Thebarenecessities:

FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments

SonjaBlum,UniversityofMuensterECPRGeneralConferenceReykjavik,25‐27August2011Section:ThePoliticsofRetrenchmentandWelfareStatePolicy–Revisitingtheory,evaluat‐ingevidencePanel:WomenandChildrenFirst?TheImpactoftheFinancialCrisisonFamilyPolicyPanelchairs:AnnetteHenninger,AngelikavonWahl

WorkinProgress:Pleasedonotcitewithoutauthor’spermission!Commentsverywelcome:sonja.blum@uni‐muenster.deAbstractFamily policies in Germany and Austria have undergone interesting developments during the lastyears:Startingfromfamilialisticpositions,far‐reachingchangesseemedunlikelyforseveralreasons(e.g. due to thembeing conservativewelfare states, governedby grand coalitions).However, pro‐foundreformsastheintroductionofincome‐relatedparentalbenefitsortheexpansionofchildcarefor under three‐year‐olds in both countries have run counter to these expectations and attractedattention.Withthesereforms,familypoliciesinGermanyandAustriaremovedfromthecomprehen‐sive‘retrenchmentagenda’inwelfarepolicies.Severalexpansionarymeasureshavebeenintroducedafter the startof theglobal financial crisis in2007and someevenafter ithit the realeconomy in2008. However, since both countries enacted radical austerity packages in 2010, the question iswhetherthesehavecontinuedwiththenewlystruckfamilypolicypathsorwhethertheybrokewiththem.

Bringingtomindthatthepre‐crisisconditions,whichframedthe2006enactmentoftheGermanincome‐related parental benefit, were clearly different from the 2009 one’s framing the Austriancounterpart,spotlightsthetimingofpolicyprocesses.Whiletheoreticalapproachestypicallyabstractfrom‘time’and‘space’,PaulPierson(2004)prominentlyarguedthatthesignificanceofcausalvari‐ablesisfrequentlydistortedwhenrippedfromtheirtemporalcontext.Againstthisbackground,thispaperstudiesrecentfamilypolicyreformsinGermanyandAustriaandtheirpost‐crisisamendmentsfrom a time‐sensitiveperspective: This contains, amongst others, a view to decisionsmade in thepast,contingenciesinpolicyprocesses,andsudden‘windowsofopportunity’.

Taking a preview, the paper finds that the post‐crisis reactions have enforced rather than de‐celeratedtheparadigmaticfamilypolicychangesinGermanyandAustria:Althoughfamiliesexperi‐encedharshsavingsmeasures, itseemsthatthecrisishelpedpolicymakersto legitimatethetakenpathsas‘barenecessities’.

FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 2

1.Introduction

In recent years, family policies across Europe removed from the comprehensive ‘retrenchment

agenda’inwelfarepolicies:Unlikee.g.pensionorhealthpolicies,theyhavebeenlargelymarked

byexpansionofbenefitsandservices.Inparticular,manycountriesfocusedonenhancingwork‐

lifebalance,childcarefacilitiesandparentalleaves.ThisisnotablyvalidforGermanyandAustria,

which–despitebeing traditionally, as conservative‐corporatistwelfare states (Esping‐Andersen

1990), ascribed a very low reformpotential – have undertaken quite far‐reaching,modernising

familypolicyreforms.However,whatstartedasaUSfinancialcrisis in2007,since2008opened

outintoaneconomiconeandaglobalrecession.Stilltoday,“theroleofthewelfarestateinthis

storyismuchlessclear”(Kaaschetal.2010:2):Nationalsocialpolicyreactionstothecrisisseem

to vary substantially and notmuch is knownonwhy they do so.One self‐evident factor is the

nationaltimingandseverityoftheoveralleconomiccrisis.

Following theact to stabilise financialmarkets1ofOctober 2008,Germanyenacted two

economic stimulus programmes in November 2008 and in January 2009, which together com‐

prised64billionEuros.2 InAustria,alsotwoeconomicstimuluspackagesandataxreformwere

enacted inOctoberandDecember 2008, comprisingabout twelvebillionEuros. Table 1depicts

GDPgrowthratesinpercentagechangeonthepreviousyear:ItshowsthatallcountriesbutPo‐

landexperiencedanegativegrowthoftheirGDPvolumein2009.However,somecountrieswere

hit particularly hard – namely the Baltic countries Latvia (‐18%), Lithuania (‐14.7%) and Estonia

(‐13.9%)–whileothershadonlylimitedslumps.Germany(‐4.7%)andAustria(‐3.9%)wereonabout

EU‐27‐average(‐4.3%)positionsconcerningnegativeGDPgrowthin2009.Aviewtotheforecasts

for2011showsthatforallcountriesbutPortugalandGreeceapositiveGDPgrowthispredicted–

though,ofcourse,toverydifferentdegrees.Germany(2.6%)andAustria(2.4%)hereareinabove‐

averagepositions.Theseandotherfiguresshowhowtheeconomiccrisishassettledbynowand

economicforecastsenhance.This isagoodsituationtolookbackandstudyfamilypolicydevel‐

opmentduringthetimesofcrisis.

Lookingat the literature, there is actuallyground toexpecteither:a terminationof the

expansionaryfamilypolicyreformpath(uptoevenretrenchment)oritsenforcement.Foronthe

onehand,particularlyin2009thenationalrecessionsputsocialpoliciesunderpressure:National

agendaswerewidelydominatedbytheissueofreducingpublicexpenditure.Ontheotherhand,

Fink(2009)haspointedtothepossibilitythattheeconomiccrisisisusedasa‘windowofoppor‐

tunity’(cf.Kingdon1995)toovercomethelowreformpotentialofconservative‐corporatistwel‐

1TheFinanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz,comprisingavolumeof400billionEuros,wasenacted insummaryproceedingsbytheGermanBundestagon17October2008.2Forshort,theywerecalledKonjunkturprogrammI (‚Savingemploymentby increasinggrowth‘)andKon‐junkturprogrammII(‚Determinedinthecrisis,strongfortheeconomicrevival‘).

FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 3

fare states and support policies against new social risks (cf. Bonoli 2007).3 Furthermore, there

seemstobea temporalorder ingovernments’ familypolicy responses to thecrisis:Richardson

(2010:495)identifiedafirststageof“stimulusfollowedbyamovetowardsausterity”.Amongthe

national reactions, hemost commonly finds changed amounts in cash benefits (e.g. child and

familyallowances),followedbymostlystimulus‐orientedchildcarereformsandmostlyausterity‐

oriented leave policy reforms. Summing up, these studies give hints, but are also unclear on

whetherandwhenexactlyweshouldfindexpansionorcutbacks.

Againstthisbackground,thispaperspecificallyaskswhetherGermanandAustrianfamily

policies havemaintained their newly‐struck path in family policies during the times of crisis or

whether they brokewith them. Family policies are a cross‐cutting issue,which – from a broad

perspective–mayinclude“topicsasvariedasemployment,transport,food,andeducationpoli‐

cies”(Gauthier2002:456).Thispaper,however,focusesonleavepolicies4andinstitutionalchild‐

care,astheyhaverisenhighonpoliticalagendasacrossEuropeinthepursuitofhigherwork‐life

balance.At times, other relevantmeasures (as e.g. child and family allowances) are integrated

into the analysis.Germany andAustria aregood cases to comparehere, because theyhad just

initiatedtheirfar‐reachingandcostlyreformpathsbeforethecrisis.Whatismore,withregardto

welfare state structuresandalso familypolicies,GermanyandAustria can“becalledbirdsofa

feather”(Alber1998:57):Comparingtheresponsesofsuchsimilarcasescanhelptounderstand

the dynamics and identify respective determinants. The case studies build on the literature,

documentsandnewspaperarticlesaswellas30qualitative interviews,conductedwithexperts

whotookpartinthereformprocessesinGermanyandAustria.5

Typically, theoretical approaches identify independent anddependent variables, but ab‐

stract from the concrete ‘time’ and ‘space’, underwhich they apply. Paul Pierson (2004), how‐

ever, prominently argued that the significance of causal variables is frequently distortedwhen

ripped from their temporal context. However, the discussion of ‘crisis policy‐making’ (see e.g.

Boin/’t Hart 2003) spotlights the timing of policy processes prominently. In the context of this

paper,thepre‐crisisconditions,whichframedthe2006enactmentoftheGermanincome‐related

parental benefit,were clearly different from the 2009 one’s framing the Austrian counterpart.

Therefore,thispaperappliesatime‐sensitiveanalyticallens(developedinChapter2)instudying

3Newsocialriskspolicies“aimatprotectingindividualsfromtheconsequencesofpost‐industrialsocioeco‐nomictrendsinthelabourmarketorinthefamilyfield”(Bonoli2007:508)ande.g.includefamilypolicyoractivelabourmarketpolicy,asopposedtoindustrialsocialrisks(e.g.oldage,unemployment).4Therearedifferenttypesofcare‐relatedleave(Kamerman/Moss2009):maternity leave,paternity leave,parentalleaveandchildcareleave,leavetocareforelderlydependentsandleavetocareforsickchildren.5The interviewswereconducted inthecontextof thePhDprojectof theauthor(cf.Blumforthcoming).Interviewed experts represent four groups, i.e. policy‐makers, administration, social partners, family andwelfareorganisations.AsinterviewswereconductedinGerman,quotationsaretranslatedinthispaper.

FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 4

thepre‐ andpost‐crisis reformprocesses inGermany andAustria (Chapter 3). Chapter 4draws

somegeneralconclusionsandgivesanoutlook.

2.ATime‐sensitivePerspectiveonPolicyReforms6

Policy analysis spotlights thepolicy‐making as a continuousprocess of ‘problem‐solving’ (Schu‐

bert/Bandelow2009:16).Itthusendogenouslytakesatime‐linkedviewinstudyingandexplaining

policyprocessesandtheirresults.However,policyanalyses–aswellaspoliticalscienceingeneral

–exhibitsasurprisingneglectofthe‘timefactor’,whichismorepronouncedthaninneighbour‐

ingdisciplines (e.g. sociology).SchedlerandSantiso (1998:5)argued that:“Timewith itsmany

rolesandfacesisamajorplayerinthefieldofpolitics.Butuptonow,neitherpoliticalsciencein

general nor studiesof democracy in particular have taken explicit and systematic noticeof it.”

Againstthisbackground,Gohl(2008:200)reviewstheoften‐usedstageheuristic:Hearguesthat

thepolicycycle7–althoughbeingprocess‐oriented–expelsallconcretechronologyfromlegisla‐

tiveprocedures until there is a flattened, one‐dimensional cycle of the ‘sameold thing’.He ac‐

knowledges thepolicycycle’sadvantages for theorybuilding,butcriticises that itdoesn’toffer

orientationforpracticalpurposes.Whatismore,alsofortheorybuildingafocusonthenon‐cyclic

andnon‐regular,buttime‐specificdimensionseemsfruitful.Thisraisestwoquestions,namely:To

whatextentdocurrenttheoreticalapproachesalreadyincludethetimedimension?Andhowcan

ahigherlevelofabstractionbereachedonthisbasis,exceeding‘singularconstellations’.

Withinthefieldof‘politicsandtime’,thehighestattentionhas–atleastexplicitly–been

paid to thepolitical‐institutional time (e.g.Riescher 1994; Schedler/Santiso 1998;Rüb 2006). To

thisdimension,Rüb(2011:72)assignsthequestionunderwhichtimerhythmspoliticaldecisions

are prepared, taken and implemented. Riescher focussed on this institutional inherent time of

politicsinher1994bookandarguedthattheinherenttimeofpoliticsdifferswiththeinstitutional

contextandmakesitsdeepest impactintheconstitutionally‐definedlegislativeperiods,bute.g.

also in legislative or parliamentary time rules (e.g. speaking time). Building up on Luhmann’s

worksonthedifferentiationofsubsystems,8Riescheridentifiesa‘politicaltime’,whichappertains

tothesubsystemandisreliantonacommonchronologywiththeenvironmentaltime.Thepoliti‐

cal timestructurespoliticalevents, it functionallyapplies to thepolitical system(Riescher 1994:

223)andframespoliticalaction.Morethantheothertwotemporaldimension(seebelow),itisof

6ThisChapterlargelybuildsontheargumentationdevelopedinBlum(forthcoming).7Thepolicycycleinitsmostpopularform(cf.Jones1970;Jann/Wegrich2009)distinguishesbetweenfivestagesof thepolicyprocess: problem formulation, agenda setting, policy formulation (andpolitical deci‐sion), policy implementation and policy evaluation. This is then followed by either termination or re‐formulationoftherespectivepolicy.8Luhmann1979:33)emphasizesthattimedoesnotnecessarilytakethesameformandstructuralrelevanceinboththesubsystemandtheenvironment,sincethedifferentiationofsubsystemsincludesthedifferenti‐ationoftimeinthesubsystem(butnotintheenvironment).

FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 5

cyclicalnature:9Differentdemocraticconstitutionsprovidedifferenttimerules,buttheyallfulfil

the function of limiting power in time (Riescher 2010: 1242). This dimension of political‐

institutionaltimerules–which,inthefollowing,willbecalledpoliticaltime–primarilyhasanim‐

pactonpoliticsandpolicies,but–likeallinstitutions–itcanbemodifiedaswell(e.g.byshorten‐

ingorextendinglegislativeperiods).

SchedlerandSantiso(1998:6)pointtothepolitical‐institutionaltimeruleswhenarguing

thatthese“definethetemporalstructuresorthetimetablesofdemocraticpolitics,itstimebudg‐

ets,itspointsofinitiationandtermination,itspace,itssequencesanditscycles”.However,their

argumentalreadypointstoanotheraspect.Thepoliticaltime,whichhasoftenbeenfocusedon

amidstthefewexplicitstudiesofpoliticsandtime,takesasystemicview,whilethestudyingof

policy processes requires an action‐oriented perspective, i.e. how the political time (and its

chronological environmental time) restrains policy‐making, but is also used (strategically) as a

resource. Of course, temporal patterns are not only shaped by the political time and strategic

action,bute.g.alsobyformandcontents:Forinstance, itrequiresmoretimetodealwithcom‐

plexproblemsandbuildingconsensus ismoretime‐intensive, ifvarious interesthavetobe inte‐

grated(Rüb2011:75).Thenagain,itisstrikinghowoftenpoliticaltacticsandstrategiesrelateto

thetimefactor:Forexample,policymakersare ‘playingfortime’,theysitan issueoutoracton

thespur‐of‐a‐moment(Blanketal.2011).Rüb(2006:4)evenconsidersallpoliticalactionasafight

forcontrolorthemanagementoftime,whichtherebylosesitsunswayable,continuouscharacter

andratherbecomesanobjectofpoliticaldecisions.

Gohl(2008:198)alsopointedtothefactthat‘time’isintentionallyusedinpolicy‐making

processesandthatthisintentionalityinshapingtemporalproceduresinfluencesonthe‘temporal

design’ (Zeit‐Gestaltung), which can be read in ‘temporal gestalts’, similar to that observed in

space‐time(Dörner2002:156ff.).Astemporalgestaltsdescribethecharacteristicsintheflowof

time aswell as the quality of succeeding situations, Gohl compares them to acoustic temporal

gestaltsofsongsorsymphonies(cf.Dollaseetal.2000).SchedlerandSantiso(1998;cf.Santiso

1996),whilenotusingthesevocabularies,distinguishedbetweenfivesuchqualitiesoftemporal

gestalts:namelytheduration,tempo,10timing,sequenceandperiodicityofactionsandevents.In

asimilarway,thepunctuatedequilibriumtheory–whichwantstoexplaintemporalpatternsof

policyprocesses–focusesonthistemporaldimension:“[P]oliticalprocessesaregenerallychar‐

acterized by stability and incrementalism, but occasionally they produce large‐scale departures

9Riescher (1994: 230)points to the fact that limitedpoliticalpower is structured into legislativeperiods,terms inoffice,coalitionnegotiationsandtimesofgovernmentformation.Thenagain, legislativeperiodsarestructured intosessions,annualbudgetpreparationsandrepeatingagendas.Policiesareclassifiedbytherhythmoflegislativeperiodsandpoliticalcareersliabletothecycleofaffirmationanddecline(ibid.).10SchedlerandSantiso(1998:19)definetempoasarelationalmeasure:“Itindicateshowmuchtimeittakestoperformagivenactivity,or,inotherwords,itmeasurestheratiobetweentimeandaction.”

FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 6

fromthepast”(Trueetal.2007:155).Thistemporaldimension,whichcanbecharacterisedbythe

different parameters identified by Schedler and Santiso (1998; cf. Santiso 1996), will here be

calledtemporaldynamics.

Previousresearch,however,hasaddressedafurtheraspect,whichcannotbeadequately

graspedbythetemporaldimensionsidentifiedsofar:Firstandforemost,thisaspectwasemphas‐

isedinthecontextofthegarbagecanmodel(Cohenetal.1972)andthemultiplestreamsframe‐

work (Kingdon 1995; Zahariadis 2007).According to theseapproaches,policywindowsopenat

criticalpoints intimeandoffertheopportunitytopolicyentrepreneurs“topushtheirpetsolu‐

tions,or topushattention to their specialproblems” (Kingdon1995: 165).Policyentrepreneurs

havetousetheseshort‐datedwindowsofopportunityinordertoachievepolicychange.Without

goingfurtherintothedetailsofthemultiplestreamsframework,theideaof‘criticalmomentsin

time’, which may have a deep impact on politics and policies, can be taken up here and con‐

sideredinamoregeneralway.Thistemporaldimensionshallbecalledtemporalmoments,tobe

consideredinadoubleway:firstly,asapointorshortperiodintime,whichcanimpactonpolitics

andpolicies.Andsecondly,asatemporalmomentum,e.g.accelerating,delayingorextenuating

thepolicyprocessandthusinfluencingthetemporaldynamics.Tokeepaconceptualdistinction,

temporalmomentsshouldnotbeconsideredtobedeterminablebythepoliticaltime(e.g.elec‐

tions).As itseems, theymayormaynotbecreatedbypoliticalactorsthemselves(whileactors

candefinitelyusethem):Apparently,somemomentsaremuchmorepronetothat(e.g.focusing

event)thanothers(e.g.serendipity).

The following tables summarises the threedimensions,whichhavebeen identified, and

givesexamplesforaccordingparameters.

Table1:Temporaldimensionsandparameters

Dimension Primarydirectionofeffect Parameters(exemplary)Politicaltime Politicaltime

⇒Politics,Policies• Legislativeperiods• Termsofoffice• Legislativetimerules(e.g.

fixedtimelimits)• Parliamentaryspeakingtime• Plenarysessions

Temporaldynamics(cf.Schedler/Santiso1998;Santiso1996)

Temporaldynamics⇐Politicaltime,Politics

• Duration• Tempo• Timing• Sequence• Periodicity

Temporalmoments Temporalmoments⇒Temporaldynamics,Politics

• Serendipity• Coincidence• Focusingevent• Courtruling• Scientificdiscovery

Source:Ownlisting

FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 7

Itwasshownthat the literatureandtheoreticalapproachesso farhavediscussedand included

differentaspectsoftherelationbetweentimeandpolitics.Inpursuitofahigherlevelofabstrac‐

tion,onecandistinguishbetweenthethreedimensionsofpoliticaltime,temporaldynamicsand

temporalmoments.Temporaldynamicsandtemporalmomentsapplyto(anumberof)individual

policiesorsubsystems,whilstthepoliticaltimeiscomprehensive.Inthefollowing,theconceptof

thesethreedimensionsoftimeinthepoliticalspherewillbeappliedasananalyticallensincom‐

paringpre‐andpost‐crisisfamilypolicyreformsinGermanyandAustria.

3.Pre‐andPost‐crisisFamilypolicyReformsinGermanyandAustria

Especially theGermanreformshavegainedquitehighattention(e.g.Henninger/vonWahl2010;

Ostner 2010; Erler 2009; Gerlach 2006), while, admittedly, only very few studies exist on the

Austrianones(forexceptionssee:Kreimer2011;Leitner2010;Blumforthcoming).Thereforeinthe

following, the contents and policy processes of these reformswill only be shortly summarised

andratherbepaidattentiontotheroleofthetimefactor,asdiscussedinthepreviouschapter.

3.1Pre‐crisisReforms

Germany

InGermany,thetwomostprestigiousandcomprehensivefamilypolicyreformsintheyearspre‐

cedingthecrisisweretheintroductionofanincome‐relatedparentalbenefit(Elterngeld)in2007

and the 2008 lawproviding for themassive expansionof childcare facilities, theKiföG (Kinder‐

förderungsgesetz).

The parental benefit replaced the childcare benefit (Erziehungsgeld), which had been

introduced in1986andrenderedmoreflexible in2001:This formermodelprovidedfora rather

longleaveofthreeyears,twoofthesewereaccompaniedbyamonthlyflat‐rateamountof307

Euros.11Bothparentswereentitledtotheleaveandcouldworkpart‐timefor19hours(until2001)

and 30hours (from2001) respectivelywhile beingon leave. Thismodelwas in linewith ‘male‐

breadwinnernorms’,asitsupportedlongleavesandsetnoincentivesforfatherstogoonleave.12

Thenewparentalbenefitintroducedin2007hasbeenratedasaparadigmaticpolicychange(e.g.

Ostner2010;Blum2010),sinceitfollowednewgoalsandsetalteredincentives:Thebenefitwas

transformed into an income‐replacement of 67 percent of the former net income, granted for

twelvemonths.Theminimumamount–i.e.mainlyforformerlynon‐employedparents–wasset

11Thisbenefitwasgraduallyreducedwithincreasingincome.12In2006,only3.3percentoffatherstookparentalleave.

FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 8

at300Euros13andthemaximumamountat1800Euros.Nexttoincentivesforshorterleavesand

aquick return intopaidemployment, theparentalbenefitalsosupports sharedparenthood,as

twoadditionalpartnermonthsaregrantediftakenbytheotherparent,i.e.generallythefather.14

Nowhowdidthis far‐reachingpolicychangecomeaboutanddidtime‐relatedfactorsmatter in

thisprocess?

After being suggested by several experts’ reports for the family ministry (esp. Rürup/

Gruescu2003),theincome‐relatedparentalbenefitwasputonthepoliticalagendaforactionin

July2004byRenateSchmidt(SPD),familyministerofthethengoverningcoalitionoftheSocial

DemocratsandtheGreenparty.Sheorderedafeasibilitystudy,butpointedoutsimultaneously

thatthereformwouldonlybeintroducedafterthenextgeneralelections,scheduledforautumn

2006. Several reasons can be identified for this ‘delay’: Firstly, especially in face of the partner

months,Schmidtmighthavebeenafraidoftheconservativeopposition(Leitner2008:218).Sec‐

ondly,inlaterstagesoflegislativeperiods,thereismostlynofinancialscopeforsuchcomprehen‐

sivereforms.Andthirdly, theSPDmaybewantedtotreasurethereform ideafortheupcoming

electioncampaign,since itwasverypopularwiththepublic.The latter factorsappertaintothe

political‐time‐dimension, and so does the development, which brought the introduction of the

parentalbenefitabout.

Following an election defeat in Germany’s most populous federal state, North Rhine‐

Westphalia, Chancellor Schröder announced re‐elections for September 2005. The SPD cam‐

paignedwiththeElterngeld,whiletheCDU/CSUstronglyopposedthisidea.However,theconser‐

vativeshadowfamilyministerUrsulavonderLeyenstatedintherun‐uptotheelectionsthatshe

likedthepolicy,but itwasunaffordable.Then inthecoalitionnegotiations, laterfamilyminister

von der Leyen agreed on introducing the parental benefitwithRenate Schmidt: She even suc‐

cessfully lobbiedfor introducingtwoinsteadofonlyonepartnermonthandpushedthereform

throughagainstconservativeresistancefromwithinherownpartyduringthefollowingmonths.15

Thus,there‐electionsopenedapolicywindowfortheElterngeld,tobeaccomplishedbyconser‐

vativefamilyministervonderLeyen,supportedbyotherpoliticalactors(ChancellorMerkel,the

socialpartners)andNixon‐goes‐to‐China‐logics16(Henninger/vonWahl2010).

13Thus,thebenefitfornon‐workingparentswashalvedbynowonlygrantedfor12insteadof24months.14Indeed,theproportionoffatherstakingparentalbenefitincreasedupto20percentin2010.Parentsarealsoeligible,however,tosharethe14monthsinotherways,e.g.bothtaking7monthsparallel.15EspeciallytheBavarianCSUrefusedtoendorsethepolicyinitscurrentform.VonderLeyengainedtheirsupportbyofferingthecompromiseofputtingthetwopartnermonthsontopofthebasictwelvemonthsandnotreducingthemfromthese,asoriginallyplanned.16Asanexpertemphasized:“VonderLeyeniscontinuingSchmidt’sfamilypolicy[…],butitwouldn’thavebeen implemented under Schmidt – or at least not as successfully ‐, because Schmidt had to push thistroughinsideherownpartyandagainsttheCDU.ThiswasmucheasierforvonderLeyen:TheCDUcouldn’tdismountitsownminister.AndtheSPDcouldn’tresist,becauseitwastheirownpolicy.”(Interview16)

FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 9

On7February2007,familyministervonderLeyenwentpublicwiththeambitiousgoalto

create 500.000 new childcare places and thereby for 35 percent of under three‐year‐olds until

2013,withanestimatedcostofthreebillionEuros(SZ,7.2.2007).Thesedemandscameasahuge

surpriseandseemtohavenotevenbeenagreeduponwithChancellorMerkelbefore, letalone

withherpartyorthefederalstates,whichareresponsibleforinstitutionalchildcare(cf.Interview

18).TheinternalresistancefromtheCDU/CSUagainsttheseplanswasenormous,whiletheSPD

andtheirfinanceministerSteinbrücksupportedvonderLeyen–however,onlyonthetermsof

firstlycuttingbackfinancialbenefitsforfamiliesinreturn17andsecondlyintroducingalegalright

tochildcarefromtheageofoneyear.VonderLeyenopposedboth.InApril2007,thefamilymin‐

ister met with representatives of the German Länder and the municipalities and they actually

agreedtocreatechildcareplacesforonethirdofunderthreesuntil2013.18VonderLeyenreferred

tothehightempoof thepolicyprocessbystatingthateightweeksearlier, ‘therewasonlyNir‐

vana’concerningthechildcareexpansion(SZ,3.4.2007).Thus,theagendasettingprocessofthe

Elterngeldshowsspecifictemporaldynamics,affectedbya‘going‐public’‐strategyoffamilyminis‐

tervonderLeyen.

However,thefinancingdisputebetweenvonderLeyenandSteinbrückwasstillsmolder‐

ing.Against this background, it came as a surprisewhen the familyminister cancelled a target

dateinmidApril,whereshehadwantedtoannouncehercompromisewiththefinanceminister

(SZ,25.4.2007).Thiscanbetracedbacktoaserendipity,towhichanintervieweerefers:

Theyear2007wassuchastrokeofluck,sinceSteinbrückhadthesefourbillionEuroscash,outsidethebudget.UnexpectedreturnsfromIdon’tknowwhere.AndthatiswhytheKiföGcouldonlybepushedtrough in2007.Even if theeconomiccrisishadnot set in, theywouldneverhavegottenthisbudgeted.Thiswastheonlyyearwhereitworked–2007/2008.(Interview26)

This isaclearexampleofatemporalmoment,whichenabledthe introductionofthereform.Fi‐

nanceministerSteinbrückcouldtheninterchangethisaceuphissleeveagainstthelegalrighttoa

childcareplacefromtheageofoneyear(Interview28),whichwillcomeintoeffectin2013.Con‐

servativeforcesintheCDU/CSU,however,onlyacceptedthisrighttochildcareinexchangefora

childcareallowance:Thiswillalsobeintroducedin2013forthoseparents,whocarefortheirchil‐

drenathomeanddon’tmakeuseofinstitutionalchildcare.Nevertheless,themassiveexpansion

ofchildcareandtheintroductionofthelegalrightfrom2013representamajorpolicychangein

Germanfamilypolicies.

17TheSPDarguedthatGermanfamilypolicyspenttoomuchonfinancialbenefits,accountofservices.18ThefederalstateagreedtoprovidefourbillionEurosforthecreationofnewchildcareplacesandoperat‐ingcosts,whichtheLänderneedtoreduplicate.

FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 10

Austria

InAustria,thetwoimportantfamilypolicyreformsintheyearsprecedingthecrisiswerethere‐

formofthechildcareallowance(Kinderbetreuungsgeld)andthelawprovidingfortheexpansion

ofinstitutionalchildcarefrom2008to2010,bothimplementedin2008.19

In2002,thegoverningcoalitionofconservativeÖVPandright‐wingFPÖhadreplacedthe

employment‐relatedleavebytheKinderbetreuungsgeld(inthefollowing:KBG):Itwasgrantedto

allparentsindependentofaformeremployment(e.g.alsohousewives,students)foraperiodof

30+6‐months20andaccompaniedbyamonthlyflat‐ratepaymentof436Euros.Thismeasurewas

harshly criticized by the opposition as familialising and they searched for an opportunity to re‐

formulate it. InNovember 2005, a pact of the family organisationKinderfreunde aswell as the

women’s organisations of the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the trade unionwent publicwith a

reformproposaltorendertheKBGflexible,i.e.makingitavailableforanoptionalperiodbetween

15and30months,thenaccompaniedbyadjustedmonthlypayments:

At first, we discussed this internally: How should we operate? In effect, we want the income‐relatedleave,butnowthere isthischildcareallowance.Weagreed:Asafirststep,prospectsarebetterforflexibilization.Thatis,sotospeak,toattacktheoppositionwiththeirownargumentsbysaying:Okay,wewant‘freedomofchoice’,parentsshouldbeabletochoose.[…]Andthisworkedout.Andwemanaged,withinsocialpartnership,towinemployersforthis.(Interview2)

ThestatementoftheAustrianintervieweeclarifieshowthereformcoalitionchoseatime‐related

salamitactic inpursuitoftheirlong‐termgoalofanincome‐relatedbenefit, i.e.theytriedtoma‐

nipulatethereformsequence.Andindeed,afterthe2006generalelections,theSPÖandthecon‐

servativeÖVPintheircoalitionnegotiationsagreedonintroducingtwonewversionsnexttothe

traditional30+6‐versionoftheKBGfrom2008:Onemediumvariantof20+4‐months(624Euros)

andoneshortvariantof15+3‐months(800Euros).Thus,thesalamitacticofthereformcoalition

preparedthegroundandthegeneralelections,onthepolitical‐time‐dimension,offeredtheop‐

portunitytoimplementthereform.

WhileduringtheyearsoftheÖVP‐FPÖ‐government,noeffective initiativeswerestarted

toexpandthedeficientchildcarefacilities,theissueenteredtheagendaintherun‐uptothe2006

generalelections.Nexttothetradeunions,nowalsotheFederationofAustrianIndustries21(IV)

called for the creation of childcare places (Standard, 9.11.2005). After the elections ofOctober

2006,thegroupnegotiatingfamilyandwomen’sissues–ledbySPÖ‐secretaryBuresandthefor‐

19Thoughthesetwo lawswere introducedafterthestartofthefinancialcrisis, theiragendasettingtookplaceearlierandtheywerenotyetaffectedbyit.20InAustria,partnermonthswerealreadyintroducedin1995,butratherasapurecostcontainmentmeas‐urethanasanincentiveforsharedparenthood(Interview15;Obinger/Tálos2006:160).21TheIVisnotmemberofAustriansocialpartnership,asaretheTradeUnionFederation(ÖGB),theFederalEconomicChamber(WKÖ),theFederalChamberofLabour(BAK)andtheChamberofAgriculture(LK).

FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 11

mer ÖVP minister for women Rauch‐Kallat – agreed to create 30.000 new full‐time childcare

places: However, this agreementwas nixed by the financial negotiatorsMatznetter (SPÖ) and

Grasser (ÖVP) forbudgetary reasons(Standard,8.1.2007).Then in2007,spurredonby theGer‐

manKiföG (Standard, 30.5.2007), familyminister Kdolsky (ÖVP) andminister forwomenBures

(SPÖ)brought the topicon thepolitical agenda foractionand itwasdecidedatagovernment

conclave in July that the federal statewouldprovide60millionEuros from2008to2010 toex‐

pandchildcarefacilities(Standard,25.7.2007).Theaimwasformulatedtocreatebetween6.000

and8.000newplacesuntil2010,mainlyforunderthree‐year‐olds.

Since,asinGermany,theresponsibilityforchildcarefacilitieslieswiththeAustrianLänder,

thefederalstatethenhadtonegotiatea 15a‐agreement22withthem.Buresconductednegotia‐

tionswith the SPÖ‐governed Länder; Kdolskywith those governed by theÖVP. The Council of

Ministers23decidedonatextofthe15a‐agreementinNovember2007,butincontrasttotheSPÖ‐

ledLänder, theÖVP‐ledones refusedtosign thiscontract.Theyarguedthat thecreatedplaces

wouldoutnumberdemandsandcriticizedthatprivatechildminderscouldnotbesubsidized.Bu‐

resthreatenedthattheSPÖ‐Länderwouldgetthewholemoney,shouldtheÖVP‐Ländernotsign

thecontractby31May2007(Standard,21.3.2008).Nevertheless,theydidthisdeadlinepass. In‐

stead of only subsidizing the SPÖ‐Länder, however, familyminister Kdolskymetwith theÖVP‐

LänderrepresentativesinInnsbruckon28Aprilandmadesome(veryminor)concessions,sothat

theyfinallysignedthecontractinMay2008.

Summingup,aconsiderableexpansionofchildcarefacilitieswas implementedinAustria

andthusaclearshiftinfamilypolicies.However,itstoodbehindtheGermanKiföG‐reform,since

no specific place‐child ratiowas formulated as a goal and since no legal right to childcarewas

introduced. This can, amongst others, also be traced back to a temporal factor, namely to the

reform sequence: In Germany, the implementation of the 12+2‐months parental benefit sharply

increased the pressure to install sufficient childcare places after this period. In Austria, on the

other hand, the childcare expansion was decided on before implementing an income‐related,

12+2‐monthsKBG(cf.Chapter3.2)andthusacorrespondingpressurewasmissing.

3.2Post‐crisisReforms

Germany

SincethegrandcoalitionofCDU/CSUandSPD(2005‐2009)had–withtheElterngeld(2007)and

theKiföG(2008)–introducedfar‐reachingandveryprestigiousfamilypolicyreforms,newissues

22ThatisanagreementbetweenthefederalstateandtheLänderunderArticle15aofAustria’sConstitution.23Thisisaweeklymeetingbyallgovernmentmembers,whichreformbillshavetopassunanimously.

FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 12

and own priorities seemed hard to find for Kristina Schröder, the new family minister of the

CDU/FDP‐coalition.InApril2010,Schröderwentpublicwithherfirstrealreformdemand,namely

expandingthesuccessfulpartnermonthsoftheElterngeld,bygrantingfourinsteadofonlytwo

of them. As the newspaper Süddeutsche (3.4.2010) commented, however, that came at a time

whenthefirststageofeconomicstimuluspackageswas justswitching intotheausteritystage:

Againstthatbackground,financeministerSchäubledirectlystalledSchröder’splans.InMay2010,

CDU‐vicechairmanKochevenquestionedwhetherthechildcareexpansiondecidedonwiththe

KiföGcouldstillbeupheldinfaceofthepressuretomakesavings(SZ,12.5.2010).Schröder’stim‐

ingthuswasverysuboptimal,asthebudgetpreparationprocess–infaceoftheeconomiccrisis

and the ‘debt brake’24 – foresaw savingsof tenbillion Euros for 2011.Against this background,

Schröderswitchedfromexpansiontocutbacks:InJune2010,sheannouncedthattherewouldbe

no additional partner months for the time being and that she rather prepared a cost‐saving

amendmentoftheElterngeld‐reform.

On7June2010,thegovernmentreleaseditsausterityprogramme,whichcontainedtwo

amendmentsoftheparentalbenefit.Ontheonehand, long‐termunemployedwouldno longer

be eligible to the Elterngeldminimum amount of 300 Euros.25 An on the other hand, for high‐

income earnerswith amonthly net income ofmore than 1240 Euros, the income‐replacement

wouldbedecreased from67 to65percent.Thenatureof theseausteritymeasuresshowsthat

theeconomiccrisisdidnot leadtoamodificationofthepathenteredwiththeElterngeld:Actu‐

ally, it hadoriginally not beenplanned to introduce aminimumamount for non‐employedpar‐

ents, since this ‘contradicted’ the income‐replacement logics: This measure had been pushed

throughby theSPDandtheConfederationofGermanTradeUnions.Now,however, the family

minister stated thatgranting theparentalbenefit to long‐termunemployedwasdetrimental to

the system and that thereby, the benefits of long‐term unemployedwould be too close to in‐

comesfrompaidemployment(SZ,8.6.2010).

Ashermostprestigiousreformissue,Schröderhadcalledforacare leave(Pflegezeit) in

March2010,i.e.thelegalrightforemployeestoshortentheirweeklyworkingtimebyhalfovera

periodoftwoyearstocarefordependants.Duringthistime,theyshouldstillreceive75percent

of their earnings, as theywould for the two years following the leave,whileworking full‐time

again. The reactions to Schröder’sproposalweremixed: Family andwelfareorganisationswel‐

24 Inthefaceoftheeconomiccrisis, thefederalismcommissiondecidedto introducea ‘debtbrake’ from2011,limitingthestructuralannualnetborrowingto0.35percentofthegrossdomesticproduct.25Thiswasplannedtobeappliedalsotoworkingparentswithverylowincomes,whoadditionallyreceiveachildsupplementorthebenefitforlong‐termunemployed(HartzIV).Aftersharpcriticismsfromtheoppo‐sitionandevenfromwithinthecoalitionparties,however,anElterngeld‐allowanceoftheirformerincome(but300Eurosatmost)was introduced for thoseof theseparents,whohadbeenemployedbefore thebirthofthechild.

FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 13

comedthegeneralidea,butarguedthattheconceptwasnotfar‐reachingenough,e.g.because

carerswould have to dispense one fourth of their earnings. The SPD and the Green party dis‐

missed the ideaas conservative and re‐familialisingandargued for expanding institutional care

instead.Ontheonehand,thisproposalhadamuchbettertiming,since itwaspopularwiththe

public and very low‐priced (SZ, 21.5.2010): Since Schröder knew that therewouldbenomoney

available, she found a fitting concept tobecomeactive in reconciliationpolicies and shapeher

personalprofile.Butontheotherhand,theprivateeconomycouldusethecrisis‐situationtoar‐

gue that a legal right to take care leavewould threaten the economic recovery. For example,

DieterHundtaspresidentof theAssociationofGermanEmployersparried:“In faceof thecon‐

tinuing economic and financial crisis, theremust not be any furtherburden on labour and em‐

ployment”(SZ,4.3.2010;owntranslation).

In the faceof these twoconflicting, temporally‐bound factors,Schröderhadelaborated

herreformproposalfurtherbyMay2010.Theprivateeconomyhadcriticisedthattheywouldface

incalculabledangersiftheiremployeeswentoncareleave–thusreceiving25percentadditional

earnings– anddidn’t return towork afterwards. Itwas thusplanned to cushion these risksby

granting smaller firms an interest‐free loan from the government‐owned development bank

(Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau). Furthermore, leave‐takers should acquire additional pension

claimsoutofthecompulsorylong‐termcareinsurance.Inautumn2010,Schröderhadtabledthe

ministry’sdraftbillforthePflegezeit–whichshewantedtointroduceby2011–,butobviously,the

governmentchoseatemporaldelayingtactic.OnlyinFebruary2011,thetopicwasontheagenda

again,butnowwithadecisivemodification:Thecareleaveshouldnolongerbealegalrightfor

employees,butonlyanoptionalofferingoftheirfirms.Thiscanmainlybetracedbacktotheop‐

positionof the private economy, but also of the coalition partner FDP. The federal cabinet ap‐

provedofthisdraftlawon24March2011anditisplannedtobeineffectfromJanuary2012.

ThePflegezeitinitsoriginaldesignwouldhavemeantaslightalternationinthefamilypol‐

icy reform path implemented by the grand coalition, since it was less focused on re‐

commodificationand rathercomprised re‐familialisingelements.While the introductionofboth

theElterngeld andtheKiföGwasenabledby thesupportof theprivateeconomy, thePflegezeit

couldnotbeenpushedthroughagainsttheir interests.Therefore, thepurelyoptionalPflegezeit

remainsofrathersymboliccharacterandhasnotsignificantlychangedthenewre‐commodifying

andde‐familialisingpathwayinGermanfamilypolicies.

Austria

The twomost important familypolicy reforms introducedafter the startof theeconomic crisis

were yet another reformof the childcare allowanceKBG (2010) and another 15a‐agreement to

FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 14

makethe lastpre‐schoolyearcompulsoryandfreeofcharge(2009).The latterwaspartof the

economicstimuluspackageandthusasameasureagainstthecrisis.Apartfromthese,benefits

forfamilieswerecutbackinthecontextoftheconsolidationactivitiesfrom2011to2014.

Asdescribedabove,thereformcoalitionofthewomen’sorganisationsfromtheSPÖand

thetradeunionsaswellastheKinderfreundefollowedtheKBG‐flexibilisationasatemporalsalami

tacticinpursuitofthelong‐termgoalofanincome‐relatedbenefit.However,theirorganisations

didnotmakethisamission.Hence,anotherreformcouldnotbeexpected inthis legislativepe‐

riodandthenextgeneralelectionsweredueinautumn2012.On7July2008,however,thevice‐

chancellorMolterer (ÖVP) foreclosed thegrandcoalitionand re‐electionswere set forSeptem‐

ber. In theelection campaign, theÖVPmaintainedanoticeable close contactwith theGerman

CDU:At theendofAugust,Moltererwent toBerlin tomeet theGerman familyminister (Stan‐

dard,21.8.2008)andafewdayslater,theÖVPsurprisinglywentpublicwiththedemandtointro‐

ducean income‐dependentKBG.AsMarek,statesecretary intheeconomicsministry,argued,it

shouldbemodelledaftertheGermanyElterngeld–i.e.beingpaidfor12+2‐months,at80percent

offormernetearnings,withaminimumof1000andamaximumof2000Euros–butincontrast

tothatbeonlyintroducedinadditiontothepre‐existingKBG‐versions.Intheircoalitionnegotia‐

tions,theSPÖandÖVPquicklyagreedonintroducinganincome‐relatedKBG.Thus,thebrought‐

forwardre‐elections,attributabletothepolitical‐time‐dimension,openedapolicywindowforthe

introductionofanincome‐dependentKBG.

Afterthisquickagendasetting,thepolicyformulationstagewasmoreconflict‐laden.The

negotiators–familystatesecretary26MarekandtheministerforwomenHeinisch‐Hosek(SPÖ)–

differedonsomeissues:Inparticular,Heinisch‐Hosekdemandedtograntthepartnermonthsalso

tosingleparents,whileMarekdismissedthis.TheycouldneitheragreeonMarek’squitecompli‐

catednoronHeinisch‐Hosek’sproposalonthisissue27andceasednegotiationsinJuly2009.When

theytookupnegotiationsagaininAugust,theywerehighlypressedfortimetointroducethere‐

forminJanuary2010andagainstthisbackgroundagreedonamergerofbothformerproposals.

The timepressure seems tohavepromotedaquickcompromise solutionand the reformcame

intoeffect inJanuary2010.Whilenegotiatedathightimesof theeconomiccrisis, thiswasvery

rarelyreferredtointhepolicyprocessofthisrathercost‐intensivereform.

Righttothecontrary,the15a‐agreementonintroducingacompulsorylastpre‐schoolyear

freeofchargewaspartofthestimuluspackageagainsttheeconomiccrisis.Theideaitself,how‐

ever,was older: After SPÖ‐chairmanGusenbauer had already produced it in 2004, the SPÖde‐ 26After2008elections,anewFederalMinistryforEconomy,WomenandYouthwasfounded.Undereco‐nomicsministerMitterlehner,ChristineMarekwasresponsibleforfamilyissuesasastatesecretary.27MareksuggestedgrantingtwopartnermonthsineachKBG‐variantonlytothosesingleparents,whosepartneriscriticallyill,deceased,inprisonorgotviolent.Infaceofthis,Heinisch‐Hoseksuggestedtograntthemtoallsingleparentswithaformerincomeoflessthan1200Euros,withoutanyfurtherinspection.

FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 15

mandeditwithinthenegotiationsofthe15a‐agreement(2008),butitwasrefusedbytheÖVPand

laternotincluded.Thenintherun‐uptothe2008elections,theÖVP‘captured’thisdemandfrom

theSPÖ–fishingforvotesandcarriedbythethreateningeconomiccrisis.FromMarch2009,Ma‐

rekwasnegotiatingwiththeLänderrepresentativesonhowtodistributethefederalfundsof70

millionEurosforeach2009/2010and2010/2011andontheconcretedetailsoftheobligatorykin‐

dergarten‐visit.TheagreementofApril2009wasthatchildrenhadtovisitthekindergartenforat

least 16hoursandat least fourdaysaweek,while theycould takeaholidayof threeweeksat

most (other than general kindergarten holidays). From autumn 2009, the obligatory last pre‐

schoolyearcameintoeffect.

The two reforms show how cost‐intensive measures were introduced during the eco‐

nomiccrisis,but in the firstphaseof stimuluspackages.Richardson (2010:506) finds inaEuro‐

pean‐comparativestudythatthereisnoevidenceofabroadausterityapproachinAustrianfamily

policies,asopposede.g.toEstonia,FranceorHungary,allofwhichcutbackmeasuresdecisively.

However,hispaperwaspublishedlate2010andconsolidationactivities,whichweredecidedonin

October2010,arepartlynotincluded.Thus,wasthereformpathenteredinAustriaquitormodi‐

fiedinthesecondstageofausteritypackages?

Indeed,whenSPÖandÖVPleakedtheirplansforthebudgetaryframework2011to2014in

May2010,itbecameclearthatharshausteritymeasureswereplannedforfamilypolicies,i.e.sav‐

ings of about 235million Euroswere discussed for 2011 (Standard, 24.5.2010).Next to the eco‐

nomiccrisis,thiswasalsoferriedbythehighlevelofdebtofthefamilyfund(FLAF).28Manyactors

werearguingfortheseausteritymeasuresbypointingtothefamilypolicychangesconductedin

theprecedingyears,e.g.arepresentativeoftheFederationofAustrianIndustriesstated:

Today,thereareanumberofbenefits,whicharerarelydrawnon,butwhichaccumulatedupto8.5billionEurosjustfor2008.Weachievetoolittlewiththesepublicexpenditure.Neitherisfertilityin‐creasing,norwomen’sparticipationinthelabourmarkettoasignificantextent.Ialsodoubtthattheyenhancewellbeing.(Standard,1.8.2010;owntranslation)

Thatis,hereferredtothetargetingoffamilypoliciesandtriedtolegitimatesavingmeasuresby

arguingthatbenefits in‐kindwereneeded,not in‐cash. InOctober2010,thegoverningSPÖund

ÖVPfixedthebudgetaryplansandthefearsofoppositionpartiesaswellaswelfareandfamily

organisationswereevenexceeded:Notonly235,buteven350millionEurosshouldbecutdown

onfamilypoliciesin2011,e.g.byrestrictingfamilyallowancestothe24thageofthechild(before:

26th)andabolishingtheadditional13thfamilyallowance,whichhadonlybeenintroducedin2008

(before theelections).Thenagain,policy‐makersargued thatpartsof thesavingsshouldbe in‐

28OutoftheFLAF,whichrestsonemployees’andemployers’contributions,familybenefitsarefinanced.ForecastsshowedthatitsdebtswouldreachfourbillionEurosbytheendof2010(Standard,24.5.2010).

FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 16

vestedinafurtherexpansionofchildcarefacilities.Inthefollowingweeks,however,particularly

students were demonstrating massively against the cutbacks, and gradually, also opposition

withinthegoverningpartieswasrising.

Againstthatbackground,theministerforwomen,Heinisch‐Hosek,andtheeconomicmin‐

ister,Mitterlehner, suggested to re‐negotiate thebudget inNovember 2010.At the same time,

Mitterlehnerarguedthatashiftfromin‐cashtoin‐kindbenefitswasnecessary:“Thecostsofour

systembearnorelationtoitsresults.Ourfamilypolicy,whichfocusesprimarilyoncashbenefits,

broughtaboutaverylowfertilityrate”(Standard,6.11.2010;owntranslation).Followingameet‐

ingwith familyorganisations inmid‐November, thegovernmentundertook someminor correc‐

tionsoftheausterityprogramme.29Thecriticsoftheausterityplanwerenotsatisfiedwiththese

marginalchanges,but thebudgetcame intoeffect inJanuary2011.All inall, this showsthatal‐

though families had to experience hard savingmeasureswith the austerity package, it did not

quitwith the family policy reformpath initiated before, but rather took the economic crisis to

legitimatetheabolishmentofin‐cashbenefits,whichwereincreasinglyregardedasnon‐efficient.

4.Conclusions

In the introduction, it was argued that there were grounds to expect either in the post‐crisis

familyreformsinGermanyandAustria:Cutbacksinthecontextofausterityprogrammes,orthe

crisis to be taken as a window of opportunity to invest into policies against new social risks.

Studyingthemainreformsintroducedinbothcountriesbeforeandafterthecrisis,actuallyboth

wastobefound.Especially inAustria,cost‐intensivefamilypolicieswereintroducedinthepost‐

crisisera,namelythe income‐dependentversionofthechildcarebenefit(Kinderbetreuungsgeld)

andthe15a‐agreementto introduceacompulsory lastpre‐schoolyearfreeofcharge.The latter

wasanexplicitpartof theeconomicstimuluspackage.Ashort time later,bothcountries intro‐

ducedharshsavingmeasuresinfamilypolicies.InGermany,theminimumamountoftheparental

benefit (Elterngeld)was abolished for formerly non‐employed parents and the income replace‐

mentwas reducedfrom67to65percent forhigh‐incomeearners. InAustria,not less than350

millionEuroswere cutdownon familypolicies in 2011, abolishing the 13th family allowanceand

restrictingittothe24th(insteadof26th)birthdayofthechild.

Asking, however, to what extent the post‐crisis reforms broke with the rather cost‐

intensivereformpathtowardsre‐commodificationandde‐familialisation,itwasshownthatthey

rathercontinuedwithit.InGermany,familyministerSchröderarguedforthecutbacksbycharac‐

terisingtheminimumamountforformerlynon‐employedparentsdetrimentaltothesystem.She

29Theydecidedthatthelimitationofthefamilyallowancetothe24thageofthechildshouldonlybeintro‐duced inJulyandnot inJanuary2011andthatexceptionsbe introduced(e.g. foryoungpeople,whodidcivilianserviceorwhosestudyprogrammeisofsurpassinglength).

FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 17

alsostatedthatitwastooclosetotheincomefrompaidemployment,thusloweringincentivesto

work–anargumentationclearlytargetingtowardsre‐commodification.InAustria,notonlywere

theincome‐dependentKBGandthe15a‐agreementintroducedafterthecrisis.Alsodide.g.family

ministerMitterlehnertrytolegitimatethecutbacksbythecrisis,arguingthatintimesofausterity

Austrianfamilypoliciescouldnolongeraffordtospendmoneyonnon‐efficientcashbenefits.

Table2:Temporaldimensionsandparametersinthereforms

Dimension Parameters Examplesfromthereforms• Legislativeperiods Elterngeld,eKBGPoliticaltime• Legislativetimerules(e.g.

fixedtimelimits)eKBG

• Tempo KiföG(goingpublic)• Timing 15a‐2009;Pflegezeit

Temporaldynamics

• Sequence KBG2008(salamitactics)

Temporalmoments • Serendipity KiföGSource:Ownlisting

Thefocusonpre‐andpostcrisisreformsputattentiontothetimingofthereformsandtotempo‐

ralfactorsassuch,whichwerethentakenasananalyticallensinstudyingthereformprocesses.

Itwasshownhowthecrisiscontextmattered,butthattemporalfactorsinfluencedthereforms

invariousregards,attributabletothethree identifieddimensionsofpolitical time,temporaldy‐

namics and temporal moments. Table 2 summarises the respective findings. For instance, the

brought‐forwardelectionsof2008openedawindowofopportunityfortheeKBG,whosepolicy

formulationwastheninfluencedbytimepressuresofthelegislativeprocess–bothonthepoliti‐

cal‐timedimension.TheKiföGwassupportedbytheacceleratedpolicyprocess(followingfamily

ministervonderLeyen’sgoing‐public‐strategy),whichcanbeattributedtothetemporaldynam‐

ics.ItwasfurtherenabledbytheserendipityoffinanceministerSteinbrück’sunexpectedreturns

offourbillionEuros,andthusbyatemporalmoment.

Comingtoconclusions,timeinitsdifferentdimensionshasturnedoutasarelevantfactor

in the family policy reform processes in Germany and Austria. Indeed, as Schedler and Santiso

(1998)argued,itissurprisinghowlittlesystematicnoticetothetimefactorhasbeenpaidwithin

politicalscience.Especiallyforpolicy‐analyticalstudies,e.g.thoseinterestedinthepolicy‐making

process, focusing studies on timewith its different facets like temporal dynamics (e.g. timing,

sequence)couldmakeanimportantcontribution.

FamilyPolicyReformsinGermanyandAustriaandTheirPost‐crisisAmendments 18

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AppendixTable3:GDPgrowthratesinpercentagechangeonpreviousyeargeo\time 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

EU27 2,5 2 3,3 3 0,5 ‐4,3 1,8 1,8 f

EU15 2,4 1,8 3,1 2,7 0,2 ‐4,3 1,8 1,7 fBelgium 3,2 1,7 2,7 2,9 1 ‐2,8 2,2 2,4 f

Bulgaria 6,7 6,4 6,5 6,4 6,2 ‐5,5 0,2 2,8 fCzechRepublic 4,5 6,3 6,8 6,1 2,5 ‐4,1 2,3 2 f

Denmark 2,3 2,4 3,4 1,6 ‐1,1 ‐5,2 1,7 1,7 fGermany 1,2 0,8 3,4 2,7 1 ‐4,7 3,6 2,6 f

Estonia 7,2 9,4 10,6 6,9 ‐5,1 ‐13,9 3,1 4,9 fIreland 4,6 6 5,3 5,6 ‐3,5 ‐7,6 ‐1 0,6 f

Greece 4,4 p 2,3 p 5,2 p 4,3 p 1 p ‐2 p ‐4,5 p ‐3,5 fSpain 3,3 3,6 4 3,6 0,9 ‐3,7 ‐0,1 0,8 f

France 2,5 1,8 2,5 2,3 ‐0,1 ‐2,7 1,5 1,8 fItaly 1,5 0,7 2 1,5 ‐1,3 ‐5,2 1,3 1 f

Cyprus 4,2 3,9 4,1 5,1 3,6 ‐1,7 1 1,5 fLatvia 8,7 10,6 12,2 10 ‐4,2 ‐18 ‐0,3 3,3 f

Lithuania 7,4 7,8 7,8 9,8 2,9 ‐14,7 1,3 5 fLuxembourg 4,4 5,4 5 6,6 1,4 ‐3,6 3,5 3,4 f

Hungary 4,5 3,2 3,6 0,8 0,8 ‐6,7 1,2 2,7 fMalta 1,8 4,2 1,9 4,6 5,4 ‐3,3 3,2 2 f

Netherlands 2,2 2 3,4 3,9 1,9 ‐3,9 1,8 1,9 fAustria 2,5 2,5 3,6 3,7 2,2 ‐3,9 2,1 2,4 f

Poland 5,3 3,6 6,2 6,8 5,1 1,7 3,8 4 fPortugal 1,6 0,8 1,4 2,4 0 ‐2,5 1,3 ‐2,2 f

Romania 8,5 4,2 7,9 6,3 7,3 ‐7,1 ‐1,3 1,5 fSlovenia 4,4 4 5,8 6,8 3,7 ‐8,1 1,2 1,9 f

Slovakia 5,1 6,7 8,5 10,5 5,8 ‐4,8 4 3,5 fFinland 4,1 2,9 4,4 5,3 0,9 ‐8,2 3,1 3,7 f

Sweden 4,2 3,2 4,3 3,3 ‐0,6 ‐5,3 5,7 4,2 fUnitedKingdom 3 2,2 2,8 2,7 ‐0,1 ‐4,9 1,4 1,7 f

Iceland 7,7 7,5 4,6 6 1,4 ‐6,9 ‐3,5 1,5 fNorway 3,9 2,7 2,3 2,7 0,7 ‐1,7 0,3 2,7 f

Switzerland 2,5 2,6 3,6 3,6 2,1 ‐1,9 2,6 1,9 fUnitedStates 3,6 3,1 2,7 1,9 0 ‐2,6 2,9 2,6 f

Japan 2,7 1,9 2 2,4 ‐1,2 ‐6,3 4 0,5 f:=Notavailablef=Forecastb=Breakinseriesp=ProvisionalvalueSource:Eurostat