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Following months of steady incident volume growth, the opening weeks of August suggest that this month may break this trend (see graph p. 17). This is significant as a month on month compari-son between 2010 and 2011 have noted an average 40% growth in AOG activity. While this recent downturn can be partially attributed to the onset of Ramadan, it is more likely that the combat-ants are using this time op-portunistically in order to take an ‘operational pause’ following an extended, and highly kinetic, period.

One standout to this trend was Kapisa Province in CENTRAL which had an extremely active period, with both sides engaging in opera-tions that have resulted in numerous casualties. The shooting down of an IMF helicopter in Wardak was unequivocally the highest profile event reported and represents the largest loss of life in a single incident for IMF since the conflict’s in-ception. While there were also numerous NGO inci-dents recorded, the theft of an NGO money transfer in Kabul City brings to light the ever present spectre of crimi-nality and its impact on the community; a reality that is often overshadowed by the wider conflict.

NGOs in the NORTH were

also affected by criminal acts, with two separate cas-es of robbery being report-ed from Balkh and Takhar. The incident in Balkh in-volved a money transfer (as with the incident in Kabul) and serves to highlight the challenges surrounding this activity. This also attests to the increase in frequency of opportunistic criminal acts during the pre-Eid period. Finally, the issue of ALP related violence continued into this period. Not only does this manifest itself within the context of the conflict, but also presents as a destabilising factor on the political sphere as local powerbrokers see these as a vector to further their vari-ous agendas.

As with the rest of the country, the WEST record-ed below average incident volumes as well as a rela-tively rare NGO incident-free period. Despite the incident downturn, Herat province continues to mark numerous incidents affect-ing travel security, a worry-ing trend that impacts NGO safety during intra/inter-provincial travel. The shifting conflict paradigm in Ghor is worth monitoring as IEA elements in this province have begun fur-thering their agenda beyond the traditional confines of the southern districts.

Kunar in the EAST noted the most significant devel-opments for the region this period. The reengagement of IMF elements into pre-viously ceded territory, pre-viously some of the most heavily contested terrain in the country, will likely serve to destabilise this province, as well as neigh-bouring Nuristan, in the coming months. In con-trast, Nangarhar has con-tinued to report low inci-dent levels, though crimi-nality and local disputes (ultimately a contest over resources) continue to de-fine the context there.

The extremely kinetic provinces of Ghazni and Helmand in the SOUTH noted the most dramatic downturns in activity this period while a protest in Zabul resulted in broader repercussions for the re-gion, including a shuffling of Provincial Police Chiefs. This action resulted in the installation of local power-broker in Uruzgan as COP, the apparent target in the complex attack in Tirin Kot noted last period. This move ultimately brings into alignment the informal and formal power structures, an act which has occurred elsewhere, most notably Kandahar following the installation of the present COP.

Issue: 79

COUNTRY SUMMARY

1 -15 August 2011

Inside this Issue

Central Region 2

Northern Region 8

Western Region 15

Eastern Region 18

Southern Region 24

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THE ANSO REPORT

YOU NEED TO KNOW

• Downturn in AOG activity levels

• NGOs affected by banditry and criminality

• Reorientation of IMF forces in Kunar

• ALP continuing source of strife in the North

• Alignment of informal/formal power structures

THE ANSO REPORT

K A B U L

criminal group this cycle, refer to the Balkh section of this report. AOG activity was limited to two separate cases of magnetic IED strikes. The first device was stuck to an IMF-contracted fuel tanker, which was parked in a warehouse along the Kabul – Jalalabad Road in PD 9. The IED detonation caused a fire which destroyed an additional 8 fuel tankers destined to supply the IMF contingent in Kandahar. On 15 August, a mag-netic IED exploded on an ANA Ford Ranger, parked along the Highway in the Bazaar area of Surobi. The strike injured two ANA soldiers sitting in the cabin. Shortly after the initial explosion, the ammunition located inside the car detonated, causing injuries to an additional three civilians. In Kabul Province (unlike in the Eastern Region), the deployment of magnetic devices is a rare oc-currence, though a very similar case to the PD 9 incident had been reported during the previous month (8 July) from the Deh Sabz section of the ‘New Bagram Road’. To conclude the low AOG account during the first two weeks of August, ANP identified and defused a wire-controlled IED on a secondary road in Dawazda Imam area of Paghman (probably destined for frequent IMF convoys), a locality which saw several ANSF search opera-

A significant theft of cash from an INGO vehicle in Kabul City and a recurrent theme of land disputes inciting demonstrations and vio-lent clashes came to the fore this cycle while AOG activity re-mained minimal. Nevertheless, the two-fold deployment of mag-netic IEDs in Kabul City and in Surobi perhaps marks a new AOG trend in the making. For the rest, ANSF-IMF initiated over 70 % of all recorded incidents, with their operations visible main-ly in Kabul City (PD 16 topped the urban districts with three op-erations), Bagrami and Paghman. In the late morning hours of 9 August, the occupants of an IN-GO vehicle transporting cash be-tween a bank and a hawala office fell victims to a ‘slash tyre & grab’ scheme, during which the project money was stolen from the vehi-cle while the driver and his assis-tant were occupied with fixing the flat tyre. It is not clear whether the vehicle had been identified and followed from the bank, or if the attackers were lucky and got attracted by the sight of a high-profile 4x4 vehicle with an NGO temporary plate. The current pre-Eid period will likely mark the usual uptick in income-oriented criminal activity, in cities as well as along the well-travelled routes in more remote areas. For yet an-other example of an NGO-related cash transportation explored by a

tions during the previous weeks besides anoth-er criminal escalation this cycle. In Bagrami, an IMF night-raid led to the arrest of two suspected AOG in Alokhel Area on 5 August. The community staged a demonstra-tion opposing the IMF operation in the morn-ing after the strike. Two additional ANP-NDS operations and cache discoveries were report-ed from Bagrami this period, including a sig-nificant discovery of explosives in Koh Mor-warid. Yet, the mentioned events were side-lined by a land dispute in the Welayati area, which opposed the local influential community of Tarakhel tribesmen to a business group linked to a prominent parliamentarian who had recently acquired land in the area. On 9 Au-gust, ANSF deployed into the area to restore order following reports of skirmishes between the tribesmen and the private security of the said politician. The situation degenerated into violent clashes with the security force, which left several casualties among the community. The dead bodies of the victims were rushed to the Darulaman Road and later on exhibited in front of the Presidential Palace, where an ap-proximate 150 tribesmen protested against the stance of the authorities and the claims of the rival party. No further clashes resumed so far, as top power-brokers representing both groups initiated negotiations to settle the dispute.

NGO Incidents Year to Date 5

This Report Period 1

C E N T R A L R E G I O N

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weeks of August. Meanwhile, the opposition net-works in the peripheral districts were keen on showing their pres-ence in the DACs, as illustrated with several incidences of IDF and direct attacks in Charkh (probably a riposte to on-going IMF operations) or a three-fold IDF attack against the IMF base in Bazi Khel of Kharwar (close to the district center). IEDs de-ployed on the road network com-pleted the picture (including three effective strikes, two in Puli Alam and one in Charkh as well as a premature detonation during em-placement on the highway in Mu-hammad Agha). Yet, it was AOG networking in-volving the IEA structures in Ghazni, Wardak and Logar which marked perhaps the most signifi-cant development this cycle, and materialized in the appointment of a new District Shadow Gover-nor for Baraki Barak, a command-er previously established in Andar District of Ghazni. It appears that the nomination was negotiat-ed between the Logar PSG and his Ghazni counterpart. This de-velopment is of note as the Baraki Barak IEA structures have tradi-tionally had a strong word in de-termining the course of action in

AOG activity continued along similar volumes as in July (which marked a 25% drop compared to AOG-initiated incidents in June, but still kept 30% higher than the rates recorded in May). This cy-cle, AOG clearly focused their military effort on the Mohammad Agha & Puli Alam sections of the Kabul – Gardez Highway, where an NGO clinic was also collateral-ly impacted in the cross-fire. Dur-ing the overnight hours of 9 Au-gust, AOG attacked an IMF sup-ply convoy on the highway in Pul Qandahari (Muhammad Agha). The attack evolved into a 30-minute clash, during which two civilians hospitalized in the NGO clinic nearby received SAF inju-ries, while the facility also sus-tained a degree of structural dam-age. A bold day-time attack (1600 hrs) against an ANA vehicle trans-iting on the highway (Joyak-Pashtunabad area, Puli Alam) in the afternoon of the same day speaks volumes as to the AOG poise in the area. The group killed the two ANA occupants and drove the vehicle to Babus where it was later recovered by ANP. In addition, at least 6 direct attacks and 2 IED strikes were staged on the highway, or along the road network in the vicinity of this artery during the first two

large parts of the province well beyond the confines of Baraki Barak proper. Similarly to the case of Jalrez in Wardak, where another Andar-based commander was recently ap-pointed as the District Shadow Governor, it seems that the ever-expanding IEA structures in Ghazni have been increasingly involved on the battlefields in the southern provinces of the Central Region. In Baraki Barak, the IMF continued larger-scale operations and tracking down the field commanders. Whereas the op-erations succeeded in impacting the local struc-tures in the short term, the networking efforts described above prove that the AOG struc-tures are mature and flexible enough to supply fresh military leaders from outside, a develop-ment which often comes with allocation of more resources to domestic networks and a pressure on the new commanders to show results within a short span of time, ultimately leading to an uptick in violence. On the ground, AOG attempted their own version of a ‘capture or kill’ operation with an ambush aimed at the convoy of Baraki Barak COP in Oni Saydan, on the Puli Alam – Baraki Barak Road, though their attempt to harm the com-mander failed.



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GRAPH INFORMATION:

The graphs provided in this report are accurate as of the 10th of August 2011. In

addition, the NGO Incidents/Year to Date figures include Criminal and AOG attributed events only. Incidents attributed to other actors (i.e. ANSF) are not

captured in this data.

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attacks against IMF-ANSF units. On 7 August, the security forces were conducting a joint operation in the area, when they came under AOG SAF. The clash left 2 IMF killed and an additional 5 IMF injured, though a possibility exists that the IMF casualties resulted from friendly fire. On 12 August, an IMF convoy drove onto a pressure-plate IED in Shahzada Khel (Tagab-Surobi Road), with the blast killing one and wounding four IMF members. Although the recently rotated IMF contingent remains pro-active in engaging the AOG, their posture has not de-terred the AOG from picking up the fight so far. Considering the main conflict vectors, the current IMF&ANSF presence is not size-able enough to control AOG ac-cess into the province and their movements between the districts, a condition which appears neces-sary to disrupt the logistical chains. On the contrary, anecdo-tal reports from Surobi indicate that local AOG based in Yakhdand (affiliated with HIG but also maintaining close links with the IEA networks) contrib-ute to the AOG efforts in Tagab. Further, additional reports emerged this cycle that a Yakhand-based commander was recently

The month of August opened up with an unprecedented record of AOG activity. The cycle marked a dozen AOG-initiated attacks, which came close to the volumes recorded for the entire month of July. A rare IDF attack against the DAC in Kohistan 1 and a two-fold IED strike in Nijrab (Shukhi, Darah Kalan) were the only outliers against the string of attacks in Tagab. Yet, AOG also left a trace in Karezak, Mahmudi Raqi, where an IED was discov-ered and defused by ANP. In Tagab, AOG mobilization trans-lated into a heavy casualty toll endured by the IMF contingent meanwhile another strand of AOG effort targeted the ALP. Four effective IED strikes oc-curred on the main roads (equally split between Tagab and Nijrab), exposing the civilian population to the risks of direct impact. In one such case, a civilian vehicle drove into a pressure-plate IED in Dara Kalan (Nijrab). The consequent blast killed the driver on the spot while another civilian, a female walking nearby an ALP check-point, was wounded in an RCIED explosion in Tatar Khel. Nawroz Khel, a hub strategically located on the Tagab - Surobi road with a secondary access to Alasay, hosted three AOG direct

appointed as an IEA District Shadow Gover-nor in Alasay. Similarly, Kohi Safi of Parwan is occasionally explored as a staging area for attacks across the river in Shukhi (Afghaniya Valley, Nijrab), while local networks are also closely linked to the opposition groups in Surobi. This period, ALP constituted another target of choice for AOG attacks in Tagab. On 8 Au-gust, Tatar Khel witnessed the above-mentioned RCIED attack against an ALP CP, which killed an ALP member and injured a female civilian. Shortly after the blast, the ALP force shot and killed an unarmed individ-ual who had reportedly triggered the device and attempted to escape from the area. The next day, AOG shot and killed another ALP member on his way to his duty station in Wali Khel (Tagab – Surobi Road). While the target-ing of IMF/ANSF seems more opportunistic and stimulated by one-time IMF/ANSF opera-tions, strikes against the local police force and their ‘informants’ (real or perceived) will likely become a more independent feature of AOG reasserting their control over the communities in the wake of the IMF gradual withdrawal.

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operation in Jawe Zareen Area in the Tangi Valley (Saydabad) on 6 August, an IEA unit successfully targeted a US Navy Chinook heli-copter with an RPG. The aircraft crashed following the impact, leading to the deaths of all 30 IMF crew-members, 7 ANA comman-dos and 1 interpreter. Although SAFIRE (surface-to-air fire) en-gagements (particularly those tar-geting low-flying helicopters) re-main a relatively common feature of the security landscape in kinetic areas across the country—in par-ticular in the Eastern and South-ern Regions—effective attacks are rare. The IEA precipitated to claim the responsibility as the at-tack provided a great moral boost to the network, while the IMF countered with an air-strike on 9 August in Se Ab Area of Chaki Wardak which killed 13 AOG members. The IMF claimed that one of the targeted fighters had been implicated in the Chinook incident, a statement destined to counter IEA ideological explora-tion of the successful strike but unlikely to achieve such a goal. The area of Mullah Khel came to the fore with the mentioned ab-duction & killing of 7 ANSF per-sonnel (3 NDS and 4 ANP), played out on the main road and concluded in another location on the outskirts of Maidan Shahr (Kote Ashro), where the bodies of the victims were discovered in the morning of 12 August (the actual abduction happened at around 1700 hrs. the previous day). Of note, the victims were travelling low-profile in a rented van, only two of them were armed, and it appeared probable that the AOG element had prior notice on their movement. Mullah Khel under-went a series of significant devel-opments since the beginning of June when ANSF-IMF managed

Although reports of two NGO-related incidents were received during this cycle (although both pertained to the previous cycle), this reporting period will be re-membered mainly due to two spectacular AOG attacks. An effective RPG strike brought down an IMF SF helicopter in the Tangi Valley of Saydabad (and resulted in the largest number of IMF casualties in a single incident since the beginning of the IMF intervention in Afghanistan), while in Mullah Khel of Maidan Shahr, AOG abducted and exe-cuted 7 ANSF officers on their way to Day Mirdad. Whereas the Chinook helicopter incident marks a spectacular strike, it does not change much to the security landscape (besides its psychologi-cal impact on both parties of the conflict), the developments in Mullah Khel indicate an important allocation of AOG resources in an area which may become a strategic hotspot of the conflict in the weeks to come (the area stretches along the main road connecting Maidan Shahr to Jalrez and on-wards to western Wardak and Bamyan). On 23 July, three civilians, includ-ing an NGO local worker, were shot dead by IMF in the Bazaar area of Chaki Wardak, reportedly unarmed and on their way to the mosque. As of yet, the exact cir-cumstances (namely the posture of either side) have not been elu-cidated. The next day in Maidan Shahr, an NGO staff member— employed as a driver of a rented van used to transport medical supplies and patients— was de-tained by NDS upon having been identified when transporting an injured AOG member from Nirkh towards the provincial capi-tal. During an IMF-led night-time

to eliminate a local IEA commander. His place was taken over by another IEA com-mander from Nirkh who brought in fresh fighters and provisions, while a new District Shadow Governor for Jalrez was appointed shortly afterwards— the job assumed by an Andar-based commander who is a known associate of the Ghazni Provincial Shadow Governor (more on Ghazni-Wardak-Logar conundrum in the Logar section of this re-port). Ever since, Mullah Khel has clearly be-come a focal area for AOG activity in Jalrez/Maidan Shahr. Indeed, the latest attack has been preceded by 3 AOG-led escalations in the area since the beginning of August, including two cases of direct fire against PSCs and an RCIED strike against IMF. Looking at the wider Jarlez main road (link road to Behsud1/Hajigak via Jalrez), in total 5 AOG incidents (2 IED strikes, and 3 direct attacks, all targeting the security forces) were staged during this cycle on this artery. Overall, AOG activity in Jalrez & western parts of Maidan Shahr has maintained the levels reached since the begin-ning of Operation Badr (5 to 7 AOG attacks in each district each month), and will likely ex-tend into the weeks to come. For the rest, the conflict developments fol-lowed the established patterns and territorial distribution, with nearly 60 % of AOG escala-tions in Wardak taking place along the High-way in Saydabad. However, AOG incident volumes seem to have dropped as compared to the last two months, a likely effect of the Ram-adan period. Besides the main conflict sphere, NGOs have been monitoring the events in Daymirdad and Behsud 1, where the Kuchi nomads started resettling in the areas from which they had been ousted by ANA earlier in June/July (Gardane Dewal, Qerghayi, Kotale Nakhsho). So far, this new wave of the Kuchi migration has not lead to violent escalations.

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ince remained calm, including Kahmard and Shibar districts where the ANSF also continued to reinforce the security infra-structure. In spite of the fact that road-side criminality has dropped considerably this year (only 2 inci-dents have been reported so far, both of them from the Ghandak Valley), the upcoming Eid period will encompass increased motiva-tion for criminal networks to in-tercept passengers in possession of cash and valuables, a factor to

While the national security appa-ratus continued to expand in Bamyan (this cycle, the ANA tashkil for Yakawlang and Panjab has been made public), a single violent escalation unrelated to the political conflict was reported from Dozdan Chashma in Yakaw-lang. Three local residents were taken into custody by ANP and charged with the killing of a local farmer, whose cattle and sheep grazed on the land belonging to the perpetrators without their consent. For the rest, the prov-

take into account during NGO road missions, particularly in Shibar District.

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for the assistance attended the distribution site to claim their share. ANP had to intervene and arrest three individuals who brought shot guns to support their claim. Unlike in Bamyan, where addi-tional ANSF checkpoints have been deployed on the main road network including access to Daykundi via Panjab and Waras, the road network in Daykundi will likely remain less policed during

The developments in Daykundi remained scarce as to significant incidents, though an escalation recorded in Khadir is noteworthy. On 13 August, a distribution of food items (wheat) implemented by GOA (Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disa-bled) within a project targeting female-headed households and the disabled individuals went awry in Shakardara area of Khedir when a group of disenchanted residents who had not qualified

the pre-Eid period, which usually marks an increase in road-side criminal activities, in par-ticular along the main access routes during the evening and night-time hours.



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THE ANSO REPORT



PA R W A N

but also including one attempted strike against the Governor’s Of-fice) became the most typical ex-pression of AOG presence in Chaharikar. Of note, the latest attack can also be interpreted as an attempt at removing another strong regional ally of President Karzai in the same vain as the attacks against Gen. Daud Daud and Gen. Sayedkheli for the North, Jan Mohammad Khan for Uruzgan, or the president’s own step brother for Kandahar. While the conspicuous timing of the attack leaves question marks as to the AOG penetration of the GOA/ANSF apparatus, two of the attackers also appeared to have used ANP uniforms to de-ceive the security personnel, a tactical method of choice for the initial phase of the attack which commenced with an AOG opera-tive in ANP uniform approaching the gate to the compound and triggering his BBIED. In Guzare Payeen of Jabalussaraj (where the current IEA Provincial Shadow Governor reportedly hails from), an AOG unit attempted to breach the house of a local ANP officer (stationed for duty in Kohi Safi) with the use of SAF and a hand grenade. Local ANP de-ployed to the area and repelled the attackers, though the intimidating effect of the night-time strike is likely to prevail as the attacked

On 14 August, a complex attack against the Governor’s Office in Chaharikar inflicted a heavy casu-alty toll among the civilian popu-lation (in total, 19 individuals were killed and 38 sustained injuries; besides 11 ANP casualties, the remaining victims were civilians) and overturned an otherwise quiet period in Parwan. Besides the breach itself, the mobilization of sizeable resources employed by AOG in the attack (6 operatives, at least 3 BBIED charges, and one SVBIED charge) and the planning (the attack coincided with a secu-rity meeting of the Governor with district COPs and IMF mentors) made for the ‘spectacular’ aspects of the event, despite the fact that the attackers failed to reach the VIP personnel. Looking at the developments preceding the at-tack, the concerted effort of the opposition to destabilize the prov-ince this year became apparent with the appointment of the Pro-vincial Shadow Governor earlier in the spring, and the AOG ‘surge’ in Ghorband. The IEA PSG had ‘inaugurated’ his tenure with a previous AOG attempt on the Governor’s life (a single BBIED operative approached the governor’s convoy exiting the compound and detonated his charge on June 21). Meanwhile, the IDF attacks (mostly oriented against IMF and ANSF premises,

household had already lost a son in an AOG targeted attack in the past. A deadlocked situation continues in Ghor-band, where sporadic one-time ANSF and/or IMF operations alternate with similarly infre-quent AOG strikes. During this cycle, AOG ambushed ANP convoys transiting on the Ka-bul – Bamyan road in Siyagerd on two differ-ent occasions in Dih Naw and in Puli Rangab. Both situations developed into clashes and casualties were recorded on both sides. As far as the AOG continue to enjoy their current freedom of movement in the valley, unless a game changer occurs (such as the establish-ment of permanent ANP and IMF outposts in the known AOG hotspots and along the infil-tration routes) similar levels of AOG activity may be expected in Ghorband in the coming months until the winter break. In Chaharikar, AOG will likely maintain IDF as their signa-ture activity, while infrequent complex or sui-cide attacks against the Governor and other high-profile targets remain a possibility as soon as the AOG resupply. As long as NGOs con-tinue to avoid exposure to high-profile political and security targets, the province will likely continue to present a reasonably permissive environment for NGO operations.

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targeting/timing purposes). Un-like initially reported, it now ap-pears that GOA vehicles which were reported in the vicinity at the time were not close enough at the time of detonation to be consid-ered the potential target, making it likely that the IED was targeting the IO convoy. Two days later, on the 5th, a se-cond IED detonation occurred at approximately the same time in the morning (0850hrs) in the same general area. This time, the IED targeted a white Toyota Hilux (occupants unknown), a vehicle often associated with NDS (although used by civilians and NGOs as well). In both attacks, nobody was injured. Further to this, on the final day of the previ-ous reporting period (July 31st), an AOG was sighted in a village close to the main road in Angor Bagh area (where the IED against the IO detonated). ANP opened fire on the group and they disap-peared. In addition, in Balkh on the 6th, also along the main Mazar – Shibirghan Road, an AOG am-bushed at 0500hrs an ANSF con-voy while it was on its way to con-duct a military operation in Cha-har Bolak District. ANSF re-sponded, causing the AOG to retreat after a fire fight which

In the morning of 14th August in District 3 of Mazar-e Sharif City, 4 armed individuals stopped a moneychanger who was trans-porting a large quantity of money on behalf of an INGO. The gun-men stole the money, however the moneychanger, who was travelling alone in a low-profile car, escaped the attack unharmed. The attacks of this type are extremely rare in Mazar-e Sharif City and remain an outlier to the existing security par-adigm in the area. From the de-tails of the incident it appears that the ambush was well planned and executed. The transport of money was a regular occurrence that most likely provided the oppor-tunity for the attackers to prepare their operation. Another incident of note occurred on the 3rd of August, when an IED detonated against the last vehicle of an IO convoy consist-ing of 3 marked IO vehicles in Chahar Bolak District along the main Mazar-Shibirghan road. Initially reported as having deto-nated approximately 20 meters behind the vehicle (as the driver noticed the smoke in his rear view mirror after the detonation) it now appears the IED detonated alongside the vehicle, clearly marking that the IO was the target (with the last one likely hit for

killed 1 local civilian and injured 2 AOG mem-bers. This volume of incident reporting along the Mazar-Shibrighan Road represents a notewor-thy spike, although it does not constitute a completely new trend. What makes it interest-ing is not only the 2 IEDs detonating along the main road in close proximity in terms of time and location, but the fact that this is occurring shortly after Operation Ebtekar 2 (to clear the main road) went into its ANSF led “Hold” phase. In the past, the main road has remained fairly quiet during hold phases, becoming more active as the phase ends. Whether this volume of activity will continue in the area remains to be seen. Also of note, 5 Bangladeshi nationals who had been working for a private road construction company and had been abducted from Kishin-de on December 17th were released on the 2nd. Information surrounding their release remains tentative, as it has not been elucidated under what circumstances the captives were released, whether a ransom was paid or—as an AOG website states—they were set free in the spirit of Ramadan and because they promised not to work for any organization that supports “foreign occupancy” again.



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tacks), 1 other ANP was also in-jured. The organization provided security for a Government Organ-ization (GO) that has a strong presence in the North, while AOGs have accused it as being an “intelligence gathering” agency on their website (an often used term for PSCs). Although not entirely common, the targeting of PSCs is not considered abnormal country-wide. Just two days after this attack (August 4th), at approximately 0610 in the morning (and just 10 minutes after IMF conducted a controlled detonation on an IED they had discovered the previous night) an IED detonated on an NDS officer’s vehicle, killing the officer and a child, as well as in-juring 2 others. The officer was the head of NDS for the district. The other IED to detonate in Kunduz occurred against an ANP vehicle, damaging the vehicle but causing no casualties. These deto-nations—with the complex attack and the killing of the NDS officer occurring inside Kunduz City it-self—mark a somewhat predicta-ble surge in AOG activity follow-ing a quiet month. The lull due to IMF/ANSF operations followed by shock tactic has been played out in Kunduz over this year and prior to this, and it is expected

The relative quiet reporting peri-ods witnessed in July gave way early August to 5 IED detona-tions (3 around Kunduz City), 9 IED discoveries, and the arrest of an AOG member who was in the process of planting 2 IEDs (also in Kunduz City). In the latter incident, a search of the man’s house revealed a further 3 IEDs. None of these was more notable than the complex attack involving multiple IEDs that occurred at approximately 0410hrs in the morning on August 2nd. Just following the first day of Rama-dan, a VBIED (a Toyota Corolla) detonated in Kunduz City at the front gate of an international Pri-vate Security Company (PSC) which was partnering with a na-tional PSC. Following the detona-tion—which was large enough to cause 10 civilian casualties and damage to the windows and doors of a number of nearby houses—including a neighbouring NGO compound—2 armed BBIEDs entered the compound on foot and detonated themselves after engaging in a fire fight with ANP/NDS and national PSC guards. The resulting casualties (outside of the civilians noted above) in-cluded the deaths of 4 national guards and 3 AOG members (1 who was driving the VBIED and 2 of the subsequent BBIED at-

that Kunduz will see a strong level of activi-ty—featuring IED based attacks—for the du-ration of the month. It is also notable that incidents are happening fairly early in the morning following the onset of Ramadan (before it gets too hot out, and relatively soon after individuals eat in the morning, before the daily fast). Another district that continues to see issues is Khanabad. Although Khanabad only wit-nessed 5 incidents this recording period (including 2 IED detonations and a separate IED discovery), there continue to be GOA/pro-government militia (PGM) tensions throughout the district. Following inter-PGM violence that started a little over a month ago, and a subsequent security meeting mid-July, the GOA approached a number of PGMs and asked them to disarm, giving them a due date to do so. Although there had been a corre-sponding lull in inter-PGM violence, the ten-sions are still existent, as evidenced by an inci-dent which occurred in Akhtash area on the 9th when 5 PGM members were arrested by the ANP after attempting to escape from sur-rendering their weapons. Although strong ANP/PGM violence has not occurred yet, the possibility remains worth monitoring.

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THE ANSO REPORT

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hough details remain sketchy). During the previous reporting period, 2 staff members of a local demining NGO had been abduct-ed along the Maymana – Almar road on July 28th, and escaped or were freed a few days later, where it appeared they had also been taken and were being held in Khwaja Namusa area(Pashtun Kot). The fact that both groups of deminers (NGO and non-NGO) were being held in Khwaja Namusa, and that 3 abductions—2 of them involving NGOs—took place over a 6 day window (July 28th, July 31st, August 2nd) marks a significant spike in abduction related insecurity. Further to this, all 3 NGO abductions (plus this most recent abduction of private deminers) have either taken place in Pashtun Kot or held the cap-tives in Pashtun Kot (or both). Faryab witnessed abductions last year, and it is worth monitoring whether or not this trend contin-ues. Following the 3 abductions over 6 days, no other abductions had been reported in Faryab the

Faryab continues to record a high volume of security incidents, with Pashtun Kot surfacing as a signifi-cant hot spot—specifically in re-gards to abductions—over the final days of the last reporting period and the first days of this one. Three staff members of a national NGO who had been ab-ducted on the last day of the pre-vious reporting period (31 July) in Sorkhab Village of the Kariz area (Pashtun Kot) were released the following day (August 1st) follow-ing the intervention of elders. There had originally been 4 of them in a GOA ambulance when they had been stopped by armed members of an AOG, who had proceeded to leave the only fe-male in the group in the care of a local religious elder while the rest were taken into temporary captiv-ity. The day following their re-lease (August 2nd), 3 members of a private demining company—also national—were abducted in Khwaja Namusa of Pashtun Kot, and held until the 6th, when they were also released (reportedly due to the intervention of elders, alt-

week following. Pashtun Kot was one of two districts to see a telecommunications tower attacked this period as well. In Gadai Qala Village on the 4th, armed men—believed to be members of an AOG—attacked and severely damaged a tele-communications tower, and a similar incident (although causing less damage to the tower) occurred on August 2nd in Qaramqol District. Qaramqol District is located just adjacent to Dawlatabad District. Dawlatabad had seen a number of incidents over June and the first half of July, but had quieted significantly re-cently. Nonetheless, this reporting period AOG attacked an ANP Checkpoint #9 along the main Maymana – Shibirghan Road in the evening hours on August 7th. In addition, AOG activities manifested itself in Jungal area (also along the main road) with an illegal checkpoint reported at around 0800 hrs on the 14th. The incident evolved in an hour-long clash with ANP deployed to the area, but did not result in casualties.



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FARYAB AOG FARYAB Crime

THE ANSO REPORT

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they liberated the trucks of all their fuel before releasing the drivers and the empty fuel tanks. Of note, the last incident prior to this one involving a fuel tanker (SAF against a fuel tanker on July 24th) also took place in Dushi District, as did the last security incident along the Kabul – Puli Khumri Road (an AOG attacked an ANP checkpoint in Dushi Dis-trict at 2100hrs on the 31st of July). On the Puli Khumri – Kunduz road, an RCIED detonated on a pro-government militia (PGM) commander’s vehicle on the 1st (in Baghlani Jadid District at 1400hrs). The same district expe-rienced another IED strike when an explosive device prematurely detonated along the main road at 1000hrs but without causing casu-alties. On the Puli Khumri – Mazar

Insecurity is slowly increasing along the main roads throughout Baghlan. Puli Khumri City serves as a transport hub to individuals wishing to use the main roads to travel between Mazar, Kunduz (and further northeast), and Ka-bul. This reporting period includ-ed incidents along all 3 sections of that road (Puli Khumri – Kabul, Puli Khumri – Kunduz, and Puli Khumri – Mazar). This keeps in line with last month’s trending of increased insecurity, although as of the time of this writing, the volume had not yet reached that of the previous 2 reporting peri-ods. On the Puli Khumri – Kabul road, armed criminals stopped 2 fuel tankers early on the morning of the 11th in Dushi District, tied up the drivers, and took the vehi-cles and the drivers from Sang Sorkh area (where they had been stopped) to Zaman Khil, where

road, an IED was discovered by local civilians and defused by NDS at 0930hrs on the 8th (around Puli Khumri City). The fact that both of these occurred during NGO travel times (between 0830 and 1530hrs during the day) is concerning, but the increased use of IEDs in Baghlan remains consistent with trends noted over July. Further to this trend—but not involving IEDs—unknown armed individuals shot and killed a GOA staff member (the Culture and Information Officer of Puli Khumri City) in his private residence in Baghlani Jadid the night of the 8th (early morning on the 9th). Baghlani Jadid remains the focal point for AOG activities in the province, having experi-enced 9 security incidents in the last fortnight.



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BAGHLAN

BAGHLAN AOG BAGHLAN Crime

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assets (strictly for financial bene-fit—there have been no political aspects reported to this crime). The first half of August did not denote a continuation to the rela-tive spike of insecurity witnessed over the last period, with approxi-mately 14 incidents, and only 1 initiated by AOGs. Farkhar, where the above incident took place, was the site of 2 other nota-ble incidents on the 6th and the 7th, marking the 12th and 13th incident in the district this year, 8 of which have taken place over the past 6 weeks. This marks al-ready the most incidents ever rec-orded in the district in any given year (with the previous high being 11 in 2009). On the 6th, an armed clash occurred between a

On the final day of the previous reporting period (July 31st)—but not reported until this reporting period—an NGO vehicle was stopped and robbed in the vicinity of Kashektan Village (Farkhar District) while moving into the area with a relatively large quantity of cash. The NGO had been im-plementing a cash-for-work pro-gram for approximately 2 months when it was stopped and robbed around there area where the pro-gram was being implemented. Reports suggest the vehicle was stopped by 2 armed men, who took the cash and fled, with initial assessments indicating that the 2 men likely knew that this vehicle would be coming and carrying this amount of cash, and that this was an active targeting of the NGO’s

Jihadi commander and an armed group in Khurm Ab village, followed the next day by the launching of 3 RPG rounds at a personal residence in Khishti Village. Incidents such as these have characterized Takhar’s recent inse-curity, with few areas denoting an extensive lack of security, but the volume off overall insecurity on the rise. Ishkamish saw a further 3 incidents, and the only AOG attributed this cycle occurred in Qaraweldy Village of Khwaja Bahawuddin District, when an AOG abducted a village elder, releasing him the same day.



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TAKHAR AOG TAKHAR Crime

THE ANSO REPORT



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actors (AOG, ACG, GOA, and others) to have multiple motiva-tions and/or affiliations (meaning that this could be the work of an AOG that also sometimes acts criminally) at this time this ap-pears to be a straight robbery ra-ther than the work of a politically motivated group. Although strong rumours arose around the incident claiming that it was meant to target the religious lead-er of the mosque, who was alleg-edly speaking against AOGs, this information appears to have little merit at this time. The head of the mosque was present when the incident took place, and multiple sources confirm that he was in no way singled out. Darzab and Qush Tepa Dis-tricts—which combine to form Jawzjan’s contribution to the Tri Prov inc i a l Area (TPA)—witnessed 2 incidents involving the targeting of pro-government militia members by AOGs. The more notable of those 2 occurred

The armed robbery of civilians at a local mosque in Aqcha and AOG/pro-government militia violence highlighted an otherwise calm reporting period for Jawzjan Province, which witnessed only 8 security incidents over the current reporting cycle. In Aqcha, armed men entered a mosque late on the evening of the 7th and searched and robbed civil-ians who were praying there. Over the course of the robbery, 2 civilians attempted to flee, and the group shot them, killing 1 and injuring the other. Local GOA has been adamant that this was the act of an AOG, going so far as to claim to know which AOG conducted the incident and who their leader was, but on the sur-face the robbery appears largely inconsistent with AOG tactics in the North, where AOGs have usually searched individuals for GOA IDs and/or threatened them to support AOG activities and not work with the GOA. While it is not uncommon for

in Darzab, when an AOG attacked pro-government militia members (PGMs) in Archato village on the 4th. The incident esca-lated to where ANP were deployed to rein-force the area and— hours later—IMF air sup-port was called in. The ensuing casualties were significant, with reports indicating that 2 ANP and 20 AOG members were killed, and 1 ANP officer and 2 PGM members were injured. In a less noteworthy incident, an AOG also at-tacked a PGM checkpoint in Nawabad Ab-dulrahim village on the 1st. Issues involving AOGs and PGMs continue to be a defining characteristic of how the conflict plays out in the TPA. This is largely be-cause—as noted previously—PGMs and AOGs compete in these areas for local sup-port, with AOGs unwilling to give up influ-ence amongst the community in the long time AOG stronghold.

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JAWZJAN AOG JAWZJAN Crime

An anti-ANP demonstration con-ducted by Jamiat party mem-bers—supporters of a local Jihadi commander aligned with the top Jamiat power broker in the prov-ince—occurred on August 6th, following the killing of two of the commander’s bodyguards. The killing occurred when the ANP had been deployed to break up a sustained conflict between two commanders of different political affiliations (Jamiat/Jumbesh). Although the conflict had been ongoing for a few weeks, sources suggest that on the 5th, a unit of ANP moved to Dara-I Suf Payin to break up an ongoing escalation between the two. During the at-



S A M A N G A N

tempt, a shoot-out occurred that resulted in the deaths of 2 of the Jamiat bodyguards. The next morning (August 6th), the bodies of these individuals were brought to Aybak by other supporters, one to the hospital and one to the house of a local power broker. Following discussions at the pow-er broker’s house, the group marched down to the Provincial Governor’s Office, chanting anti-ANP slogans in what looked like a potentially combustible demon-stration. However, the Governor addressed the crowd before noon, and they dispersed peacefully soon after. Although this demon-

stration ended peacefully, issues between PGMs and/or local commanders and ANP—especially inter - party issues—bare continued monitoring. In the other noteworthy incident to occur in the province, armed men riding motorcycles robbed a gold shop in Aybak on the morning of the 9th, with one o them being subsequently arrested while the other managed to escape.

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SAMANGAN AOG SAMANGAN Crime

THE ANSO REPORT

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lage (both this year), both of them involved intimidation, with the prior one involving an AOG. In the first incident in Qush Tepa, which occurred on April 25th, 20-25 armed men riding motorcycles entered the village and immediate-ly proceeded to the owner of a house which was being used by an INGO, demanding to know their whereabouts. With the NGO staff members not in the village, the group asked the owner to let them know in advance the next the INGO was scheduled to visit. The NGO met with the commu-nity, which conceded that there were armed men in the general vicinity of the village, and that they would not be able to guaran-tee the NGO’s security, which caused the NGO to withdraw from the location. It is alleged by individuals in the area that the same AOG that has been con-ducting operations along the Sar-e Pul – Shibirghan road (and likely was involved in the illegal check-point this period) is the one that may be intermittently intimidating villages such as Qush Tepa along the road, but this remains uncon-firmed at this time. In another incident to occur in Sar-e Pul District occurred in Sar-e Pul City, around the vicinity of the Governor’s office, when prisoners

The relative volume of inactivity that had been noted along the Sar-e Pul – Shibirghan road was dis-rupted by a short daytime illegal checkpoint around Sayed Abad area that occurred at 1030hrs in the morning on the 9th. This was the first recorded illegal check-point to occur along the road since July 14th (although the 13th for the year), with the last one also being a daytime occurrence. So far, 5 of the 14 illegal checkpoints have occurred during “NGO trav-el hours “(between the hours of 0830 and 1530). As per other such incidents, armed men stopped at least 1 private vehicle to search for GOA employees, with no ensuring engagement tak-ing place. Prior to this, the road had been fairly quiet, with no other reports of illegal checkpoints or attacks on IMF/ANP elements for the duration of the cycle. However, Qush Tepa Village—which lies just off the main road—saw a second act of intimidation this year when armed individuals—reportedly members of an AOG—approached a private con-struction company’s compound and threatened them not to work, setting fire to one of their loading vehicles as they left. Although there have only been two inci-dents recorded in Qush Tepa vil-

who were unhappy with their treatment and sentencing set fire to a mattress in one of their rooms and subsequently attempted a prison break on the night of August 2nd. Although sources suggest that the prisoners made it through the first gate, they were turned back at the second by prison guards and ANP/NDS reinforcements. Reports of gun fire surfaced as the guards attempted to intimidate the pris-oners and take control of the crowd, but sources suggest that nobody was hurt (or es-caped) in the incident. A further 4 incidents took place in Sayyad and Sar-e Pul districts. Amongst these, AOGs continued to target pro-government militias (PGMs) in the Tri-Provincial Area in an attack in Shah Toot village on the 4th, where PGM members from Darzab (Jawzjan) had to be called in to assist the besieged PGMs. Reports indicate that 2 PGM members and 1 AOG member were killed, and that the AOG were able to secure a heavy machine gun from the area. Another attack on PGMs occurred in Sar-e Pul (Boghwai Uzbakia) but did not involve casualties. Conflict in the TPA continues to heavily feature PGM/AOG violence as the GOA and the AOGs who reside there com-pete for influence and control of the area.



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SAR‐E PUL

SAR‐E PUL AOG SAR‐E PUL Crime

NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the 10th of

August 2011.

THE ANSO REPORT

Darayim an ANP serviceman was killed when a magnetic IED which had been attached to the vehicle of a former AOG commander det-onated, and in Baharak, an AOG attacked an ANSF/IMF joint convoy with an RCIED (followed by SAF). Anecdotal reports from the province suggest that Badakhshan recently witnessed an influx of external AOG actors—with some suggesting their origins in Kunduz—moving through the province to-wards the East (Baharak and Warduj). This was highlighted with an AOG ambush target-ing an ANP patrol in the DAC area of Warduj, which injured one civilian. Despite the previously reported ANSF opera-tions to disturb AOG and drug trafficking net-works, armed groups keep maintaining pres-ence in the area, although their activities along the road have decreased. The road takes on a vital role during the drug season, and actors from a variety of parties (from AOG to GOA) are involved in the trafficking to Tajikistan and therefore have an incentive to keep the road open.

B A DA K H S H A N

of gun fire—manifested in the same mode. In light of the fact that there were no other surrounding structures in the area, but that it appeared to miss purposefully by a wide mar-gin, it is apparent that the gunfire was meant to intimidate rather than to cause casualties. Initial reports from the community sug-gest that the attack may have been the result of a personal dispute with the landowner of the com-pound, with multiple sources sug-gesting the community wants the NGO to stay in the area, but per-haps move out of that compound, however, conflicting reports exist. The NGO is currently in the pro-cess of communicating regularly with the community to assess the exact circumstances of the inci-dents and its origins, and to avoid similar events in the future. The last (and only other) NGO occur-rence in the district was August 2008 and was an IED outside an NGO compound for intimidation purposes in order to extort mon-ey. Three AOG attributed incidents occurred in the province this re-porting period as well. In

This reporting period Badakhshan witnessed an increase in the over-all level of security incident as compared with the previous cycle with a total of 14 security events recorded across the province, in-cluding one NGO related. At the end of the last reporting period, an NGO compound and clinic came under harassing fire twice (once on July 25th, and once on July 30th), in a pair of inci-dents that have yet to properly assessed. The incident occurred in the area around Shingan in Yawan District, a district which has only recorded 17 security incidents since 2006, with this marking the 3rd thus far this year. Reports suggest that the NGO, which was relatively se-cluded from other compounds, observed a medium volume of SAF shot from the surrounding hills towards—but well above—their compound late the evening of the 25th. The initial responses they received from the communi-ty suggested that it might be relat-ed to drug traffickers (a reaction ANSO was able to independently verify). However, just 5 days lat-er, they received a second volley



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BADAKHSHAN AOG BADAKHSHAN Crime

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the

security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us

regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

THE ANSO REPORT

During this reporting period He-rat City experienced an IED inci-dent in which AOG detonated a RCIED against a GOA vehicle while in transit in District 5. So far this year there have been only 4 IED incidents recorded in the city, and in spite of this latest inci-dent, their use is likely to remain rare in the city in the future. In contrast, the use of IEDs remains a common tactic for AOG against IMF/ANSF on the outskirts of Herat City: for example, Guzara and Injil, where high profile facili-ties are located along the main road, as seen in the incident of an IED detonation against an IMF convoy in transit on the 4th of this month. At the provincial level, AOG have continued to concentrate their activity in the eastern districts of Obe & Pashtun Zarghun. This period there were two AOG inci-dents in the former district: the first case involved an IED detona-tion against an ALP member and the other a SAF assault against an ANP CP in Krashk area. In addi-tion, recent reports indicate that AOG operating under a promi-nent commander in Pashtun Zar-ghun have recently gained rein-forcements from Adraskan and Helmand Province and are ex-panding their sphere of influence into the border area between Obe and Pashtun Zarghun and the southeast of Pashtun Zarghun. There were 3 incidents this period which further this assessment. In the first case, the AOG reportedly



H E R A T

abducted a driver along with a private commercial truck to the Chinaran village of Pashtun Zar-ghun where the AOG has strong influence, while the affected party was in transit in a border area be-tween the two districts (the driver and the truck were released un-harmed the next day, following negotiations held by elders). In the second case, the AOG abduct-ed 16 local civilians, many of whom are from a village located in the southeast of Pashtun Zar-ghun whose population has been resisting against its expansion (seven of the abductees were re-leased after payment of ransom). In the last incident, the AOG ad-vanced into a village located in the southeast of Pashtun Zarghun and tried to disarm villagers who had recently received a supply of ar-maments from the GOA. The villagers’ resistance against the AOG resulted in an armed clash, and in response, ANSF launched military operations which lasted for 2 days and temporarily dis-lodged the AOG from the south-east of Pashtun Zarghun to the border area with Obe. However, the prompt withdrawal of the ANSF deployment after the oper-ation, and the limited number of troops available in mountainous southeast region of Pashtun Zar-ghun, suggest that the AOG is likely to return in the near future. While these three cases suggest that the AOG under the said commander has been expanding

its sphere of influence towards northeast and southeast of Pashtun Zarghun, the resistance from the local population will likely continue, causing the security situation to further deteri-orate in the short term. The concentration of AOG activity in the northern and southern districts is another no-ticeable security trend of this reporting period. In Shindand and Kushk (mainly along the He-rat-Turghundi main road), the volume of AOG incidents and tactics employed (SAF/RPGs or IEDs against convoys and ANSF/IMF patrols) have remained consistent with longer term trends, though there was no AOG incidents recorded in Kushk Kuhna. Although the total number of AOG incidents dropped from 4 to 1 in comparison with the last two weeks of July, Gulran has remained a hotspot of abduction as on the 5th of August, AOG abducted two local civilians (they were released unharmed the following day). Reportedly, the local community’s resistance against this exter-nal AOG presence was the main reason for this abduction. Last month, locals from the said village fought and repelled the AOG after an ANP deployment was sent, killing three AOG supporters and one villager. Therefore, the AOG reportedly sought revenge and intim-idated the villagers by abduction in order to increase its influence. Abduction and the con-flict between the AOG and the local commu-nity in Gulran are likely to remain an im-portant consideration in the short term.

W E S T E R N R E G I O N

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HERAT AOG HERAT Crime

THE ANSO REPORT

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8 ANP officers wounded. At the provincial level, 43% of the total IED incidents was concentrated in Khaki Safed (3 out of 7), and the rest was equally spread into Anar Dara (1 incident), Qala-I-Kah (1 incident), Pusht Rod (1 incident), and Bakwa (1 incident). Overall, these cases indicate that IED incidents were concentrated mostly in the central districts along main roads used by IMF/ANSF for patrolling and logistic supply. In addition, the use of IED is likely to remain the prima-ry tactic by AOG in targeting the same. In contrast to IED incidents, dur-ing this reporting period, abduc-tion incidents have been noticea-bly absent and the number of inci-

Farah province experienced a sharp decrease in the total number of AOG incidents during this re-porting cycle (the total number of AOG incidents dropped from 26 to 10 in comparison to the PRP). Although the reason for this de-cline is not certain at present, the use of IED has remained a domi-nant tactic for AOG which is con-sistent with longer term trends. 71% of the total IED detonations (5 out of 7) targeted IMF/ANSF convoys and 57% of the total IED incidents (4 out of 7) oc-curred while the affected parties were in transit. As a result of the-se attacks, total casualties included the NDS Chief of Anar Dara Dis-trict, 2 ANA soldiers, and 4 ANP officers killed, and a further 1 IMF soldier, 3 ANA soldiers, and

dents which involved direct attack with SAF/RPGs decreased sharply. The total number of SAF/RPGs incidents declined from 12 to 2 in comparison with the previous reporting peri-od. Further, all incidents which involve direct attack with SAF/RPGs occurred in a specific area of Bala Buluk (Shiwan area) which has been a traditional stronghold of AOG. While the reason of this change in security trends during this reporting period is uncertain at pre-sent, it is reflective of a trend noted region wide which indicates a broad downturn in overall AOG activity levels.



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curring in Charsada during the first two weeks of this month. A roadside IED detonated prema-turely while being emplaced and killed one AOG member, and another roadside IED targeted an ANP vehicle while in transit in the same district and caused minor damage to a public transportation vehicle passing by. Of note, these mark the first IED incidents to be recorded in Charsada, and the exact reason for the emergence of this tactic is not certain at this moment, though the recent infil-tration of AOG from Helmand into this district is the likeliest cause. Taywara, whose border is adjacent to Helmand, traditionally hosts a high level of infiltration of Helmandi AOG which appears to have a link with the high number of IED incidents. In Charsada,

During this reporting cycle, Ghor province experienced 3 IED inci-dents initiated by AOG, although the total number of AOG inci-dents has dropped 37% (from 11 to 7) in comparison with the pre-vious reporting cycle. The use of IED has not been a common tac-tic for AOG in Ghor in the past and the primary concentration area for IED incidents was Tay-wara district. 36% of the total IED incidents of this year (4 out of 11), most of which targeted ANP and GOA, occurred in Tay-wara District, as seen in the first case this period when AOG planned to use a roadside IED against an ANP vehicle while it was in transit near the DAC (instead, the detonation killed one civilian passing by). However, IED use has spread, including two IED incidents oc-

since a prominent local commander originating from the said district was reportedly appointed as the Deputy Provincial Shadow Governor by IEA around April or May, the number of total AOG incidents has increased (all of the total 8 AOG incidents happened after the end of April of this year, and the total number of AOG incidents increased from 3 to 8 during the period from January to August of this year compared with the same period of the last year). While these incidents alone are not suf-ficient to establish longer term trends, it does suggest that the use of IED against high pro-file targets may further prevail in this province as AOG expand their presence and activity levels within the district.



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GHOR AOG GHOR Crime

THE ANSO REPORT

During this reporting period, AOG were less active in Badghis than in the previous reporting period (the number of total AOG incidents dropped from 24 to 16), for reasons that remain uncertain. The number of total IED detona-tions in this province noted a sharp decrease from 9 to 2, while the use of direct attack with SAF/ RPGs remained the dominant tactic for AOG. Ghormach, one of the districts where AOG activi-ty is traditionally concentrated, the number of total IED incidents has dropped from 5 to 0, while the total number of SAF/RPGs inci-dents has remained unchanged (5). In the case of Muqur and Qadis, 2 other areas of AOG ac-tivity concentration, the total IED incidents has declined (Muqur: from 2 to 0, and Qadis: from one



B A D G H I S

to 0), while the use of direct attack with SAF/RPGs against ANSF/IMF CPs or patrols has remained a common tactic for AOG. In contrast, in Murghab, usually the most active district, the total IED incidents has increased slightly (from 1 to 2). However, several reports suggest that a group of around 10 IED trainers have recently begun training local AOG members on new tactics and technology (such as magnetic and plastic IEDs) which has tem-porarily reduced IED activity until the training is completed. While this sharp decline of the use of IED tactic against ANSF/IMF convoys or patrols could affect this security trend for the short term, the volume of IED inci-

dents are likely to return to previous levels over the longer term. Regarding ALP issues, at the beginning of this month AOG assassinated the head of one of most powerful tribes in Qadis, which has strong influence over ALP of this district. Pri-or to his assassination, he was responsible for 100 ALP members from the Dara-e Boom area who were actively engaged in the pro-gram. He also took a major role in the APRP, recruiting a large number of AOG members to join ALP. As such, his assassination is likely to change the local power dynamics of the district and exacerbate existing tribal tensions.

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Country Level AOG Initiated Incidents: 2006-2011 (the numbers provided on the graph indicate yearly peaks)

THE ANSO REPORT

Nangarhar experienced one (indirect) NGO incident during this period, namely the killing of a Rodat community development council (CDC) employee, who was appointed by the NGO-supported CDC to oversee one of the council’s projects in the dis-trict. The incident, which oc-curred in the house of the em-ployee and also saw his brother killed, appears to have been driv-en by a personal dispute, rather than his status as an employee of the CDC. Furthermore, 4 days after the incident, in which one of the attackers was caught and stoned to death by angry neigh-bours, a night letter purportedly from local AOGs appeared in the district, stating that any locals that worked with ‘the Crusader armies’ would suffer the same fate as the doctor. However, this appears to have been an opportunistic piggy backing by local opposition mem-bers on an incident driven by oth-er tensions, a growing nationwide trend, and as such these twin de-velopments are not assessed to represent a deterioration in the NGO operating environment in that district. In the broader provincial environ-ment, AOG kinetic activity in the first half of Ramazan slowed to nearly nothing, with just 7 AOG-initiated incidents recorded across the province, a significant drop



N A N G A R H A R

consistent with the wider national slowdown during the month of fasting. Of these incidents, the most significant was the assassina-tion of a low-level NDS employee in Sorkh Rod. There was an in-consequential hit-and-run attack on the Sorkh Rod DAC late at night, with a similar nighttime attack recorded against the Achin DAC a week later, in this case injuring one ANP policeman. 2 IEDs targeted ANP vehicles in Chapahar and Rodat, while in Nazyan an ANBP CP was at-tacked with SAF, injuring local civilian in the cross fire. Finally, the home of an NDS official in Behsud was attacked late at night, to no avail. Much more important during the period were flare-ups of pre-existing local tribal/political ten-sions, both in Bati Kot and Achin. In the former, the Kuchi-Sepai conflict over land there led to fire-fights between the two sides in the Chardeh village area on the 9th, killing 3 Kuchis and 4 Sepai, with 15 others from both sides wounded. After a demonstration by the Sepai on the 10th protest-ing GOA inaction against the Ku-chis, which blocked Highway 7, ANSF fired on the crowd killing a Sepai protestor and a local civil-ian. The following day, ANSF conducted an operation against armed elements in both factions

in the Chardeh area, and arrested 3 for posses-sion of small arms. On the 15th, a central gov-ernment delegation attended the scene to at-tempt to find a resolution, but recent evidence of GOA ineffectiveness in settling such local disputes suggests that this issue may remain standing for the near future. In Achin too, the local land dispute, also involving the Sepai, continued to see bouts of armed clashes, alt-hough in the 4 incidents recorded, no one was injured or killed. In Jalalabad city, the conflict environment was dominated by consequences of the recent spate of abductions. First, the kidnapped money dealer was released after paying a ran-som, while the son of another money dealer also recently kidnapped was freed during an ANSF operation. Beyond this, the most sig-nificant incident was a warning letter received by a UN employee, threatening him to leave his job. Other incidents mostly consisted of fistfights broken up by ANP. Finally, Nangarhar recorded its first UAV crash in re-cent months, with one coming down in the Mawlawi Khalis Family Colony, an ironic land-ing location giving the strong anti-IMF senti-ment common in this township; not coinci-dentally, it must be assumed, it was not the IMF but the ANSF that recovered the wreck-age.

E A S T E R N R E G I O N

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THE ANSO REPORT

Kunar recorded one, familiar, NGO incident this period, where the IMF stationed in Khas Kunar again came to search the NGO clinic operating in Shalai. This is the third time that these forces have carried out such a search, and each time have come up emp-ty-handed in their attempts to find either medical or non-medical support for AOGs. While the NGO in question previously at-tempted to raise the issue with the IMF working in the area, the SOF element of the IMF presence in the area means that it is difficult for anyone to hold them to ac-count, including the local commu-nity and government; however, after the second fruitless search of the clinic, the IMF in the area did assert they had no intention of targeting the clinic again, making this latest incident even less un-derstandable. While the clinic searches appear in error, security forces in Khas Kunar do have some cause for worry in wider Khas Kunar, after the incident in which 2 Pakistani BBIED operatives were identified and killed by ANSF as they exited the district heading towards Asa-dabad, the work of the TTP-affiliated AOG operating out of Mohmand Agency into the dis-trict. During this period, howev-er, the only AOG incident in Khas Kunar was an SAF attack on an ANP CP in the Saro Ghundey area. Elsewhere, the key security devel-opments were in the north-western corridor, represented by Manogai and Wata Pur districts.



K U N A R

Most importantly, in the final days of July and the beginning of this period international military forc-es re-entered their previously abandoned facilities in Manogai and upper Wata Pur (with the bulk of the forces concentrated in Nangalam as previously), 6 months after they had pulled out and ‘transitioned’ to ANSF com-mand there. The IMF’s stated objectives in returning to these areas remain in effect the same as they were when they originally garrisoned the valley in 2003: cre-ating the conditions to allow for ANSF to eventually take over and effectively secure this territory. Yet the practical reasons for such a ‘realignment’ of their previous ‘realignment’ are clear: the transi-tion to ANSF authority in the valley was a counterproductive failure. First, the area’s diverse mix of Salafi, IEA and Pakistani AOGs substantially strengthened their hold vis-à-vis the GOA and ANSF in these districts, augment-ing their presence in the major settlements and on the key road-ways, and continuing to apply kinetic pressure to static ANA positions. Second, it also gave them the confidence to formally seize neighbouring Waygal in Nu-ristan, a coup of both ongoing propaganda and concrete regional strategic value. However, in spite of the renewed intent by IMF to personally battle the deeply rooted AOG presence in these valleys, and potentially also to retake Waygal DAC, it remains deeply unlikely that, after

8 years of deteriorating security there, the re-garrisoning of these valleys by IMF will achieve their stated objectives. Not only was this corridor of valleys, focused around Nan-galam, the site of Afghanistan’s very first upris-ing against the new Communist government in 1978, it has been home to the most persistent active AOG presence over the past 35 years (including against the Taliban government). The RPG downing of one of the very first IMF helicopters to return to Manogai in the final days of July served as a stark reminder of what they had left behind, while in the last fortnight, 22 of the 44 AOG attacks in Kunar were recorded against ANSF and IMF in Manogai (15) and Wata Pur (7). Without deci-sively defeating the AOGs there and in neigh-bouring valleys, something highly unlikely both because of the geography and the timeframe IMF are working to, it remains likely that no security force can militarily defeat the opposi-tion factions there, and as such the eventual ceding of the territory remains the only likely outcome. Other districts in the province were, however, considerably quieter, consistent with what seems to be a wider strategic pause for Rama-zan in AOG activities. Notable incidents in-cluded an illegal CP in Shegal, in which two ANBP police were abducted, an IED that tar-geted the vehicle of a former provincial coun-cillor in Dangam, and an IMF airstrike in Chapa Dara’s Kanday, which killed 2 suspect-ed AOG fighters.

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THE ANSO REPORT

N U R I S TA N

food stuffs and other basic items had made it to Parun in 2011. Moreover, the previous day an IED had struck one of the vehi-cles involved in the above supply mission, in the immediate area of the CP that was subsequently tar-geted, which had killed an ANP officer; when other ANSF stopped to help the wounded ANP policemen, AOG fighters ambushed them, and it was for their assistance that the ANSF had called in IMF air support. However, it is reported that in spite of these new ANP CPs, road safety still remains a large prob-lem. Not only are the spaces in between the static ANP positions unguarded and therefore affected by AOG presence, but the ANP CPs themselves are felt to be a magnet for AOG attacks; moreo-ver, with IMF moving back into Manogai after the failed attempt to transition to ANSF control in March, the situation along the

Wama district registered Nuri-stan’s most significant develop-ments during the past fortnight, most importantly due to the friendly fire incident recorded there on July 31st, in which an IMF air strike mistakenly targeted an ANP CP in Trenik, on the bor-der with Kunar’s Chapa Dara, killing 4 policemen, with ground forces then detaining 12 more. While IMF subsequently claimed that Nuristani ANP leadership assured them no ANP units were within a 15km radius, and that the provincial government was using it as propaganda against the IMF, to what end exactly the govern-ment would do so was unclear, and it rather appears that lines of communication simply failed be-tween the forces. The CP target-ed was one of the CPs established along the Chapa Dara-Wama route for the security force-led supply mission to Parun that took place shortly before this incident, the first time that supplies such as

Kunar stretch of the road also remains highly insecure (see Kunar). The move back into Manogai has also trig-gered concern amongst the AOGs operating in AOG-held Waygal that a push to retake the district will soon take place, and as such re-ports have been received from there that AOGs have emplaced significant numbers of IEDs both along the main district roadway and within the immediate area of the DAC. Final-ly, in Kamdesh and Bargi Matal threat report-ing about planned attacks on the DAC and IED emplacement on the main valley road continued to be received, although nothing had started as of the end of the reporting peri-od and it does not appear that any significant armed assaults are imminent.



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ACRONYMS:

Please see the final page for a list of ANSO-utilized acronyms.

THE ANSO REPORT

K H O S T

cantly better at disrupting AOG networks that penetrate the pro-vincial capital. The effect of this has been a major reduction in non-spectacular AOG incidents in Khost City and its environs, after a 15 month period of nearly con-sistent escalation of such inci-dents, from January 2010 to March 2011. However, some pen-etration remains, manifesting itself during this period in the form of an IED detonation near the old NDS office, killing one local male; yet it is worth noting that the ma-jority of recent IED incidents that have occurred in the capital envi-rons in the past 2 months are in fact likely to derive from local commercial rivalries, such as the music shop and hotel IEDs rec-orded in the past fortnight. Beyond the provincial capital area, Mando Zayi and the non-border areas of Matun, Tani and Gurbuz are also currently assessed as rela-tively permissive for humanitarian operations, with risks primarily in the form of sporadic IEDs against ANSF. Road access to the capital from neighbouring provinces re-mains a challenge, primarily due to conditions in the Zadran dis-tricts of Paktya, although appro-priate measures can be taken to minimise risk; indeed, the primary vector of risk continues to be road traffic accidents from poor road infrastructure, as registered in Shamal and Nadir Shah Kot. However, the northern districts of Musa Khel, Sabari, Bak and Tere Zayi continue to see an active conflict between AOGs and secu-

Khost did not record any NGO incidents during this period, but did see a targeted killing with rele-vance to the NGO community. An engineer running his own con-struction company, which re-ceived contracts from IMF, was shot and killed by friends while driving out of Khost City towards Sabari, in what is believed to be an incident driven by the criminal intent to rob the victim of money and his vehicle. Local police also indicated that the culprits were likely to have done so partly be-cause they felt the incident would appear to be AOG targeting of an IMF-connected local national. This follows July’s armed robbery of NGO programme money in Tani, a district and a tribe particu-larly affected by this sort of preda-tory criminality. NGOs operating in Khost are advised to pay partic-ular attention to emerging trends concerning the risk of criminal targeting for financial motives. However, while risks from rob-bery, abduction and collateral in-volvement in complex attacks on ANSF and other governmental targets remains a standing con-cern, other security trends indicate a moderate improvement in the operating environment for hu-manitarian agencies in Khost, par-ticularly around the provincial capital. Perhaps most important-ly, ANSF physical presence has significantly increased inside and on the outskirts of Khost City; the number of daily urban foot pa-trols, including at night, has nearly doubled over the past quarter, and ANSF have also become signifi-

rity forces. Perhaps the most serious incident was the failed BBIED in the Bak bazaar, in which ANP identified a BBIED operative and engaged him with SAF, causing the vest to detonate and killing the would-be assailant. Also in Bak, an IED struck an IMF vehicle in the DAC area, while AOG fighters ambushed an IMF/ANSF vehicle patrol with SAF, with no major consequences. In Musa Khel, 7 sep-arate AOG-initiated IED, SAF and IDF inci-dents were recorded, all in the DAC/IMF base area, one of which killed an ANA soldier and another of which injured 3 IMF soldiers. In Sabari, 6 were recorded, the most severe killing an ANP policeman in an IED attack on an ANP vehicle in the Khulbesat bazaar. In Tere Zayi, all significant incidents took the form of IMF operations, where 5 separate clearing op-erations resulted in 20 suspected AOG fighters arrested. Similarly, kinetic incidents continue to be rec-orded along the border areas of Gurbuz, Tani and Matun, where cross-border attacks against IMF and ANSF by both AOG and PakMil forces continue. Of note, an IMF operation in Gurbuz’s Waro village, somewhat away from the border, led to the detention of the Dis-trict’s Shadow Governor during the fortnight. Yet AOG activity continues to be predomi-nately contained in these peripheral areas, mostly because of the effectiveness of the ‘campaign’ forces operating in these border areas, who actively conduct aggressive anti-AOG foot patrols day and night, in contrast to mostly static ANBP positioning.



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THE ANSO REPORT

The most significant incident to occur this period in Laghman was the interdiction by ANSF in Pah-lawan Baba of a large group of Alingar AOG fighters reportedly planning to attack the prison; in the ensuing firefight, 1 AOG fighter was killed, and 1 ANA soldier and 8 AOG fighters were injured. This is the first time that the prison has been targeted since May 2009, when a unit of AOG fighters attacked the prison, lead-ing to the escape of one prisoner and the killing of another. In this latest incident, the motivation is thought to be the attempted re-lease of 4 important AOG fight-ers, including a commander, de-tained three weeks ago in an oper-ation in Bad Pakh’s Garuch valley. However, the prison had benefit-ed from structural improvements completed by the PRT in late July, so even if the AOG unit had been successful in reaching the prison this time, they may not have suc-ceeded in their objectives in any case.



L A G H M A N

Beyond this stand-out incident, Laghman recorded a particularly quiet 2 weeks, with just 6 AOG incidents recorded. Qarghayi rec-orded 2 incidents carried out by the AOG unit(s) operating out of the Torghar area into the Kheirokhel-Darunta stretch of Highway 7, the first of which was the most serious: a night time ab-duction of 4 civilians from a civil-ian vehicle travelling on the High-way in the direction of Jalalabad. This incident, involving civilians not known to be connected to the GOA or security forces in any way, bears a strong similarity to one which occurred in the same area in early July, which was re-ported to have been solely moti-vated by the expectation of a ran-som payment, and as such this latest incident is also assessed to be strictly criminal in intent. Two days later, 3 of the 4 were re-leased, with the final captive re-maining in AOG custody at the time of writing, while on the same day as their release ANP arrested

one armed man believed involved in the kid-napping, in the same area. Then, on the 13th, AOG fighters attacked an ANA OP between Darunta and Surkhakan, injuring one ANA soldier in the subsequent exchange of fire. The other 4 AOG-initiated incidents occurred in Alingar and Alishing. In Alingar, 2 IED det-onations were recorded, against IMF vehicles in Parwai and Shakhatra, with 2 discoveries also recorded. Another IED detonation oc-curred too, in Mehtarlam’s Pahlawan Baba against an IMF vehicle, but as it did so on the Alingar road, this can be understood to be pri-marily part of the Alingar-specific AOG land-scape. In Alishing, AOG fighters attacked the DAC late at night to no effect; while an IEA spokesman asserted a number of ANSF had been killed, the district’s chief of police noted that ‘not even a mouse was injured in the at-tack’.

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THE ANSO REPORT

PA K T Y A

most significant operation took place in Skawey, in which 1 local AOG commander and three Paki-stani fighters were killed by IMF ground forces during a clearing operation. 3 other significant IMF operations took place in the district, in Mulayan and Haibat Khel, during which a total of 14 suspected fighters were arrested. The district’s conflict, intensifying further in recent weeks, looks set to continue to be intense in spite of what appears to be the slight province-level downturn. In Sayid Karam, two IEDs on consecutive days in Chinow vil-lage each led to ANP fatalities; the first killed 1 and injured 2, while just 13 hours later, another 2 were killed and 3 further injured. Kohseen was the district’s second focus for AOG targeting of secu-rity forces, with a brief ambush of an IMF patrol followed some days later by an illegal CP early in the morning, which was itself fol-lowed later that morning by the discovery of an IED by IMF re-sponding to the CP. A further ambush of an IMF patrol convoy took place in Osman Khel, and on the 14th, the dead body of the district attorney kidnapped the previous day was found. After last period’s attack on the house of the head of the district council in Alamgai, this fortnight’s devel-

While the geographical foci for the province’s conflict remained stable, the trend for conflict inci-dents in Paktya appears to be con-tinuing its drop after the June peak, with August likely to contin-ue the trend of an approximate 10% month-on-month drop. Zurmat and Sayid Karam record-ed the most significant kinetic operations, and in both security force fatalities and illegal AOG vehicle CPs were recorded, indi-cating the extent of the AOG contestation of these parts of the province. In Zurmat, the ongoing conflict between the Mansur AOG faction and the IMF contin-ued to be fierce, with both sides scoring notable successes against the other. From the opposition side, an ambush of an IMF con-voy in Guldad Khel led to the death of an IMF soldier and the injury of two more in the ensuing exchange of fire; a subsequent search operation detained two suspected AOG fighters. In the nearby DAC, an IED hit an IMF vehicle and injured two IMF ser-vicemembers, while in neighbour-ing Sahak area, the faction’s dis-trict stronghold, another IED struck an IMF vehicle a few days after the ambush. Sahak was also one of the foci of the fortnight’s IMF operations, with an operation conducted there arrested an IED cell coordinator. However, the

opments demonstrate the growing power of the AOG units operating in Sayid Karam, and as such raise the threat of collateral involve-ment in conflict incidents of the district, in-cluding in the DAC area. Elsewhere in the province, Gardez City re-mained quiet apart from a night letter placed on the Shaikhan house of a local employee of a UN-affiliated international organisation, which issued a general warning against working with IMF or the GOA. In Wuza Zadran and Shwak, the Zadran districts through which the Gardez-Khost road runs, perhaps the most noteworthy trend was the twin attacks on PSC escorts of IMF supply convoys on the main road. Although they did not lead to fatalities, a similar event was also recorded in the Zadran district of Spera, Khost, this period, and indi-cates an emerging trend by the Haqqani AOG faction that dominates the opposition land-scape in the Zadran districts, the attempts to assert their permission-granting authority over such projects. The northern districts saw no stand-out incidents, although a low level of AOG attacks continued to take place against IMF targets in Lija Mangal and Jaji, and against the Jaji and Jani Khel DACs, with Jaji also see-ing the swift execution of an ANP policeman after his abduction in the Hashem Khel area.



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THE ANSO REPORT

Kandahar Province continued to experience high incident volumes with 58 AOG initiated events. Zhari, Panjwayi District and Kan-dahar City bore the brunt of AOG activities. AOG continued to favour direct attacks as attested by the total of 32 assaults (mostly on ANP). During these, 4 ANP officials were killed and 16 ANP received injuries. The majority of the direct attacks were reported from Zhari and Panjwayi, though ANP checkpoints in Kandahar City came under attack on two occasions, including a larger-scale assault in District 4 which encom-passed the use of handgrenades causing injuries to three ANP ser-vicemen. Targeted killings came to the fore this period with at least 9 cases of assassinations recorded in the last fortnight; the majority of them taking place in Kandahar City (5 ANP officials and 1 ANA mem-ber were killed in the city alone). The victims included ANP, GOA personnel as well as local residents associated with the IMF presence. On 3rd of August, AOG killed a tribal elder in the Bazaar area of



K A N DA H A R

Panjwayi. On 7th of August 2011, a member of the district council and another tribal elder were killed in Maywand Bazaar. 89 AOG-initiated targeted killings have been reported since the be-ginning of 2011, with the highest peaks marked in January (21) and in June (16). The majority of the-se incidents (68) occurred in Kan-dahar City. IED related incident decreased to 14 occurrences. 3 civilians were killed in IED strikes, including a child, in two separate detonations in Kandahar City and in Spin Boldak. Three children were also reportedly killed by a roadside IED in Arghistan District. Two IED incidents were notable due to their lethal effect. 3 ANP were killed and 2 sustained injuries when their vehicle was hit by an IED in Shorabak District, near Jamriz Nika Village. The truck which came in to collect and transport the casualties was im-pacted by another device, leading to an additional 7 fatalities among the ANP. As a result, seven ANP were killed. Overall, AOG inci-dents are relatively rare in Shor-

abak, though 12 out of 13 cases recorded in 2011 so far were IED strikes (on one occasion, 8 IMF and 2 ANP were killed in a single IED explosion there). A low rate of 19 incidents has been also reported from Maruf District during 2011, which were primarily IED relat-ed. An IED strike was also reported from Maruf, another district with low AOG activity. Three 3 ANP were killed when their vehicle hit a road-side device in Khogyani. IMF/ANSF conducted a joint operation in Shah Wali Kot in an attempt to stem the flow of recent AOG arrivals. The operation result-ed in a prolonged clash, which lasted around 10 hours. As a result, nine AOG members including their local commander were killed and one ANSF was wounded. The incident appears to be outside of the conflict norms for this district, as only 6 IMF/ANSF operations were carried out in the district this year (out of 266 documented IMF/ANSF operations across Kandahar Province), while the AOG struck on 22 different occasions.

S O U T H E R N R E G I O N

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THE ANSO REPORT

While other border provinces wit-nessed drops in AOG-initiated incidents in the first two weeks of Ramazan, Paktika this period saw no fall from the highs of the past two months, with 77 separate oc-currences of AOG kinetic activity. However, the nature of these inci-dents did indicate a substantial lessening of the kinetic intensity of AOG operations, with 56 of these incidents taking the form of IDF attacks on ANSF, IMF and DACs across the province, con-centrated in Barmal’s key border IMF positions, Gayan’s primary IMF facility and Nika’s DAC: not a single one of these was recorded to have caused any casualties or damage. Similarly for SAF attacks on secu-rity force targets, only 3 of the 24 recorded attacks led to casualties: 2 ANP were shot dead in a target-ed killing in Sharana’s Sra Qala area, an ambush in Urgun’s Lawa-ra area killed 1 ANP, and an at-



PA K T I K A

tack on two ANA CPs in Yahya Khel led to 5 ANA injuries. Fi-nally from the AOG side, just 4 IED detonations were recorded, 3 in Sar Hawza, in total killing 1 ANA soldier and injuring 2 IMF and 3 further ANA soldiers, and one in a complex ambush on an IMF convoy in Dila DAC that led to the arrest of one AOG fighter. Given the high numbers of casu-alties recorded recently in the con-flict recently, the relatively low impact of these AOG operations is significant, as is the total ab-sence of any targeted killings or spectacular attacks. From the ANSF and IMF side, just 7 significant IMF incidents were recorded, 5 of which were search operations, which in total detained just 4 AOG fighters, al-beit including a local commander in one operation in Mata Khan DAC area. The remaining 2 were counter artillery fire incidents in

Barmal, along the border with South Waziri-stan; in one incident in Margha, an AOG fight-er was killed before he could himself fire a rocket at the IMF base in that area, while in another in Malik Shay, two civilians were wounded collaterally in IMF fire at an AOG position. This record stands in heavy contrast to recent periods’ heavily kinetic IMF disposi-tion, where large numbers of AOG fighters were killed or detained, culminating in the very high death toll in the disruption operation in Sar Hawza last period. In all, therefore, the first fortnight of Ramazan has seen a remarka-ble drop in kinetic intensity in the province, and this is attributable both to a lowering in IMF operational activity and, as across much of the border, to the break that Ramazan rep-resents for AOGs to pause, reassess, regroup and wait to redeploy.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the

security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..”

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THE ANSO REPORT

U R U Z G A N

of the attack. AOG direct attacks impacted ANP posts in Dihrawud, Shahidi Hassas and Tirin Kot with at least 5 of such occurrences. The at-tacks remained small scale, and the AOG operatives usually with-drew after a brief engagement without inflicting any casualties. There was one exception to this in Tirin Kot City on 13 August, when an AOG assault on an ANP checkpoint resulted in the killing of three ANP and two AOG, and an additional ANP received inju-ries. Meanwhile, IMF and ANP initiat-ed two engagements with AOG during two separate operations in Tirin Kot District. The opera-tions resulted in the killing of 5 AOG members, while an addi-tional 5 AOG were arrested and an assortment of explosives and remote-control components were seized. The province witnessed a notable political change, when a key pow-erbroker from Uruzgan was ap-pointed as the new Chief of Po-

Uruzgan witnessed 11 AOG initi-ated occurrences in the present reporting cycle. This shows a slight downturn in comparison to the 16 AOG incidents reported during the previous cycle. When it comes to geographical distribu-tion, the districts of Tirin Kot and Dihrawud made for the majority of the incidents. Nonetheless, the districts of Chora and Shahidi Hassas were also impacted. The volume of effective IED strikes and their concentration in Tirin Kot District, Dihrawud and Chora remained consistent with the previous report cycle. The said districts saw 8 IED strikes against IMF and ANP. IED relat-ed fatalities occurred twice on the civilian side. On 9 August, an RCIED hit an ANP vehicle in Dihrawud, killing three children and one ANP official. Three days later, an RCIED detonated against a group of civilians, killing three and wounding six in Tirin Kot City. The blast occurred on the river bank in a spot popular for leisure activities and frequented by ANSF personnel, the likely target

lice. The background of this rapid shift re-mains unknown at this stage, as the out-going COP had been appointed only 4 months ago (the COP was shifted to take up the same post in Zabul). The new COP (the appointment of which was previously opposed in the past by the Dutch contingent formerly responsible for the province) is seen as a controversial figure by many both from inside and out of the prov-ince. The commander controls his own para-military contingent as well as a quasi-official highway security force between Uruzgan and Kandahar Province and is a crucial partner to IMF SOF operations in the province. Follow-ing the killing of Jan Mohammad Khan (the powerbroker’s father in law but also his rival in the local competition for power), AOG target-ed the commander during the complex attack on 28 July 2011 in Tirin Kot. Further assess-ment is required to evaluate the impact of the appointment on local politics and the security situation in the province.



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THE ANSO REPORT

Helmand remains the most kinetic province in the Southern Region. The incident volumes stayed im-pressive, although a slight down-ward was noted while the geo-graphical distribution has not changed significantly. Nad Ali, Musa Qala, Sangin and Nahri Sar-raj districts accounted for the bulk of events. Helmand witnessed a large num-ber of IED related incidents (45 IED strikes, a volume consistent with the previous reporting peri-od). Nearly 70% of the IEDs were directed against IMF. Still, the ANP bore the brunt of IED related casualties, with a total 13 ANP officials killed and 28 wounded. This includes one inci-dent in Grishk where two RCIEDs detonated simultaneous-ly against an ANP convoy, killing 2 and injuring 15 ANP service-men. On 12 August a roadside IED stroke a civilian vehicle, kill-ing 5 civilian occupants at once. Further, 3 civilians were wounded when an RCIED detonated in



H E L M A N D

Lashkar Gah City in front of a mosque in the Bazaar Area on 15th of August, possibly targeting frequent ANP movements in the vicinity of the nearby ANP sta-tion. Yet, direct attacks remained the tactical method of choice (70 cas-es), largely destined to impact ANP posts and convoys across the province. In one of these as-saults, 5 ANP officials had been killed at a checkpoint in Grishk Area on the 10th of August. On the IMF side, a patrol came under attack from and AOG element based in a bulding in Nad Ali, leaving one IMF killed. The sub-sequent airstrike destroyed the structure and caused the death of 8 civilians, a woman with her 3 daughters and 4 sons, and 2 AOG members. 14 incidents (IED strikes and di-rect attacks) were notated in Lash-kar Gah City. Although most of these were ineffective, ANP suf-fered the loss of 10 officers (three

killed and seven wounded) in two separate IED strikes. Also targeted killings continued unabated in Lashkar Gah and Nahri Sarraj District. In Lashkar Gah City, an ANP official was killed and another was wounded by an AOG “hit team” on a motorbike, while in an-other incident in the city an NDS official was also killed. In Nahri Sarraj, AOG killed a reli-gious scholar. Of note 29 AOG initiated tar-geted killings, carried out mainly against ANP and GOA officials, have so far been reported from Helmand Province this year. It is to note that 11 of these assassinations occurred in Lashkar Gah City alone. Targeted killings will likely remain a foremost AOG method to exert control over the local population. IMF/ANSF launched several operations in Marja, Nad Ali and Nahri Sarraj. As a result, 18 AOG were killed and 5 wounded. In addi-tion, 6 AOG were arrested.

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N I M R O Z

shaw driver received injuries in two separate incidents. AOG also struck directly, includ-ing a case of a directed killing of a local employee of a Private Devel-opment Organisation, an agency which may be seen as associated to the GOA and IMF effort in the province. Looking into the 2011 records, two incidents reported from Nimroz included cases of civilians killed on the charges of spying for the GOA (both assassi-nations occurred in May). Within the broader context of the South-

The incident levels remained low in Nimroz Province with the re-ported 11 incidents remaining consistent with the patterns of the previous cycle. The conflict in Nimroz is dominated by develop-ments in Khash Rod which ac-counted for 70% of all reported incidents this cycle. 4 IED strikes occurred in Khash Rod this cycle, marking a relative drop as compared to six IED inci-dents during the previous cycle. The account of casualties included the civilians. A driver of a civilian vehicle was killed, while a rick-

ern Region, PDOs constitute a direct target as their profile and activities are closely associated with the IMF/GOA efforts. IMF/ANSF engagements with AOG resulted in the killing of 19 AOG members and the detentions of two mid-level commanders.



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THE ANSO REPORT

The overall incident volumes sig-nificantly decreased this cycle, marking only 31 incidents. AOG initiated direct and indirect attacks and IED deployment represented 38% of the recorded volumes (12 cases), an outstanding drop when compared to 39 AOG-initiated incidents during the previous cy-cle. This drop is concomitant with the inception of Ramadan, though the incident volumes in other provinces in the region re-mained largely unaffected by this factor. This suggests that the AOG activity in Zabul rather went thru a deliberate downscal-ing of operations after an extend-ed period of high activity levels, a cyclical measure allowing time for rearming, refitting and recruiting. During the present cycle the ma-jority of security events were re-ported from Qalat, Shahjoy and Tarnak Wa Jaldak, including three direct attacks. In one incident, an IMF-contracted supply convoy came under attack, which resulted in the killing of two civilian driv-ers. An additional driver received



Z A B U L

injuries. In total, seven truck were impacted and burned. 6 IED strikes have been con-firmed this cycle so far. In one incidence, a bicycle-mounted IED detonated in front of a public bath in Qalat, killing one civilian and wounding 24 others. As there were no security targets in the area when the blast occurred, the IED likely detonated prematurely (though a precedence of a public bath directly targeted with an IED exists in the Kandahar Province). IDF attacks played a minor role in the context. One such occurrence was reported from Shahjoy, where AOG fired two rockets towards the district centre with the projec-tiles landing in an open field. In Qalat, a telecom tower was set on fire; whether this attack is related to AOG’s use of extortion from the telecom company, a tactical objective, or just a plain destruc-tive mayhem is yet to be deter-mined. IMF units carried out op-erations in Shahjoy and Qalat and arrested 9 AOG incl. a mid-level commander and his associate.

A notable event occurred on 5th of August when an approximate 250 demonstrators gath-ered in Qalat City in protest to an ANP/IMF action which resulted in the killing of two pre-sumed AOG members and a consequent exhu-mation of the bodies of the victims by ANP in an effort to determine their identity. Gunfire erupted during the event, and clashes followed between ANP and the protesters. As a result, 3 demonstrators and 1 ANP were killed and an additional 5 demonstrators and 1 ANP mem-ber received injuries. The next stage was played out two days later, when approximately 300 community members gathered in the central mosque of Qalat City and demanded a penalty for those ANP members who extracted the two corpses from the gravesite. The cause was sidelined by the appointment of the new COP (former COP Uruzgan) the same day, and no further repercussions of the issue have come to light so far.

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NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the 10th of

August 2011.

THE ANSO REPORT

G H A Z N I

primarily with SAF - such as Zana Khan and Ajristan. In one such instance on 9 August, one civilian was killed in Ajristan. Further, the province also witnessed a concen-tration of direct attacks on ANP posts with a notable 5 reported assaults in Ghazni, 2 in Qarabagh and 1 each in Andar and Dih Yak districts. Two direct attacks on ANP occurred in Ghazni City where two AOG riding on a mo-torcycle opened SAF on an ANP post and killed two ANP officials, while in another attack two ANP officials were shot and killed by AOG on their way home. This strand of activity is consistent with the established practice of targeted killings of ANP and GOA officials. AOG also ex-plored vulnerabilities of IMF/ANSF convoys as well as the lo-gistical convoys escorted by PSCs. As in the past though, AOG ap-peared reluctant to engage the protection units for prolonged periods, and usually disengaged after a brief initial ambush. During the present reporting peri-

The security situation in Ghazni Province remains one of the most precarious in the Southern Re-gion. At least 82 AOG initiated attacks were reported across the province with 21 such occurrenc-es taking place in Ghazni District alone, followed by Andar with 16 reported incidents. IED deployment followed a downwards trend with 11 effec-tive IED strikes in Ghazni district, Qarabagh, Waghaz, Dih Yak and Andar. These were mainly des-tined for IMF and ANP, although one IED buried in a pile of gar-bage appeared to have detonated prematurely, causing two civilian casualties. On another occasion in Ghazni District, a civilian and 6 ANP officials, including the Head of ANP Intelligence, were wound-ed when two RCIEDs detonated in a short span of time against two ANP vehicles. Direct attacks remained the pre-ferred tactic of local AOG, with at least 14 strikes carried out against the District Centres (DAC’s) across the province. Some DAC’s received multiple direct attacks –

od, the DAC’s of Andar, Ghazni, Gelan and Dih Yak received several mortar and rocket attacks, mainly targeting military installations. While the IDF attacks did not result in any civilian casualties the proximity of such events to urban centres represents a constant high risk factor of collateral involvement for the civilian population incl. the NGOs. IMF/ANSF maintained their operational pace with several interventions in Andar, Ghazni, Qarabagh, and in Dih Yak. The operations led to the arrest of 19 AOG members while a vari-ety of weapons and ammunition were seized. Following an IMF night-raid in Khogyani, dur-ing which a local mullah and a teacher were killed and four other civilians were detained, a demonstration attended by 1000 people gath-ered in Ghazni City in the morning of 8 Au-gust 2011. The event concluded without vio-lence but reinforced the view that IMF/ANSF operations enjoy little support from the popu-lation in the province.



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CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) Tomas Muzik - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 Mukhtar - [email protected] - 0799 322 116

NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR) Brian Laguardia - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 Firoz - [email protected] - 0799 408 252

EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) Rory Brown - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 Naseer - [email protected] - 077 2546 242

SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR) Volker Lankow- [email protected] 0796 688 416 Noori - [email protected] - 0700 492 550

WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) Taro Yamagata- [email protected] - 0799 322 192 Sayed Karim- [email protected] - 0707 474 135

COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) Nic Lee - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 Patrick Malach - [email protected] - 0793 230 118

ANSO ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group / AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANBP-Afghan National Border Police / ANP-Afghan National Police / AOG-Armed Opposition Group / APPF-Afghan Public Protection Forces (local depu-tised militias) / DC-District Centre / GOA-Government of Afghanistan / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / IED-Improvised Explosive Device / IMF-International Military Forces / NDS-National Directorate of Security (Intelligence) / PRP-Previous Reporting Period / PSC-Private Security Company / RPG-Rocket Propelled Gre-nade / SAF-Small Arms Fire / SOF - Special Operations Forc-es / VBIED-Vehicle Borne Im-provised Explosive Device / PDO-Private Development Or-ganisation / ALP-Afghan Local Police / LDI-Local Defence Initiative / IEA-Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) / PSG-Provincial Shadow Governor (IEA) / DSG-District Shadow Governor (IEA)

THE AFGHANISTAN NGO SAFETY OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

MISSING This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the prov-inces of:

Panjshir

This is because we do not know enough about the area to comment on the sig-nificance of the inci-dents occurring there. If you can help us understand the prov-ince better, please contact us.

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