The Arab Conquests in Central Asia

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Recommended CitationGibb, H. A. R. Te Arab conquests in Central Asia. London: Te Royal Asiatic Society, 1923. viii, 102 p.
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C O N QU E ST S I N C E N T R L S I


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JAMES G. FORLONG

FUND

VOL.

IT.

T H E

ARAB CONQUESTS

IN

C E N T R A L A S I A

Y

H. A R.

GIBB, M A

EDIN. AND LOND.)

Lecturer in Arabic, School of Oriental Stud~esLondon

THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

74

GROSV NOR

STREET ONDON

.I.

1923


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CONTENTS

lut

PREFACE vii

I

THE OXUSBASIN

E arl y Ilistory Politica l Divisions The

rabic Sources . .

V .

TH E T U R I ~ I S H

OUNTERSTROI


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PREFACE

TH

first draf t of this work was presented to t h e

University of London in December 1921 under tile t i t le

of T h e Arab Coilquest of Transoxania , as a tllesis fo r

t h e deg ree of M aster of A rts, and was al~pr ov edby t h e

Sen a te in January

1922,

for publication as such. D ur ing

the year my attention was taken up in other directions

and, except for the publicatioll of two studies on t h e

subject in the Bulletin of the School of Oriental Stu die s,

nothing further was done until by the generosity of tlie

Trustees of the Forlong Bequest Fund an opportunity

of p ub lication was offered. I n its present forin t h e worlt

h a s bee n largely rewritten and revised. I t ma kes no

c la im to presen t a complete lGstorical account of t h e

A r a b s in Central Asia,

but

is

intended solely as

a

critical

s t u d y of th e au thorities in greater detail than has hi th ert o

be en mad e. Much is therefore om itted bccaosc i t b a s

already been dealt with in the standard histories. I n

o rd er to keep down the cost of publication, the extensiv e

references which originally accompanicd tlie text have

been

cut

down t o a few notes at the end of each ch ap te r.

N o references ar e given when, as in the great m aj o ri ty

of

cases, the authority for thc statements made can

easily be found in the appropriate place either in Tabari

or

Balzdhuri.

regret that several worlcs which are indispensable

f o r a thorough stu dy of th e subject have, for ling uis tic

reas ons, been inaccessible t o me. Such are va n Vloten 's

Opkomst der Abbnsiden, and almost the whole

r a n g e of Russian research work. Through the kindn ess

of Sir Denison Ross, however, I have been able to avail

myself

of

a draf t

MS.

t ranslation of the most i m p o r t a t

and

valuable of them all, Professor

W

Bar thold ' s

YI


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viii

PREF CE

Tuvkestalz

as well as of his as yet unpublislled London

lectures on Th e Nomads of Central Asia. My sincere

thanks are

due

to

Sir Denison Ross also for

his

continued

interest and inaterial assistance ever since he first intro-

duced me t o th e subject to Sir Thomas Arnold for much

encouragement and helpful counsel to Professor

Barthold, who has read the MS. through and made a

number of valuable suggestions to the Trustees of

the

Forlong Bequest Fund for their ltindness in undertalting

the publication

;

and in no small nieasure to my wife,

who has given much time and labour to preparing the

MS

for publication.

London,

April, 1923


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I INTRODUCTION

I

THE

OXUS

B SIN

Early History

T he Oxus is a bo un da ry of tradition r ath er t h a n of

history. Lying m idway between th e old fro ntie r of

Aryan civilisation form ed by the Jax artes and t h e Pa m ir

i and the natural strategic Irontier offered by the north-

eastern escarpment of the plateau of k i n , it ha s never

i

proved a barrier to imperial armies froin either side.

I t was not on the Oxus but on the Jaxartes that

I

Alexander's strategic insight ,fixed the position of

Alexander Eschate, and when the outposts of Persian

dominion were thrust back by the constant pressure of

the Central Asian hordes, their retr ea tw as s taye d no t o n

the Oxus but on the MurghBb.

Thus when t h e t id e of

conquest turned and th e Arabs won back h e r anc ient

heritage for Persia, they, like Alexander, were compelled

to carry their arms ever further to the East and al l un-

knowing re-establish th e frontiers of th e Ac haem enid

Em pire. I t was from the legends of S s nian im es,

enshrined in th e pagee of th e historian s and the nat ional

epic of Firdawsi, th a t th e Oxus came to be regardc d a s

the boundary between h i in a nd T i i r h .

Through all the centuries of invasion, however, the

peoples

of

Sogdiana and the Oxus basin remained I ra n ia ~ l

a t bottom, preserving an Iranian speech a n d Ira ni an

institutio ns. B ut the political conditions of th e co un try

a t th e period of the Arab conquests were so co ~ n p le x h a t

it is necessary t o trace briefly th e course of th e ir

devclopmen t.

Th e second ce ntury B.C was a period of uphe av al

n

Central Asia th e powerful Hiung-Nu peoples we re

dispossessing weaker trib es of their pasture l an ds a n d

forcing them to m i g a t e westwards, Between 150 a n d

B


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ARAB

CONQUESTS

IN CENTRALASIA

126 B.C.

a succession

of nomadic tribes, the last and

lnost powerful of which were a branch of the Yueh-Chi,

were driven down into Sogdiana. It is now generally

held that these tribes were of Aryan origin, though the

question is not perhaps settled with absolute certainty.

Before long, however, a second group, the Ic ang, pos-

sessed themselves of Sogdiana, driving the Yueh Chi on

into Bactria and the Afghan mouniains 1).

In these

districts they found, alongside the Iranian peasantry, a

settledpopulationof Tulthari (in Chinese, Ta-Hia), already

noted in the Chinese annals for their commercial enter-

prise 2), and tvhile at iirst the nomad tribes introduced

complete confusion, it would seem that they rapidly

absorbed, or were absorbed by, the native elements, and

thus assimilated the Hellenistic civilisation of Bactria.

From this fusion arose, about

6

A.D. the powerful

Icushan Empire which spread into India on the one side

and probably maintained some form of suzerainty over

the Ic ang ltindgoms of Sogdiana on the other. Under

the new empire, Buddhism was acclimatised in Turltestan,

and Sogdiana developed into a great entrep t for Chinese

trade with the West. Towards the close of the ihircl

centu~yhe Icushan Empire, wealcelled by attaclts from

the new national dynasties in India and Persia, reverted

to its primitive form

of

small independent principalities,

which, however, retained sufficient cohesion to prevent

a Persian reconquest, I t is practically certain that

SBsBnian authority never extended beyond Balk11 and

rarely as far. In the fourth and fifth centuries references

are made to a fresh horde of nomads in the north-easi,

the Juan-Juan (Chionitae, Avars) 3), but it does not

appear that any new settlements were made in the

Oxus countries.

In the middle of the fifth century, another people,

the Ephthalites (Arabic Haytal, Chinese Ye-Tha), per-

haps a branch of the Hiung-nu, not only completely

overran the former Kushan territories, but by successive

defeats of the Persian arinics forced the SZsBnid Icings


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Trm Oxus

BASIN

to pay tribute.

Th e Ephthalites appear to have been a

nomadic people organised as a military c aste of t h e

familiar Turkish type, smd the existing institutions and

principalities, in large pa rt a t least, con tinued side b y side

with them

4).

Their rule was too transitory t o produce

any lasting eTIects, or t o inflict any serious in jury o n t h e

commerce ant1 prosperity of Sogdiaila.

The rise of th e Central Asian em pire of the Turlrs

proper Tu-ICueh) da tes from their ove rthrow of t he Juan-

Juan in IlIongolia in

552,

under their great K han , Mok an.

His brother Istam i the Silzibul of th e B yz an tin e

historians), tlie semi-independent jabghu of the ten tribe s

of Western Turlts, after co ~~ so lid at in gis power in the

Ili and Chu valleys, formed an alliauce with KhusrG

AnGshiruCin, and in a joint attack between 563 and 68

the two powers colnpletely overthrew the Ephthalite

kingdom and divided their territorics.

For

a brief

moment the Oxus was the actual boundary between

friin and TBrBn under pressure from the silk tr ad er s

of

Sogdiana, howwcr, the alliance

was

brolten and the

wealter successors of AntishirwBn could scarcely do more

than maintain their outpost garrisons on the MurghZb.

From this time the Ephthalites, lilte tlle Kushans, were

gradually assimilating to the Iran ian populatioll 5 ) ,

though th e change w s less rapid n the Cisoxine land s of

Lower TukllQristBn,BBdghis, and H e ri t , where Ep hth alite

principalities were re-constituted, probably with Turlrish

support, and continued to give Persia much trouble on

lier north-eastern frontiers

6).

11

the other hand the

Turlts of th e five western tribes Nu-she-pi), who b ecame

independent

d t c r

the break up of the Great Khanate

about 582, maintained their suzerainty over Sogcliana

and the middle Oxus basin by freqnenl expeditions, in

one case a t least as far as Ball


12/111

ARABCON~UESTSN CENTRAL SIA

interference in tlle administration cf the subject princi-

palities was a t first limited to tlie appointment of military

governors ancl the collectio~lof tribute. Thus, in t l ~ e

semi-legendary account give11 by An-NaysBbfiri of tlie

Turkish conquest of BulchLra the Bulch?ir I


13/111

TII OXUS

B SIN

g o o d

cause for doubting whether a Turlcisli army ever

c a m e in response to their appeals for support until the

ris

of the Tiirgesh power in

716

Geographically the cultivated lands to the west and

so~z th-west f the middle Jaxartes are diviclecl by the

I-I is sa r mountains into two well-defined areas. The

n o r t h e r n area includes the rich valley of the Zarafshdl

a n d the lesser streams which descend the northern slope

o f t h e watershed, the southern comprises the broad

bas in

forined by the Oxus ancl its tributaries between

t h

mountains of the Pamir and the steppelands. Tlle

former; which as a whole is called Sogdiana in clis-

t i nc t ion from the smaller principality of Sughd, was at

t h i s

period divided between a number of small states,

each inclependenl of the others but forming together a

l o o s e confederacy in a manner strikingly reminiscent of

t h e

I-Iellenic city-states. The strongest bond

of

union

w a s

formed by their mutual interest in the Chinese sillc

t r a d e , the chief stations of which were a t Samarqand,

P a y k a n d , and I


14/111

ARABCONQUESTSN CENTRAL SIA

the later lists the rulers of Sl~ shnd FarghLna as well as

the I-Chwiirizm ShZlx are shown as belonging lo the clan

also, though with less probability

9) .

Whether the

family were of IC'ang origin, or, as the Chinese records

state, belonged to the Yueh-Chi, they appear in the

Arabic histories with Persian territorial titles (KlludZh,

S h ~ h , a n dhe general term diliq2n). Some of the princes

also possessed Turlcish titles, probably conferred on them

as vassals of the Khan. The ruler of Samarqand, as

king of Sughd, is called the Ikhshidh or IkhshEdh, which

is easily recognised as the Persian khshayathiya This

title was borne also, as is well known, by the king of

FarghZna.

t

is certain at least from both Chinese and

Arabic accounts that these rulers were not Turks. The

Turkish names by which they are sometimes called 'ere

given out of deference or compliment t o their Turkish

suzerains, just as Arabic names begin to appear amoilgst

them immediately after

,

the Arab conquests. Par-

ticdarly misleading is the name Tarkhan which appears

inore than once in tlie list of princes of Samarqand and

has been erroneously talcen as

the

title Tarkhgn; though

it is in reality only the Arabic transcription of a personal

name spelt in the Chinese records Tu-hoen. During

the six or seven hundred years of their rule all these

princes had become fully identified with their Iranian

subjects 10). Tile kingship moreover was not a

real monarchy but rather the primacy in an oligarchical

system. Their authority was far from absolute, and tlie

lancled aristocracy (dihqgns) and rich merchants pos-

sessed, s will be seen later, not only a large measure of

independence but also on occasion the power to depose

the ruling prince and elect his successor. As the

succession appears to have been largely hereditary it is

probable that, according to Iranian custom, eligibility

was confined to a single royal house. In some cases,

it would seem, the succession was regulated during t he

lifetime of the reigning prince by sonle such inethod a s

association in the principate, probably colnbined wit11


15/111

t h e a p p o i n t ~ n e n t of t h e reinaini~lg pri~ices to other

fiefs 111.

\ ,

T h e od ed erac y of these states, however, \\,as ill

n o sense all alliance arid probably anlounted to little

I l lore th an a

nodzls

vivendi Besides the inore iulI>orta.1lt

p rinces th er e existed an enormous nuinber of petty

autocrats, some possibly Turlcish, others probal)ly

descended from former conquerors, wliose authority

m a y sorn eti~ nes h a v e scarcely extended beyo~ld the

li m it s of their own villages. In

lands subject to tlie TurBs

and patrol led by nomadic t r ibes an effective centraliscd

go ve rn m en t was h a rd ly possible. Mutual antagonis~lls

a n d w ars cannot h a v e bee11 uncoiilinon though we have

n o w no record of th em , except that during the early Arab

pe rio d there was ho stil i ty between

Bulths rs and W ar d ~ ~ a ,

b u t th e la tte r cann ot be reckoned among the Shao-wu

principalities since, according to Narsliakhi, it was

found ed by a S s nidprince about 300 a.n. Until thc

profitable Chinese tracle was threatened by the Arabs

w e find no tru st w orth y record of combined resistailce

offered by the country to its piecemeal reduction, and

o n l y lon g after th e co nq uest s of Qutayba is tliere any

h i n t of a concerted rising. At the same time, the

s tr en g th of the c it ie s an d warlike nature of their

in ha bi ta n ts may be ga ug ed from the way in which thcy

not only preserved themselves from destruction at the

h a n d s of their succ essive nomad invaders, bu t even

gained their respect, while this, in some respects perhaps

t h e m o st highly civilised of all the lands subdued by the

A r a b s 12), roved also the most difficult to conquer,

a n d mos t in t ractab le t o ho ld .

T h e sam e lack of unity is apparent in the districts

s o u t h of the Iron

G a t e ,

though nominally subject to a

sillgle auth ority . I t is important to bear in mind that

t h e ZarafshXn and O x u s valleys were completely inde-

p e n d en t of olle ano ther-th at the differencebetween tthem

w a s no t merely one

of

governm ent, but also of Ianguage,

lld ev en , to some e x t e n t , of blood, owing to the greater


16/111

A n l j n C o ~ g u s s r s N CENTRALASIA

Illixtllre of races in t h e so uth ern basin. Whell,

occusiollally, as in th e Miis egend , reference is made

ll

t llc Arabic l~istories o colnmon action b y S u g ll d a n J

y ~ u k ~ l ~ i s t ~ l l ,t is due t o complete misun ders tanding

of t ilc of the country prior to th e con que st , an d i t is

\vortlly of i l lat no such reference is t o be fou nd in

ally rlarrative otllerwise reliable. O n his o u tw a rd

jollrllcy ill

630,

Yua11 Chwang found t h e c o u nt ry divided

into t\vcnty-sc\len petty st a te s un de r se p a ra te rulers,

with tile cllicf military authority vested in the Turkisl1

Sltiid, tile eldest son of th e Ja bg hu of t h e W est er n Turlcs,

wllo lind ids scat near th e m od ern Q un du z. D ur in g

the

1)cl.iotl of ani~ rchyvliich befell t he W estern T u rk s in t h e

lo\ln\\*i~igears, the whole dis tr ic t was fo rm ed i nto a n

indcl~endcntkingdon1 under a sol1 of th e fo rm er S h ~ d ,

wllo lo~intlcd he dynasty of Jabglms of X u l t h ~ r i s t 3 n .

blir~or Turkisl~ chiefs and inte nd an ts pr ob ab ly seized

similar authority in their

own d is t r i c t s , and though

tlur Jal)gliu was rccognised as suzerain o a ll t h e la n d s

lrorn the Irou Gate to Ziibulistzn and Kapisa and from

IIerZt to I


17/111

THEOXUSBASIN 9

of the famous Buddhist shrine of Naw bahii r, a s th e

capital of th e Turlcs

;

it was in fact: th e cen tre

of

what

we might allnost ten n the an lp hic ty on y of Low er

TukhZrist Ln, comnbining str ate gic a n d colnm ercial

importance with religious ven eration. L on g aftel. t h e

Nawbahgr had been destroyed b y Ib n Amir this s a ~ t i -

ment continued to exist in the co un try

16).

A chance narrative in Tabari

(11.

1224 f . ,

which,

though ol BBtiilite origin, can scarcely h av e been in ve nt ed ,

indicates the situation in Lower Tulchitristjn in

710

In the presence of Qutayba, the ShSd and as-Sabal

(King of Ich uttal) do homage to th e J ab gh u, th e form er

excusing himself on the ground t h a t tho ug h he h a s joined

Qutayba against the Jabghu, ye t h e is th e Jab gh u s

vassal.

The Ep hthalite prince of Badg his thcn docs

homage to the Shad, who must consequently be regarded

as the chief prince in Lower T u k h ~ r i s t ~ n . is indent i-

ficatioll with the Jabgbu himself in another passage

(Tab. 11.

1206

9) is obviously impossible. Th ou gh

certainty on the point is hardly to be expected, the

description best suits the king of Chaghjnizn (Chaghan

Khudah), who consistently ado pted a n a tt it u d e of co-

operation with th e Arabs. I t wordd seem too th a t the

lcing of Chaghanizn com manded th e arm ies

of

Lower

Tukhkristgn in 65 and again in 737 . Moreover, an

embassy to China on bchalf of TulchhBristZn in 719 was

actually despatched y the king of ChaghBniHn, which

implies that he held a status in the k ingdom conso~lant

with th e high title of Shad. T he co n cl ~~ si o rlrawn by

Marquart and Chavannes th a t th e lcing of ChaghaniZn

and the Jabghu were identical is disproved by the

Chinese records (16).

Such con ditio~ ls f political disu nion were natu ral ly

all in favour of the. Arabs. It might have seemed also

that the general insecurity, together with the burden

ol maintaining armies and courts and th e ever-recurring

ravages of invasion, would move th e rnass of th e pop ula-

tion to welcome the prospect of

a

strong

nd

united


18/111

go ve rnm en t, more especially as so large a proporti011 of

t h e Muslin1 arm ies were com posed of tlie ir Pe rsia n lcin.

For the Arabic records in general are misleading on two

inlportant points. By t lieir use of the word T u r k

,

fo r all the non-Persian peoples ol the E as t, th ey g ive the

impression (due perhaps t o tlie circumstanc es of th e time

in wliicli the chief histories were composed) that the

oppon ents of the Arab s inT ranso xan ia w ere th e historical

I

Turlts.

The t ruth is that unt i l 72 the Arab invaders

were resisted only bv the local princes with armies

composecl alm ost enti rely of ~ranli'ans,except perhaps

on one or two special occasions when Turlcish forces may

hav e intervened. Th e other error is in interp reting the

conquests s primarily wars for th e F ait h. Rebellion,

fo r instance, is expressed in terms of a po stas y. I t is now

well established that this conception is exaggerated

religious questions did not, in fact, enter until much

later ,and even then chiefly as expressions of political

relationslips. To the Iranian peasantry, themselves

stead fastly attach ed t o the national cults, th e ad ve nt of

an oth er faith in this meeting-place of all the cultures

a n d religions of Asia a t first carried little significance.

Two factors in particular combined to provoke a resis-

tance so s tubborn tha t i t took the Arabs a century

me rely to reduce the coun try to sullen submission. The

first of these was t h e proud na tional s pi rit of the

Ira nia ns which was eventually to break down the

sup rem acy of th e Arab s an d give birth to th e first

Pe rsi an dyn astie s in IslBm. Th e few wise go verno rs of

IChurBsb found in this their strongest support , but,

outraged again a nd again b y an arrogant a n d rapacious

administration, the subject peoples became embittered

an d sought all means of escape from its tyr an ny . The

secoild was the in te re st of t h e comm ercial relatio ns on

which the wealth and prosperity of the country de-

pen ded . This again m ight have disposed th e cit ies to

accept a rule which proinised not oil ly stabil i ty, but

a

wide extension of o pp ortu nity . The A rab governors,


19/111

TH OXUSBASIN I

as we shall see, were 11ot indeed blind to tlds, but the

exactiolls of the treasury , a n d still more t h e greed o f local

officials, combined wi th t h e uilse ttlem el~ t of c o l ~ s t a n t

invasion t o create a n a tti tu de of distrust, which deepened

la te r into despair. I t mus t not be fo rgo t ta l t l ~ a t he

com me rcial ties of th e Sogdians werc much stronger w ith

t h e E ast than wit11 the W est, and th at this too prom pted

them to cultivate relations with the Turks and Chinese

ra th er t h a n with t h e Arabs when th e necessity of lna kin g

a choice was forced upon tllein.

he

rabic Sources

The early Arabic sources are remarlcably rich in

material for

the

reconstruction

of

the conquests in

K llu ri ss n and Transoxania. For the earlier period t h e

na rr ati ve s of Ya qfibi an d Baladhuri a re nearly as full

as those of Ta ba ri, bu t th e special value of the l a t t e r lies

n

his metho d of com pi la tiol ~wllicl~ enders the t ra di tio us

amenable to crit ical s tudy and thus provides a control

for a ll th e o t h e~ s . Mo~eove r,while the other historians,

rega rdin g the con quests of Qu tayba as definitely coinp let -

ing the redu ction of Transox ania, provide only m eag re

notices for the la te r period, Tabari m ore than cornp en-

sa te s for their silence by the uloimous wealth

of

deta i l

embodied in t h e accoun ts he quotcs from A l-Madg iili

and o the rs

of

the last thirty years

of

Uinayyad rule.

As a general ru le , these thr ee historians rely on dif fer en t

authorities, t l ~ o u g h ll use the earlier histories of Al-

MadB ini a nd A b B Ubayda to some extent . Th e mono-

graph of Narshakhi (d.

969 A.D.)

based on both Arabic

and local sources, with sonle resemblance to Baliidhuri,

i s mlIortunately preserved only in a Persian version of

tw o centuries l a te r which has obviously been edi ted , t o

what extent is unlcno\vn, but which probably represents

the original as unsatisfactorily

as

Bal arni s Pe rsia n

version of Ta ba ri. Ev en so it preserves to u s som e

acco unt of t h e peoples against whom the A r a b

in

vaders were matched, and thus does a l i t t le to remedy


20/111

12

R B C o ~ ~ u ~ s r s

N

CENTR L ASIA

the tlelects of the other historians in this respect.

I t

may well be doubted, however, wlietlier some of its

narratives' merit the reliance placed upon them by van

Vloteri

17).

Thc inucli later historian Ibrl al-Athir intro-

duces very littlc new material, but confines himself for

thc most pa rt to abridgiug and re-editing the narratives

in Tabari, witli a tendency to follow the Inore exaggeralctl

accounts. The geographer Ibn IChfirdXdhbih gives a

list of titles ancl names, which is, however, too confused

to supply any reliable evidence.

Reference

has already been made to certain aspects of

tlie conquests in which the Arab historians are misleading.

Their information on t he Turlcs and the principalities of

Sogdiana can now, fortunately, be supplemented ancl par

S

of their narratives controlled from Chinese sources,

chiefly th rougl~ Chavannes' valuable Documents snr

les Tou-ICiue (Turcs) Occidentaux. But there are two

other facts u~hich lso detnand attention : one, that tile

Arabic authorities, as ive possess them, and even witli all

allowance made for their limitations, are by no means

exhaustive ; i . ~ .eliance 11 on~issions n the narratives

is an unsafe principle o criticisnl the other, t ha t by

critical study i t is possiblc to distinguish a t certain poinls

scveral lines of tendentious tradition or legend, directed

to the interests of national feeling or of some pa~ticular

tribe or faction, and centred in some cases round

specific persons. 'I'hcse may most conveniently bc

sum~narised s follotvs

1

A Qaysite tradition, centred on the family of

Ibn KltZzim

2

An Azd-Rabi'a tradition, centred on Muhallab

and hostile to Hajjaj. This became the most

popular traclition among the Arabs, and is

followcd by Baladhuri, but opposed by Ya'qitbi

3

Bshilite tradition, centred on the tribal hero,

Qutayba b. hluslirn. I n general

it

found littlc

favour but is occasioilally quoted solnewhat

sarcastically by Tabari.


21/111


22/111

that progress

of the

Arab

arms

in

Central

Asia

whose

vicissitudes re o u t l i i l e d in the following pages.

Full Titles in

Bi b l i o g l . ap 1 i y )

Isranlce, Bcitragc 41 if. 01.

Cordicr, Chine I. 226.

I f

Marqnnrt s

idcntificnlion (Erznshahr. 201f.) is coucct.

Cordicr I . 229

:

Brhnshohr 60 if.

Yu an Cllwnng I , 103. Prof. Bnrtllold suggcsts tha t the connection between

th e Eplrtllalitcs and lhc I-Iuns may have bcen political only, not rncial.

Chavannes, Doctlments 166

:

crfinahal~r 9.

Tnb.

I.

2886. 13 and 2880. 3 : Ya'qobl, Histovy, 11. 103

:

YFiqi~t (ed,

WUslcnfcld) I. 402 :

BtlFidhuri 403 Eriinshahr 06 f . , 77 1.. and 160.

BBddlis was still nomad nnstnrc-around in t l ~ e X I V t h cntllrv : Ibn.

Ballfiln, 111, 01

f

Yu en Cinva~lg . 106

;

11. 200; Cl~ov.

oc

101 : nran shah r 260

if

Tomnscl~ck,Soghdiann, 110.

Sco Alsrouart. Chronalocio. 11 Sllimtori in Ifeleti Szcmlc I11 f1002) foot -

. . .

.

notc to pp. t22-3.

Cf. Narsllakhl 20. 4. On the Irnnisation of nolnndic elements, Blochet,

Introduction a I'Ilistoirc dcr &Iongols, (Lcydcn, 1010) p. 211 n o t e ;

Pcisl


23/111

11

THE EARLY

RAIDS

T h e Conquest

o f

Lower TztkkBristBqz

Arab legend relates that the Muslim forces,

pursuin

Yazdigird from thc field of Nihxwand in 211642, 1lad

already come in contact with the Turks of Tulth%r-

i s t ~ n efore the death

of

'Omar. But ille final

destruction of the S%%nidpower and iirst iml>osition of

Arab rule on KhurBs%nonly followed ten years later, by

tlie troops of 'Abdullah ibn 'Arnir, 'OthmCn's goverlior

in Basra. The Ephthalites of HerM and Badghis sub-

mitted without

a

blow, and the first serious check to

their advance was met in the Murghlb valley, when al-

Ahnaf

b.

Qays with

an

army of 4,000 Arabs and 1,000

Persians found himself opposed by the organised forces

of Lower Tukharistan and was compelled to retire on

Merv-Rfidh. A second expedition under al-Aqra' b

Hlbis, however, defeated a weaker force in

Jiizjw

and

subsequently occupied Jfizjgn, F2ry%b, Txlaq%~i, nd

Balkh. Small divisions made plundering raids into the

neighbouring territories,

e.g.

to SiminjBn (a town within

tlle frontiers of TukhaistBn proper, governed by a

Turkish prince, the Ru'b IChSn), and to ICllw%~izin,ot

always with success

;

on the other hand, a successful

raid was made on MByamurgli in Sogdiana in 331654,

which is mentioned by Abi~Ubayda alone of the Arabic

authorities

1).

A general insurrection which broke

out sliortly afterwards, headed by a certain Qarin,

apparently a member of the noble Persian family bearing

that name, seems to have been instrumental in causing

the Arabs to evacuate KhurlsZn for a time 2), though

several raids are recorded of 'Ali's governors between

6

and 38 A H

These earliest conquests, in fact, were

little more than plundering raids on large

scale

the

effect of that movement of expansion whose momentum

was carryillg forward the Arabs irresistibly. According

I 6


24/111

t o t h e Cliiuese records, which, however, require to be

used wit11 cantion at this point, the retreat o the Arabs

in

655

was iollo\ved up by the army of Tulth?iristgn who

re in st a te d PerGz, the son of Yazdigird, as ti tu la r lting of

Pers ia

3).

W hen i~eacewas restored to IslZ n~ y th e recognition

of ~u 'B \v f i , an 41/661, Ibn 'Am ir w a s again entrusted

wit11 t h e conquest of IChurBsBn. T he sam e rough and

re ad y metliods were adopted as before th er e appears

to h a v e been no definite plan of invasion, an d even th e

or de r of governors is tnlcertaiil. N ot only ar e trad itio ns

re la t ing to

A H

32

and

42

confused by the different

au tli or iti es , but a vast anlount of th e whole is affected

b y tr ib a l legends. H int s of fierce resistance are given

from tim e to time. Qays b , al-Haytham, th e governor 's

first legate, was faced with a fresh revolt ill Bgdghis,

IIe rB t, and Balltll. H e recaptured th e la tt er and in re-

taliation destroyecl the famous shrine of Nawbahxr, but

left

t h e Eplilhalites to be dea lt with by his successor,

'Abdullah ibn 1ChB~in1. It is clear that there was no

orde red progress of the Arab arm s until Iihu rZs n \was

b ro u g h t under th e adm inistration of ZiyZd b . Abihi.

A ft e r a n experimental division of the province un de r

tri ba l leade rs, a policy obviously dangerous an d quicltly

abanclo ned, ZiyZcl, realising t he danger of allowing

Persia11 ilationalism a iree liand in the East, baclted up

b y t h e resources of TulthSristZn, centralised th e adm inis-

tr at io n a t Merv, and organised a preventive campaign.

I n 47 /06 7 11is lieutenant, al-Haltam b . 'Am r al-GhifZri,

op en ed a series of campaigns directed to t h e conquest

of Lo w er TulthZrist n and Gharjistgn , in th e course of

wliich lle crossed the Oxus and carried his arms into

Cl~agl~ZniZu,nd drove PEr6z back to China in dis

co m fitu re. On his death, three years later, th e conquered

prov inc es rose in revolt, bu t th e new governor, R ab i'

b . i d H i t l i tlie first conqueror of S ij is tzn,

af te r reducing Balltll, pursued the E phthalite arm y in to

Qu histZn and dispersed it with great slaughter. Ag ain


25/111

TIIE EARLY

RAIDS 7

an expedition was sent across the Oxus into Chagllz,l i~n

(clearly ind ica ting the connect ion between C h a g l t g ~ l i ~ ~ ~

a n d Lo w er TukhgristZn), w hi le another directed down tile

le f t ba n k of th e river

secured

Zamm and Amul, the two

chief f e r r y points for S og d ia n a. Mention is also made of

a co nques t of IShwiirizm. All these expeditioils seem

t o p o i n t t o a methodical plan of conquest, arranged

betweell ZiyLcl and his go ve rn or s tlie Arab po\ver was

thus firnlly established, for the moinent at least, in tlle

Cisoxanian lands, and the way preparcd for Uie invasion

of So gd ian a. A furth er im p or ta n t step was the colonisa-

t ion d ICharLs3n by fifty thousand families froin Basra

and Kfifa 4), ettled according to Arab practice in five

garrison town s, for t h e d o u b le purpose of securi~ig he

co nq ue st s already made, a n d providing the forces for their

fu rt he r extension.

The

irst

I?zvasioiz

of BztlrhZrZ

nqt

Sz6gh d

Although at this junctioil ZiyLd himself died, liis

policy was carried on

by

his sons, in particular by

'Uba ydullB h. Scarcely a n y governor, not even Ha jjaj,

ha s su ffered so much a t t h e hands of the traditionists as

t h e Mu rderer of H u sa y n , though his ability and

devot ion to the U rna yg ads are beyond que s t i o~ ~.t is not

su rp ris in g therefore t h a t his earlier military successes

sh o u ld b e so briefly r e l a t e d , in spite of their importance.

Y e t

as

he was no 111ore than 5 years of age wlien

app ointe d b y Mu'Bwiya

t o

th e province of IchurBiin on

probation, and only two years later wasselected to

fill

his f at he r's position in Iraq, his administration m ust have

b e en mar ltedly successful. Th e policy of Ziy5d had now

firm ly secured Khurhsiin an d made it feasible to use i t as

a

b a s e for t h e exten sioil of t h e conquests into the rich

la n d s across th e river. O n his arrival a t Merv, therefore,

in t h e a utm nn of 531673 the new governor began Prc-

pa ra tio ns fo r an inv asio n of Bulchaii.

T h e Shao-wu pr incipal i ty

1

Bulchara was a t this tim e

sec ond in importance o n l y to Sanarqand. I t illcluded


26/111

I

18

ARAB

CONQUESTSN CENTRALASIA

i

i

no t only the greater p ar t of th e oasis (" a l -Bulh8r iya ")

then tnuch more thicltly pop ulate d th an n ow , but also th e

i

great elnporiuln of Paylcand, which controlled t h e tra d e

roote across the Oxus a t A m nl. Of its early his to ry we

have ~ \ V O ccounts, both confused, inaccurate in detail ,

and often conflicting. Fr om thes e it ]nay be gatherecl

that the prince, who held t h e high T urltish title of Sh ad

i

5) ,

esided at Paylcand,the citade l

o

BiikhBr?ibeing e itlier

loui~detlr rcstored by t h e BulchBr I


27/111

THEE RLY IDS 19

NaysXbfiri the re is no reference a t all- o KhBtiin.

More-

over there a r e indications that Tabari was aware of the

local tradition and completely rejected it

;

this, a t least,

would account o r the unusual practice of specifying

Qabaj-IChStfin as the wife of thc lcing in 5 n a

Even Balldhuri rejects the Inore fantastic developments

of the legenrl. Tabari's narrativcs, however, require to

be collated with the additioilal material in Balldhuri,

who hasno

t

relied entil-ely on thc local tradition. The germ

of the native version is probably to be found in a con-

fusion of the Arab conquests with the later

w r

between

BulthBrl a n d Wardana

7),

whose echoes are heard

in

Qutayba's iiivasions thir ty years after.

In the spring of 64 874 Ubaydulld~ ZiyLd crossed

the river ai ld marched directly on Paylcald. After a

partial success, he led his forces forward towards Bukhlra

and severely defeated the army of t he Bulrhar JChudXh.

From Tabar i 's narrative, which relates only that two

thousand m e n of Bulchiirl, slcilful archers, were talten by

'Ubaydullah to Basra, where they formed

his

personal

guard, it i s left t o bc inferred that

a

treaty was concluded

under which the Bulthjr IChudZh became tributary.

The

local~traditionmagnifies the expedition by adding a siege

of Bulth8rH (during the winter) and bringing in an army

of Turlcs t o assist KhXtCn, but confirms the success of

the Arabs. 'Ubaydullah's practice on this occasion of

lorrning bodyguard or retinue of captives appears to

liave been

a

common one. 'Abdur-Rakman ibn Samura

hacl previously brought captives from Sijisth to Basra,

where they built him a mosque,

and

later governors of

I


28/111

2

R B

CONQUESTS N

CENTRAL SIA

i

reduced their city. Talcing fifty young nobles as hostages, i

he retired from Sughd and subsequently occupied

Tinnidh, a11 important fortress on the Oxus colltrollillg

tile maill North and South trade route, having pre-

sull~ably ~arched hrough the Iron Gatc. Thc conquest

of Sughd was thus definitely co-ordinated'with tha t of

Cllagli6ni nn.T barils arrative is strangely vague and

abrupt it contains no mention of BulchBrR nor any

tleh~iite eierence to Sa~narqand, xcept for the statement

Ilkat it was the objective of Sa'id's expedition. Using

this narrative alone, one ~vouldbe inclined to suspect

that the city captured by Sa'id was not Samarqand but

I


29/111

THEEARLY

IDS 21

avaricious 'Abdur-Rakm,~nb. ZiyBd. In 61/680-681

Yazid I appointed Salm, another son of Ziyiid, to

IchurBsxn and S i j i s t ~ n . Eager to enlulate his brother,

Sahn, even before leaving Basra, announced his intention

o renewing the expeditions into Transoxania and enlisted

a picked force on the spot, including such tried leaders as

Muhallab b. Abi Sufra and 'Abdullah

b

I


30/111


31/111

T a s

E RLY

~ I D S

3

influence in determining the attitudc of the peol>les o

Sogdiana to the Arabs. From 67 to 602 ilowever, the

new power of Tibet held the Chinese armies in cllcclc

ill

the Tarim basin and cut off all possibility of Chi~lcse

intervention in the West. Tile Sogdiall princes were

thus

throw11 on their own resources, and, @orant as

yet of the danger behind the Arab raids, thev seem to have

bowed. to the storm. It must not be forgbtten that the

cities had never before met such n enemy a s the Arabs.

They

had been accustomed to plundering raids by Tnrlcs,

wlio disappeared as quicltly as they came, and who,

dislilting t o undertake a lengthy siege, were easily

appeased by

a

ransom. Familiar with such nominal

annexations, [hey would naturally adopt the same tactics

against the new invaders. Had tlie Arabs maintained

their pressure, there was thus every prospect that Trans-

oxania would have

bee11 colonised with a tithe of t l ~ e

expense and loss incurred in its reconquest and would

liave become as integral a part of ilie Muslirn dominioils

as I


32/111

4

ARABCONQUESTS

N

CENTRALASIA

from whicll lie continually raided the neighbouring

districts. His exploits were worlced up in popular story

illto an epic of adventure, in which legend has almost

I

i

overlaicl historical fact.

The most fantastic exaggera-

tions were devised in order to provide a suitable back-

round for the incredible dceds of valour indulged in

by

the hero.

But in truth his actual exploits were

sufficiently anlazing, and all the efforts of the forces of

t h e local rulers (magnified in the legend to huge armies of

" Turks and I-laytal and Tibetans ) although aided

o n one occasion by a force of Khuzg'ites, were unable to

dislodge him. For fifteen years he remailled in secure

possession of his stronghold, a refuge for the disaffected

from all sides, and a standing example of the helplessness

of the ru1el.s across the river.

In 77/006 Umayya re-opened the campaigns into

Transoxania. An expedition to I


33/111

Taa

E RLYR IDS 25

outward tranquillity. The same extrenle measures that

had been adopted there were not necessary in I


34/111

ill; ^^ ~ o ~ g u ~ s r sN

CENTR L

ASIA

llol\~cl,cc, llat Hajjzj, whose policy Was to keep

golremors (lcpen(1ent on himself, viewed with suspicioll

tile concclllration of autllority in the hands of the leader

of a llo\\,erful ~ostilc lan, bu t he was content to wa it for

the i ~ ~ e a ~ ~ t i ~ n rnt1 give Irazid sufficient rope to hang him-

self. Esccpt lor a11 attempted raid on RllwLrizm

Yazi(I carried ont no cspeditions, while under his govern-

I I I C I I ~the precarious internal balance of I


35/111

TME ARLYAIDS 7

claimed for Yazid in BBclghis can have beell of little cifcct

19). Fortunately for thc Arabs, Muss's jealousy of

ThZbit and IIurayth causcd a division ill tllc ranlts

of

their enemies, but though the brothers both fell ill battle,

the danger remained acute. The so11 of PEr6z still

lingered in TukharistSn, and even at t lere

was some uneasiness about the situation in Rllurazn 20).

TO Hajjaj i t was obvious that the first. essential was

to reunite the Arabs and that so long as Yazid was in

power that was impossible. The only difficnlty lvns to

find a governor acceptable to Qays and to substitute 11irn

without rislting a revolt of Azd. I t was solved wit11

admirable ingenuity. By ordering Yazid to transfer

his authority to his weaker brother Mufaddal, Ilajjsj

a t one stroke removed the man from whom he had most.

to fear and prevented him from uniting Azd in opposition,

although Yazid realised

that

the fall of his house ir7as

imminent. At the same time the Caliph's permission

was sought for the nomination of Qutayba ibn h1usli1n

as governor of KhurLsBn. Belonging

to

the neutral tribe

of B&hila, Qutayba was recboned as allied to Qnys,

b u t might be trusted to hold the scales evenly between

the factions he had already di st in ~~ is he dimself in

Ir8q

and in his governorship of Rayy, and was the more

devoted to HajjEj in that he was protected by no strong

party of his o m . The accepted belief that HajjZj took

no steps to remove the family of Mui~ailab ntil Mosa was

put out of the way is based on a remark att ributed to

Muhallab

n

the &Ifis -legend.which is frequently contra-

dicted elsewhere both expressly and by implication.

Mufaddal, during his nine monll~s f office in 851704

seems to have endcavoured to in~prcssHajjaj by a show

of military activity against the rebels in BBdghis. At the

same time, acting in concert with the local princes

(magnified in the legend to Tarlthiin a ~ l d s-Sabal

),

he sent an expedition to Tirmidh under 'OthmAn bb.

~ ~ ~ [ f i d ,\ f f i ~ gas cut off ancl ltilled

in

a sortie ancl his

S u l a y m ~ urrendered at discretion. Il aj js j' s


36/111

first

exclalnation on hcarillg the

i lews is said to have

been

one of anger at the insult to

Qays,

but

the

last hindrance

t o the

appoiutme~lt

f the

new

governor

was now

removecl

and towards the

close of

the

year

Qutayba b. Muslim

arrived

in

M e y v .

NOTES

I .

RaI. 408

: Chnv.. Doc. 172,

n

1 . T here wrre two ocalilies called 31Zya-

m u r g h in

Soghd

:one n e a r S a n ~ a r q a n d Idalrhri

321. G ,

a n d t h e

olll r

o n e

d a y ' s m a r c l i from Nasal an the Bul rhar l road ( ib id .

3 Y 7

7), According

to

t h e

Cllinose records th e

fanner

i s t ho

one

n quost ion hcre.

%

YYBqilt,

ed.

Wiislcnfeld. TI.

411. 21

:

of

Cuclani,

Annali

V111.

4

If.

00

QBrin, Ni3ldelre. Sasaniclca

I??, 831

:

Marquart,

I l r i n s l m h r

134.

I . C h a v . , Doc, 172.

4.

Cf La m me ns. Zi td b. Abil li

(R.S.O.

1012)

p.

604.

G

Cf.

with

Tuglisl~bda

he

nam e of th e reign ing prince in GEE, Cllav., Doc.

137.

(i.

Chov.,

Doc.

130.

7 . Narsltakhi 8

and

30.

8.

C l l r o n o i o ~ i o

7

: Erdcinshaltr 303 i This view i s suppor ted a l so by tho le t te r

f m m L11e king of Salnarqand ta the Empe ror of China i n 718 soe p. 00).

w l ~ l c l l uts th o f irst Arab conqnest some 36

years

before, i c in 082 or 83.

0.

A c c o u ~ l t s lsr, in I


37/111

111. THE CONQUESTS OF QUTAYBA

THEachievements of the Muslim ar~lliesn Central nsia

during the reign of Walid I wel-e due in the first lace to

the complete co-operation between tlle directive gcnil s f

Hajjzj and the mili tary capacity of Qutayba. Qutayl,n's

strategic abilities have been somewhat overrated, tl,ougll

the Arabic texts are

t

no pains to conceal the fact tllat

his gifts fell something short of genius. On lnorc tllall

one occasion we are shown in wliat coilstant toucll thc

viceroy was kept with the progress of his armies, ;ullci llow

large a part he toolr in drawing up the'plan of campaign,

though the credit of carrying it throng11 to a succcssiul

issue rightly belongs to Qutayba. Iiajjiij seems to 11avc

had the fullest confidence in his lieutenant, ancl if

hc did

not hesitate lo utte r reproof and waiming when occnsioll

required, he was equally quick to express appreciation of

Qutayba's success. The Arabs of

ll

carties sooil rcalisccl

that behind their general lay the authority of HajjHj,

i h c

wholesome respect inspired by whom prcventerl a.11~ open

breach during his lifetime. The second factor wl1ic11

materially assisted the conquests was tha t in tlleic prosc-

cution Qutayba united all parties in I


38/111


39/111

T H E CONQUESTS

O

Q U T A Y B A

31

assistance in response to any appeals for sulpport wllicll

may have reached them from Sogdiana

1).

Rqtlally if

not more impossible was i t for the Tiirgesh to intervene

in Sogdiana during th e sam e period 2). B y the Turl ts ,

as we have seen, th e A rab historians mean as a general

rule the local inhabitants, amongst whom tl iere inay

qu ite possibly hav e been included a t t h a t time Turkisli

ele m en ts. Occasional references t o the 1


40/111

33

A R A B CONQUESTS

N CENTRAL

ASIA

revolt

alllollgst solne of t he inha bita nts. T h is l n a y

l L~ .llal~s tllc lrlorc correct version, since we hear of

~ ( ; ~ l k l ~cillg

ill

a l.ui11ous condition fo u r Years l a t e r

1 ,

. ) . Thc submission of Ballch w as f ol lo ~ ve d

1, . ~ l ~ ~ ~ tf 'rislr, king of Ch agh Zn ijll, w ho h a d

~xobabb'

1

cclolwr;ltctlwit11 Mufaddal in the at ta ck on T in n i d h t h e

\j[ylr llefore.

His action was, i t seems, inspired b y e u d

\Vitl1 tllc liillg of S lliimxn a n d Althariul , ill t h e upper

o

the Surltllan and Penjab rivers, against

l,c llo1)cd to use tlie Arab troops in re tur n f o r h i s as sis-

i

1:lncc to thcm. Mufaddal ha d actually p ro je c te d a n

cs],ctlitio~l gainst SliUln&n before his recall, a n d it w a s

I I I J \V

c::~rrictl out by Qutay ba , who

was

p e rh a p s t h e I n o r e

~.rr:itly to ul~ der take t since i t assured t h e sa fe ty

of

t h e

coi~tllernnplxoacli to the Iron Gate. Afte r t h e su bm is -

sil)n

of

tllc Icing GllislashtHn, who

w s

of Tu rk i sh b lood ,

:~c.cortling o Yu an-C liwa~ ~g, lntayba re tu rn e d t o Merv

.

;~lonc>,c :rv i~~g l ~ c rmy to fo llow under h i s b ro th e r

Srilik,

who carried out a number of minor raids oil the

y . t is ol,vious t h a t, in spite of B a lsdh u ri 's i m ag i n a -

tive nccciunt, these raids must be located in t h e d i s t r i c t s

ltc3ifil~bouri~~gn tllc Oxus. The readings in T a b a r i ' s

11:irrntive arc, I~ @ \\~ ev er,efective

3).

H a v i n g t h u s

i~o1:itcrl Nc'zak in BZdghis, the hea rt of t h e r e v o l t ,

[,. ~lta$x~ \K?I I~ he winter months in negot ia t ing w i t h

lli111 tllr(~ng11 ulayn ~ he Counsellor," a n in fl u en ti al

I't r~i:lll wllosc sltill in co nd uc ti~ lg he m o s t d if fi cu lt

n~'h'Otiatiolls pr o~ cc l more il la n once of the u t m o s t

\';'lllc

t

Jjutayba. Nezalc was persuad ed to s u r r e l l d e r

:uld

was

~(111dllCt~do Mcrv, wllere peace

was

co n c l u d ed

on coll(litio11 that Q utayba would no t e nte r ~ g d ~ l ~ i

perso11.

AS

a precautionaly measure however t h e

cl\'cmor a l~ an g e d ha t NezaIc sllould

accompany

h i m

i l l all

cspeditions.

Thus for the molnent

at

least , the

d W c r of an outbrealc in I < h u r~ s~ l . nas averted, in a

'nmlllc'c llononrable to both part ie s,

tile son of peraz

" ~ ) k

IVaY back to China to await

a more

f vour ble

ol)portn~~ity

4).


41/111

THE

CONQUESTS

QUTAYBA

The

owques t o BukAltr~

In the following year, Qutayba, first making sure

of

the crossings at Amul and Zamm, opened his calnpaigns

in Bu l~ h ~&it11 3 attack on Paylrand, From the

expressions of Narshakhi, on whose llistory of this

we may place more reliance since his details as

a I-de

fit in with and supplement the other ilistol.ies, it

can be gathered that the principality of BukhSra was

weakened by civil war and invasion. During the minority

of TughshCda and the regency of ICh tiln, he alllbitious

nobles had struggled between tl~ernselves or the cl~ief

power most of the territories, includi~lgBukhirfi itself,

had been seized by the prince of Warrl,~na nd the re

maining districts seem to have been bmugllt under the

rule of Khunuk IChudSh, a noble who assulned the title

of

Bulrhar

Xhudah

(5) .

Paylcand

w s

thus more or less

isolated and, from Narshalclii's account, secms to have

been left to its fate. The battle with the Sughdinns

related

in

Tabari is an obvious anticipation from thc

events

of

the following year. After a siege

of

some two

months the city came to tenns with Qutabya, who left

it under a small garrison and, according to Tabari's

version, began the return march to Merv.

n

kineute in

Payltand, however, brought liim back a t once. t seems

reasonable to assume that the citizens, illlagining

Qntayba's

attaclz

to hnve been

no

more than a11 isolated

raid, tried to expel the garrison as soon as 11e retired.

The details given in Narshalrhi, that on Qntayba's ad-

vance towards BukharZ a certain citizen, a ~ ~ a g e dy

the insulting conduct of the governor, Wlrqa' b. Nasr

al-Bzxli, attempted t o murder him, are trivial and

unconvillcing. Whatever the cause of tllc revolt may

have been, however, Qutayba took ierriblc revenge.

In accordance mediaeval practice the ralegadc city

was sacked, its fighting'lnen put to death, and its

wornel

and children enslaved. The booty taken from t'lisl the

first of the great trading cities of Central Asia

be

forciblycaptured by the Arabs, furnidle(l inexhaustible


42/111

3 1:

ARAB ONQUESTS I N C E N T R A L ASIA

for the exaggerated details of later tradition.

~l~~ ]nost ilnportant part nf the spoil was

an

arsenal of

\\rcapons and ar.mour, the excellence of which was s11ch

that the forging of Sugl~d appears in contenlporary

alongri le the traditional forging of Davicl for

sclperlativc craftsmanship

6).

With the consent

of

IlajjSj, these weapons were not incIuded in the division

tllc booty but used to re-equip t h e army. The s ta te-

lllc~,that

there

were only

350

suits

o

armour in the whole

army bcfore this is, however, of Bshilite provenance

and

scarcely worthy

of

credence. The exemplary puni sh -

I U C I I ~

thns meted out by Qutayba to Paykalld at t h e

I~rgin~~ingf his career was a stern warning to N~za lc n d

t l ~ c ogdia~~s. hose wl~o ccepted Arab dominion would

I)c

1n1111a11clyrcatccl, but any at tempt at rebellio~lwould

11c

ii~cxorably cruslled. Nevertlleless the sentence o n

I ' a ~ ~ k a ~ ~ das so~newl~at itigated in the sequel,

s

N;~rsl~akl~illds that tlle captives were ra~lsorned

by

t h e

~nrrc:l~a~~tsf Payltancl on their return from

the

a nnua l

irntlit~g xl>cclition to China, ancl

the

city, after lying in

ruins for n1r111y years, was eventnally rebuilt.

The clisxster at

Payltand

roused the princes

ancl

nlcrcl~ants f Trnnsoxania to the danger of neglecting t h e

illv;l(lcrs. Tl~e eud between WardZna and BukhZr3

(\.;IS

pakhcd up

;

round Wariljn I


43/111

THECONQUESTSF QUTAYBA 5

i a ~ n o u s unning order of Hajjiij : Crush ICish, destroy

N as al , and drive Wardill] back. Narshakhi and Ya'-

q n b i gives an account of th e nego tiations between

Hayyan an-Nabati, representing Qutayba, and Tarkhan

k in g of Su ghd , which is certainly to be put, with Tabari ,

aftel: the conquest of Bu lhiirii two years late r. Th rough-

out all these campaigns there is manifest a tendency,

common to th e early chronicles of all nations, t o exag ger-

a t e the num bers ancl composition of the opposing forces.

As usual the B d ~ i l i t e ccount carries this to th e p oint of

absurd ity by introducing a Tiirgesh force of n o lcss th an

200,000 men, an obvious ai~ach ronism , nfluenced by th e

la te r Tiil-gesh invasions. Th e connection is nl ad e clear

b y the inention of IICfir Maghalfin , whom we find nea rly

th irt y years later (T ab . 11. 1602. 2) as one of th e chiefs

of the Tiirgesh. The true accoun t would seem to b e

that Qutayba did not attempt to f ight a pitched batt le,

but by dilatory tactics wearied out the allies and gave

time for their natural inclination towards disunion to

operate, then evaded ihcm by a rapid march through the

Iron Ga te ancl, except for a rcarguard skirmish w ith the

enemy's cavalry, got his army clear across the river

at

Tirmidh. The app ointm alt of 'Abdur-RahmZn ibn

Muslirn t o comm and th e real-guard gives us t h e clue, a s

it was to this brother that Qutayba regularly entrusted

all the most difficult comm ands. In the following ye ar

Qutayba was still unable to make beadway against the

united forces of Wardiin IIChudiih, ICish and Nasaf, and

after protracted fighting

(in

spite of the double victory

claimed by th e Bghilites) returned to Merv. F or th is

weakness he was severely reprimanded by Hajjzj, who,

with th e aid of a map , drew up

a

plan of a tt a c k . T h e

i~ ivas ion f 00/709 seems to have taken W ardiin IIChudBh

by surprise, as the IvIuslim arm y w as able to ad van ce a t

once to the siege of Bukhilrii. There is som e ground fo r

the conjecture, however, th at t l ~ edeath of WardZn

I


44/111

6

CO N Q U ESTS

IN

CEN TRA L SIA

tile liesitation of tlie forces of Sam arq and t o inter-

crle

TIle battle before the walls of Bulthgrg is dcs-

cribcd by Tabari in a long Ta m imite tradit ion re m in is ce n t

f tile

ancient days," bu t tl ie actua l ca pt ur e

o

h e c i t y

s left t be ide r red . Th is siege i s t r an s fe r red t o

WnrdSna by Vambery

cf. Heart

o

A s i a P. 62

l ,rObably on the authority of th e Persian T a b a ri (Z ot en -

1

I ~ ~ ~

11 l ~ i j ) , ut N a rs ha kh i, T a b a ri a n d a l l o t h e r

nu ~llo r.itics uite definitely refe r to BukhHriE. A b fi

' l]haydaEs radition (Bal . 420) of captu re by t r e a c h e ry is

at best a confusion with the ca ptu re of S a m a rq a n d . A ll

tlla details given in Narsllalthi relative to Q u t a y b a 's

orgnnia;ltion of Uulcli%r% o no t refer to th is y e a r m o s t

lnoh11)ly the only imlnediate measures ta ke n w e re t h e

inllmsitioii oi a t r ibute of 200,000 dirhelns an d t h e o c c u p a -

tioli o t l ~ c itadel by a n A rab garrison.

tliplomatic success followed the victory a t B u k h a rB .

f i rkhfin, king of Sanlarqand, opened ne go t ia t io ~i s w i t h

( t~t;qlba, who w s represen ted by the comm ande r o f h i s

l lcrs i;~u orps, Hayy?in an-Nabati , an d term s we re a g r e e d

I I ~ I O I I ,probably on th e basis of th e old tr e a ty m a d e

by

Salm ibn Ziyiid. Tarlthfiil gave hostages for t h e p a y m e n t

of tr ibutc and Qutayba begail the march b ack t o M e r v .

Cotrsolirlnlioic and Advance.

If tllc Aral~s etunled in the a utuln n of B0/709 e l a t e d

nit11 tllcir success, they were soon given fr es h c a u s e f o r

:ln xi ct ~. NEzak, finally realising tha t all ho pe of re c o v e r-

illl:

intlependcnce must be extinguished

i

A r a b r u l e

was

strengtll[ lle~ln I


45/111


46/111

8

, i l t ~ u

~o~gurss . r s

N

CENTRAL SIA

t

tllis time \\re find traces of the new spirit that was t o

makc

itself

lllore felt in later years,and hear voices ra ised ,

like

Tllabit Qullla's, against the treachery that calls

itself

resolution." Tabari inserts at this point t h e

Ilarl:lti\rc of tile p u t t i ~ ~ go death of the hostages of

JfixjfiIl, ll retaliation for the lllurder of the Arab host age

In JtLjBn, a more excusable incident. BalEdhuri

puts it at t]~eeginning of Qutayba's career, however,

as tllougll it bclo~~gedo the first pacificatioll of Lower

l'~~kl~grisbdn,o that its position in Tabari may possibly

IIC

tluc to its superficial similarity with the case of NBzak.

The

results of this exl~editio~lere of the greatest impor -

t;uncc not only was NBzalc's scheme crushed and Lower

'I'uklidrist311 eliceforth i n co~ ~o ra t edn the Arab Emp ire,

I)ut also for the first tinlc Arab authority was extended

cl\.csr tlic Jabghu and his immediate vassals in the Oxus

1,asin. I Jic fonner, exiled to Damascus, formed a

valu-

l ~ l oiostagc agaiust any attempt to regain indepa~dence,

;111tl it sce~us ot improbable that the king of ChaghZniSn

\US

made rcgcnt

for

the young Jabghu (see above,

p.

9 ,

'Abtli~r-l


47/111

TIIE

CONQUESTS

1;

QUTAYDA :{ I

re-orgalisation was necessary. Tughsh~da,llougll still

youtll, w s restored to the position of Bl\lrh. r-I


48/111


49/111

THECONQUESTSF QUTAYBA

41

lines as the Ar ab forces, but m ore devoted t o tile person

of the ~ o v e r l i o r ncl able to take his par t agail ls t th e

Arabs. E I o ~ery nearly this plan succeeded, even hi

~ u ta y b a 's w n case, the sequel was to show.

The llractice of raising native levies, once started,

appears t o h av e become general in I< hu r zn. We have

no information as to when the local forces of I


50/111

4

ARAB ONQUESTS IN

CEN TRA L SIA

R utb il hastened to tender his subnlission, a nd a t th e sarne

time sen t an embassy to convey his homag e lo the

Bm pe ror of China (14). Recognition of Arab suzerainty

over Z?tbulist n involved of course only th e p a y m e n t of

a

fixed tribute, ancl no at te m p t was mad e a t a perm ane nt

occul~ation.

Meauvllile a serious situatioil had arisen in Sughd.

Ti le l~ lercha l~ t snd nobles of S a ~ n a rq a n d ad resented

th e wealilless of their lcir~g nd the pay m en t of tr ib u te

in Qu tay ba 's absericc the pa rty for resistailce

oztlraace

gained the upper hand, and Tarkhtn, deposed on the

grouilcl of incapacity, co m m itte d suicide . T h e choice

of the electors fell 011 Ghiirak

15),

prince of whom we

would gladly hav e known more. U nd er th e ev er incre'as-

ing clificulties with which he was confronted during

his

twenty-seven years of rule, his consu~n~nateandl ing

01 the n o s t confused situations shows to h a v e beell

at

once statesnlan and patriot, and preserved his king-

i

donl fro111 repeated dis as ter .

The action of the Su gl~ clia n

nobles, lio~ve ver,he Arabic account of wh ich is c o l~ ii rm e d

by

the Chhcsc records, coil st ituted a c h a l l a ~ g e o A rab

pretensions whicl~Qutayba could ]lot be slow in answer-

ing. These considerations clearly disprove the partial

tradition of Abii 'Ubayda (Bal.

422 ,

l o t he ef fec t tha t

Qutayba treacherously a t tacked I< h w ~ riz n l n d San lar-

q m d in spite of the treaties of Sa'id i b i ~O t hm a n , a n d t h e

argument based upon it b y van Vloten in L a Dorni atio,r

Auabe, mu st also, in consequence, be som ewh at m od ified.

The winter of

931711

therefore, was spent in

pre-

paratiorls lor an expedition against Samarqand, but

before the opening of th e cainpaigning season, Q u ta y b a

I

received a secret ruission from the IChwLriz~n

SllSh,

wllo offered to beconie trib ut ar y if the Ar ab s w ou ld ri d

lliln of his rebellious bl-oilier I


51/111

TLKE

ONQUESTS

O QU TA Y D ~ . 43

terms, which included, ill accordance wit11

tllc

llew

scheme, the provision of a corps oi 10 000 at)lcbodied

lllen as well as the usual tribute. Qutayba rclnnined ;,t

tile capital (16) until tlie army was collcctcd, wllilc

'Abdur-Rahm~nwas employed, according to

T ahlri,

ill

reducing the Icing of RhLmjird, wlio from tbc l,arallel

account in BalHdhuri is to be iclc~itifiedcitller t riill

IChurrazLdh, or a t least with his party. Tile lJcrsiall

Tabari adds a long and cloubtless lege11da1.y ~ ; I ~ . I ~ L L I . C

of liis surrender. Four thousa~~drisoners were takcll

and butchered, probably by order of the l


52/111

A R A ~ ONQUESTSN CENTRAL ASIA

The booty from the first expedition into I


53/111

THECOWQUESTSF QUTAYBA

the humiliating position of Tugl~sl~Bda,nd wit11 l l s

retinue, accompanied possibly by the merchants, witlldrcw

from Samarqand altogether and built a nejv city, Iiarnrl-

la th , some four farsaklls distant ill the dircctioll

Ishtikhan (18). Qutayba s doable-dcaliug ou tllis

occasion, however, tarnished his reputation alllong bolll

Persians ancl Arabs, far more than liis severity to Paykarld

and I


54/111

46

ARAUCONQUESTSN CENTRAL

SIA

BZhilite tradition. Professor Hou tsm a has raised

several objections to th is view, the m ost im p or ta nt being

th a t the cl~rouology f t he inscriptions has lo be m an ipu -

lated t o allow of this date , as tlie natura l d a t e to assume

froin the contest is at la tes t

711.

These, together with

the consideratiolis mentioned above, render Marquart's

hypotliesis absolutely untenable.

sccond suggestion has been pu t forward

by

Professor

Barthold, to which, however, Professor Houtsma's

objections would apply with equal force

20).

I n t h e

na rra tive of the historian Y a'qfibi (11. 314 , there is a

brief notice

as

follows Q uta yb a appointed his bro the r

'Abdur-RnhinFm ibn Muslim goveillor of Samarqand,

b u t t h e

Inen of Sa ~n arq an dreacherously revolted against

him, and llewith our o ther in for~na t ion . W l ~ i le

it callnot be said definitely therefore, that Ya'qfibi's


55/111

THE

CONQUESTS P QUT~IYB 47

statements in this case coiltai~i o trntll, it is certainly

preferable to regard them as a later development

of

the

narrative, on the lines of the Bal~ilite radition.

f the chronological objectio~lsraised by Professor

Houtsma are sound, there reinains still a third possible

solution, which, however, as tliere is no con-oborativc

evidence from either the Arabic or Chinese sources, must

remain nothing but

a

hypothesis. I t is surely cluitc

tenable that Icd- tegin's organizatioil of t11e Sogdiall

people had something to do with t l ~ e eposition

of

Tarkhfin and appointment of GMralc. With Sogclian

trade playing the most important part which wc know

in the Turkish lands, it would be well worth whilc to t y

to prevent the Arabs from obtaiuing control over it.

The very unexpectedness of the description givcn to this

expedition shows clearly that there was some motive for

organization and it is clifficult to see what other

motive there could have been. These circumstnilces

would render it quite probable that GhGralc did, in fact,

appeal to t he

IShBq n

for assistance against the Arabs,

bu t it seems that the growing power of thc Tiirgesl~

barred the way into Sogdiana against t l ~ cNorlhern

Khanate for the remainder

of

its sllort existence.

By

the conquest of Samarqaild Qulayba fillally estab-

lished his position in Transoxania. It must not be

assamed, however, as many of the Arab historians give

the impression of assuming, that the holding of Samarqand

meant the conquest of Suglld. All that had beell done

was to settle an Arab garrison in a colllltr~as yet

unfriendly. I t was the cluty of the conllnanders at

Samarqa1ld gradually to extend their autllo~it~ver the

the whole district of Sughd by expeditions and

91) .

There \ as thus a radical difference between the

collquest of BukhSrZ and ' th at o Samarqand.

The

former w s the result of a series of campaips in which

the resources of the country had been

exh usted

and the

province annexed piecemeal. The whole

P ~ P ~

ad

become subjects of the Arabs a i d

Were

under constallt


56/111

8

A R A BCONQUESTSN CENT RAL SIA

surveillance

:

TughshS.da llimself held his ranlr on suffer-

anc e ancl w as compelled to maintain a t least a n o utw ard

sho w of lo yal ty . But: Sainarqancl had been captured

in one sw ift thrust

;

Sughd as a whole was still unsubd ued

a n d only f ro m policy aclrnowledged the suz erainty of t h e

A rab s fo r t h e time being. Ghfiralr a t Ishtilrhan w as

free to t u r n e i ther to the Arabs or to the Turks 18).

Nevertheless in the years that followecl there is evidence

t h a t friend ly relations were formed between t h e A rab

garris on a n d m any of th e local leaders and in ha bi ta nt s

3). T h e w hole country, however, had suffered terribly

in the constant iilvasioils and counter invasions. A

co nt en lp ora ry poet gives a vivicl picture of i ts d issip ated

wealth , its

ruinecl and desolate lands :

'

Daily Qniayba gatbels spoil, increasing om. wealth with new

weal th

:

A BZllilitc who has worn the crown till the h ai r th at w a s

black has whitencd. Sughd is subdued by his squ adr ons , it s

people lef t sitt ing in nalcedncss As oft as he lig ht s in a la n d ,

his h ors e lea vc it furrowed and scarred.

he

Ex editions wto the Jaxartes Provinces.

I t m ig h t pcrliaps have been expectecl t h at Q utay ba 's

n e x t o bje ct afte r the capture of Sam arqand wo uld be t o

establish A rab authority in Sughd as firmly a s ha d b ee n

done in BukllarE. I t would probably have be en b e tt e r

in t h e e nd liacl he done so, bu t for the moment t h e at tra c-

tio ns of t h e forwarcl policy wllich had al re ad y provecl

so successful were too strong. Instead of conc en tra tin g

on t h e red uction of Suglid, it was decided t o push t h e

fro nt ie rs of th e Empire furthe r into Central Asia, ancl

leave t h e former to be carried out at leisure. Q ut ay ba

therefore crossed to BulthhB, where 20,000 levies f rom

. K h w & r i z ~ n ,ulrhzra, Rish, and Nasaf had been su m m on ed

t o

in ee t h im , and marched into Sughd. If th e re w s a

T urk ish a rm y wintering in the country, it offered n o

con sidera ble resistance to the advance of t h e A ra bs .

I11

S u g h d Q ~ ~ t a y b aivided his forces into two corps.

The Persian levies were sent in the direction of Sh3,sh,


57/111

THE ONQUESTSP QUTAYBA

D

while he himself with the Arabs niarclled on I


58/111


59/111

THE ONQUESTSP QUTAYBA 51

only the first of many such sent by the governors of

IChurCsjn to maintain frialclly relations with the Chinese

court.

It

cannot be doubted that in the majority of

cases at least the object o these missions was commercial,

particularly where joint embassies were sent with one or

other of the Sogdian principalities.

In the following year

951714 the raids on the Jaxartes

provinces were renewed. I t wlould seem on comparing

Balsdhuri s account with Tabari that Qutayba made

ShXsh his headquarters and worked northwards as far as

Isbijiib. The prince of Shash appealed to China for

assistance, but without effect

26).

Qutayba s plan

therefore was to follow up the important trade-route

which led from Turfan clown the Ili valley, along the

northern edge of the Thian-Shan mountains, through

Tokmak and Tariiz into Shiish and Samarqand. Though

the economic importance

o

controlling this trade-route

may have had its part in this decision, especially in view

of their new patronage of Sogdian trade, it is probable

that this was less in the mind of the Arabs than its

strategic value as the road by which the Central Asian

Turks debouched on Transoxania. Towards the end of

the summer, the expeditions were abruptly interrupted

by the news of the death of Hajjsj, which had occurred

in Shawwd (June). Deeply affected by the loss of his

patron and not a little uncertain of the effect on his own

fortunes, Qutayba disbanded the army, sending garrisons

to BukhjrB, Icish, and Nasaf, and returned to Merv.

WaIid, however, allayed his fears by an encouraging letter,

and made his province independent of IrBq. But the

death of Hajjjj llad affected IChurBsBn too deeply for

such a simple remedy. The Arabs had gained wealth in

their expeditions, they were weary of the constant

campaigns and anxious to enjoy the comforts of peace.

Factional feeling was merely slumbering, and a new ele-

ment of unrest had been added by a ICfifan corps under

Jahm b. Zahr, which had been transferred to IChurXsiXn

from India by Hajjgj in his last year. All parties among


60/111

62

A ~ f n ONQUESTS

I N

CENTRAL SIA

t llc ~~~b~ were alienated froin Q uta yb a eve n g a y s

had

been estranged by his highhanded actioll

in

t h e

first

place ,vitjl the iiouse of Al-Ahtam an d again b y his f e u d

wa l t iC , Abi Siid, the chicf of Tamiln 27) m o re -

o,rcr, were suspicious of his lneclizing te ndenci es .

rimollgst the Persians he was popular, but H ~ Y Y S ~l l -

Nab a tllougll restored t o his position in co m m an d of

the

I+rsian Lrool~s, ad not forgiven Q uta yb a for hi s dis gra ce

a t I


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THE

CONQUESTS

F

QUTAYBA

83

i t ies 11 whicli

it

professedly rests.

Only one 01 these

relates an expedition to I


62/111

6

ARAB ONQUESTS

IN CENTRAL

ASIA

family and bodyguard of Sogdian princes remained

faithful.

The death of Qutayba marked not merely the end of

t]le Arab conquests in Central Asia for a quarter of a

century, but tlie beginning of

a

period of retrogression.

Under Waki' b. Abi SBd, his successor

20),

the armies

melted away. Mulrhallad, the son of Yazid b. Mul~allab

and his lieutenant in Transoxat~ia, anied out summer

raids on the villages of Sugl~d, ut an isolated attempt on

the

Jaxartes provinces by 'Omar's governor, Al-JarrZlt

b. 'Abclullah, met with ignominious failure. It is possibly

to this that the tradition, mentioned by Barthold

Turbcsta~, 60 , of the disaster met with by a Muslim

army refers. On the other hand an embassy was sent in

tlle name of tlie Caliph to renew relations with the

Clliliese court, and a third in concert with tlie ltingdoms of

TulltBrist%n and Samarqand, etc., during the reign of

'Omar

25).

There is mention also

of

an expedition into

ICliuttal wl~ich regaitled some territory. But it was

Qutayba, with Hajjiii a t his baclr, who had held his

conquests together, and when lie disappeared there was

neither leader nor organisation to talte his place. The

history of the next decade clearly shows how loose and

unstable was thc authority of the Arabs. It was force

that had made the conquests, and only a settled policy

of

force or coilciliation could hold them. The first was

absent. Qutayba in chains at the worId's end is more

terrible to us than Yazid as governor in our very midst

is

the

graphic

sumnlary

put

into the mouths of t h e

conquered, while of Rutbil, king of Zibnlistiin, we are

told expressly that after the death of Hajjzj he paid

not a ccnt of tribute to any of the govenlors of Sijistiin

on behalf of the Umayyads 'nor on behalf of Abii

hluslim.

30).

Nor was 'Omar's policy a true policy of conciliation,

based as it was iiot on the maintenance of the Arab

collquests but on the co~npletevacuation of Transoxania.

His

orders

t o

that effect were of course indignantly


63/111

rejected by Llle Arab colonists ul Bulthiira and Samaqand,

but together with his appointment of the feeble and

ineffective 'Abdur-Rahrn~tl b. Nu'ayin al-Qushayri as

governor, such a policy was naturally coilstrued by the

Sogdialls as mere weakness, and an invitation to regain

their independence. In addition to the embassies to

China, to

be

related in the next chapter, and possibly also

some negotiations with the Tiirgeslr, Ghiirak sought to

win back h i s capital by playing on 'Omar's piety. The

Caliph sent envoys t o the princes of Sogdiana calling on

them to accept IslBm, and Ghiirak, outwardly professing

his adherence, sent a deputation to 'Oinar urging that as

Qutayba deal t with us treacherously and tyrannically,

but God h a s now caused justice and equity i-o reign

the city should be restored to the Sughdians. The

commonsense of the judge appointed to try the case on

'Omar's instructions by the governor of Sanlaqand,

SulaymZn b Abi's-Sari (himself a mawlii), solved th

problem in a n eminently practical manner, and

w

are

told that

is

decision, so far from being malicious,

was satisfactory to both the Arabs and the Suglidians,

if

not perhaps to Ghiirak. Beyond the relnission of ltl\araj,

it is doubtful whether 'Omar's administration benehted

the subject peoples in the slightest, and the ~.enction

which followed his brief reign only aggravated the

situation. Already before its close the Sughdians had

withdrawn' their allegiance 31).

Thus wi thin six years from the death of Qutayba,

rnuch of

his

work was undone. He had laid the founda-

tions on which the later rule of Islam was built, and laid

them well, though his own superstructure w s too flimsy

to withs tand the tempests of the years ahead. But the

fault was n o t entirely, perhaps not even chiefly, the fault

of th e builder. He

w s

snatched away before his work

was done, even if in his latter years he tellded t o neglect

everything else for military glary. S we shall see, there

was no peace

in

Transoxanja until other men arose, great

and strong enough to adopt and carry out

til

best of


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CONQUESTS

N CEXTRAL

ASIA

llis

The nlthlessness and ferocity of h is co nq ues ts,.

llowever, llave been mnch exaggerated.

H e w a s a lw a y s

ready

to

use cliplomacy rathe r th an fo rc e

if

i t offered ally

]lope of suc cc~ s, much so tha t his len ie nc e w as mis-

cotlstrucd 11 occasion by both friends a n d fo es. O nly

in cases

of

treachely aud revolt his puni shm ent ca m e sw ift

alld terrible. Th at he did not hesitate t o t a k e ven geallce

011

bis private enemies is to say no more t ha n t h a t h e was

A rab. I t was ilot without reason t h a t in la te r days

the Muslir~lsof Central Asia added Q u ta y ba s n a m e t o

thc roll of nlartyrs and tha t his tomb i n F ar g h Z n a bec am e

a favourite place of pilgrimage 32).

To surn up the position in Central sia in the years

i~nmecliaiely ollowing Q utayba s con que sts

:-

1)

Lower Tukharistan and CliaghZniSn formed an

integral part of the Arab Einpire.

2)

Tnklialistxn, now

in

the decay of i ts power, was

h ld as a vassal state, together

wi t h

t h

The Arab Conquests in Central Asia

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