The Analysis of Wonder - Predrag Cicovacki

7/25/2019 The Analysis of Wonder - Predrag Cicovacki

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The Analysis of Wonder


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The Analysis of Wonder

An Introduction to the PhilosophyofNicolai Hartmann

Predrag Cicovacki

NEW YORK LON DON NEW DELHI SY DN EY


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For Heidi:

Keep Shining

A man does not learn to understand anything unless he loves it.

Goethe


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Contents

Chronological Table i

Introduction! "oes Hartmann #atter$ 1

Part I %eing

Part II &alues

II'1 Nature of &alues ()

II'* #oral &alues in +eneral ,)

II'- .our .undamental #oral &alues /-

II'0 .our .orms of ove /2

II') Aesthetic 3b4ect and Aesthetic Act 2)

II'( Aesthetic &alues 151

II', Truth in Art 15)

II'/ 6ublime 111

II'2 Criti7ue of #oralism 11,

Part III Personality

III'1 The 8ealm of 8eal %eing and the 8ealm of &alues 1*)

III'* Personality as a &alue 1-1

I'1 Philosophical #ethod 2

I'* %eing as %eing 1,

I'- #odifications of %eing *-

I'0 6trata of 8eal %eing *2

I') Categories of 8eal %eing -)

I'( Categories of %eing and Categories of Cognition 01

I', 3ntology of Cognition 0,

I'/ Criti7ue of Intellectualism )-


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viii Contents

III'- Pseudo9 6purious9 and +enuine Personality 1-,

III'0 .ulfillment of Personality 10)

Conclusion! Hartmann:s Ne; Ways of Philosophy 1)-

%ibliography of Hartmann:s Works 1(-

Inde 1()


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Chronological Table1

1//* Nicolai Hartmann ;as born on .ebruary *59 in 8iga9 son ofCarl August Hartmann and his ;ife Helene9 ;ho ;ere %altic+ermans' Nicolai ;as one of their four children'

1/2, Attends a +ermanber das Seinsproblem in dergriechischen Philosophie vor Plato? @3n the Problem of %eingin +reekPhilosophy before Plato'

125,=5/ 8eturns to 6aint Petersburg to teach +reek and atin in agymnasium'

1252 "efends the Habilitation! >Des Proklus Diadochus

philosophische Anfangsgrnde der Mathematik? @ThePhilosophical .oundations of #athematics of Proclus"iadochus'

Publication of Platos Logik des Seins @Plato:s ogic of %eing'

1211 #arries Alice 6tephanitB'

121* Publication of Die philosophischen Grundfragen der Biologie@The .undamental Philosophical uestions of %iology'

%irth of daughter "agmar'

1210=1/ 6ervice in +erman #ilitary in World War I'

1212=*) Dniversity Professor of Philosophy in #arburg'

1 The chronological table is mostly based on #artin #orgenstern9 Nicolai Hartmannzur Einfhrung EHamburg! Funius &erlag9 122,G9 10=*/ and 121=*' Also used are8obert Heiss9 >Nicolai Hartmann! A Personal 6ketch9? Personalist 0*!12(19 0(2=/(Nicolai Hartmann und Heinz Heimsoeth im Briefwechsel9 ed' .rida Hartmann and8enate Heimsoeth E%onn! %ouvier &erlag Herbert +rundmann9 12,/G Hans


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Chronological Table

12*1 Publication of Grundzge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis@%asic Mlements of a #etaphysics of Jno;ledge'

12*- Publication of Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus9 %d' I!Fichte, Schelling und die Romantik @The Philosophy of+erman Idealism9 &ol' 1! .ichte9 6chelling and the8omantics'

12*)=-5 Professor in Cologne'

12*( Presents >ber die 6tellung der Osthetischen Werte im 8eichder Werte berhaupt? @3n the Place of Aesthetic &alues inthe 8ealm of &alues at the 6ith International Congress of

Philosophy9 at Harvard Dniversity9 Cambridge9 #assachusetts'Publication of Ethik @Mthics'

"ivorce from his first

;ife' 12*2 #arries .rida 8osenfeld'

Publication of Die Philosophie der deutschen Idealismus9 %d' II!Hegel @The Philosophy of +erman Idealism9 &ol' *! Hegel'

12-5 Presents >Jategorien der +eschichte? @Categories of Historyat the 6eventh International Congress of Philosophy9 in

3ford'

%irth of son 3laf'

12-1=0) Professor in %erlin'

12-* %irth of daughter ise'

12-- Publication of Das Problem des geistigen Seins:Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der Geschichtsphilosophieund der Geisteswissenschaften @The Problem of 6piritual%eing! Investigations on the .oundations of the Philosophy of

Historyand the Human 6ciences'

12-) Publication of Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie @3nthe .oundations of 3ntology'

12-/ Publication ofMglichkeit und Wircklichkeit @Possibilityand Actuality'

1205 Publication of Der Aufbau der realen Welt: Grundriss derallgemeinen Kategorienlehre @The 6tructure of the 8ealWorld! 3utline of a Theory of the +eneral Categories'

120- Publication of Neue Wege der Ontologie @Ne; Waysof 3ntology'

120)=)5 Professor in +Kttingen'


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Chronological Table i

12)5 Publication of Philosophie der Natur: Abriss der speziellenKategorienlehre @Philosophy of Nature! 6ketch of a Theoryof

the 6pecial Categories'

"ies on 3ctober 2'

12)1 Posthumous publication of Teleologisches Denken@Teleological Thinking'

12)- Posthumous publication of sthetik @Aesthetics'

12))=)/ Posthumous publication of Kleinere Schriften @6horter Works9%d' I!Abhandlungen zur Systematischen Philosophie E12))G@&ol' I! Mssays Concerning 6ystematic Philosophy %d' II!

Abhandlungen zur Philosophie-Geschichte E12),G @&ol' II!Mssays on the History of Philosophy %d' III! VomNeukantianismuszur Ontologie E12)/G @&ol' III! .rom Neois the study of the Rultimate reality: of all things! of the real and finalnature of Rmatter: EontologyG9 of Rmind: Ephilosophical psychologyG9 and ofthe interrelation of Rmind: and Rmatter: in the process of perception andkno;ledge EepistemologyG'?-

The second part of "urant:s clarification is fairly standard' The firstpart9 ho;ever9 is interesting9 even for Hartmann:s point of vie;!philosophy is >an attempt to coordinate the real in the light of the ideal'?This is of interest for several reasons' .irst9 it puts no direct emphasiseither on kno;ledge or on morals9 as is customary no;adays' "urant:scharacteriBation is also intriguing because it does not preclude an

understanding of philosophy as love of ;isdom! the ;isdom of ho; togovern our lives in this troubled9 disorienting age' Hartmann is al;aysengaged in dialectical ;restling ;ith philosophical tradition9 and thisoriginal meaning of philosophy may be more important to him than itis for the vast ma4ority of contemporary philosophers' .inally9 "urant:srelating of the ideal and the real is significant for Hartmann because beingand values are t;o ma4or themes of his entire philosophical opus' &aluesare not derived from real being9 but belong to

* A' C' +rayling9 Ideas that Matter: The Concepts that Shape the 21st CenturyENe; Qork! Perseus %ooks9 *552G9 *(-'

- Will "urant9 The Story of Philosophy: The Lies and !pinions of "reat PhilosophersENe; Qork! 6imon and 6chuster9 *555G9 -'


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#oes $art%ann Matter& -

an independent realm that he calls >ideal being'? .or Hartmann9 as for"urant9 the realespecially our livesneeds to be coordinated in the lightof the ideal'

Theproblems of fitting Hartmann into adialogue ;ith otherphilosophers of his age begin ;ith his insistence on the central andindispensible role of ontology for the overall philosophical pro4ect'Mven a cursory list of his main publications sho;s us that he dedicatedmost of his career to developing a systematic ontology and articulatingits relevance for other disciplines! "rund'()e einer Metaphysikder Erkenntnis E>%asic Mlements of a #etaphysics of Jno;ledge9?12*1 forth ed'9 1202G9 #ie Philosophie

des deutschen

Idealis%us E>The Philosophy of +erman Idealism9? &ol' I!

12*- &ol'II! 12*2G9 Ethik E>Mthics9? 12*) -rd edn9 1202G9 #as Pro*le% des)eisti)en Seins E>The Problem of 6piritual %eing9? 12-- *nd edn91202G9+ur "rundle)un) der !ntolo)ie E>3n the .oundations of3ntology9? 12-) -rd edn9 120/G9 M,)lichkeit und WirklichkeitE>Possibility and Actuality9? 12-/ *nd edn9 120/G9 #er Auf*au derrealen Welt E>The 6tructure of the 8eal World9? 1205 *nd edn9 1202G9#ie Philosophie der -atur E>Philosophy of Nature9? 12)5G9Teleolo)isches #enken E>Teleological Thinking9? 12)1G9 and.sthetik E>Aesthetics9? 12)-G'

6ince ontology has been virtually noneistent from the publication ofJant:s Criti/ue E1,/1G9 ;hy does Hartmann go back to ontology$ "o;e really need ontology to eamine ho; the ideal can and should helpus coordinate our lives$ Why not approach the eternal and the everThinker9?

absorbed in his o;n thoughts and oblivious to the historical tides of hiso;n times' Hartmann did live in his o;n age and his philosophical

thinking ;as acutely a;are of the different temporally conditionedapproaches to

personal relation cooled off and their professional opposition intensified as ;ell' .ormore details9 see +eorg +adamer9 Philosophical Apprenticeships9 trans' 8' 8'6ullivan ECambridge9 #A! #IT Press9 12/)G9 1*=1) and passi%' 6ee alsoWolfgang Harich! -icolai $art%ann0Le*en Werk Wirkun)9 ed' #artin#orgenstern EWrBburg! JKnigshausen L Neumann9 *555G'

) 8obert Heiss9 >Nicolai Hartmann! A Personal 6ketch9? Personalist9 0*!12(19 0/*=-'

.ollo;ing Heiss and Hartmann9 throughout the manuscript9 I use >he? and >man?generically9 that is9 to refer to a human being and not to one gender only' The choice isbased purely on the simplicity of this language9 as opposed to the cumbersome >he orshe? and >hisSher? epressions'



#oes $art%ann Matter& )

philosophy and its central problems'( Arendt famously claimed that it is>not ideas but events @that change the ;orld'?, Hartmann did not thinkthat ;e can understand the events ;e eperience ;ithout previously heldideas9 or that ideas are endorsed in order to change the ;orld'

In light of such obstacles and compleities9 ho; can ;e discern the truenature and relevance of Hartmann:s philosophy$

In this book9 I ;ill use three >measuring sticks9? moving from themost general to;ard the most specific' .irst9 I ;ill use some help fromJarl Faspers' In the Introduction to his monumental book9 The"reat Philosophers9 he divides all ma4ors philosophers into threemain groups!

E1G the >pragmatic individuals? Esuch as %uddha9 Confucius9 6ocrates andFesusG E*G the great thinkers at the borders of philosophy and other realmsof human eperience Ee'g'9 +oethe9 "ostoevsky9 TolstoyG and E-G the greatphilosophical thinkers' Faspers then divides this third group into severalsubcategories! E-'1G the seminal thinkers9 ;hose ideas have continuedto bear fruit EPlato9 6t Augustine9 JantG E-'*G the intellectual visionariesand original metaphysicians EParmenides9 Heraclitus9 Plotinus9 6pinoBaGE-'-G the >great disturbers9? regardless of ;hether they ;ere primarily the>probing negators? EAbelard9 "escartes9 HumeG9 or the >radical a;akeners?EPascal9 essing9 Jierkegaard9 NietBscheG and E-'0G the >creative orderers9?;hose great systems are the culmination of long developments EAristotle9A7uinas9 HegelG'/

If Hartmann belongs to the Pantheon of great philosophical thinkers9 atthe end of this treatise ;e ;ould be able to determine into ;hich group heshould be classified'

6econd9 the evaluation of Hartmann:s philosophy can also beapproached in a more thematic ;ay' He clearly stands ;ithin the Westernphilosophical tradition and inherits some of its main concerns9 problemsand assumptions' This tradition9 though it has been long and comple9 can

perhaps be summed up by its four central >pillars?!

1' The principle of order9 ;hich holds that everything that eists isordered and structured'

*' The principle of knoa*ility9 ;hich asserts that everythingthat has structure and order is kno;able'

( 6ee9 for instance9 Hartmann:s article9 >+erman Philosophy in the ast Ten Qears9?;hich he ;rote as President of the +erman Philosophical Association MI-#

)/!12029 01-=--', Hannah Arendt9 The $u%an Condition EChicago! Dniversity of Chicago Press9122/G9 *,-'

/ Jarl Faspers9 The "reat Philosophers: The 3oundations9 ed' Hannah Arendt9trans' 8alph #annheim ENe; Qork! Harcourt9 %race L World9 12(*G9 ,'



( The Analysis of Wonder

-' The principle of self4%astery9 ;hich affirms that ethical

development and virtuous behavior re7uire self


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Part I

%eing

Being itself is disharmonious, and conflict is the form of its being.

Hartmann


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I '1

Philosophical #ethod

.or Plato and Aristotle9 philosophy begins ;ith ;onder E7898G' Arendt

understands 7898 in terms of a >shocked ;onder? at the miracle ofbeing9 ;hich could leave us speechless because the actual content of ;hatis observed is untranslatable into ;ords' It is precisely this >shocked;onder? that eventually leads Plato to;ard the beholding of Ideas' WhileAristotle speaks about the beginning of philosophy in virtually the sameterms as Plato9 his emphasis is different than that of his teacher' .orAristotle9 >the actual impulse to philosophiBe lies in the desire Rto escapeignorance:'?1

The modern spirit of doubt stands in striking contrast to the ancient

spirit of ;onder' All modern philosophy9 maintains Arendt9 consists in theramifications of "escartes: radical doubt' "udley Qoung points outanother important difference bet;een the ancient and modern attitudes9the one dealing ;ith the ;ill



15 The Analysis of Wonder

Hartmann accounts for different stages of philosophical thinking bycombining phenomenology and aporetics' Philosophy is a conceptualanalysis of @8Bphenomenology? to issue a call!

>Zurck zu den Sachen? >return to the things themselves'? The motive

for this call is a preoccupation of modern philosophers not so much ;iththe ;onders of the universe9 but ;ith the ;onders of the mind cogniBing

this universe' Instead of focusing on things ;e observe9 ;e concentrate onmental processes by means of ;hich ;e observe and analyBe thosethings' What does not even penetrate the consciousness of a normalobserverto observe ho; he observes9 to be conscious of his o;nconsciousnessbecomes a chief concern of modern philosophy' Thiseplains the shift in philosophy not only from ontology to epistemology9but also to;ard the philosophy of mind9 psychology9 and logic' It is also

the motivation behind ;orks such as Hegel:s Phenomenology of Spirit

the study of forms of consciousness'Hartmann is sometimes considered a phenomenologist and his ;ork is

even called the culminating point of the phenomenological movement'- %uthe is a phenomenologist only in so far as he supported Husserl:s respect fora careful intuitive observation of reality and his enthusiasm to return tothings themselves' .or Hartmann9 this is more than a mere methodologicalpoint!

A narro;ing of the field of vision is the inveterate vice of philosophy'

The defect in all >isms? ;hether rationalism9 empiricism9 sensualism9

materialism9 psychologism or logicismis narro;ness in the mapping

out of the problem' Mvery;here the manifoldness of the phenomena ismis4udged and varieties are erroneously treated as all alike' 0

Philosophy begins ;ith ;onder and leads to problems and aporiasED>FG8G' Mven careful and openNicolai Hartmann and Phenomenology9? Philosophy andPhenomenological Research9 -!120*S-9 -2-=0*-9 especially -2( and 0**'

0 Nicolai Hartmann9 Ethik, trans' 6tanton Coit ENe; Qork! #acmillan9 12-*G in three

volumes' Coit:s translations ;as recently modified by A' #' Jinneging andrepublished by Transaction Publishers ENe; %runs;ick9 NF! &ol' I! MoralPhenomena9 *55* &ol' II! Moral Values9 *55- &ol' III' Moral Freedom9 *550G' I;ill give references to the chapter and section of the +erman edition9 and then in thebrackets to the volume and page number of the Mnglish translation in this particularcase9 ch' ,a @I9 15('



Philosophical Method 11

lead to aporias9 ;hich are like knots in ;ood' They are not made by us9nor do they emerge because of our ignorance9 lack of depth9 or because;e approach problems from the ;rong angle' The knots are in the ;ooditself9 in the grains of the ;orld that ;e encounter' They emerge as thetree of being gro;s' We encounter them regardless of our philosophical orhistorical perspectiveregardless of ;hether ;e look at the tree of beingfrom the top or bottom9 from the left or right'

These knots9 those problems and aporias9 create a philosophicalchallenge' They present a challenge because it is difficult to cut a knotthrough the middle9 no matter ho; hard ;e try or ho; skillful ;e are'3ften ;e must ackno;ledge these knots and leave them as they are' 3nly

in that sense does philosophy become theoretical E7HFG8G not as adefinitive or comprehensive solution of certain problems9 and even less as

a complete theoretical system' Philosophy is EonlyG a way of looking and

considering9 of grasping and contemplating the compleities of the ;orldas much and as carefully as that is possible')

Although practiced by 6ocrates and Plato9 Hartmann credits Aristotlefor developing aporetics' The virtue of Aristotle:s forgotten procedureconsists in approaching philosophical problems by analyBing the givenfacts and trying to uncover the inner structure of the problems in 7uestion'+rasping the inner structure of philosophical problems allo;s us to

ignore their accidental features and historical residues' It also enables usto understand ;hat is ceaselessly puBBling in these problems'#etaphysical problems are nothing but eternal puBBles that the ;orldposes to us'

Aristotle relates aporias to =>FG8?9 the eplorations of variousroutes or ;ays' This is ;hy Hartmann translates the +reek ;ord >aporia?as Weglsigkeit! encountering obstacles on our ;ay and getting lost en

route' These obstacles may result from our ignorance and confusion'They also9 and no less importantly9 emerge from the path9 from reality

itself! >being itself is disharmonious9 and conflict is the form of being'?(

) Taken in this sense9 in Grundzge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis9 forth ed' E%erlin!Walter de +ruyter9 1202G9 ch' 119 1*)9 Hartmann seems to suggest the follo;ing threeWie ist kritische 3ntologie berhaupt mKglich$?9 in Festschriftfr Paul Natorp E%erlin! Walter de +ruyter9 12*0G9 ed' M' Cassirer9 1*0=,, reprintedin Nicloai Hartmann9 Kleinere Schriften9 &ol' - E%erlin! "e +ruyter9 12)/G9 *(/=-1-97uoted from page -11' Translated by Jeith Peterson as >Ho; is Critical 3ntology

Possible$? Axiomates **! *51*9 -1)=)0' 6ee also Nicolai Hartmann9 Neue Wege derOntologie9 trans' 8einhard C' Juhn as New Ways of Ontology and first published inMnglish by Henry 8egenery Company EChicago9 in 12)-G9 and recently reissued byTransaction Publishers ENe; %runs;ick9 NF9 *51*G' I ;ill give references by firstciting
http://plato.standford.edu/entires/nicolai-http://plato.standford.edu/entires/nicolai-http://plato.standford.edu/entires/nicolai-http://plato.standford.edu/entires/nicolai-



1* The Analysis of Wonder

The aporia of cognition is one eternally puBBling philosophical problem'An analysis of basic phenomena leads to this aporia' Phenomena revealthat a sub4ect and an ob4ect of cognition transcend each other9 yet the actof cognition consists in overcoming their gap' The sub4ect and the ob4ectstand against each other9 separated from one another9 and their ontologicalstatus is by no means determined by their cognitive relation' This ob4ect isindifferent to;ard any sub4ect9 that is9 to;ard being kno;n by any sub4ect'And even the sub4ect is not limited to this relation9 for cognition is onlyone of the possible ;ays in ;hich any sub4ect relates to the ;orld'Nevertheless9 as sub4ects and ob4ects of cognition9 there is an importantrelation bet;een them' The aporia of cognition reveals the paradoical

nature of this relation! Is the cognitive relation of the sub4ect and theob4ect something accidental and inessential to their separate eistences9or does it abdicate their transcendence$ Hartmann devotes his first ma4or

philosophical ;ork9 Basic Elements of a Metaphysics of Knowledge9 to this

aporia'Hartmann perceives the most distinctive virtue of Aristotle:s aporetics as

>discussing problems ;ithout trying to solve them at any cost'?, This is notan innocent remark9 for Hartmann believes that the strictly metaphysicalaspects of philosophical problems are beyond the limits of the rationallyresolvable' They are insolvable not because of a lack of the right method9

or our ignorance9 or9 more generally9 some deficiency of the cognitivesub4ect' 8ather9 they are unsolvable because there is something conflictingand irreconcilable in the very nature of being' This metaphysical aspect ofphilosophical problems is unavoidable9 and thus the goal of philosophycannot be to solve its problems >no matter ;hat'? The aporetic methoddoes not look >longingly for results'?/ Its goal must instead be to establish>the minimum of metaphysics necessary for the proper consideration ofphilosophical problems'?2

the chapter from ;hich the 7uote is taken E;hich is the same for the original +ermanand the Mnglish translationG9 and then by giving a page number of the Transactionedition in this particular case9 ch' &I9 (,=,-'

, Nicolai Hartmann9 Grundzge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis9 Introduction9 /'In Ethik9 ch' ,)a @III9 1-/9 Hartmann claims! >No philosophy Rsolves: metaphysicalproblems9 it can only deal ;ith them and ho; far it can succeed in so doing mustal;ays remain doubtful'? As an illustration of this approach9 see ch' /0 @III9 *)1=) ofEthik'

/ Nicolai Hartmann9 >"iesseits von Idealismus and 8ealismus9? Kant-Studien *2!12*091(1'

2 Hartmann9 Grundzge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis9 Introduction9 /' .or further

discussion9 see Anton 6chlittmaier9 >Nicolai Hartmann:s Aporetics and Its Place inthe History of Philosophy9? in The Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann9 ed' 8' Poli9 C'6cognamiglio9 and .' Tremblay E%erlin! Walter de +ruyter9 *511G9 --=)*'



Philosophical Method 1-

Aristotle distances himself from 6ocrates9 ;ho claims that the onlykno;ledge that he has is that of his ignorance' Qet even Aristotle admitsthat the resolutions of the aporias ;e face may take a variety of forms! notonly the positing of the most likely hypothesis9 ;hich he considers to bethe distinguishing feature of the method of analysis9 but also of allo;ingthe eistence of a reasonable contradiction9 ;hich is the sub4ect matter ofdialectic'

To emphasiBe the same point9 in his ;ritings after Basic Elements of aMetaphysics of Knowledge9 Hartmann speaks more often about antinomiesthan about aporias' In this sense9 he follo;s Jant9 ;ho argues thatspeculative metaphysics leads to the contrasting9 e7ually supportable

claims that cannot be resolved by rational means EaloneG' Jant initiallyaccepts the eistence of four antinomies of pure reason9 but in thesubse7uent Critiques ECritique of Practical Reason and Critique of

JudgmentG9 he discovers ne;antinomies in other realms of philosophical thinking as ;ell' According toHartmann9 there are metaphysical aporias and antinomies in every aspectof being9 in every facet of human eperience'

Can these aporias and antinomies ever be resolved$ Is the task ofphilosophy to lead us to the definitive solutions to such metaphysicalproblems$

Hartmann does not think so' In this contet9 it may be important tointroduce a fe; of his thoughts on dialectic' ike a 6ocratic dialogue9dialectic deals ;ith differing9 fre7uently opposing vie;s' 6ocrates hasno problem ;ith his dialogues ending in aporias9 as long as they lead hisinterlocutors to realiBe the unsoundness of their o;n previously held vie;sand their ignorance ;ith regard to some important ethical issues' Plato andAristotle turn dialectic into a positive method9 a method by means of;hich ;e come to the most general ideas from most specific cases' ike6ocrates9 Jant retorts to the negative aspect of dialectic9 the dialectic as

the >logic of

illusion9? a ;ay of curbing the unfounded pretentions ofspeculative reason' .or Hegel9 dialectic once again becomes a positivemethod by ;hich a thesis and its antithesis are resolved into a highersynthesis'

Hartmann resists this >tetbook? interpretation of Hegel:s dialecticalmethod' He does not hide his high9 almost reverential opinion about thismethod!

Dnder all circumstances one ;ill not be able to conceal that there

is something opa7ue9 unclarified and enigmatic in dialectic' There

;ere in all ages only very fe; ;ho mastered it9 isolated ones indeed'

In anti7uity there ;ere about three or four speculative thinkers in

the modern period definitely not moreat least of those ;ho have



10 The Analysis of Wonder

created ;ith it something definite' 3bviously there is a characteristic

dialectical giftedness ;hich permits development9 but does not result

from training' It is then a special9 original9 independent gift of inner

vision and indeed of a synoptic grasping9 ;hich9 advancing along

the coherent data9 sees them at once from various aspects again and

again and notices them iridescent in their contradictions but at the

same time grasps the sub4ection of the contrasts to the thing itself' It

is remarkable that those ;ith dialectic talent do not reveal the

mystery of dialectics they have the method and apply it ;ell9 but

they cannot describe ho; they do it' Mvidently they themselves do

not kno; it' It is comparable to the creation of the artist' The artist

does not kno; the la; he follo;s ;hen he creates' %ut he creates inconformity to it' +enius and the congenial both follo; the la;

blindly9 unfailingly9 as in somnambulism'15

Hartmann fre7uently claims that philosophy is one of the sciences' He usesthe ;ord >analysis? in a related ;ay9 suggesting that our eploration of acertain sub4ect has to be as systematic and rigorous as possible' 6uch anapproach does not tell the ;hole story of his understanding of philosophyand its method' Philosophical analysis is initiated by the careful graspingof the phenomena and stands opposed to all aprioristic deductivism9 ;hichburdened even Hegel:s dialectic' 6uch careful grasping9 follo;ed by astepWie ist kritische 3ntologie berhaupt mKglich$? especially -5*=-1

and Nicolai Hartmann9 Der Aufbau der realen Welt9 -rd edn E%erlin! Walter de+ruyter9 12(0G9 ch' 1,9 102=)('



Philosophical Method 1)

can be dealt ;ith only through dialectical thinking' In Hartmann:s vie;9it is precisely the task of dialectic to track do;n concealed antinomicalelements ;herever they eist'

The fact that there ;ere only a fe; masters of dialectic in the entirehistory of Western philosophy suggests to Hartmann that dialectic is morelike a gift than a method that can be trained' Philosophical thinking relieson analysis9 on a rational eploration of all data and kno;ledge availableto us9 from common sense to scientific kno;ledge' Qet philosophy ends indialectical thinking9 ;hich does not shun oppositions9 contradictions9 oreven insoluble problems' 3n the contrary9 it thrives in them9 ;hich is ;hysometimes dialectical thinking is called the >logic of paradoes'?

If dialectic9 as the cro;n of philosophical thinking9 cannot be fullyarticulated and trained9 if it makes a philosopher more like an artist anda somnambulist than like a scientist9 then it ;ill certainly have an impacton ho; philosophy is understood and practiced' Philosophy is not a 7uestfor certainty' It is not a product but a pro4ect' "espite its systematic andrigorous approach9 philosophy does not prove anything' It probes'


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I ' *

%eing as %eing

Aristotle:s most famous book9 Metaphysics9 ;as not named that ;ay

by him' He left no title at all9 and its editors placed it behind his ;orkson Physics' Thus the name Metaphysics! behind Eor above9 or beyondG

physics' It is generally accepted that this title9 accidental as it is9 isaccurate' Hartmann disagrees' He believes that the book should be named>3ntology? since it deals ;ith ontological problems' 3ne eception isbook II9 ;hich focuses on metaphysical issues in the narro; sense'

Hartmann holds that ontological problems are a subset of metaphysicalproblems concerning the ultimate nature and structure of being EJKB9 SeinG' Dnlike the ma4ority of our metaphysical problems9 he argues

that ontological problems are most solvable' Qet9 ;e cannot solve themif ;e follo; the ;ays of traditional ontology!

The old theory of being is based upon the thesis that the universal9

crystalliBed in the essentia as substantial form and comprehensible

as concept9 is the determining and formative core of things' ' ' ' The

etreme representatives of this doctrine even assigned true reality to

the universal essences alone9 thereby disparaging the ;orld of time

and @individual things'1

The essence of things can be captured by concepts and definitionsor atleast that ;as the epectation of the old ontology' Mistence itself9ho;ever9 is far more slippery' Among other things9 it re7uires contact;ith and careful observation of the concrete being under consideration'This is ;here phenomenology replaces the old deductive ontology'

1 Hartmann9 Neue Wege der Ontologie9 ch' I9 *2=-5' Mtienne +ilson epresses it in a ;aycloser to our common sense understanding! >Human reason feels at home in a ;orldof things ;hose essences and la;s it can grasp and define in terms of concepts but

shy and ill at ease in a ;orld of eistences9 because to eist is an act9 not a thing?God and Philosophy9 *nd edn ENe; Haven9 CN! Qale Dniversity Press9 *55*G9 (,'



1/ The Analysis of Wonder

Hartmann argues that this type of deductive ontology is impossible forus' The time of ontological systemsindeed9 of all grandiosephilosophical constructionsis over' After Christian Wolff:s monumentaleffort to build the ultimate ontological system9 ontology has beenneglected it has fallen into centuriesne; ;ays of ontology'?3ntology itself9 ;ith its sets of traditional problems9 is as indispensible asever'*

Why9 eactly9 do ;e need ontology$ Whyshould not ontologicalproblems9 understood as the perennial problems that deal ;ith the

structure of being as being9 be dismissed$Hartmann counters that all fundamental metaphysical 7uestions are

ontological in nature' 3ntological vie;s are present in the background ofmost other 7uestions9 including scientific ones science cannot determine

;hat is matter9 force9 energy9 space9 time9 et cetera' 6cience must accept

certain ontological interpretation of these categories' This is one important;ay ontology is essential for our overall understanding of reality and ourplace and role ;ithin it' In the second and the third parts of this book ;e;ill consider the significance of ontology for ethics9 aesthetics9 and ourunderstanding of personality'

I am emphasiBing this point because Hartmann:s entire philosophicalopus depends on his vie; that ontology is an endeavor that has a groundingfunction for other intellectual disciplines' If he is right9 the ontologicalvie;s have a domino effect on the rest of our beliefs' To make this clearer9Hartmann reminds us that it makes a difference ;hether9 for instance9;e agree ;ith Plato that the particular is less real and derivative of theuniversal9 or9 like Aristotle9 turn it upside do;n' It makes an even greaterdifference ;hether ;e concur ;ith ancient and scholastic philosophers thatbeing and good are intimately connected9 or assert9 together ;ith modern

philosophers9 that this is not so9 and that cosmology and ethics havenothing in common' This kind of denial is decisive for our understandingof ethics in terms of autonomy9 rather than as moral norms revealed to usby some transcendent deity'

We ;ill decide later ;hether ontology has indeed such a grounding rolein our thinking' Hartmann opens his Foundations of Ontology in a more

* Nicolai Hartmann9 Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie9 forth ed' E%erlin! Walter de+ruyter9 12()G9 i' .or Hartmann:s masterful summary revie; of the history of

ontological thought9 see Chapters )=15 of this ;ork' His revie; also includes a harshcriticism of Heidegger'



Being as Being 12

restricted manner9 focusing on the simplest and most direct ontologicalproblem of being as being!

3ntology begins ;ith a decisive statement of openness regarding the

fundamental metaphysical 7uestions9 ;ith an attitude that stands

in opposition to >philosophical? perspectives and systems' .rom the

point of vie; of ontology9 it is not at all important9 in terms of posing

the 7uestion9 ;hether or not there is such a thing as a >ground? of the

;orld9 ;hether or not this ground has an intelligible form9 or even

;hether or not the construction of the ;orld has some meaningful

end to;ard ;hich its ;hole process is oriented' The character of

being as such is not significantly altered by the ans;ers to such7uestions' These distinctions only come into play ;hen considering

broader aspects of differentiation' Clearly9 decisive conse7uences for

metaphysics arise from the initial handling of the 7uestion of being'

%ut this understanding cannot be taken the other ;ay around' We

cannot kno; anything about the ;orld or its >ground? before ;e get

into the 7uestion of being' Neither can theories regarding the ob4ects of

being be verified' .or9 by its very essence9 the problem of being ;ould

appear to be rooted in such 7uestions' It inheres in phenomena9 not in

hypotheses'-

Philosophers Eand scientistsG have al;ays searched for the ultimateelements of reality' They have searched for them in the sense in ;hichthe roots of the tree of kno;ledge represent the ultimate issues in"escartes9 or in the ;ay +od9 immortality9 and freedom signify theultimate concerns in Jant:s metaphysics' The beginning and the end ofthe paragraph 7uoted above ;arn not to approach the 7uestion of beingas being in terms of hypothesis and pre



*5 The Analysis of Wonder

Hartmann:s openas a matter of principle9 ontologytracks only the problem and considers only that ;hich is demanded bythe problem' It moves a;ay from the natural standpoint as little as

possible9 and it preserves its point of vie; as far as it is valid'?0

3ntological analysis of being treats Aristotle:s 7uestion of being asbeing as the initial 7uestion of ontology and this is important for severalreasons' 3ne of the most important messages of Hartmann:s entire opusdeals ;ith the fullness and richness of being' He intends to revivephilosophy9 so that it can adapt to the reality of the ;orld in its richness'Hartmann:s intention need not be immediately obvious9 for the 7uestion of

being as being amounts to approaching being in its bareness' We have to

ponder ;hat it means to be9 simply to eist! not as this or that kind ofthing9 not necessarily as a thing9 but simply to be' Think about it! in orderto come to the richness and fullness of being9 ;e need to start from itssheer eistence'

Although this 7uestion of being as being may appear simple9 it isactually etremely difficult to think through' The history of philosophy istestimony to the fact that ;e often rush to classify being in terms of someof its characteristics9 determinations or predicates9 rather than keepingit open9 preserving it in its bareness9 and focusing on it in its generalityand indeterminacy' A cardinal sin of traditional ontology is its perpetualattempts to define being through its various contents and manifestations'

8egardless of ;hether this is done in terms of substance9 essence9causality9 matter9 form9 immovable9 unchangeable9 indivisible9 individual9;hole9 or any other ;ay9 Hartmann finds this pro4ect irreparably fla;ed9and for the same reason' All these concepts limit themselves to individualcategories of being' They >get? only one side of being and miss being asbeing' They forget that the problem of being as being deals not only ;iththe inorganic ;orld9 but ;ith a living organism9 as ;ell as ;ith thepsychic and spiritual forms of life'

Naivety and common sense limit being to things' %ut being belongse7ually to processes9 relations9 and properties of things' %eing belongs

0 Hartmann9 Grundzge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis9 ch' *-9 1/)'



Being as Being *1

to ;hat is changing and becoming9 as ;ell as to that ;hich is enduringor permanent' It does not distinguish bet;een ;hat appears and ;hat ishidden9 or ;hat can be cogniBed and ;hat ;ill never be so' %eing belongsto ;hat is one9 as much as it belongs to ;hat is many9 to parts or to totalityto ;hat is individual as to ;hat is universal' What is evil is no less realthan ;hat is good ;hat is ugly has its being no less than ;hat isbeautiful or sublime' As Hartmann sums it up! >The most insignificantgrain of dust in the universe is no less being than the universe itself'?)

Hartmann is firmly convinced that beingsimply being as beingcannot be defined' %eing is the most general category ;e can think and askabout' There is nothing else >behind it? to ;hich it can be further reduced9

or in terms of ;hich it can be defined' In this regard9 there is no differencebet;een being Eas the most general ontological categoryG9 the good Easthe most general ethical categoryG9 and the beautiful Eas the most generalaesthetic categoryG' The most general categories are al;ays indefinable andthus partially irrational'

Although being as being has a grounding function9 although it servesas the root for all specific manifestations of being9 Hartmann re4ects linearhierarchies of being' We can attempt to grasp some aspects of the relationsof being as being to;ard the individual beings' Perhaps ;e even have anintellectual obligation to clarify them as much as possible' #uch about

them ;ill9 ho;ever9 remain unkno;n forever' With the rest of ourscientific and philosophical efforts9 ontology ;ill never become a closed

system9 a complete body of kno;ledge' What little can be kno;n about

being ;ill9 nevertheless9 turn out to be of enormous significance'

) Hartmann9 Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie9 ch' ,e9 (('


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I ' -

#odifications of %eing

Although being is not definable9 this does not imply that it is

indeterminable' %eing can be determined indirectly9 through its variousmanifestations' Hartmann bases his ne; ontology on three kinds ofontological manifestations! EiG modes Eor modalitiesG of being9 ;hich refer

to various kinds of modalities EiiG moments of being9 ;hich deal ;ith the

relationship of Dasein Ethat something is eistent and presentG and Sosein

Eho; it is its being in a certain ;ayG EiiiG ways of being9 ;hich concernthe relationship bet;een the real and the ideal'

The structure of being can be conceived of in terms of the relationof modes that govern it9 that is9 in terms of >inter



*0 The Analysis of Wonder

Hartmann strongly opposes this teleological orientation of old ontology'

In fact9 he finds that the persistence of teleological thinking in modernphilosophy is one of the main reasons for the neglect of ontology if the;orld is going in a certain direction9 if it is guided by an >invisible hand?to;ard its predestined goal9 ;hy bother eamining being as being$ Whynot9 instead9 study the proclaimed JN>? and the processes leading toits realiBation$

To counter this teleological mirage9 Hartmann introduces thedistinction bet;een an >essential possibility? of old ontology Eas somethingdestined to be realiBedG and a >real possibility? Ethe realiBation of ;hichdepends on ;hether all of its necessary conditions are satisfiedG' In real

being9 or >actual reality9? only that ;hose conditions are all real is possible'Hartmann thus eliminates the need for a teleological conception of a divinebeing9 as ;ell as a purely mechanical determinism of the ;orld' He refusesto postulate in advance any prenegatively? possible is also unreal andimpossible' >Actuality in the narro; and only true sense is only the realactuality'?*

Hartmann:s consideration of the modalities of being leads to a ne;formulation and 4ustification of the principle of sufficient reason' Also9 itbrings him to a ne; characteriBation of the nature of becoming9 obligation9and the puBBling ontological status of aesthetic ob4ects Eto ;hich ;e ;illreturn to in Part IIG'

1

Hartmann9 Neue Wege der Ontologie9 ch' III9 0('* Nicolai Hartmann9 Mglichkeit und Wirklichkeit9 *nd edn E%erlin! Walter de +ruyter91202G9 ),' .or further discussion9 see 8afael Hntelmann9 Mglich ist nur dasWirkliche: Nicolai Hartmanns Modalontologie des realen Sein E"ettelbach! 8Kll9*555G'



Modifications of Being *)

The discussion of the moments of being9 in terms of Dasein and Sosein9represents one of the finest eamples of Hartmann:s novel approach toontology'- His clarification of this fundamental ontological distinctionhelps us see ho; dialectical thinking may lead to a fruitful chain ofreasoning9 or;hen in the >;rong? handsto ever greater confusionregarding the nature of the real' He believes that a misunderstanding of thecomple relation of Dasein and Sosein is responsible for countless

mistakes throughout the history of Western philosophy'ike some other +erman epressions9 the terms Dasein and Sosein

do not have elegant Mnglish translations' Dasein literally means thatsomething9 some being9 is present' It refers to the fact that something

is' Sosein9 by contrast9 points to;ard what it is' The history of ontologyis full of erroneous convictions that the difference bet;een Dasein andSosein corresponds to the distinction bet;een eistence and essence'Hartmann maintains to the contrary that Sosein is not identical toessence it involves essential as ;ell as nonessential characteristic of;hatis' .urther9 he denies that eistence and essence can be ontologicallyseparated! eistence is also essence9 and essence is also eistence' 0 Ho;can that be possible$

Dasein and Sosein stand in opposition to each other as t;odistinguishable moments of being' Nevertheless9 they are both needed asthe characteriBations of one and the same being' As Hartmann succinctlystates9 >There is no Sosein ;ithout Dasein and no Dasein ;ithout

Sosein'?) The t;o terms can be conceptually differentiated9 but Dasein

and Sosein cannot be ontologically separated' "espite being deeply

inter;oven9 there is no direct and tautological identity bet;een Dasein

and Sosein9 even in the same thing' The relation is rather dialectical9

;hich9 for Hartmann9 means that the Dasein of a certain A is at the

same time the Sosein of a certain %9 and the Sosein of that eistent % is

at the same time the Dasein

of some C' .or instance9 the Dasein of a tree is the Sosein of a forest9 for;ithout the tree the forest ;ould not be the same' .urther9 the Dasein ofthe forest is the Sosein of9 say9 a landscape the Dasein of the landscape isthe Sosein of the earth9 and so on' At the end of the chain9 ;e come to the

- 3tto 6amuel translates Dasein and Sosein as >Hereness? and >6uchness? 3tto6amuel9 A Foundation of Ontology: A Critical Analysis of Nicolai HartmannENe; Qork! Philosophical ibrary9 12)-G9 0,=/' It is also possible to translate theseterms as >that;hat



*( The Analysis of Wonder

last member9 the universe as a ;hole9 about ;hich ;e can only say that itis EDaseinG but not ho; it is ESoseinG'(

Here ;e see the difference of Hartmann:s treatment in comparisonto the traditional philosophers' Without a proper appreciation of theDaseinSosein distinction9 the traditional philosophers perpetually

tried to determine the Sosein of the ;orld as a ;hole by analogy to anindividual thing EresG' They also attempted to elevate the Dasein of thelast link into some kind of higher Eabsolute9 unconditional9 etc'G being'No such hierarchies of being are 4ustified' What ;e must take a;ay from

this distinction of Dasein and Sosein is that more than mere eistence

belongs to the real9 and that there is eistence even outside of the real' This

directs us to;ard Hartmann:s discussion of the real and ideal being9 ;hichhas turned out to be the most controversial of the three modifications ofbeing he discusses' 6ince it is also most important for all other parts of hisphilosophical pro4ect9 ;e ;ill give it due attention'

It is obvious that there are real beings' They are phenomenologicallygiven to us as individual9 uni7ue9 and temporally located' #any real beingsare also located in space Efor instance inanimate ob4ectsG9 but not all ofthem are' %ut9 ;hy believe that there is any other kind of being$ Whybelieve that there is any sphere of ideal being or9 as Hartmann sometimesalso calls it9 the ideal ;orld$ This is the central aporia of ideal being'

In long9 and often futile9 discussions over the nature of universals9 idealbeing has been relegated either into things9 concepts9 or9 in some cases9 thetranscendent mind of +od' Hartmann admits that there is no >natural?consciousness of ideal being' Its eistence is hidden9 as it ;ere9 in thebackground of real being' While real being imposes itself on us9 idealbeing never does' This is ;hy ideal being is so often denied9 neglected9 orsimply overlooked'

The first and most convincing indication that ideal being eists ;asfound in mathematics' .rom Plato:s belief in the significance of geometry

to +alileo:s dictum that >the %ook of Nature is ;ritten in mathematicallanguage9? there has long been a conviction that mathematical principlesare not 4ust concepts and ideas' They eist not as thoughts but as entities'%esides mathematical principles9 there are also logical principles'Hartmann calls mathematical and logical principles >formal essences9?in order to distinguish them from values9 ;hich Efollo;ing #a 6chelerGhe considers as >material essences'?

Ideal being manifests itself through multiple connections ;ith realbeing' To a significant degree9 the ;orld of real things obeys mathematical

( Hartmann9 Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie9 ch' 12d9 1*/=2'



Modifications of Being *,

and logical principles ideal values find their realiBation in this ;orld' Wecan hardly understand ;hat human beings are9 or ;hat it means to have apersonality9 ;ithout taking into account the various aspects of ideal being'

Hartmann holds that ;e can discover the structural properties of idealbeing even ;ithout their actualiBation in real being' Ideal being is open forinsight by a priori cognition' We can recogniBe ideal being a priori becauseit is universal9 nontemporal9 and unchanging' .rom this point of vie;9 itappears that ideal being has a mode of eistence independent of real being4ust as real being is indifferent to being cogniBed9 ideal being is indifferent

to being actualiBed' This realiBation seduces Plato to consider ideal beingas

a higher form of being and ontologically superior to real being'Plato goes too far' He overlooks the double aspect of the relationship of

real and ideal beings' 3ntologically speaking9 real beings have superiorityover ideal beings' Although indifferent to;ard their actualiBation andepistemologically superior9 ;ithout a proper actualiBation9 ideal beings>float? ;ithout real function' Thus9 ideal beings are imperfect andincomplete9 unless tied to real beings' The key point is that these t;ospheres of being9 these t;o ;orlds9 are not 4ust disparate but also unitedthey are t;o ;ays of being of the same ;orld' In Hartmann:s ;ords9

Ideal being can be found in the basic structure of everything real'

3ntologically speaking9 the ;hole sphere of the ideal is indifferent to

the sphere of the real' %ut the t;o spheres do not eist independently9

nor do ;e encounter them in mutual isolation' They are simple different

;ays of being' What distinguishes them radically is the fact that

everything real is individual9 uni7ue9 destructible ;hereas everything

ideal is universal9 returnable9 al;ays eisting',

We can no; connect Hartmann:s discussion of Dasein and Sosein to

the real and ideal being' It has been generally assumed that Dasein is aneistence that belongs to real being9 ;hile Sosein is9 roughly9 essence9;hich belongs to the mode of ideal being' Although ;e find such ideasmaintained throughout the history of philosophy Eeven in HusserlVG9 theyare incorrect' The basic relationship of Dasein and Sosein is con4unctive9

;hile that of real and ideal being is dis4unctive' The identity of Dasein

and Sosein is dialectical9 not tautological' With regard to the real and theideal9 they are not identical9 either in the dialogical or tautological sense'

, Hartmann9 Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie9 ch' 00b9 *),' 6ee Hartmann9 Der Aufbauder realen Welt9 chs' ))=(59 0()=)15' Hartmann:s most etensive treatment of Platois in Platos Logik des Seins E%erlin! Walter de +ruyter9 12()G'



*/ The Analysis of Wonder

.urther insights may be gained by tying these distinctions on thepossibility of a priori and a posteriori cognition' In the spirit of Jant9Hartmann argues that in an a priori manner ;e can kno; the ideal Sosein9the ideal Dasein9 and the real Sosein9 but never the real Dasein' Aposteriori ;e can kno; the real Dasein and the real Sosein9 but nothingabout ideal being'/

While philosophical attention is more often related to the ideal thanto real being9 Hartmann urges us to focus on real being first' 8eal beingincorporates in its structures9 in its combination of Dasein and Sosein9ideal being as ;ell' 8eal being poses the greatest challenge not only toour kno;ledge but also to our feeling of values' .ar deeper and far more

fundamental than purely cognitive acts are those that are emotionallygrounded' "espite the modern preoccupation ;ith the mind and thinking9Hartmann insists that our emotional responsiveness to reality is at thebottom of all cognitive activity' The eistence of isolated cognitive activity9together ;ith our traditional overestimation of the eternal and neverivory to;er? of philosophy and to;ardthe richness and concreteness of the changing individual entities thatpopulate the real ;orld'

/

Hartmann9 Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie9 ch' *1a9 -*5'2 Hartmann9 Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie9 ch' )5d9 -*5'



I ' 0

6trata of 8eal %eing

.or Hartmann9 philosophy is anything but a trifling academic game'

Philosophical problems spring neither from idle curiosity9 nor frominvented intellectual subtleties' They are enforced on us by phenomenaincontestable to all ;illing to observe and think carefully9 to all ;hohave ever become a;are of them' In Hartmann:s ;ords9 >And behindthe phenomena there is the ;orld as it actually is9 including man suchas he is'?1

The primary concern of philosophy is >the ;orld as it actually is9including man such as he is'? In the terminology introduced earlier9philosophy:s primary fascination must be ;ith real being9 not ideal being'

In the previous section ;e have observed ho; Hartmann dispels thepre4udice that being as being must refer to some higher9 perfect form ofbeing' Here ;e ;ill consider ho; he turns against an even older9 perhapseven more deeply rooted misconception that being as being must referto something immovable and unchanging' Also ;e ;ill discuss hisunderstanding of the unity of being'

Hartmann claims that real being is becoming' 8eal being is changing9temporal9 and individual' And ;hat is changing9 temporal9 and individualcannot be rigid9 motionless9 and inimical to life' Nor can it be finished orperfect in every respect' 3n the contrary9 everything real is in motion it

is in flu! >#otion and becoming form the universal mode of being of thereal9 no matter ;hether it be a 7uestion of material things9 living forms9 ofhuman beings'?*

There is a multiplicity of forms of real being in their compledevelopments and mutual interdependencies' We cannot epect tounderstand all of these compleities9 or that they are all unfoldingaccording to some supermaster plan'? Hartmann is categoricalin asserting that9 >not everything in the ;orld of reality9 perhaps only the

1

Hartmann9 Neue Wege der Ontologie9 ch' I9 112'* Hartmann9 Neue Wege der Ontologie9 ch' III9 0,'



-5 The Analysis of Wonder

least part of it9 is meaningful'?- Qet many of these compleities can beuntangled9 at least partially9 through a careful philosophical analysis' Thisanalysis of the comple makeup of real being is the sub4ect of Hartmann:smost ambitious ontological ;ork9 The Structure of the Real World'

The cru of Hartmann:s analysis consists in his opposition to all formsof reductivism and dualism' He establishes a pluralistic vie; of reality9;ith a dynamic interrelation of the four strata! the inorganic9 the organic9the psychic9 and the spiritual' %efore ;e come to his positive vie;9 let usconsider some of his criticisms of monistic reductivism and eclusivedualism' .or instance9 the ;orld cannot be ruled either from belo;9 orfrom above' Identifying the real ;orld ;ith inorganic matter simply

cannot eplain the diversity of the phenomena in the ;orld9 includingthe organic9 the psychic9 and especially the spiritual' Nor is it possible toeplain everything by means of an allsin+od



Strata of Real Being -1

Notice ho; Hartmann al;ays steers the ontological discussion to;ardthe nature of man and his role and place in reality' He may begin ;iththe most abstract of all 7uestions EWhat is being as being$G9 but does notrestrict himself to abstractions' Indeed9 ho; could he9 ;hen he thinksof reality in terms of changing9 temporal9 and individual beings$ And9phenomenologically speaking9 the most comple of such individual realbeings is man' When ;e observe human beings9 ;e see most clearly thatthe unity of being9 as ;ell as the unity of the real ;orld9 cannot beeplained through one substance9 ;hatever that substance may be' Inhuman beings ;e find diversity that is nevertheless united9 or9 to put itthe other ;ay around9 unity in diversity or heterogeneity' The unity of

man9 as ;ell as the unity of the ;orld9 cannot be the unity of oneprinciple9 of one substance9 or of any one thing' It must be the unity of astructure9 comple as it is9 and dynamically maintained' In man ;erecogniBe the presence of the inorganic9 the organic9 the psychic9 and thespiritual layers'

We also find in man a dynamic interrelation not only bet;een thesestrata9 but also ;ithin them' 3pposition occurs bet;een counteractingforces at the level of the inorganic9 the level of pure physical processes9;hich Elike action and reactionG are so related that they establish adynamic balance' The spontaneous forces of self



-* The Analysis of Wonder

the ontological novelty of every higher level ;ith regard to every lo;erlevel'

Hartmann:s account of ho; this happens is structurally similar to his

eplanation of the dialectic of the Dasein and Sosein' He illustrates it

;ith the eample of matter and form9 perhaps the most misunderstoodof all ontological distinctions' #atter and form are not to be understoodin any absolute and static sense9 neither in terms of an ultimate9 insolublematerial principle9 nor in terms of an isolated and elevated form' .ormand matter are relative in the sense that all form can be matter for ahigher form9 and all matter can be form for a lo;er matter' The atom isthe matter of the molecules but is itself a formed structure' The molecule

is the matter of the cell9 ;hich in turn is the matter of multicelledorganism9 and so on'

%esides this principle of dependency9 the real ;orld is also constructedon the related but different principle of determination' We understand thisprinciple even less than the principle of dependency' .or eample9 muchof our thinking about the principle of determination is in terms of causesand effects' Qet they constitute only one form of determination' The basicprinciple of determination is rather the modal principle of sufficient reason'This principle affirms that nothing occurs in the ;orld that does not haveits EsufficientG ground in something else' The principle of sufficient reason

is e7ually important for all strata of the real ;orld' In the realm of thought94ust like in the inorganic realm9 nothing eists by chance in the ontologicalsense' Mverything depends on some conditions and occurs only ;herethese are fulfilled' If all conditions are fulfilled9 they form a sufficientreason9 and the event is bound to occur'

Human beings serve as the simplest and most convincing proof thatreality is both layered and dynamically united' #an is a participant notonly of the spatially etended inorganic and organic strata of reality9 butalso of its nonspatial psychic and spiritual layers' He is endo;ed ;ith

consciousness9 as ;ell as spirit' #odifying some insights of Hegel and"ilthey9 Hartmann distinguishes a personal spirit from an ob4ective spirit9;hich presents itself as a suprapersonal being manifested in institutions9legal order9 culture9 religion9 science9 speech9 and so on' He calls thesemanifestations of the living and historically bounded supraob4ectified spirit'? Hartmann avoids the pre4udices of bothsupra



Strata of Real Being --

No; ;e can better understand ;hy Hartmann insists that ontologyis a fundamental philosophical discipline' In his vie;9 there can be noanthropology ;ithout ontology9 or the other ;ay around'

The nature of man can be ade7uately understood only as the

integrated ;hole of combining strata and9 furthermore9 as placed

;ithin the totality of the same order of strata ;hich9 outside of

man9 determines the structure of the real ;orld' #an cannot be

understood unless the ;orld in ;hich he lives and of ;hich he is a

part is understood94ust as the ;orld cannot be understood ;ithout

an understanding of man = that one member of the ;orld to ;hich

alone its structure is ehibited' This ehibition is the vie; of the;orld ;hich philosophy sketches')

) Hartmann9 Neue Wege der Ontologie9 ch' I9 1*5' 6ee Hartmann:s books9 Das

Problem des geistigen Seins E%erlin! Walter de +ruyter9 12)5G9 ch' (9 ,2=//9 andPhilosophie der Natur E%erlin! Walter de +ruyter9 12)5G9 )**ff'


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I ' )

Categories of 8eal %eing

In order to understand the nature of reality9 ;e must comprehend its

dynamic and layered structure' In order to grasp this structure ;emust discern the elements that compose it! the categories' Hence9 asthe fundamental task of ontology9 Hartmann establishes the follo;ing!the determination of the categories characteriBing each stratum of realbeing9 and of those that are common for all four strata' 3ur task no;is to discover the ;ay he understands the nature and function of thecategories9 ;hat categories he identifies9 and ho; he determines theirmutual relationship'

ike many other ;ords taken from ordinary language and converted

into technical terms9 the ;ord >category? did not initially suggest anythingof philosophical relevance' The +reek noun ;8JO>FG8 meansaccusation and predication' As a verb9 it means to accuse E;8JQ meansagainstG someone at an assembly' Aristotle removes the negativeconnotation and uses this ;ord to refer to the most general ;ays in;hich a sub4ect



-( The Analysis of Wonder

as ob4ects of our cognitive 4udgments' The categories are the foundation ofa systematic unity of our ;ay of cognition'1

.or Jant9 the categories are not primarily the determinations of beingthey are not primarily ontological' 8ather9 they are epistemologicalconcepts' In his terminology9 they are the concepts of the understandingnecessary for the synthesis of eperience' Jant provides both the>metaphysical? and the >transcendental? deduction of the categories9 thatis9 the >proofs? of their pure origin and ob4ective validity' Hesystematically presents them in four groups E7uantity9 7uality9 relation9and modalityG9 each of ;hich contains eactly three subcategoriesEunity9 plurality9 totality reality9 negation9 limitation substance and

accident9 causality and dependence9 community possibility=impossibility9 eistence= noneistence9 necessity=contingencyG'

Hegel:s Logic opens the ;ay for the development of ontology in termsof a systematic analysis of the categories' He continues Jant:s analysisof categories and significantly enriches our understanding of them byliberating us from Jant:s unnecessary epistemological constraints' DnlikeJant9 Hegel goes back to the most primordial ontological concepts! beingand its opposite! nonbeing9 or nothingness' Without these categories thereis no possibility of eplaining the becoming9 or the emergence of anythingne;' In contrast to Jant:s static and aals ob? as ifG9 ;hich emerge from

practical purposes' .or Mdmund Husserl9 categories are the simple andnot further dissolvable unities of meaning'

A fe; clarifications must be made before ;e turn to Hartmann:s vie;'%ecause there are many kinds of categories9 from here on ;e ;ill use

1 6ee9 for instance9 Immanuel Jant9 Critique of Pure Reason9 trans' Norman Jemp6mith ENe; Qork! Palgrave9 *55-G9 A()=,S%%25=*9 A,2=/5S%15)=('



Categories of Real Being -,

>categories? to refer eclusively to ontological categories9 unless other;isenoted' Mven among the ontological categories there are some that belongto all spheres of being E>modal categories?G9 some to the entire real ;orldE>fundamental? categoriesG9 and some to a specific level of realityE>special? categoriesG' Hartmann discusses the first group of theseontological categories in Possibility and Actuality9 the second in TheStructure of the Real World9 and the third in Philosophy of Nature' We;ill focus primarily on the fundamental and special categories9 ;hichapply to the realm of real being'

Hartmann calls our attention to three typical misconceptionsregarding categories' .irst9 a category is usually not distinguished from

a concept of that category' 6econd9 there is a lack of distinction bet;eenontological and epistemological categories' Third9 there is an assumptionthat categories of being must eist either in some linguistic or mentalisticrealm9 or on their o;n' Hartmann denies both horns of this false dilemma'3ntological categories eist only as the determinations of being they areimmanent to real being' They are not applied to reality by the cogniBingmind9 or by the competent users of language' Categories are inherent inthings themselves and in the events they determine' They articulate the

Sosein of real entities! their configurations9 structures9 and contents9 but

not their eistence'Categories are the principles of real being insofar as they deal ;ith

;hat is universal and necessary' 6ince every discipline aims atuncovering its principles9 ontology becomes centrally oriented on asystematic analysis of categories' Hartmann:s >Ne; Ways of 3ntology?transforms the treatment of ontology that dominated from Aristotleto Christian Wolff! from being a science of being as being9

ontology becomes a categorial analysis' In The Structure of the Real

World alone9 Hartmann engages in an analysis of )/ ontological

categories' We cannot consider in any detail his individual findings9

but have to outline his general conception of categories'Categories do not eist in isolation from other categories' Nor are they

limited in number' Thus9 ne; ontology must endeavor to establish eactly;hat categories are the basic determinants of each strata of real being' Thisundertaking must also eplain ho; categories of various strata interrelateand co



-/ The Analysis of Wonder

and content9 pleasure and displeasure9 consciousness and unconsciousness'.inally9 the categories of the spirit are! thought9 kno;ledge9 ;ill9 freedom9evaluation9 and personality'

Dnlike the categories specific for one stratum9 the >fundamental?categories Ecommon for all strata of real beingG came in pairs! principle=

concretum structure=modus form=matter inner=outer determination=

dependence 7uality=7uantity unity=manifoldness harmony=conflictcontrast=dimension discretion=continuity substratum=relation element=structure'

There is no dominant category of one layer9 nor is there a dominantpair of categories that determines all the strata of real being' All categories

of one stratum 4ointly determine everything and share in all particulars'The fundamental categories are so related that in every pair each of thecategories presupposes its counterpart9 and is in turn presupposed by it'.or eample9 form presupposes matterfor it must be the form of somematterand matter is ;hat it is only as a matter of some form that shapesand structures it'

The categories of each stratum are interrelated in a homogeneous;ay from within' The categories of various strata are interrelated in aheterogeneous ;ay from without' The categories of a lo;er stratum aresuperior ;ith regard to their strength in comparison to the categories

of any higher stratum' Qet they are poorer in terms of their structure'Hartmann sometimes uses the technical terms >supersuper



Categories of Real Being -2

-' The la; of hierarchical order! categories of the lo;er strata

are contained in the higher9 but not the other ;ay around'0' The la; of dependence! the dependence of categories isasymmetrical9 ;ith the higher categories dependent on the lo;er9though their categorial novelty is thereby not limited'*

Hartmann:s comprehensive categorial analysis consists neither in purely apriori kno;ledge9 nor in its purely a posteriori counterpart' It presupposesthe ;hole breadth of human eperience9 from everyday life to the mostelaborate scientific research' It also relies on philosophical eperience asrecorded in the historical development of human thought9 as a long seriesof

attempts and proposals9 disappointments and selfHartmann:s Theory of Categories! Introductory 8emarks9? inThe Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann9 ed' 8' Poli9 C' 6cognamiglio9 and .' Tremblay9

1=-*'- Hartmann9 Grundzge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis9 ch' -0d9 *(0'


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I ' (

Categories of %eing andCategories of Cognition

>#an kno;s things by means of his categories9 but he does not need

a kno;ledge of these categories for the purpose'? This is Hartmann:s

fundamental vie;' He further eplains! >Jno;ledge of categories does

not come until epistemology develops9 but kno;ledge of things does

not have to ;ait for epistemology'?1

Hartmann follo;s Plato and Aristotle in the conviction that epistemologydoes not come before ontology9 nor can it replace ontology' 3urcommonsense kno;ledge and scientific practices are based on the premise

that the ;orld is ;hat it is9 ;hether ;e kno; of it or not' The naturaldirection of our attention is to;ard things9 to;ard cogniBing ;hat the

;orld is like' Hartmann calls this primal attitude! >intentio recta'?3;ing to a collapse of the ancient and medieval ;orldvie;s9 "escartes

redirects the course of the traditional thinking' Instead of focusing on;hat ;e EcanG kno;9 philosophers become preoccupied ;ith a metaHo; do ;e kno; that ;e kno;$? The cogniBing mind becomesthe fiation of modern philosophers' We search not so much forkno;ledge9 but for the kno;ledge of kno;ledge' In Hartmann:s

terminology9 our attention turns a;ay from reality9 a;ay from being' Itturns to;ard the analysis of our thoughts about being from intentiorecta to;ard intentio obliqua'*

Jant plays a t;ofold role in this process' .irst9 he brings this selfepistemology naturaliBed? or to;ard the analysis ofkno;ledge in terms of +ettierconsciousness? is Bewutsein9 ;hich

clearly has its root in Sein9 ;hich means being' Consciousness is a beingthat is a;are of other beings'

Jant is right to claim that reason is not a thing among things' "oesthis mean9 ho;ever9 that reason is not a being among beings$ The ;holelanguage of things9 ;hich ;e have inherited from the Parmenidean=

Aristotelian ;ay of thinking9 is rendered dubious not only by theeaggerated focus on reason and sub4ectivity9 but even by thinkingabout the thing in itself' What is this mysterious thing in itself$ It maybe understandable in its negative sense Eits concept being a >limitingconcept?G9 but it is 7uite puBBling in a positive sense' If it is a thing9 thenit should be determinable by means of the categories that reason appliesto all other things Eob4ectsG that provide the material for eperience andthinking' %y Jant:s definition9 ho;ever9 that cannot be the case'

) .or further discussion9 inspired by Hartmann9 see Predrag Cicovacki9 Anamorphosis:Kant on Knowledge and Ignorance Eanham9 #"! Dniversity Press of America9122,G9 ch' 19 1,=0,'



Categories of Being and Categories of Cognition 0)

Hartmann deviates from Jant ;ith regard to the thing in itself' It is a

being9 and it is eactly ;hat ;e can kno;9 if cognition is to be possible at

all' 3ur kno;ledge is not about ho; things appear9 but about ho; theyare' According to Hartmann9 >being is the common sphere in ;hichsub4ect and ob4ect stand over against each other'?( There is no valid reasonfor pushing anything outside of the sphere of being9 neither any allegedtranscendental sub4ect9 nor some unkno;able thing in itself' Jno;ers areeistents they are real beings9 4ust as the things and events they attemptto kno; are eistent and real' >Principles of cognition are ' ' ' ontologicalprinciples9 ;hich is possible only if cognition itself has a being9 is a kindof being'?,

This is one of the most important implications of Hartmann:s thesisof the continuity of all being' No; ;e can grasp the relevance of thefundamental categories9 the categories common for all strata of real being'6uch categories are transformed at each ne; layer' Nevertheless9 enoughremains structurally the same throughout such transformations9 enough toguarantee the possibility of a unity of all being'

The unity of all being is the unity amidst heterogeneity9 diversity9compleity9 and conflict' This unity is not the unity of things9 of thestatic forms of being9 but the unity of structures in the turmoil of variousinterconnections' 8eal being is not the being of separate and discontinuousthings' This being is the being of related9 interpenetrating structures andprinciples9 the unity of the categorial co



0( The Analysis of Wonder

;e cannot eplain this unity' %ut their partial identity is sufficientto account for it' Jant:s thesis9 that the conditions of the possibilityof eperience are at the same time the conditions of the possibility ofob4ects of eperience9 can be accepted ;ithout being interpreted in thesub4ectivist ;ay' 6ince cognitive sub4ect is part of the overall being9the conditions of the possibility of cognition can be interpreted in anob4ective9 mind



I ',

3ntology of Cognition

Hartmann speaks of cognition in terms of Erfassung9 ;hich can be

translated as >grasping'? The sub4ect reaches out >to grasp? the ob4ect'As a verb9 to grasp makes us think of grasping by a hand9 of seiBing9 andholding' Hartmann reminds us that there is not 4ust physical but alsomental grasping'

Cognition is not creation of any kind9 as Neospeak t;o different languages9 but they speak ofthe same thing'?* The a posteriori aspect aims at the ob4ect in itsindividuality and contingency' The a priori aspect reaches only as far asthe general and necessary' The boundaries bet;een a priori and aposteriori9 as ;ell as those bet;een spontaneity and receptivity9 thinkingand intuition9 are far more blurred than Jant assumes' Mven in aposteriori cognition ;e cogniBe something general' This generality is9ho;ever9 not the same generality that

1 Hartmann9 Grundzge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis9 ch' ),b9 0-2'* Hartmann9 Grundzge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis9 ch' ),c9 001'



0/ The Analysis of Wonder

;e cogniBe by means of a priori cognition Ethat is9 generality as necessityand universalityG' .or eample9 ;e cogniBe the property of red as a generalproperty of an individual ob4ect' There is no sensible property that in itselfdoes not contain something general in this sense9 as Aristotle and Hegelhave documented'

A priori cognition also involves an element of receptivity9 ;hich isdifferent than the one that occurs in a posteriori cognition' It is similar ;ithspontaneity9 ;hich Jant reserves eclusively for a priori cognition' Mveryactive directing of the sub4ect to;ard his ob4ects9 be they kno;able a priorior a posteriori9 is a spontaneous act' This spontaneity does not ecludethe receptive element9 nor is only receptivity characteristic of a posteriori

cognition'In Hartmann:s vie;9 the distinctions bet;een a priori and a

posteriori9 thinking and intuition9 and spontaneity and receptivity9are epistemologically of secondary importance' .ascination ;ith thesedistinctions is a reflection of the shift from the intentio recta to;ard the

intentio obliqua9 of the modern distortion of the cognitive phenomenon'The distortion is responsible not only for the prioritiBation of thesedistinctions9 but also for the neglect of the truly significant elements ofcognition'

To clarify this vie;9 Hartmann distinguishes four aspects of cognition!

the psychological9 the logical9 the ontological9 and the epistemological'The first of them deals ;ith the 7uestion of psychological form ;ithregard to the reaching of the cognitive sub4ect' The second concernsthe problem of the logical comprehension of the grasped ob4ect' Thethird investigates the ontological status of the ob4ect and the sub4ect'The fourth and most important is the problem of the sub4ect:s reaching outto;ard the ob4ect! the problem of grasping as such'

Hartmann further groups these four aspects into t;o general classes!the psychological and the logical aspects deal ;ith the nonmetaphysical

side of the cognitive relation' The ontological and the epistemologicalconcern its metaphysical segment' The epistemological turn of modernphilosophy shifts our attention to;ard its nonmetaphysical aspects'Hartmann9 by contrast9 argues that the heart of the issue is in themetaphysical side of cognition' He also mentions that the ontologicaland the epistemological aspects are not only indispensible but alsocomplimentary' This is ;hy he attempts to develop a metaphysics ofcognition'-

- Nicolas %erdyaev praises Hartmann for insisting on this vie; see hisThe Beginningand the End9 trans' 8' #' .rench ENe; Qork! Harper L %rothers9 12),G9 0*'



Ontology of Cognition 02

What is ;rong ;ith the nonmetaphysical and antilogic? of cognition9to ;hat makes our cognition >ob4ective'? 8egardless of ;hether this logicis transcendental Eas in JantG9 dialectical Eas in HegelG9 or formal Eas inanalytic epistemologyG9 in logicism the move is al;ays made in the samedirection! first from the la;s of logic to the la;s of thinking9 and then fromthe la;s of thinking to the la;s of real being'

While these logical structures are re7uired to eplain the ob4ectivity ofour cognition9 and ho;ever important the logical structures of thinkingimposed on the ob4ect of cognition are9 they fail to grasp the essence of the

phenomenon of cognition' ogicism creates rational constructs that standoutside of real cognition' %ecause the rational is traditionally identified;ith kno;ledge9 and kno;ledge is understood in close association;ith 4udgments9 philosophers are prone to overestimate its relevancefor the cognitive relation' They focus unduly on internal coherence andunderestimate the nonrational and non4udgmental aspects of kno;ledge'They also neglect the ontological status of the actual ob4ect and thecognitive nature of the sub4ect=ob4ect relationship'

Cognition is a relation bet;een one:s consciousness and its ob4ect' Assuch9 it transcends consciousness' This relation also goes beyond the merelogical structures that must be applicable to any ob4ect9 in order for it to



)5 The Analysis of Wonder

become an ob4ect of our thinking' The product of consciousness can neverbe similar to anything outside of consciousness' Nevertheless9 the productof consciousness must represent its ob4ect as it is' It must someho; captureand repeat the determinations of its ob4ect9 ;hich eists independently ofthe consciousness representing it'

Cognition is a result of the confrontation of the sub4ect and the ob4ect9of the kno;er and the kno;n' They each eist on their o;n9 so thattheir confrontation must have an indispensable ontological element' Thecognitive relation is rooted in an ontological relation' While kno;ledgebelongs to a conscious being9 its ob4ects are positioned out among all strataof being' We have already seen ho; Hartmann:s ne; ontology eplains

the relationship bet;een various strata of real being9 their differenceEin the form of the categorial noveltyG ;ithout denying their continuity Einthe form of the categorial recurrenceG' No; ;e have to pay more attentionto ;hat Hartmann calls the >epistemological? aspect of cognition'

The result of cognition is something >third9? different from the sub4ectand the ob4ect' It is also irreducible to them' Thus9 this something thirdhas a peculiar relation to each of them! according to its ontological sphereand psychological origin9 it belongs to the sub4ect and can be modifiedby it' With the ob4ect9 it shares the form of ob4ectivity and a predictablepattern of behavior' This further thing9 a representation of the relationof the sub4ect and the ob4ect9 is a constitutive element of the cognitiverelation' It is also the source of a great aporia! If the sub4ect and the ob4ectare so different9 if the gap bet;een them seems so unbridgeable9 ho; canthe sub4ect reach to;ard the ob4ect and gain an ade7uate representationof it$

+rasping the ob4ect by the sub4ect must involve some fundamentaloverlapping and correspondence'0 3verlapping and correspondence donot presuppose their similarity' The products of consciousness can neverbe similar to any outonly if

0 As Nicolai Hartmann puts it elegantly in Ethik9 >Truth is the ob4ective agreementEbereinstimmungG of thought9 or conviction9 ;ith the eisting situation? ch' )5g9

@II9 */1' 6ee Hartmann9 Grundzge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis9 chs' )h9 (e9 ,e9and ))=, and Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie EHamburg! .eli #einer

&erlag9 12/*G9 ch' -9 1)=*0'



Ontology of Cognition )1

these t;o coincide can thought hit off being'? The secret is in >therecurrence of @ontological categories of lo;er strata in the structure ofthe intelligent spirit'?)

The categories of the lo;er strata recur in the content of kno;ledge ofthe higher strata' This recurrence accounts for the possibility ofcoordination bet;een the sub4ect and the ob4ect9 so that the formercan ade7uately represent the latter9 despite their difference andindependence' Hartmann calls it a >reduplication? of the categories inthe cognitive relationship! >The same categories confront each other inthe ob4ect and the sub4ect! in the ob4ect as categories of the real9 in thesub4ect as categories of content only'?(

The details of such a reduplication of the categories are not onlybaffling but also9 for the most part9 inaccessible to us' As Jant alreadyrealiBed9 it may be easier to eplain such reduplication in the realm of7uantitative categories' Ho; it happens ;ith all other Enon7uantitativeGcategories is yet to be comprehended' Although Jant errs in his turnto;ard logicism in his eplanation of the possibility of cognition9Hartmann believes that his account of the possibility of all synthetic

4udgments is still valuable!

If ;e no; remember that the a priori element of kno;ledge depends

on the identity

The Analysis of Wonder - Predrag Cicovacki

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