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OBSERVING THE 2001 GUYANA ELECTIONS

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THE CARTER CENTER

OBSERVING THE

2001 GUYANA ELECTIONS

FINAL REPORT

ON E CO P E N H I L L

AT L A N T A, GA 30307

(404) 420-5188FAX (404) 420-5196

W W W . C A R T E R C E N T E R . O R G

FEBRUARY 2002

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Carter Center Election Observer Delegation and Staff List ..................................................... 4

Terms and Abbreviations ........................................................................................................ 6

Foreword ................................................................................................................................. 7

Executive Summary ................................................................................................................. 9

Background ........................................................................................................................... 141992 Elections and Carter Center Involvement1997 Elections and Aftermath

Constitutional Reform and Time Frame for Elections ........................................................... 15Constitutional Reform CommissionInternational AssistanceGECOM, the New Electoral System, and the Electoral CalendarThe High Court Decision of Jan. 15, 2001

Pre-Election Observation ...................................................................................................... 18Establishment of The Carter Center Election Observation OfficeParty and Candidate RegistrationVoter RegistrationProduction and Distribution of ID CardsElection Staffing, Management, and TrainingDisciplined Service Forces BallotingPolitical CampaignMedia MonitoringVoter Education

Election Observation ............................................................................................................. 33Carter Center Observer Briefings and DeploymentVoting Process and the CountPost-Election Leadership MeetingsConsolidation of Regional Counts and Announcement of ResultsCarter Center Quick Count and Review of Statements of Poll

Post-Election Observation ..................................................................................................... 44

Conclusions and Recommendations ...................................................................................... 46The Carter Center’s May 17 Final StatementRecommendations

Acknowledgments ................................................................................................................. 50

Appendices ............................................................................................................................ 52

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CARTER CENTER ELECTION OBSERVERDELEGATION AND STAFF LIST

March 15-21, 2001

Leadership TeamThe Honorable Jimmy Carter, 39th President of the United States and Chair of

The Carter Center, United StatesMrs. Rosalynn Carter, former First Lady of the United States and Vice Chair of

The Carter Center, United StatesThe Honorable Lloyd Erskine Sandiford, former Prime Minister, Barbados

Delegation MembersFrank Boyd, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Illinois Wesleyan University, USAJason Calder, Assistant Director, Global Development Initiative, The Carter Center, USADavid Carroll, Associate Director, Democracy Program, The Carter Center, USAArchbishop Samuel E. Carter, S.J., Archbishop Emeritus of Kingston and Director, Citizens Action

For Free and Fair Elections (CAFFE), JamaicaCharles Costello, Director, Democracy Program, The Carter Center, USAMadhu Deshpande, Graduate Assistant, Democracy Program, The Carter Center, IndiaClarence Dias, President, International Center for Law and Development, IndiaJason Forrester, Senior Researcher, Foreign Policy Studies Program, Brookings Institution, USARachel Fowler, Project Manager, Democracy Program, The Carter Center, USAAmbassador John Graham, former High Commissioner to Guyana, former Ambassador to

Venezuela, CanadaJohn Hardman, Executive Director, The Carter Center, USAChris Harris, Account Executive, CauseLink, USACara Hesse, Deputy Director, National Voting Rights Institute, USASteven Hochman, Director, Research, The Carter Center, USACynthia Hooks, Director, Educational Programs, The Carter Center, USARichard Klein, Elections Consultant, USALuc Lapointe, Elections Consultant, CanadaAnthony Maingot, Professor of Sociology, Florida International University, TrinidadJeffrey Mapendere, Senior Program Associate, Conflict Resolution Program, The Carter Center,

ZimbabweJohn Marsh, Juris Doctor Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, USAPhilliat Matsheza, Executive Director, Human Rights Trust of Southern Africa, ZimbabweLayna Mosley, Assistant Professor, Department of Government and International Studies,

University of Notre Dame, USARansford Palmer, Chairperson, Department of Economics, Howard University, USADavid Pottie, Senior Researcher, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, CanadaAndrew Reynolds, Assistant Professor, Department of Government and International Studies,

and Kellogg Institute Fellow, University of Notre Dame, United KingdomTim Wilcox, Protection Operations Specialist, The Carter Center, USA

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Field Office Staff and Medium-Term ObserversSue Nelson, Guyana Elections Field Office Director, The Carter Center, USAPatrick Berg, EU Masters Degree Candidate in Human Rights/Democratization, GermanyCatherine Clarke, Independent Elections Consultant, United KingdomDavid Danzig, Journalist, USASheila Jaghab, Economic and Political Consultant, USAJohn Lewis, Ph.D. Candidate in Theory and Policy Studies, University of Toronto, CanadaRalph Ogden, Medium-Term Observer, Attorney at Law, Wilcox and Ogden, P.C., USA

Carter Center StaffMatt Clark, Intern, Democracy Program, The Carter Center, USATynesha Green, Program Assistant, Democracy Program, The Carter Center, USASusan Johnson, Coordinator of Conferencing and Events, The Carter Center, USANancy Konigsmark, Director of Scheduling, The Carter Center, USACurtis Kohlhaas, Leadership Coordinator, Events Department, The Carter Center, USAOlivia Owens, Program Financial Analyst, The Carter Center, BurundiLaine Price, Program Officer, Democracy Program, The Carter Center, USAKay Torrance, Communications Specialist, Office of Public Information, The Carter Center, USA

Delegation Photo

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The Carter Center delegation consisted of observers from 10 countries.

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TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CARICOM ........................Caribbean CommunityCEO ....................................Chief Electoral OfficerDRO....................................Deputy Returning OfficerDSF .....................................Disciplined Service ForcesEAB .....................................Electoral Assistance BureauEU .......................................European UnionGAP/WPA .........................Guyana Action Party/Working People’s AllianceGAWL ................................Guyanese Association of Women LawyersGDP ....................................Guyana Democratic PartyGECOM .............................Guyana Elections CommissionGFTE ..................................Guyana Field Test ExerciseGLTOG ..............................Guyana Long-Term Observation Group (supported by UNDP and EU)IFES ..................................... International Foundation for Electoral SystemsJFAP.................................... Justice for All PartyJITA .................................... Joint International Technical AssessorLTO ....................................Long-Term ObserversMOU ..................................Memorandum of UnderstandingMRC ...................................Master Registration CardMTO ...................................Medium-Term ObserverNDI .....................................National Democratic Institute for International AffairsNFA ....................................National Front AllianceNRR ....................................National Registrar of RegistrantsOAS ....................................Organization of American StatesOLE .....................................Official List of ElectorsPAVE ..................................Public Awareness and Voter Education ProgramPO .......................................Presiding OfficerPNC ....................................People’s National CongressPNC/R ................................People’s National Congress/REFORMPPP ......................................People’s Progressive PartyPPP/C ..................................People’s Progressive Party/CIVICPR ........................................Proportional RepresentationPRP .....................................People’s Republic PartyPVT .....................................Parallel Vote TabulationRO.......................................Returning OfficerROAR.................................Rise, Organize and RebuildSOP .....................................Statement of PollTUF ....................................The United ForceUN ......................................United NationsUNDP .................................United Nations Development Program

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FOREWORD

Located physically in South America butconsidered culturally to be part of the Carib-bean, Guyana has suffered in the past decade

from the dual burdens of poverty and external debtand a political system marked by ethnic division andmistrust between the two major political parties, thePeople’s Progressive Party (PPP) and the People’sNational Congress (PNC). Support for these twoparties divides closely along ethnic lines with Indo-Guyanese of East Indian descent supporting the PPPand Afro-Guyanese descendants of enslaved Africanssupporting the PNC. Because of the ethnic basis ofpolitics, elections in Guyana have tended to looklike demographic census profiles and to accentuatedivisions in the society rather than to consolidate apluralistic democratic system.

The Carter Center first became involved inGuyana prior to the critical transitional electionsof 1992, which were held following the implemen-tation of economic reforms and a gradual openingof the political system by President DesmondHoyte. Although the electoral process nearlycollapsed due to violence on election day, thefinal results were accepted as legitimate by bothparties and were hailed by international observers,including a team from The Carter Center, as freeand fair elections.

The next round of elections held in December1997 encountered serious problems during thetabulation process after the balloting. The resultsshowed an apparent victory for the PPP but wererejected by the opposition PNC, and the processwas marred by days of violent protests. A protractedmediation effort by the Caribbean Community(CARICOM) resulted in the signing of theHerdmanston Accord, a compromise agreementbetween the two major political parties to reform

the Constitution and hold new elections withinthree years.

The 2001 elections were a direct result of theHerdmanston Accord and represented a critical testof the condition of Guyana’s democracy. In Octo-ber 2000, following a request from the governmentof Guyana for The Carter Center to monitor theelections, the Center sent an initial assessment teamto learn the views of key stakeholders regarding theelectoral process. In February 2001, the Centeropened an election field office and began deploy-ment of a team of six medium-term observers(MTOs) to observe and assess the pre-electionperiod. For the March 19 elections, Rosalynn and Iwere joined by former Prime Minister of BarbadosSir Lloyd Erskine Sandiford as heads of a 44-personCarter Center observer delegation.

Unfortunately, the Guyana Elections Commis-sion (GECOM) faced serious administrative andlogistical challenges in order to conduct theelections within the tight schedule created by thepolitical conditions flowing from the HerdmanstonAccord. Because of questions about the quality ofthe voters list, GECOM conducted extensivereviews and revision exercises. Nonetheless, theaccuracy of the voters list was questioned by bothmajor parties. The electoral timetable was alsosqueezed by delays in the production and distributionof the national ID cards, a fact which necessitatedchanges in the official criteria for voter identification.Voter education was insufficient and materialswere sometimes unclear, leading to confusionabout certain aspects of the recently revisedelectoral system. The difficulties in each of theseareas were exacerbated by the partisan differencesthat surfaced among some of the members ofGECOM.

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One of the most disturbing phenomena observedduring the electoral process was the media’s lack ofprofessionalism and impartiality. Campaigning anddiffusion of propaganda, especially on TV talk shows,continued through election day. One talk show host’s“reporting” bordered on incitement to violence.

Despite these challenges, which are explainedfurther in this report, the Carter Center delegationconcluded that the electoral process met minimuminternational standards and that the Guyanesepeople were able to express their will freely onelection day. With high voter turnout, the PPPwon 52.9 percent of the vote, and incumbentPresident Bharrat Jagdeo was reelected. Althoughthere were serious incidents of violence and riotingin Georgetown, the capital city, following theannouncement of results, the opposition PNCultimately recognized the outcome. Questionsabout the accuracy of the voters list were resolvedin August 2001 when an independent audit byInternational IDEA, conducted at the requestof GECOM, concluded that the voter list was99 percent accurate.

The 2001 elections, while certainly importantin terms of sustaining democratic legitimacy, havedemonstrated once again that democratic electionsalone cannot provide the solutions to Guyana’sproblems of political and social development.Serious efforts to bridge the gap between the twomajor communities in the country will be required.

In the months following the elections somepositive changes have taken place. One of the mostimportant has been the ongoing dialogue betweenPresident Jagdeo and former President and PNCopposition leader Desmond Hoyte on a wide rangeof critical issues. This dialogue can bear fruit in theform of a sustained commitment by all parties towork together to solve Guyana’s problems, includingsteps to ensure more inclusive governance and toprovide the foundation for sustainable development

with the full participation of all sectors of Guyanesesociety. It is my sincere hope that this great country,endowed with abundant human and naturalresources, will have a future in which all citizenscan fully participate and enjoy their democraticrights, while also fulfilling their responsibilities oftolerance, dialogue, and respect.

Rosalynn and I would like to thank our respectedco-leader, Sir Erskine Sandiford Lloyd, whosepresence on the delegation contributed greatly toour efforts. We also would like to thank all theCarter Center delegates and MTOs for their valuablecontributions and the Democracy Program staff fororganizing the mission.

On behalf of The Carter Center, we also wishto express our appreciation to the members ofGECOM, in particular Chairman Major General JoeSingh (ret.), for their support and cooperation duringthe project. Likewise, we wish to acknowledge thecollaboration and efforts of other observer groups,including the Guyana Long-Term ObservationGroup (GLTOG), the European Union ElectionObservation Mission, the Commonwealth,CARICOM, the Organization of American States(OAS), and the Electoral Assistance Bureau (EAB).

We are especially grateful for the generosityof The Ashcroft Foundation, established by phil-anthropist Sir Michael A. Ashcroft. Our mission wouldnot have been possible without this vital support.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The electoral process in Guyana has madesignificant progress since the Carter Center’sfirst involvement in the early 1990s. In

1992, the Center monitored Guyana’s first electionsin 28 years that were accepted by all parties as freeand fair and that resulted in a peaceful transfer ofpower. The elections in 1997, which the Center didnot observe, were challenged by the oppositionPNC and marred by violent protests. Subsequentmediation by CARICOM led to the HerdmanstonAccord, which called for implementing constitu-tional reforms and holding new elections withinthree years.

A Constitutional Reform Commission wasestablished in 1999 to strengthen the role of parlia-ment, create constitutional commissions, andreform the electoral system. The parliament passed,among other reforms, a new electoral system andthe permanent GECOM. The commission consistedof six members appointed by political parties andwas led by Major General Joseph Singh (ret.).GECOM initially set the election date for Jan. 17,2001, but due to difficulties meeting deadlines thedate was delayed until March 19.

Meanwhile, on Jan. 15, 2001, a long-runningcourt challenge to the 1997 elections was con-cluded with a High Court decision to void the 1997elections and call for new elections before March31, 2001. The High Court ruled that the use ofvoter identification cards in 1997 as the only meansof establishing eligibility violated the Constitution.The government abided by this decision, and,despite technical glitches and political pressure fordelays, general elections were scheduled for March19, 2001. Due to the importance of the 2001elections, the international community took severalsteps to show its support for the electoral process,including an EU assessment mission which led to

the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding(MOU) between the government of Guyana andthe donor community. There was also agreement onthe need for international monitoring of the elec-tion process.

In October 2000, the Carter Center respondedto an invitation by President Bharrat Jagdeo toobserve the general elections by sending a team toGuyana to assess the status of electoral preparationsand the prospects for Carter Center involvement.The team met with political parties, GECOM, andothers and found that political tensions were highdue to the tight schedule set by the HerdmanstonAccord. The Carter Center sent a second team toGuyana in February 2001 to open a field officeand deploy MTOs. The MTOs monitored allaspects of the pre-electoral process, includingfinalization of the voter registration list and IDcards, the campaign, media coverage, votereducation, poll worker training, and other electionpreparations.

Nomination day was held on Feb. 15, and13 parties submitted applications in a relativelysmooth, if burdensome, process. Eight partiesqualified to contest on the national list, and onlyone party appealed its rejection through a petitionto the High Court. The Court denied the petition,stating the nomination application was submitted aday late, which the Center verified.

GECOM went to great lengths to ensure thevoter registration process concluded with an accu-rate and updated voters list, but this remained acontentious issue for the political parties through-out the electoral process. GECOM executed bothcomputer and field tests of the voters list from the1997 elections and also conducted a nationwidevoter registration exercise during October andNovember 2000.

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One major complaint during elections was thatthe names of registered voters were recorded in thewrong part of the country, which led to somecitizens not being able to vote on election day.Although the Center did not conduct a field test ofthe voters list, a team from a domestic monitoringorganization, the Electoral Assistance Bureau (EAB),located 93 percent of the 1200 names sampled fromthe 2001 voters list. While GECOM asserted thatthe list was 95 percent accurate, the PNC/Rbelieved the list was padded and that last-minuteaddenda to the list deliberately disenfranchisedsome of their supporters. On election day, CarterCenter observers did not witness large numbers ofvoters on polling day who were disenfranchisedbecause of problems in the voters list.

The production and distribution of voter IDcards was slow, especially in the coastal areas of thecountry. Since many of the cards were not distrib-uted by the day before the election, GECOMdecided that the only requirement for voting wouldbe that an individual’s name appeared on the voterslist. Voters without identification were allowed totake an oath to swear to their own identity, leavingindelible ink as the only safeguard against multiplevoting. On election day, Carter Center observerswitnessed small numbers of people being turnedaway because their names were not on the list orthey were registered for another polling station.

GECOM suffered from several managerial andadministrative problems that adversely affected theelectoral process. First, GECOM election commis-sioners were selected based on party affiliation andworked primarily to protect party interests. Whilethe core secretarial staff consisted of workers fromprevious elections, other staff and poll workers wererecruited and trained. International training supportunfortunately did not yield expected results. Train-ing sessions were well attended and organized, buttheir quality varied.

On March 12, The Carter Center observedvoting by the Disciplined Service Forces (DSF),who were to be deployed to provide security onelection day. Preparations for DSF voting wentslowly, but balloting went well with only a fewirregularities.

Despite high levels of tension throughout theprocess, the political campaign was largely free ofviolence. Political parties were able to move aroundthe countryside freely to campaign and to conductrallies. While some parties, such as GAP/WPA, ranpositive campaigns, many other party speakers usedinflammatory language that attacked their oppo-nents. To combat these problems, GECOM issued apolitical party code of conduct on March 3.

Although there were no censorship issues orrestriction on the freedom of the press, the mediaplayed a significant role in fueling tensions through-out the electoral process. More than 50 mediaoutlets signed a code of conduct in October 2000,but an independent panel of media referees foundthat the code was ignored by almost all signatories.Television talk shows were particularly notable intheir lack of objectivity. Carter Center observersalso found that government-owned media wasbiased in favor of the incumbent PPP.

The GECOM voter education program includedcivic education activities throughout the country,as well as a large number of posters and leaflets.Though extensive, these efforts were insufficient inremote regions, where there were substantiallyhigher numbers of rejected ballots on election daythan in the coastal regions.

Several days before the election, the Center’sfield staff was joined by a delegation of 37 short-termobservers, led by former U.S. President JimmyCarter, former First Lady Rosalynn Carter, andformer Prime Minister Sir Lloyd Erskine Sandiford ofBarbados. The delegation was briefed in Georgetownand deployed to all 10 regions in Guyana, where

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they met with local election and party officials toreview the state of electoral preparations.

In general, observers found that election daywas peaceful, as Guyanese turned out in largenumbers. Poll workers were generally well trainedand acted professionally and impartially, and mostpolling stations were clearly marked and stockedwith polling materials. Political party agents werepresent at all of the polls visited by Carter Centerobservers, and there were no reports by theobservers of any significant security incidents orintimidation. Voters were able to cast their votesin secret, and the ballots were counted at eachpolling station with political party agents presentto certify, along with poll workers, the accuracy ofthe count. There was a great deal of confusionover what time the polls closed, but the Centerconcluded that this did not affect the integrity ofthe results.

Carter Center observers gathered data from asample of polling station results as part of its electionobservation mission. This “quick count” did notdiffer meaningfully from the final results announcedby GECOM. While these findings were not madepublic, they were used by the Center delegation’soverall assessment of the electoral process.

In spite of considerable planning for the process-ing and computerization of the elections results,GECOM fell behind schedule and strayed from theseplans due to time constraints. International observersobserved the hand tabulations of results at GECOMheadquarters, but party agents were not allowedaccess. In the post-election period, internationalobservers reviewed about 90 percent of the State-ment of the Polls (SOPs) collected in GECOMheadquarters and found that more than 99 percentwere signed by polling officials and party agents andthat less than one percent had mathematical errors.

Georgetown, Guyana. Guyana is the only English-speaking country in South America.

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On March 20, President Carter and PrimeMinister Sandiford, along with the heads of otherinternational observation groups, met with Chair-man Singh and two other members of GECOM toaddress the slow release of preliminary results to thepublic. GECOM recognized the problem andindicated that results were to be released soon.After the meeting, President Carter and PrimeMinister Sandiford held a news conference andannounced that the elections process was generallypeaceful and orderly and that the Center’s observersreported very fewirregularities on electionday. At the end of thepress conference,President Carter madean impromptu plea forall Guyanese to worktogether for nationalreconciliation.

After the press conference, two prominentmembers of civil society with ties to the oppositionsent a letter to President Carter expressing concernabout electoral violence and requesting his assis-tance to facilitate agreement on key issues ofgovernance and reconciliation. In response, Presi-dent Carter drafted a short statement outlining keypoints on governance that should be acceptable toboth sides and which could form the basis foradditional steps in the future. Although PNC/Rleader Desmond Hoyte and PPP/C leader BharratJagdeo were both in agreement with the substanceof the points outlined in the statement, neithersigned the document and Hoyte later indicated thathe had not agreed in any way to the statement.

On March 23 GECOM announced the results ofthe elections and subsequently approved theallocation of seats and issued a Declaration ofPresident, with the PPP/C as the party with the mostvotes. The political atmosphere remained tense for

several weeks, during which there were numerousprotests and several violent demonstrations inGeorgetown and along the coast. In an effort toprevent further violence, President Jagdeo andHoyte agreed to meet on April 24 to begin a high-level political dialogue.

In May 2001, the Center issued a final state-ment on the electoral process, concluding thatoverall, the electoral process met internationalstandards, the voters of Guyana were able to freelyexpress their democratic choices on March 19, and

the official resultsreflected the will of thevoters. The statementalso provided specificassessments of severalkey aspects of theprocess, includingelection day processes,

voter registration, party observers, election manage-ment systems, and the media.

In order to address lingering concerns about theaccuracy of the voters list, GECOM requested anindependent audit of GECOM’s administration ofthe electoral process, including the voters list. Theaudit, which was conducted by the InternationalInstitute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance(IDEA) and published in August 2001, concludedthat the voters list produced by GECOM was about99 percent accurate. These findings served todiscount claims of serious inaccuracies in the voterslist that might have undermined the credibility orlegitimacy of the elections.

In a spirit of respect and support, the Center offersseveral recommendations for improving future elec-tions, as follows: (1) There should be a comprehensivereview of the electoral system and legislation, based onthe audit and systems review completed by Interna-tional IDEA; (2) Parliament should reform the legalframework for the electoral process to eliminate

In Guyana’s “winner-take-all” political system,elections alone will not produce an inclusive

system of governance.

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outdated statutory provisions and establish moreefficient systems for GECOM, including proceduresfor voter registration and verification of the voters list;(3) Careful consideration should be given to alterna-tive models of election administration, possibly byreducing or eliminating political party representationand increasing the role of independent members ofcivil society; (4) GECOM should maintain a policyof open and transparent election administrationthrough all phases of the electoral process, includingtabulation and consolidation of results, allocation ofseats, and pronouncement of the new president.GECOM should also ensure that complete pollingstation level results are announced and publicized ona timely basis to allow all parties and candidates tocross-check results; (5) Parliament should enactbroadcast legislation to set standards for appropriateuse of public airwaves and ensure equitable coveragefor all parties by the state-owned media; (6) Parlia-ment should enact legislation to give GECOM oranother independent body the power to enforceelection-related codes of conduct for political partiesand the media, and ensure that inflammatory propa-ganda cannot be used to incite violence.

While credible and accurate elections areessential to democratization, it is clear that inGuyana’s “winner-take-all” political system withits recurring patterns of ethnic voting and politicalpolarization, elections alone will not produce aninclusive system of governance with broad partici-pation by all major groups. In order to promotegenuine political reconciliation and development,the government and the major parties in Parlia-ment, working together with civil society, shouldcontinue the process of constitutional and electoralreform. This would allow all parties to participatemeaningfully in development of policy and legisla-tion and serve as part of a system of checks andbalances that promotes accountability. The CarterCenter plans to support Guyana’s democraticconsolidation and sustainable development throughan integrated program of initiatives drawing on theCenter’s expertise in democracy, conflict resolution,economic development, and transparency. Theinitiative is designed to help Guyana realize itsNational Development Strategy and will build onexisting Carter Center activities in support of ruleof law and civil society strengthening. �

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BACKGROUND

1992 ELECTIONS AND

CARTER CENTER INVOLVEMENT

The October 1992 elections in Guyana werethe first elections in 28 years that wereinternationally monitored, accepted by

all parties as free and fair, and resulted in a peacefultransfer of power. The PPP/C and its presidentialcandidate Cheddi Jagan emerged as the winner with53 percent of the vote. The PNC and incumbentPresident Desmond Hoyte received 42 percent ofthe vote.

The largest observer delegation to monitorthe 1992 elections was organized by the Councilof Freely Elected Heads of Government, aninformal group of leaders from the WesternHemisphere chaired by former U.S. PresidentJimmy Carter and based at The Carter Center.The Commonwealth also sent a large observerdelegation, which coordinated efforts with theCarter Center team.

During two years of involvement betweenOctober 1990 and October 1992, the Council/Carter Center played a significant role by mediatingagreements between the government of Guyanaand opposition parties about key aspects of theelectoral process. After the 1992 elections, theCenter continued to play an important role inGuyana’s democratic evolution. In 1994, in col-laboration with the International Foundation forElectoral Systems (IFES), the Center helped pro-duce a comprehensive analysis of the electoralsystem, including recommendations for improvingits effectiveness. Since 1995, the Center also hasworked in collaboration with the government,private sector, and civil society to facilitate theproduction of a National Development Strategy.

1997 ELECTIONS AND AFTERMATH

In 1997, President Cheddi Jagan died in office andPrime Minister Sam Hinds became president to com-plete Jagan’s term. Elections were held later that year onDec. 17, 1997. Jagan’s widow, Janet Jagan, was thePPP/C presidential candidate, and Desmond Hoyte wasagain the PNC presidential candidate. As in 1992, theelection results were divided along ethnic lines, with theIndo-Guyanese PPP/C winning the majority of seats inParliament and the presidency, while the largely Afro-Guyanese PNC remained the minority party.

Although voting transpired largely without inci-dent, problems became apparent in the aftermath ofthe election, when Janet Jagan was sworn in with only90 percent of the vote counted. The PNC refused toaccept the results and boycotted Parliament whileviolent demonstrations disrupted the capital for severalweeks. Shortly afterwards, a PNC supporter, EstherPereira, filed suit in the High Court to challenge theelection, alleging massive fraud and the unconstitu-tional use of voter identification cards.

To stem the escalating violence, CARICOMnegotiated the Herdmanston Accord, an agreementbetween the government and the PNC which providedfor a CARICOM audit of the 1997 election results,revisions to the Constitution within 18 months, andnew elections within three years instead of five(see Appendix 1). Violence continued even after theCARICOM audit found the election results to beacceptable. At a CARICOM annual summit in July1998, the PPP/C and the PNC signed the Saint LuciaStatement, in which both parties agreed to pursueconstitutional reforms while the PNC agreed to takeits seats in Parliament (see Appendix 2). After sufferinga mild heart attack, Janet Jagan stepped down andBharrat Jagdeo, former minister of finance, was sworn inas president in August 1999. �

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CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM ANDTIME FRAME FOR ELECTIONS

Carter Center observersRichard Klein (left) andRachel Fowler (right)meet with Joe Singh(second from left)andother GECOM members.

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CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM COMMISSION

In 1999, in accordance with the HerdmanstonAccord, a Constitutional Reform Commissionwas created to lead the reform process. The

commission reached consensus on several keyreforms, including strengthening the role of Parlia-ment, creating constitutional commissions (onethnic relations, human rights, and the rights ofchildren and indigenous people) under the umbrellaof a human rights commission, and reforming theelectoral system.

A Joint Management Committee, comprised ofPPP/C and PNC members, was created in Parlia-ment to review the reforms and draft amendmentlegislation. Amendments related to the electionswere approved to enable the holding of nationalelections in 2001, but other reforms such as the

creation of committees on ethnic relations andfinance were not brought to the floor for a vote.

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

Because of the importance of the 2001 elections,the international community provided significantlevels of assistance and played a large role inmonitoring the process. In February 2000, at therequest of the government of Guyana, the EU senta needs assessment mission to Guyana. The missionrecommended a review of the 1997 voter registrationand counting systems, an international technicalquality control mechanism, and comprehensiveinternational and domestic observation of theelectoral process.

Based on this assessment, a MOU was signedbetween the government of Guyana and the majordonors in June 2000. The MOU established the

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TABLE 1: Important Statutory Dates

EVENT STATUTORY SCHEDULE

Nomination day ................................................... 32 days before electionApproval of nominations .................................... 28 days before electionAppeal of rejections ............................................ 26 days before electionPublish final nominations .................................... 23 days before electionPublish polling station list ................................... 20 days before electionPublish candidates/voters/polls lists ................... 14 days before electionRequest for recounts ............................................... 1 day after election

terms and conditions for financial and technicalassistance, including benchmarks to measureprogress in electoral preparations and a set ofinternational standards to be met. It also created aJoint International Technical Assessor (JITA) tomonitor progress and provide monthly reports tothe Election Commission, donors, and the govern-ment of Guyana on progress made.

GECOM, THE NEW ELECTORAL SYSTEM,AND THE ELECTORAL CALENDAR

Legislation was passed to create a permanentsecretariat for the Election Commission, and theformer head of the Disciplined Forces, MajorGeneral Joseph Singh (ret.), was appointed chair-man of the Election Commission in May 2000. Thecommission members were selected following the“Carter Model” first introduced prior to the 1992elections following President Carter’s mediation,whereby the government and opposition partieseach named three representatives, with the chair-man chosen by the president from a list of sixacceptable nominees put forward by the opposition.

Under Chairman Joe Singh the commissionadopted the acronym GECOM for the GuyanaElections Commission. After consultation with the

political parties, GECOM published a timetablein August 2000 which followed statutory datesrequired by legislation and scheduled elections forJan. 15, 2001, consistent with the deadline estab-lished in the Herdmanston Accord.

However, due to the extended political wran-gling between the major parties over constitutionalreform and related issues, GECOM was left with avery tight schedule. The time line providedGECOM with only five months to complete allelectoral preparations, including hiring registrarsand other polling officials, updating and verifyingthe voter registration list, photographing voters fornew national ID cards, training polling day officials,and conducting voter education exercises.

Not surprisingly, GECOM had difficulty meet-ing deadlines. The situation was made worse by thefact that Parliament did not pass the key enablinglegislation and electoral reforms until November2000. The electoral reforms created a new electoralsystem that blended elements of a national propor-tional representation (PR) system together withregional representation in order to enhance therepresentation of smaller parties and regionalinterests. In addition, the reforms provided for thedirect election of all the members of Parliament.Previously, only 53 of 65 seats were elected directly,

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1 The ruling also meant that the cards being produced byGECOM for the 2001 elections could only be used as oneform of identification and not as the only acceptable means ofestablishing eligibility to vote.

while the other 12 were elected indirectly throughregional councils. The details of the system werenot completely finalized until February 2001, whena final constitutional amendment was adoptedwhich set the minimum number of legislative seatsat 65, with 25 seats elected as regional seats. Theother 40 were “top-up” seats calculated on the basisof national results in order to compensate for anydisproportionality arising from the regional results.The reforms did not affect the process for thepresidency, which is won by the leader of the partythat gains the most votes.

Because of difficulties in completing electoralpreparations, most importantly revising and verify-ing the voters list and producing and distributingnational ID cards, GECOM eventually realized itwould not be possible to hold the elections inJanuary. This was made public on Nov. 13 whenGECOM informed the government that it was nottechnically prepared to hold an acceptable electionby the scheduled date and that the elections wouldneed to be postponed for at least two months. TheJITA endorsed this decision.

While acknowledging GECOM’s rationale forthe delay, the leadership of the PNC indicated thatthe PPP/C government would not be viewed aslegitimate beyond the Jan. 17 deadline establishedby the Herdmanston Accord. Amidst growingpolitical tension and fears of political violence,leaders of the four parties represented in Parliamentmet with President Jagdeo in early December andagreed to set the election for March 19, 2001.However, the parties were not able to agree on thequestion of governance and the role of the incum-bent PPP government during the interim periodbetween Jan. 17 and March 19 and decided to referthe issue to an all-party committee for furtherdiscussion.

THE HIGH COURT DECISION OF

JAN. 15, 2001On Jan. 15, 2001, the long-running legal

challenge against the 1997 election results wasfinally resolved by a High Court ruling. In a dra-matic decision announced just two days before thestart of the “interim” governance period, the HighCourt issued a judgment which declared the 1997elections “vitiated,” because the statutory require-ment of using voter identification cards violated theConstitution.1

However, at the same time, the Court alsodeclared that in order to uphold the rule of law andprevent the creation of a legal vacuum, the sittinggovernment elected in 1997 should remain inpower until March 31, 2001. This gave GECOM afinal deadline that could not be moved withoutprovoking a constitutional crisis. During the interimperiod, the High Court limited the government’spowers to those necessary for day-to-day operationsand for election preparations.

The court decision struck a fine balance thatleft both parties feeling somewhat vindicated. Forthe PNC, the decision confirmed their view that the1997 elections were flawed and unconstitutional.The PPP was satisfied because the court decisiondid not find that the flaws in the 1997 electionwould have affected the final results and did notforce the PPP government to step down before theMarch elections. �

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PRE-ELECTION OBSERVATION

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CARTER CENTER

ELECTION OBSERVATION OFFICE

In October 2000, The Carter Center sent athree-person team to Guyana to assess thestatus of electoral preparations and to learn

the views of parties, GECOM, and other groups.This trip followed an Oct. 19, 2000, request fromthe government of Guyana to observe the generalelections (Appendix 3). The team found thatGECOM and most of the major parties andpolitical actors welcomed the Center involve-ment as observers. The PNC position wassomewhat vague, however, in that they indicatedthat they welcomed international observersgenerally but did not specifically endorse TheCarter Center.

The Center team reported that political tensionswere high as a result of the squeeze created by the

need to complete electoral preparations and holdelections within the time frame established in theHerdmanston Accord. In this context the team feltthat international observers could help buildconfidence in the process by serving as an indepen-dent voice to assess the credibility and integrity ofthat process.

In early February 2001 the Center openedan election observation office staffed by a fieldoffice director and six MTOs. Although theCenter’s MTOs were not present to monitor voterregistration, they were able to observe many ofthe key aspects of the electoral process, includingcandidate nomination, the electoral campaign,polling day voting and counting process, post-election vote tabulations, and the swearing-in ofthe newly-elected president. Carter Centerobservers visited all 10 regions during the pre-election period.

Medium-term observersJason Forrester,Catherine Clarke, andPatrick Berg (left to right)frequently traveled thecountry in small planes.

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The Center’s field office and MTOs benefitedsignificantly from the assistance provided by theGLTOG, an observation program supported by theUnited Nations Development Program (UNDP),which included an EU mission as a component part.The GLTOG established a field office with long-term observers (LTOs) in October 2000 – severalmonths prior to the Center – and played a key rolethroughout the electoral process.

PARTY AND CANDIDATE REGISTRATION

Nomination Day was held on Feb. 15, 2001.Thirteen parties submitted applications to the ChiefElectoral Officer (CEO) and the Statutory Officerat City Hall. Although the submission process wentsmoothly, a few of the parties had complainedearlier to Carter Center observers that the applica-tion process was burdensome because it requiredoriginal signatures from voters on each of themultiple copies necessary. GECOM had alsoimposed a 6:00 p.m. deadline for applications,which the GAP/WPA delegation questioned, sayingthe Constitution set an end date limit for nomina-tions and the day ended at midnight.

GECOM posted a copy of each application, asrequired by law, and advised the parties of problems

with their applications within the statutory dead-line of Feb. 17. The parties then had until Feb. 18to correct the problems. GECOM published thefinal list of 11 parties accepted to contest theMarch 19 elections on Feb. 18, also a date withinthe statutory deadline (see Appendix 4). Onlyeight of the 11 parties were contesting in enoughof the geographic regions to qualify to contest onthe national list. The parties and presidentialcandidates for the national elections are shown inTable 2. (below)

One of the smaller parties, the People’s RepublicParty (PRP), whose application was rejected in allregions but one, appealed its rejection through apetition to the High Court. At the hearing, theHigh Court ruled that because the ballots had beenordered and printed almost immediately afterGECOM certified the party lists, to find in favor ofthe PRP would mean reprinting the ballots anddelaying the election. The Court eventually deniedthe petition on the ground that it was filed a daytoo late. This process was followed by CarterCenter observers, who reviewed the paperwork onfile with GECOM and concurred with GECOM’sdecision that the PRP’s application had not metstatutory requirements.

TABLE 2: Parties / Presidential Candidates Competing Nationally in the 2001 Elections

PARTY PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE

Guyana Action Party/Working People’s Alliance (GAP/WPA) ... Paul HardyGuyana Democratic Party (GDP)..................................................... Asgar AllyJustice for All Party (JFAP) ............................................................... C.N. SharmaNational Front Alliance (NFA)........................................................ Keith ScottPeople’s National Congress/Reform (PNC/R) ................................. Desmond HoytePeople’s Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C) ......................................... Bharrat JagdeoRise, Organise and Rebuild (ROAR) ............................................... Ravi DevThe United Force (TUF) .................................................................. Manzoor Nadir

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2 Administratively, Guyana’s 10 regions are subdivided intodivisions and subdivisions.

VOTER REGISTRATION

For the 2001 general and regional elections,GECOM went to significant lengths to ensure thevoter registration process culminated in an accurateupdated list of all registered voters. GECOMundertook both computer and field tests of thevoters list from the 1997 elections, conducted newregistration and photographic exercises, providedan opportunity for political parties and the publicto review the voters list and to file claims andobjections, and provided contesting politicalparties with the updated and final voters list inelectronic format.

Throughout the process, however, the accuracyof the voters list remained contentious with allpolitical parties. In particular, both the PPP/C andthe PNC/R indicated they had concerns about thelist. One of the most serious complaints was that thenames of some people who had registered, or whohad updated their registration information, hadbeen recorded on the voters list in the wrong part of

the country and hence they would not be permittedto vote on election day. By GECOM’s own admission,the voter registration process was overly bureaucraticand outdated, a problem that contributed to some ofthe errors in the voters list.

While the 2001 voter list contained errors, aswill be detailed later in the report, Carter Centermonitors did not observe a significant number ofindividuals who were unable to vote because theirnames were not on the voters list. Clearly, however,the process of registering voters needs to beimproved in order to build the confidence ofcontesting political parties and the public in theaccuracy of the voters list for future elections.

In Guyana, people are able to vote only if theyhave previously registered. Further, they are permit-ted to vote only at one polling station within thesubdivision where they registered to vote.2 The

Elections officers explainprocedures to CarterCenter field office directorSue Nelson.

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3 The National Register of Registrants (NRR), which contained516,049 names, served as the PVL. The 1997 FVL, whichextracted only those persons who were 18 years or older at thetime of the election, contained 459,997 names.

4 Of the 459,997 names of registered voters in the 1997 FVL, 8percent (36,920) were found to have the same surname anddate of birth while 0.4 percent (2,031) had the same surname,first name and date of birth.

5 However, in light of the January 2001 High Court rulingwhich declared that it was unconstitutional to require votersto produce an identification card to vote, GECOM an-nounced that the new identity card would be just one ofseveral documents a voter could use for identification.

Official List of Voters (OLE), also known as theFinal Voters List (FVL), is the authoritative list ofall eligible persons who are registered to vote. Forthe elections, the OLE is sorted by region, divi-sion, subdivision, and polling station, and eachpolling station is provided with the section of theOLE containing the names of people designated tovote there. No one is permitted to vote at apolling station if his/her name does not appear onthe OLE for the polling station. When the OLE isaccurate, it provides a substantial safeguardagainst multiple voting and against voting bypeople who are not eligible.

In 1996, in preparation for the elections held inDec. 1997, Guyana conducted a door-to-doorregistration of Guyanese citizens 14 years of age orolder. This yielded the National Register of Regis-trants (NRR), from which the 1997 FVL wasproduced by extracting the names of qualifiedvoters 18 years of age or older.3 Following the1997 elections, the PNC charged that the 1997FVL was inflated to the advantage of the rulingPPP/C party. The party charged that the list con-tained names of people who had registered morethan once, were not yet 18 years old, residedoutside of Guyana, or who did not exist. Accordingto the PNC, evidence that the database had beentampered with and “padded” with extra names wasfound in the fact that the 1997 FVL showed a largerthan expected increase in registered voters com-pared to the 1992 FVL.

In response to these complaints, GECOM formedan integrity committee to analyze the 1997 FVL. InAugust 2000, the committee found that the mainNRR registration database was intact but reportedsome evidence of names of the same person appear-ing more than once on the 1997 FVL.4 The com-mittee recommended, therefore, that GECOMconduct a field test in order to assess the accu-racy of the list and determine whether there was

any basis to charges that the list was padded.Based on the findings of the integrity commit-

tee, GECOM decided to use the 1997 NRR list of516,049 names as the Preliminary Voters List (PVL)for the 2001 elections rather than conduct anentirely new registration. In order to provide anopportunity for any eligible Guyanese who had notregistered to vote in 1996 to register for the 2001elections, as well as for those people who hadmoved since 1996 to reregister, GECOM con-ducted a nationwide voter registration exerciseduring October and November 2001. Further,GECOM decided in September that everyone whowished to vote in the 2001 election, whether ornot his or her name appeared on the 2001 PVL,had to go to a registration center to be photo-graphed. The photographic exercise served toprovide registered voters with voter ID cards thatthey would use on election day as proof of theireligibility to vote.5

At the same time, GECOM commissioned aGuyana Field Test Exercise (GFTE) of the 2001PVL to more precisely determine its accuracy. TheGFTE, which was designed and managed by aworking group comprised of GECOM officials andrepresentatives of both major parties, entailed afield survey of about 22,000 randomly chosennames drawn from the 2001 PVL representing all

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Chronology of the 2001 Voters List

NRR 1996 National Register of Registrants, 1996PVL 1997 Preliminary Voters List, 1997FVL 1997 Final Voters List, 1997PVL 2001 Preliminary Voters list, 2001GFTE Guyana Field Test ExerciseRVL 2001 Revised Voters List, 2001 (PVL, plus new registration minus deletions)FVL/OLE 2001 Final Voters List, or Official List of Voters, 2001Addendum 2001 Addendum to OLE 2001

6 The final sample size was only 21,804. The GFTE did not processany information for 341 of the original 22,145 sampled people.

7 Following the political agreement, this step was passed into lawin October 2000.

10 regions of Guyana.6 GFTE teams attempted tolocate these persons based on the address informationcontained in the 2001 PVL. The GFTE started inlate October and was completed in mid-December.Of the people sampled in the GFTE, 93 percent(20,271) were found or accounted for, while sevenpercent were designated as “unknown.” However,when the seven percent “unknown” were addedtogether with those that had been determined asdead (four percent) or migrated (five percent), theresult was the conclusion that an estimated 16percent of the names on the 2001 PVL should not beincluded in the voters list. Although the two majorparties drew different conclusions from the GFTEabout the overall accuracy of the PVL, GECOMconcluded from the findings of the GFTE that the2001 PVL was inflated.

Following political wrangling between the PPP/Cand the PNC/R, the two sides agreed that as a meansto purify the list, persons who did not come forwardto be photographed prior to the completion of thefinal voters list would be removed from the list.7 Ineffect, GECOM decided to treat any name for whomno picture was taken as a person who had migratedor died since 1996 or who never existed and thereforeshould be removed from the 2001 PVL. AlthoughGECOM’s stated policy was that no voter would be

knowingly disenfranchised, political parties and thepublic complained that insufficient information andtime was provided to adequately conduct the voterregistration and photographic exercise in the interiorof the country. Ultimately, GECOM extended theperiod of voter registration, via the claims andobjections period and photographic exercise,through the first half of December as well as for theweek between Christmas and New Year’s.

Based on the 2001 PVL and the informationcollected during the voter registration and photo-graphic exercise, GECOM created the 2001 RevisedVoters List (RVL), sometimes referred to as theSupplementary Voters List (SVL). New names wereadded and information updated for people who hadmoved since 1996. In addition, as indicated above,GECOM took steps to remove all names for whichno photograph was taken in order to eliminate any“ghost” names in the voters list. The resulting 2001RVL contained 433,478 names and was provided topolitical parties in electronic format on CD-ROM onJanuary 31, 2001, for their review. After compiling

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8 Approximately 16,000 new names were added and 99,000 oldnames removed from the PVL to arrive at the RVL.

the additions, deletions, and other reconciliationsteps, the RVL represented a net reduction of82,571 names from the original PVL.8

In spite of these steps, many political partiescontinued to express concern about the quality ofthe 2001 RVL. Most political parties, includingboth the PNC/R and the PPP/C, possessed anec-dotal evidence about people who had registered in1996 or 2001 and were not on the 2001 RVL at allor who were listed under the wrong region. Further,the PNC/R charged that the 2001 RVL was stillinflated. By their calculation, the voters list shouldcontain only about 410,000 names. However, theGuyana Bureau of Statistics estimated the votingage population in the country as 480,000.

Initially, GECOM intended that the 2001 RVLwould be the 2001 FVL. However, after consultingthe electoral act and the Constitution, GECOMdetermined that the RVL must be posted for 21days, during which claims and objections could bemade by political parties and the public for addi-tion, corrections, and deletions to the 2001 RVL.Because GECOM had not planned for thisadditional step, staff members had to be devotedto this task who were originally scheduled topartake in training on election day activities.

This also delayed the production of the voterID cards, which, because of time constraints, wereto be produced based on information contained onthe RVL instead of the OLE as originally planned.This additional claims and objections periodfollowing the posting of the RVL was initiallyscheduled for Feb. 1-21, 2001. During this period,political parties continued to be critical of thequality of the RVL. As with the voter registrationand photographic exercise, GECOM extended thisprocess for an additional week until Feb. 26, underpressure from political parties and the public formore time to check the 2001 RVL.

In an effort to build public confidence in the

2001 RVL, the Electoral Assistance Bureau (EAB),an independent domestic monitoring organizationwith experience dating back to the 1991 elections,conducted a field test of the 2001 RVL similar tothe field test conducted by the GFTE on the 2001PVL. In a press release, the EAB announced that itsteams were able to locate 93 percent of the 1200names they sampled from the 2001 RVL.

GECOM amended the RVL based on the inputfrom individual citizens as well as contesting politicalparties during the period of claims and objections.GECOM is required by law to publish the 2001OLE (FVL) at least 14 days prior to election day.On March 5, GECOM released the 2001 OLE with438,940 names, including 6,179 additions, 717deletions, and 967 corrections in address. As withthe 2001 RVL, the 2001 OLE was provided to allcontesting political parties in electronic format onCD-ROM.

Complaints about the accuracy of the 2001OLE continued from all political parties, butprimarily the PNC/R and PPP/C. Both partiesargued that names were still missing or assigned tothe wrong region of the country. The PNC/R alsodemonstrated that some persons who were on the2001 RVL were inexplicably excluded from theOLE. According to the PNC/R, the 2001 OLE wasinflated by almost 30,000 names. While this repre-sents only six percent of the 2001 OLE, the PNC/Rpointed out that it could translate into four seats inParliament according to Guyana’s proportional seatallocation system. Citing problems with the voterslist, high-ranking members of the PNC/R indicatedto Carter Center observers and others that theywere considering a boycott of the elections.

In a last attempt to address parties’ concerns,GECOM announced that it would issue an Addendum

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that would correct some of these problems. TheAddendum, which was published on March 16,increased the total number of electors on the list(OLE plus Addendum) to 440,185. On the sameday, GECOM announced that voters without IDcards would be allowed to vote as long as theirnames were on the list.

PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION

OF ID CARDS

Production of ID cards for voter registration wasa slow process. The international firm De la Ruewas contracted and produced cards of high qualitywith security features. However, production wasbased on entering information from the MasterRegistration Cards (MRCs) created during theregistration process, and this system proved to beunwieldy. Before cards could be produced, MRCshad to be transported from the point of registrationback to the capital and sorted into administrativedivisions. This process took much longer than

expected and delayed production of the cards.Postal workers were asked to help sort in an effortto speed up the process.

Due in part to the delays in production, theprocess of distributing cards was also delayed. Thiswas another area of concern for the political partiesand voters. Although GECOM’s policy of produc-ing and sending the cards out to the farthest regionsfirst ensured that the logistically difficult andremote regions had their cards on time, it alsomeant that the populated coastal areas receivedtheir cards very late.

Because many cards remained to be distributedin Region 4 (Georgetown) three days before theelections, GECOM decided on March 16 that theonly requirement for voting would be to have one’sname on the list. Voters without accepted forms ofidentity were allowed to take an oath to swear totheir own identity. This bypassed the problem ofdistributing the cards in time for polling but elimi-nated one of the principal safeguards adopted by

A voter checks to see ifher name appears on thevoters list.

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GECOM to ensure voter identity. It also left indelibleink as the only safeguard against multiple voting.

Given the problems with the voters list,discussed above, the PNC/R also requested thatvoters whose names were not on the list but whopossessed new ID cards be allowed to vote. Thisrequest was denied several times by GECOM, withthe final four-two vote (against) made just beforethe close of the polls on election day. This issuecaused confusion on polling day and is discussedfurther in the polling section of the report.

Although it was difficult for observers todetermine the extent of this problem, evidence onvoting day suggested that only a small number ofpotential voters were affected. About half ofCarter Center observers witnessed small numbers(averaging one-two voters per polling station)being turned away because their names were noton the list or because they were listed for anotherpolling location. The PNC/R nonetheless contin-ued to claim that tens of thousands of people hadbeen disenfranchised.

As a post-election exercise, because of thecontroversy surrounding the list and the lingeringperception by PNC/R supporters that the list wasnot accurate, GECOM asked donors to fund anindependent audit of the list. In response, theInternational Institute for Democracy and ElectoralAssistance (IDEA) was asked to organize a team ofexperts to conduct an audit that would evaluateand assess GECOM’s work in the 2001 elections.The audit team’s report, which was published inAugust 2001, concluded that the voters listproduced by GECOM was highly accurate (morethan 99 percent), that there was no evidence ofmanipulation or electoral fraud in any of the areasreviewed, and that none of the errors and problemsinvestigated appeared likely to have led to electoraladvantages for any particular party nor would theyhave affected the result of the election.9

These were highly significant findings as theyserved to discount any claims of serious inaccura-cies in the voters list that might have underminedthe credibility or legitimacy of the elections.

ELECTION STAFFING, MANAGEMENT,AND TRAINING

With the exception of the chairman, theGECOM Election Commissioners were selected onthe basis of their party affiliation and were seen byeach party as instruments to ensure that their parti-san interests were protected. The core secretariatstaff was part of the electoral machinery from previ-ous elections, and the remaining staff and temporaryregistrars/poll workers were supposed to have beenrecruited on merit. Although jobs were advertisedand candidates tested, recruitment remained apolitical issue. There were complaints of test scoresnot being taken into consideration and of imbalancesin ethnic representation at polling stations. Themanner and selection of staff was a major concernfor the PPP/C, which repeatedly told Carter Centerobservers that the PNC/R party members controlledthe electoral apparatus. Haggling over staff, especiallyin the politically volatile Region 4 (Georgetown),dragged on into March, holding up the administra-tive and election preparation process.

Efficient and effective management of theprocess and of staff was also an issue. GECOMpersonnel worked long hours, sometimes 20 hours aday in the days leading up to the election, yet theywere unable to meet many of their planning andlogistical deadlines. Although improved strategicplanning and better management of personnel andresources would have helped, GECOM was facedwith unrealistic deadlines, in part because of its effortsto respond to problems raised by the major parties.

9 See “Report of the Audit and Systems Review of the 2001Elections Process in Guyana” by International IDEA.

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There appeared to be a reasonable delegationof responsibilities to the field, which enabledcompetent Returning Officers (ROs) and DeputyReturning Officers (DROs) to resolve local logisticaland staffing problems. However, cumbersomeprocedures and multiple forms for most aspects ofthe process were inefficient and added opportunitiesfor human error. Systems designed to streamlineoperations, such as the one designed for relaying thecount information, were either not used or brokedown in implementation.

Some GECOM staff became political targetsand grist for the mill of talk show hosts. The com-puter section and those individuals seconded fromthe private sector were especially targeted. The

ridicule, along with long hours and low wages, madeit difficult to attract and keep quality staff. ManyGECOM employees only agreed to stay at thebehest of Chairman Joe Singh and his calls to servethe national interest.

GECOM made extensive efforts to train its staffbut was hampered by administrative problems. Forexample, most candidates for positions at the pollsreceived written notice too late to be able to attendthe initial weeklong training in January 2001. Therewere also initial shortages of training manuals.

Carter Center observers attended a number ofGECOM training sessions, which generally tookplace in schools and public halls, and which werewell attended, well organized, and constructive.

Polling officersensure that a voter’sID card matchesthe registration list.

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Trainees worked closely with GECOM instructionmanuals and in group sessions to conduct role-playsof different election day scenarios, including proxyvoters, voters without ID cards, and blind andincapacitated voters. The role-plays were followedby a question-and-answer period to clarify confu-sion by means of discussion, group consensus, anddirection from the trainer. In addition to theinstruction manual, an addendum of FrequentlyAsked Questions was produced to address commonproblems and areas of misunderstanding.

There were, however, differences in the qualityof training, which seemed largely dependent on thecompetence of DROs. In some subdistricts, thestations were well equipped with mock electionmaterials, and trainees were well informed with agood understanding of procedures. In other areas,trainees received last-minute notifications, had nomaterials, and seemed apathetic and uncertain.

A national test of the methods and means ofcommunicating results from the polling stations tothe DROs, to the ROs, and then to GECOM wasscheduled for the weekend before the elections.Only Region 6 conducted this test, as the otherregions were not prepared or were consumed withthe distribution of ID cards. The test in Region 6revealed an immediate need for more training forthis critical part of the process.

Carter Center observers found no significantproblems during the actual polling and pollingstation counting process that related directly backto training. However, GECOM’s failure to train itsworkers adequately to consolidate the count and tocommunicate the results back to GECOM wasevident. There was also evidence of logistical andmanagerial lack of organization that adverselyaffected the efficiency of the operations, such as thelate arrival of the voters list Addendum for theDisciplined Service Forces (DSF) voting andmissing MRCs during election day.

DISCIPLINED SERVICE FORCES BALLOTING

On March 12, the DSF (which includes police,defense force, and prison guards) went to the pollsto cast their ballots. By law, the DSF were able tovote prior to the elections, since many of the DSFwould be deployed and providing security onelection day. In all, 7,022 members of the DSFwere registered to vote, and 5,983 cast theirballots at one of 44 designated polling stationsacross the nation.

As required by law, GECOM publicized thepolling places for the DSF prior to voting day.Preparations for DSF voting went slowly, withballots for each voter pulled manually according tothe region where the DSF member was registered.10

Each ballot was sealed in an envelope with the DSFmember’s name handwritten on it. A separateenvelope marked with the region was provided forthe DSF member to place his/her ballot in beforecasting it in the ballot box. The regional envelopesallowed the DSF votes to be sent back to theregions to be mingled with the ballots cast onMarch 19. This procedure, established by anelection law amendment, was designed to ensurethe secrecy of the DSF vote.

The preparation of ballots was well monitoredby political party agents. Preparations continuedlate into the night of March 11, with some of thematerials not being sent out until 4:00 a.m. onMarch 12. As a result, some polling stations openedlater than the planned 6:00 a.m. time, but moststations were open by 8:00 a.m.

The Carter Center observed poll openings atseven polling stations, the voting process at 26stations, and poll closings at five stations. As awhole, the DSF balloting went well, with only a fewirregularities or areas of concern.

10 Because not every party contested in every region, the ballotsfor each region differed.

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At the opening, about half of the seven stationsobserved reported minor problems. These includeda PNC/R van parked outside a polling station inLinden and a PPP/C flag hanging from a nearbytelephone pole. Although there were no domesticobservers from the EAB, there were agents presentfrom the PNC/R at all seven polls, from the PPP/Cat six polls and from the GAP/WPA at two.

At the 26 polling stations where the Centerobserved the voting process, the majority of observ-ers reported a few minor problems but no majorproblems. A common problem was the late arrivalof the voters list Addendum. Another issue notedwas the number of voters who voted with no formof identification. At 16 of the 26 polling stations,numerous individuals were permitted to vote whodid not show proper identification. These voterstook an oath and had superior officers presentvouch for their identity.11

Materials for voting were present at all 26 stationsobserved, and GECOM staff appeared well trainedand nonpartisan. Voters’ fingers were checked forindelible ink at all polls observed, and there were noreported instances of voter intimidation.

No problems were reported at any of the fivepolling stations where the close of polls wasobserved. The ballot boxes were sealed for returnto Georgetown. With international observers andparty agents present, the boxes were opened severaldays later at GECOM headquarters, and the enve-lopes were sorted by region. The envelopes werethen sent out to designated polling locations ineach region to be opened and mingled with theMarch 19 ballots.

POLITICAL CAMPAIGN

Although the political atmosphere in Guyanawas tense, the political campaign was largely free ofviolence, with parties able to campaign and tomove about the countryside freely. Citizens were

also free to attend rallies and other political events.Campaigns started in earnest with Nomination Dayin mid-February. Large campaign billboards andposters dotted the cities and countryside. Ads wereplaced in the newspapers and broadcast on TV andradio. Parties had publicized kick-offs where theyunveiled their platforms and presented their maincandidates.

Rallies were a common form of campaigning,and these rallies grew in size and frequency in therun-up to election day. The PPP/C and PNC/Rgenerated larger crowds and held more ralliesthan the smaller parties. Speakers of all partiesfocused on similar issues such as education,economy, infrastructure, and jobs, and oftenblamed each other for the problems facingGuyana. A few persons and parties ran a positivecampaign, most notably GAP/WPA. Unfortu-nately, some party speakers used inflammatorylanguage and made personal attacks on opposingcandidates. Of particular concern was the PNC/R’suse of the slogan “slow fire,” that was perceivedas implying support for political violence againstthe ruling PPP/C and its supporters. Fortunately,this rhetoric was toned down during the lastmonth of the campaign.

In contrast, however, the language at PPP/Crallies became more strident and inflammatory asthe elections drew near. In addition, several of thesmaller parties reported to Carter Center observersthat they were being harassed or intimidated byPPP/C supporters or government officials. Inparticular, ROAR blamed the PPP/C for a series ofincidents that culminated in shots being fired in

11 At Brickdam Police Station (Region 4), a Carter Centerobserver noted that 91 electors voted with no identification.At a police station in Region 7 all 12 GDF soldiers on theOLE voted without an ID, and at a police station in Region10 observers witnessed four GDF voters who appeared to beunderage voting without an ID.

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the vicinity of ROAR activists putting up postersin Region 6. These incidents appeared to beconcentrated primarily in hotly contested areasor where it appeared that the smaller parties(such as GAP/WPA or ROAR) were makinginroads.

There were also incidents of stone throwingagainst speakers at some of the PPP/C rallies,and the escalating number and intensity ofincidents resulted in a press release from theGLTOG that condemned election-relatedviolence. The GECOM chairman also issued apublic appeal for an end to the violence.Although the incidents did not escalate into aserious disruption of the campaign and policereported only a handful of election-relatedmisdemeanors, the atmosphere remainedextremely volatile and tense.

In an effort to curb the negative tone andnumber of incidents, which left some GECOMstaff feeling intimidated, GECOM issued a political

party code of conduct on March 3. This initiativecame very late in the process because GECOMhad been waiting for the political parties todevelop their own code, as had been done bythe media. Subsequent party inaction led to aGECOM decision to set some ground rules for theremainder of the campaign and for the acceptanceof the results. Lacking a formal code endorsed bythe parties, GECOM had no enforcement powersand the code was largely ignored.

GECOM also proposed a series of televiseddebates among the presidential candidates. Twodebates were held among the presidential candidatesfrom TUF, ROAR, GDP, and PNC/R. The PPP/Ccandidate, President Bharrat Jagdeo, who had beencalling for a televised debate between only himselfand PNC/R candidate Desmond Hoyte, did notparticipate in the GECOM’s program of debates.The GAP’s presidential candidate, Paul Hardy, wasin the hinterlands campaigning, so the party sentanother representative.

Supporters often displayedcampaign posters onschools and houses.

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MEDIA MONITORING

There were no censorship issues or restrictionson the freedom of the press in the 2001 elections.Instead, Guyana suffered from an irresponsiblypartisan press. Of particular concern to observerswas the continuation of campaign commercialsand talk show propaganda throughout the electoralperiod, including election day. Some of theindependent television stations and newspapersattempted to act in a responsible and balancednature, but they were overshadowed by a fewpopular and inflammatory talk show hosts. Statetelevision, which has the only nationwide coverage,was pro-government in its broadcasts.

The lack of objective reporting and accurateinformation available to voters was a concern toobservers, as it not only limited the ability of votersto make a reasoned choice on polling day but alsoincreased political and ethnic tensions and, in somecases, incited the public to violence.

To address these issues, representatives frommore than 50 radio, television, and print mediaoutlets came together in October 2000 to sign amedia code of conduct. The nine-page code wasmeant to lay the ground rules for the upcomingpolitical season. It declared that time and spaceallotted to coverage of the political parties shouldbe balanced. It also committed the signatories toprovide free space and 10 minutes of airtime dailyto each party competing in the election. Thoughthe agreement was not legally binding, it was hopedthat it might help temper partisan reporting andcoverage of the news and electoral campaign.

An independent panel of media referees wasestablished to monitor the media environment,including the ability of the press to live up to itscommitments. The panel, which featured twoCaribbean journalists, issued regular reportsthroughout the election season. Their work wasaugmented by other media monitoring units,

including a 15-person team at GECOM, an11-person team in the GLTOG, and a group thatwas subcontracted by the EAB.

In general, these monitoring groups found thatthe code of conduct was ignored by almost all ofthe signatories. Most media outlets continued toreport the news in a manner that was biased, oftenin favor of one of the two major parties. In addition,some of the talk show hosts blatantly portrayedparty propaganda as news and used inflammatorylanguage throughout the electoral process.

Media monitors found that the government-controlled television, radio, and newspaper outletsmade modest efforts to present the oppositionparties’ campaign platforms, but their pre- and post-election day coverage was pervaded by an overtlypro-government tone and bias. In its final report,the GECOM monitoring unit called the outlets a“mouthpiece” for the government. The GLTOGmonitoring group found that they gave 57 percentof their news coverage to the PPP/C campaign(all positive) and only 10 percent to the PNC/R(predominately negative). The Chronicle, thegovernment-controlled newspaper, had the samebias in its coverage. On the positive side, monitorsnoted that the independent newspaper, theStabroek News, made efforts to portray the news ina balanced manner. Media monitors also reportedthat the PPP/C and the PNC/R received morecoverage than all of the smaller parties combined.

Television talk show hosts were active politicalactors during the 2001 campaign. Presidentialcandidate C.N. Sharma hosted his own daily showand used it to promote his campaign. Also ofconcern were talk show hosts who presented rumoras fact and used their television outreach andpersonality in an inflammatory manner. One of themost notable was Mark Benschop, who was arrestedseveral times in front of GECOM while urging hisviewers to demonstrate against the slow distribution

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of ID cards, and who spent election day on the airpromoting the PNC/R and deriding the PPP/C, thechief of police, and other targets.

Channel 9, which carries Benschop’s programand other pro-PNC/R talk shows, was noted in allof the monitoring reports as having violatednearly every provision of the media code ofconduct. GECOM’s monitoring unit found thatChannel 9 “pushed the limits of irresponsibility todangerous and incendiary levels” in the daysfollowing the elections.

VOTER EDUCATION

Voter education plays an important role in theperception of integrity in the electoral system. Inaddition to understanding the practicalities ofvoting, such as the date of the election, poll open-ing and closing times, and how to mark the ballotpaper, the electorate needs a basic understanding oftheir rights and responsibilities under the Constitu-tion and election law.

In Guyana, there were three new elements inthe electoral legislation for 2001, including theallocation of 25 seats for geographical representation,the allocation of 40 seats for the national “top-up”list, and mandatory gender representation, wherebyat least one-third of the candidates nominated byeach party had to be female. This did not mean thatone-third of a party’s representation in Parliamenthad to be female, because once the number of seatswas allocated after the election, parties were free toselect the members of Parliament from candidatelists without regard to either gender or place ofresidence. This also meant that a party could selecta representative for a particular region, even thoughthat representative did not live in, or even visit,that region.

In the pre-election observation period, CarterCenter observers monitored the outreach of votereducation programs and had concerns that themessages were not reaching people in more remotecommunities. The GECOM voter education plancame into effect at the end of January. Despite its

The Returning Officerin Region 8 coordinatespolling station returnsfrom this office.

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late start, GECOM made a concerted effort toinform the electorate through its public awarenessand voter education (PAVE) program. The PAVEprogram incorporated a number of initiatives toreach all levels and sectors of society in all regions.The initiatives included education forums, outreachproject teams, production and distribution ofposters and leaflets, and a voter education caravan.

GECOM worked in collaboration with theGuyanese Association of Women Lawyers and theWashington, D.C.-based National DemocraticInstitute (NDI) to host educational forums on theconstitutional changes and the electoral system.Some forums were targeted at specific audiences,such as women NGO representatives or representa-tives of youth and Amerindian communities. Therewere also several open sessions held across allregions. These meetings enabled GECOM todisseminate information to prominent civil societyfigures and encourage them to go out into commu-nities to inform the electorate, to motivate peopleto exercise their right to vote, and to assure votersof the secrecy of the ballot.

A large number of posters and leaflets wereproduced and distributed. These posters were helpfulfor the most part, but some of the informationsupplied in the leaflets was confusing and misleading.In some instances, the electorate believed that the

term “geographical representation” meant that theywould be represented in Parliament by someone whohailed from their region and was known to theconstituents. This was not necessarily the case, as thecandidate lists submitted by the parties for the“regional” seats could include persons from anyregion in the country.

Similarly, some voters understood the “genderagenda” to mean that one-third of seats in Parlia-ment would be taken up by women, when in realitythe legislation required only that one-third of thecandidates on the party lists were women. Votersdid not always understand the ballot paper design,and the explanation of the proportional representa-tion system and the mechanism for allocating seatsleft some voters feeling confused and frustrated.

A schedule was drawn up for the voter educa-tion caravan to travel throughout the regions with agroup of performers to act out parts of the votingprocess. The schedule and its revisions were rarelyfollowed. Observers reported a general lack oforganization and found that the performances didnot portray a clear message.

The problems with voter education outreachand with poll worker training in the remote regionswere reflected in the number of rejected ballots onelection day, which was significantly higher in thehinterland than in the coastal regions. �

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ELECTION OBSERVATION

In addition to The Carter Center, four otherinternational groups sent observer missions tomonitor the elections. As noted above, the

GLTOG, which had a field presence starting inOctober, deployed a total of about 65 observers tomonitor the polls. There were also observer teamsfrom the OAS, CARICOM, and the Common-wealth. In general, there was good coordinationbetween the international observer groups, includ-ing coordination of the deployment of observersacross the country’s 10 regions.

In addition, the domestic civil society monitor-ing group EAB fielded a large number of observersand was able to cover about half of the pollingstations on election day.

CARTER CENTER OBSERVER BRIEFINGS

AND DEPLOYMENT

The Carter Center’s MTOs were supplementedby a team of short-term observers to monitor the

period surrounding the polls. The Center delegation,which totaled 44, was led by former U.S. PresidentJimmy Carter, former First Lady Rosalynn Carter,and former Prime Minister Sir Lloyd ErskineSandiford of Barbados and included observers from10 countries.

On March 16, the observers participated in afull-day briefing that included training on how toobserve elections and the Center’s methodology forgathering and reporting observation data. In addi-tion, delegates received information on the politicalhistory and electoral system of Guyana from expertswithin the delegation. Representatives of the PNC/R,GAP/WPA, and ROAR provided overviews oftheir electoral issues and concerns. The head ofthe GLTOG presented a summary of what theirobservers had witnessed since their arrival in fall2000, and the Chairman of GECOM and twocommissioners provided an in-depth update on thestatus of election preparations.

David Carroll, Mrs.Carter, and PresidentCarter meet withGECOM ChairmanJoe Singh.

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Carter Center observers were deployed in 25teams of one or two persons to all 10 regions, withthe highest number of teams deployed to thecoastal areas, including Region 4 aroundGeorgetown (see Appendix 5). Deployment wascoordinated with the other international observa-tion groups in order to ensure that the maximumnumber of polling stations was covered.

Upon arrival, President Carter issued an arrivalstatement and then held a series of meetings, alongwith co-leaders Prime Minister Sandiford andRosalynn Carter. These included meetings with thepresidential candidates for the major parties, represen-tatives of other parties in Parliament (WPA,TUF),ambassadors from the major donor group, the heads ofthe other international observation groups, andseveral representatives from civil society organizations.

VOTING PROCESS AND THE COUNT

On Saturday, March 17, observers weredeployed to their regions and spent Saturday and

Sunday visiting the ROs, DROs, political parties,and polling stations within their areas, observing theend of the electoral campaign and the final prepara-tions for polling day.

On election day, March 19, observers were atthe polls by 5:00 a.m. in order to watch set-up forthe 6:00 a.m. opening. Carter Center observerswatched the poll opening at 24 stations. Duringelection day, observers visited anywhere fromabout five to 15 polling stations, depending ontheir deployment area. In total, Carter Centerobservers monitored the voting process at 415polling stations in all 10 regions of the country.At the close of voting, Carter Center observersmonitored the closing and counting process at 23stations. Most of the Center observers returned toGeorgetown after the conclusion of the count onMarch 19 or early on Tuesday, March 20. Some ofthe Center’s observers were redeployed to theirareas in the days after the elections to monitor theconsolidation of the count at the subregional andregional level.

Prime MinisterSandiford (left),President Carter, andGECOM ChairmanJoe Singh (right)exchange greetings.

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Carter Center observers reported that the poll-opening process went smoothly with only a fewminor procedural irregularities. These irregularitiesincluded a missing voters list at one station, missingelectoral ink at three stations, and a late opening atfive of the 24 stations observed. For the most part,however, the prescribed procedures were followed:at every station observed, the MRC canistersarrived sealed, the six-digit number for the officialseal was selected randomly, and the ballot boxeswere shown to be empty and sealed.12

The presence of party polling agents is one ofthe most important means to ensure adequatemonitoring of the electoral process. Party pollingagents from the PPP/C and PNC/R were present atmore than 90 percent of the 24 openings observedby Carter Center monitors, while GAP/WPA hadagents at 25 percent, TUF at 12.5 percent andROAR at 4.2 percent of the stations. The EAB hadobservers at about half of the stations. All of theparty agents had GECOM accreditation, and theEAB observers were clearly identified with blue

armbands. Almost every polling station had apolice officer present, but their presence wasinconspicuous and nonthreatening.

Of the 415 stations where Carter Centerdelegates observed voting, there were no irregu-larities reported at more than 85 percent ofstations, while 14 percent had minor irregu-larities, and only one percent reported major ormany irregularities.13

Using informationgathered from pollingofficials, Carter Centerobserver Ransford Palmercompletes a checklist at apolling station.

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12 One of the integrity mechanisms used in the elections was toplace a stamp mark with a unique, six-digit polling station codeon the back of each ballot as it was issued to each voter. Asthere were two parts to the ballot, the poll workers wererequired to stamp the back of each half.

13 Two major irregularities were reported: (1) In one station inRegion 9, the polling official was not folding ballots properly.This was not discovered until after almost 50 percent of theballots had been cast. Officials later considered the improperlyfolded ballots spoilt, so almost 70 out of approximately 140ballots were not counted; (2) In one station in Georgetown,during the period around 6-7 p.m. when there was confusion asto whether or not polls were closed, approximately 15 peoplecame to the polls and appeared to be voting by impersonatingpeople whose names were on the list but who had not voted.

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Additional statistical information collectedby Carter Center observers reinforced the overallassessment that polling went well. At 99.3 per-cent of the stations observed, there were noreports of intimidation, and 97.3 percent of thestations were reportedly free from politicalcampaigning of any kind. The ballot boxes werefirmly sealed in all but one of the stations observed.Polling officials appeared to be dedicated, work-ing a very long day for polling and well into thenight for the count.14 (Appendices 6-8 providesummary statistics from the Center’s observationforms.)

Most of the polling officials encountered byCarter Center observers seemed to be adequatelytrained, and most of the polling stations had theprincipal materials necessary for voting. In general,polling stations were well organized and enabled asmooth flow of voters, although some stations wereof necessity located in small schools, other publicbuildings, or private residences. Voter turnout washigh, especially in the early morning hours, when

voters waited patiently, sometimes in very longlines. Observers noted the special care given tovoters with disabilities. Polling officials painstakinglyensured that these voters understood how to markthe ballot and helped the elderly or infirm into andout of the polling stations and voting booths.

Carter Center observers noted several problemsrelated to a lack of training, such as giving ballotpapers to voters who already had electoral ink on theirfingers and neglecting to stamp both sections of theballot (3.3 percent of the stations observed). Observ-ers reported confusion among some voters, especiallyin the hinterlands, as to how the ballot paper shouldbe marked and folded. In some cases, voters tooklonger than five minutes to mark their papers andreturned from the ballot booths looking confused. Inother cases, voters did not know how to fold the ballotcorrectly so that the stamp marks placed on the back

Carter Center observerCara Hesse visits anoutdoor polling station.

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14 One poll worker, however, reported being disenfranchised,because her employment letter had not been forwarded byGECOM, and as a result she was not able to vote at thestation where she was working.

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of the ballots (both top and bottom section) werevisible. On a number of occasions, the PO wasrequired to give further instruction on how to markand fold the ballots. Observers witnessed voters beinggiven more than one ballot on six occasions and notedproblems with secrecy of the ballot in three percent ofthe polls visited.

In spite of the procedures GECOM implementedto address problems with the voters list and incom-plete distribution of ID cards, problems were evidenton polling day. In addition to requiring ID cards orother forms of identification, GECOM provided forthe use of MRCs on election day as a backup integ-rity mechanism to verify voter identification. Duringthe voting process the MRC was pulled for eachvoter and cast along with the ballot into the ballotbox to avoid multiple voting. However, observersnoted that it was a time-consuming process for pollworkers to find a voter’s MRC card in the stacks of400 cards sent to each polling station. Also, MRCswere missing from some of the stations, so manyvoters voted without them. Based on Carter Center

observations, the MRCs were not effective in servingeither as a backup to catch errors on the registrationlist or in serving as an integrity mechanism to protectagainst multiple voting.

At more than 50 percent of polling stationsvisited, Carter Center observers saw at least oneperson vote without an ID card. At about 10percent of the stations, observers saw more than10 people vote without identification documents.

At almost half of the polling stations observedby the Center, at least one person was turned awayfor not having his or her name on the final voterslist. A number of observers reported seeing manyvoters who appeared to have gone to the wrongpolling station within their subdistrict, particularlyin Georgetown, and after waiting in the queue hadto be directed to a different polling station, causingconfusion and frustration. While both partiescomplained that their supporters were being turnedaway, the PNC/R was particularly adamant anddecided to request that GECOM allow voting bypersons who had ID cards or receipt stubs from the

The count beginsat a polling stationin Region 5.

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photographic exercise, but whose names did notappear on the list.15 By a vote of four to two,GECOM upheld its existing policy and reaffirmedthat only persons listed on the OLE (as amended bythe Addendum) could vote.

However, as the day wore on there was grow-ing tension in the streets of Georgetown, wheresome PNC/R supporters were gathering to protestwhat they believed were deliberate attempts toprevent them from voting. Shortly before the closeof polls, PNC/R leaders requested that GECOMreconsider its decision. GECOM did not announceits final decision confirming its prior ruling until6:30 p.m. In the meantime, there was confusion inmany areas of the country as a result of conflictinginstructions coming from GECOM headquarters,as reported on television and radio. Depending onthe region, POs received word before, during, orafter the closure of the polls that the polls shouldremain open until further notice.16 Some POsreceived instructions that the poll closing shouldbe extended from 6:00 to 7:00 p.m., while othersheard a GECOM announcement on the radio thatthe polls were to close at a “designated hour” andthought that this meant that the polls shouldremain open until further notice. Shortly before6:00 p.m., some polling officials reported receivingofficial instructions that voters who did not havetheir names on the voters list but who were inpossession of the new ID card could vote. CarterCenter and other international observers subse-quently witnessed a small number of peoplecasting ballots even though their names were noton the voters list.

Because of the conflicting nature and latenotice of the instructions, several polls closed at6:00 p.m. and started their count, leaving angry andfrustrated persons shouting for them to reopen,especially in Region 4. The confusion ended by8:00 p.m., when it became clear that the reference

to the “designated” hour meant the scheduled6:00 p.m. closing time and that GECOM had metthat night and voted against the PNC/R request toallow votes to be cast by persons in possession of aID card but not on the voters list.

After the close of polls, Carter Center observersmonitored the closing and counting process at 23stations. At all of these stations, counting wentsmoothly, with only one observer reporting a majorirregularity.17 Eight teams reported minor irregularities,and 13 teams reported no irregularities.

In the polling stations monitored by CarterCenter observers, the count was done in a trans-parent manner, with each ballot being shown tothose present as it was being counted. POs wereconsistent in determining whether a ballot shouldbe accepted or rejected, and they filled in formscorrectly at all but three of the polling stations.18

The results were transcribed accurately onto thestatements of poll (SOP) and were uniformlysigned by polling officials, party agents, andobservers present. In only one instance did anobserver see a PO forget to sign the SOP. At allstations observed, SOP copies for both thegeneral and regional elections were posted outsidepolling stations as required by law. Carter Centerobservers felt the party agents had accurately

15 During the photographic exercise, voters were provided with areceipt stub as evidence that their photo was taken. GECOMfound that the stubs could be forged rather easily and decidednot to allow them to serve as evidence that photographs hadbeen taken.

16 Isolated areas nationwide and much of Region 6 did notreceive instructions to remain open.

17 The one major irregularity reported during the closing andcounting was a case in Region 6 where 58 ballots were rejectedbecause the poll worker failed to stamp and fold the ballotscorrectly.

18 In these three cases, the PO neglected to fill in all of the BallotPaper Account, which is the form to be completed before theballot box is opened for the count.

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recorded the results for their parties. The counttook longer than expected, primarily due tobureaucratic requirements such as multiple formsand copies to be completed.

Despite the confusion at closing time, whichdetracted from an otherwise smooth election dayprocess, the Carter Center delegation concluded thatthese irregularities did not materially affect theintegrity of the process or the results. In a sense, itappears that keeping the polls open longer served asa release valve for some of the anger and frustrationthat had built up throughout the day in Region 4 dueto the perception that voters were being deliberatelydisenfranchised by problems in the voters list.

Several recounts were requested, notably threein Region 3 (where the PPP/C disputed the numberof ballots rejected because of illegible stamp marks)and one in Region 6. Observers reported that PNC/Ragents stopped observing the recount process inRegion 3 after party agents squabbled over therecount procedures. In the recounts, results did notsignificantly differ from the original figures.

POST-ELECTION LEADERSHIP MEETINGS

On March 20, President Carter and PrimeMinister Sandiford, along with the heads of otherinternational observation groups, met withGECOM Chairman Singh and two other membersof the Commission to address a common concern:the slow release of preliminary results to the public.The GECOM commissioners recognized the prob-lem and indicated that results were expected to bereleased soon.

After these meetings, President Carter andPrime Minister Sandiford held a news conferenceand released a preliminary statement summarizingthe Carter Center delegation’s assessment of theelectoral process leading up to the opening of polls,the casting of ballots, and poll closings (see Appen-dix 9). The statement noted that the process wasgenerally peaceful and orderly and that the Center’sobservers reported very few irregularities during thevoting process. One important exception was theconfusion that surrounded the closing of the polls,when polling officials received unclear instructions

Schools were often usedas polling sites.

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through GECOM personnel, the media, or others asto whether to allow voting after the 6:00 p.m.scheduled closing. The Center’s statement alsonoted that all the political parties had expressedconcern about the accuracy of the voters list beforethe elections and that some voters claimed they hadregistered but were not on the voters list. While theCenter’s observation data did not indicate any majorsystemic irregularities in the list, the statement notedthat the magnitude of these problems was difficult toascertain. Finally, the statement stressed that whilethe elections were an important and necessaryelement of Guyana’s democratic process, they werenot sufficient alone to solve the problems nor healthe wounds of Guyana’s divided society.

After President Carter and Prime MinisterSandiford read portions of the prepared preliminarystatement, President Carter made an impassionedimpromptu plea in which he called on all Guyaneseto work for national reconciliation and for puttingthe well-being of the country before that of any oneparty. He emphasized that, following the election,

Guyanese faced a choice between a future withcontinued sharp ethnic and political divisions orone in which the country moved forward in aunified fashion. While noting that both majorparties and their leaders had agreed privately thatimportant constitutional reforms were necessary, hesaid the major responsibility to ensure that key stepsbe taken would rest with the victorious party (seeAppendix 10).

Following the final press conference, twoprominent members of civil society with ties to theopposition sent a letter to President Carter expressingconcern about the potential for violence and request-ing that he facilitate an agreement between the twopresidential candidates on the issues of governanceand reconciliation raised in the press conference.

Acting on this request, in the early morning ofMarch 21, President Carter drafted a short state-ment summarizing what he believed were key pointsthat would be acceptable to both sides and whichcould lay the foundation for additional steps.Copies of the draft statement were sent immediately

Democracy ProgramDirector CharlesCostello, PresidentCarter, and PrimeMinister Sandiford holda press conference topresent the preliminarystatement.

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to contacts with both parties, and meetings werearranged hastily before departure later thatmorning with PNC/R leader Desmond Hoyte andPPP/C leader Bharrat Jagdeo. In separate meet-ings, President Carter presented the draft to bothleaders. Both Hoyte and Jagdeo indicated thatthey agreed to all the steps outlined in the draftstatement, but Hoyte said he preferred not tosign it, since it reiterated commitments alreadymade by both parties. Although it was not appar-ent at the time, it later became clear that Hoytehad not seen the draft prior to the meeting, as hehad been unable to meet with his associates whohad copies.

The following day, The Carter Center issuedthe statement in a press release noting that bothsides agreed with the text and had pledged toimplement its provisions. Media reports the nextday mischaracterized the commitments as formalbrokered agreements. In light of this, the Centerissued another press release the following day thatemphasized that the draft statement was intended as

a reaffirmation of shared principles and not as asigned or brokered agreement. (See Appendices 11and 12.) Shortly thereafter, Hoyte sent a terse letterto the Stabroek News that indicated that he wasnot aware of any accord brokered by Mr. Carterand had not agreed to anything with PresidentJadgeo or President Carter.

Given the active role played by the Center andPresident Carter in Guyana in the past, and in lightof the post-election context of heightened politicalpressures, Hoyte’s reaction to the Center andPresident Carter’s interventions are understandable.While aware of the risks that its statements andactions might provoke a negative reaction fromHoyte and the PNC/R, the Center was motivatedby a genuine desire to stimulate dialogue betweenthe two leaders and to encourage them to agree tosteps that would benefit all Guyanese. Although itwas not until several weeks after the elections, theCenter is pleased that the two parties and theirleaders decided to initiate an ongoing process ofpolitical dialogue.

Carter Center observerJohn Graham traveled byboat to observe voting.

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CONSOLIDATION OF REGIONAL COUNTS

AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESULTS

Considerable effort and expense had beenexpended by GECOM in planning and arranging forthe processing and computerization of the results.However, in the push to release results quickly,GECOM strayed from its planning. In Region 4, forexample, some of the statements of poll results weresent directly to GECOM for tabulation instead ofbeing consolidated first at the electoral district (i.e.,region) level by the RO. Complaints by politicalparties about the integrity of the computer system,generated in part by misinformation from talk showhosts and in part by the alleged computerized disloca-tion of voters on the voters list, resulted in a GECOMdecision to tabulate the results manually before enteringthe information into computerized spreadsheets.

Tabulation of results at GECOM headquarterswas observed by international observers, but partyagents were not allowed to monitor the process, andthis was of concern to Carter Center observers.Having party agents present at all stages of theprocess, especially during the consolidation of theresults and the allocation of seats, is an integral partof ensuring the accuracy and transparency ofelections. GECOM assured the Center’s field officedirector that party agents were free to observe thetabulation, but the smaller parties, in particularROAR, continued to complain that they wereunable to have open access to monitor the finalphases of the process. ROAR officials argued thatthis was unfair to the smaller parties, since the twomain parties in effect were monitoring the processthrough their GECOM commissioners.

Once the results were tabulated and checkedlate on March 22, they were signed by the chiefelectoral officer (CEO) and submitted to GECOM.With the unanimous approval of GECOM,results were announced very early on March 23.The Commission subsequently approved the

allocation of seats and issued a Declaration ofElection of President.

After the results were announced, however, asupervisor from Region 4 realized there had beenan error in the totals in her submission andbrought this to the attention of GECOM. TheCommission met and heard a legal opinion fromtheir counsel that suggested that the official resultscould still be changed because they had not yetbeen published in the official gazette. On March27, the results were revised and the total votes forsome parties were changed, thereby affecting theallocation of seats. This change gave a seat inParliament to TUF and took away one of the seatsheld by the PPP/C. Table 3 shows the allocation ofparliamentary seats.

The parties were notified on March 28 of thesecorrections by letter and met later that day with theCEO. The fact that some of the polling stations hadbeen inadvertently left out of the original totalsfueled requests by opposition and small parties forrelease of results at the polling station level. Up tothat point, GECOM had released total figures butnot the station-by-station results that the partiesand observers needed for verification purposes. A

TABLE 3:Allocation of Parliamentary Seats in the2001 Elections

PARTY SEAT ALLOCATION

GAP/WPA 2GDP -JFAP -NFA -PNC/R 27PPP/C 34ROAR 1TUF 1

TOTAL: 65

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court case brought by PNC/R candidate JosephHamilton challenging the process of tabulating theresults resulted in GECOM suspending its intention(pending the court decision) to scan the statementsof poll for public release on a CD-ROM.

CARTER CENTER QUICK COUNT

AND REVIEW OF STATEMENTS OF POLL

As part of its comprehensive monitoring effort,The Carter Center gathered data from a sample ofpolling station results to conduct a quick count orparallel vote tabulation (PVT). The quick countwas undertaken to monitor indirectly the tabulationprocess by which vote counts from individualpolling stations were added together by GECOM toarrive at the official results.

The election results predicted by the Center’squick count did not differ meaningfully from thefinal results announced by GECOM, indicating thatthe tabulation process was conducted withoutsignificant mistakes or fraud. The findings of thequick count were not made public, but they wereused to inform the Center delegation’s overallassessment of the electoral process. As the samplecould not be drawn on a totally random basis dueto logistical travel constraints, the Center did nottreat the quick count as fully reliable in a scientificor statistical sense.

In order to conduct the quick count, the Centerselected a representative sample of 100 pollingstations, approximately five percent of the totalnumber of stations, from all 10 regions. Prior todeployment, Carter Center observers were givenprecise instructions to collect vote count informa-tion from the posted SOPs at the selected pollingstations along with their other monitoring duties.Carter Center observers did not count ballot papersthemselves nor did they ask individuals for whomthey had voted. Rather, late on election night andearly the following morning, observers recorded the

official vote counts from selected polling stations asposted on the official SOP. By noon on March 20,information had been received for 89 of the 100polling stations.

The Carter Center quick count results suggestedthat PPP/C would receive approximately 54.2percent of the vote and the PNC/R 41 percent, withthe remaining 4.8 percent split among the othercontesting parties. The margin of error for the quickcount was seven percent with a 90 percent confi-dence interval.19 The election results announced byGECOM on March 27 did not differ significantly,awarding the PPP/C with 52.9 percent, the PNC/Rwith 41.9 percent, and the other parties with 3.2percent of the vote. Several weeks later, on April 5,GECOM published an updated list of official resultswith minor revisions (see Appendix 13).

The EAB also considered undertaking a largescale PVT for the elections. However, the organiza-tion ultimately decided to tabulate unofficial resultsbased on 835 of the nearly 1,900 polling stations.Their findings were also consistent with the finalofficial results announced by GECOM and with thefindings of the Center’s quick count.

Once GECOM had announced the officialresults, Carter Center observers, in coordinationwith the GLTOG, conducted an independentreconciliation of all but approximately 185 ofnearly 1,900 official SOPs collected at the GECOMheadquarters.20 This review showed that more than99 percent of the SOPs had been signed by a POas well as party agents, an issue in the 1997 elections.A comparison of vote count results from individualpolling stations as collected by Carter Centerobservers with the official SOPs at GECOM head-quarters showed no significant difference. �

19 The margin of error was calculated based on a 90 percentconfidence interval.

20 The remaining statements of poll were not readily available bythe time the observers had to leave.

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POST-ELECTION OBSERVATION

In the days immediately following the election,the PNC/R and its supporters continued tocomplain of voters being disenfranchised

because their names had not been on the voters list.The more ardent supporters gathered at CongressPlace, PNC/R headquarters, to vent their dissatis-faction. The day the official election results wereannounced, PNC/R Election Commissioner HasylnParris was attacked by a crowd at Congress Place,apparently because of his part in the unanimousvote by GECOM commissioners to approve theresults. Unrest broke out in Buxton, a small coastaltown near the capital, and spread along the EastCoast road. Businesses in Georgetown remainedclosed and school children stayed at home ascitizens worried about the disturbances spreading.

Within hours of the announcement of theofficial results, PNC/R candidate Joseph Hamiltonpetitioned the High Court for an injunction to

prevent president-elect Bharrat Jadgeo from beingsworn in as president. Hamilton’s petition claimedthat GECOM and its CEO had not followed theprovisions of the Representation of the People Act,because they bypassed consolidation of the countby the ROs.

The High Court heard the case until March 28,when it adjourned to make its decision. While thecourt was in session, crowds of protesters andonlookers gathered outside. Several times duringthe proceedings the court recessed because it couldnot hear over the noise of the crowd outside thecourthouse and the sound of gunfire as police firedpellets over the heads of protestors.

The case was heard by Chief Justice DesireeBernard, the same judge who had ruled in 1997 thatthe court had no jurisdiction to intervene at thatpoint in an election. Her own words were quoted incourt by both sides, one side claiming that she

Polling officials and partyagents take a breakoutside a polling stationin Region 8.

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should rule as she did in 1997, and the otherclaiming that the two cases were different.Acknowledging in court that she was under anenormous amount of pressure to rule swiftly andcorrectly, the Chief Justice said the country wasfalling prey to mob rule and that people werebeginning to fear for their lives.

In her decision, read on March 31, the ChiefJustice dismissed the injunction to block the procla-mation of Bharrat Jagdeo as president. However,she expressed concern that party agents were notpresent to monitor the tabulation of the results asrequired by Section 84 (1) of the Representationof the People Act. The latter requires:

The Returning Officer to ascertain the totalvotes cast for each list by adding up the votesrecorded in the statements of poll in thepresence of persons entitled to be present asset out in Section 86 (1) which includesmembers of the Commission, duly appointedcandidates, counting agents, and such otherpersons as, in the opinion of the ReturningOfficer, have good reason to be present.

In view of the above, Justice Bernard orderedGECOM and the CEO to fulfill the provisions ofArticle 84 (1) of the Representation of the PeopleAct. The Commission subsequently ordered ROs torecertify the statements of poll in front of partyagents. This process started on March 31 andcontinued until April 4 but did not materiallychange the results in the end. The PNC/R refusedto take part in the recertification process, as itbelieved the swearing-in should not have takenplace before the process was completed. On March31, the same day as Justice Bernard’s decision,Bharrat Jagdeo was sworn in as President. (SeeAppendix 13 for GECOM’s April 5, 2001, publica-tion of official results.)

When the Center closed its election observationoffice on April 6, the PNC/R still had not acceptedthe results. The party was preparing a petitionchallenging the election and suggested privately thatit might not take its seats in Parliament.

The political atmosphere remained tense forseveral weeks. There were numerous protests, someof which turned into violent demonstrations androadblocks in Georgetown and along the coast.Tensions reached a boiling point shortly afterHoyte’s April 7 declaration that the PNC/Rintended to escalate its protest against thereappointment of Roger Luncheon as Head of thePresidential Secretariat, on the grounds that hisappointment politicized a post that should havebeen filled by a neutral civil servant. Violencebroke out after a PNC/R rally where calls for “slowfire” were replaced by “more fire.” On April 9,not long after a Channel 9 talk show host calledfor “raging fires,” fires set by arsonists rippedthrough the heart of Georgetown, destroying eightbuildings on Robb and Regent Streets. A womanalso was shot dead in the vicinity of the PPP/C’sheadquarters.

In an effort to prevent further violence, Presi-dent Jagdeo and Hoyte agreed to meet on April 24.During the meeting, the two leaders reachedagreements in six key areas, including steps toreduce tensions and ensure a politically neutralpublic service. In a follow-up meeting the next day,the leaders issued a statement summarizing agree-ments reached on a series of questions, includingthe creation of committees on depressed communi-ties, the bauxite industry, and house lot apportion-ment. In a third meeting on May 2, the two leadersagreed on additional follow-up steps. �

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

THE CARTER CENTER’SMAY 17 FINAL STATEMENT

About six weeks after closing its field officein Georgetown, the Center issued a finalstatement summarizing its assessment of

the electoral process in Guyana (see Appendix 14).The statement, released on May 17, 2001, con-cluded that “overall,the Center finds thatthe electoral processmet internationalstandards, that thevoters of Guyana wereable to freely expresstheir democraticchoices on March 19,and that the officialresults reflected the willof the voters. Unfortunately, there was post-electionstreet violence and lingering doubts about theaccuracy of the voters list and final results. While itis critical to improve the electoral system for futureelections, it is equally important that Guyanesework together toward political reconciliation,inclusiveness, and good governance.”

The Center’s statement also provided specificassessments of several key aspects of the process,including election day processes, voter registration,party observers, election management systems, andthe media. The Center found that the election dayvoting and counting processes went peacefully, thatpoll workers were well trained and professional, thatvoters were able to cast their vote in secret, andthat there were no reports of significant securityincidents or intimidation.

Regarding voter registration, the Center noted thatproblems with the voters list and voter registration

were the principal reasons for opposition partyclaims that GECOM was not ready for electionday and that these greatly affected the level ofconfidence of the Guyanese people in GECOMand the electoral process. Although GECOM hadextended pre-election deadlines and issued supple-mental voter registration lists in an effort not todisenfranchise voters, the final OLE still suffered

from repeated butcorrectable errors.Finally, the Center’sstatement stronglysupported GECOM’srequest for an indepen-dent external audit.(The audit, which wascompleted by Interna-tional IDEA in August2001, concluded that

the voter list was 99 percent accurate and thatnone of the problems appeared likely to favor anyparticular party, nor would have affected the resultof the election.)

The Center’s statement noted problems inGECOM’s election management and planningsystems, which contributed not only to inaccuraciesin the voters list and delays in producing anddistributing voter identification cards, but also tomeltdowns in the systems for vote reporting andtabulation. Although GECOM had developedsophisticated computerized systems, the software forthe system was never completely verified and thesystems had to be discarded, which meant that thefinal results had to be tabulated manually fromnearly 1,900 SOPs. The vote count was ultimatelyaccurate and honest, but it was inefficient andcaused the announcement of final results to bedelayed by more than 48 hours.

The Center concluded thatGuyana’s 2001 electoral process met

international standards and thatthe official results reflected

the will of the voters.

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The Center also expressed concern regardingthe absence of political party agents during thetabulation of results at the national level. Whereasthe counting process at polling stations was trans-parent and open to party agents, access to GECOMheadquarters was difficult. This was especiallyproblematic for the smaller parties, including theWPA/GAP, TUF, and ROAR, which did not haverepresentation in GECOM and therefore had noaccess whatsoever to these key parts of the tabula-tion exercise.

In regard to the media, the Center echoed theviews of GECOM’s Media Monitoring Unit (MMU)and other observers regarding the unbalanced andbiased coverage in the state-owned media and theirresponsible and inflammatory broadcasts ofvarious TV talk shows.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As noted above, despite the technical glitchesand political problems observed in the elections,some of which are inherent in administering a

Voters willingly enduredlong lines in order toparticipate in the process.

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nationwide electoral apparatus, the Center con-cluded that Guyana’s 2001 electoral process metinternational standards, that the voters of Guyanawere able to freely express their democraticchoices, and that the official results reflected thewill of the voters. The Center commends GECOMfor its professional administration of the elections,for its commitment to developing and implement-ing reforms to improve the electoral process, andfor its openness to accepting the scrutiny ofinternational observers.

A number of recommendations for electoralreform already have been made by a range of groups,including civil society leaders, political parties,GECOM itself, and other election observationgroups. Nonetheless, in a spirit of respect and sup-port, and recognizing that it is up to the Guyanesepeople to decide, the Center offers the followingrecommendations for improving future elections:

� Comprehensive review of the electoralsystem and legislation. The audit andsystems review by International IDEAshould serve as the basis for a comprehen-sive review of the electoral system andlegislation by GECOM and Parliament.Guyana adopted a new electoral system in2001 but retained elements of the oldsystem on its books, hampering efficientadministration of the process. The processshould be studied as an integral whole, withproblem areas and conflicting or missinglegislation identified and corrected.

� Reform of electoral process and proce-dures. Parliament should use the auditfindings and GECOM’s internal reviews asthe basis for its own review and reform ofthe legal framework for the electoral pro-cess. This should include constitutionalprovisions and enabling legislation toeliminate outdated or conflicting statutoryprovisions, and establishing systems andprocedures within GECOM that are more

efficient and less bureaucratic. Particularattention should be paid to the auditreport’s recommendations for improvingprocedures for voter registration and verifi-cation of the voters list.

� Election administration. Parliament andpolitical parties should consider alternativemodels of election administration. The so-called “Carter formula,” which has beenfollowed since 1992, provides for an electioncommission with balanced representation ofruling and opposition parties. While adop-tion of this model was critical to the successof the breakthrough transitional elections in1992, in subsequent elections it has allowedparty interests to interfere with effectiveelectoral administration. As part of electoralreform efforts, Guyana should give carefulconsideration to alternative models, possi-bly reducing or eliminating political partyrepresentation and increasing the role ofindependent members of civil society andprofessional experts.

� Transparency of electoral processes.GECOM should maintain a policy of openand transparent election administrationthroughout all phases of the electoralprocess, including exercises that covertabulation and consolidation of results, theallocation of seats, and the pronouncementof the new president. In particular,GECOM’s policies and procedures shouldensure that party agents from all contestingparties have adequate access to observe notonly the counting of ballots at the polls, butalso the tabulation and consolidation ofresults in the regions and at GECOMheadquarters in Georgetown. GECOMshould also ensure that complete pollingstation level results are announced andpublicized on a timely basis. These steps willallow all parties and candidates to checkSOP information against informationcollected on polling day and to challenge

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specific incidents where they have evidenceof a significant discrepancy that wouldmaterially affect the election results.

� Broadcast legislation. Based on wideconsultation with stakeholders, Parliamentshould enact broadcast legislation that setsstandards for appropriate use of publicairwaves to ensure equitable, impartialcoverage for all parties by the state-ownedmedia. Although freedom of speech and ofthe press should be limited only in caseswhere other basic rights and public safetyare endangered, measures should beincluded to ensure that inflammatorybroadcasting cannot be used to inciteviolence.

� Codes of conduct for political parties andmedia. Parliament should enact legislationto give GECOM or another independentbody the power to enforce election-relatedcodes of conduct for political parties andthe media.Credible and accurate elections where the will

of the voters can be freely expressed and accuratelyreported are essential to the democratizationprocess and the accountability of elected officials.However, it is clear that given Guyana’s “winner-take-all” political system and its recurring patternsof ethnic voting and political polarization, electionsalone will not produce an inclusive system ofgovernance with broad participation by all major

groups. Resolving Guyana’s deep-seated mistrustwill be much more difficult than fixing technicalproblems in the electoral process.

There have been some encouraging signs,however, such as the initial set of constitutionalreforms passed in 2001 after the elections and thehigh-level political dialogue that President Jadgeoand Minority Leader Desmond Hotye sustainedthroughout 2001. In order to achieve the inclu-siveness and good governance that will benecessary for genuine political reconciliation andsustained development, the government and themajor parties in Parliament, working together withcivil society, should continue the process ofconstitutional and electoral reform. This wouldallow all parties, whether in the majority or inopposition, to participate meaningfully in develop-ment of policy and legislation and serve as part ofa system of checks and balances that promotesaccountability.

The Carter Center plans to support Guyana’sdemocratic consolidation and sustainable develop-ment through an integrated program of initiativesdrawing on the Center’s expertise in democracy,conflict resolution, economic development, and trans-parency. The initiative is designed to help Guyanarealize its National Development Strategy and willbuild on existing Carter Center activities in supportof rule of law and civil society strengthening. �

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Carter Center would like to acknowl-edge the assistance and cooperation thata number of persons and organizations

provided during this project.In particular, we would like to acknowledge

the cooperation and assistance of GECOMChairman Joe Singh, whose unwavering dedica-tion to a credible and accurate electoral processinspired admiration; the GECOM commissionersand CEO Gocool Boodoo, who met with ourobservers and shared their concerns and hopes forthe process; Statutory Officer Albert Henry,whose unfailing good humor endeared him to our

observers; and the GECOM staff, for their hardwork and dedication. We also appreciated thecommitment to the electoral process shown byregional returning officers, district returningofficers, and poll workers and the assistance thatthey provided to our observers.

We would also like to thank the political partiesand their members for participating in multiplemeetings with our field office director and MTOsand for helping to brief our observer delegation.

A special note of appreciation is due to PoliceCommander Paul Slowe from Region 6 and PoliceCommissioner Laurie Lewis for providing a police

Carter Center Guyana office staff and MTOs with President Carter and Field Office Director Sue Nelson. Fromleft: Winston Fordyce, Ralph Ogden, Sat Narain, Margaret Burke, Brian Lewis, President Carter, David Danzig,Sue Nelson, Sheila Jaghab, Patrick Berg, Karen Pratt, Catherine Clarke, and John Lewis

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escort for the safe return of two Carter Centerobservers caught in Region 6 during disturbancesalong the coastal road.

Our mission in Guyana was facilitated greatlyby the presence of the GLTOG, which was kindenough to share volumes of information collectedduring their five-month stay preceding our arrival.We would like to thank them and their director,Simon Osborne, for assisting our efforts and ensur-ing close coordination among all 10 observer teamsin Guyana. We would also like to thank the domes-tic monitors who worked for the EAB, and otherinternational observer groups, such as CARICOM,the Commonwealth, and the OAS, for their coordi-nation and information-sharing.

In Atlanta, Democracy Program DirectorCharles Costello and Associate Director DavidCarroll were responsible for directing the GuyanaMission. Program Coordinator Rachel Fowler

managed the project at headquarters with logisticalsupport from Program Officer Laine Price, ProgramAssistant Tynesha Green, and program interns MattClark, Madhumati Deshpande, and Brett Lacy. TheCenter is grateful for the hard work and assistanceof local Guyanese staff in Georgetown, in particularBrian Lewis, Margaret Burke, Karen Pratt, SatNarain, and Winston Fordyce.

Field Office Director Sue Nelson, our senior in-country representative, drafted this report, withassistance from Richard Klein and from MTOsPatrick Berg, Catherine Clarke, Matt Clark, DavidDanzig, John Lewis, and Ralph Ogden. DavidCarroll, Charles Costello, Rachel Fowler, and LainePrice revised and edited the document. Laine Pricemanaged the process of compiling appendices, withhelp from Brian Lewis, Madhumati Deshpande,Lauren Green, and Kirtley Fisher. �

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APPENDICES

1. Herdmanston Accord2. St. Lucia Statement3. Government of Guyana invitation to Carter Center to observe the elections4. Contesting Political Parties5. Carter Center deployment and region map6. Summary Form: International Observers: Opening of Polling Stations7. Summary Form: International Observers: Observation of Voting8. Summary Form: International Observers: Observation of Counting9. Carter Center Preliminary Statement, March 20, 2001

10. Remarks by President Carter after Preliminary Statement, March 20, 200111. Carter Center Press Release with Georgetown Statement, March 21, 200112. Carter Center Press Release Reaffirming Statement, March 22, 200113. General and Regional Elections, Official Results, GECOM, April 514. Carter Center Final Statement, May 17, 2001

15-23. Newspaper Articles

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APPENDIX 1

CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY MISSION TO GUYANA

HERDMANSTON ACCORDSigned in Guyana, 17th January 1998

Measures for Resolving Current Problems

The deliberations and consultations undertaken by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Mission have confirmed an urgentneed for the de-escalation of conflict emphasised in the Mission’s initial Statement. The Mission concluded that resolution ofcurrent problems in Guyana must begin; and that this can only happen through a political process to which all contribute. TheMission has recommended to the Leaders of the two parties the Menu of Measures set out below. It considers that, if agreedby the two main political parties as an integrated package, these measures can contribute significantly to the resolution ofexisting problems.

The Menu of Measures has taken into account the contributions of all political parties and of civic groups. The Mission is ofthe view that these measures will commend themselves to the society as a whole and invites all members of the society to givetheir full support to them.In this context, the Leaders of the PPP/Civic and the PNC have agreed as follows:

1. AN AUDIT(i)Without prejudice to any judicial process arising from the 15 December 1997 elections, an independent inquiry (the audit)will be carried out in two stages, namely:

(a) in the first stage, an urgent review of the due process of the count on and after 15 December 1997 (including therole of the Elections Commission) to be completed within three months of 17 January 1998 with a view toascertainment of the votes cast for the respective political parties; and

(b) in the second stage, an audit of systemic aspects of the electoral process, including the post-balloting phase.

(ii) The audit will be carried out under CARICOM auspices by a team proposed by the Chairman of CARICOM, afterconsultation with the Leaders of the political parties which participated in the 15 December 1997 elections, and agreed to bythe Leaders of the PPP/Civic and the PNC. The Terms of Reference for the conduct of the audit team are annexed hereto.

(iii) The PPP/Civic and the PNC will cooperate in the enactment of any enabling legislation that may be required for theeffective conduct of the audit.(iv) The Parties to this Accord will accept the findings of the first stage of the audit as binding upon them: and the enablinglegislation will provide for such findings to be admissible for the purposes of any Election Petition in respect of any matters offact to which they relate. 2. A MORATORIUMAn immediate moratorium on public demonstrations and marches will be declared and implemented. The ban on theseactivities will be simultaneously lifted. These arrangements will subsist for a minimum period of three months from 17thJanuary 1998.

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3. DIALOGUEThe PPP/Civic and the PNC will “activate arrangements for sustained dialogue between them with a view to fostering greaterharmony and confidence and resolving issues on which agreement can be reached.”

4. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM(i) A Constitutional Reform Commission will be established by law, with a wide mandate and a broad-based membership drawnfrom representatives of political parties, the Labour Movement, religious organisations, the private sector, the youth and othersocial partners. The Terms of Reference of the Commission and its membership will be determined by the National Assemblyafter a process of consultations with the political parties. It will be mandated to consult with civil society at large.

(ii) The Commission will also be mandated to conclude its deliberations and present its report to the National Assembly withineighteen months of 17 January 1998. The process for implementing the changes recommended by the Commission andapproved by the National Assembly to be concluded in sufficient time to allow for post-reform general elections which will beheld within eighteen months after the presentation of the report of the Commission to the National Assembly.

(iii) Among the matters to be addressed by the Constitutional Reform Commission will be measures and arrangements for theimprovement of race relations in Guyana, including the contribution which equal opportunities legislation and concepts drawnfrom the CARICOM Charter of Civil Society can contribute to the cause of justice, equity and progress in Guyana.

5. CREATING A NEW ENVIRONMENTThe political Leaders of the PPP/Civic and the PNC will issue a joint statement confirming their commitment to the agreedprocess of dispute settlement and their resolve to avoid the use by or on behalf of their respective Parties of language whichis accusatory and which might have an inflammatory effect in the political context.

6. IMPLEMENTATIONFor the purposes of the implementation of these measures, the PPP/Civic and the PNC will each appoint a seniorrepresentative with plenipotentiary powers for ensuring the smooth and uninterrupted translation of these agreedundertakings and arrangements into practice in a manner which supports the return of Guyana to normalcy.

7. CARICOM’S CONTINUING ROLEThe Parties also accept that the Chairman and Bureau of CARICOM will retain a continuing interest in the implementation ofthe measures, and remain at the disposal of both Parties in that regard.

The Menu of Measures set out in paragraphs 1 to 7 above is agreed this 17th day of January 1998 by

_____________________________________PEOPLE’S PROGRESSIVE PARTY/CIVIC

____________________________PEOPLE’S NATIONAL CONGRESS

___________________________On behalf of the Chairman of theCARIBBEAN COMMUNITY

Source: Taken from http://hostings.diplomacy.edu/iirt/chronology/Update9l.htm

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APPENDIX 2

GUYANA: THE SAINT LUCIA STATEMENT

Friday July 3, 1998

1. In signing the “Herdmanston Accord” on 17 January 1998, the Leaders of Guyana’s two main political Parties stated thatthey were doing so “specially mindful of the willingness of (their) CARICOM colleagues to remain engaged with Guyana inthis endeavour”. It is in this spirit that as colleagues we have taken the opportunity of our Saint Lucia Summit, on occasion ofthe 25th Anniversary of CARICOM, to initiate a dialogue with them on the current situation in Guyana - conscious of our ownfull participation as signatories to the “Herdmanston Accord.

2. We are also fully resolved that it is pre-eminently our task to be in the front line of all efforts to assist Guyana as part of ourown family.

3. Our conversation with President Jagan and Mr Hoyte have convinced us all of the necessity to return to Guyana to theagreed path of the ‘Herdmanston Accord’ - within the time-frame agreed in the Accord. Convinced that there is no time tolose in securing this, we have resolved together to place our collective commitment behind the undertakings, arrangementsand measures in paragraphs (a) to (j) below to which President Jagan and Mr Hoyte, representing the PPP/Civic and the PNCrespectively, have agreed between themselves and with CARICOM, namely:

(a) All parties to the ‘Herdmanston Accord’ reaffirm their commitment to the Accord, and to the implementation of itsprovisions as initially contemplated

(b) Both stages of the Electorate Audit as provided for in paragraph 1 of the ‘Herdmanston Accord’ have been presented tothe parties in Guyana. All the parties to the Accord have agreed to accept the findings of the first stage of the Audit - as setout in paragraph 1 (i) (a) of the Accord - as binding upon them; but it is recognised that this does not preclude the pursuit ofelection petitions which have been filed in the courts by both parties.

(c) The next substantive step to which the parties are committed under the Accord is that of Constitutional Reform on thebasis and within the framework provided for in paragraph 4 of the Accord. We recall that provision specifically and reaffirmour determination to pursue it in spirit and letter.

(d) Mindful that among the matters to be addressed by the Constitution Reform Commission will be: ‘measures andarrangements for the improvement of race relations in Guyana, including the contribution which equal opportunities legislationand concepts drawn from the CARICOM Charter of Civil Society can contribute to the cause of justice, equity and progress inGuyana - it is accepted that the parties will take steps for the early implementation of specific measures to achieve theseobjectives in advance of constitutional reform itself.

(e) We all agreed that it is feasible to complete the work of the Constitution Reform Commission and to have the Reportsubmitted to the National Assembly by 16 July 1999 as originally contemplated, thereby maintaining the timetable in paragraph4 (ii) of the Accord, and we commit ourselves to achieving it.

(f) To enable this timetable to be met, the parties have agreed that they will settle as soon as possible, by law in the mannerrequired by the ‘Herdmanston Accord’, the terms of reference and the naming of the Constitution Reform Commission mindfulthat CARICOM is resolved to assist them in every way required, but more specifically by arranging for the provision oconstitutional experts and facilitators.

(g) The parties have also agreed that the necessary enabling legislation should be enacted in time to allow the Opposition totake their seats in the National Assembly by 15 July 1998. Mr Hoyte has indicated his intention that, without prejudice to theoutcome of the election petitions referred to above, the PNC will assume their seats in the National Assembly by the date, andPresident Jagan has indicated her agreement to secure the enactment of the necessary enabling legislation.

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APPENDIX 2

(h) Mrs Jagan has also agreed to make all normal parliamentary arrangements to facilitate the due functioning of theOpposition in the National Assembly, including exploring in consultation with all Parties in the Assembly the establishment ofa Parliamentary Management Committee for the better organisation and functioning of parliament as established in a numberof parliamentary democracies.

(i) Building on this historic process of the meeting of Guyana’s political leaders with CARICOM Leaders in Saint Lucia and thedemonstration that through dialogue lies the path to the resolution of Guyana’s problems, the parties have agreed to redoubletheir efforts for dialogue as provided in paragraphs 3 and 6 of the “Herdmanston Accord”. Further, the two leaders havegiven CARICOM Heads of Government their assurance that they will themselves meet on a periodic basis to facilitate theachievement of all the processes to which they committed their Parties by the “Herdmanston Accord”.

(j) The two leaders have recognised the value of high level Facilitator acceptable to them whose functions will be developed inconjunction with them. Therefore, they have accepted the offer of CARICOM to provide such a Facilitator who will beappointed as a matter of urgency to further assist in the due implementation of these several agreements.

3. In the context of the conversation in Saint Lucia CARICOM leaders are satisfied that there will b an end to illegal protest onthe streets of Guyana as dialogue and parliamentary processes take their rightful and more prominent place in Guyana’sgovernance. We are strengthened in this by the assurance that the rule of law will be upheld and that as a consequenceviolence in the political life of the country will cease. None of us wish to stifle dissent in any of our countries; but none of uswill accept disorder and threats to life and property as a way of political life.

4. CARICOM remains committed to the peaceful settlement of differences and disputes within our region and states. Thesegoals are fully supported by both President Jagan and Mr Hoyte. We are therefore heartened by their assurance that this isthe path along which they will work to achieve national unity and cohesiveness for the betterment of Guyana and all itspeoples. We are certain that all Guyanese will lend their tangible support to this.

5. We express our genuine appreciation of the statesmanship shown by our colleagues in Guyana in making this historicAgreement possible and once again pledge the commitment of the Caribbean Community to remaining engaged with Guyanain the implementation of the “Herdmanston Accord” and this Agreement and to be at the disposal of the Parties for thispurpose.

MADE THIS 2ND DAY OF JULY 1998, and accepted by:

…………………………………….THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITYCHAIRMAN

....………………………………….PEOPLE’S PROGRESSIVE PARTY/CIVIC

………………………………………PEOPLES NATIONAL CONGRESS

Source: Taken from http://hostings.diplomacy.edu/iirt/chronology/Update9o.htm

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APPENDIX 3

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APPENDIX 4

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APPENDIX 5

Carter Center Team DeploymentGuyana General Elections

March 2001

Region 5

Team 16 Andrew Reynolds

Region 6

Team 17 Anthony MaingotCynthia Hooks

Team 18 Ralph Ogden

Team 19 David Pottie

Region 7

Team 20 Chris HarrisMatt Clark

Team 21 Jason Forrester

Region 8

Team 22 John Graham

Team 23 Patrick Berg

Region 9

Team 24 Luc Lapointe

Region 10

Team 25 David DanzigTim Wilcox

Region 1

Team 1 Catherine Clarke

Region 2

Team 2 Clarence DiasPhilliat Matsheza

Region 3

Team 3 Sheila Jaghab

Team 4 Layna MosleyFrank Boyd

Team 5 Cara HesseMadhu Deshpande

Region 4

Team 6 President CarterMrs. CarterCharles Costello

Team 7 Sir LloydJohn Hardman

Team 8 John Lewis

Team 9 Ransford PalmerSue Nelson

Team 10 Jason Calder

Team 11 Jeffrey Mapendere

Team 12 Archbishop CarterSteven Hochman

Team 13 Richard Klein

Team 14 John MarshSusan Johnson

Team 15 Rachel Fowler

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APPENDIX 6

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APPENDIX 7

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APPENDIX 7

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APPENDIX 8

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*Results for questions 15-16 represent the total count for ONLY the 23 stations where The Carter Centerobserved the counting process and do not necessarily reflect voting patterns throughout the nation.

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: Kay TorranceTuesday, Mar. 20, 2001 Local Cell 624-2666

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF THE CARTER CENTER ONTHE 2001 GUYANA GENERAL AND REGIONAL ELECTIONS

GEORGETOWN, GUYANA...The Carter Center would like to commend the Guyanese people for their conduct andparticipation in yesterday’s elections and present this preliminary statement on the electoral process.The delegation is co-led by former President Jimmy Carter, Rosalynn Carter, and former Prime Minister Sir LloydErskine Sandiford of Barbados. The observation mission was invited by the government of Guyana and the GuyanaElections Commission (GECOM). The delegation included 44 observers from 10 countries.

The Carter Center has been active in Guyana for more than a decade, and our activities for the 2001 election beganin October of 2000. An advance team visited Guyana in October to assess the status of electoral preparations and tolearn the views of political parties, GECOM, and other groups.

The Center opened an election observation field office in February to support a team of six medium-term observers(MTOs). The MTOs monitored pre-election technical preparations for the vote, including the preparation of the voterslist, production and distribution of national ID cards, training of elections officials, and voter education. In addition,they observed the campaign activities of the political parties and monitored the media for its impact on the politicalenvironment in which these elections would take place.

The election observation mission arrived on March 15 and joined the Carter Center MTOs to form 25 teams thatdeployed to all 10 regions of Guyana. On election day, these teams visited 401 polling sites of the 1,892 total pollingstations. Although the voting is now over, the Center will continue to observe the counting and tabulation processthroughout the country. The delegation will issue its final report in the coming weeks, but we can present thefollowing preliminary findings. These remarks are confined to our observations on the electoral process leading up toopening of polls, casting of ballots, and poll closings. Since the process of vote tabulation is ongoing, it is too earlyto evaluate the election as a whole. Ultimately, the Guyanese people will judge the electoral process and itsoutcome.

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The electoral process was generally peaceful and orderly throughout the country and delegations reported a highturnout in all regions. The delegation found citizens eagerly but patiently waiting in many areas, sometimes in longlines, to exercise their right to vote.

Opening of polls. The delegation visited 20 sites for opening and found either no irregularities or minor irregularitiesat each of these polling stations, which by and large opened on time. In the cases where minor irregularities werereported, observers found a shortage of materials or the late arrival of polling officials.

Voting. Polling officials were professional, well organized, and impartial. Delegates reported that the vast majority ofpolling sites had polling agents from the two major political parties. Also, domestic and other international observerswere encountered throughout the country. Of the 378 polling stations observed, teams found no or minor irregularitiesin 98 percent of the sites.

The most common area of concern was the voters list. GECOM has stated the list is 95 percent accurate, leaving afive percent margin of error. All political parties have expressed concerns about the accuracy of the final voters list.The limited Carter Center observation data has to date not shown major systematic irregularities in the list. Theobservers reported some voters claimed to have registered but could not find their names on either the Official Listof Electors or the Addendum. It is difficult to ascertain the magnitude of this issue at this point, given that there areno uniform mechanisms for tracking these complaints.

The closing of polls and ballot count. Nearly all of the Carter Center observation teams reported confusion at theclosing of polling stations. Many polling officials received instructions through GECOM personnel, the media, orothers to allow voting after the scheduled closing time of 6:00 p.m. Some polls that had been closed were reopened.Delegations deployed in Georgetown reported a rush of individuals during this period at some polling stations, whiledelegates in other regions reported few or no voters during this period. Without clear instructions from GECOM,polling officials were uncertain whether to allow further voting or to proceed with closing and the tabulation of results.

Carter Center teams observed the counting and tabulation of ballots at 21 sites throughout the country. Delegatesreported significant error only at one polling station. The teams found that the administrative process during closingmade the vote count extremely slow at most of the sites observed.

Governance. While these elections are an important and necessary element of Guyana’s democratic process, theyare not sufficient alone to solve the problems nor heal the wounds in Guyana’s divided society. It is clear thatGuyana’s biggest challenge is to develop the kind of constitutional and electoral institutions and arrangements whichwill further political and ethnic reconciliation.

The Carter Center believes that regardless of who wins these elections, it would help the cause of national unity if allGuyanese would recommit themselves to working and living together in peace and mutual respect, develop inclusiveinstitutions of governance, and build a civil society that supports constructive political relations. This delegation hasheard from Guyanese from across the length and breadth of the country. They have a clear desire to complete theconstitutional reform process, pursue national reconciliation, strengthen an independent civil society, institutionalizepermanent electoral reforms, deepen the rule of law, reform the media, especially the state media, and ensure thatdevelopment is equitable and includes all ethnic groups.

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President Carter’s comments at press conference on March 20, 2001, prior to question-and-answer period

people. If the country has any chance for substantialprogress in the future, the Chief Justice of theSupreme Court, the Chancellor, must be chosen insuch a way, for instance, that every citizen of thiscountry, regardless of which party is their choice,would have confidence in the integrity of that choice.

The auditor general, who monitors the expenditure ofall funds and who has enormous power in Guyana,must be chosen in the same way, with an open,transparent process, and with the two major partiescooperating as much as possible in making thatchoice. The allocation of contracts by the governmentto build roads, to build schoolhouses, to replace theseawalls, involving the expenditure of enormous sumsof federal money, must be made in a joint fashionwithin the Parliament. There has to be a revision sothat the standing committees will be governed asmuch as possible by both major parties. I have talkedat length with former President Hoyte and with theincumbent President Jagdeo as well, and both agreedprivately that these changes must be made. And asyou know, those of you who are familiar with thegovernment process, a great deal has been done tobring a consensus in the constitutional reformcommittee. But we have not reached the point yetwhere a very open and generous — and victorious— party will have the sensitivity and the graciousnessto extend a hand of friendship and cooperation to thelosing party, and the losing party quite often has notbeen gracious enough to accept defeat in such a waythat they can communicate freely and easily andcooperatively with those who win.

We will take questions in a few minutes about ourobservations during the election process.

We have met since then with the observer teams andhave also met on two occasions with top officials atGECOM. I think that you all know that none of theobservation teams from foreign countries make anystatements about the results of the election or thetabulation of votes. That’s the responsibilityexclusively for GECOM and all of us have pledgedthat that’s something that we will not do. After theresults of the election are announced and after thewinning candidates are identified, this fine and smallcountry will face two basic options, for the next fiveyears: either to continue with sharp divisions,ethnically and politically, with a minimum of economicand social progress as has been the case in recentyears regardless of which party was in power; or, theother option is to face the future in as unified a fashionas possible, with the two major parties agreeing tocommunicate easily with one another, with thecandidates elected themselves and with party officials.

This has not been the case in the past. Guyana hasmade strides towards constitutional revision whichwould in effect, in general terms, reduce the power ofthe presidency and invest that power in the hands ofthe Parliament. Both parties have agreed to this basicchange. But neither has been willing to make thenecessary final legislative decisions to put it into effect.This is a very crucial element of government, becauseGuyana in the past, with its extremely divided societyhas had, in effect, a “winner take all” result fromelections. This must be changed by the Guyanese

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The Carter Center has been involved in 30 or soelections around the world – last year, six elections, inmajor countries around the world, recently inIndonesia and Nigeria, large countries where thedivisions are very deep. But after the elections areover, generally people reach out to one another andsay “let’s heal our wounds; let’s try to put our bestfoot forward” and hope that the losing party can setan example by which they can become popularenough to win in the future. And I hope that this willbe done in Guyana. There has to be good will here,which so far, in my opinion as a foreigner, has notexisted. And I would guess that 95 or 99 percent ofthe Guyanese people would like to see the politicalcontention and disagreements minimized and theirmajor leaders, in whom they have completeconfidence, cooperate with each other. So, regardlessof who wins this election, and we have no way to saywho will win this election, my hope is there will be agracious acceptance of the result with the majorresponsibility in my opinion being on the victoriousparty, to make sure that every step is taken to putthese reforms into being.

There need to be moderate changes in the electoralprocess. This is the only country in which we haveever participated where there was vituperative andcontinuous negative advertising, right up to themoment of voting, even on election day. This is notdone in most countries, where you have to stopcampaigning and stop making any partisan commentswhile the people are trying to go to the polls, or thenight before. So election reform needs to be institutedin Guyana. My comments are as a foreign citizen who

is very interested in Guyana. And I’d like toemphasize, in closing my own comments, thateverything I have said is with the predication that allthe decisions have to be made by Guyanese people.Not by major donors, not by international observers,not by those who come here for a brief period oftime, but by the citizens of Guyana themselves. Andmy prayer and my hope is that this great country,endowed with enormous human resources and naturalresources, can have the kind of future that the peoplewant.

I have been extremely impressed with the patience ofthe people and the deep dedication of the poll officialsunder very trying circumstances. This has been anadmirable demonstration of the commitment of thepeople to democracy and to freedom and to fair andequitable elections. I hope that the political leaderswill be as dedicated to the process of healing woundsas the people have shown they desire.

We’ll be glad to answer any questions that you mighthave on the election process.

Transcribed by Carter Center staff

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT:Kay Torrance

Wednesday, Mar. 21, 2001 Local Cell 624-2666

Georgetown, Guyana....Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter drafted the attached statement and presented it toPresident Bharrat Jagdeo and to former President Desmond Hoyte. Both leaders and their associates approved thetext and pledged to implement its provisions as expeditiously as possible.

Georgetown, Guyana21 March 2001

Recognizing the need for political, cultural, and economic progress in Guyana, we agree that the first step must beto complete the work of the Special Select Committee, which will result in a new constitution for our nation. Theconstitution will be put to a referendum for approval by the citizens of Guyana within 12 months. Adequate staffingand resources will be provided to implement its provisions.

Our goal will be an inclusive organization of government, within which the majority and opposition political parties willboth be involved in the leadership of parliamentary standing committees and the selection of leaders to fulfill majorresponsibilities of governing and management. These will include but not be limited to the Chief Justice andChancellor, the Auditor General, members of a strong human rights commission and an ethnic relationscommission, the allocation of lands and housing, the tendering of contracts, a permanent committee onconstitutional reform, and a permanent elections commission. A new elections code is needed, with provision for themaintenance of an accurate voters list.

We will cooperate fully in maintaining a constructive dialogue between the top leaders of PPP/Civic and the PNC/Reform parties, and will include appropriate representation from other political and civic organizations, including theAmerindian community and women.

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: Charles CostelloThursday, Mar. 22, 2001 Local Cell 624-2665

CARTER CENTER REAFFIRMS STATEMENT OF AGREEMENT BETWEENGUYANA’S PRESIDENT AND OPPOSITION LEADER

Georgetown, Guyana….On Wednesday, March 21, 2001, The Carter Center issued a pressrelease with an attached statement drafted by President Carter. President Carter had shared adraft of the statement with the two main political party presidential candidates on Wednesdaymorning before leaving Guyana. While neither presidential candidate signed the statement, bothindicated verbally to President Carter that they supported the content of the document.

The statement covers principles and objectives to help to find a way forward for Guyana after theelections and reflects already agreed upon goals emanating from the constitutional reformprocess. It also expresses a willingness to cooperate in achieving these goals and creating thenecessary supportive political environment. As such, the statement is a reaffirmation of sharedprinciples rather than a signed or brokered agreement.

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APPENDIX 13

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APPENDIX 14

Guyana Elections 2001Final Statement

The Carter Center

Introduction. On March 20, 2001, the day after the March 19 elections in Guyana, The Carter Center issueda preliminary statement (attached) about the electoral process. The statement characterized the elections upthrough the balloting process in positive terms, saying that the process was generally peaceful and orderly andthat there were no irregularities at the vast majority of the polling sites visited by Carter Center observers.However, the Center’s statement noted that observers reported significant confusion surrounding the closing ofpolls, at least in the Georgetown area, due to conflicting information from the Guyana Elections Commission(GECOM), the media, and others regarding the possibility of extending voting beyond the scheduled 6:00pmclosing time. In addition, while noting that the political parties had expressed concerns about the accuracy of thefinal voters list, the statement reported that it was difficult at that time to ascertain the magnitude of the problem.Finally, the statement echoed the sentiment of many Guyanese that the elections alone are not sufficient to solvethe nation’s problems.

In the days following the Center’s preliminary statement, other international observer missions issued similarstatements, indicating a large degree of consensus on the part of Guyana’s friends in the international community.

This statement is issued with benefit of the passage of weeks since the election and is intended to offerobservations on the overall electoral process, especially vote tabulation and the voter registration list. CarterCenter observers remained in Guyana for about three weeks after the elections and were able to observe thevote tabulation process, the declaration of official results, the court challenge to the swearing in of the presidentelect, the court’s decision, and the subsequent assumption of office by President Jagdeo.

Overall, the Center finds that the electoral process met international standards, that the voters of Guyana wereable to freely express their democratic choices on March 19, and that the official results reflected the will of thevoters. Unfortunately, there was post-election street violence and lingering doubts about the accuracy of thevoters list and final results. While it is critical to improve the electoral system for future elections, it is equallyimportant that Guyanese work together toward political reconciliation, inclusiveness, and good governance.

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Election day processes. As noted in its preliminary statement, the Center found that election day and the votecount went peacefully, as voters turned out in large numbers to vote freely for the party of their choice.Pollworkers were well trained and acted professionally and impartially. Polling stations were, in most cases,clearly marked and stocked with polling materials. Political party agents were present at almost all of the 415polls visited by Carter Center observers, and there were no reports of significant security incidents or intimidation.Voters were able to cast their vote in secret, and the ballots were counted at each polling station, with politicalparty agents and poll workers certifying the accuracy of the statements.

In a completely different setting but reflecting this positive assessment only of election day processes in Guyana,President Carter characterized Guyana’s elections as “almost perfect” during an interview with CNN in Atlanta onMarch 26 at a meeting of the National Commission on Federal Election Reform, which is studying possiblereforms needed for U.S. federal elections.

Voter registration. While The Carter Center’s overall assessment is positive, several issues arose during theprocess that GECOM and the government of Guyana will need to address before holding the next election. Voterregistration was the principal issue and reason for opposition party claims that GECOM was not ready forelection day. Although GECOM had extended pre-election deadlines and issued supplemental voter registrationlists in an effort not to disenfranchise voters, the list appeared to suffer from repeated but correctable errors, e.g.,last minute dislocation of an undetermined number of registered voters within the list. Another concern was thatthe revised voters list had too many names and contained the remnants of fictitious voters added during the original1996 registration. Based on field testing performed, GECOM believes the list was 95% accurate and that thisfigure will be upheld by an independent external post-election audit to be performed by International IDEA. A95% accurate voter registration rate is an accomplishment exceeding rates in many established democracies;however, unexplained changes to the list, which happened sometime during the final correction period, left politicalparties believing that many of their supporters were being deliberately disenfranchised.

Although Carter Center observers did not witness large numbers of voters on election day who were unable tovote because their names were not on the list, nor did they observe any systematic evidence of voters registeringor voting more than once, the issues of the voter registration and accuracy of the list greatly affect the level ofconfidence of the Guyanese people in GECOM and the electoral process. To address these concerns, and toavoid future registration problems, The Carter Center strongly supports GECOM’s commission of an externalaudit, which will help determine the extent to which the list was inaccurate.

Election management systems. Inaccuracies in voter registration and the resulting delays in production anddistribution of voter identification cards are only part of the larger election management and strategic planningprocess. Future election planning, management, and systems could also be addressed by the upcoming audit if itwere expanded to include broader management issues. The audit could then make recommendations onintegrating Guyana’s newly streamlined electoral management systems and procedural use of technology with thenew electoral system that will be adopted by Parliament.

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In this year’s election, for example, the sophisticated computerized vote reporting and tabulation systemsdesigned with help from international experts was discarded for all practical purposes by GECOM and finalresults were tabulated manually from nearly 1,900 Statements of Poll at GECOM headquarters. The softwarefor the system was never completely verified prior to the opening of the polls. The vote count was ultimatelyaccurate and honest, but it was inefficient. As a result the announcement of final results was delayed by morethan 48 hours, creating suspicions.

Party observers. Another issue noted by Carter Center observers was the absence of political party agents atthe tabulation of results at the national level. The openness and transparency of the system, which had beencommendable up to that point, seemed to close once the results were posted at the polling stations and thestatements of poll were delivered to the Returning Officers. Access to the GECOM headquarters for partyagents became difficult unless special accreditation or escorts were obtained. Although international observerswere able to continue their observation of the statements of poll without hindrance after they obtained the extraaccreditation, political party agents were absent. The two major parties, PNC/Reform and PPP/Civic, wereless affected since both had representatives on GECOM. However, the smaller parties, including the WPA/GAP, TUF, and ROAR, lacked access to key parts of the tabulation exercise. The ability of party agents fromall participating parties to freely monitor the electoral process to its conclusion, including the count and theresolution of electoral disputes, is an essential part of a free and fair process that GECOM should endeavor tofacilitate in the future.

The media. The role of the media during the elections was monitored closely by GECOM’s MediaMonitoring Unit (MMU) and others and thus was not a major focus of The Carter Center’s observationmission. Nonetheless, the Center wishes to echo the views of the MMU and other international observers bynoting the unbalanced and biased coverage in the state-owned media, and the irresponsible and inflammatorybroadcasts of various TV talk shows, including open partisanship under the guise of news, even on election day.In the future, while respecting freedom of the press, laws governing the media must be strengthened to addressthese problems.

Conclusion. Despite the problems encountered, some of which are inherent in administering a nationwideelectoral apparatus with more than 9,000 temporary employees and almost 500,000 voters, The Carter Centerfound that the voters of Guyana were able to freely express their democratic choices on March 19 and that theofficial results reflected the will of the voters. The Carter Center congratulates the Guyanese people, GECOM,and the political parties on an electoral process that met international standards.Unfortunately, Guyana’s electoral achievements have been marred by arson, post-election street violence andlingering doubts among the opposition party and its supporters as to the accuracy of the results. Fixing technicaldeficiencies in the process should be comparatively easy; however, curing the deep-seated mistrust that findssinister cause in routine election administration will be much more difficult.

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The new government and Parliament, together with civil society participants, must continue the process ofconstitutional and electoral reform. They should pledge to put the nation first and work for politicalreconciliation, inclusiveness and good governance in order to achieve the sustained development citizens yearnfor. Dialogue now underway in Guyana is an encouraging sign.

Carter Center and Guyana. The Carter Center closed its election observation office in Guyana on April 6,2001, after having been in country since February 5, 2001. The Center’s field office director and six mediumterm observers, supplemented by 37 short term observers, formed a delegation led by former U.S. PresidentJimmy Carter, First Lady Rosalynn Carter and former Prime Minister Erskine Sandiford of Barbados.Delegates observed election preparations and the electoral process from the nomination of parties andcandidates through the campaign period, polling and the announcement of the results, as well as the post-election activities described in this statement.

The Carter Center will issue a comprehensive final report in June on its two-month observation of the electoralprocess in Guyana and will include recommendations on how the electoral process can be improved. WhileThe Carter Center and others are pleased to offer recommendations, it is up to the Guyanese people tocapitalize on the gains made during the March 19 elections.

Beyond the elections, The Carter Center remains involved with Guyanese democratic development effortsthrough its support for the National Development Strategy and its work on rule of law and strengthening civilsociety in a long-term project partnered with NDI, IFES, and Guyanese stakeholders.

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APPENDIX 16

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APPENDIX 18

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APPENDIX 19

FINANCIAL TIMES

3/30/01

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APPENDIX 21

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APPENDIX 23

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THE CARTER CENTERAT A GLANCE

WHAT IS THE CARTER CENTER?

The Center is a nonprofit, nongovernmentalorganization founded in 1982 in Atlanta,Ga., by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter

and his wife, Rosalynn, in partnership with EmoryUniversity. The Center has helped to improvemillions of lives in more than 65 countries bywaging peace, fighting disease, and building hope.

We work directly with people threatened by war,disease, famine, and poverty to solve problems,renew opportunity, and create hope. A key to oursuccess is the ability to make detailed arrangementswith a nation’s top leaders and then deliver servicesto thousands of villages and family groups in themost remote and neglected areas.

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WHAT HAS THE CENTER ACHIEVED

IN 20 YEARS?The Carter Center has alleviated suffering and

advanced human rights by:

� Observing about three dozen multipartyelections in more than 20 countries

� Leading a worldwide campaign that hasreduced cases of Guinea worm disease by 98percent

� Preventing or correcting human rightsviolations worldwide

� Helping to provide some 35 million drugtreatments to sufferers of river blindness inAfrica and Latin America

� Creating new avenues for peace in Sudan,Uganda, the Korean Peninsula, Haiti, theGreat Lakes Region of Africa, Liberia, andEthiopia

� Working to erase the stigma against mentalillness in the United States and abroad

� Strengthening human rights institutions,civil society, and economic development inemerging democracies

� Fostering improved agricultural practices,enabling 4,000,000 farmers in Africa todouble, triple, or quadruple their yields ofmaize, wheat, corn, and other grains

� Building cooperation among leaders in theWestern Hemisphere

� Helping inner-city familiesaddress the social issues mostimportant to them

HOW IS THE CENTER STAFFED

AND FUNDED?The Center has about 150 employees, based

primarily in Atlanta, Ga. The Center is financed byprivate donations from individuals, foundations,corporations, and international developmentassistance agencies. The 2000-2001 operatingbudget, excluding in-kind contributions, wasapproximately $34 million. The Carter Center Inc.is a 501 (c)(3) charitable organization, and contri-butions by U.S. citizens and companies are tax-deductible as allowed by law.

WHERE IS THE CENTER LOCATED?The Carter Center is located in a 35-acre

setting 1½ miles east of downtown Atlanta. Fourcircular interconnected pavilions house offices forPresident and Mrs. Carter and most of the Center’sprogram staff. The complex includes the nonde-nominational Cecil B. Day Chapel and otherconference facilities.

The Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, whichadjoins the Center, is owned and operated by theNational Archives and Records Administration ofthe federal government. The Center and Library areknown collectively as The Carter PresidentialCenter.

THE CARTER CENTER

ONE COPENHILLATLANTA, GA 30307

(404) 420-5100 ◆ FAX (404) 420-5145W W W . C A RT E R C E N T E R . O R G

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