyografik Bir Deneme (Istanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2001). 122 According to Inalcık, the general expansion was around 40% in the countryside. Halil Inalcık, Osmanlı Imparatorluğu Klâsik Çağ (1300-1600), trans. Ruşen Sezer (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2014): 52-57.

31

upgraded agricultural methods, cultivable lands were also expanded by the growing

rural population.123

The tahrir registers were well exploited until Ottoman demographic studies entered

into a new epoch when cizye and avarız defters were used for the 17th century

demographic studies. Classic tahrir registers had almost stopped to be compiled in the

17th century as a result of fiscal and military transformation. The last general survey

of the empire was practiced in the 1570/80s and after that time, the surveys were made

for some special cases.124The Ottoman financial system went through a transformation

and tahrirs were replaced by avarız registers starting from the early 17th century.

These registers focused on the muslim and non-muslim tax payers and they could yield

demographic data which allows a comparison with the demographic figures of the

tahrir registers.

It was Bruce McGowan who emphasized the importance of summary avarız and cizye

records for demographic studies of the 17th century.125 He developed his argument,

which he based on quantitive data obtained from these sources, and he claimed a

“demographic catastrophe” in the Balkans. His method and controversial findings

were criticized by Maria Todorova in the following years. She criticized his

misinterpretation of sources and his conclusion. She highlighted that the idea of

demographic catastrophe was insupportable, and his claim was -with her words-

“spurious”.126 Despite McGowan’s misinterpretation of sources, he could be regarded

as a pioneer who encouraged the exploitation of these sources.

123 Cook, Population Pressure, 10-11. 124 Gilles Veinstein, “Les Registres de Recensement Ottomans. Une Source pour La Démographie Historique à l’Époque Moderne,” Annales de Démographie Historique (1990): 366. 125 See Bruce McGowan, Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land, 1600-1800 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). He used icmal avarız records. 126 Maria N. Todorova, “Was There a Demographic Crisis in the Ottoman Empire in the Seventeenth Century?” Etudes Balkaniques 2 (1988): 62-66.

32

Preceding to the notion of a 17th century demographic catastrophe in the Balkans,

there were historians who argued an extraordinary period of demographic movements

and a population decline in the rural districts of central Anatolia between the last

decade of the 16th century and the first half of the 17th century. Mustafa Akdag was a

pioneer who drew attentions to huge demographic movements in the rural Anatolia

which he associated with the vagabond groups of suhte activities and Celali Revolts.127

Akdag based his arguments on the revolts that destructed rural economy which ended

in huge land abandonment.128 Although he emphasized mass peasant immigrations

and land desertions with some numerical data by using reports sent to the center from

the provinces, he could not handle it in detail because it seems that he was not aware

of the existence of avarız registers to project the population fall. He tried to sustain his

argument with examples of price rises of some basic foodstuff from narh registers.129

He associated dramatic price rises of foodstuff like barley, wheat or bread with Celali

desertion.130

2.2.2 Filling the Celali Gap

There are two major recent developments which unearthed the Celali Effect on rural

population. The first development is the detailed comparative studies of detailed cizye

and avarız registers with the tahrirs, which yielded some concrete numerical

figures.131 Oktay Özel developed the most comprehensive study using classic tahrir

defters and detailed avarız registers in a comparative way in terms of revealing the

Celali depopulation in rural lands.132 Mehmet Öz approached these sources in detail

and he observed the similar demographic changes in the northern parts of Anatolia.133

127 Akdag, Celali Isyanları, (1995), 488-497. 128 Ibid., 446. 129 For narh registers see Kütükoglu, Osmanlılarda Narh Müessesesi, 3-38. 130 Akdag, Celali Isyanları, (1995), 452-454 131 Mehmet Öz, “Population Fall in Seventeenth Century Anatolia: Some Findings for the Districts of Canik and Bozok,” Archivum Ottomanicum 22 (2004): 6. 132 See Özel, The Collapse of Rural Order, 89-177. 133 See Mehmet Öz, Orta Karadeniz Tarihinin Kaynakları VIII Canik Sancağı Avârız Defterleri (1642) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2008).

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A similar comprehensive work was accomplished by Ali Açıkel, in which he handled

Tokat region.134 Their pioneering works revealed the size of the demographic decline

in the Anatolian countryside. There are other studies as well based on avarız records

which allow us to evaluate the limits of the demographic decay between the 1580s and

the 1640s.135

The other development is related to the new perspective on the exploitation of waqf

account books. The waqfs were religious institutions which accomplished some duties

like helping the poor or distributing foodstuff to the needy. 136 The waqfs had a

significant place in economic and social order of the Ottoman Empire. The economic

and commercial activities of waqfs, especially huge imperial ones, required a complex

system of redistribution to be able to maintain their existences. They derived income

from vast agricultural lands, shops, bathhouses, ins or various manufactories from

rural and urban areas. The waqfs recorded their incomes and expenditures

systematically and these registers can show any changes in their localities on short

terms and long terms. 137 Waqf accounts are suitable to yield many different

conclusions thanks to the diversity of records regarding local economic and

demographic conditions, which should make them particularly important to reveal the

134 I am very thankful to Ali Açıkel for sharing his unpublished PhD thesis with me. See Ali Açıkel, “Change in Settlement Patterns, Population and Society in North Central Anatolia: A Case Study of The District (Kazâ) of Tokat (1574-1643)” (Unpublished Doctorate’s Thesis, University of Manchester, 1999). 135 See Mehmet Ali Ünal, “1646 (1056) Tarihli Harput Kazası Avarız Defteri, ”Ege Üniversitesi Tarih Incelemeri Dergisi XII, (1997): 9-73; Bilgehan Pamuk,“XVII.Yüzyıl Ortalarında Gümüşhane (Torul) Kazası,” Belleten LXXIII/266 (2009): 115-143; Mehmet Inbaşı, “Erzincan Kazası (1642 Tarihli Avarız Defterine Göre),” Atatürk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Dergisi 41 (2009): 189-214; Süleyman Demirci, “Avariz and nüzul levies in the Ottoman Empire: An assessment of tax burden on the tax-paying subjects. A case study of the Province of Karaman, 1628-1700,” Erciyes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi 1, 11 (2001): 1-17. 136 For general information on waqfs, see Mehmet Genç, “Klâsik Osmanlı Sosyal-Iktisadî Sistemi ve Vakıflar,” Vakıflar Dergisi 42 (2014): 10-17; Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, XVIII.Yüzyılda Türkiye’de Vakıf Müessesi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2003). 137 The records of the Early Modern waqf-like institutions, like abbeys, constitute one of the principal sources of European economic history. Joseph Ruwet, “Mesure de la Production Agricole sous l’Ancien Régime,” Annales Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations 19,4(1964): 626-628; Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, “Dîmes et Produit Net Agricole (XVe-XVIIIe Siècle),” Annales. Economies, Société, Civilisations 24, 3(1969): 826-828.

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Celali Effect.138 A detailed and comparative analysis of waqf records would reveal

long and short term economic trends, fluctuations in agricultural production, prices of

basic goods and foodstuff, rents of various properties and certain disasters like

epidemics or earthquakes.139 For instance, while a remarkable rise in the agricultural

production can be indicator of a good season, a drastic decline could be indicator of a

problem. The waqf account books can fill the “gaps” in economic and demographic

history in the absence of general tahrir registers.140

Waqf records were introduced by Ömer Lütfi Barkan in the early 1960s. 141 His

meticulous transcriptions of account books and attentive calculations about waqf

economy were followed by Suraiya Faroqhi in the 1970s. She dealt with some waqf

account books in the era of Ottoman transformation -or crisis- at the turn of the 16th

century. 142 Following her pioneering works, these sources have been revived by

comprehensive studies of Kayhan Orbay in the 2000s. He handled certain waqfs in

Anatolia and Rumeli in the period of Celali Revolts and Ottoman transformation

period.143 His works emphasized that waqf account books are actually unique archival

sources to follow local economic and demographic changes.

138 For a recent study see Orbay, “ ‘The Celâlî Effect’ on Rural Production and Demography in Central Anatolia: The Waqf of Hatuniyye (1590s to 1638),” 29-44. 139 For instance, a mühimme from 1584/85 mentions that an earthquake destroyed Erzincan completely. Registers of a waqf situated in the region would help detail the level of destruction. BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 52 (h.992/m.1584-1585): 164/414. 140 See, Kayhan Orbay, “Filling the Gap in Demographic Research on the Ottoman Transformation Period: Waqf Account Books as Sources for Ottoman Demographic History (The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries),” Turcica 49 (2018): 85-118. 141 Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Imaret Sitelerinin Kuruluş ve Işleyiş Tarzına Ait Araştırmalar,” Istanbul Üniversitesi Iktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası 23/1-2 (1962-3): 239-96; idem, “Edirne ve Civarındaki Bazı Imaret Tesislerinin Yıllık Muhasebe Bilançoları,” Türk Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi 1/2 (1964): 235-377. 142 For example, Suraiya Faroqhi, “A Great Foundation in Difficulties: or Some Evidence on Economic Contraction in the Ottoman Empire of the mid-Seventeenth Century,” Revue D’Histoire Magrebine 47-48 (1987): 109-121; idem “Agricultural Crisis and the Art of Flute-Playing: The Wordly Affairs of the Mevlevî Dervishes (1595-1652),” Turcica XX (1988):43-69. 143 Kayhan Orbay, “Financial Development of the Waqfs in Konya and the Agricultural Economy in the Central Anatolia (Late Sixteenth-Early Seventeenth Centuries)” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 55 (2012): 74-116; idem, “The ‘Celâlî Effect’ on Rural Production and Demography in Central Anatolia,”

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2.2.3 The Question of Lost Peasants

The Ottomanists agree that the Ottoman rural population underwent a period of

turbulence and extreme mobility sometime between the last quarter of the 16th and the

first half of the 17th centuries.144 The high degree of tax paying rural population

decline resulted in a breakdown of rural structure and production in the Anatolian

countryside. 145 Ottomanists have asserted various causes to analyze drastic

demographic decline between 1574s and 1643s. Among these factors, the most widely

disputed ones are demographic pressure, the levendisation of countryside, some new

employment chances in big cities associated with economic growth and finally the

effects of Celali Revolts. Moreover, there are recent arguments about catastrophic

effects of extreme climatic events associated with the Little Ice Age.146

Rural demographic studies that covered the 16th and 17th centuries evolved so much

around the notion of the demographic pressure in the central Anatolia.147 Michael

Cook dealt with the problem of population pressure in detail. In his reputed work,

Cook argued that Ottoman çift lands got fragmented in north-central Anatolia owing

to increasing surplus population, which impoverished Anatolian peasants and pushed

them out of their localities. He presented numerical data that confirms the land

fragmentation for some districts of rural Anatolia.148 There are other works which

approve Cook’s argument on the land fragmentation.149 The greatest challenge to the

demographic pressure dispute came from Islamoglu-Inan. 150 She rejected the

144 Özel, Goşa’nın Gözleri, 190-198. 145 See Özel, The Collapse of Rural Order. 146 Sam A. White, “Climate Change and Crisis in Ottoman Turkey and the Balkans, 1590-1710,” in The Middle East-Past Present and Future, 20-23 November 2006 (Istanbul: Istanbul Technical University, 2006): 395-398. 147 On the “demographic pressure” see Thomas Robert Malthus, An Essay on Population (London: J.M. Dent, 1958). 148 Tables A16, H12 and R.13. Cook, Population Pressure, 37-39, 85. 149 Ertürk, “XVI. Yüzyıl Anadolu’sunda Ziraî Yapı ve Köylülerin Geçim Durumları Hakkında Bir Degerlendirme: Akşehir Örnegi,” 523-537. 150 Islamoglu-Inan, State and Peasant.

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demographic pressure with the theory of Boserup151 ; however, she seems to ignore

that the development of agricultural methods, intensification of cultivation and

expansion of cultivable lands could also be linked to increasing population pressure

on the limited cultivable plots. 152 The tahrir records of the central and northern

districts of Canik, Amasya and Çorum provide some data which supports the

demographic pressure.153 They show the signs of dense settlements particularly in low

lands and on high plateaus suitable for cultivation. Some inhabited or unused lands

were reactivated as supplementary arable land.154 Özel states that even if a general

demographic pressure for all Anatolian rural lands cannot be accepted for the time

being, north-central parts of rural Anatolia were exposed to such a pressure.155

As a result of population pressure, Ottoman peasants might have found it economically

difficult to get married. For instance, the proportion of married men in the total adult

male population in Tokat countryside in 1574 decreased around 30% compared to 20

years earlier.156 The worsening economic conditions seems to have proven for other

districts as well. The number of bachelor peasants (mücerred) increased about 300%

in rural districts of Bursa region.157 While a part of this “surplus population” found

some new arable lands to earn their living thanks to the relative expansion of cultivable

lands, the other landless portion may have looked for alternative ways with an

inclination for the abandonment of their settlements.

151 Ester Boserup, The Conditions of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of Agrarian Change Under Population Pressure (London: G. Allen&Unwin, 1965). 152 “Demographic pressure” was not peculiar to Anatolian rural lands in the 16th century. For example, rural lands in France went through a period of expansion of cultivated lands and then fragmentation in the 16th century like the Anatolian countryside. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie et Jean-Marie Pesez, “Les Villages Désertés en France: Vue d’Ensemble,” Annales. Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations 20, 2 (1965): 278-283. 153 For instance, Öz, XV-XVI.Yüzyıllarda Canik, 51. 154 See White, The Climate of Rebellion, 69-71. 155 Özel, “Population Changes in Ottoman Anatolia During the 16th and 17th Centuries: The “Demographic Crisis” Reconsidered,”188. 156 Ibid., 186. 157 Koç, “XVI. Yüzyılın Ikinci Yarısında Köylerin Parçalanması Sorunu: Bursa Kazası Ölçeginde Bir Araştırma,” 1962-1963

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A part of these bachelors (mücerred) and landless peasants got involved in brigandage

activities in their localities with groups of 15-20 or 30-40 men.158 Mustafa Cezar had

discussed the connection between demographic expansion and increasing brigandage

activities in the countryside in his work. He asserted that a part of landless peasants

got involved in banditry activities and they became “levends” in the second half of the

16th century. 159 Moreover, the increasing availability to the firearms in the 17th

century might have contributed to the increasing levendisation. 160 The terms

like levents and gurbet taifesi161 started to be used very often in the second half of the

16th century, which was an indicator of increasing levendisation and land desertion.162

Some historians maintained that the effects of “the Little Ice Age” were so harsh that

it brought an end to the growth and welfare of “Le Beau XVIe Siècle” in the

Mediterranean states.163 Catastrophic climatic events were associated with subsequent

agricultural failures which ended in impoverishment and land desertion.164 Similar

158 Cezar, Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler, 137. 159 Ibid., 59-63. 160 Some historians claim that the cost of fire arms in the 16th century declined, which facilitated the access to fire arms. André Corvisier, “Guerre et Mentalités au XVIIe Siècle,” XVIIe Siècle 37 (1985):228. Jennings found out that the price of firearms in Kayseri (Central Anatolia) was not very high to create an obstacle to reach it in the first quarter of the 17th century. He states that the use of firearms among the non-askeri dwellers was very widespread in some parts of the empire in the beginning of the century. Ronald C. Jennings, “Firearms, Bandits, and Gun-Control: Some Evidence on Ottoman Policy Towards Firearms in the Possession of Reaya, from Judical Records of Kayseri, 1600-1627,” Archivum Ottomanicum 6 (1980): 343-345. A mühimme record from 1609/1610 could be an example to indicate the accessibility to fire arms. A mühimme sent to the governor of Bolu was asking 295 firearms (tüfek) collected from bandits (eşkiya) and inhabitants (reaya) to be sent to the imperial center immediately. (Liva-yı mezburun reayalarında ve eşkiyalarında bulunan tüfekleri cem idüp…reaya ve eşkiyalarında bulunan tüfekler cem idilüp cemen iki yüz doksan beş aded tüfek…) BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 78 (h.1018/m.1609-1610): 17/44. Moreover, it is worth mentioning here that the efforts of the center to collect fire arms in the following decades were reflected on the notes of French ambassador. It is stated the Sultan Murat IV works to disarm (désarme) everybody carrying firearms (les armes à feu) including embassies (désarme tous sans excepter les ambassadeurs). AD(Nantes) Série A: Vol.4, 2mi2215/52 161 Mühimmes record banditry of gurbet taifesi in the second half of the 16th century. (Gurbet taifesi evi ve barkı ile etrafı gezüb gündüz tenha buldukların katl ve esbabların garet ve ketmile uğruluk edüb…) See Daglıoglu, On Altıncı Asırda Bursa, 38, 43, 74. 162 Inalcık, The Classical Age, 52. 163 Faruk Tabak, Solan Akdeniz 1550-1870: Coğrafi-Tarihsel Bir Yaklaşım, trans. Nurettin Elhüseyni (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları,2010), 278. 164 Ibid., 288.

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effects of the climatic events on the dispersal of rural population have been discussed

for the Ottoman Empire.165 The effects of the so called extraordinary climatic changes

on population crisis cannot be ignored because the Ottoman rural society was highly

depended on agricultural economic activities for their livings. Ottomanists are well

aware of that there were some harsh climatic events which affected agricultural

production and demography. Studies of the waqf account books point out that the

decline of agricultural production related to the harsh climatic events usually lasted 1-

2 seasons and such a short term cannot have pushed 70-80% of peasants to desert their

settlements.166

In short, the shared point among historians is that the central and northern parts of rural

Anatolia went through a period of demographic crisis. The size of demographic crisis

in north-central parts of Anatolian districts was illuminated thanks to extensive and

meticulous studies of Özel and Öz. On the other hand, it has been still disputed the

forces which pushed the tax paying peasants to go out of their localities and simply

got “lost” from the records. It is without doubt that the push and pull factors mentioned

triggered mass population movements partly between second half of the 16th century

and the 17th century. On the other hand, the Celali Effect was the major reason behind

the demographic crisis.

165 White, The Climate of Rebellion, 78-85. 166 For example, Orbay, “Financial Development of the Waqfs in Konya and the Agricultural Economy in the Central Anatolia (Late Sixteenth-Early Seventeenth Centuries,” 86, 99, 100, 104.

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2.2.4 The Celali Effect: An Assessment on Rural Population

“ Tutalum Basalum, Ele Getürelüm ”167

Anatolian peasants were under pressure of small scale bandit groups composed of

çiftbozan reayas 168 and former yevmlü levends in the second half of the 16th

century.169 On the other hand, violence in the countryside entered into a harsh phase

with the first great Celali Rebellion of Karayazıcı (head of a sekban division in Sivas)

and Hüseyin Paşa (the governor of Karaman) in 1599.170 Karayazıcı’s army defeated

forces that the central state sent against him near Maraş171 and Antep regions in 1599

and 1600.172 Karayazıcı besieged Bursa and Sivas castles damaging local economy

and dwellings.173 Bursa mukataa records reflect difficulties as the Celalis attacked. As

a result of the destruction, mukataa lands rested unsold or their values did not increase.

167 Selâniki Mustafa Efendi, Tarih-i Selâniki, 215. 168 Koçi Bey, Koçi Bey Risâlesi, 17-18. 169 Some historians argued that the Anatolian countryside was exposed to banditry by former yevmlü soldiers of Ottoman princes, who wanted to expand their entourage and supporters in order to be able to claim the throne. Landless mücerreds and çiftbozan reayas gathered around these princes for the purpose of getting a tımar or being recruited in the janissary army. As an addition to peasants, former sipahis -who had lost their tımars- constituted the kapıhalkı of an Ottoman prince. Having a crowded army and influential kapıhalkı were significant factors to eliminate other rival princes. For example, when prince Bayezıd lost the fight against his brother Selim, his yevmlü soldiers, who lost their hopes to get a tımar or an office, started brigandage activities because they were basically “unemployed”. It was also argued that the yevmlüs of prince Bayezıd constituted the first beams of “Celalism” in the Anatolian countryside. See Şerafettin Turan, Kanunî’nin Oğlu Şehzâde Bayezid Vak’ası (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1961), 159-173. For the prince fights and entourage see H. Erdem Çıpa, Yavuz’un Kavgası: I. Selim’in Saltanat Mücadelesi (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2013). 170 “Vilayet elden gitti, Müslümanlarun ehl ü iyâlleri ve mal ü menâlleri pâymâl oldu.” (For Hüseyin Paşa) “Eşkiya ve erâzilden yanına cem olan eli tüfenglü sekbân, niçe yüz nefer melâ’în evbâş u kallâş mübâhî taifesiyle reâyâ-yı memlekete tekâlif-i şâkka itmeğle, kuzât-ı zemân ile zindegânî idemeyüp niçe mahall ü mekânda fesâdâtları ceng ü cidâle mueddi olup ifrât u tefrît ile siyaset iderek nâmı Celali oldu.” Selâniki Mustafa Efendi, Tarih-i Selâniki, 816; Naima, Tarih-i Naima, I, 232; Ibrahim Peçuylu, Tarih-i Peçevî, II, 252-253. 171 Simeon mentions Celali destruction in Maraş. Andreasyan, Polonyalı Simeon, 186. 172“Serdârlık ile üzerlerine giden vezîr Mehmed Paşa hazretleri üstüne cem olan leşker ekall-i- kalîldür ve yeni yazılan bin yeniçeri taifesinden ancak üç yüz nefer adem vardur. Düşmen olan Celali taifesi hadden fuzûn olmışdur. Şâm’dan ve Halep’ten gelecek leşker henüz gelüp yetişmedi. Bendergâhlardan kimse gelüp geçmeğe mecâl ü imkân kalmadı.” Selâniki Mustafa Efendi, Tarih-i Selâniki, 827, 863. 173 Voyage books describe Bursa castle well fortified and built on the top of a hill. See Evliya Çelebi, Seyâhatnâme, Cilt 1. yay.haz. Seyit Ali Kahraman (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2013), 222-223. “Castle of Bursa was as big as the city and it was fortified with strong walls. “ Jean Thévenot, Relation d’un Voyage fait au Levant (Paris: Th.Joly, 1664), 165.

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Mukataas of Bozahane and Han-ı Cedid in Bursa show the decline between 1596 and

1620.

Mahruse-i Bursa’da vâkîi olan Bozahane ve Han-ı Cedid mukâtaası 1004 zi’l-kaadesinin gurresinde üç yıla iki yüz kırk beş bin akçe ziyâde ile? uhdesinde iltizâmda iken tahvili tamâm olalı hayli zaman olup mukâtaa-yı mezbûre ? ziyadeye çıkmakla bu iltizâm kabul ider kimesne bulunmamakla nice zaman hâli ve muattal kalmagın… 174

Another record points out that these mukataas were still dealing with some difficulties

and they had remained unsold for two years in between 1611 and 1617.

Bursa’da vâkîi Bozahane ve Han-ı Cedid mukâtaası 1020 muharremi gurresinde üç yıla yüz yirmi bin akçe iltizâmda iken tahvili tamâm olup ahirde talep zühur eylemeyip iki sene hâli kalıp mukâtaa-yı mezbûrun tahvil-i cedidi 1026 muharreminin gurresinde iltizâm-ı sabık üzere üç yıla yüz yirmi bin akçe iltizâm kabul ederim…175

These two mukataas could not provide the tax amount expected from them until 1620.

It seems that the mukataa demands started to normalize but the mukataa value did not

increase between 1596 and 1620. While these mukataas were sold with 245.000 akçe

ziyade (the offer was increased) in 1596 for three years, now the total value paid

declined to 120.000 akçe for three years in 1620.

Mahruse-i mezbûrede (Bursa) vâkîi bozahane ve han-ı Cedid mukâtaası bundan akdem sene 1030 muharremi gurresinde üç yıla yüz yirmi bin akçeye Kâmil nâm kimesne uhdesinde iltizâmda iken merkûm fevt olmağla ? nâm kimesne gelüp mukâtaa-yı mezbûreye ibtidai târihte iltizâm-ı sabık üzere üç yıla yüz yirmi bin akçe iltizâm kabul iderim şol şartla ki…176

174 BOA. MAD.d,04689/9. 175 BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/73. 176 BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/164.

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Karayazıcı roamed the countryside of north-central Anatolia for four years until the

imperial administration bargained with him to end his revolt.177 The rebellion of

Karayazıcı and Hüseyin Paşa was followed by rebellious brother of Karayazıcı

called Deli Hasan.178 His violent actions were effective in a huge area, he was active

in several regions such as Sepedlü (the north of Sivas), Tokat, Amasya, Çorum and

Kütahya.179 Deli Hasan’s forces moved to south Çorum in 1602 and he defeated

Ottoman army led by Hüsrev Paşa in the same year. After his success on battlefield

against the central forces, he moved towards Ankara and he besieged the town

extorting 80.000 gold kuruş from its citizens.180 The Celali violence in Ankara region

led its dwellers to flee to safer urban towns or rural lands like safer corners of

mountains. According to a official inspection 33 out of 28 villages were completely

abandoned by 1604 in the subdistrict of Bacı.181 Mukataa records reflect the Celali

destruction and demographic dispersal in Ankara as early as 1601.

“1009 şaban gurresinde Ankara vilayetine eşkiya müstevli olmagın tahvil-i cedidi üç

aydan ziyade muattal kalup talep ve rağbet olmamagın eşkiya havfından reaya ve beraya

perişan olmağla... ”182

Bundan akdem nefs-i Ankara’da vâkîi olan Ihtisap ve Pazarcık tevabii mukâtaası 1009 şabanının gurresinde üç yıla ? akçe iltizâm olunan ? tahvili tamâm olalı dört ay mürur idüp…talep olundukda

177 The imperial state bargained with some Celali leaders offering them high offices. Karayazıcı died towards the end of 1601. Akdag, Celali Isyanları, 383. 178 Mustafa Naima, Tarih-i Naima, I, 294. 179 Polish voyager Simeon was an eyewitness of Celali destruction in Tokat region and he mentions the Celali depopulation in the region. Andreasyan, Polonyalı Simeon, 104. Kütahya region was sacked once more by Tavil Halil in 1605. Kaza of Şeyhlü was invaded by 12.000 rebels for 34 days. The settlements around Kütahya like Uşak, Güre, Selendi, Simav, Çal, Baklan, Home and Geyikler were pillaged several times. Süleyman Polat, “Osmanlı Taşrasında Bir Celali Yıkımının Izleri: Tavil Halil’in Kütahya (Kazaları) Baskını ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Yansımaları Osmanlı Taşrasında Bir Celali Yıkımının Izleri,” Gazi Akademik Bakış 35, 6:12 (Yaz, 2013): 38. 180 Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion, 41. 181 Akdag, Celali Isyanları, 415. 182 BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24262/9-10.

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Celâlî havfından bazarlar hâli ve muattal kalmıştır ve bir kimesne talep ve rağbet olmamagın…183

The counter-violence of the imperial center and Deli Hasan was stopped by the

initiatives of the center and Deli Hasan was offered the Beylerbeylik of Bosnia in 1603.

However, Istanbul government got suspicious of his disloyal activities and Deli Hasan

was executed, possibly at the suggestion of Kuyucu Murat Paşa, in 1606.184 On the

other hand, Akdag states that the central state’s efforts to stop Celali violence by

offering Celali leaders high offices did not yield the expected results and the Celali

groups continued.185

After Deli Hasan’s execution, the central power faced the most challenging rebellion

led by an Ottoman pasha. The governor of Aleppo, Canbuladoglu Ali, wanted to

benefit from the internal weakness into which the Ottomans had fallen, rebelled in

northern Syria with an army composed of 5.000-6.000 men.186 The character of his

rebellion was different from other Celali Revolts because he was the governor of

Aleppo and his family had an autonomy near hereditary in the region, which might

have threatened the central authority directly. 187 The Canbuladoglu case was

particularly important for the imperial center to win him over.188 Canbuladoglu’s

struggle with other emirs like Ali, Yusuf and Fahreddin in the region forced Istanbul,

facing both a successful Syrian rebel and Anatolian Celali civil war, to bargain with

183 BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24262/11. 184 Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion, 45. 185 Ibid., 437. 186 Hrand D. Andreasyan, “Bir Ermeni Kaynagına Göre Celalî Isyanları,” Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi 13, 17-18 (1963): 34-35. The French ambassador of Pera confirms that he had forces around 5-6.000 horsemen. Jean de Gontaut-Biron, Advis et Relation de Turquie envoye au Roy par Mensieur de Sallignac de Tout ce qui c’est passé (Paris: Pierre Menir, 1608), 9. Another contemporary French chronic mentions 15.000 horsemen additionally. Micheal Baudier, Inventaire de l’Histoire Généralle des Turcz…depuis l’An 1300 (Paris: S. Chappelet, 1617), 739. It seems that he declared his rebellion sometime between 13th and 29th of September 1606. See the report, BNF.Français, 16145-4 (Années 1605-1623)/55-56. 187 Canbuladoglu was the member of a family which was dominating the region for a long time. Gontaut-Biron, Advis et Relation de Turquie, 9. 188 Özel, “The Reign of Violence: The Celalis c.1550-1700,” 190.

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him.189 He was given the title of Beylerbeyi of Temeşvar in September 1608.190 While

Kuyucu Murat Paşa defeated Canbuladoglu Ali Paşa and retook Aleppo in 17

November 1607,191 the city of Ankara was frustrated by another Celali leader called

Kalenderoglu Mehmet.192 His destruction was reflected on waqf records. A certain

tax farmer Süleyman could not pay 81.000 akçe to the wafq of Bayezıd II in Amasya

in 1605-1606 because his tax farm unit of Has-Virancık in the district of Murtazaabad

of province of Ankara was ravaged.

Mukâtaa-yı mezbûrenin mültezimi olan Süleymân nâm yeniçerinin tahvili tamâm oldukda zimmetine lâzım gelen mâl-ı vakıftan 81.000 akçe talep olundukda vilâyete Celâlî bad-kıtâl müstevli olup…ber-mûceb-i hüccet-i şeriyye 81.000 akçe merkûm Süleymân’ın zimmetinden ref olunmagın şerh verildi.193

After his attempts in Ankara, he moved to Bursa where he tried to once again to

pressure the imperial center to be given a beylerbeylik.194 Bursa mukataas reflect his

destruction in the region. The tax farmers were experiencing difficulties to collect

revenues from their tax farm units and to make payments to the center.

Mahruse-i Bursa’da…bundan akdem bin on altı muharremi gurresinde tahvili iki yük akçeye Ahmet ve Nuri nâm kimesneler iltizâm eyleyüp üç sene tamâm oldukda vilayet-i mezbureye(?) Celâlî eşkiyası müstevli olmağla mukâtaa battal kalmagın…tahvili

189 Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion, 118. 190 Canbuladoglu came to Istanbul in 26 January 1608 to ask to be forgiven and he was executed on 1 March 1610. BNF.Français, 16171 (Années 1574-1610)/ 360-369. 191 Kuyucu Murat Paşa defeated Canbuladoglu and he retook Aleppo in 17 Novembre 1605. BNF.Français, 16171 (Années 1574-1610)/ 359. 192 Ankara castle was occupied by Kalenderoglu during 5 days in 1606. Records of Ankara kadı (Ankara Şeriye Sicilleri) in 1607 mention permanent Celali attacks effective in Ankara since the last 5-6 years. Özer Ergenç, Osmanlı Tarihi Yazıları: Şehir, Toplum Devlet (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2013), 106, 130. 193 Extracted from Kayhan Orbay, “Celâlîs Recorded in the Account Books,” Rivista degli Studi Orientali LXXVIII, 1-2 (2004): 77. 194 Kalenderoglu came to Bursa with 2000 horsemen. “He attacked to Bursa (Bursia) and he took control of a huge part of the city, which were very close to the castle.” Gontaut-Biron, Advis et Relation,14. Dwellers of Bursa had built fortified walls between Tatarlar-Yeşil-Şehreküstü regions for security reasons against Celali groups. Ergenç, XVI.Yüzyıl Sonlarında Bursa, 23.

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yüz ellişer bin akçe üzere bâ-berât ve bilâ-kefîl zabt ittirüp hâlâ iki tahvil de mürur idüp teslimatları görüldükde iki yüz kırk bin akçe bâkîleri zühur eyleyüp talep olundukda küllî kesir eyledim deyü cevap verüp mezbûrlar müflis ve düyûn olmağla tahsil de mümkün olmayup ve mukâtaanın tahvil-i cedidiyle âhir talep ? olundukda tahammülü olmamağla kimesne talep olmayup muattal kalmış…195

The presence of Kalenderoglu in Bursa can be followed on the accounts of the waqf

of Çelebi Mehmet (known as the Yeşil Imaret). The waqf lands were exposed to Celali

attacks and the agricultural production decayed in 1606-1607. The repair costs were

extremely high in 1608, which could be associated with the Celali destruction.196

Kalenderoglu was defeated in 1608 by Kuyucu Murat Paşa near Elbistan. While the

central state was struggling with the great Celali revolts, there were also small-scale

groups in Anatolian countryside like Derviş Nazır, Hayalioglu, Karakaş, Kara Said,

Gurguroglu, Gezir-oglu, Çakı-oglu, Kürt Mahmut, Yusuf Paşa, Ilyas Paşa, Kumkapılı,

Akmirza and so on, who ravaged their localities.197

The Celali devastations led Ottoman peasants to flee in mass to safer areas in the short

period called The Great Flight (1603-1607), as termed by the peasants “Büyük

Kaçgunluk”.198 The Great Flight period can be marked as the peak point of violence in

the Anatolian countryside inflicted by the Celali armies and the central forces. The

government’s response to the Celalis costed the lifes of around 80.000 rebels between

195 BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/60. 196 Kayhan Orbay, “16. ve 17. Yüzyıllarda Bursa Ekonomisi: Sultan Çelebi Mehmet Yeşil Imâreti’nin Mali Tarihi (1553-1650),” A.Ü. Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi (OTAM) Dergisi 22 (2007): 141-142. 197 There must have been hundreds of small bandit groups in Anatolian countryside who were locally active. For instance, a certain Hamza (former governer of Karesi) ravaged villages of the waqf of Sultan Murat Han in Bursa region with his 300-400 horsemen and 100 sekbans around 1609-10. Ayşe Erol, “78 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri’nde (h.1018/m.1609-1610) Yer Alan Anadolu Eyaleti’ne Ait Vakıflarla Ilgili Hükümlerin Tasnifi,” Gazi Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 3, 6 (2016): 23-24. 198 The high level of desolation attracted attention of foreign observers. A contemporary French chronic calls it “the great desolations and -demographic- moves (des grandes desolations & remuëments)”. Palma Cayet, Pierre Victor, Renaudot Théophraste, Le Mercure François, ou, La Suitte de l’Histoire de Commençant l’an M.D.CV. pour Suitte du Septenaire du D. Cayer&Finissant au Sacre du tres Chrestien Roy de France&de Nauarre Loys XIII, vol.3 (Paris: Par Iean Richer, 1611-1648), 220.

45

1606 and 1608-9.199 On the other hand, despite harsh counter-actions of the imperial

center, the Celalism did not come to an end after Kuyucu Murat Paşa’s campaigns.

The second phase of the great Celali Revolts broke out with the rebellion of Abaza

Mehmet Paşa, the governor of Erzurum, in 1622. The revolt of Abaza Mehmet Paşa

turned the affairs in the region worse because “Old” Halil Paşa was in Safavid

campaign with the central army during his revolt.200 Abaza Mehmet besieged Erzurum

and destroyed the forces there sent against him.201 He attacked Ottoman forces with

the object of taking revenge of murdered Sultan Osman II.202 As an addition to his

pillage in Erzurum region, he besieged Ankara with a force of around 50.000 men 203

and he occupied the city of Bursa for 3 months.204 Despite his rebellious activities, he

was pardonned twice in 1624 and 1628.205 He was assigned to a governorship in the

199 Özel, “The Reign of Violence: The Celalis c.1550-1700,” 190. 200 AD(Nantes) Série A: Vol.3, 2mi2215/274-275. 201 As an addition to Abaza’s forces, the winter conditions were also effective in failure of Halil Paşa. The army of Hasan Paşa faced a complete failure. The French ambassador, who was in the imperial center during the revolts, puts emphasis on the Ottoman defeat before the Celali army. AD(Nantes) Série A: Vol.3, 2mi2215/274-275. 202 French consul of Aleppo between 1623-1625 states that Abaza Paşa was a humble servant of the sultan. However, he rebelled for the revenge of Sultan Osman II after he commanded several times by the prophet in his dreams to take the revenge. Louis Gédoyn, Journal et Correspondance de Gédoyn “le Turc”, consul de France a Alep, 1623-1625, ed. A. Boppe (Paris: Impr. de Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1909), 49. 203 A. De La Martine, Histoire de La Turquie, vol. 5 (Paris: Libraire du Constitutionnel, 1854), 387. Similar to the other foreign chronics, he seems to have exaggerated the numbers. 204 French agent reports, dated 13 October 1623, state that after Abaza Paşa “tired” all janissaries (tous les janissaries de cet empire) in Bursa, the center sent the Aga of Janissaries and his companions to stop his revolt in Bursa and to prevent from from taking all the town (pour empêcher qu’il ne la prenne la ville de Burcia…). Abaza Paşa’s army dissolved the central forces, commanded by Sinan Paşa (Cigale, in the original text), and they retreated to Ankara to wait orders from the center (se retirer dans la ville d’Angouri pour attendre les commandements de la porte…). 5-6.000 janissaries (cinq ou six milles janissaries) were sent to Bursa to fight Abaza, the sipahis were not willing to fight because of approaching winter. BNF.Français, 16145-4 (Années 1605-1623) /221-222. 205 A letter that was sent by a French agent in March 1623 to France states that the soldiers were not very willing to fight Abaza. The grand vizier had to make extra payment to janissaries and sipahis. BNF.Français, 16149-4 (Années 1619-1624)/456. On the other hand, as it is understood from the letter of English ambassador dated 1 November 1623, Abaza Paşa challenged the central forces very severely that the center had to forgive him to stop his advance. The ambassador states that there were rumors that Abaza Paşa would march towards Istanbul after Bursa. Roe, The Negotiations,187-188. A contemporary French chronic states that Abaza Paşa was waiting spring to march towards Istanbul and he was five days distance away to the capital. Cayet, Victor and Théophraste, Le Mercure François, 276.

46

Balkans until he was executed in 1634.206 Abaza’s revolt was followed by the local

Celali brigandage like Ilyas Paşa (around Balıkesir-Manisa, 1630) and

Karahaydaroglu (1647).

The large scale Celali Revolts were just resumed above between 1576-1643. As an

addition to the great Celali Revolts, there were so many smaller Celali bands

composing of 30-40 bandits active in local areas.207 Taking all of those Celali activities

into consideration, the next section will cover three issues related. Firstly, the Celali

destruction on rural population will be displayed. Some numerical data will be

presented to see the size of the Celali Effect on rural demography. Secondly, the

question of lost villages will be touched slightly. The high degree of land desertion

ended in a total village abandonment in some districts. Thirdly, while some villages

were deserted, their peasants escaped to the hilly lands to evade Celali brigands and

settled there. This section will be about these new villages.

2.2.4.1 Drastic Decline: “A Demographic Crisis”

The high degree of population decline in some parts of northern and central Anatolian

lands allows historians to define it a “demographic crisis” more than a “demographic

decline”. The rate of decline had reached until 100%s in some rural areas which ended

in totally abandoned settlements.208

206 He took part in Poland campaign commanding 80.000 soldiers short time before his execution. Renaudot, Gazettes Nouvelles, Relations, Extraordinaire, 1. 207 Mühimme registers are full of examples of the brigandage activites of small scale Celali packs and local bandits in the Anatolian countryside. See 3 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (966-968/1558-1560), Divan-ı Hümayun Sicilleri Dizisi:I (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlügü, 1993), 625; 5 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (973/1565-1566), Divan-ı Hümayun Sicilleri Dizisi:II (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri, 1994), 33,34,35; 12 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (978-979/1570-1572), Cilt I, Divan-ı Hümayûn Sicilleri Dizisi:IV (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlügü, 1996), 412; Mühimme Defteri 90 (Istanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırma Vakfı, 1993), 298, 334; BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 78 (h.1018/m.1609-1610):16/41. 208 Simeon notes having seen so many big villages deserted while he was going to Sivas from Tokat. Andreasyan, Polonyalı Simeon, 105.

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The Celalis were active mainly in the central and northern parts of Anatolia and these

regions received the greatest damage. One of the regions they were most cruel was

district of Tokat. Rural population figures of 1641 demonstrate extraordinary changes

when compared with 1574. The records of 1574, 1600, 1601, 1611, 1620 and 1641

allow us to investigate the drastic decline gradually. While there were 10.004 rural

households in 1574, it declined to 8820 in 1601.209 The decline in rural population

corresponds to desertion and disappearance of 44 (18.88%) villages in the same

period.210 The Celali Effect might have reached at the peak during the Great Flight

years when the population of the whole kazâ declined sharply from 8820 households

to 2745 households only between 1601 and 1611.211 The sharp fall of 68.87% caused

the desertion or disappearance of around 52 (22.9%) villages in the region.212 The

comparison of the total households of 1601 and 1641 proves that there was about

63.60% fall (from 8820 households to 3202.5 households) in the rural population in

Tokat region. The Celali Effect could have struck the region at least three times. The

first dispersal was experienced during the revolt of Karayazıcı at the turn of the 16th

century. The second immigration was seen during the Great Flight between 1603 and

1607. Finally, the third one might have been related to the revolt of Abaza Paşa after

the 1622s when he ravaged Tokat213 and most of the parts of province of Rum.214

209 Açıkel, “Change in Settlement Patterns, Population and Society in North Central Anatolia: A Case Study of The District (Kazâ) of Tokat (1574-1643)” 174. 210 This decline is seen only in five nahiyes of Venk, Kafirni, Yıldız, Tozanlu, and Kazabad). Ibid.,174-175. 211 Ibid., 175. Simeon notes that there were about 1000 Armenian households in Tokat before the Celalis. However, it declined around 50% after the Celalis. Andreasyan, Polonyalı Simeon, 104. Account books of the Waqfs of Hatuniyye in Tokat show that the the waqf was in financial difficulty before 1610. The most possible explanation of the financial difficulty is related to the Celali attacks. The tax base of waqf lands could have abandoned their villages and fled to safer areas during the invasion. I am thankful to Kayhan Orbay for sharing his unpublished article with me. Kayhan Orbay, “A Case for Research in the “Celali Effect” on Rural Production and Demography in Central Anatolia; Revenue Loss and Shrinkage in the Waqf of Hatuniyye” 6-9. 212 Açıkel, “Change in Settlement Patterns, Population and Society in North Central Anatolia: A Case Study of The District (Kazâ) of Tokat (1574-1643)” 175. 213 A letter dated 12 October 1623 states that Abaza Paşa took the castle of Tokat (Tocatt). “Suddenly, pretending obedience (Abaza Paşa), he assaulted and took the castle of Tocatt…All that part of Asia obeys him…” Roe, The Negotiations, 185. 214 Özel, “The Reign of Violence: The Celalis c.1550-1700,” 190.

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The Celalis were active in other districts around Tokat. Amasya, which is situated 113

km north of Tokat, faced several Celali attacks. The figures extracted from records

between 1520 and 1643 present historians the changing demography of the region in

a long period. The general demographic expansion of the 16th century and the Celali

demographic crisis in the following decades can be traced thanks to the recent study

of Oktay Özel.215 The total population of kaza of Amasya depicted a high rate of

increase of 78.78% between 1520 and 1576.216 The sharp demographic expansion was

accompanied with an increase in the number of rural settlements, inhabited mezraas

and cultivated lands.217

Table 1: Some Examples of the Rural Demographic Changes (Hane) in the Kâza of Amasya Between 1520 and 1643. Based on Tahrirs of 1520, 1576 and Avarız of 1643218

215 Özel, The Collapse of Rural Order. 216 The rise of mücerreds in the same period was striking, it rose around 201.72%. Ibid., 114. The expansion rate of mücerreds could also give traces of worsening economic. The young bachelors might have found getting married difficult. 217 It is assumed that there was not a border change in this period. Özel, The Collapse of Rural Order, 114. 218 Ibid., 113.

1520 1576 1643

Nâhiye Hane Hane Hane

Amasya (nefs) 90 312 193

Akdağ 892 1463 637

Argoma 2986 4326 1202

Aştagul 458 809 85

Geldigelen (âbâd 3246 6479 1910

Gelikiras 688 975 252

Total 8360 14364 4279

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The demographic expansion faced a sharp decline sometime between 1576 and 1643

because the region was exposed to the great Celali attacks many times.219 When the

tahrir of 1576 and avarız of 1643 (mufassal) records are compared, the limit of

demographic dispersal appears. The figures show that there was a 78.67% decline in

the total rural tax-paying population in the kâza between 1576 and 1643. The high

degree of demographic dispersal is also reflected to the number of villages and 144

(38.70%) villages were totally deserted or disappeared.220

219 The great Celali armies were violent enough to penetrate into Amasya despite being protected by a fortress. Busbecq noted that “On the highest hill, we find the fortress of Amasya. It is rather big and guarded perpetually by the Turks.” Ogier Ghislain de Busbecq, Ambassades et Voyages en Turquie et Amasie de Mr. Busbequius trad.S. Gaudon (Paris: P. David, 1646), 138. French voyager and diplomat François de La Boullaye-Le Gouz (1623-1668) saw Amasya in the late 1640s. He states that there were deserted settlements, hans and destructed mosques. Moreover, it seems that he was also a victim of the brigand activities. While his group was resting during the night, a certain group of brigands called “Kara Kise (?)” or “noir valeurs” (in the original text) attempted to steal their belongings. François de La Boullaye-Le Gouz, Les Voyages et observations du Sieur de La Boullaye Le Gouz, où sont Décrites Les Religions, Gouvernements et situations des Estats et Royaumes d’Italie, Grèce, Natolie, Syrie, Palestine, Karaménie, KaldéeAssyrie, Grand Mogol, Bijapour, Indes Orientales des Portugais, Arabie, Égypte, Hollande, Grande-Bretagne, Irlande, Dannemark, Pologne, Isles et Autres Lieux d’Europe, Asia et Afrique (Paris: G.Clousier, 1653), 66-67. 220 Özel, The Collapse of Rural Order, 118.

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Table 2: Changes in the Rural Population Between 1576 and 1643 in nefer.221

The extent of demographic crisis and deserted villages varied from nâhiye to nâhiye.

For example, while Aştagul lost more than 90% of its population, the nâhiyes of

Bergome and Yavaş-ili could keep nearly half of their previous population.222 The

principal reason was related to the degree of Celali violence and Celali-like activities

of members of provincial military-administrative class (ehl-i örf) who sacked the

countryside with their levends. 223 Amasya region might have experienced

demographic decline which roots from the demographic pressure as well. However, it

seems that demographic crisis was the result of activities of two great Celali leaders of

Karayazıcı and Deli Hasan. Karayazıcı entered Amasya around 1600 and he stayed in

the region during six months. 224 His sojourn destructed rural economy and

demography because his Celali army, composed of 50-60.000 soldiers, might have

extracted their needs from the dwellers like nourishment, housing and so on.

221 Ibid., 117. 222 Özel, The Collapse of Rural Order, 118. 223 For an example of roaming activities (yağma ve zülum) of ehl-i örf and insecurity, see Andreasyan, Polonyalı Simeon,109-110. 224 Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion, 33.

Nahiye 1576 Nefer 1643 Nefer % Decrease

Amasya (nefs) 486 193 60.28

Akdağ 2536 709 72.04

Argoma 8289 1424 82.82

Aştagul 1571 128 91.85

Bergome/Yavaş-İli 2684 1135 57.71

Geldigelen (Âbâd) 11124 2154 80.63

Gelikiras 1897 326 82.81

Total 28587 6069 78.67

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A similar demographic dispersal that Amasya and Tokat regions experienced is seen

in the Bozok and Canik districts. The high degree of lost tax paying peasants and

deserted villages, about 70-80%, between 1576 and 1642 in the region lead

demographic historians to look for a connection with Celali Revolts because the

regions were exposed to Celali attacks several times in the period. The comparison of

figures extracted from tahrir records of 1576 and detailed avarız (mufassal) records of

1642 displays the extend of the Celali Effect on rural population. The demographic

destruction will be shown with some examples in the region below

Table 3: A Comparison of the Data Derived from Tahrir of 1576 and Avarız

(Mufassal) of 1642. Number of Peasant Households (Hane) in the District of Bozok225

The region was hit most seriously by Celali revolts of Karayazıcı, Hüseyin Paşa and

Deli Hasan between 1590 and 1610.

225 Öz, “Population Fall in Seventeenth Century Anatolia: Some Findings for the Districts of Canik and Bozok,” 13.

1576 1642

Subdistrict (Nâhiye) Household(Hane) Subdistrict (Kaza) Household(Hane)

Akdağ 1970 Akdağ 948

Gedik+Çıbık 3025 Gedik+Çıbık 531

Çıbık 1388 - 0

Emlak 2022 Emlak 367

Boğazlıyan 2793 Boğazlıyan 195

Total 11198 Total 2041

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Table 4: A Comparison of the Data Derived from Tahrir of 1576 and Avarız (Mufassal) of 1642. Number of Peasant Households (Hane) in the District of Canik226

As seen in the examples presented above, the rural population of region witnessed a

drastic decline between two record periods.227 A great part of this demographic crisis

could have been caused by the Celali bands who were active in the region between the

1598s and 1607s (the end of the Great Flight). When the first great Celali leader

Karayazıcı had lost his first major battle against the imperial center, the survivors of

his army fled towards north via Sivas and Amasya to the Canik mountains around

226 Öz, “Population Fall in Seventeenth Century Anatolia: Some Findings for the Districts of Canik and Bozok,” 11. 227 Ibid., 22-29.

1576 1642

Subdistrict (Kaza) Household(Hane) Household(Hane)

Arım 4707 1288

Kavak 1730 667

Samsun 1789 603

Bafra 3546 1211

Satılmış 4666 200

Ünye 856 445

Terme 3747 731

Total 21041 5145

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1601.228 It is highly probable that the surviving Celali comrades formed many bands

in the region.229 The army of Deli Hasan, composed of 20-30.000 men,230 may have

sacked the villages because it is sure that he was in the Tokat region in 1602 where he

defeated two Ottoman pashas.231

The examples presented above in the charts indicate a demographic crisis which took

place between the 1580s and the 1640s. However, these studies cannot provide

infromation on the demographic situation and fluctuations on shorter periods during

violent years of Celali attackts. On this issue the waqf account books could provide

regional demographic fluctuations year by year and allow to see the Celali Effect on

short notices in the waqf lands of Selîm II.232 The general demographic trend in the

waqf region was a decline because Konya region was under violent Celali attacts

starting from the final years of the 16th century. The Celali leader of Karayazıcı and

Hüseyin Paşa (governor of Karaman) ravaged the central Anatolian since 1598. Their

damage in the central Anatolia was followed by Celali leader of Deli Hasan in 1602.233

Rural population, based on çift-tax households, declined from 611 (1594) to 349

(1600-1), which is equal to a 42% drop. The number of mücerreds declined from 846

(1594) to 259 (1600-1) which means that 69% of mücerreds either evaded tax records

or got married or fled totally. The number of bennaks witnessed a similar decline and

while their number was 1014 in 1594, it declined to 320 in 1600-1, which is equal to

a 68% fall. The rural population of Konya region can be assumed to have continued

228 Mustafa Naima, Tarih-i Naima, I, 293. 229 A mühimme from 1609-1610 approves violent actions of Celali comrades in the region. Sivas dwellers were under Celali attacks (zaleme zulmünden reayası perakende ve perişan olup…) since the last 7-8 years (yedi sekiz seneden berü Celali istilası…). BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 78 (h.1018/m.1609-1610): 11/26. It is highly probable that these were the the Celali bands who fled towards the north after 1601. 230 Ibrahim Peçuylu, Tarih-i Peçevî, II, 270. 231 Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion, 39. 232 Orbay, “Financial Development of the Waqfs in Konya and the Agricultural Economy in the Central Anatolia (Late Sixteenth-Early Seventeenth Centuries,” 88, 91. 233 Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion, 40-41.

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declining during these difficult periods of Celali attacks after 1600-1s.234 There is

some data which confirms the Celali depopulation in Konya region in the following

years of the 1600s. For instance, a mukataa record dated 1602 signals difficulties in

collection of some taxes, including the cizye, in Karaman, which was related to the

Celali destruction (Celali havfından).235 Records of waqfs in Konya region indicate a

general harvest crisis between 1607-1609 when the grain prices were extremely high

which might sign the Celali rural depopulation.236

2.2.4.2 The Question of the Lost Villages

As discussed above the general demographic decline in the central and northern

Anatolian districts was around 70-80%. The depopulation was followed by temporary

and permanent abandonments of villages. The total abandonments started with the first

great Celali revolts at the turn of the 16th century. For example, a certain voyvoda

Ibrahim Aga informs the imperial center that 36 villages in the subdistrict of Haymana

(attached to Ankara) were totally deserted in 1603 because the region was under

pillage.237 Subdistrict of Bacı witnessed a drastic decline in the number of villages in

the same period. 33 villages out of 38 were completely abandoned.238 The number

settlements in the northern Anatolian parts of Canik and Bozok districts declined

between 1576 and 1642. For instance, the number of villages of Arım (in Canik)

declined from 148 to 80 (45%).239 Subdistrict of Bogazlıyan (in Bozok) lost 52% of

its villages in the same period.

234 Faroqhi, “Agricultural Crisis and the Art of Flute-Playing: The Wordly Affairs of the Mevlevî Dervishes (1595-1652),” 46. 235 BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24262/1 236 Orbay, “Economic Development of the Imperial Waqfs; A Study in the Institutional and Local Economic History in the Transformation Period” 96, 107. 237 Akdag, Celâlî Isyanları, 416. We learn the existence of eşkıya in Haymana around 1593-1594 from a mühimme record. BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 71 (h.1002/m.1593-1594):188/373. 238 Akdag, Celâlî Isyanları, 415. 239 Öz, “Population Fall in Seventeenth Century Anatolia: Some Findings for the Districts of Canik and Bozok,” 10.

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The lost and totally deserted settlements will be discussed in this part between 1570s

and 1640s. Amasya and Tokat cases will be dealt in detail and the village

abandonments will be handled on short and long terms.

2.2.4.2.a Amasya

Özel indicated that the majority of the lost villages were situated in lowlands and

plateaus in Amasya.240 The 45% of abandoned villages were the small ones composed

of a few hanes with less than 25 taxpayers in total.241 These two elements made them

vulnerable against the Celalis. The bigger villages were exposed to the attacks and

they lost a part, in some cases substantial portion of their population; however, the

great size villages with more than 250 taxpayers experienced lesser total abandonment

or disappearance.242

The nahiyes of Akdag, Argoma and Geldigelen, with the largest plains, experienced

the great village loss. Özel showed that the common point of these regions is that the

most of the villages attached to these nahiyes were in small size composed of 1-24

nefers. The small size settlements received greater damage than the big ones. The

greatest settlements with 200-250 nefers experienced a 1% total desertion.

It was shown that 144 villages were deserted between 1576-1643.243 It could be

assumed that, there might have been so many actions regarding disappearance or

resettlement of villages between these two registers. On the other hand, it cannot be

shown for the time being because of the absence of avarız or tahrir registers between

two periods. Future studies with different documents, which could yield some

numerical data about settlement numbers, like waqf defters, could reveal the changes

240 Oktay Özel, “Osmanlı Anadolu’sunda Terkedilmiş/Kayıp Köyler Sorunu (17-19.Yüzyıllar),” in Ötekilerin Peşinde: Ahmet Yaşar Ocak’a Armağan, ed. Fatih Yeşil, Mehmet Öz (Ankara: Timaş Yayınları, 2015): 575 241 Özel, The Collapse of Rural Order, 106; idem, “Osmanlı Anadolu’sunda Terkedilmiş/Kayıp Köyler Sorunu (17-19.Yüzyıllar),” 578. 242 Özel, The Collapse of Rural Order, 106. 243 Ibid., 105.

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in shorter periods. Özel stated that 43 out of 144 abandoned villages seem to have

reappeared sometime after 1643 and they survived to the beginning of the 20th

century.244 The remaining 101 villages, which had existed in tahrir of 1576, did not

show up.245 These indices signal that the Celali Effect had long and short term results

in rural population of Amasya. While there was a recovery after 1643, some

settlements got dispersed permanently.

2.2.4.2.b Tokat

Tokat region reflects the Celali Effect more in detail thanks to the records of tahrir

(detailed) of 1574, the avarız registers of 1600, 1601, 1611 and 1643 (the latter is

timar-zeamet register). The revolts seem to have been quite effective in the region at

the turn of the 16th century because the comparison of 1574 tahrir and 1600 avarız

(summary) points a 18% drop in the number of villages. 44 villages that existed in

1574 disappeared in 26 years.246 The features of deserted villages show similarities

with Amasya. The majority of lost settlements were the smallest ones with less than

25 hanes.247 The avarız of 1601 shows that 3 villages which appeared in the previous

register got disappeared between 1600-1601. 248 The next avarız register in 1611

indicates that 59 of the populated villages in 1601 were deserted.249 The total number

of disappeared villages between 1574 and 1611 is 99 (plus 7 hassa settlements that got

lost between 1601-1611). While some settlements were totally abandoned in the

previous register, they could have been resettled in the following record. For example,

11 villages, which appeared in 1574 and got disappeared in 1601, are found again in

1611 records. If the re-emerged settlements between 1574-1611 are not counted, 86

villages could be deserted in the same period.250

244 Ibid., 109. 245 Özel, The Collapse of Rural Order, 110 246 Açıkel, “Change in Settlement Patterns, Population and Society in North Central Anatolia: A Case Study of The District (Kazâ) of Tokat (1574-1643)” 158. 247 Ibid., 158-159. 33 villages of 44 had less than 25 hanes. 248 Ibid., 159. 249 Ibid., 160. 250 Ibid., 162.

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The comparison of previous three registers with records of 1643 (timar-zemat

defteri)251 signals that the desertion was a temporary action against the Celalis. 18

villages that existed in 1574, but lost in other three records, reappeared in 1643. 20 of

the deserted villages during 1601-1611 re-emerged in 1643 register.252 On the other

hand, 48 of the deserted villages between 1574 and 1611 did not appear in 1643

records. Their absence in 1643 does not guarantee that the situation kept unchanging.

The maps and documents of the 20th century confirm that 20 out of 48 disappeared

villages reappeared sometime after 1640s. 253 The other 28 villages may have

disappeared completely, or some might have re-emerged with different names after

1640s. The Celali Effect shows signs of short and long-term results on the settlements

in Tokat. The reappearance of villages after a short period of time indicates that while

some part of peasants tended to return back, some dwellers kept staying in the new

settlement.

As an addition to the numerical data presented in this study, there are some cases on

mühimme registers which support this idea for other regions. For example, the

mühimme of 1617-18 points out that the kâza of Koçhisar was deserted (celâlî

fetretinden ahâlisi perişan olup dağılan) owing to the Celali Revolts but the district

was resettled (daha sonra tekrar bayındır hale gelen) most possibly after a short time

the revolts were quashed in the region. 254

2.2.5 The New Celali Settlements

The lowlands and wide plateaus received the maximum Celali destruction because

their location made them susceptible and visible to Celali armies. They were more

251 Only kılıç-villages are recorded in this defter. Ibid., 162-163. 252 Açıkel, “Change in Settlement Patterns, Population and Society in North Central Anatolia: A Case Study of The District (Kazâ) of Tokat (1574-1643)” 162. Some of these villages might be found in Niksar. A mühimme from 1616-1617 mentions resettlement projects in Niksar (Tokat region). BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 81 (h.1025/m.1616-1617):207/472. 253 Açıkel, “Change in Settlement Patterns, Population and Society in North Central Anatolia: A Case Study of The District (Kazâ) of Tokat (1574-1643)” 162-163. 254 82 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (h.1026-1027/m.1617-1618), Divan-ı Hümayun Sicilleri Dizisi:VI (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlügü, 2000), 134.

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densely settled. Özel showed that the villages in the lowlands experienced the highest

depopulation and the settlements which were situated on the high hills or relatively

higher lands received relatively lesser destruction in Amasya region. 255 Açıkel’s

findings show similar results about the rate of demographic drop between low and high

lands.256 Hütteroth had reached a similar conclusion for Karaman province of the

central Anatolia. He stated that while the mountain villages experienced abandonment

around 30-40%, the open plains had been deserted around 90% in the same period.257

The similar trends can be expected for other rural parts of central and northern Anatolia

between the 1570s and 1640s.

The lost peasants bring the question about their fate during and after the revolts. They

cannot be assumed to have been killed by the Celalis. The majority of lost peasants

may have chosen one of the four alternatives; a) joining the Celali armies or forming

bandit groups (köylülerin bir kısmı malları ve başları havfından eşkiya yanına

varıp)258, b) immigration to big towns, c) returning back to their former lands some of

which was occupied by the members of military (askeri) class,259 d) formation of the

new settlements. This section demonstrates the formation of new settlements in the

Celali period.

While Celali violence was ending in disappeared villages in the lowlands, the new

ones were established in the higher lands for security reasons. Avarız registers of 1640s

indicate that there was a proliferation of kazas (sub-district) and villages in some

districts of central and northern Anatolia. Öz’s findings demonstrate that the number

of kazas in the district of Bozok and Canik increased. There were 2 kazas in Bozok

district in the 1576 tahrir and it rose to 9 between 1576-1642. Canik region

255 Özel, The Collapse of Rural Order, 105-106. 256 Açıkel, “Change in Settlement Patterns, Population and Society in North Central Anatolia: A Case Study of The District (Kazâ) of Tokat (1574-1643)” 157-166. 257 Özel, The Collapse of Rural Order, 106-107. 258 Ibid., 172. 259 See Inalcık, “Adâletnâmeler,” 90-91.

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experienced a bigger proliferation and the number of kazas increased from 7 to 19 in

the same period.260

The increase of village numbers could not be a result of the natural demographic rise

because hane numbers do not match with the villages. Kavak region had witnessed a

30% rise in villages; however, the hane number was 61% (667 hanes in 1642) lower

when compared with the figures of 1576 tahrir (1730 hanes).261 Samsun shows similar

results with Kavak. Even if the rise of village number was around 4%, there were 66%

(1789 households in 1576) less hanes in 1642 (603 households). Both districts show

that the villages were splintered during the revolts and the new ones appeared in remote

regions with lesser households.

The districts of Bozok experienced a similar trend with Canik. The proliferation was

around 68% for Akdag and 69% for Sorkun.262 The households in Akdag region

declined from 1970 (1576 tahrir register) to 948 in 1642 (avarız). It is most probable

that the villages got fragmented and new settlements were established with lesser

habitants. The size of increase was around 69% in Sorkun region. On the other hand,

the region expanded demographically and the number of household (hane) rose from

238 (1576) to 976 (1642) in Sorkun. This drastic rise could be related the movement

of Turcoman groups. It is known that there were semi-nomadic Turcoman groups in

the region.263

To conclude, there was a proliferation of villages and kazas between 1570s and 1642.

On the other hand, this increase was not related to a natural demographic expansion.

Most of these new settlements were founded in higher mountainous regions to evade

260 Öz, “Population Fall in Seventeenth Century Anatolia: Some Findings for the Districts of Canik and Bozok,” 6. 261 See Öz, Population Fall in Seventeenth Century Anatolia: Some Findings for the Districts of Canik and Bozok,” 11. 262 The number of villages increased from 63 (1576) to 106 (1642) in Akdag. There were 11 villages (1576) and it rose to 87 (1642) in Sorkun. 263 The number of villages increased from 11 (1576) to 87 (1642) Öz, “Population Fall in Seventeenth Century Anatolia: Some Findings for the Districts of Canik and Bozok,” 7, 13.

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the Celalis. There should be just a few households in these villages because despite

the proliferation, there was a general decline in the number of households around 70-

80% in the region. It seems that these new villages were temporary safe places to

evade the Celalis and the majority of peasants may have returned to their former

settlements when the damaging effects of the Celali came to an end.

2.3 Conclusion

The Ottoman demography entered into a complicated era in the last decade of the 16th

century when the great demographic expansion came to an end coinciding with the

first great Celali Revolts. The Celali armies destructed rural economy and pushed a

great part of Ottoman peasants out of their settlements. The Celali Effect drove the

Ottoman rural population into an extraordinary period of demographic mobility. The

degree of mobility and desertion was so wide that some historians call it a

“demographic crisis”.

The Celali Effect on demography was discussed in two main sections. The first section

argued the urban demography. It is a great loss that we do not have enough official

surveys for towns to reveal the Celali Effect with numerical demographic data. The

scarcity of these registers led historians to use different sources like chronics, juridical

records, mühimmes, telhis and waqf registers. The urban changes were attempted to be

projected in Istanbul through the repair and construction registers. The conclusion

showed that the city was exposed to two great immigrations during the great revolts

which created a “surplus labour” in the town. The immigrations reversed after the great

rebels were calmed down and Anatolian countryside entered into a short period of

normalization. After the elimination of two great rebels, the town evacuated the

surplus labour and the wages returned to the normal levels before the revolts. It is most

probable that the peasants had tendency to return to their former lands after the revolts.

Moreover, the central state may have encouraged or forced them to do so.264 The

264 Faroqhi mentions two forced return attempts in 1610 and 1635. See Faroqhi, Orta Halli Osmanlılar, 56. It seems that one of Faroqhi’s statements is also found on the gazettes of 1635. See Renaudot, Recueil de Toutes Les Gazettes, 479.

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fluctuations indicated that the Celali Effect was a short-term result in the urban

population in the example of Istanbul.

The second part discussed the rural demography. The comparison of avarız and tahrir

registers signaled three chief changes. The first section aimed at showing the size of

demographic dispersal and following crisis during and after the great revolts.

Presented examples showed that the rural population of some parts of central and

northern Anatolia declined around 70-80% between the 1570s-1640s. In the second

part, sharp decline in the number of settlements was followed in Amasya and Tokat

regions. The Celali destruction resulted in total abandonment and disappearance of

some villages. The Celali Effect was most destructive in the settlements which were

situated in the low lands or wide plateaus. The records showed that the Celali Effect

on the deserted villages differed regionally. While some of the abandoned villages

were recovered as early as the first decades of the 17th century, some of them remained

desolated. The village desertion was accompanied by new settlements most of which

was in high lands. The following section argued that the peasants fled to higher

mountainous lands to evade the bandits and they established new settlements

composed of a few households. The registers of 1640s indicated that the number of

villages rose in some districts. This rise was not related to the natural demographic rise

because despite the increasing settlements, the household (hane) kept declining during

the revolts. As a result of Celali bands, the villages got dispersed into smaller new

villages. Even if the records point out an augmentation in village numbers, they were

actually villages formed by fleeing peasants. We are not sure yet how much percentage

of these new villages kept remaining in their new locations. These settlements could

be thought as temporary shelters against banditry. It is most probable that the majority

of peasants returned to their former lands by their own wills265 or attempts of the

center266 once the destructive effects of the revolts ended.267

265 For example, A mühimme mentions attempts of resettlement after the Celalis in Karahisar-i Sahib in 1611/1612. BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 79 (h.1020/m.1611-1612):313/792. 266 A mühimme record dated 1609/1610 indicates that the center guaranteed some tax exemptions (tekalif-i örfiye ve şakkadan muaf ve müsellem olmaları) to reaya of Erzurum who returns back to their former lands. BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 78 (h.1018/m.1609-1610):11/26. 267 82 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (1026-1027/1617-1618), Divan-ı Hümayun Sicilleri Dizisi:VI (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlügü, 2000), 33.

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CHAPTER III

THE OTTOMAN ECONOMY AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY AND

THE CELALİ REVOLTS

The period under examination marked by severe financial difficulties which started to

be felt in the late sixteenth century. The Ottoman economy had entered into a period

of depression owing to different reasons which are still widely discussed. The

economic depression of the empire has been dealt in global and local bases. Some

historians handled the question in the context of the 17th century General Crisis.268

The Ottoman economic depression was explained by global trends like the effects of

American silver, catastrophic climatic events -the Little Ice Age- or changing

international trade routes. On the other hand, these works lacked to penetrate into the

local economic conditions and economic institutions peculiar to the empire. Some

historians asserted recently that neither American silver nor the Little Ice Age had

played outstanding roles in the Ottoman economic crisis. Şevket Pamuk emphasized

the effects of the local economic conditions and he argued that the Ottoman economy

entered an extended period of instability, which lasted until 1640s, after the

debasement of 1585-1586.269 He showed that the general price increase, or Price

Revolution,270 was actually triggered by several debasements of Ottoman akçe in the

last decades of the 16th century.271 As long as the amount of the American silver that

entered into Ottoman lands is not known, the classic argument of the effects of

268 See Parker, Global Crisis. 269 Pamuk, A Monetary History, 1-31. 270 For a pioneering work of the Price Revolution in Ottoman Empire see Barkan, “The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History of the Near East,” 3-28. 271 The debasement of 1585-6s had reduced silver content of akçe by 44%. Pamuk, Paranın Tarihi,135. It is known that Ottoman akçe had been debased several times between 1580-1586s. In each debasement, akçe lost its silver content more. See Nicoara Beldiceanu, “La Crise Monétaire ottomane au XVIe Siècle et Son Influence sur Les Principautés roumaines,” Südost-Forschungen XVI (1957): 70-86.

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American silver on the Ottoman Price Revolution cannot be shown in detail.272 On the

other hand, the lack of solid data should not end in ignorance of the cheap silver in the

Ottoman lands. There are still important traces that signal the effects of the American

silver on deterioration of Ottoman economy. For instance, a certain French chronicler

Vignau who was at the same time one of the secretaries and interpreters of the French

embassy in Istanbul mentioned the destructive effects of high quality silver which

came from Spain and Poland in high quantities into the Ottoman lands.273 Even if he

seems not to be aware that this silver was of American origin, he argued the new silver

impoverished Ottoman reaya.

Development of climatic studies made some historians search a direct relationship

between Ottoman economic crisis and some extraordinary climatic events.274 The

catastrophic effects of the Little Ice Age was believed to lead to an agricultural

production crisis associated with the price rises and the Celali Revolts.275 Some recent

studies showed us that the effects of climatic changes were experienced locally and in

a minor basis. On the other hand, since there is not a detailed climate index for the

central Ottoman lands, i.e. Anatolia, any connection between the Little Ice Age and

17th century agricultural crisis would remain incomplete.

272 Unlike Ottoman Empire, there is some data about the amount of silver that entered in Europe, see Fernand Braudel, La Méditerranée et Le Monde Méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II, 2e édition. (Paris: A. Colin, 1966), 433-454; Ruggiero Romano, Conjonctures Opposées: “La Crise” du XVIIe Siècle en Europe et en Amérique Ibérique (Geneve: Université de Geneve, 1993), 110-154. The Period 1550-1610-20 is distinguished by the reign of American silver in the European finance. By 1600-10 the supply of American silver had for the first time shown a downward trend, which was paralleled by a decline in the volume of shipping on the Carrera de Indias. Henry Kamen, Crisis and Change in Early Modern Spain (Galliard: Aldershot Variorum, 1993), 45-46. 273 The work mentions huge amounts of silver coming from Sevilla (Les Piastres Sevillanes) and Poland (Quarts de Pologne) into the Ottoman lands. He puts emphasis on the silver coming from Sevilla because it was high in amount and it was in very good quality. He relates the impoverishment of Ottoman subjects to flow of silver. Vignau, L’état Présent, 144-145. 274 The change in climate cannot be totally ignored or denied. It is accepted that European continent experienced a cooling period and harsh climatic events which were felt most direly in the 16th century and early 17th centuries. See Fernand Braudel, La Méditerranée, II, 245-252. There are examples in French manuscripts which point extraordinary climatic events. “ The present year (1599) is too cold and it snowed so much that there are some people who died and got lost in ice fields. A certain messenger found dead on his horse by the soldiers who wanted to talk to him. He could not endure this coldness.” and “There are sentinels who died during their guard on the city walls. River of Mezelle got so frozen that one could dig ways under the ice.” BNF.Français, 14530. 275 See White, The Climate of Rebellion.

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The dissertation which relates economic difficulties of the empire to the changing trade

routes and decline of Mediterranean trade seems to be lacking.276 The Ottoman Empire

may have felt the effects of growing Atlantic trade in the long term; however, the

switch from the Mediterranean trade to Atlantic trade may not have happened that fast

to affect the Ottoman economy deeply at the turn of the 16th century. Moreover, the

size of the “decline” of the Mediterranean trade and the changing situation of the trade

routes in the 16th century fis still very controversial.277

There are some studies which handled the Ottoman economic crisis in more local basis

with imperial financial institutions. These works assume that Ottoman central treasury

was under pressure principally owing to three major internal reasons. The first of them

was the long-lasting wars with the Safavids in the east and Habsburgs in the west in

the second half of the 16th century.278 These wars began to drain the financial reserves

of the central treasury. It is stated that the treasury experienced the first major silver

shortage with the outbreak of war with Iran in 1578, when the payments of soldiers

brought a huge pressure.279

The second was the expansion of fire arm using janissary army and increasing

recruitment of mercenary.280 After the second half of the 16th century, sipahis lost

their crucial position in the wars because the warfare was changing and there was a

276 See Suraiya Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and World Around It (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 154-155. 277 See Tongas Gérard, “Les Relations de la France Avec L’Empire Ottoman durant La premiere Moitié du XVII Siècle et l’Ambassade à Constantinople de Philippe de Harlay, Comte de Césy: 1619-1640” (Unpublished Doctorate’s Thesis, Université de Toulouse, 1942), 141-142. 278 See Inalcık and Quataert, eds. An Economic and Social, 420-423. 279 Pamk, A Monetary History, 132. Fiscal difficulties may have continued. A mühimme record dated 1609/1610 could be an indicator of fiscal difficulties to pay military payments. The center was requesting 20 yük akçe -equal to 2000000 akçe- (tedarik ve irsal) hastly (ber vech-i istiacel) from Karaman mukataas for military payments (kul mevacibi içün). BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 78 (h.1018/m.1609-1610): 5/12. 280 The empire was in need of firepower against European armies. Virginia H. Aksan, “Locating the Ottomans Among Early Modern Empire,” Journal of Early Modern History 3, 2 (1999): 115. It was put forward that there was a general expansion in the fire arms soldiers related to the changing warfare associated with the Military Revolution. See Geofrrey Parker, La Révolution Militaire : La Guerre et l’Essor de l’Occident, trans. Jean Joba (Paris: Gallimard, 1993).

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growing need for fire arm soldiers.281 Inefficiency of sipahi cavalry army,282 which

fought with conventional weapons like bow, sword and lance, against Austrian

musketeers led Ottoman statesmen to expand the janissary army.283 A work dated 1588

is important to mention to comprehend the situation of sipahis against fire arm soldiers

from a perspective of a foreign observer at the end of the century. It is stated that the

sipahis started to lose their principal place in the Ottoman army because they could

not endure before the infantry on the horseback.284 As a result of inefficiency of

sipahis, the number of janissaries was increased from 13.000 in the 1550s to 37.000 in

1609.285 Each new recruited janissary put pressure on the central army.286 While the

paid army expanded, the sipahis were assigned to other tasks.287 A contemporary

281 Inalcık and Quataert, eds. An Economic and Social, 24. 282 It is widely accepted that the sipahis were old fashioned fighters and their methods were not capable to defeat fire arm soldiers. According to a contemporary observer, sipahis were still effective at the end of the 16th century. He states clearly that European states received the greatest damages and defeats from sipahi army. Their methods were still powerful; however, they could not stand before infantry with fire arms because their capacity of movement was very restricted with their horses in the rough lands. Moreover, the sound of artillery frightened cavalry army which caused a organization problem in the campaigns. René de Lusinge De La Naissance, Durée et Cheute des Etstats, où sont Traittées Plusieurs Notables Questions sur L’establissement des Empires & Monarchies (Paris: Marc Orry, 1588), 158-180. Two war recits written 1621 and 1622 by anonymous writers state that the Ottoman army was quite powerful and frightening (effrayant). Compare Anonymous, Récit Véritable de Ce qui s’est Passé entre L’armée du Roy de Pologne et Celle du Grand Turc, depuis Le Premier Septembre dernier, jusques au 24 Décembre 1621 (Lyon: Claude Armand, 1622); Anonymous, La Description Générale de L’effroyable Armée du Grand Turc Envoyée Contre Le Roy de Pologne et la Description de L’armée de Pologne et du Secours Général Fourni par La Chretienté Contre Les Desseins du Grand Seigneur (Paris: Abraham Saugrain, 1621). 283 From the era of Süleyman I, the number of janissaries equated with fire arms was increased. By 1609, their number reached 37.000. Inalcık, The Classical Age, 48. 284 There is no doubt that these infantries were fire armed soldiers. “The sipahi, which was a powerful cavalry unit, destructed by the infantry.” René de Lusinge (1550-53?–1610-15?) was a seigneur and bureaucrat. He was close to the king of France Henri III. This part of work discusses the Ottoman army. Lusinge, De La Naissance, Durée et Cheute, 158. I am thankful to Martin Genty (University of Nantes, History Department) for his comments on my translation of this complicated work. 285 There were 16.000 janissaries in the era of Sultan Süleyman and the number was increased constantly. Inalcık, Klâsik Çağ, 53. 286 There are deficits in the budget of the central treasury between 1592 and 1608. The deficit reached the highest point in the period of 1597-8. The deficit could be related to the wars and janissary payments. See Ahmet Tabakoglu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi (Istanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 1985), 14-15. The rising numbers of janissaries was one of the mostly mentioned issues in the nasihatname (advice) literature. Contemporary nasihatname writers Kâtip Çelebi (1609-1657) and Koçi Bey (?-1650) put emphasis on the growing number of paid soldiers and their financial pressure. Çelebi, Düstûru’l-Amel, 118-119; “Bu denlü mevâcib mi yetişür? Ve bu denlü mevâcibe hazîne mi vefâ eder?” Koçi Bey, Koçi Bey Risâlesi, 52. 287 Linda T. Darling, “Nasihatnameler, Icmal Defterleri, and the Timar-Holding Elite in the Late Sixteenth Century-Part II, Including the Seventeenth Century,” The Journal of Ottoman Studies XLV

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observer René de Lusinge states that the sipahis were recruited in the janissary army

and artillery.288

Finally, I argue the Celali Effect on three different fields of the economy in short and

long runs. The first part deals with the breakdown of rural economy and following

“agricultural production crisis”. The depopulation brought a remarkable decline in the

agricultural production and livestock raising. In the second part, the difficulties in

production and trade of Ankara mohair and Bursa silk are handled. While the Celali

Effect on Bursa silk is dealt with a price index, mohair is handled through examples

from kadı registers, travel accounts and fermans. The last part will demonstrate the

problems in mukataa revenue collection, the destruction of tımar system and burden

of the Celali campaigns, all of which I argued to be effective in the fiscal

transformation.

3.1 The Celali Effect on The Rural Economy

3.1.a Temporary Scarcity of Basic Foodstuff

As indicated in the first chapter, the northern and central lands of Anatolian

countryside experienced high degree of depopulation between the last decade of the

16th century and the first half of the 17th century. The depopulation resulted in

deserted settlements especially in low lands and plateaus, on which the rural economic

activities could have been practiced most densely and productively. It could be

assumed that the Ottoman peasants were engaged in two main rural economic

(2015):10. When the tımarlı sipahis were the backbone of the Ottoman army, they were covering 30-40% of military expenses. Pamuk, A Monetary History, 132. 288 See Lusinge, De La Naissance, Durée et Cheute, 158-180. Another work dated 1637 claimed that the Ottoman army lacked modern artillery and fire arms. A certain Jean Douet (15..-1657) wrote a book dedicated to the French king on the military to defeat enemies of France and to make it the most powerful state. He states that the Ottoman army lacks artillery and their information on war machines are very limited. The writer must refer to some fire arms when he used the term “war machines”. Jean Douet, Discours sur Les Machines de Victoires et Conquestes. Pour la Deffense, Augmentation & Gloire de la France (Paris: Michel Brunet, 1637), 82.

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activities, which were agricultural production and stock raising.289 It is seen that these

two fields were damaged severely during the revolts.290

Akdag states that narh prices signal a famine which started to threat the Ottoman reaya

with the first great revolts toward the end of the 16th century.291 The scarcity might

have been seen most remarkably in the regions which the Celalis hit most violently,

i.e. central and northern Anatolia. For example, 1 akçe could buy 480 grams (150

dirhem) of bread in Ankara around 1599 but it declined to 386 grams (120 dirhem) in

1606. This decline was most probably related to the first great Celali Revolts of

Karayazıcı and Deli Hasan. A telhis of Yemişçi Vizier Hasan Paşa points out a similar

portrait about breakdown of cereal production in Sivas, Tokat and Turhal regions. The

paşa states that rebels stole the cereals in warehouses and even the growing ones on

the fields.

289 The rural economic activities could be followed on the tahrir records. The agricultural production constituted the first rural activity. Stock raising was an important economic activity and it was usually practiced by nomadic groups (yörük and aşiret). Moreover, cultivators could also be engaged in stock raising as an additional activity. See Güçer, Hububat Meselesi, 13-19. 290 Akdag, Celâlî Isyanları, 421-422. 291 Ibid., 425.

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Akdag states that narh prices signal a famine which started to threat the Ottoman reaya

with the first great revolts toward the end of the 16th century.292 The scarcity might

have been seen most remarkably in the regions which the Celalis hit most violently,

i.e. central and northern Anatolia. For example, 1 akçe could buy 480 grams (150

dirhem) of bread in Ankara around 1599 but it declined to 386 grams (120 dirhem) in

1606. This decline was most probably related to the first great Celali Revolts of

Karayazıcı and Deli Hasan. A telhis of Yemişçi Vizier Hasan Paşa points out a similar

portrait about breakdown of cereal production in Sivas, Tokat and Turhal regions. The

paşa states that rebels stole the cereals in warehouses and even the growing ones on

the fields.

Sivas etrâfında yeni hâsıl yedişmedi, üçer yüz zorbaları Tokat ve Zile Turhal etrafında çıkup bulduklarını katl edüp kimesne tarlalardan arpa biçdürüp evlerinde buldukları zahîreleri alup, merkeblerine ve arabalarına yükleyüp giderler; reaya ekinlerin ve harmanların bıragup dağlar başına ehl ü ıyâllerin alup gitmişler… 293

A similar scarcity was present in Kayseri region as well. The weight of bread

experienced reductions during the Great Flight, while 1 akçe could buy equal to 320-

160 (100-50 dirhem) grams of bread it was reduced up to 224-230 gram (70-75

dirhem) in 1608.294 It is clear that the reason behind the diminishing weight of bread

was the disruption of cereal production (yağma ve talan). 295 The wheat scarcity

reached the top point during the Great Flight (1603-1607), when the great number of

peasants deserted their agricultural lands.296 Akdag stated that the famine did not last

292 Akdag, Celâlî Isyanları, 425. 293 Orhonlu, Telhisler, 22. 294 Akdag, Celâlî Isyanları, 426. 295 A group of people living in the villages of Hisarcık and Enderek (around Kayseri) went to kadı court to complain about brigand activities. “Iş bu bin on altı senesinde vaki olan mah-ı rebiülevvelde (1607 Temmuz), Zülfikar Paşa ve Ömer Paşa ve Macar nam reisü’z-zaleme on bine karip eşkiya ile Kayseri’yi ve etrafında olan kariyeleri muhasara edüp, nice bigünah Müslümanları katl ve nice mazlumları kapsetmekle malını ahzedüp emvâl ve erzaklarımızı nehbü garet ettiklerinden gayri, hâlâ darü’l-harp misâli cümle memleketimizi yağma ve talan ettiklerinden mâadâ…” Akdag, Celâlî Isyanları, 442. 296“Reayanın kuvvetli olanları dağlara çıkıp haydut oldular ve yolları set eylediler. Zayıf olanları dahi kâfiristana kaçıp memâlik hali ve harap kaldı.” Akdag, Celâlî Isyanları, 428.

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so long and the production started to reach its normal levels after the victory of Kuyucu

against Celali leaders when cultivation started to increase.297 The Celali Effect seems

to have caused a short term pause in the cereal production, which ended in a short

period of price increase.

The rising price of meat shows that the stock raising was damaged during the revolts.

Akdag’s findings indicate that while a sheep could be bought 100-120 akçe in 1595,

the price rose drastically, and a sheep costed 217 akçe in 1609.298 There are traces

which signal that the meat entered into a period of scarcity during the Great Flight.

Mühimme registers confirm the Celali Effect on stock raising. There are examples

which point out that the great Celali packs or small-scale brigand groups usually

usurped the livestock (ellişer ve yüzer koyunların ve öküzlerin ve sığırların alıp,

koyunların ve öküzlerin ve at ve katırların alıp ambarları yıkıp, tavarların ve sığırların

sürüp garat ve hasarat edüp) during their raids.299 An anecdote told by Polish voyager

Simeon is interesting to see the level of livestock scarcity. He witnessed that some

mohair (tiftik) sellers were arrested because they were caught selling fake mohair

mixed with wool. Their pretext was that there was a scarcity of mohair because the

Celalis had either killed or stolen the goats.

“Memleketimizde tiftik kalmamıştır. Celâlîler her tarafı harebeye çevirerek keçileri telef ve

gasp eylemiş olduklarından fakir düştük ve bunu yaptık.” 300

297 Ibid., 426. 298 Ibid., 428. 299“Ellişer ve yüzer koyunların ve öküzlerin ve sığırların alıp, koyunların ve öküzlerin ve at ve katırların alıp ambarları yıkıp, tavarların ve sığırların sürüp garat ve hasarat edüp…” 85 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (1040-1041 (1042)/ 1630-1631 (1632)), Divan-ı Hümayun Sicilleri Dizisi:VIII (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlügü, 2002), 144. A certain Ahmed, with his band composed of 400 horsemen, was extorting 10 sheeps from each karye he arrived in Kestel (Kestel should be found in Bursa region) around 1646-47. 91 Nolu Mühimme Defteri (H.1056/1646-1647) Istanbul:Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlügü, 2015), 258. See Daglıoglu, On Altıncı Asırda Bursa,105. 300 Andreasyan, Polonyalı Simeon, 57.

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Mukataa registers signaled some difficulties. Mukataas of adet-i ağnam in Kastamonu

could not be sold because the Celalis had ravaged the region several times between

1600-1608.

Reis-i eşkiyadan Karakaş, Kalenderoğlu, Kara Said, Küçük Hüseyin ve Top nâm Celâlîlerin hareketinden bâkî kalan reaya dahi gitmişlerdir…kaza-yı mezbûrede koyun kalmayıp adet-i ağnam mukâtaası mahlul ve nâfüruht kalmıştır…301

There was no demand for mukataa of adet-i ağnam in Kengiri (Çankırı) because there

was a scarcity of sheep in 1610-1611.

“Liva-yı Kengiri’ye tabii kaza-yı Kırca ve ? ahalisi Celâlî istilâsından perakende ve perişan

olmağla reayada koyun kalmayıp adet-i ağnam mukâtaası ile tahvili nâfüruht kalmıştır…”302

A case in Ankara kadı records from the first decade of the 17th century shows that the

Celalis sometimes chose to sell the livestock to the sellers whom they had a

collaboration.

Bundan akdem mezbûr Hakverdi Celâlî zorbasından birkaç yüz koyun getirüp ekal bahâ ile otuzar akçeye koyun satup, alup sattığı koyun fukarânın sürülen koyunlarıdır…mezbûrun alup sattığı koyunları Celâlîden getirdi deyü şehadet etmeğin…303

Akdag states that the meat was still expensive at the end of the Great Flight (1603-

1607). There is no numerical indice about increasing abundance of meat in the years

following the Great Flight; however, it could be assumed that the short period of

normalization created by the Kuyucu Campaign might have increased stock raising

after the 1610s. The Celali Effect resulted in a short period breakdown of rural

301 BOA.MAD.d,04684/114. 302 BOA.MAD.d,04684/115. 303 Akdag, Celâlî Isyanları, 441. It is possible that he was working with the Celalis

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production and following food scarcity. In the next section, the size of Celali

destruction on the agricultural production will be discussed using the studies based on

waqf accounts.

3.1.b Agricultural Production Crisis

Tahrir registers that are used by economic historians entered into a period of obscurity

after the last tahrirs of the 1590s, when it started to be practiced for some special cases.

The general fiscal transformation and the transition from tahrirs to avarız records

caused some problems for modern economic historians. While tahrir was concentrated

on the economic activities, the concern of avarız was not production or taxes taken

from any kind of surplus. Avarız registers were prepared to extract, a sum (which could

change depending on the burden of war) in kind, in cash or service from a group of

hanes, which is termed as “avarızhanesi”.304 This feature of the new system did not

yield much information about rural economic breakdown in the Celali period.

As some examples were shown in the first part, the decline of agriculture production

was tried to be dealt through mühimme registers, telhis and narh prices. It is sure that

these sources provided some data on the Celali Effect; however, they could not show

the size of destruction so much in detail. The information in these registers is usually

shallow or inadequate to compass the shrinkage in the production. The problem

regarding the sources is partially solved when the waqf registers are handled in this

context. They allow to monitor any breakdown or development in the rural economy

periodically of a limited area in the Celali years thanks to extensive revenue records.305

304 There was not a standard about how many real hanes constituted an avarızhane. 3, 5, 7 or 9 real hanes could be equal to one avarızhane. See Ergenç, Osmanlı Tarihi Yazıları, 22, 82. Avarız taxes could be converted from kind to cash and service or vice versa. This flexiblity of taxation might have answered to the current fiscal needs better in the Celali period. For instance, a mühimme record dated 1609/1610 could shows that while the center could not extract the avarız in service because of the Celali Effect, the tax was transformed into cash. A kaza attached to Bolu (the name of kaza could not be read) was objected to the banditry (Celali ve zorba eşkıyası…tecavüz eyledikleri ecilden…) and the tax of mekkari (animals used for transportation of goods) was converted into cash. (avarızhanelerin her hanesiden…140 akçe bedel-i mekkâri cem ve tahsil ve ordu-yı humayun hazinesine teslim ettirmek…). BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 78 (h.1018/m.1609-1610): 23/58. 305 The figures on the agricultural production can be assumed to be more proper and reliable than the tahrirs. While the rural production figures on the tahrirs were the average of the last three years, the waqfs recorded them yearly.

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In this section, the works that are based on the account registers of three waqfs situated

in Konya and one in Tokat will be handled. These two regions were hit several times

by the Celalis and detailed records of the wafs reflect the level of their damage in local

base. It will be shown that the agricultural production was so low in some years that it

would allow us to call an agricultural crisis than a mere decay.

3.1.b.1 Konya

Orbay’s studies indicate that the imperial waqfs of Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî,

Sadreddîn-i Konevî and Selîm II experienced agricultural failures and financial

difficulties many times. Among these failures three periods seem to have come

forward as the Celali Effect when there was a regional harvest crisis at the turn of the

16th century, the first decade of the 17th century and around 1621-23.306 The first

period of agricultural crisis may have been aggravated by the revolt of Karayazıcı in

1598. As discussed in the first chapter, the number of çift-tax households had declined

46% between 1596 and 1600-1 in the waqf of Selîm.307 This decline was accompanied

by a remarkable drop in the agricultural production. The prices of barley and wheat

rose remarkably from 1599 to 1600-1.308 While a kile of barley was 24.75 akçe in

1599, it rose to 40 akçe in 1600-1. The price of wheat (in kile) went through a period

of rise from 47.14 akçe in 1599 to 60 in 1600-1.309 The waqf of Konevî and Mevlânâ

experienced similar agricultural failures. The agricultural yields of Konevî were very

low (and prices very high) in 1597-8.310 Waqf of Mevlânâ experienced financial

difficulties related to the harvest failure in 1600 and it received lower amount of wheat

306 Comparisons of Faroqhi’s and Orbay’s waqf economy works indicate very clearly that the effects of the Celalis on agricultural production in the waqf lands and waqf economies should be handled regionally. While these three waqfs were going into difficult years at the turn of the century, the waqf of Seyyid Gazi (Konya region) was not affacted negatively by the Celalis and the revenues in 1599-1600 were quite high. 307 Orbay, “Financial Development of the Waqfs in Konya and the Agricultural Economy in the Central Anatolia (Late Sixteenth-Early Seventeenth Centuries)” 88, 91. 308 Orbay, “Financial Development of the Waqfs in Konya and the Agricultural Economy in the Central Anatolia (Late Sixteenth-Early Seventeenth Centuries)” 90, 92. The price of grain increased when the production declined. 309 Ibid., 89. 310 Ibid., 93.

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and barley compared to previous period.311 The agricultural failures did not last more

than 2-3 seasons. For instance, records of Mevlânâ indicate that the prices of barley

and wheat declined remarkably in 1601, which could be related to a better agricultural

production compared to previous years.312

The second period is around 1607-1609, when high prices signal some difficulties in

the agricultural production and even a harvest crisis. The crisis might have been

triggered by the climatic conditions because 1607-8 was a dry season.313 The other

reason could be related to the Celali destruction and local banditry. A letter sent to the

French Ambassador by the Janissary Aga in 1607 shows that there were central forces

and Celalis fighting in Konya and vicinity.

We tell him (the French ambassador) the news from us that we arrived at Konya (Cognà) on the 11th of August (1607). The general first vizier waits to punish the guilties (méfaisants) and rebels. By now, 10 important rebel chiefs have been executed. These 10 chiefs were collected from different lands and from up to 10 fortresses. These fortresses were razed completely. As an addition to these, there was a great chiefs of rebels called Solimis Oğlu (Sülemiş Oğlu?), towards whom we sent a great troop which will catch (surprendre) him. We pray to the God that there are other rebels around as well (which our army will catch). It is necessary to send an army against Kalender Oğlu ve Saît, the great rebels. We sent there a Beylerbeyi and Sancak Beyi (with) two companions of sipahis and 2500 janissaries and still we sent there another Beylerbeyi and 3000 janissaries for rebellious Sancak Beyi called Celali Musti. We sent some troupes to two different places. With the help of God, there will survive no a rebel and even (their) name on the earth (sur la terre). We keep waiting to send our army to anyone who does not show obedience and to anyone who does not join this army to punish them (the rebels). We are waiting to go to Alep from Konya with our general, through the way of Kaisaria (Kayseri?). I salute (the ambassador) with all of my heart.

Aga of Janissaries (l’Aga des Janissaries)314

311 Ibid., 97. 312 Ibid., 97. 313 Ibid.,100. 314 BNF.Français, 16146-1 (Années 1605-1611) /127-128.

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The activities of these Celali leaders and their struggle with the central forces in the

region might have disturbed rural economic activities.

The third period was around 1621-22 and 1622-3.315 Records of Mevlâna indicate that

price of a kile of wheat increased from 60 akça in 1621-2 to 120 akça 1622-3.316 This

sharp 100% rise signals that there was a severe decay in the agricultural production.

The waqf of Sadreddîn-i Konevî went through a similar production crisis between

1621-5. Faroqhi related this crisis to the Celali destruction in the region.317 There were

small scale Celali activities in the region some of which could be identified. For

example, there were sekban and levend bands in Karaman region in the same period.

A group of them killed the governor Sefer Paşa and ravaged his properties.318 It could

be supposed that there were other groups which distracted agricultural production. The

production might have been influenced most direly by the revolt of Abaza Mehmet

Paşa of Erzurum in 1622. His destructive activities were not concentrated in Konya

region. However, his troops were effective in neighboring regions of Kayseri and

Nigde. 319 French agent notes state that his revolt caused damage in Karahisar

(Carahissar), where he massacred the dwellers.320 Abaza challenged Serdâr Mehmet

Paşa, who came with his army to convince him to end his revolt, around 1624 in

Konya.

315 Orbay, “Financial Development of the Waqfs in Konya and the Agricultural Economy in the Central Anatolia (Late Sixteenth-Early Seventeenth Centuries)” 104. 316 Ibid., 104. 317 Suraiya Faroqhi, “Vakıf Administration in Sixteenth Century Konya: The Zaviye of Sadreddin-i Konevi,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of Orient 17/2 (1974): 162. 318 Inalcık, Devlet-i Aliyye, II, 195. 319 Inalcık, Devlet-i Aliyye, II, 194. 320 BNF.Français, 16149-4 (Années 1619-1624)/466-467. An another report dated 10th of September 1623 states that Abaza Paşa besieged an Ottoman Pasha (the name of the pasha is not clarified) in Karahisar (douze journée d’icy/12 days away from Pera) with a force of 30.000 men (une armée de trente mille hommes) and 20 pieces of artillery (vingt pieces d’artillerie). “This news worried the janissaries a little bit because the two letters (courriers) confirmed that Abaza Pasha did not pardon the janissaries when he took Halissea (it is understood from a different document that this is a village or town close to Georgian frontier) … The Grand Vizir and the Janissary Aga with his all militias (toute la milice) left Constantinople to defeat Abaza.” BNF.Français, 16145-4 (Années 1605-1623)/210. An earlier report dated 3 September 1623 confirmed that Abaza had killed 500-600 janissaries in Halissea. BNF.Français, 16145-4 (Années 1605-1623)/202.

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The account period of Mevlânâ demonstrates that the agricultural conditions in the

waqf lands started to recover in 1623-4. There was not a drastic increase in the grain

collection, but it was higher than the previous year. The next year, 1624-25, the traces

of former agricultural failures were recovered partly. The registers show that the rural

production normalized, when the prices of wheat and barley dropped almost to the old

levels in 1625-6.321

The account books of three waqfs signal that there were three periods of agricultural

production decline. The first period coincides with the break out of the first Great

Celali Rebellion. Karayazıcı is accepted to be the most destructive in the central

Anatolian lands where these three waqfs were situated. The second period was

triggered by the climatic conditions and Celali activities of Kalender Oglu, Saît,

rebellious Sancak Beyi Celali Musti and Sulimis Oglu in Konya vicinity. The third

period of crisis was around 1621-22 and 1622-3. Faroqhi stated that the waqf of

Sadreddîn-i Konevi went through a financial crisis in 1621-5 and she related the crisis

to Celali activities. The revolt of Abaza broke out in 1622 in Erzurum. His revolt was

effective in the vicinity of Konya, which might have damaged waqf villages. His revolt

could have resulted in a drop of agricultural yields in 1622 and 1624. The decline and

recovery periods point out that the Celali Effect on the agricultural production in the

region was a short-term result.

3.1.b.2 Tokat

The region was ravaged several times by revolts of Karayazıcı, Deli Hasan, Tavil Halil

and Meymun at the end of the 16th century.322 The accounts of waqf of Hatuniyye

reveal the level of destruction on the rural economy. The Celali desertion resulted in a

drastic decline in rural revenues which ended in a financial crisis.

321 Orbay, “Financial Development of the Waqfs in Konya and the Agricultural Economy in the Central Anatolia (Late Sixteenth-Early Seventeenth Centuries)” 106. 322 Celali leader Meymun, brother of Kalenderoglu, traversed Tokat with his 6.000 men. Visit of such a big rebel army can be assumed to have disturbed the dwellers. Hammer-Purgstall, 8, Histoire de l’Empire Ottoman, 150.

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The waqf did not experience any extraordinary agricultural failures or any economic

crisis between 1593 and 1599. There were only minor fluctuations in agricultural

production and cereal prices. It is unfortunate that after 1599 the records lack until

1610.323 The absence of registers prevent us from following the situation when the first

great rebellion hit Tokat in 1601. The region was ravaged and a remarkable number of

tax payers (around 80%) deserted their lands as handled in the first chapter. The size

of destruction in the waqf lands and finance appears in 1610.

A comparison of 1599 - 1610 points out the expected Celali Effect. The waqf was

going through a severe financial crisis between these two dates. The absence of records

does not allow to see the destruction before 1610; however, it could be assumed that

the waqf had already been dealing with severe financial difficulties. The waqf income

fell drastically from 443.000 akçe to 119.000, which might have stemmed from the

Celali Effect.324 The financial problems seem to have continued because the revenues

declined to 78.000 akçe between 1610-1612.325 It seems that there were still problems

with the lost tax base. Orbay states that the waqf did not show any significant recovery

up to 1638.326

The Celali Effect on economy might be approved by disruption of charity activities

and functioning of the waqf. The financial problems forced waqf administration to

curb its expenses. For instance, while there were twenty employed personnels in 1593,

it was decreased to six in 1612. The kitchen expenses were reduced, and they declined

from 270.000 akçe (1593) to 5.820 (1614).327 The number of beneficiary was affected

323 Orbay, “A Case for Research in the “Celali Effect” on Rural Production and Demography in Central Anatolia; Revenue Loss and Shrinkage in the Waqf of Hatuniyye” 6. 324 Orbay, “A Case for Research in the “Celali Effect” on Rural Production and Demography in Central Anatolia; Revenue Loss and Shrinkage in the Waqf of Hatuniyye” 7. 325 Ibid., 7. 326 Abaza Paşa’a ravages in Tokat might have been effective on the ongoing difficulties. Roe, The Negotiations, 185. 327 Kayhan Orbay, “A Case for Research in the “Celali Effect” on Rural Production and Demography in Central Anatolia; Revenue Loss and Shrinkage in the Waqf of Hatuniyye” 9.

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by crisis and their number was reduced from fourteen (1593) to two in 1610. The

ongoing financial crisis forced waqf to shrink its fundamental charity activities.

A comparison of waqf of Hatuniyye with other three waqfs in Konya demonstrates

that Hatuniyye experienced a deeper financial crisis during the revolts. This could be

related to the the three main factors. a) The Celali activities were more destructive. b) The waqf finance was not as powerful as other imperial waqfs in Konya. c) The waqf

registers signal that, regardless of the level of Celali violence, the tax base of waqf did

not return to their lands until 1639. There is no clear evidence to show if the revolts

were more devastating than Konya, but the crisis was so severe in Tokat region that

waqf of Hatuniyye had to close the public kitchen (imâret) between 1610-1612. The

ongoing financial crisis of the waqf does not approve that depopulation continued in

the whole region. As shown in the first chapter, there were peasants who returned back

to their lands in the early 17th century. However, it could be assumed that the deserted

waqf lands were not totally resettled at least until 1639. The Celali Effect is observed

a longer term in the waqf lands of Hatuniyye, the Celali crisis, which started most

possibly in the first years of the 17th century, continued up to 1638.

3.1.c Conclusion

The Ottoman rural economy went through a severe period of crisis between the first

decades of the 16th century and the first half of the 17th century. The Celali revolts

and the Great Flight, which led 70-80% of tax paying peasants to desert their lands,

resulted in breakdown of cultivation and stock raising.

Narh prices indicate that low cereal production and stock raising caused a temporary

period of food scarcity.328 The crisis in the wheat production might have resulted in

derogation of breads. The weight of bread equal to 1 akçe was decreased gradually and

it reached at the peak point in the Great Flight. Akdag points out that the bread might

have entered into a period of normalization thanks to the campaign of Kuyucu Murat.

328 The effects of instability of akçe is a priori accepted on the fluctuating prices.

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The Celali Effect caused a short-term period of cereal scarcity. I argue that central

Anatolia witnessed a moderate tragedy of cereal during the revolts.329 Cereal famine

might have led peasants to eat lower quality bread.

The indices of mühimme, telhis and narh prove that the tragedy of cereal was

accompanied with a shortage of meat. The drastic rise of meat prices between 1595

and 1609 points out a decline in the stock raising.330 As stated in the mühimme and

kadı registers, the Celali bands were stealing livestock for their consumption and sale.

There is no detailed numerical data for meat after Kuyucu Murat Paşa campaign

(1609). On the other hand, as Akdag stated the meat prices should have normalized

partly after the campaign when a relative resettlement started.331

The size of Celali destruction could be followed more detailed in the waqf account

registers. Orbay's studies on the waqfs of Mevlâna, Konevî, Selîm II in Konya and

Hatuniyye in Tokat demonstrate many periods of financial difficulties and agricultural

declines. The waqf registers signaled a general regional agricultural crisis in Konya

around the end of the 16th century, the first decade of the century and in 1621-22 -

1622-3. The three periods of decay could be associated with revolts of Karayazıcı, Deli

Hasan, Kalender Oglu, Sait, Sulimis Oglu, Celali Musti and Abaza Mehmet Paşa. The

decline of rural revenues did not last more than 2-3 subsequent seasons, the Celali

Effect was short term in Konya region.

On the other hand, the waqf of Hatuniyye experienced a deeper financial crisis. The

registers reveal that agricultural lands were deserted and production had collapsed

sometime between 1599 - 1610. The depopulation led by Karayazıcı, Deli Hasan and

Tavil Halil might be the fundamental factor behind the agricultural production crisis.

The waqf witnessed a financial catastrophe and it had to cease the basic charity

activities. For instance, the waqf kitchen stopped to serve food to the needy between

329 For the original term “La Tragédie du Blé” Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Les Paysans de Languedoc (Paris : Flammarion, 1969), 82-84. 330 Akdag, Celâlî Isyanları, 428. 331 Ibid., 426.

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1610-1612.332 The registers indicate that the financial situation of waqf and rural

revenues did not recover so much until 1639. While the waqf in Konya overcame the

Celali Effect in a few years, Hatuniyye was still suffering from breakdown of rural

economy and depopulation of waqf lands. The long term Celali Effect is observed on

the waqf finances in Tokat region.

Four waqfs from two different regions show that the Celali Effect changed regionally.

They prove that it is not possible to speak a general Celali Effect at the same time for

all parts of Anatolia.

The Celali Effect on rural economy had another side for peasantry. The tragedy of

cereal ended up more expensive bread and, most possibly, lower quality bread. As for

the meat, it did not constitute a major part as significant as bread in diet of an Ottoman

peasant. French voyager Jean Dumont notes that the Turks do not raise livestock for

meat, because the other products like leather and wool were much more valuable.333

However, it seems reasonable to state that the scarcity resulted in consumption of

lesser meat.

3.2 Silk and Mohair Industry in the Celali Years

This chapter handles the obstacles in Bursa silk and Ankara mohair industries during

the Celali uprisings. The first section aims at showing the Celali Effect on Bursa silk

industry using price index of raw silk prepared by Çizakça.334 The second section

argues that the Celali ravages caused a regional Ankara goat shortage and it resulted

in a short period of difficulties in mohair and sof production. The Celali Effect on

332 Orbay, “A Case for Research in the “Celali Effect” on Rural Production and Demography in Central Anatolia; Revenue Loss and Shrinkage in the Waqf of Hatuniyye” 9. 333 Jean Dumont, Voyages de Mr. Du Mont en France, en Italie, en Allemagne, à Malthe et en Turquie, vol.1 (La Haye: Etienne, 1699), 58. 334 Çizakça, “Price History and the Bursa Silk Industry: A Study in Ottoman Industrial Decline, 1550-1650,” The Journal of Economic History 40, 3 (Sep., 1980): 533-550.

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mohair are dealt in two different regions, Ankara and Tosya, and local differences of

the Celali Effect are emphasized.

3.2.a Bursa Silk Industry

Çizakça’s price index of Bursa raw silk between 1550 and 1650 allows to follow price

fluctuations in a long period of time. 335 He associates the rises with the Price

Revolution, Ottoman-Iran wars, Celali uprisings and increasing European demand. In

this section I argue that the drastic rise of raw silk price at the turn of the century was

related to the break out of the great Celali uprisings.

The index shows that the prices (in akçe) increased constantly between 1595 and 1603

about 78%. This period coincides with the suhte activities and boom of the first great

revolt. The revolt of Karayazıcı and Hüseyin Paşa was effective in a wide area

including Bursa.336 The following period witnessed Deli Hasan’s revolt in 1602, which

caused a great panic in Bursa.337 On the other hand, the price rises between 1595-1597

cannot be associated with the rebellions of 1598 and 1602. These rises could have been

influenced by local production conditions or suhte movements, that have not been

identified in detail yet.

The traces of small scale banditry of suhtes and the Celali groups before the boom of

the great Celali Revolts are found in the voyage books. John Newberie, arrived at

Bursa in 1581, witnessed execution of three thieves. H Lowry interprets this as the

sparks of the Celali robbery in the region.338 Jean Palerne, voyager who traveled from

Paris to Jerusalem for pilgrimage, visited Karaman sometime around 1581-1583. He

335 Çizakça used court registers about inheritance (tereke defters). The problems of these records to reflect the real market prices of goods are a priori accepted. For tereke defters and some of their problems, see Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Edirne Askerî Kassamı’na Âit Tereke Defterleri (1545-1659),” TTK Belgeler III, 5-6 (1966): 1-18. 336 Evliya Çelebi, Seyâhatnâme, I, 222-223. 337 Dwellers of Bursa were asking for aid from the central state against Celali attacks. A group of bandits composed of 600 horsemen was active in Bursa in 1603. Akdag, Celâlî Isyanları, 375, 382. 338 Heath W. Lowry, Seyyahların Gözüyle Bursa (1326-1923), trans. Seldar Alper (Istanbul:Eren Yayıncılık, 2004), 54.

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states that while he was expecting to see a beautiful place, the town was in ruins. He

notes to have seen a huge hole on the city walls.339 The voyager does not mention any

specific reasons to explain the bad situation of the town. On the other hand, this

destruction could be related to the activities of suhtes or Celali groups. A mühimme

dated 1583 warns Mehmed Paşa about suhte destruction in Karaman. These suhtes

were ravaging the region with bows and guns.

Sûhte taifesi yanlarında görde ve ellerinde ok ve yay ve tüfenk ile cemiyyetle gezüp müslimânların akçe vü esbâb ü davaların ve oğulların alup küllî fesâd eyleyeler…yarar âdemlerünle ve muhâfazaya kalan sipâhîler ile kalkup al’l-gafle ol ehl-i fesâd olan sûhtelerin üzerine varup…340

The effects of the 1578-1590 Ottoman-Iran war could be another contributing factor.

As Ergenç states Ottoman-Iran wars led to some difficulties in supply and trade of

silk.341 On the other hand, Çizakça’s raw silk price index shows that the Ottoman-Iran

wars of 1603-12, 1615-18, 342 1624-39 and price fluctuations were not very

consistent.343 For instance, the price of raw silk experienced one of the lowest periods

during the war of 1615-18. Even if the war of 1578-90 really increased the prices, this

correlation may not be a general conclusion for other Ottoman-Iran wars and raw silk

prices.344 While the prices increased around 14% between 1595-1597, the rise between

339 Jean Palerne, Peregrination du S. Jean Palerne (Lyon: Jean Pillehotte, 1606), 339-340. 340 Ülker, Sultanın Emir Defteri, 105. 341 Ergenç, Osmanlı Tarihi Yazıları, 228-230. For the classic argument about the effects of the Safavid-Ottoman relations on silk, see Fahri Dalsar, Türk Sanayi ve Ticaret Tarihinde Bursa’da Ipekçilik (Istanbul: Sermet Matbaası, 1960), 302-306, 335. 342 A mukataa record shows that war with the Safavids had caused problems in mukataa of mizan-ı harir in 1616. “Mahruse-i mezburda (Bursa) mizan-ı harir mukataası mültezimi olan Yasih nam-ı Yahudi gelüp iltizamda olan mizan-ı harir mukataası Acem Seferi vaki olmağla çatdan(?) işlemeyüp külli kesirim olmagın…” BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/113. 343 Çizakça, “Price History and the Bursa Silk Industry: A Study in Ottoman Industrial Decline, 1550-1650,”536. 344 H. Lowry, basing his argument on the interpretation of travel accounts, states that the flow of Iranian silk to Bursa might have declined in 1580s because of growing local production. Lowry, Seyyahların Gözüyle Bursa, 85. For increasing mulberry trees and local production, see Gerber, Economy and Society, 81-83. The high dependency on Iranian silk could have declined through the end of the 16th century. Bursa became one of the centers of silk production. Halil Inalcık, “Ipek,” Islâm Ansiklopedisi 22 (2000): 364.

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1597-1603 was around 56%. The accelerating price rises at the turn of the century

could be associated directly with the Celali destruction.345 The destruction can be

traced in mukataa registers. There were financial difficulties, mültezims (tax-farmers)

could not make payments and demand for mukataas declined around 1603-1604. The

Celali destruction is followed clearly on the mukataas of şemhane (candlemaker) and

mine.

Mahruse-i Bursa’da vâki şemhâne mukâtaasının bir tahvili yüz altmış bin akçe ve ihzariye mukâtaasının bir tahvili yüz otuz bin akçe Nusrettin nâm kimesne uhdesinde iltizâmda iken tahvilleri tamâm olalı hayli zaman mürur edip mezkür mukâtaalara tâlip ahir zuhur eylemeyüp…mezbûr Nusrettin meclis-i şerhe ihzar olunup sual olundukda şöyle cevâp eder…Celâlî eşkiyası müstevli olmak ile berât ittirmek müyesser olmayıp ve ol arzlar zâyîi olup gitmiştir…bu kulları uhdesinde yalnız şemhâne mukâtaası kalup aslen iyileşmeyüp muattal kalmıştır…mukâtaa-yı mezbûre iki seneden ziyâdedir ki bî-berattır. 346

The mine mukataa in Inegöl was going through difficulties because the dwellers in the

region had dispersed.

Hâlâ Inegöl madencilerinden ? nâmı zımmi divân-ı âliye gelip ve arz-ı hal sunup hâlâ emin nâzırımız olmamakla maadenler battal kalıp mâl-ı miriye külli zarar olmuştur…reaya ihtilalden hâli olmayup maaden battal olmuştur…347

Mukataas in the region continue to signal destruction in the following years. There

were some problems in 1609 in Inegöl mines and some Bursa hasları.

Eşkiya ve haramzade ihrak ü binnar idüp ve ekser katl idüp bir nefer kimesne kalmayup bir akçe hasıl olmayup ve bunlardan maada

345 The destruction of Katır Hanı (Mehmed Bey Hanı) could be one of the most solid examples of Celali destruction of silk trade and supply. Dalsar states that this han may have been a residence of silk merchants. Dalsar, Bursa’da Ipekçilik, 21. 346 BOA. MAD.d, 04684/66-67. 347 BOA.MAD.d,04689/64.

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Anca(?) kurayı dahi ihrak eylemişlerdir…Inegöl maadeninde bir dane işçi ve bayici (?) ve üstâd kalmayup…Rumeli’den üstâd gelmesi içün arzlar gelüp…vech-i meşruh üzere Bursa ve Yenişehir ve ? ve Kine(?) ve Inegöl kadıları dahi arzlar göndermişler ve mukâtaalar külli kesir ve zarar eylemişlerdir… 348

The Inegöl mine mukataa was still experiencing difficult years and it was sold to a tax

farmer 50.000 akçe lower (Inegöl madeni elli bin akçe aşağı olmak üzere) than normal

price in 1613.349 The mukataa signals traces of recovery towards 1616 as the tax

farmer offered 50.000 akçe increase (ziyade).

Hüdavendigar Sancağı’nda vâkîi Inegöl maadeni mukâtaası bundan akdem bin yirmi beş şevvali gurresinde üç yıla iki yüz seksen yedi bin beş yüz akçeye dergâh-ı âli çavuşlarından Ali çavuş nâm kimesne uhdesinde iltizâmda olup hâlâ tahvili tamâm olup tahammül olmamasıyla kimesne talep olmayup hali ve muattal kalmış iken hâliya mahruse-i Bursa’da Hazret-i Emir Sultan mahallesi sakinlerinden Hüseyin kulları divân-ı âliye gelüp mukâtaa-yı mezbûrenin tahvil-i cedide işbu bin yirmi dört şevvali gurresinde elli bin akçe ziyade ile üç yıla üç yüz otuz yedi bin beş yüz akçeye iltizâm kabul ederim şol şartla ki… 350

The price of raw silk in 1603 (351.05) remained the highest until 1635 (373.47). The

price starts to decline after 1603 until 1617.351 This could indicate four points about

the Celali Effect. Firstly, the effects of revolts of Karayazıcı, Hüseyin Paşa and Deli

Hasan on the production and supply did not last very long. Secondly, the uprising of

Kalenderoglu (active between 1604-1608) and his destruction in Bursa around 1608

did not affect the silk remarkably. Thirdly, the short period of normalization after

Kuyucu campaign in 1608 might have led prices to drop. The effect of the campaign

is seen in the raw silk price index, when the prices declined sharply in 1608 compared

348 BOA.Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/8-9. 349 BOA.Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/8. 350 BOA.Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/59. 351 Apart from the great revolts, this period kept witnessing Celali destruction. Tavukpazarı Hamamı was damaged by the Celalis in 1619. Ergenç, Şehir, Toplum Devlet, 94. The high amount of repair costs of Sultan Murad II waqf could be associated with Celali events in Bursa region in 1609. Kayhan Orbay, “Bursa’da Sultan II. Murad Vakfı’nın Mali Tarihi (1608-1641),” I.Ü. Iktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası 61 (2011): 311.

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to the previous year. Fourthly, it can signal that the population was not disturbed

remarkably, which could have affected silk production negatively. Gerber’s findings

on the population352 confirm that the region suffered lesser than central Anatolian

lands some of which experienced a demographic drop around 70-80%. He argued that

rural and urban population of Bursa had increased during the rebellion years.353 Bursa

could have been regarded a secure town against Celali attacks and it received Celali

immigrants.354 The traces of rise can be seen in some mukataa registers during the

revolt of Abaza Paşa. It is understood that the number of cizye households (hane-i

cizye) increased from 270 households to 280 around 1622-1624. These were the cizye

households attached to the mukataa land. These new comers could be the Celali

immigrants coming from eastern Anatolia during the revolt of Abaza Paşa in Erzurum

around 1622.355

The price decay until 1617 experienced a 93% rise in 1622. Mukataa records signal

some difficulties for payments of silk mukataas (mukataa-yı mizan-ı harir) between

1622 and 1624 in Bursa.356 The price rise and difficulties in mukataa payments could

signal some problems in production and silk supply. The index does not monitor the

prices until 1627. The price of 1627 was still high compared to years 1607-1617. Even

if the price fluctuations between 1622 and 1627 are not demonstrated, the high prices

of 1622 and 1627 could signal some problems in Bursa silk. These rises could be

related to increasing local banditry and murder of Sultan Osman II in 1622 which led

to the revolt of Abaza Paşa in the same year. As a French report, dated 13 October

1623, states Abaza Paşa besieged Bursa and he managed to defeat all janissaries (tous

les janissaries de cet empire) commanded by Sinan Paşa (Cigale).357 It could be

assumed that prices rose remarkably in 1623 because of the great rebellion.

352 See Gerber, Economy and Society, 12-16. 353 Ibid., 12-13. 354 Gerber, Economy and Society, 13 355 “Nefs-i Bursa’da kadimde 270 hane-i cizyeleri olup 10 hane zeyl olup ceman 280 hane olup…” In the following part of the document, the total amount that mültezim would collect from these cizye hanes is calculated. BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 25377/1 356 BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 25377/1. 357 BNF.Français, 16145-4 (Années 1605-1623)/222.

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The index shows that the prices declined around 67% between 1627 and 1630. The

destruction of Abaza Paşa in the region had already ended in these years and decaying

prices could be affected by safe environment. Therefore, it could be stated that the

Celali Effect caused a short term effect on the raw silk prices in Bursa. There was a

sharp price rise in 1622 and most possibly the prices reached the top in 1623 when the

town was besieged. Since there is not a price index for this year, it cannot be

maintained with numerical data. On the other hand, the difficulties in payment of silk

mukataas between 1622-1624 seem to be a solid example of some difficulties in the

production. There is no price data between 1622 and 1627 but the prices declined in

1627 and the following periods. It seems that once Abaza Paşa left the town, the prices

might have started to decay, which reached the lowest point in 1630. The revolts

damaged Bursa silk but the Celali Effect was seen short term. Once the revolts ended,

the high prices started to normalize.

3.2.b Ankara Mohair

As there are not many studies showing price index of Ottoman textile, the traces of the

Celali Effect on mohair358 are aimed to be followed through different sources like

voyage literature and works based on the primary sources like kadı sicils and

fermans. 359 The works share the common point that the production of mohair

experienced difficult years at the turn of the 16th century when the Celalis plundered

Ankara goats (tiftikkeçisi) with other livestock. The Celali Effect on mohair is dealt in

358 Mohair was a special raw material obtained from Ankara goat. It was believed that the goat was peculiar to Anatolian steppe and the quality of the mohair would be worse when the goats were taken from their natural habitats. Faroqhi states that Evliya Çelebi mentions the failures of Europeans when they tried to breed this animal in their own countries. Suraia Faroqhi, “Mohair Manufacture and Mohair Workshops in Seventeenth-Century Ankara”, Iktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası 41, 1-4 (1985):211-212. French traveler and historian Jean Dumont (1667-1727), who possibly saw Ankara goat during his trip in the Otoman Empire, differentiates this species from ones he saw in Europe. “A different type of sheep is bred in Anatolia, which were physically different than sheeps in Europe (Des Moutons d’Occident). This different type was bigger than others and its tail seems distinct. The climatic conditions and peculiar herbage caused this different type of sheep to appear.” Dumont, Voyages de Mr. Du Mont, 58. 359 There are only a few price studies of Ottoman textile in the 16th and 17th centuries. Barkan had pioneered the field. See Barkan, “Edirne Askerî Kassamı’na Âit Tereke Defterleri (1545-1659),”1-479.

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two regions, Ankara and Tosya (in Kastamonu), where the production of mohair and

sof was an outstanding economic activity.360

Polish traveler Simeon could be one of the first voyagers who saw the Celali

destruction in the first years of the 17th century. A case he witnessed is important to

see the size of the Celali Effect on Ankara mohair. Some sellers were brought to kadı

court, their guilt was to attempt to sell mohair, brought from Ankara, Sofya and Tosya,

mixed with wool. The sellers confessed that the Celalis ravaged all goats in the empire

(Celaliler keçileri telef ve gasp etmiş olduklarından, memlektimizde tiftik kalmayıp…),

which forced them to sell the false mohair.361

There are sources which approve that sof production went through some difficulties at

the end of the 16th century in Tosya region because of Celali movements. Faroqhi

points out that Tosya craftsmen asked for permission to shorten the length of sof used

in kaftans. The craftsmen were given permission by an imperial order (ferman) around

the 1600s to shorten them from 12 to 11 arşın.362 Faroqhi associates this request with

destructive effects of the banditry activities. A mukataa record reveals that Kastamonu

was ravaged by Karayazıcı and Deli Hasan with a Celali army composed of 1000

bandits in 1600-1601.

Teftiş olundukda iptida 1009 tarihinde huruç eden Karayazıcı ve kardaşı Deli Hasan nâm reis eşkıyasınca bin eşkıya ile gelüp liva-yı mezbûre (Kastamonu) üzerine müstevli olup nice fukarâyı katl ve emval ve erzaklarını yağma ve garet eylediklerini ektirip sürülmeyip reaya perişan olduklarından…gayri târih-i mezbûrda bin on altı senesine gelinceye değin reis-i eşkıyadan Karakaş, Kalenderoğlu, Kara Said, Küçük Hüseyim ve Top nam-ı Celâlîlerin hareketinden bâkî kalan reaya dahi dağılıp gitmişlerdir… 363

360 Sof was woven mainly in Tosya, Koçhisar and Ankara. Kütükoglu, Osmanlılarda Narh Müessesesi, 59. 361 Andreasyan, Polonyalı Simeon, 37. 362 Faroqhi, Osmanlı’da Kentler ve Kentililer, 175. 363 BOA.MAD.d,04684/114. Presence of such a Celali army may have affected sof in Tosya.

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The insecurity that the first Celali uprisings created damaged the production and trade

of mohair and sof. The length of cloth was still 14 arşın in Koçhisar around 1588-89

before the great Celalis.364 Even if the great revolts were not concentrated in Tosya,

the region was affected negatively because the Celalis could possibly block the trade

routes during their raids in Kastamonu, which might have created a mohair (tiftik)

shortage. The complaints on shorter kaftans increased remarkably around 1600s and it

supports the idea about increasing difficulties in mohair production.365

As I argued before, the Celali Effect differed regionally. While Tosya was not a center

of Celali violence, Celali banditry caused some difficulties in mohair supply and sof

production. This could be related to the conditions of protection. Tosya was not well

protected with fortified walls, compared to Bursa and Ankara, and it was more

susceptible to any Celali ravages.366 Ankara experienced several attacks of big Celali

armies; however, it could overcome the revolts and mohair trade could continue even

at the turn of the 16th century, when the great revolts broke out. Faroqhi states that

Ankara was protected with fortified walls and it was a big town which could have

provided a relatively good situation for production and trade in the revolt years.367 The

number of inhabitants in Ankara did not decline as much as some of the other towns

in the central Anatolia and it could prevent any discontinuation in the production and

trade.368 Ergenç’s detailed studies on Ankara mohair trade verify Faroqhi’s assertion.

His findings indicate that the mohair trade at the turn of the century was very active.

While the armies of Karayazıcı and Hasan Paşa were ravaging central Anatolian lands,

there were European merchants in Ankara who came to buy mohair in 1599.369

364 Faroqhi, Osmanlı’da Kentler ve Kentliler, 175. 365 See Ibid., 175. 366 The Celalis were more effective in rural lands than the towns because of the same reason. The level of rural depopulation was much more higher than the urban. 367 Faroqhi, Osmanlı’da Kentler ve Kentliler, 175. 368 Faroqhi, “Mohair Manufacture and Mohair Workshops in Seventeenth-Century Ankara,” 234. 369 Ergenç, Osmanlı Tarihi Yazıları, 156.

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Continuing Celali attacks in the following years could not preclude Ottoman and

foreign merchants to come to the town for trade.370

The price fluctuations of mohair have not been brought into the light yet. However, it

could be assumed that prices experienced fluctuations in upward trends.371 As I argued

for the silk, the price rises would not have lasted more than a few years for mohair.

The Celali Effect was seen on short term on mohair.

3.2.c Conclusion

The major textile sectors of Bursa silk and Ankara mohair went through a short period

of difficulties during the revolts. The index pointed out that the price of raw silk

increased at the turn of the century, which lasted continuously until 1603. The decisive

factor behind this rise could be associated with the Celali uprisings. The armies

damaged the production and blocked the trade ways which could stop the silk

production and flow in the town.372 The following years showed a period of price

decay until 1622 and this can be interpreted as a short term Celali Effect. The regional

conditions and Kuyucu campaign prepared suitable conditions to recover silk

production and trade.

As far the situation of mohair, two different regions were handled. The first region,

Tosya, demonstrated that the uprisings affected the sector. Faroqhi’s statement, based

370 Ibid., 156-161.The European demand for Ankara sof and tiftik was so high that Ankara craftmen wanted the center to forbid sale of these goods to European merchants in 1615. Ankara craftmen were about to experience difficulties in providing tiftik for sof production. Tabakoglu, Osmanlı Maliyesi, 237. 371 French diplomat Louis Deshayes de Courmenin (1600-1632), who was in the Ottoman capital in 1624, mentions that Abaza Paşa was in Ankara with his 80.000 soldiers sometimes around 1623-4. If his words are taken into consideration, (despite possible exaggeration of the number) presence of such a big Celali army in the town could be assumed to affect the mohair production, trade and prices. “He is now in Ankara (Angoury) with his 80.000 men.” Louis Deshayes de Courmenin, Voiage de Levant: Fait par le Commandement du Roy en l’année 1621 (Paris: A. Tapupinard, 1624), v. 372 The Celali armies could block the city ways, which would cut connection with surrounding towns or the center. For instance, Karayazıcı had blocked the ways to Sivas during his ravage. “Sivas beğlerbeğisi hâlâ Sivas içinde imiş ve sakî-i mezbûr Sivas çayırlarına konmuş, yanında olan eşkıyanûn havfından ne kimse şehre girer ve ne hod şehrden çıkar…” Orhonlu, Telhisler, 14.

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on fermans and court records, was an indicator of difficulties in mohair supply and sof

production. Ankara went through a relatively good period in terms of trade and

production compared to Tosya. Ergenç’s findings show that the mohair could

overcome the Celali crisis in Ankara. Regardless of the destruction in the region,

Ottoman, Venetian, Polish and English merchants visited the town often even during

the revolts. As Faroqhi states the fortified walls and relatively less Celali depopulation

helped the town. Moreover, the region recovered its population fast when the difficult

years of Celalis came to an end.373

The level of Celali destruction changed regionally and it is quite normal to obverse the

effects at different sizes. This difference could be associated with the degree of Celali

violence and some peculiar conditions such as being well fortified with strong walls

and a good location as seen in Ankara. While textile in Bursa and Tosya experienced

difficulties years, Ankara seems to have overcome the revolts better compared to them.

There is not a mohair price index, but it would be reasonable to assume that the prices

fluctuated during the revolts. A possible price rise associated with the Celalis would

have lasted a short period. Regardless of this idea on mohair prices, the other examples

indicate that the Celali Effect on silk and mohair textile was not long term and the

sectors escaped the revolts without severe loss.

3.3 The Adaptation of the Central Finance System

The Ottomanists have argued that the central treasury experienced fiscal difficulties

between the late 16th century and early 17th century. The argument was developed

basically on the effects of the changing trade routes, advent of great amount of cheap

American silver to Ottoman Empire, “decline” of Ottoman industry and luxury

consumption of the ruling class.374 The changing military technology was put forward

373 Faroqhi, “Mohair Manufacture and Mohair Workshops in Seventeenth-Century Ankara,” 234. 374 See Barkan, “The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History of the Near East,” 5. Two pearls costed 10.000 sequins (gold coins) might be a solid example of luxury consumption of the ruling class in the era financial difficulties and Celali activities (1606). This had attracted the attention of the French embassy. BNF.Français, 16145-4 (Années 1605-1623)/63.

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to have contributed to the fiscal crisis. The increasing dependency on fire arms resulted

in expansion of janissary army and recruitment of mercenary soldiers called sarıca and

sekban, which increased burden on the central treasury.375 The long-lasting wars on

two fronts against Safavid and Habsburg exhausted Ottoman treasury. The inflationary

period and debasements exacerbated the financial crisis. Telhis of Vezir Yemişçi

Hasan Paşa (in office between 1601-1603) at the turn of the century could be regarded

as a reflection of these financial difficulties:

Saâdetlü pâdişahım baş defterdâr kulunuzu çağırdup hâzînede ne mikdâr altun vardur deyü suâl eyledüğümde 50.000 çil akça vardur, gayri nesne yoktur deyü cevâb eyledi; devletlü pâdişâhum hâlâ hazînenin müzâyakası kemâlindedür malûm-ı humâyûnunuzdur ki akça tahsîl edecek bir yer yokdur ve az çok tahsîl olunan akçanın dahu kimin Matbah-ı âmireye ve kimin Âhura ve kimi dahı sâir mevâcîbe sarf olunur ve akça yetüşmeyüp kalanın dahı nihâyeti yokdur husûsâ cebeci ve topçu ve ehl-i hiref ve âhur ve tersâne halkunun dahı ekserine mevâcib verilmemüşdür her gün gelüp ulûfelerin taleb etmeden hâli değillerdür; mesârife nihâyet yok nereden tahsîl edeceğümüz bilemezüz…ve şimdi bir mevâcib dahı gelüp erişdi hazîne olmaduğından aklumuz başumuzda değildür eğer memleket mamûr olup akça tahsîli mümkin olsa devletlü pâdişâhumdan sakınur mıydum? 376

It is known that the treasury was already under the pressure of increasing expenditures

before Vezir Yemişçi Hasan Paşa wrote this telhis. Akdag states that the central

treasury was experiencing difficulties as early as the beginning of the second half of

the 16th century.377 The Ottoman statesmen had taken some cautions to overcome the

financial difficulties. One of the fastest responses to the crisis was the debasement of

Ottoman akçe around 1584-6. However, as the Ottoman statesmen were aware, the

375 Inalcık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700,” 292. Janissary number increased from 12.789 in 1568 to 37.627 in 1609. The first official translator of French embassy, Guillaume Postel (1510-1582) was sent by François I to the imperial center, mentions that the number of janissaries around 1550s was around 12.000-13.000. See Guillaume Postel, La Tierce Partie des Orientales Histoires, ou est Exposée La Condition, Puissance & Revenue de l’Empire Turquesque: avec Toutes Les Provinces & Pais Generalement depuis 950 Ans en Ça par Tous Ismaelites Conquis (Poitiers: Enguilbert de Marnef, 1559), 30. 376 Orhonlu, Telhisler, 30. 377 Akdag, Iktisadi ve Içtimai Tarih, 656.

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debasement was a short-term solution. It was argued that the debasement contributed

to instability of akçe and worsening fiscal problems.378

The failure of debasement in the long term and the deepening financial crisis ended in

a principal change in the Ottoman taxation system. The center adapted the taxation to

current conditions. The practice of classic system of tahrir diminished and avarız

system came forward as an important source of revenue.379 While the center was

dealing with economic problems and increasing need for cash, the Celali Revolts had

broken out in the central Anatolia. Taking the conditions mentioned above into

consideration, I argue that the Celali Effect on the period of fiscal transformation is

seen in three ways. Firstly, one of the most important cash revenues of the treasury380,

Anatolian mukataas collected through iltizam or emanet system, started to decline as

early as the end of the 16th century with the boom of the first great revolts. Difficulties

in collection decreased the annual revenues of the central treasury. Secondly, the Celali

desolation in tımar villages resulted in disfunction of this tımar system because the

primary condition of the system, peasants attached to the soil, was destructed. Thirdly,

declining mukataa revenues and payments expected from provincial treasures led

center to increase the share of expenses from central treasury for the Celali campaigns.

This situation increased the pressure on the central treasury and accelerated ongoing

fiscal difficulties.

3.3.1 On the Transformation of Taxation

The social and economic changes had usually been interpreted as the signs of “decline”

or “corruption” in the earlier Ottoman historiography.381 This was closely related to

the domination of Ottoman chronics and nasihatnames (advice literature) on history

writing, which lasted until the late 20th century. The writers of these works described

378 Pamuk, Paranın Tarihi, 153-156. 379 The practice of classic tahrirs was not abandoned completely in the 17th century. For instance, there is a mufassal (detailed) tahrir register for Ordu in 1613. See Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, Ordu Kazası Sosyal Tarihi (1455-1613) (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlıgı Yayınları, 1985). 380 Çakır, Osmanlı Mukataa Sistemi, 71-73. 381 For instance, see Barkan, “The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History of the Near East,” 5.

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any changes in their times as breakdown of traditional institutions (kadimden gelen).382

Linda Darling’s detailed studies on Ottoman treasury offices depicted that the Ottoman

fiscal crisis and following changes should be regarded as efforts of adaptation to the

new conditions. She highlighted that the changes in the classic land system and

taxation were applied to overcome the fiscal crisis.383 These were not signals of decline

or corruption as chroniclers and nasihatname writers had dictated once.

3.3.1.a Shift from Tahrir Registers to Avarız

Avarız (avarız-divaniye and tekalif-i örfiye) was composition of taxes either paid in

kind (nüzul, sürsat and iştira), cash (avarız akçesi) or some services.384 It was levied

for extraordinary cases usually at the times of wars. The amount of tax was not

predetermined, it changed according to burden of the war. The tax was imposed to a

predetermined number of avarızhanes. It was collected from Muslim and non-Muslim

reayas who could provide their living from any urban or rural property.385 Some

exemptions were given under various conditions. 386 For instance, derbendcis

(guardians of mountain passes), köprücüs (bridge guardians), madencis (miners) and

çeltükçüs (rice grower) were exempted from avarız.387 Moreover, the central state

could exempt some groups which were not very suitable to yield required tax. For

instance, reaya living around the war zone would be exempted.388

382 See Douglas Howard, “The Ottoman Tımar System and Its Transformation, 1563-1656” (Unpublished Doctorate’s Thesis, Indiana University, 1987), 22-29. I am thankful to Douglas Howard for sharing his thesis with me. 383 See Darling, Revenue-Raising. Idem, “Ottoman Fiscal Administration: Decline or Adaptation?” 157-160. 384 Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Avârız” Islam Ansiklopedisi, II (1979), 13. 385 Tabakoglu, Osmanlı Maliyesi, 155. 386 Barkan, “Avârız” 15. 387 Darling states that 20-40% of the total number of households was exempted from avarız. There were some other groups which were given exemption. See Darling, Revenue-Raising, 88-89. For instance, a mukataa record highlights that 250 (out of 3050) non-Muslim nefers were exempted from avarız-ı divaniye and tekalif-i örfiye for their services in Limni Castle. There were 4000 normal cizye hanes. BOA.MAD.d,01850/44. 388 Darling, Revenue-Raising, 89.

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The imposition of avarız tax was an exception in the early 16th century and it was

collected once needed. However, it was turned into a regular tax at the end of the

century.389 According to Koca Sinan Paşa, it became an annual exaction during the

Safevid campaign in 1580s owing to increasing expenditures.390 Historian Selaniki

states that it was collected every year in the first five years of reign of Mehmet III

(1595-1603) but Murad III (1574-1595) had never levied avarız.391 Inalcık asserts that

it might have been turned into regular tax in the period of 1593-1606 Ottoman-

Habsburg war.392 Darling highlights that it became annual during the long war with

the Habsburgs (1593-1606) and she claims that the transformation to a regular

collection was completed by 1620-1621.393 The effects of expansion of janissary army

and burden of wars in the center may have played the decisive role. Avarız continued

to be levied regularly after the war and this registering system took place of classic

tahrir registers, which started to be practiced for some special cases after 1580s.

Accepting the effects of wars and increasing expenditures, I argue that the Celali

Revolts exacerbated the financial crisis and influenced the fiscal transformation period

in three ways.

3.3.1.a.1 Mukataa Revenue Collection Problems

The has mukataa registers of Anatolia indicate that the tax farmers were going through

a period of severe difficulties to make payments to the center in the Celali years. The

tax farmer, whose mukataa did not function properly, could not make payments. As

the mukataa defters of Rumeli and Anatolia are compared, the mukataa payments

coming from Rumeli constituted the major part. On the other hand, some cases showed

that the amount of the bakis (arrear) in Anatolian mukataas exceeded a few millions

of akçe, which deserves the attention. The cases show that even modest amounts of

akçe, compared to the yearly budget and Rumeli mukataas, could be very important

389 Barkan, “The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History of the Near East,” 26; Darling, Revenue-Raising, 90. 390 See Sahillioglu, ed. Koca Sinan Paşa’nın Telhisleri, no.105, 146-147. 391 Darling interprets this as an exaggeration of Selaniki. Darling, Revenue-Raising, 93. 392 Inalcık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700,” 315. 393 Darling, Revenue-Raising, 93.

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for the center owing to the financial pressure. An example from 1609-1610 points to

the level of financial difficulties and cash need. A mühimme register points that the

center was requesting (tedarik ve irsal) 2.000.000 akçe (20 yük akçe) hastily (ber vech-

i isti’cal) from Karaman mukataas for military payments (kul mevacibi içün).394 I

argue that the destruction of mukataa lands and following collection problems

exacerbated ongoing fiscal difficulties. As an addition to increasing sums which the

center could not collect, the demand for mukataa lands and mukataa values declined

in the Celali years because the insecure atmosphere created by the bandits discouraged

tax farmers to be a candidate.

The mukataa revenues of the central treasury started to decline with the boom of the

first great revolts. A record from 1601 was pointing to the baki akçes and gühercile

from 1599 in Uşak. The amount of tax farmer’s debt reached to 7.447.812 akçe and

3819 kantar gühercile. The gühercile (nitre) was paid in kind because this raw material

was used to produce gunpowder.

Nezâretinde bâkî kalan 43 yük ve doksan sekiz bin yüz dört akçe ki ceman zikr olunan bekaya-yı ? ve cedid yetmiş dört yük ve kırk yedi bin sekiz yüz on iki akçe olup Celâlî zühûr etmekle vilayet ihtilal üzere olup ve nezâretlerin dahi tahvil-i cedidleri dört kimesneye virilüp miri yetmiş ve seksen atlu ile devr etmekle fukarânın tahammüleri olmadığından…Mehmet ve Numân çavuşun iki tahvilden ? teslimâtlarından maada bâkî kalan üç bin sekiz yük doksan kantar gühercile…395

A mukataa record points out that after Yenişehir has mukataa agreement came to the

end in 1601-1602 (tahvili tamam olup), no candidate wanted (talep ve rağbet

olmadığından) to buy the iltizam for a while (bu ana değin hali kalıp). 396 It is

acceptable that the mültezims, who were not very sure about his economic profits in

the era of Celali violence, did not aspire to be a candidate.

394 BOA.Mühimme Defteri, 78 (h.1018/m.1609-1610): 5/12. 395 BOA.MAD.d,18147/6-7 396 BOA.Bab-ı Defteri,26001/1.

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An another example from Kastamonu depicts that the Celalis destructed the mukataa

stealing gühercile produced. The dwellers on the mukataa land deserted and it stopped

functioning.

“Karayazıcı’nın adamları kârhane üzerine gelip (gühercile madeni) üç kantar hâsıl olmuş

gühercileyi ahz idüp, reayası dahi celâ-yı vatan edip kârhaneleri hâli ve muattal olduğunu

ilâm ederler.” 397

Tax farmers were not willing to buy mukataas in Ankara, Inönü and Sultanönü regions

between 1599-1602 because of insecure environment. 398 As some mukataas left

unsold more than 5 months, the center tried to sell them without any increase in the

mukataa values. An another record signals that these regions were still coping with

some difficulties in 1603 because of land desertion.

“Mukâtaa-yı mezbûre ziyade perakende ve perişan olup…külli mâl zayîi olunmak üzere…” 399

A petition sent by the inspector (müfettiş)400 demonstrates that there was a severe

problem in mukataa revenue collection in a huge geography between 1602-1605. It

seems that the tax farmer could not make any payment and baki was 850.000 akçe.

Müfettiş Mevlânâ Abdürrahman arz gönderüp bundan akdem vilayet-i Anadolu ve Karaman ve Rum ve Diyarbekir ve ?…cizye-i kıbtiyan ve cizye-i ? ve cinâyet-i ? ve ? mukâtaası 1010 zi’lkaadesinin yirmisinden üç yıla sekiz yük ve elli bin akçeye iltizâm iden Süleymân Çavuş gelüp mukâtaa-yı mezbûre ziyade perakende ve perişan ve kesr-i mukâtaa olunmak ile şimdiye değin tahvil ? tutanlar haklaşmayıp külli bâkîleri kalmış iken bu kulları dahi

397 BOA.MAD.d,04689/70. 398 BOA.MAD.d,18147/11. 399 BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24262/4. For similar cases from Bursa, Kastamonu, Inegöl mukataas see BOA.MAD.d,04689/5, 9, 29, 63-64; BOA.MAD.d,04684/1, 66-68, 114-115, 123. 400 For müfettiş see Çakır, Osmanlı Mukataa Sistemi, 6-7.

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Celâlî havfından çıkup ? akçe kefiline mecal olmaya…bana külli zulüm olmuştur… 401

A petition of Piri Çavuş clarifies that the mukataas in Bursa were dealing with the

Celali destruction and there was 240.000 akçe baki around 1609.

Celâlî eşkıyası müstevli olmağla mukâtaa battal kalmagın…tahvili yüz ellişer bin akçe üzere bî-berât ve bilâ-kefil zabt ittirüp hala iki tahvil de mürur idüp teslimatları görüldükde iki yüz kırk bin akçe bâkîleri zühur eyleyüp talep olundukda külli kesr eyledim deyü cevap verüp mezbûrlar müflis ve düyûn olmağla…402

The value of Yenişehir and Inegöl mine mukataas signaled difficulties in 1609. After

the petitions, which highlighted that the mukataa lands could not function properly,

the mukataa value was decreased.

Eşkiya haramzade ihrak ve binnar idüp ekser katl idüp bir nefer kimesne kalmayup bir akçe hasıl olmayup…tahammülleri yoktur deyü kazanın arzları mucebince…Inegöl maadeni elli bin akçe aşağı olmak üzere deruhte olunup… 403

A register of Mihaliç points out a severe payment problem in 1609-1610. The center

emphasized the financial pressure (müzayaka virmek üzeredir) and requested

7.000.000 akçe baki to be sent.

“Hala dahi bâkî olan yetmiş yük hassa harc? Hasan kulları mübaşeretiyle tedarik ve

irsâl üzere…teala ihmal olunmayup irsâl ve itmam…” 404

401 BOA.Bab-ı Defteri, 24262/1 402 BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/60. 403 BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/8-9 404 BOA.MAD.d,04684/52.

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The destruction caused mukataas to remain unsold usually for a few months and, in

rare cases, some years. Certain mukataas in Bursa remained unsold during two years

after the end of the contract in 1611.

“Bursa’da vâkî bozahane ve han-ı cedid mukâtaası bin yirmi muharreminin

gurresinde üç yıla yüz yirmi bin akçe iltizâmda tahvili tamâm olup âhirde talep zühur

eylemeyüp iki sene hâlî kalıp…” 405

There were other mukataas in Bursa which remained unsold. There was no tax farmer

demand for mukataas in Kancak (?) during six months in 1613.

Bursa kazasına tabii Kancak tevabii mukâtaası bin yirmi iki ramazan gurresinde üç yıla yüz doksan bin üç yüz otuz beş akçeye (tax farmer’s name?) iltizâm olup tahvili tamâm olalı altı ay mürur eyleyüp talep zuhur eylememekle…406

The mukataas kept signaling revenue collection problems in 1620s. The mültezims of

has mukataas in Bursa, Yenişehir, Bilecik, Akmeşe (?) and vilayet-i Anadolu were

experiencing difficulties to make payments to the central treasury around 1622-1624.

It is noted that the treasury was facing financial difficulties (müzayaka çekilmeğe)

because of unpaid mukataas. The center was asking the payment of 4.131.000 akçe.

“Mâl-ı miri tahsil olunmak mümkün olmamagın irsali lâzım gelen…kifâyet-i kadri

irsal olunmayup müzâyaka çekilmeğe…” 407

Taking the fiscal depression and continuing Celali destruction into consideration, the

center paid special attention to protecting continuation of mukataa revenues. The most

405 BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/73 406 BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/74. 407 BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 25377/1. As an addition to this sum, baki cizyes from evkaf-ı selatin and nefs-i Bursa, the amount could not be read, were requested.

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important reason was related to the fact that the mukataas were making one of the

greatest cash contributions to the budget. It seems that there were three basic strategies

of the center in order to prevent mukataas from being unsold and deserted (nafüruht

ve mahlul). The first one was the transition to emanet system, the least applied, the

second strategy was to contact the former tax farmer in order to convince him to

repurchase the same mukataa. The third one was some kind of negotiation and

acceptance of some payment facilities by the center.

Firstly, some registers showed that once there are severe problems of payment and

decaying tax farmer demand, the center could transfer the mukataa revenue collection

from iltizam to emanet system. The center was interfering directly in the collection

process and a collector was being assigned. This was a temporary reaction against the

Celali destruction. An example from Bursa in 1614-1615 shows that as the tax farmer

started to experience difficulties, the mukataa was given to the emanet (ber vech-i

emanet).408

Saadetli sultanım hazretlerinin hâkî pâ-yı şeriflerine arz-ı hal oldur ki, Bursa’da Ikizceler ağnamı emini olan (?) nâmı kimesnenin tahvili âhir olmaya karib olup iltizâma zarar götürmek üzere ber vech-i emânet bu kullarına sadaka buyurulmak babında… 409

On the other hand, the center avoided the emanet system because simply the revenue

collection with iltizam was more profitable. In the emanet system tax collector,

assigned by the center, was not responsible for any fluctuations in revenues. He was

just sent to collect the expected sum. On the other hand, there was a contract in the

iltizam system in which the sum and certain conditions were strictly clarified. As an

addition to these, the application of iltizam system was much more practical for the

center.

408 For emanet system see Çakır, Osmanlı Mukataa Sistemi, 150-154. 409 BOA.MAD.d,01850/59.

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Secondly, once a certain mukataa cannot be sold fast, the center was contacting the

former tax farmer to convince him to repurchase the same mukataa. After some

mukataas in Bursa remained unsold, the center proposed them to the former tax farmer

in 1611.

Mahruse-i Bursa’da vâkîi Bacı pa-yı ağnam ? ve tevabii mukâtaası sene 1020 rebiü’levvelinin gurresinde üç yıla yüz elle bin akçeye otuz ikinci bölükte yevmi on üç akçe ulufeye mutasarrıf olan Mustafa uhdesinde iltizâmda olup hâlâ tahvili tamâm olup muhasebesi görüldükde bî’t-tamâm cevâb vermekle mukâtaa-yı mezbûrenin tahvil-i cedidine ahirde talep(?) olunduk da kimesne zühur eylememeğe merkûm Mustafa’ya iltizâm-ı sabık üzere teklif olundukda… 410

On the other hand, the center’s efforts were sometimes ignored by the tax farmers and

the Celali destruction made them reject the proposition. Once the former tax farmers

were proposed to buy mukataas in Yenişehir, Inegöl, Bursa in 1609-1610, they

rejected the proposition stating that these mukataas cannot function properly.

“Mukâtaa-yı mezbûrenin tahvil-i cedidlerinden al deyü teklif olundukda bu iltizâm

mukâtaalarının tahammülleri yokdur deyü cevap virdiklerinden…” 411

Thirdly, the center could accept some payment convenience that the tax farmer

requested. Once there are some problems with revenues, the tax farmer proposes to

buy the mukataa under a condition which permits to split the yearly payment burden

as he wishes because he assumes that there could be difficulties to pay the exact

amount that was requested. This condition is usually recorded like the followings on

the contract.

410 BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/168. 411 BOA.MAD.d,04684/21.

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“Mukâtaa-yı mezbûreyi iltizâm eylediğimde bir senenin fazlasını bir senenin kesrine

mahsup olmak üzere iltizâm kabul idüp…” 412

“Mukâtaayı üç yıla on dokuz yük akçeye iltizâm ve kabul ider de şol şartla ki

mukâtaalar birbirinden ayrılmayup birinin fazlası diğerinin kesrine mahsup oluna…” 413

A few examples above signal that despite center’s efforts to protect mukataa revenues,

the treasury suffered from revenue collection difficulties with the first great Celali

Revolts at the end of the 16th century. Mukataa payments, one of the most significant

cash revenues, either decreased or could not be collected properly from Anatolia. The

center requested the unpaid sums emphasizing that the treasury was under pressure

(müzayaka çekilmeğe).

These cases presented above were just some chosen examples from defters to depict

the general turbulence in mukataas and they signal that unpaid mukataa revenues

exacerbated the fiscal difficulties. It is reasonable to think that bakis just between 1599

and the 1610s had already exceeded some tens of millions of akçe. On the other hand,

the collection problems did not last very long. As mentioned shortly in the demography

chapter, there are indices proving that as the Celalis were squashed, the mukataas and

tax farmers started to recover. The Celali Effect caused a short term crisis on the central

treasury. This crisis was influential in the era of fiscal transformation because any

problem in the collection of mukataa revenues meant lesser amount of akçe sent to the

central treasury and this period is marked with the increasing need for cash, which is

associated with the avarız taxes becoming an annual levy.

3.3.1.a.2 The Changing Conditions of Taxation

The proper operation of classic tahrir registers was dependent on the functioning of

tımar system. There were two indispensable conditions for tımar; a) attached cultivator

to the soil and b) adherence to miri land principle (the center had the ultimate authority

412 BOA.MAD.d,04689/25. The mukataa of Mihaliç dock in 1600. 413 BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/8. Haslar mukataası of Yenişehir, Gine(?), Tüca(?) and Bursa in 1609.

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on the tımar lands). 414 The first condition of tahrir tax system was destructed

remarkably at the turn of the 16th century because the Celalis caused a wide

demographic dispersal. The Celali land desertion increased in the following periods

and reached the peak with the Great Flight. Half of the population living in villages in

Tokat and Sivas regions had already deserted their lands as early as 1609, when

Kuyucu Murat Paşa suppressed the major revolts.415 Despite the efforts of the center

to force fleeing peasants to return back to their lands, it did not end in a complete return

in a short period. The state was still coping with the problem of fugitive peasants as

late as 1635.416 A tımarlı sipahi could not endure 20-30 years for a complete return.

Akdag stated that while the central treasury was looking for ways to compensate its

expenses, the center did not concentrate all its attention on improving the worsening

conditions of the dirlik owners (dirlik sahipleri).417 He added, the center tried to

improve the financial condition of sipahis by encouraging fleeing peasants to return to

their formers lands and increasing the amount of çiftbozan akçesi418 in the period of

revolts and the Great Flight. The return of tax paying peasants could help the sipahi

economically once cultivation restarted. Akdag stated that the tımarlı sipahis and has

owners asked to increase çiftbozan akçesi from 75 to 300 akçe.419 It is not very clear

if this rise was applied really but it is important to evaluate the worsening fiscal

conditions of tımarlı sipahi. This attempt could be seen in two ways. Firstly, the

sipahis aimed at preventing the land desertion. Secondly, the high amount could be

414 McGowan, Economic Life in Ottoman Europe, 105. 415 Özel, “Banditry, State and Economy: On the Financial Impact of the Celali Movement in Ottoman Anatolia,” 74. Moreover, see the hüküm sent to kadıs in Rum Beglerbegligi about Tokat and Sivas dwellers (Tokat ve Sivas ahalisi) in 1609/1610. BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 78 (h.1018/m.1609-1610): 23/59. 416 Renaudot, Recueil de Toutes Les Gazettes, 479. 417 Akdag, Celâlî Isyanları, 56-57. 418 For çiftbozan akçesi see Nicoara Beldiceanu and Irene Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “Recherches sur la Province de Qaraman au XVIe Siècle. Etude et Actes,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 11, 1 (Mar.,1968): 23-24. 419 The center attempted to increase it from 74 to 300 akçe in the period of revolt but it is understood that the center had to undo it. See Akdag, Celâlî Isyanları, 51-52. Taking these reasons into consideration, the possible effect of the inflation is a priori accepted. However, the only factor behind this rise should not be related just to the inflation in the era of high percentage of çiftbozan events. This action could be thought to discourage the land desertion.

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thought as the efforts of sipahis to guarantee their economic situation in the era of

desertion. On the other hand, it seems that the center did not channel all its attention

to reestablish the classic system in the era of crisis (ihtilâl zemânı). The works of

Darling and Barkey showed that the imperial system could be very flexible and

Ottoman statesmen took pragmatic decisions to overcome the problems. For instance,

Barkey showed that the state chose to bargain and “buy” 420 the great Celali leaders

offering them high offices. While a Celali leader was considered an enemy, it could

turn to a high officer after a short period. Similar to this approach, the central state

may have decided to replace tahrir registers with the avarız instead of a complete

recovery of the previous system. The fiscal crisis was tried to be overcome by changing

the most basic features of a classic imperial institution.

The taxation was based on predetermined production and imperative economic

activities of a hane in the classic tahrir. On the other hand, the rural population

dispersal and following breakdown of rural economy damaged tımar lands and sipahis,

which ended in the dysfunction of application of tahrir registers. On the other hand,

the amount of avarız tax was not predetermined, the center could decide it depending

on its needs either in cash, kind or service. When the center arranged the sum of avarız,

it took into consideration the situation of avarız payers (reayanın kudret ve

tahammülerine göre). 421 The avarız was imposed to avarızhanes, which were

composed of 3-10 real tahrir hanes.422 The fundamental condition to be an avarız

payer was to earn a living (kâr ve kisbe kadir murahik).423 Avarız records do not

contain detailed information on the economic activities and rural production of tax

420 The revolt of Abaza had caused panic in the center. Agent reports of Istanbul French embassy state that the mother sultan sent some valuable vests and a good sword to Abaza in order to start the bargaining process. BNF.Français, 16149-4 (Années 1619-1624)/466-467. 421 Barkan, “Avârız”14–15. 422 The general assumption is that 3-10 real tahrir hanes were equal to 1 avarızhane. Darling, Revenue-Raising, 106-108. 423 Akdag, Iktisadi ve Içtimai Tarih, 561. As directly quoted from Tabakoglu, “Avarız yükümlülerini vergi takatlari açısından hâneye tâbi olabilmeleri için ödeme yerinde bir mülkü kullanmaları gerekiyordu. Buna göre hâne sayımı defterlerinde yer alan nüfus köyde ise toprağa, şehirde ise geçimini sağlayacak sürekli bir işe sahip olan faal nüfustur.” He based his argument on a record about avarız levy. See Tabakoglu, Osmanlı Maliyesi, 155.

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payers. The peasant desertion and following breakdown of rural life might have led

the center to give up its hopes of tax extraction from predetermined rural production,

on which tımarlı sipahi was dependent.424

3.3.1.a.3 The Burden of the Celali Campaigns

A study discussed the Celali campaigns from a financial perspective using the

ruznamçes.425 It is indicated that the Celali campaigns increased the pressure on the

central treasury. The beylerbeyliks of Anatolia, Sivas, Karaman and Erzurum could

not make a great financial contribution to the Kuyucu Murat Paşa’s campaign because

these regions were under Celali attacks.426 The depopulation and continuous Celali

activities in these regions, as mukataas reflected the turbulence, affected provincial

treasures (eyalet hazinesi) negatively.

Polat revealed that the contribution of mukataa revenues constituted the greatest part

in the campaigns. He argued that the Celali destruction caused lesser amount of akçe

to be collected than expected from Anatolian mukataas. The examples used in this

study support this idea. A comparison of average of financial contribution coming

from mukataa revenues to two different military operations resumes the situation

better. The total contribution of cizye and mukataa revenues to Kuyucu Murat’s Celali

campaign was around 10-11% in the total campaign treasury.427 On the other hand,

this average was higher in the other future military operations. The contribution of

mukataas to the eastern campaign of Hüsrev Paşa in 1627-1629 was 23.50% and of

the cizyes were 10.40% of the campaign treasury.428 This situation was closely related

to the Celali destruction.429

424 Özel, “Banditry, State and Economy: On the Financial Impact of the Celali Movement in Ottoman Anatolia,” 71. 425 For ruznamçes see Polat, “Kuyucu Murat Paşa’nın Celali Seferi Finansmanı,” 565-566. 426 Ibid., 570. 427 Polat, “Kuyucu Murat Paşa’nın Celali Seferi Finansmanı,” 572. 428 Ibid., 572. 429 Ibid., 572.

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As a result of the problems with provincial treasuries and declining contribution of

mukataas to the Celali campaigns, the central treasury had to increase its part in the

campaigns. While the payments (irsaliye) of Hazine-i Amire and Enderun Hazinesi to

the wars consisted usually 25-34% of the expenses, it exceeded 46% in the Celali

campaign.430 The center had to take loans from high class Ottoman statesman. For

instance, former Defterdar of Karaman Mehmet Paşa lent 1.010.766 akçe for Kuyucu

Murat’s Celali campaign.431 Once this amount is compared with unpaid mukataas, the

level of financial depression and cash need is understood better. The baki requested

only from Mihaliç mukataas was 7.000.000 akçe in 1609-1610.432

There are some indices that the center was requesting bakis from mukataas for finance

of military operations. This should be closely related to the current economic

difficulties of the treasury. A mühimme register from 1609-1610 signifies the necessity

of payments of baki (2.000.000 akçe) from Karaman mukataas for military payments

(kul mevacibi içün) and the sum was requested as fast as possible (ber vech-i

isticale).433

Moreover, it is an interesting point to note here that the difficulties of the central

treasury to finance the Celali campaigns had been noticed by the members of the

French embassy. A report mentions that the center looked for loans from great dirlik

owners in order to finance and convince the janissary army to suppress Abaza Paşa’s

revolt.434 According to these reports, the financial difficulties were influential on the

the bargaining process.435

430 Ibid., 580. 431 Ibid., 575. 432 BOA.MAD.d,04684/52. 433 BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 78 (h.1018/m.1609-1610): 5/12. 434 BNF.Français,16149-4 (Années 1619-1624)/466-467; BNF.Français,16145-4 (Années 1605-1623)/192. 435 The same document states that although the Müfti had declared war against Abaza (Moufti a declaré la guerre contre le Bacha d’Erzeroum…), “everybody was asking for peace”. The declare of war against the rebel pasha caused some tension among some pashas (brouilleries entre plusieurs pashas d’Asie

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To conclude, this part aimed at discerning the Celali Effect on the era of fiscal

adaptation and financial difficulties. The period is marked by transition from classic

tahrir registers to avarız in the early 17th century. I argued that the Celali Effect

influenced the financial transformation in three ways. First, the mukataa revenues

declined remarkably, which were one of the significant cash sources of the central

treasury.436 Second, the basic condition of the tımar system was destructed profoundly

and the tımars could not function. Third, the financial problems were exacerbated by

the Celali campaigns because the central treasury had to increase its contribution to

the campaigns. The indices pointed out the short term Celali Effect was seen on the

fiscal adaptation and crisis.

3.4 Conclusion

The goal of this chapter was to discuss and highlight the Celali Effect on the Ottoman

economy and following period of fiscal transformation. The question of the Celali

Effect was handled in three main parts. In the first part, the rural economy was handled.

It was shown that the revolts caused problems in the rural production, which ended in

a short period of scarcity of basic cereals and meat. The level of shortage was tried to

be monitored with the examples of narh prices, mukataa registers and account books

of waqfs in Konya and Tokat. Akdag showed that the prices of wheat, bread and meat

rose in the Celali period. The primary factor behind this rise was the Celali dispersal,

which led to a period of decay in agricultural production and livestock raising.

Mukataa defters remarked a notable decline in the number of livestock. Some

mukataas of adet-i ağnam could not be collected and the demands to buy adet-i ağnam

mukataas decayed. Waqf records showed that the prices of basic foodstuff like barley

and wheat (these were cultivated most widely) rose remarkably once the Celalis hit the

region. The narh prices and waqf registers depicted that the Celali Effect on rural

economy and agricultural crisis was seen on short term in discussed regions of central

and northern Anatolia. Similar to narh and waqf registers, mukataas could allow to

follow the longevity of the Celali Effect; however, it requires a wider mukataa study,

celuy de Maras vers Damas) who were against the war. BNF.Français,16145-4 (Années 1605-1623)/192-193. 436 See Çakır, Osmanlı Mukataa Sistemi, 71-73.

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which surpasses the limits of this master thesis. It should be noted that mukataas

studied so far do not show any severe long term Celali Effect. Taking the regional

differences into consideration, it is probable that most of the damaged mukataas started

to recover in a few years.

In the second part, the industries of Bursa silk and Ankara mohair were handled. The

price index of raw silk by Çizakça showed that the prices rose in the violent years of

revolts. The prices of raw silk were influenced by the Celali activities. The Celali

Effect on Bursa silk was seen short term. The situation of Ankara mohair was handled

in regions of Ankara and Tosya. I argued that while Ankara could overcome the Celali

Effect, Tosya went through a period of difficulties in production and supply of mohair.

It is highlighted that the Celali Effect differed regionally. Despite Ankara region was

hit by the Celalis many times, the mohair could maintain its production in the region.

On the other hand, Tosya was not a Celali violence center but mohair felt the crisis

deeper. The Celali Effect, regardless of the level of violence, could differ regionally.

In the last part, I argued that among other causes influential in the era of financial

adaptation the Celali Effect played an outstanding role. The Celali depopulation

damaged mukataas and tımar system. The mukataas did not work properly owing to

the desertion and the central treasury faced a short term Celali crisis. The tımar system

was damaged profoundly. The sipahi had lost the vital condition of the system. The

pressure on the central treasury had been exacerbated in the Celali campaigns. The

treasury had to increase its part in the campaigns because the provincial treasuries

could not send money and mukataa revenues had declined remarkably. These three

factors accelerated the transition from tahrir to avarız system. The decaying mukataa

revenues and pressure of the Celali campaigns were fiscal reasons. On the other hand,

the destruction of tımar lands was institutional cause. The center tried to return the

fugitive peasants back to their lands as early as the first desertion started at the end of

the 16th century. On the other hand, this process was not that fast and the expected

return was not seen in a short time. This situation made center to give up hopes from

any kind of rural economic activities on which that the tımar system would be based.

The avarız system did not require an attached cultivator to the soil. The base of taxation

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was transformed from rural production, that the sipahi used to collect in kind and cash

for himself, to avarız taxes levied by the center composed of kind, cash payment and

some services. In short, the new system was compatible with the new conditions

created by desertion, remarkable mukataa revenue decline and the fiscal crisis. The

Celali Effect discussed in three sections speeded up the fiscal transformation which

ended in avarız taxes becoming an annual levy.

It seems that the Celali Effect was much deeper on the economy than argued in this

study. While discussing the Celali Effect and the Ottoman economy at the end of the

16th century, one should be careful to discern the roles of revolts because the economic

problems had been provoked by different causes. There are some gaps which wait to

be filled by new archival studies. For instance, our knowledge about agricultural

production crisis seems to be limited between the 1590s and 1640s. There are some

narh prices giving an idea about the changing prices, but they are not enough to cover

such a long period. It seems that waqf registers come forward remaining as one of the

most important sources to fill the gaps in agricultural production crisis.

The situation of textile sectors of Bursa silk and Ankara mohair was handled in the

Celali years. It was shown that these sectors were affected by the Celali violence. Even

if there are some problems in the price index of raw silk of Çizakça, his study provided

an important source to follow the Celali Effect with numerical data. His efforts to

prepare a price index in the 1980s were not followed by the future historians and not

a detailed price index could be prepared since then covering the Celali years. The

situation for mohair was more obscure. The Celalis caused some difficulties in mohair

production and supply but their reflections cannot be followed on a price index, which

would monitor the changes yearly. A mohair price study would make an important

contribution to the field to see the exact level of Celali destruction. In this study some

Celali Effect on mohair was shown through studies based on fermans, kadı records and

voyage books; however, these sources need to be supported by numerical indices.

It appears that Ottoman economic difficulties and transformation of fiscal system have

not been illuminated completely yet. It is widely accepted that these were affected by

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many external and internal factors. The effects of the American silver on prices need

to be shown more. For instance, the inflation on Akdag’s price examples of foodstuff

in the Celali years should be questioned more widely. These prices were used as

indicators of Celali destruction in this study. As Akdag had stated the major factor

behind the rise was the revolts but it could still be challenged once the inflation is

handled deeper.

The transition from tahrir to avarız should be studied more widely because the Celali

Effect on rural demography directly affected the proper functioning of economic

activities in mukataa lands and continuation of tımar system. Accepting the effects of

increasing war burden on avarız, which turned it into an annual extraction, the Celali

Effect should be emphasized once more in the era of fiscal transition. As discussed in

this study, the mukataas, which provided one of the major cash revenues of the central

treasury, were destructed in the era of violence. As a result of the desolation, mukataa

lands could not function properly and the pressure on the central treasury was

exacerbated owing to uncollected revenues.

A detailed study of Anatolian has mukataa registers is crucial in order to see the

uncollected mukataa revenues and the following economic burden of the Celalis in

yearly budgets. As shown in this study, the central treasury had difficulties to collect

mukataa revenues. The majority of mukataa registers studied for this study were

recorded between the 1590s and 1620s. There are still many records left aside, for the

time being, that could signal the Celali Effect. These records will provide some

numerical data and important notes (derkenars)437 on the Celali destruction.

These records could fill an important gap in the Celali period. On the other hand,

despite the future contribution of these registers to the demographic and economic

history, Anatolian mukataas in the Celali years have not been studied in detail yet.

437 For instance, a derkenar mentions a tax collection difficulty in Bursa because of the Celali activities. BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/60.

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There are important studies on mukataa system.438 These studies cover how mukataa

system works and mültezim buys iltizams. On the other hand, the system of these

registers has yet to be studied completely. Any work handling the systematic of defters

would make an important contribution.

438 See Çakır, Osmanlı Mukataa Sistemi; Erol Özvar, Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikane Uygulaması (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2003).

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CHAPTER IV

THE GENERAL CONCLUSION

The Ottoman narrative sources describe the Celalis as violent and cruel great armies

who ravaged the settlements and disturbed reaya in Anatolia. The findings reached in

this study demonstrate that not only the demography but also the economy of the

Ottoman Empire was prone to be affected by widespread violence and brigandage.

This study discussed the effects of the Celali Revolts, the Celali Effect, by evaluating

the existing literature from a different perspective and by examining archival sources.

The case studies, mainly based on numerical data, were revisited in terms of the Celali

Effect. The Ottoman and French archival materials were used. The study of archival

documents pointed to the importance of mukataa registers. Mukataa defters, which are

surprisingly left aside despite their apparent richness, can help analyze the Ottoman

demography and economy. In the light of these methods, the study has reached the

following conclusions.

First, the question of the urban demographic changes in the Celali years were

examined through the wages of skilled and unskilled construction workers in Istanbul.

The wage fluctuations pointed that the town had received mass migration in the era of

rebellions. This conclusion was a concrete proof of the words of the contemporary

observers.439 This attempt emphasizes the necessity of similar wage index, preferably

of the construction workers, for other Ottoman towns. For instance, the important

cities, such as Bursa, Ankara and Kayseri, can be examined through the same method.

Compared to Istanbul, these towns faced the Celali violence directly and it is

reasonable to expect that the fluctuations in wages reached the peak during the Great

Flight. Accepting the difficulties of preparing a wage index, these studies will make

an important contribution to understanding the level of demographic mobility in the

era of violence.

439 Kâtip Çelebi, Düstûru’l-Amel, 113-114.

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Second, the rural demographic crisis was discussed through case studies which

presented a comparison of the data extracted from tahrir and avarız registers. As an

addition to these defters, this study indicated the significance of the waqf and mukataa

records to follow rural demographic fluctuations on shorter terms. There are a few

waqf studies which question the records for this purpose.440 On the other hand, has

mukataa defters have not been examined systematically yet. This study demonstrated

that these registers reflect the traces of demographic changes.

The very first aim of the has mukataas is actually to record and follow mukataa

revenues of the central treasury. On the other hand, they present data indirectly about

changing demography. The kâtip (scribe) noted any changes in the mukataa lands

which caused a remarkable decline in the economic activities. The majority of the

cases showed that the principal cause was related to the demographic fluctuations.441

The mukataa registers of the central and northern Anatolia studied so far confirmed

the land desertion and the demographic crisis that were proposed by comparative

studies of tahrir and avarız defters. The defters studied indicated that the remarkable

demographic fluctuations usually lasted a few years. They should be used owing to

their three features. Firstly, there are defters for the significant years of the Celali

Revolts, such as the Great Flight, and they will allow to assess the limits of the

depopulation. Secondly, these registers were compiled on shorter periods. For

instance, the mukataa of Inegöl mines can be investigated, minimum, three times until

second decade of the 17th century (in 1609, 1612 and 1616). Thirdly, since these

registers were compiled for all mukataas situated in different parts of the central and

northern Anatolia, they allow us to follow the regional changes. These three features

may indicate the very short term regional fluctuations in the Celali years. A wide

mukataa study exceeded the limits of this study; however, the examples used prove

that a systematic study of these registers is necessary. In order to make use of these

documents properly, a study which explains the complex defter system is required.

440 Orbay, “The ‘Celâlî Effect’ on Rural Production and Demography in Central Anatolia,” 29-43. 441 There are a few examples of negative effects of climate, epidemic, great fires and wars. See BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/113, 124, 145, 146, 157, 176, 192.

112

Third, as an addition to the demographic fields, the Celali Effect was discussed in

economic spheres. The mohair and silk industries were going through hard periods

because the production and trade were suffering from the rebellions. The index of raw

silk prices gave the expected results and the silk production experienced remarkable

fluctuations. On the other hand, the exact situation of mohair could not be discussed

with numerical indices because of lack of a mohair price index. Present indices allow

us, for the time being, to assume that the prices of mohair had fluctuated remarkably

too. This claim needs to be proven by future studies presenting mohair prices, which

would be an important contribution.

Fourth, the economic difficulties of the central treasury, a part of which was associated

with the effects of the revolts, can be studied very productively with Anatolia has

mukataa records. The defters studied validate the words of the contemporary observers

about increasing financial difficulties and pressure on the treasury.442 The mukataa

revenues, after payments of mevacibs, were sent directly to the central treasury.443 The

mukataa revenue collection problems naturally reflected to the total revenues of the

treasury and yearly budgets. A calculation of bakis (arrears) will give an idea about

economic loss of the treasury. Only future studies will allow to see the degree of the

economic damage of the Celalis on the central treasury. It should be noted that there

are hundreds of cases about bakis and müflis (bankrupt) tax payers between 1590s and

1620s. Moreover, a new study will show that the number of müflis tax-farmers and

amount of bakis increased remarkably in this period. As an addition to the economic

loss associated with the decaying economic activities in mukataa lands, some cases

depict that the treasury could not collect the cizyes, one of the most significant cash

revenues of the center, in the Celali years.444 As an addition to the cash lost, the

problems of cizye payments give an idea about the level of non-Muslim depopulation.

442 See Orhonlu, Telhisler, 30. 443 Mevacib was some payments made, which tax farmers had promised in the mukataa contract, once the revenues of the mukataa were collected. Military payments, janissaries of certain fortress in particular, constituted the greatest part. If Anatolian and Rumeli mukaatas are compared, mevacibs were very modest in Anatolia. 444 For example, MAD.d,04684/17.

113

There are also important derkenars (notes on the margins) which clarify the problems

in mukataa lands.445

Fifth, French archival sources offered data about the great Celali leaders, the actions

of the center towards rebels and the Celali destruction. The content of letters on the

revolts, despite being often prejudiced, showed similarities with mühimme registers

and contemporary Ottoman narrative sources. Considering that these letters were

composed minimum once in each 10-15 days, a systematic study of these documents

could give traces of mass immigration and social life in Istanbul.

Sixth, the discussions indicated the importance of regional differences of the Celali

Effect in the economic and demographic spheres. The rural demography chapter

showed that the rate of depopulation and resettlement was regionally different.446 The

future studies of mukataa registers can make an important contribution to revealing

the regional differences in the countryside. The mukataa examples used signaled that

there could be remarkable differences in the degree of the Celali Effect even in a small

region. These differences can be examined widely by comparing defters of different

mukataa units situated in the same area. On the other hand, the number of urban

demography studies seems to be inadequate to handle the regional differences of towns

clearly. We need more studies of urban demography which allow to follow, or deduce

at least, the demographic changes yearly.

Last but not least, at first glance the Celali Revolts look like a series of temporary

rebellions composed of hundreds of armed men who came from different layers of the

society. These groups inflicted unprecedented violence during a few years in a wide

445 For instance, a derkenâr mentions a tax collection difficulty in Bursa emphasizing Celali attacks. BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/60. 446 A recent study highlighted the regional differences. Mehmet Kuru showed that the western Anatolia became shelter for peasants who fled from the Celalis and population of the western Anatolia and Mediterranean coastal regions rose while there was a great depopulation in the central and northern Anatolia. I am thankful to him for sharing his unpublished thesis with me. Mehmet Kuru, “Locating an Ottoman Port-City in the Early Modern Mediterranean: Izmir 1580-1780” (Unpublished Doctorate’s Thesis, University of Toronto, 2017), 57-66.

114

geography. The first reaction to the revolts was an immediate land desertion which

started to take place as early as the first years of the 17th century. A part of the deserters

joined the Celalis and reinforced human source of violence. After a while, the victims

became rebels and this turned into an interminable chain of Celalism. The center

squashed the revolts through counter violence and the rebels were massacred. Once

the revolts in the countryside were calmed down, while a part of immigrants had

already merged with urban life, some others returned back to their çifts and villages.

Some of the effects of the revolts discussed emphasized that the Celali Revolts meant

more than a story of destruction and social turbulence. The effects appear to be more

complex and extensive phenomenon than dealt with in this study. Once the immigrants

started to return back to their çifts and villages, they found their fields invaded by

members of askeri class, effects of which constitute a part of the long lasting and

complicated debate of çiftik.447 The future studies will surely find answers to some

questions and challenge the findings proposed by the present study. One of the greatest

contributions to the field will be made after a systematic study of mukataa registers,

which deserve to be given more attention.

447 Özel, The Collapse of Rural Order, 180-181.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu çalışma 16.yüzyılın son yılları itibariyle Anadolu’da başlayan Celali Isyanları’nın

etkilerini demografik ve ekonomik alanlarda incelemeyi ve bir “Celali Etkisi” kavramı

oluşturmayı hedeflemektedir. Tezin temel sorunu Osmanlı “Transformasyon

Dönemi”nde meydana gelen demografik ve ekonomik alanlardaki degişim ve

problemlerin hangilerinin Celali Isyanları’yla ilişkili oldugunu ortaya çıkarmak,

isyanların etkilerini dönemi etkileyen diger olaylar içinden ayrıştırmaktır.

Kabul gören genel görüşe göre 16.yüzyıl Osmanlı Imparatorlugu için bir büyüme

çagıydı. Kırsal ve şehir nüfusu hızla artmış ve imparatorluk geniş topraklara ulaşmıştı.

Bu gelişmeler sebebiyle klasik tarih yazımında 16.yüzyıl “Yükselme Devri” olarak

adlandırıldı. Ancak 16.yüzyılın sonlarına dogru büyüme duraklamış ve imparatorluk

bir dizi problemle ugraşmak zorunda kalmıştır. Genel nüfus artışı yüzyılın ikinci

yarısında kırsal alanlarda nüfus baskısına yol açmaya başladı. Artan nüfusa tarım

alanları yaratabilmek için tam çift niteligindeki araziler parçalanma sürecine girdi ve

yeni tarım arazileri açıldı. Ancak bunlara ragmen nüfus baskısı kırsal alanda devam

etti ve topraksız köylülerin bir kısmı ekonomik kaygılarla büyük şehirlere göç etmeye

başladı. Yerlerinde kalan reayanın bir bölümü ise çeteler kurarak yagma ve talan

faaliyetlerine girişti. Artan güvensizlik ortamı kırsal ekonomiyi olumsuz etkiledi ve

üretim yapan köylünün çiftini terk etmesine sebep oldu.

Transformasyon Dönemi Askeri Devrim tartışmaları içinde anılan bir dizi olaya şahit

oldu. Habsburg ve Safevi savaşları ateşli silah kullanan yeniçeri sayısında bir artışa

yol açtı. Yeniçeri sayısı hızla arttırıldı ve merkezi gelirlerin en büyük gider kalemini

oluşturdu. Asker ödemelerinin yanında iki cephede süren savaş masrafları merkezi

hazine üzerindeki baskıyı arttırdı. Diger taraftan maaşlarını köylerinden topladıkları

vergiyle elde eden ve klasik dönemde Osmanlı ordusunun bel kemigi sayılan tımarlı

sipahi sayısı düşüşe geçti. Sipahilerin geçirdikleri dönüşüm konusunda modern tarih

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yazımı çeşitli görüşler sunmuştur. Bunlardan en çok kabul göreni Sipahilerin ateşli

silahlarla savaşan Habsburg Ordusu karşısında yenilgiye ugramasından sonra bunların

bir kısmının Topçu Ocagı’na ve bir kısmının da cephe arkası görevlere alınmasıdır.

Geçimini tımarından saglayan askerlerin sayısı azalırken, ateşli silah kullanan ve

düzenli maaş alan ordu büyüdü. Bütçelerdeki yıllık giderler artan maaşlı asker

sayısının ve bunun mali yükünü yansıtır. Artan yeniçeri sayısına ek olarak merkez

paralı asker sayılarını da arttırmıştır. Savaş bitiminde terhis edilen ve geliri kesilen bu

askerler kırsal alanlarda gruplar halinde haydutluk yaparak tarımsal üretime zarar

vermiş ve reayanın yerlerini terk edip kaçmasına sebep olmuştur.

Bu dönemi etkileyen bir diger olay da Fiyat Devrimi ile ilişkilendirilen fiyat

hareketlerinin etkileridir. Enflasyonist dönem Amerika’dan bol miktarda gelen ucuz

gümüşün etsiyle bagdaştırılırken, son dönemlerde bazı tarihçiler tagşişlerin etkileri

üzerinde durmuştur. Transformasyon Dönemi’nde yapılan tagşişler neticesinde para

deger kaybetmiş ve maaşlı kadrolar arasında memnuniyetsizlige ve isyanlara sebep

olmuştur. Artan mali yükün altında tagşiş ve enflasyon birbirini besleyen süreçler

haline gelmiştir. Ücretler düşüş yaşarken genel fiyat artışları maaşlı kadronun yanında

reayayı da olumsuz yönde etkilemiş olmalıdır.

Merkezi hazinenin artan yükü karşısında uzun vadede kazanç saglamayan tagşişlere

ek olarak vergilendirme sisteminde de adaptasyona gidilmiştir. Tımar sistemine dayalı

tahrir kayıtları 16.yüzyılın sonlarında neredeyse terk edilmiş ve savaş zamanı gibi acil

durumlarda toplanan avarız vergisi yıllık düzenli bir gelir haline dönüşmüştür.

Merkez, ihtiyacı ölçüsünde avarız vergisini nakdî, aynî ya da hizmet olarak talep

etmiştir. Avarız gelirlerinin belirlenmesi için tahrir kayıtları bırakılıp avarız sayımları

yapılmaya başlanmıştır. Avarız gelirlerine ek olarak cizye gelirlerinin de merkezi

hazinedeki önemi artmıştır.

Son dönem Osmanlı tarih yazımı Küçük Buz Çagı olarak adlandırılan aşırı soguk ve

kuraklık gibi iklimsel olayların etkilerini vurgulamaya başlamıştır. Erken Modern

dönemde tarımsal üretimin iklim karşısındaki hassasiyeti göz önüne alındıgında,

iklimsel felaketlerin tarımsal üretime zarar vererek kırsalda yaşayan reayayı olumsuz

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etkiledigi kabul edilebilinir. Birbirini takip eden hasat krizlerinin köylerden kentlere

göçü tetikledigi akla makul görünebilir. Osmanlı arşiv belgelerinde de iklimsel

olaylara baglı bazı aksamalar yaşandıgının izlerini bulmak mümkündür. 17.yüzyıl

Osmanlısında iklimsel olaylar ve kırsal ekonomi arasındaki korelasyon inkar

edilemez; ancak tarihçilerin elinde bazı data eksikleri vardır. Avrupa ve Balkanların

büyük bir kesimi için yıllık iklimsel olayları gösteren listeler mevcutken, Anadolu’nun

merkezi için bu tür çalışmaların artmasına ihtiyaç vardır. Başta vakıf defterleri ve

mühimme kayıtlarından yıllık iklimsel felaketlere deginen çalışmalar varsa da

bunların sayısı fazla degildir.

Merkezi yönetim yukarıda sözüne edilen şartlar altında demografik ve ekonomik

alanlarda çeşitli zorluklarla karşılaşmış ve güncel duruma adapte olarak çözüm

yöntemleri aramıştır. Vergi sisteminde degişiklikler ve mali hazine bürolarındaki

düzenlemeler bunun en somut örneklerindendir. Bunlara ek olarak 16.yüzyılın son

yıllarında Anadolu’da Celali Isyanları patlak vermiş ve var olan zorluklar karşısında

merkezi yönetimin yükünü arttırmıştır. Celali liderlerine karşı pragmatik davranan

merkez kimi liderleri savaş meydanlarında öldürürken kimilerine yüksek görevler vaat

ederek isyandan caydırma yoluna gitmiştir.

Bu çalışma Osmanlı Transformasyon Dönemi’nde görülen problemler içinden Celali

Isyanları’nın etkilerini ayrıştırmıştır. Isyanın etkileri demografik ve ekonomik

alanlarda “Celali Etkisi” kavramı adı altında incelenmiştir. Kavramdaki amaç çeşitli

sebeplerden etkilenen Osmanlı demografisinin ve ekonomisinin içinden sadece Celali

Etkisi ortaya çıkarmak ve vurgulamaktır. Bu kavram Celali Isyanları’nın Osmanlı

demografisi ve ekonomisindeki etkilerini ortaya koymak ve vurgulamak amacıyla

kullanmılmıştır. Bu ayrım Celali Isyanları’nın felaketsel derin problemlere mi yoksa

geçici duraklamalara mı sebep oldugunu cevaplamayı hedefler. Celali Etkisi’ni ortaya

çıkarmak için çalışmada çeşitli arşiv belgelerinden faydalanılmıştır.

Çalışmanın en önemli arşiv belgelerini has arazilerin çeşitli mukataa gelirlerini

gösteren defterler ve iltizam talepnameleri oluşturmaktadır. Buna ek olarak mühimme

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defterlerinden de faydalanılmıştır. Osmanlı arşiv belgelerinin yanında Fransız elçilik

raporları da incelenmiştir.

Yukarıda özetlenen giriş bölümünden sonra tezin ikinci ana başlıgı Celali Etkisi

altındaki kentsel ve kırsal nüfusu tartışır. Birinci alt başlık kentsel nüfustaki etkileri

işçi fiyatları üzerinden Istanbul örneginde ele alır. Celali yıkımından yerlerini terk

eden reayanın bir bölümü Istanbul’a kaçmış ve şehir nüfusunda kısa süreli artışlara

sebep olmuştur. Bu artışlar “nüfus baskısı” ve işçi ücretlerinde enflasyonla

sonuçlanmıştır. Işçi ücretleri ve büyük isyan yılları beraber ele alındıgında ücretlerin

iki dönemde önemli ölçüde etkilendigi görülmüştür. Bunlardan birincisi küçük çaplı

yagmaların oldugu ve ilk büyük Celali olaylarının patlak verdigi 16.yüzyıl sonudur.

Karayazıcı ve Hüseyin Paşa’nın yıkımından kaçan halkın bir kısmı Istanbul’a göç

etmiştir. Gelen göçmenlerin büyük çogunlugu inşaat işlerine yönelmiş ve işçi

ücretlerinde düşüş görülmüştür. Ikinci düşüş 1620’lerin başlarında görülür; ancak bu

yıllarda Anadolu’da büyük çaplı bir Celali Isyanı olmamıştır. Bu düşüşün bir kısmı

Anadolu’nun birçok yöresinde görülen yüzlerce Celali haydutlugu ile ilgili olabilir.

Söz konusu düşüş Abaza Paşa’nın 1622’deki isyanı sırasında hızlanmış olmalıdır. Bu

isyan geniş bir cografi bölgede etkili olmuş ve merkez tarafından panikle

karşılanmıştır. Her iki düşüş de kısa süreli olmuş ve isyanlar merkezi yönetim

tarafından bastırıldıktan sonra ücret düşüşü tersine dönmüştür. Bunun arkasında

isyanlardan sonra Istanbul’dan kendi istekleri ve merkezin zorlaması sonucu ayrılan

göçmenler vardır. Celali Etkisi kentsel nüfus üzerinde Istanbul örneginde incelenmiş

ve etkilerin kısa süreli oldugu görülmüştür.

Ikinci alt başlıkta kırsal nüfustaki etkiler geniş ölçüde ele alınmıştır. Tahrir ve avarız

defterlerinin karşılaştırılmasına dayalı çalışmalar kabaca 1580 ve 1643 yılları arasında

büyük bir nüfus düşüşüne işaret ederler. Bu düşüşün arkasındaki en büyük sebep Celali

Isyanları’nın yol açtıgı yıkımdır. 16.yüzyılın son yıllarında başlayan Karayazıcı ve

Deli Hüseyin’in isyanını 17.yüzyılın başlarında Kalenderoglu ve daha küçük Celali

grupları izlemiştir. Kuyucu Murat’ın Celali seferleri sona erdiginde Anadolu’nun

birçok yeri yagmalanmış ve Celalilerin yogunlukta oldugu yerlerdeki reaya dagılmıştı.

Büyük Kaçgunluk (1603-1607) adı verilen dönemde Anadolu büyük demografik

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hareketlere şahit oldu ve bazı bölgelerin kırsal nüfusu %80-90 civarında azaldı.

Kuyucu Murat Paşa’nın Celali seferlerinden sonra Anadolu’da başlayan

“normalleşme” süreci uzun sürmedi. Kalenderoglu’nun 1608’de sonlanan isyanından

sonra 1622’de Abaza Mehmet Paşa isyan bayragını çekti. Isyan geniş bir cografyada

etkili oldu ve Anadolu Celali dalgası altında bir kez daha sarsıldı.

Avarız ve tahrir defterlerinin karşılaştırılmasına dayalı çalışmalar azalan nüfusu

göstermekle beraber akla bazı sorular da getirir. Bunlardan ilki Celali Etkisi altındaki

kısa süreli nüfus hareketleridir. Avarız ve tahrir defterleri karşılaştırmaları genellikle

yaklaşık olarak 60 yıllık dönemi kapsar; ancak kısa dönemli demografik hareketler

hakkında ipucu vermez. Kırsal nüfus üzerindeki Celali Etkisi’nin tam olarak ortaya

çıkartılması için demografik hareketlerin mümkün oldugunca kısa zaman aralıklarında

takip edilmesi gerekir. Vakıf defterleri Celali yıllarında nüfus degişimlerini izlemeye

yardım edebilir. Özellikle Selatin Vakıfları’nın kendi vakıf arazilerinde yaptıkları

tahrirler Celali Etkisi’ni yıllık olarak gösterebilir.

Bu çalışmada kırsal nüfus düşüşü Amasya ve Tokat bölgelerinde ayrıntılı olarak

incelenmiştir. Bu bölgelerde yaşayan kırsal nüfusun ortalama olarak %70-80’i

yerlerini terk etmiştir. Yüksek orandaki düşüş meskûn köy sayılarında da azalmaya

neden olmuştur. Kaybolan köylerin çogu Celalilerin kolay ulaşabildigi platolarda

bulunan büyük ölçekli olmayan yerleşmelerdir.

Yüksek oranlardaki nüfus düşüşü bu insanların Celaliler tarafından katledildigi

anlamına gelmez. Genel düşüş içinde isyanlar sırasında hayatını kaybedenlerin oranı

göç oranının yanında düşük miktarlarda kalmış olmalıdır. Celali yıkımıyla karşılaşan

reaya şu dört seçenekten birini seçmiş olabilir. Bunların ilki Celali ordularına dahil

olup, yagma ve yıkım zincirinin bir parçası olmaktır. Bunlara ait örnekler mühimme

defterlerinde karşımıza çıkar. Ikinci olarak bunların büyük şehirlere göç etmesdir.

Istanbul incelenendiginde bunun örnerkleri görülebilinir. Üçüncüsü, kaçan reayanın

kısa bir süre sonra eski yerlerine dönmesidir. Yerlerine geri gelen reayanın bir kısmı

boşalan arazilerinin askeri sınıf tarafından işgal edildigini görmüştür. Son olarak,

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yerlerini terk eden reayanın Celali yagmasından korunmak için güvenli gördügü

engebeli daglık arazilere yeni yerleşim alanları kurmasıdır.

Bu kısımda ayrıca “Celali yerleşkeleri” olarak adlandırılan isyanlardan etkilenip farklı

bir yere yerleşen köylülerin kurdukları yerleşkeler incelenmiştir. Celalilerin kolayca

ulaşabildigi platolardaki yerleşim yerlerinden kaçan reaya çareyi daha yüksekteki

korunaklı alanlarda bulmuştur. Bu yerleşmelerin bir kısmı bir çeşit geçici Celali

barınagı gibi hizmet etmiş olabilir. Bozok ve Canik ele alınmış, bu bölgelerde

Celalilerden kaçan reayanın bir bölümünün daha güvenli daglık alanlarda yeni köyler

kurdukları ve buna baglı olarak köy sayısının arttıgı gözlemlenmiştir. Yerleşim

sayısındaki artış dogal nüfus artışından kaynaklanmamış olmalıdır; çünkü yerleşim

yerlerinin sayısı artarken hane sayıları Celali öncesi dönemle karşılaştırıldıgında hala

düşüktür. Köylerden dagılan reaya küçük gruplar halinde farklı yerleşim yerleri

oluşturmuştur. Ancak Celali yıllarındaki nüfus hareketleri bundan çok daha karışık

olmalıdır. Tokat bölgesi bu açıdan ipucu sunabilir. Söz konusu bölgede Celali yıkımı

altındaki reayanın yerlerini terk etme ve yeni yerleşim alanları kurma konusunda

oldukça dinamik oldugu görülmüştür. Celalilerin Tokat’ı vurdugu daha ilk yıllarda

reaya yerlerini terk etmeye başlamıştır. Konya’da bulunan II.Selim Vakfı’nın kayıtları

da reayanın Celali Isyanları’da karşı ne kadar hassas oldugunu göstermiştir. Isyanların

Konya’da etkili oldugu ilk yıllardan itibaren vakıf arazilerinde yaşayan reaya kaçmaya

başlamıştır.

Bu çalışma mukataa defterlerinin bu alanda kullanılması gerektigini de göstermiştir.

Bu defterler ana amaçları geregi demografik kayıtlar olmasalar da mukataa arazileri

nüfustaki önemli degişikliklerden etkilenmiştir. Bunun en bariz örneklerinden biri

isyanın ve kaçışların başladıgı henüz ilk yıllarda mukataa gelirlerinin düşmesi,

mültezimlerin öngörülen ödemeleri yapamamaya başlamasıdır. Sayısal verilerin

incelenmesi sonucu ortaya çıkan bu durum bazen de mültezim veya mukataa müfettişi

tarafından açıkça vurgulanmıştır.

Celali Etkisi’nin kırsal popülasyon üzerindeki uzun ve kısa vadeli olarak

degerlendirilmesi bölgesel farkılıkların önemini ortaya koyar. Kırsal nüfusta Celali

Etkisi hem uzun hem de kısa vadeli olarak görünür. Demografik düşüşün detaylı olarak

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incelendigi Amasya ve Tokat bölgelerinde Celali Etkisi farklılıklar göstermiştir.

Amasya’da 1576 tahririnde meskûn olan ve 1643 avarız defterinde terk edilmiş

gözüken köylerin bir kısmı daha sonra iskân edilmiş ve 20.yüzyıla kadar ulaşmıştır.

Diger yandan 1643 avarız defterinden sonra tekrar ortaya çıkmamış köyler de vardır.

Bölgesel farklılıklar Celali Etkisi’nin Amasya ölçeginde hem uzun hem kısa dönemli

olarak görüldügünü gösterir. Tokat da benzer sonuçları göstermiştir. 1574 tahrir

defterinde meskûn ve 1601 avarız kayıtlarında terk edilmiş görünen köylerin bir kısmı

1611 avarız defterinde tekrar meskûn görünür. 1574 tahririnde meskûn kaydedilen

fakat 1600, 1601 ve 1611 avarız defterlerinde terk edilmiş köylerin bir kısmı 1643’te

tekrar iskân edilmiştir. Diger yandan söz konusu karşılaştırmada 1574’de meskûn

oldugu halde 1643’te tekrar ortaya çıkmayan köyler de vardır. 1643’te ortaya

çıkmayan köylerin bir kısmı daha sonra iskân olurken diger bölümü tamamen ortadan

kaybolmuş olmalıdır. Tokat örneginde de Celali Etkisi’nin kırsal nüfus üzerinde hem

kısa hem de uzun dönemli etkili oldugu görülmüştür.

Çalışmanın üçüncü ana başlıgı Celali Etkisi’ni ekonomik alanlarda tartışır. Bölümün

ilk konusu kırsal ekonomideki Celali Etkisi’dir. Isyan yıllarında tarımsal üretimde ve

hayvancılıktaki düşüşe baglı olarak yiyecek sıkıntısı ele alınır. Tarımsal üretim Konya

ve Tokat’ta bulunan vakıflar üzerinden işlenir. Hayvancılıgın durumu mukataa

defterlerinden örneklerle tartışılır. Ikinci bölümün konusu Celali Etkisi altındaki ipek

ve tiftik endüstrilerileridir. Ipek Bursa’da, tiftik Ankara ve Tosya (Kastamonu)

bölgelerinde incelenir. Son bölüm merkezi ekonominin isyanlardan nasıl etkilendigini

irdeler ve Celali Etkisi’nin degişen vergi sistemindeki rolünü ele alır.

Kırsal alanlardaki Celali kaçkını sonucu tarımsal üretim ve hayvancılık zorlu yıllara

girmiştir. Narh fiyatları üretimdeki düşüş dönemlerini yansıtır. Tahıl üretiminin

azalması ekmek fiyatlarını yükseltmiştir. Örnegin Celalilerin en çok etkili yerlerden

biri olan Ankara ve çevresinde 1 akçe 1599 yılında 480 gram ekmek alabiliyorken,

1606’da ancak 386 gram alabilmiştir. Celali orduları reayanın tarlasındaki hasatı

biçmiş, ambardaki tahılları da yagma etmiştir. Hayvancılık da etkilenmiş ve narh

fiyatları yükseltilmiştir. 1595’te fiyatı 100-120 akçe arasında degişen bir koyun

1609’da 217 akçeye yükselmiştir. Narh fiyatlarına ek olarak mühimme defterleri, gezi

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yazıları ve mukataa defterlerinde de Celali Etkisi’nin kırsal ekonomik faaliyetler

üzerindeki etkisi görülür. Bu çalışmada kullanılan mukataa defterlerin

haycanvanlıgılın ugradıgı zararın derecesiyle ilgili bilgi de sunmaktadır. Örnek olarak

Kastamonu’da 1600-1608 yılları arasındaki Celali yagmaları yüzünden adet-i agnam

mukataaları vergilendirilecek koyun kalmadıgı gerekçesiyle satılamamıştır. Mukataa

defterleri tarımsal üretim ve hayvancılıkta görülen duraklamanın birkaç sezon

sürdügünün sinyallerini verir. Isyan dönemleri sonunda kırsal üretim kısmen iyileşme

egilimi göstermiştir. Celali Etkisi tarımsal üretim ve hayvancılık üzerinde kısa süreli

etkili olmuştur.

Vakıf muhasebe defterleri Celali Etkisi’ni daha kısa dönemlerde ve daha ayrıntılı

ortaya koyar. Osmanlı’da vakıflar dini birer hayır müessesesi olmanın yanında kırsal

ve kentsel alanlarda çeşitli gelir kalemlerini yöneten kuruluşlardır. Bu kalemlere ait

gelirlerin ve vakıf giderlerinin muhasebesi tutulur. Kentsel ve kırsal üretimdeki

dalgalanmalar bu kayıtlar üzerinden degerlendirilebilinir. Konya’daki Selatin

Vakıfları’nın muhasebe defterleri Celali Etkisi’nin derecesini detaylı gösterir.

Konya’da bulunan Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî, Sadreddîn-i Konevî ve Selîm II

vakıfları bölgede 16.yüzyılın sonu, 17.yüzyılın ilk onlugu ve 1621-1623 yıllarında

tarımsal üretimde Celali Etkisi sinyalleri verir. Üretimdeki sıkıntılar nedeniyle vakfın

tarımsal gelirleri düşmüş ve tahıl fiyatları yükselmiştir. Ancak defterler takip

edildiginde Celali krizinin birkaç sezon sürdügü ve isyanın etkilerinin azalmasıyla

birlikte tarımsal faaliyetlerin artmaya başladıgı görülür. Bu artışla ilişkili olarak tahıl

fiyatları da düşmeye başlar.

Tokat’ta bulunan Hatuniyye Vakfı muhasebe defteleri de tarımsal üretimdeki Celali

Etkisi’ni gösterir. 1593 ve 1599 yılları arasında vakfın muhasebe defterleri önemli bir

tarımsal düşüş göstermez. Celali yıllarının başlangıcını kapsayan 1599’u ve takip eden

yılların defterleri mevcut degildir. Ancak 1610 yılına gelindiginde kayıtlar mevcuttur

ve 1599 yılı verileriyle karşılaştırıldıgında vakfın bir Celali krizi yaşadıgı görülür.

Vakfın gelirleri büyük oranda düşmüştür ve vakıf bazı temel işlevlerini yerine

getirememektedir. Vakıf mutfagı 1610-1612 yılları arasında kapatılmıştır. Vakıf

muhasebe defterlerine göre Tokat’ta Celali Etkisi daha ciddi ve uzun süreli

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görülmüştür. Hatuniyye Vakfı’nda muhtemelen 17.yüzyılın ilk yıllarında başlayan

Celali Etkisi en azından 1638 yılına kadar sürmüştür. Vakıf arazileri bu süre zarfından

yeniden iskan edilmemiş olmalıdır. Konya ve Tokat’taki Celali Etkisi’nin bölgesel

farklılıkları Celali şiddetinin düzeyinin yanında vakıfların mali güçleriyle de ilgilidir.

Ikinci bölümün konusu ipek ve tiftik endüstrilerindeki problemlerdir. Ipek Bursa’da

incelenirken tiftik Ankara ve Tosya’da (Kastamonu) ele alınır. Bursa ham ipek fiyat

endeksi 16.yüzyılın ikinci yarısıyla 17.yüzyılın ilk yarısı arası fiyat hareketlerini takip

etmeyi mümkün kılmaktadır. Celali Etkisi Bursa’da degişen fiyatlar üzerinden

incelenir. Tiftik için henüz geniş çaplı bir fiyat çalışması yapılmamıştır. Tiftigin

geçirdigi zorluklar kadı sicilleri ve fermanlara dayalı yapılan çalışmalarda

görülebilinir. Ayrıca gezi yazıları da tiftik keçilerinin Celali yıllarında azaldıgının

ipuçlarını verir.

Bursa ham ipek fiyatlarında 1595 ve 1603 yılları arasında ciddi bir artış görünür. 1595-

1597 arasında büyük bir Celali Isyanı yoktur; ancak fiyatlar Bursa ve çevresinde

yaygın olan haydutluk faaliyetlerinden etkilenmiş olabilir. 1598-1603 arasında fiyatlar

%56 artmıştır. Bu yükseliş Karayazıcı ve Deli Hasan’ın Celali yıkımıyla ilişkilidir.

Fiyatlar 1603’ten itibaren 1617’ye kadar düşmüştür. Bu düşüş dört farklı şekilde

yorumlanabilir. Ilk olarak, Karayazıcı ve Deli Hasan’ın isyanları ipek üzerinde uzun

süreli hasara neden olmamıştır. Ikinci yorum ise Kalenderoglu’nun isyanın da (1607)

ipek üzerinde sarsıcı etkileri olmadıgı yönündedir. Üçüncü olarak, Kuyucu Murat’ın

Celali seferi ve takip eden görece normalleşme zamanı ipek fiyatlarının düşmesine

yardımcı olmuştur. 1603-1608 arasındaki düşüş gözle görülür şekilde fazladır. Son

olarak, fiyatlardaki düzelme egilimi isyanların Bursa’da ipekçiligin yapıldıgı yerlerde

nüfusun ciddi olarak düşmedigi sinyalini verebilir. Isyan yıllarında Bursa’nın göç

aldıgı ve nüfusunun arttıgına dair bulgular vardır. 1603’ten 1617’ye kadar düşüş

gösteren ham ipek fiyatları 1622’ye gelindiginde çarpıcı şekilde yükselmiştir. 1617-

1622 yılları arasında fiyat bilgisi olmadıgı için fiyatların tam olarak hangi yılda

artmaya başladıgı kestirilemez. Diger taraftan 1622’de patlak veren Abaza Paşa isyanı

fiyatların artmasında en etkili rolü oynamıştır. Mukataa kayıtları bu durumu destekler

niteliktedir. 1622-1624 arasında ipek (mizan-ı harir) mukataalarında ödeme

problemleri görülür. 1622 -1627 tarihleri arasında fiyat bilgisi mevcut degildir; ancak

1627’ye gelindiginde fiyatların düşüşe geçtigi görünmektedir. Bu düşüş 1630’a kadar

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sürmüştür. Abaza Paşa’nın isyanı ipegin üretimini ve tedarigini etkilemiş; ancak uzun

süreli krizlere yol açmamıştır. Celali Etkisi Bursa ipeginde kısa dönemli olarak

görünür.

Tiftik endüstrisi Tosya ve Ankara bölgelerinde incelenir ve Celali Etkisi’nin bölgesel

farklılıkları vurgulanır. Tiftikte yaşanan üretim problemleri tiftik keçilerinin

yagmalanması gibi sebeplerle sayılarının azalmasıyla dogrudan ilgilidir. Polonyalı

Simeon’un anlattıgı vaka bu bakımdan kayda degerdir. Simeon birkaç satıcının tiftik

keçisi yoklugu yüzünden içine yün karıştırılmış kusurlu tiftik sattıklarını kaydeder.

Tosya bölgesinde 16.yüzyılın sonlarında tiftik sıkıntıları görünmeye başlar. Ustalar

kaftanda kullanılan sofun boyunun kısaltılmasını istemişlerdir ve kendilerine 1600

yılında fermanla bu izin verilmiştir. Bu istek tiftigin bulunmasının zorlaşmasıyla

ilgilidir; çünkü sof tiftikten dokunan bir kumaştır. Tiftik tedariginin zorlaşması Celali

Etkisi ile ilişkilidir. Tosya Celalilerin saldıkları ana merkezlerden birisi olmamasına

ragmen Celali zulmünden etkilenmiştir. Mukataa kayıtları 1600-1601 yıllarında

Karayazıcı ve Deli Hasan’ın 1000 kişilik bir orduyla Kastamonu’da yagma

yaptıklarını kaydeder. Tosya’daki tiftik üretim ve tedarigi bu isyanlardan etkilenmiş

oldugunu düşünmek mantıklıdır. Sayısal veriler üzerinden tartışılamasa da tiftigin

üretiminde ve saglanmasında görülen bu zorlukların fiyatları arttırması olasıdır. Ancak

Bursa ipek endüstrisine benzer şekilde isyanların ardından tiftigin bir normalleşme

dönemine girdigi düşünülebilinir. Celali Etkisi Tosya örnegi üzerinden bakıldıgında

tiftikte kısa vadeli olarak görünür. Ankara da ise durum daha farklıdır. 16.yüzyılın

sonlarında ve 17.yüzyıl başlarında bölgede görülen Celali olayları Ankara tiftigini

sarsmamıştır. Celali şiddetinin görüldügü yıllarda dahi şehre yerli ve yabancı tüccarlar

tiftik almak için gelmişlerdir. Ankara esnafının 1615’teki şikayeti Avrupalı tüccarların

yüksek talebi hakkında bilgi verebilir. Esnaf sof üretimi için tiftik bulmakta

zorlanmaya başladıgından 1615 yılında Avrupalı tüccarlara bu ürünlerin satılmasının

yasaklanmasını talep etmiştir. Tosya ile karşılaştırıldıgında Ankara tiftigi Celali krizini

daha kolay atlatmış görünür. Bunda Ankara’nın saglam duvarlarla daha iyi korunması

ve Celaliler sebebiyle kentten kaçan nüfusun hızlıca iyileşmesininin rolü olabilir.

Ankara ve Tosya bölgeleri karşılaştırıldıgında Celali Etkisi’nin bölgesel

farklılıklarının önemi ortaya çıkar. Tosya bölgesi krizi hissederken, Ankara’da Celali

yıllarında dahi tiftik ve sof üretimi canlıdır. Tiftigin yıllar içinde degişen degeri her iki

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bölgede de fiyat endeksiyle takip edilemese de, Celali Etkisi’nin kısa vadeli etkili

oldugu iddia edilebilinir.

Son bölümde merkezi hazine ve tımar sistemi üzerindeki Celali Etkisi üç alt başlık

altında tartışılır. Ilk başlıgın konusu merkezi hazinenin temel nakit gelirlerinden birini

oluşturan mukataa gelirlerinin düşmesidir. Geniş bir mukataa çalışması bu tezin

sınırlarını aşacagından defterlerden seçilen bazı örneklerle Celali yıkımının

mukataalara zarar vermesi sonucu merkezi hazinenin mukataa gelirlerinin düştügü

gösterilmiştir. Özellikle merkez ve kuzey Anadolu’da bulunan mukataalar üzerindeki

ekonomik aktiviteler sekteye ugramış ve bazı durumlarda ise Celali kaçkını sonrası

mukataa arazilerinin boş kalmasıyla mukataalar tüm işleyişlerini durdurmuştur.

Mültezimler Celali tehlikesi sebebiyle mukataalar almak istememişler ve bunun

neticesinde mukataalar satılamamıştır. Bazı mukataaların iki seneye kadar boş kalması

çarpıcıdır. Merkezi yönetim durumdaki zorluga karşı stratejiler geliştirmiş,

mukataaların devamını saglamaya ve mukataa gelirlerini korumaya çalışmıştır. Diger

taraftan Celali Etkisi baskın gelmiş ve en şiddetli Celali yıllarında mültezim talepleri

düşmüştür. Mültezimler Celali Isyanları’nın başladıgı ilk yıllardan itibaren ödeme

sıkıntıları çekmiş ve bazıları birkaç sene içinde iflas etmiştir. Ayrıca üzerinde

durulması gereken bir diger nokta da baki akçelerin birkaç milyon akçeden çok daha

fazla olmasıdır. Ekonomik zorluklar ve artan masraflarla ugraşan merkezi hazine

üzerindeki yük mukataa gelirlerinin düşmesiyle daha da şiddetlenmiştir. Bu baskının

bir göstergesi de merkezin hazine üzerindeki zorlugu belirterek mültezimlerden baki

akçelerin istemesidir

Ikinci alt başlıgın konusu Celali Etkisi’nin tımar sistemi üzerindeki etkisidir. Yaklaşık

olarak 1580’lerde klasik tahrir pratigi terk edilmeye başlanmıştır. Tahrir yapılabilmesi

tımar sisteminin işleyişiyle yakından ilişkiliydi. Celali yıllarında tımar köyleri

boşalmış, bir kısmı da tamamen kaybolmuştur. Bu durum karşısında tımarlı sipahi

gelir kapısını kaybetmiş ve boşalan köyler tahrir yapılmasını olanaksız hale gelmiştir.

Merkezi yönetim reayayı yerlerine geri dönmeye zorlasa da elimizdeki bulgular kısa

sürede istenilen oranda dönüş olmadıgını gösterir. Köylüsü kaçan sipahinin bu duruma

ne kadar dayanabilecegi ayrı bir sorun olarak çıkar. Bu açıdan bakıldıgında merkezi

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yönetim köylüsü kaçan sipahinin durumunu reayayı köyüne geri dönmeye zorlayarak

düzeltmeye çalışırken diger yandan tarımsal üretim çevresinde dönen tımar sistemini

arka plana atmaya başlamıştır. Tımar sisteminin temel şartı olan topraga baglı

köylünün artık yerlerinde olmaması, sistemin fonksiyonunu yerine getirememesine

sebep olmuştur. Bunun sonucunda da tahrir pratigi eski önemini yitirmiştir.

Son olarak merkezin Celali seferlerinin finansı için hazineden yaptıgı harcamaların

getirdigi mali yük vurgulanmıştır. Sefer hazinesi için eyalet hazinelerinden gönderilen

irsaliyeler öngörülen miktardan daha düşük kaldı. Bu durum Celali Etkisi’nin yarattıgı

yıkımın bir sonucuydu. Bunun üzerine merkez kendi bütçesinden yaptıgı katkıyı

arttırdı. Hazine-i Amire ve Enderun Hazineleri genellikle savaş masraflarının %25-

34’ünü karşılarken Kuyucu Murat’ın Celali Seferi’nde masrafların %46’sından

fazlasını karşılamak durumunda kalmıştır. Bu durumda merkezi hazine üzerindeki

baskı artmıştır. Tüm bunlara ek olarak düşen mukataa gelirlerinin getirdigi yük de göz

önüne alındıgında, maliye bir Celali krizi yaşamıştır. Fransız raporlarında da bütçenin

karşılaştıgı zorlukların yansımaları görülür. Bu dokümanlara göre merkezi yönetim

Halil Paşa’yı Abaza Mehmet Paşa’nın isyanını bastırması için gönderirken mali

zorluklar çekmiş bunun neticesinde bazı büyük dirlik sahiplerinden borçlar almak

zorunda kalmıştır. Ayrıca bu raporlara göre merkezin Abaza Mehmet Paşa’yla

anlaşma sürecini tetikleyen faktör ekonomik zorluklardır.

Merkez, ekonomik baskılar altında degişen şartlara ayak uydurmuş ve klasik tahrir

kayıtlarından uzaklaşarak avarız sayımları yaptırmaya başlamıştır. Avarız vergileri

acil durumlarda toplanan bir vergiyken 16.yüzyıl sonuyla 17.yüzyılın ilk dönemleri

arasında düzenli vergi haline gelmiştir. Bunda avarız vergisinin esnek yapısı sayesinde

mevcut şartlarda kullanışlı olması etkilidir. Devlet ihtiyaç durumunda avarız vergisini

aynî, nakdî ve hizmet olarak toplayabiliyordu. Celali Etkisi avarıza geçiş sürecinde

hazine üzerindeki varolan baskıları agırlaştırarak nakit ihtiyacını arttırmış ve avarızın

düzenli vergiye dönüşmesinde kısa dönemli olarak rol oynamıştır.

Çalışmanın son ana başlıgında buluntulardan yola çıkarak alanla ilgili yeni fikir ve

sorular öne sürülülür. Celali Etkisi’nin Istanbul örneginde oldugu gibi diger önemli

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Osmanlı şehirlerinde de çalışılabilmesi için sayısal veri sunabilen daha çok çalışmaya

ihtiyaç vardır. Bu yeni çalışmalar Celali Etkisi’ni farklı kentlerde tartışmayı ve

karşılaştırmayı mümkün kılacaktır. Kırsal nüfusta ise vakıf ve mukataa defterleri

Celali yıllarında kırsal nüfustaki degişimleri izlememize yardım edecek önemli

kaynaklardır. Vakıf defterlerini bu sorular için kullanan çalışmalar varsa da Anadolu

mukataa defterleri hala yeterli ilgiyi görememiştir. Bu çalışmada defterlerin sadece bir

kısmı ele alınmış ve mukataaların söz konusu alanda kullanılabilecegi gösterilmiştir.

Mukataa defterleri genellikle kısa aralıklarla tutulmuş ve tüm mukataa birimlerini

kaydetmiştir. Defterlerin bu iki özelligi kısa periyotlarla bir bölgedeki önemli

demografik dalgalanmalar hakkında fikir verir.

Ekonomik alanlara gelindiginde ise tiftik fiyatlarındaki dalgalanmaları gösteren bir

çalışmanın eksikligi göze çarpar. Celali Etkisi altındaki ipegi sayısal verilerle

tartışabiliyorken, sof için henüz bu mümkün degildir. Son olarak merkezi ekonominin

Celali Etkisi altındaki durumu ele alındıgında mukataa defterlerinin önemi bir kez

daha ortaya çıkar. Mukataa defterlerinin sistematik çalışılmasına ihtiyaç vardır. Bu

çalışma neticesinde Celali yıkımı sebebiyle merkezin toplayamadıgı akçeler ve

merkezi hazine üzerindeki baskı sayısal verilerle gösterilebilinir. Bu dönemde baki

akçeler oldukça artmış ve mukataalar birbiri ardına boş kalmıştır. Bu çalışma

yapılmadan önce karışık mukataa defterlerinin sistematigini ve girift yapısını

açıklayan bir çalışmaya oldukça ihtiyaç vardır.

Fransız elçilik raporları bu çalışmada ele alındıgında bu belgelerin mühimme

kayıtlarını dogrular nitelikte görece güvenilir kaynaklar oldugu görülmüştür. Yaklaşık

olarak her 10-15 günde en az bir defa rapor tutuldugu düşünülürse binlerce mektup

keşfedilmeyi bekliyor. Bu belgeler sistematik olarak çalışıldıgında özellikle

Istanbul’da Celali göçlerinin ve degişen sosyal hayatın izlerini bulmak mümkün

olabilir.

Celali Etkisi’nin bölgesel farklılıklar göstermesi bu çalışmanın önemli bir diger

buluntusudur. Belirli bir bölgenin mukataa serileri incelenip karşılaştırıldıgında

bölgesel Celali farklılıklarının dikkat çekecek derecede oldugu göze çarpar. Bu

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kayıtlar küçük bir bölgede bulunan mukataaların isyanlardan farklı derecelerde

etkilendigini sayısal veriyle gösterir. Bu durum Celali şiddetinin derecesiyle dogrudan

ilişkilidir.

Son olarak, Celali Isyanları ilk bakışta sadece bir karışıklık ve şiddet dönemi ifade

ediyor gibi görünse de sonuçları bu tezde tartışıldıgından çok daha önemli ve derin.

Isyanın görünen ilk sonucu büyük bir demografik hareketlilikle köylerin terk

edilmesiydi. Isyanların bastırılmasından sonra reayanın bir kısmı artık kentsel hayatın

bir parçası olmuşken, diger kısmı görece normalleşen kırsala kendiliginden veya

merkezin emirleri sonucu geri döndü. Köye dönen reaya, çiftlerinin askeri sınıf üyeleri

tarafından işgal edildigini ve çiftliklere dönüştürüldügünü görecekti. Bu durum uzunca

bir süredir devam eden Erken Modern Osmanlı tarihinin önemli tartışmalarından

birinin içinde anılmaktadır.

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B. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

Enformatik Enstitüsü

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Cabar

Adı : Oguz

Bölümü : Tarih

TEZİN ADI (Ingilizce) : The Celali Effect in 17th Century-Ottoman Transformation

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılsın ve kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla tezimin bir kısmı veya tamamının fotokopisi alınsın.

2. Tezimin tamamı yalnızca Orta Dogu Teknik Üniversitesi kullancılarının erişimine açılsın. (Bu seçenekle tezinizin fotokopisi ya da elektronik kopyası Kütüphane aracılıgı ile ODTÜ dışına dagıtılmayacaktır.)

3. Tezim bir (1) yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olsun. (Bu seçenekle tezinizin fotokopisi ya da elektronik kopyası Kütüphane aracılıgı ile ODTÜ dışına dagıtılmayacaktır.)

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