/ 17Rosen: Europe-Arab Lobby

In the early 1980s, there was a palpable concern among staffers at the AmericanIsrael Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) of the looming rise of an Arab-Americanlobby aimed at challenging the pro-Israel community. The National Association of

Arab-Americans (NAAA), founded in 1972, was at a high point, and in 1980, formerU.S. senator James Abourezk established the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Com-mittee (ADC). In 1985, James Zogby added the Arab American Institute. Some punditspredicted that AIPAC had finally met its match, and a few of AIPAC’s own top sup-porters were alarmed. The Arab-American lobby looked as if it was on an upwardtrajectory.

Steven J. Rosen served for twenty-three yearsas a senior official of the American Israel PublicAffairs Committee. He is now director of the Wash-ington Project of the Middle East Forum.

AN ARAB-AMERICAN LOBBY?

However, attempts to mobilize Americans ofArab origin in a crusade against Israel have beenlimited by the fact that this agenda is not a criti-cal interest for the majority. About two thirds ofArab Americans (63 percent) derive from Chris-tian minorities in the Middle East, who have suf-fered at the hands of extremist Arab-nationalistand Muslim groups in their home countries. Morethan half of all Arab Americans are Lebanese andSyrian Christians, who know the damage doneto Lebanon by Syrian Baathists, Palestinian ter-rorists, and the Shiite Hezbollah.1 A third of allArab Americans are Maronite Christians and are

more faithfully represented by organizationssuch as the American Lebanese League, devotedto saving Lebanon from Arab extremists, ratherthan organizations crusading against Israel orsupporting the Palestine Liberation Organiza-tion (PLO). Only a minority of Arab Americans,then and now, seeks to support organizationswhose sole or main purpose is conducting po-litical action against Israel; and some of thosewho are attracted to the anti-Israel agenda areso radical that such organizations do not wantthem.

The largest Arab-American group, theAmerican-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee(ADC), attracts recruits by combating anti-Arabbias and stereotyping inside the United States,a cause understandably closer to the hearts ofmany mainstream Arab-American families than

1 “Arab Americans,” US4Arabs.com, accessed Aug. 16, 2010;“Arab Americans,” Arab American Institute, accessed Aug. 16,2010.

The Arab LobbyThe European Componentby Steven J. Rosen

18 / MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY FALL 2010

importing into the United States the struggleagainst Israel that brought so much misery intheir countries of origin. The National Associa-tion of Arab-Americans, which focused on theIsrael agenda, has ceased to exist altogethersince it merged into ADC in 2001.2 Today, Arab-American organizations are a factor in the MiddleEast debate but certainly have not risen to alevel that can challenge the influence of theAmerican friends of Israel.

A PETRODOLLAR LOBBY?

Another issue that raised concern in thepro-Israel community in the 1980s was the growthof a “petrodollar lobby” in the United States,fueled by the giant oil companies and embas-sies of Middle East countries such as SaudiArabia, awash in a flood of money since the Or-ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC) quadrupled oil prices in the 1970s. AIPACfounder Isaiah Kenen had described the Arablobby as a “petro diplomatic complex.”3 StevenEmerson wrote about the petrodollar lobby inhis 1985 best-seller, The American House ofSaud, revealing how Arab embassies and firms

that seek Arab contractsemploy prominent U.S.figures such as formerSenate Foreign Rela-tions Committee chair-man William Fulbright,former White House aideFrederick G. Dutton,former secretary of thetreasury William Simon,former Texas governor

John Connally, former budget director Bert Lance,and former vice president Spiro Agnew.

Yet it is difficult to see significant evidenceof the impact of the petrodollar lobby in the Arab-Israeli sphere or any major effort on their part tointerfere in the bilateral relationship between the

United States and Israel. Oil firms, Arab embas-sies, and their lobbyists do have considerableinfluence in the sphere of energy policy, and onsome Persian Gulf issues, including arms salesto Arab gulf states.4 But their main focus is onthe rich and comparatively moderate Arab coun-tries, not Israel’s less prosperous neighbors suchas Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the Pales-tinians.5 And they have shown no signs of seek-ing to do battle against AIPAC and the friendsof Israel. In fact, on a few select projects (nota-bly Turkey policy and the Baku-Ceyhan Caspianpipeline), AIPAC and their interests have alignedand the two lobbies have in fact cooperated witheach other. Even when they differed, as on Iran,it was a clash of interests about economic sanc-tions rather than an ideological dispute aboutIran itself.

EUROPE AS THE REAL ARAB LOBBY

Long experience in Washington leads to adifferent and somewhat surprising conclusion.The strongest external force pressuring the U.S.government to distance itself from Israel is notthe Arab-American organizations, the Arab em-bassies, the oil companies, or the petrodollarlobby. Rather, it is the Europeans, especially theBritish, French, and Germans, that are the mostinfluential Arab lobby to the U.S. government.The Arabs know this, so their preferred road toWashington often runs through Brussels orLondon or Paris. Nabil Shaath, then PalestinianAuthority “foreign minister,” said in 2004 that theEuropean Union is “the ally of our choice.”6 TheArabs consider Europe to be the soft underbellyof the U.S. alliance with Israel and the best way todrive a wedge between the two historic allies.

The Europeans are particularly formidablein their influence over U.S. Middle East policybecause of four advantages. First, although there

2 “Press Statement on ADC NAAA Merger,” Arab-AmericanAnti-Discrimination Committee, Dec. 29, 1999.3 Isaiah Kenen, The Jewish Digest, Dec. 1975.

4 Steven Emerson, The American House of Saud (New York:Franklin Watts, 1985).5 Ibid.6 Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv), Jan. 9, 2004; Reuters, Jan. 9, 2004.

The Arabsconsider Europeto be the softunderbelly ofthe U.S. alliancewith Israel.

/ 19

exist subtle differences, many Euro-pean leaders share a broad set ofcommon beliefs about Israel, the Pal-estinians, the Arab world, and theMiddle East conflict that are con-siderably closer to the Arab per-spective than to Jerusalem’s pointof view, and closer to the Arab endof the spectrum than the prevailingviews of U.S. policymakers.

Second, they—especially rep-resentatives of Britain, Germany, andFrance—have easier and closer ac-cess to U.S. officials up to and in-cluding the president than do eitherthe Arabs or the Israelis.

Third, the Europeans couchtheir presentations within a widerframework of shared values and in-terests and mutual trust with theUnited States, so the message istaken more seriously than if it camefrom an unelected leader of an Arabsociety vastly different from the United States.

Fourth, U.S. officials believe that it is in thenational interest to keep the European allies happy,lest they change to an independent Europeanpolicy toward the Middle East, falling under thesway of such Europeanists as former EuropeanUnion commissioner for external affairs Christo-pher Patten. Thus, for example, Patten said in July2010, “The default European position should notbe … if the Americans don’t do anything, to wringour hands. We should … be more explicit in set-ting out Europe’s objectives and … try to imple-ment them.”7

The direct access to the president that is avail-able to the prime minister of the U.K., the presi-dent of France, and the chancellor of Germanyhas less to do with the personal chemistry thatmay exist between them and any given U.S. presi-dent than with the objective importance of theircountries to the United States. Britain, France, andGermany are three of the top six economies in theworld and three of the top six military powers, as

ranked by defense expenditures.8 Two of them—France and Britain—are among the five perma-nent members of the U.N. Security Council whohold the power to veto. The same two are amongthe world’s leading nuclear powers. Four Euro-pean countries—France, Germany, Britain, andItaly—sit among the Group of Eight (G8), a forumalso including the United States, Canada, Russia,and Japan. The British, French, and German gov-ernments have the greatest influence over the for-eign policy of the European Union and the great-est influence over Europe’s voice in the MiddleEast Quartet (which consists of the United States,the EU, Russia, and the U.N.).

The United States also has a longer anddeeper history of shared values and commoninterests with the major European countries, andfewer conflicting interests, than with Russia,China, or any Arab nation. For sixty-five years,Britain, France, and Germany have been our keyallies in the United States’ principal military and

Rosen: Europe-Arab Lobby

Europe’s foreign policy chief Javier Solana (left) meetswith Palestinian Authority president-elect MahmoudAbbas, Ramallah, January 10, 2005, the morning afterAbbas’s election. Solana has tirelessly promoted thePalestinian agenda regardless of the flagrant violationof signed agreements.

7 The Guardian (London), July 18, 2010.8 “Military Defense Spending and Budgets by Country,”GlobalFirepower.com, accessed Aug. 16, 2010.

20 / MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY FALL 2010

political alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Or-ganization (NATO). Their opinions are stated ina moderate tone and are deemed to be more rea-sonable than the majority of Arab countries.There is a presumption on both sides that theyare America’s principal partners, the ones whoseinterests Washington must always take into ac-count, and who can be expected to give greaterdeference to America’s own needs.

This presumption of shared interests alsogives European counterparts privileged accessand enhanced credibility with senior membersof the U.S. bureaucracy at the National SecurityCouncil, the Department of State, the Pentagon,and within the intelligence community and otheragencies. Assistant secretaries, office directors,and senior advisers give special weight to theopinions of their French, German, and Britishcounterparts and spend more time with them thanthey do with the Arabs. These Europeans alsohave easy access to members of Congress andtheir senior staffs.

1,000 LOBBYISTS VS. ONE LONELY GUY

A dramatic example of how European inter-vention can drive a wedge between the UnitedStates and Israel occurred nearly twenty years

ago in the sharp confrontation be-tween President George H.W. Bushand Jerusalem. The untold story aboutthis was the role of a European leader,British prime minister John Major, inprovoking what may have been theworst episode ever to occur betweena U.S. president and the governmentof Israel. It was a famous clash butone that might well not have oc-curred but for the European leader’sintervention.9

The Kuwait war had just ended in1991, and President Bush announcedon March 6 his intention to convenean international conference on peacein the Middle East.10 At the same time,the Soviet Union was in its final stagesof collapse, and Soviet Jews who had

been prevented from emigrating were flooding out.More than 200,000 had already arrived in Israel,and a tidal wave of more than one million wasexpected to follow imminently. Israel faced gravechallenges to absorb such an enormous influx,equal to 20 percent of its existing population. OnMay 5, 1991, the Israeli ambassador to the UnitedStates, Zalman Shoval, announced that Israelwould soon ask Washington for $10 billion in loanguarantees to help provide housing for one mil-lion Soviet immigrants expected to arrive duringthe next five years.11

The Palestinians feared that the new immi-grants would settle in the disputed territories.12

President Bush and his secretary of state, JamesA. Baker, declared that if any new loan guaran-tees were to be granted they would have to belinked to a commitment by Israel not to use themoney in the territories.13 A mechanism would

In August 1991, British prime minister John Major(right) visited George H.W. Bush (left) at the Bushfamily summer home in Maine where he persuadedthe president to withhold loan guarantees from Israelin order “to give peace a chance.”

9 Donald Neff, “Israel Requests $10 Billion in U.S. LoanGuarantees for Soviet Immigrants,” Washington Report on MiddleEast Affairs, Apr./May 1995, pp. 79-80.10 George H.W. Bush, address before joint session of Con-gress, Mar. 6, 1991.11 Neff, “Israel Requests $10 Billion.”12 The New York Times, Jan. 31, 1990.13 Neff, “Israel Requests $10 Billion”; The Christian ScienceMonitor, Jan. 11, 2010.

/ 21

have to be found to ensure that the loan guaran-tees would not be used to support settlementactivity, lest the international conference an-nounced by the president be undermined.

To permit time to find a formula, Prime Min-ister Yitzhak Shamir agreed to delay Israel’s offi-cial request for the loan guarantees for threemonths until September 6.14 During the summerof 1991, Secretary Baker made numerous trips tothe region, looking for a way to avoid a collisionbetween the loan guarantees and the peace pro-cess.15 A few AIPAC colleagues and I were in-volved in some of the behind-the-scenes nego-tiations, conducted primarily by ElyakimRubinstein, the Israeli government secretary,Secretary Baker and his staff, and Senator Rob-ert Kasten, Jr. (Republican of Wisconsin) onbehalf of pro-Israel members of Congress, andAmbassador Shoval.

By mid-August, we were relieved to learn,via communication with Baker and his staff, thata solution acceptable to Washington had beendevised. The president had not yet approved it,but Baker was confident that he had a formulathat would be acceptable to all sides. For AIPAC,this was a matter of paramount importance be-cause it affected the fate of a million imperiledJews, a historic effort to initiate a peace process,and the bilateral relationship between Israel andits most important ally.

George H.W. Bush was vacationing at hisfamily’s summer home in Kennebunkport, Maine,in late August 1991 when British prime ministerJohn Major and his wife Norma visited. It wasthe kind of informal quality time directly with thepresident, unmediated by aides and advisers,that makes European leaders so influential onissues like the Middle East. Major had just toldthe Egyptian press that Israeli settlements, in-cluding those in East Jerusalem, were “illegal”and “damaging” to the peace process, and he

wanted Bush to stand up to Israel.16 Baker waspressing the president to compromise, but theBritish leader urged him to take an absolutestand.

Bush returned from Kennebunkport with hismind changed according to subsequent reportsfrom U.S. officials. To Baker’s surprise, the presi-dent rejected the package of assurances the sec-retary had carefully assembled and decided tothrow down the gauntlet to Israel and its sup-porters. On September 6, 1991, he asked Con-gress for a 120-day delay on the loan guaran-tees “to give peace a chance.”17

Six days later, Bush went a step further. OnSeptember 12, more than 1,000 Jewish leadersfrom around the country descended on CapitolHill to lobby lawmakers for the loan guarantees.President Bush responded by calling a news con-ference the same day to warn that he would vetoloan guarantees if Congress insisted on approv-ing them despite his plea for a 120-day delay. Healso criticized the pro-Israeli lobbyists, saying,

We’re up against very strong and effective …groups that go up to the Hill … There weresomething like a thou-sand lobbyists on theHill working the otherside of the question.We’ve got one littleguy down here doingit. … The Constitutioncharges the presidentwith the conduct of thenation’s foreign policy… There is an attemptby some in Congress toprevent the presidentfrom taking steps cen-tral to the nation’s se-curity. But too much is at stake for domesticpolitics to take precedence over peace.18

Asked what was the lowest point in the his-

Rosen: Europe-Arab Lobby

14 Leon T. Hadar, “Showdown at the Settlements Corral: CanObama Remake the Bush-Baker Classic?” Foreign Policy, Mar.25, 2010.15 “The Arab-Israeli Peace Process Progress Report - 8 Apr.1992,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, Apr. 8,1992.

16 “Al-Aqsa Intifada,” The Jerusalem Forum, Amman, ac-cessed Aug. 16, 2010.17 Los Angeles Times, Sept. 7, 1991.18 Neff, “Israel Requests $10 Billion.”

The presumptionof sharedinterests givesEuropeansprivileged accesswith membersof the U.S.bureaucracy.

22 / MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY FALL 2010

tory of U.S.-Israel relations, many experts wouldpick this clash over the loan guarantees.19 It was,at the very least, one of the most serious set-

backs in the relationship.But the role of a Britishprime minister in undoingmonths of effort by themediators and instigat-ing the clash has neverbeen exposed until now.It is an example of theway a key European caninteract with the highest

decision-maker in the United States and movehim toward the Arab point of view and awayfrom Israel.

EUROPE IS CLOSER TO THE ARABS

This kind of European influence is difficultto track because it occurs behind-the-scenes,invisible to the public. It covers a wide range ofMiddle East issues: pushing Washington topressure the Israelis to make concessions to thePalestinians; urging engagement with terroristorganizations such as Hamas on the theory thatit will moderate them; getting Washington to re-strain Israeli security measures such as the“fence,” targeted killings, the blockade of Gaza,and allegedly excessive use of force; and pro-voking intensified opposition to Israeli settle-ment activity, especially in Jerusalem.

There are many suppositions why Europe-ans tilt against Israel and toward the Arabs. Forone thing, the Middle East is a place where Eu-ropeans can flaunt their foreign policy indepen-dence from the United States without responsi-bility for causing catastrophic results becausethey assume that the United States will protectIsrael from any dire consequences such may pro-duce. For another, Europe depends more heavilyon trade with the Arab world and on Arab oilexports than does the United States.

For example, the Arab gulf states are a $300billion import market for world products,20 com-pared to Israel’s $50 billion imports.21 Europemay also have a desire to appease the “stronghorse” in the region (e.g., Israel has but one votein the U.N.; the Arabs have twenty-five votes,the Muslim nations, fifty votes). Then there isthe guilt among many Europeans over their dis-credited imperial past, leading them to falselyview Israelis as oppressing Third World peoples.Then, again, it may be the growing influence ofEurope’s own Muslim populations (e.g., Arabsin France, Turks in Germany, South Asians inBritain) and their need to keep such segments oftheir domestic populations as quiescent as pos-sible. Some analysts suggest that there may alsobe an element of satisfaction at being free tocensure Jews in Israel, relieving European guiltover responsibility for the Holocaust. Finally, itmay be that the Europeans simply do not under-stand that Israel is a democracy at war, living ina mortally dangerous neighborhood, whichmust act in self-defense in ways that may seemexcessive to onlookers in a benign environ-ment such as twenty-first-century westernEurope (even though the Western democra-cies and the United States have used harshermeans than Israel in wars far removed from theirown territory).

DEADLINES FOR A PALESTINIAN STATE

One of the things the Europeans want fromWashington is intensified pressure on Jerusa-lem to make concessions in peace negotiations,in order to get an agreement with the Palestin-ians. Europeans like the idea of deadlines, inter-national conferences, verbal and economic pres-sure on Israel, and other devices, to dislodgethe Israeli government from what they tend tosee as its “intransigence.”

19 Foreign Policy, Mar. 25, 2010.

Europe dependsmore heavily onArab trade and oilthan does theUnited States.

20 “GCC: Trade in Goods,” Europa, European Union, Brus-sels, accessed Aug. 19, 2010.21 “Middle East: Israel, Economy,” 2010 World Fact Book,U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, McLean, Va., Aug. 3, 2010.

/ 23

For example, in 2002, the Europeanshatched the idea of a “road map” with dead-lines for the creation of a Palestinian state toforce Israeli-Palestinian negotiations to aconclusion. On September 17, 2002, Euro-pean officials presented a plan to Washing-ton that they had drafted with Palestinianparticipation and endorsement.22 Jerusalemstrenuously objected to deadlines that ig-nored Palestinian noncompliance with pastsigned obligations, and U.S. officials ex-pressed reservations about the European ap-proach because the blueprint was too de-tailed at too early a stage.23 But Secretary ofState Colin Powell, nonetheless, joined theEU, the secretary general of the United Na-tions, and Russian foreign minister IgorIvanov in signing the Quartet statement an-nouncing “a concrete, three-phase imple-mentation road map that could achieve a fi-nal settlement within three years.”24 German for-eign ministry spokesman Andreas Michaelis saidthat the content of the Quartet pact was “nearlyidentical” to proposals put forward by EU for-eign ministers.25 EU Middle East envoy MiguelAngel Moratinos said it was “a European ideaand not an American idea.”26 It was a vehicle forEuropean and U.S. pressure on Israel.

Washington was able to condition the roadmap deadlines, however, by insisting that theplan be “performance based.” While the roadmap announced “clear phases, timelines, targetdates, and benchmarks,”27 the Bush adminis-tration forced the Quartet partners to agree that

progress between the three phases wouldbe strictly based on the parties’ compli-

ance with specific performance benchmarksto be monitored and assessed by the Quar-tet … Progress … will be based upon theconsensus judgment of the Quartet ofwhether conditions are appropriate to pro-ceed, taking into account performance ofboth parties.28

However, by 2010, the road map has stillnot produced a Palestinian state, and the Euro-peans are again growing impatient about theslow pace of negotiations. European leaders arebeginning to revert to their original concept ofdeadlines and a date certain to force an earlierresult. In July 2009, Europe’s foreign policy chiefJavier Solana called for the U.N. Security Coun-cil to recognize a Palestinian state by a certaindeadline even if Israelis and Palestinians hadfailed to agree among themselves:

After a fixed deadline, a UN Security Councilresolution should proclaim the adoption ofthe two-state solution ... set a calendar forimplementation ... [and] accept the Palestin-ian state as a full member of the UN ... If the

Rosen: Europe-Arab Lobby

French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner roderoughshod over Israel’s political and securitysensibilities by suggesting that the internationalcommunity recognize a Palestinian state evenwithout an agreed border and urging Hamas’sparticipation in the negotiations.

22 Reuters, Sept. 17, 2002.23 Ha’aretz, Sept. 18, 2002.24 “Quartet Roadmap to Israeli-Palestinian Peace,” MidEastWeb, Rehovot, Sept. 17, 2003.25 Agence France-Presse, Sept. 18, 2002.26 “Chronological Review of Events Relating to the Questionof Palestine, November 2002,” United Nations Information Sys-tem on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL), New York, ac-cessed Aug. 16, 2010.27 “Quartet Roadmap to Israeli-Palestinian Peace,” MidEastWeb, Rehovot, Apr. 30, 2003.

28 “Quartet Statement on the Middle East,” European Union@ United Nations, European Commission, Sept. 17, 2002.

24 / MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY FALL 2010

parties are not able to stick to it [the time-table], then a solution backed by the interna-tional community should be put on the table.29

Solana’s plan is a classic example of the pres-sure paradigm: Frustrated by the slow pace ofdirect negotiations between the parties, the worldpowers seek to dictate a final status outcome,especially to Israel.

French foreign minister Bernard Kouchnermoved in the same direction in February 2010:“One can imagine a Palestinian state being ...recognized by the international community, evenbefore negotiating its borders. I would betempted by that.”30 Kouchner and his Spanishcounterpart Moratinos wrote that the EuropeanUnion “must not confine itself to the … outlinesof the final settlement;” it “should collectivelyrecognize the Palestinian State ... There is no

more time to lose. Europemust pave the way.”31

The EU as a wholehas not gone this far yet.In November 2009, thePalestinians formallyasked the EU to urge theU.N. Security Council torecognize a unilaterallydeclared state,32 only tobe told that conditionswere not yet ripe for such

a move.33 But in March 2010, under EU pres-sure, the Quartet set a 24-month deadline forfinal settlement of the conflict and the creationof an independent Palestinian state.34 Kouchnersaid: “France supports the creation of a viable,independent, democratic Palestinian state ... bythe first quarter of 2012.”35

ENGAGEMENT WITH TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

Another persistent theme of Europeanpolicy is pressure on U.S. administrations toengage with terrorist organizations on thetheory that such engagement will moderatetheir behavior.

The PLO: For years, the U.S. governmenthad a strict policy of not negotiating with thePLO until it renounced terror. The Ford adminis-tration affirmed it in writing in 1975: The UnitedStates “will not recognize or negotiate with thePLO so long as the PLO does not recognizeIsrael’s right to exist and does not accept U.N.Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.”36 In1985, President Reagan signed it into law.37 InNovember 1988, Yasser Arafat finally bowed tothe U.S. conditions and renounced armedstruggle, and Reagan authorized the first con-tacts between U.S. officials and the PLO.38

The Europeans never accepted the idea thatrecognition of the PLO should be conditioned onit renouncing terror and accepting Israel’s rightto exist. Fully eight years before Arafat seeminglyrenounced terror and recognized Israel, the Euro-pean Economic Community, including the gov-ernments of Britain, France, and Germany, warnedWashington in the 1980 Venice declaration, thatthe PLO had to “be associated with [peace] ne-gotiations ... to exercise fully [the Palestinian] rightto self-determination.”39 Throughout the periodthat U.S. administrations shunned the PLO as aform of pressure to induce it to renounce terror,European leaders condoned contact with the or-ganization and various forms of recognition andtried to move the U.S. policy.40

29 Reuters, July 12, 2009.30 Ibid., Feb. 21, 2010.31 Bernard Kouchner and Miguel Angel Moratinos, “A Pales-tinian State: When?” Le Monde (Paris), Feb. 23, 2010.32 The Guardian, Nov. 16, 2009.33 Voice of America, Nov. 12, 2009.34 “Statement by Middle East Quartet,” U.N. Secretary Gen-eral, New York, Mar. 19, 2010.35 Palestine Note (Washington, D.C.), July 27, 2010.

Several Europeancountries havetold Washingtonthat Hezbollahis a legitimateLebanesepolitical party.

36 Israel-United States Memorandum of Understanding, Con-gressional Record, Washington, D.C., Sept. 1, 1975.37 The International Security and Development CooperationAct of 1985, 22 U.S.C. 2151 note, Public Law 99-83, sect.1302, Oct. 1, 1985.38 “U.S. opens dialogue with PLO - Ronald Reagan, GeorgeShultz statements,” U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash-ington, D.C., Dec. 14, 1988.39 “Venice Declaration,” archives, The State of Israel, Jerusa-lem, June 13, 1980.

/ 25

Hezbollah: A similar tension exists to-day between European and U.S. policiestoward Hezbollah. The U.S. State Depart-ment designated Hezbollah as a foreign ter-rorist organization in 1997,41 and U.S. offi-cials have repeatedly called on EU govern-ments to implement a similar ban to allowtheir own law enforcement and intelligenceagencies to curb Hezbollah operations.42

Hezbollah’s secretary general HassanNasrallah publicly admitted that if the EUdid this, “our funding [and] moral, political,and material support will ... dry up.”43 ButEU foreign policy chief Solana claimed inJuly 2006 that the EU did not have enoughevidence to determine whether Hezbollahshould be listed as a terror organization. Two-hundred and thirteen members of Congresswrote to Solana in protest.44 In June 2009,Solana went even further and met with aHezbollah official who had been elected tothe Lebanese parliament, saying that “Hezbollahis a member of the Lebanese society.”45

Likewise, several European countries, ledby France, have told Washington that Hezbollahis a legitimate Lebanese political party with amilitary wing, not primarily a terrorist organiza-tion, as if the idea of an armed political party isnot a contradiction in terms.

In 2005, French president Jacques Chiracrebuffed a U.S. request to add Hezbollah to theEU terrorist blacklist, arguing that it is an impor-tant part of Lebanese society.46 In 2006, Italianforeign minister Massimo D’Alema said that

“apart from their well-known terrorist activities,they also have political standing and are sociallyengaged.”47 In July 2007, French foreign minis-ter Kouchner hosted a meeting that includedHezbollah in an effort to broker a Lebanese po-litical compromise, in spite of objections ex-pressed by ninety-one U.S. congressmen. AMinistry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson de-clared, “Hezbollah is an important political group[that should be] fully integrated into the politi-cal scene.”48 The spokesperson was promptedto make this statement only two years after theassassination of former Lebanese prime minis-ter Rafik al-Hariri, for which Hezbollah leaderNasrallah has stated that he expects a U.N. tri-bunal to indict members of his group,49 andtwenty-two years after the October 1983 attackon the Beirut barracks where fifty-eight Frenchparatroopers were killed,50 an act for which

Rosen: Europe-Arab Lobby

40 Rory Miller, “The PLO factor in Euro-Israeli relations,1964-1992,” Israel Affairs, Oct.-Dec. 2004, pp. 123-55, ftnt.33.41 “Hezbollah,” International Terrorist Symbols Database,accessed Aug. 17, 2010.42 “Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List,” hearing beforethe Subcommittee on Europe, Committee on Foreign Rela-tions, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., June20, 2007.43 Muriel Asseraf, “Prospects for Adding Hezbollah to the EUTerrorist List,” American Jewish Committee, New York andWashington, D.C., Oct. 1, 2007.44 Softpedia, Aug. 2, 2006; European Jewish Press (Brussels),Aug. 10, 2006.45 France 24 TV news, June 14, 2006.46 Ha’aretz, Aug. 2, 2005.

47 Egypt.com News (Cairo), Apr. 15, 2009.48 Briefing, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, July 10,2007.49 Reuters, July 22, 2010.50 Pierre Tristam, “The 1983 Attack on U.S. Marines inLebanon,” About.com, accessed Aug. 17, 2010; “23 October1983: A Blast that Still Echoes,” U.S. Naval Institute, Annapo-lis, no. 22, Oct. 2009.

Hezbollah’s secretary general Hassan Nasrallahpublicly admitted that without European Unionaid and backing,“our funding [and] moral,political, and material support will ... dry up.”

26 / MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY FALL 2010

Hezbollah leader Imad Mughniyah was indictedby a U.S. grand jury in 198551 and for which aU.S. federal judge found Hezbollah to be guiltyin 2003.52

Although the Europeans may not yet havesucceeded in getting Washington to acceptHezbollah as a legitimate political party, theyhave contributed to an environment in whichsuch a shift will be a growing temptation for U.S.leaders as Hezbollah tightens its noose aroundLebanon.

Hamas: European policy toward Hamasis somewhat differentthan its stance towardHezbollah. Under U.S.pressure, the militarywing of Hamas was puton the EU terror list inDecember 2001,53 and its“political” wing wasadded to the list in Sep-tember 2003.54 Hamas’sviolent takeover of Gazain June 2007 placed con-

flicting pressures on the Europeans. The vio-lence of the Hamas putsch, the organization’sfierce ideological doctrine, and the firing of thou-sands of Qassam rockets into Israel since theGaza takeover,55 cast doubts even among themost gullible Europeans that the organizationwas in fact evolving in a moderate direction. Butthe reality that Hamas has control over thepeople of Gaza, a population for whom manyEuropeans feel a special responsibility, rein-forces the belief that it must be deemed a part-ner, both for the delivery of humanitarian aid(even if a terrorist organization might siphon offfunds) and for political negotiations over thefuture of Gaza.

Many Europeans still believe that engage-ment with Hamas will result in a moderation ofits position; for them, the terror listing is an im-pediment. In August 2007, Italian prime ministerRomano Prodi called for dialogue with Hamas:

Hamas exists. We should not ignore this fact.It’s a complex structure that we should helpto evolve toward pro-peace positions ... Onemust push for dialogue so that it happens ...There will be no peace in the Middle East aslong as the Palestinians are split in two.56

Javier Solana, then the European Union’sforeign policy chief, said in 2006 that it was “notimpossible” for Hamas to change. “I don’t thinkthe essence of Hamas is the destruction of Is-rael. The essence of Hamas is the liberation ofthe Palestinians.”57 This idea is disputed bystatements by Hamas itself, reiterating its long-standing commitment to Israel’s destruction asa prerequisite to the establishment of an Islamicstate in the whole of Palestine.58

French foreign minister Kouchner thinksthere will not be an Israeli-Palestinian peace agree-ment without Hamas at the table. He said in Janu-ary 2009 that “we realized this long ago— thatHamas was one of the interlocutors” in the MiddleEast peace process and that “we believe we willhave to talk to them when they ... agree to startnegotiations.” A ministry spokesman said thatParis would be ready to talk to a Palestinian unitygovernment that included Hamas as long as it“respects the principle of the peace process.”59

Lord Patten, EU commissioner for externalrelations, 2000-04, says the sole condition fortalks with Hamas should be an agreement to acease-fire even if Hamas refuses to accept pastsigned agreements.60 Massimo D’Alema, Italy’sforeign minister, 2006-08, believes that Hamas ismore like the Irish Republican Army (IRA) than

51 Muhammad Sahimi, “The Fog over the 1983 Beirut At-tack,” Frontline, Public Broadcasting Service, Oct. 24, 2009.52 USA Today, May 30, 2003.53 “Freezing Funds: List of Terrorists and Terrorist Groups,”Europa, European Union, Brussels, Dec. 27, 2001.54 Journal of the European Union, C70E/140, Mar. 20, 2004.55 “The Hamas Terror War against Israel,” Israel Ministry ofForeign Affairs, accessed Aug. 17, 2010.

Europe affectedU.S. policy onIsrael’s securityfence by fundingthe NegotiationSupport Unitof the PLO.

56 European Jewish Press, Aug. 13, 2007.57 “EU’s Solana: ‘Hamas Doesn’t Want to Destroy Israel,’”Jihad Watch, Oct. 30, 2006; Israel News Agency (Jerusalem),Jan. 15, 2009.58 Reuters, Mar. 12, 2007.59 France 24 TV news, Jan. 21, 2009.60 The Guardian, July 18, 2010.

/ 27

akin to al-Qaeda.61 Sweden granteda visa to a Hamas minister in 2007,62

and the former Finnish foreign min-ister, Erkki Tuomioja, claimed thatHamas “is not the same party itwas” before it won the 2006 elec-tions.63 Benita Ferrero-Waldner, theEU’s external relations commis-sioner, 2004-09, announced that shewould review the EU ban on directaid to the Hamas-led Palestiniangovernment64 though she backedaway from this position afterHamas seized control of Gaza andarrested Fatah officials in June of2007.65

These European voices advo-cating political negotiations withHamas have not yet convinced ei-ther EU officials or Washington.The main obstacle is not Jerusalem’sobjections but reluctance to under-mine the Palestinian Authority (PA)headed by Mahmoud Abbas andSalam Fayyad. But if the “moderates” led by thesetwo slip, resistance to pressure from supportersof negotiations with Hamas may begin to erode.Many Europeans may simply not have the forti-tude for a long struggle with implacable foes andmay be easily lulled into wishful thinking thatthe West can moderate Islamic extremists simplyby talking to them.

ISRAEL’S SECURITY FENCE IS “ILLEGAL”

A third continuing theme of the Europeansis that many of the measures that Israel employsto assure its security are excessive and dispro-

portionate if not actual violations of internationallaw. This is how Europe sees Israel’s securitybarrier, its targeted killings of known terrorists,its blockade of Gaza, its campaign againstHezbollah in Lebanon, and its settlements in theWest Bank. Europeans are constantly urgingWashington to restrain Israel.

Israel’s security fence against terrorist infil-tration, under construction since 2003, hasstrong support among the Israeli public becausethe barrier has been effective in preventing sui-cide attacks. A recent public opinion poll findsthat “it is hard to find any issue in Israel aboutwhich there is so wide a consensus.”66 Whenthere was no fence, during the first three yearsafter the launch of Arafat’s al-Aqsa intifada inSeptember 2000, Israel suffered ninety-three sui-cide attacks that left 447 Israelis dead and 4,343Israeli civilians wounded. In the most recent fouryears, since most of the fence has been com-pleted, the number of attacks has declined to

Rosen: Europe-Arab Lobby

61 YNet (Tel Aviv), Aug. 29, 2006; The Irish Times (Dublin),Jan. 28, 2009.62 Rory Miller, “Why the European Union Finally SidelinedHamas,” inFocus Quarterly, Fall 2007.63 EUobserver (Brussels), Sept. 1, 2007.64 European Jewish Press, May 14, 2007.65 Miller, “Why the European Union Finally SidelinedHamas.” 66 YNet, June 7, 2007.

Israel’s security fence, which slashed Israeli terror casualtiesfrom hundreds of dead and thousands wounded in each ofthe first three years after the launch of Arafat’s terror warin September 2000 (euphemized as al-Aqsa intifada), tofewer than ten fatalities per annum in subsequent years,has been sharply criticized by the European Union.

28 / MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY FALL 2010

fewer than five a year, and the number of Israeliskilled by terrorists has averaged fewer than tenper year.67

Washington has acknowledged the impor-tance of the barrier for Israel’s security but ex-pressed concern about its route wherever it de-viates from the pre-1967 line.68 In the words ofPresident George W. Bush:

The barrier being erected by Israel as a part ofits security effort must be a security, ratherthan political, barrier. And its route shouldtake into account, consistent with securityneeds, its impact on Palestinians not engagedin terrorist activities ... It should be tempo-rary rather than permanent, and, therefore,not prejudice any final status issues, includ-ing final borders.69

The Europeans, on the other hand, havebeen unanimous and firm in opposing the con-struction of the fence since its inception. OnNovember 18, 2003, the European Council urged

Israel “to stop and re-verse the construction ofthe so-called securityfence inside the occu-pied Palestinian territo-ries, including in andaround East Jerusalem,which is in departure ofthe armistice line of1949,” adding that thefence was not only un-acceptable but also “in

contradiction to the relevant provisions of in-ternational law.”70 On July 20, 2004, all twenty-five members of the European Union voted for a

resolution in the U.N. General Assembly, opposedby the United States, demanding the barrier’sremoval.71 The European Council reiterated inits “Conclusions” of December 8, 2009, that the“separation barrier where built on occupied land[is] illegal under international law.”72

Europe affected U.S. policy on the fenceby funding a sophisticated PLO diplomatic team,the elite Palestinian unit known as the Negotia-tion Support Unit of the PLO (NSU), headed byPalestinian chief peace negotiator Saeb Erekat.The NSU is funded by Britain’s Department forInternational Development and has also re-ceived financial support from the governmentsof Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Swe-den.73 It consists of more than twenty profes-sionals who periodically lobby Washingtonpolicymakers on behalf of the PLO with the par-ticipation of Palestinian advisers including Di-ana Buttu (Canadian-Palestinian), Michael Tarazi(American-Palestinian), Omar Dajani, and AmjadAtallah. A high point in the work of the NSU wasa dramatic PowerPoint presentation on Israel’ssecurity fence given to National Security Ad-viser Condoleezza Rice by the NSU’s StephanieKoury (a Lebanese American from Texas) dur-ing a visit to the West Bank on June 28, 2003.Hours later, Rice shocked and angered membersof the Israeli cabinet when she asked them to“reconsider” the fence. Koury’s presentationcaused the Bush administration to become muchmore critical of the security fence. A few daysafter the Koury briefing, an AIPAC colleagueand I met with Rice privately and heard an unfil-tered expression of her reaction to Koury. Threeweeks later, the NSU team flew to Washingtonto make the presentation to other U.S. officialsand members of Congress.74 Rice’s anger over

67 “Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks in Israel Since theDeclaration of Principles (Sept 1993),” Israel Ministry of For-eign Affairs, Jerusalem, accessed Aug. 17, 2010.68 “U.S. Policy on the Separation Barrier and Statements fromChurch Leaders,” Churches for Middle East Peace, Washington,D.C., accessed Aug. 17, 2010.69 George W. Bush to Ariel Sharon, Ariel Sharon to George W.Bush, in Ha’aretz, June 6, 2009.70 “Declaration of the European Union,” Fourth Meeting of theAssociation Council EU-Israel, Brussels, Nov. 17-18, 2003, p.5.

Some Europeangovernmentsengage intargeted killingswhile callingIsrael’s useunlawful.

71 Res. ES-10/15, U.N. General Assembly, New York, July20, 2004.72 “Council Conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process,”European Union, Brussels, Dec. 8, 2009.73 “Development Assistance and the Occupied PalestinianTerritories,” International Development Committee, House ofCommons, London, p. 21; “About Us,” PLO NegotiationsAffairs Department, accessed Aug. 18, 2010.74 The Forward (New York), July 18, 2003.

/ 29

the fence was the low point of relations betweenWashington and Jerusalem during the GeorgeW. Bush years, and Palestinian lobbying fundedby the Europeans achieved it.

ISRAEL’S TARGETED KILLING OF TERRORISTS IS “ILLEGAL”

Israel follows a policy of targeted killings ofterrorists who are preparing specific acts of vio-lence or operationally engaged in organizing,planning, financing, and arming such operations.The purpose is to prevent imminent attacks whenIsrael does not have the means to make an arrestor foil the attacks by other methods. Israeli se-curity officials believe that this policy keeps po-tential bomb makers on the run and serves as adeterrent to militant terrorist operations. Israelisalso believe that targeted killings have less im-pact on Palestinian non-combatants than woulda military incursion into a Palestinian popula-tion center aimed at their capture.75 On Decem-ber 13, 2006, the Supreme Court of Israel ruledthat targeted killing was a legitimate form of self-defense against terrorists within specified rulesof conduct.76 The Israeli public strongly sup-ports the policy of targeted killing: 90 percent inone poll, 75 percent in another.77

U.S. State Department spokespersons haveat times expressed disagreement with the Israelipolicy of targeted killings, for example, on Au-gust 8, 2001,78 November 5, 2002,79 and April 17,2004.80 In reality, Washington accepts the Is-

Rosen: Europe-Arab Lobby

raeli policy as long as it seeks to neutralize immi-nent threats.81 The United States itself has be-come the world’s leading practitioner of targetedkillings according to a recent report by the U.N.’sspecial rapporteur on ex-trajudicial executions.82

The George W. Bush ad-ministration used dronesto attack militant targetsforty-five times.83 TheObama administrationhas increased the attacksto fifty-three in 2009 andto thirty-nine in the firsthalf of 2010 in Pakistanalone, according to the New America Founda-tion,84 which also found that drone strikes sinceObama took office had accounted for approxi-mately 450 deaths, about one-quarter of themcivilians.85 Michael E. Leiter, head of Obama’sNational Counterterrorism Center, defended thepolicy on July 1, 2010, saying that it would be“wholly irresponsible” not to stop those plot-ting to harm Americans.86 Like the Israeli pub-lic, majorities of Americans support targetedkillings of terrorists.87

But the Europeans have shown less toler-ance than do Americans for the Israeli policy. OnDecember 13, 2002, the European Council calledupon Israel “to stop excessive use of force andextrajudicial killings, which do not bring securityto the Israeli population.”88 On November 18,2003, the council said targeted killings were un-lawful and urged Israel “to abstain from any pu-

The pre-1967line was neverrecognized byeither side as apermanentpolitical border.

75 Gal Luft, “The Logic of Israel’s Targeted Killing,” MiddleEast Quarterly, Winter 2003, pp. 3-13.76 HCJ 769/02 Summary Judgement, The Public Committeeagainst Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel, IsraeliSupreme Court, Jerusalem, Dec. 13, 2006.77 Steven R. David, “Fatal Choices: Israel’s Policy of Tar-geted Killing,” Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Sept. 2002, p. 7.78 News briefing, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C,Aug. 8, 2001.79 BBC News, Nov. 6, 2002.80 Ha’aretz, Apr. 17, 2004.

81 Chris Toensing and Ian Urbina, “Israel, the U.S. and‘Targeted Killings,’” Middle East Report, Feb. 17, 2003.82 Philip Alston, “Report by the Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,” United Nations,New York, May 28, 2010.83 CNN, Apr. 28, 2010.84 National Public Radio, Mar. 25, 2010.85 “The Year of the Drone,” New America Foundation, Wash-ington, D.C., and Sacramento, Calif., accessed Aug. 18, 2010.86 Los Angeles Times, July 1, 2010.87 David, “Fatal Choices: Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing,”p. 18.88 “Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council,” Brus-sels, Dec. 13, 2003.

30 / MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY FALL 2010

nitive measures which are not in accordance withinternational law, including extrajudicial killings anddestruction of houses.”89 On January 17, 2004,EU spokesman Diego Ojeda said that the “Euro-pean Union has spoken on several occasionsagainst [Israel’s] so-called extrajudicial killings ofsuspected terrorists.”90 In February 2010, Presi-dent Nicolas Sarkozy declared France’s “irrevo-cable condemnation of what is nothing less thanan assassination” by Israeli agents of a Hamascommander in Dubai.91 In December 2007, the Pal-estinian Centre for Human Rights produced aharshly critical paper on the illegality of “extraju-

dicial execution” by Israel,a publication “producedwith the assistance of theEuropean Union.”92

There is an elementof hypocrisy in the Euro-pean claim that Israel’s useof targeted killings is un-lawful because some ofthe European govern-ments that approve thesestatements engage in thepractice themselves. InJuly 2010, a British official

revealed that a U.K. spy agency pinpoints thehiding places of al-Qaeda and Taliban chiefs inAfghanistan and Pakistan for targeted killingsby U.S. drones.93 British agents attempted to killGerman field marshal Irwin Rommel during theNorth African campaign94 and did kill SSObergurppenführer Reinhard Heydrich in 1942.95

In May 1987, in Loughgall, Northern Ireland, aBritish special operations unit killed eight Irish Re-publican Army (IRA) militants who were prepar-

ing to attack a police station.96 A year later, onMarch 7, 1988, British security forces killedthree IRA militants in Gibraltar as they walkedtoward the border with Spain.97 In July 2010,the French government acknowledged that itssecurity forces assisted in killing six terroristsin Mali linked to al-Qaeda to prevent a terroristattack in Mauritania.98

ISRAEL’S BLOCKADE OF GAZA IS “ILLEGAL”

On May 31, 2010, French ambassador GérardAraud told the U.N. Security Council that Israel’sblockade of Gaza is illegal and unsustainable andshould be lifted. Araud added that Israel’s use offorce against the Turkish flotilla was unjustifiableand disproportionate.99 British prime ministerDavid Cameron agreed: “The Israeli attack on theGaza flotilla was completely unacceptable ... Gazamust not be allowed to remain a prison camp.”100

Meanwhile Foreign Secretary William Hague toldthe House of Commons that the blockade of Gazawas “unacceptable and unsustainable.”101 TheBritish ambassador to the U.N. demanded that Is-raeli restrictions on access to Gaza be lifted toallow unfettered access and the unimpeded flowof humanitarian aid, commercial goods, and per-sons to and from the enclave, which, he said, wasamong the highest international priorities of thenew British government.102 Former EU commis-sioner Patten argued that the Israeli blockade was“immoral, illegal, and ineffective.”103

Here again the European position is hypo-

89 “Declaration of the European Union,” Nov. 17-18, 2003, p.4.90 International Middle East Media Center (West Bank), Jan.17, 2004.91 The Tehran Times, Feb. 23, 2010.92 “Position Paper: Extra-Judicial Execution,” PalestinianCentre for Human Rights, West Bank, Dec. 2007.93 Fox News, July 25, 2010.94 Time, May 19, 1980.95 “The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich,” Central Intelli-gence Agency, McLean, Va., Sept. 22, 1993.

96 “Special Air Service (SAS) - Loughgall, Northern Ireland,”British Special Forces and Elite Units, Kent, U.K., accessedAug. 18, 2010.97 “1988: IRA Gang Shot Dead in Gibraltar,” BBC, accessedAug. 18, 2010.98 Reuters, July 23, 2010.99 “Security Council Condemns Acts Resulting in CivilianDeaths during Israeli Operation against Gaza-bound Aid Con-voy,” U.N. news office, New York, May 31, 2010.100 The Guardian, July 27, 2010.101 Ibid., June 2, 2010.102 “Security Council Condemns Acts Resulting in CivilianDeaths during Israeli Operation,” May 31, 2010.103 The Jewish Chronicle (London), July 19, 2010.

Europeans putIsrael on thedefensive about itsGaza blockade,making it difficultfor Washingtonto supportIsrael’s right toself-defense.

/ 31Rosen: Europe-Arab Lobby

critical. From 1993 to 1996, twelve European naviesparticipated in a NATO-Western European Unionblockade known as “Sharp Guard,” enforcing bothan arms embargo and economic sanctions on theformer Yugoslavia. This involved the navies ofBelgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Tur-key, and the U.K. Some 74,000 ships were chal-lenged; almost 6,000 were inspected at sea, andmore than 1,400 were diverted and inspected inport.104 Had there been violent resistance to thisblockade, all the parties enforcing it were commit-ted to the use of force. The fact that no one daredto challenge this powerful blockade preventedviolence from occurring, not any principled ob-jection to the use of force. Nonetheless, the Euro-peans at the U.N. Security Council continue toput Israel on the defensive about its Gaza block-ade, making it more difficult for Washington tosupport Israel’s right to self-defense under article51 of the United Nations charter.105

The Europeans evidenced a similar attitudein July 2006 when Israel went into Lebanon inresponse to Hezbollah attacks. An agreed state-ment by the EU presidency stated, “The Euro-pean Union is greatly concerned about the dis-proportionate use of force by Israel in Lebanonin response to attacks by Hezbollah on Israel.”106

French foreign minister Philippe Douste-Blazyagreed that Israel’s strikes were “a dispropor-tionate act of war” and said that the French gov-ernment supported “Lebanon’s demand for a re-ferral to the United Nations Security Council assoon as possible.”107

ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ARE “ILLEGAL”

President Ronald Reagan said in 1981 thatIsrael’s settlements were “ill-advised,” “unnec-

essarily provocative,” and “an obstacle topeace,” but he also said that they were “not ille-gal.”108 This distinction has been the implicitpolicy of all successive U.S. administrationssince Reagan.109 The George W. Bush adminis-tration added a further distinction betweensettlement blocs on territory that the Palestin-ians are expected to cede to Israel in a land swapin future negotiations (asArafat agreed as part ofthe Clinton parametersnegotiated at CampDavid in 2000), versusisolated settlementsdeeper in the West Bankinterior on land expectedto fall under eventualPalestinian sovereignty.President Bush consid-ered that the settlementsin the West Bank interiorwere more problematic while the blocs on landto be swapped could be accommodated. BarackObama apparently has rejected these Bush re-finements, and his administration seems to con-sider all Israeli settlements equally problematic.But even Obama has not returned to the pre-Reagan assertion that the Israeli settlementsare illegal.110

However, on this issue, again Europe iscloser to the Arab side and is more critical ofIsrael than the United States is. On June 13,1980, the European Economic Community, theprecursor to the EU, affirmed in its Venice dec-laration that “these settlements, as well asmodifications in population and property in theoccupied Arab territories, are illegal under in-ternational law.”111 On December 8, 2009, theEU Council reiterated this belief: “Settlements... demolition of homes and evictions are ille-

Europeaninterventionoften inflamescontroversiesover settlementsbetweenWashingtonand Jerusalem.

104 “NATO/WEU, Operation Sharp Guard,” North AtlanticTreaty Organization, Brussels, Oct. 2, 1996.105 Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, June 26,1945, art. 51.106 Deutsche Welle (Bonn), July 14, 2006.107 Gerald M. Steinberg, “Europe’s Disproportionate Criti-cism,” The Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2006.

108 “Quotes from U.S. Government Officials on Israeli Settle-ments,” Churches for Middle East Peace, Washington, D.C.,accessed Aug. 18, 2010.109 The Washington Post, June 17, 2009.110 Steven J. Rosen, “Tough Love Is No Love at All,”ForeignPolicy.com, July 21, 2009.111 “Venice Declaration,” June 13, 1980.

32 / MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY FALL 2010

112 “Council Conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process,”Dec. 8, 2009.113 Jeffrey Helmreich, “Diplomatic and Legal Aspects of theSettlement Issue,” Jerusalem Issue Brief, Jan. 19, 2003.114 The Yale Globalist (New Haven), July 4, 2010.115 CNN, Mar. 23, 2010.

gal under international law.”112

The juridical premise on which the Euro-pean policy is based is that Israel is occupyingland taken from another sovereign power. Butthe pre-1967 boundary was nothing more than a

demarcation of the posi-tions held by opposingarmies when the fightingstopped in 1949, neverrecognized by either sideas a permanent politicalborder. Nor has the Jor-danian occupation of theWest Bank prior to 1967been recognized by anycountry apart from Brit-ain and Pakistan. The

West Bank is disputed rather than occupied ter-ritory, so the Geneva Convention cannot be ap-plied113 as the Europeans seek to do. The Euro-peans are reifying a temporary holding line thatexisted for less than eighteen years (1949-67)while ignoring realities that have lasted for twiceas long (1967-2010).

For Israelis, more important than an arcanelegal dispute is the practical impact of declaringall Jewish communities across the pre-1967 lineto be equally illegal. That statement, if true, wouldmean that more than half the Jews in Jerusalem,the nation’s capital, are living unlawfully onsomebody else’s land114 in homes the Israelisbuilt and paid for in completely Jewish, estab-lished communities including Gilo, French Hill,and Pisgat Ze’ev, which are across the previousarmistice line. Israelis do not consider these tobe settlements at all.115 It would mean that MaaleAdumim, a sprawling metropolis of 36,500people, is lumped together with nearlyunpopulated dots on the map. It would also meanthat the militarily indefensible pre-1967 line isrecognized under international law as permanent,

in contravention of a fact that was implicitly ac-knowledged by Security Council Resolution242,116 which envisaged Israel’s retention ofsome territories captured in the 1967 war.

European intervention often inflames con-troversies over settlements between Washing-ton and Jerusalem, frictions that have had aparticularly destructive effect in the case of theObama administration. Martin Indyk, an adviserto Obama’s secretary of state Hillary Clintonand Middle East envoy George Mitchell, saidrecently: “I don’t think that ... Barak Obama,Hillary Clinton or George Mitchell—want to getwaylaid again by an argument about settle-ments [instead of] the main challenge which isto reach an agreement on what the borders ofthe Palestinian state will be ... The settlementissue will be resolved as a result of that.”117

European pressure has pushed the Obama ad-ministration to emphasize the thorniest part ofthe settlement issue, Jewish housing in Jerusa-lem. Bill Clinton wisely avoided this minefieldeven when, in 1995, the Yitzhak Rabin govern-ment gave approval for 5,000 new housing unitsto go up in East Jerusalem because, as an ad-viser said, “To take action now ... would bevery explosive in the negotiations, and frankly,would put us out of business as a facilitator ofthose negotiations.”118

CONCLUSION

European leaders are the most effective ex-ternal force urging the U.S. government to moveaway from Israel and closer to the Arabs. Eu-rope is not hostile to Israel on every issue, andnot every European intervention with U.S. offi-cials is meant to move U.S. policy in the Arabdirection. But, on the whole, the Arab road toWashington runs through Paris, London, andBerlin.

European leadersare the mosteffective externalforce urgingWashingtonto move awayfrom Israel.

116 “The Situation in the Middle East,” U.N. Security Coun-cil Res. 242, Nov. 22, 1967.117 Natasha Mozgovaya, “Martin Indyk: I Think the Settle-ment Issue Will Be Resolved,” Ha’aretz, July 28, 2010.118 Steven J. Rosen, “Obama’s Foolish Settlements Ultima-tum,” Foreign Policy, Apr. 1, 2010.