The Abilene Paradox After Thirty Years

The Abilene Paradox After Thirty Years:

A Global Perspective

MICHAEL HARVEY MILORAD M. NOVICEVICM. RONALD BUCKLEY JONATHON R.B. HALBESLEBEN

T he accelerating rate of globalization, thefrequent introduction of new technolo-

gies, and evolving regulation have all con-tributed to the complexity of conductingbusiness. The standard operating proceduresof the past have diminished in value, giventhe dramatic changes in the business envir-onment. Managers are casting around toidentify appropriate business models, as wellas the metrics, to determine whether new‘‘solutions’’ have worked.

With an increasingly limited experiencebase upon which to make decisions in globalenvironments, managers tend to rely on con-sultants or groups for support and guidancein decision-making. Seeking assistance dur-ing difficult times or with risky decisions is anatural phenomenon in business, but thisapproach is problematic when it turns intogroup decision-making on a ‘‘consensus’’decision. Oftentimes, many of these deci-sions resemble ‘‘a camel rather than a horse,’’due to the process by which they werereached, although on the surface they mayhave widespread formal support from allthose in the group.

A classic article published in Organiza-tional Dynamics 30 years ago has become a‘‘must read’’ for academicians and man-agers trying to understand potential pro-blems with group decision-making. Thearticle, the ‘‘Abilene Paradox: The Managementof Agreement,’’ by Dr. Jerry B. Harvey,revealed a hidden risk for managers seekingpublic support for their decisions (withoutevaluating possible individual dissentbehind that public support). We believe thattoday’s global and knowledge-rich environ-ment is conducive to the Abilene Paradox.Thus, it might be timely for a different Har-vey (‘‘with a little help from his friends’’) toreexamine the Abilene Paradox and markthe 30 years it has been in the managementliterature.

THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUESHIGHLIGHTED BY THEABILENE PARADOX

The Abilene Paradox is a parable about howgroups follow a decision-making process

Organizational Dynamics, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 215–226, 2004 ISSN 0090-2616/$ – see frontmatter� 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.orgdyn.2004.01.008www.organizational-dynamics.com

L E A R N I N G F R O M P R A C T I C E

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that is not entirely open to individual differ-ences of opinion. The parable used by Profes-sor Harvey tells of four adults sitting on a frontporch in Coleman, Texas (some 53 miles forAbilene), on a very hot summer day. Whileeveryone appears content drinking lemonadeand playing dominoes, someone in the groupsuggests taking a drive to Abilene to eat lunch.Privately, each of the four participants thinksthis suggestion is without merit because theonly available car has no air-conditioner. Buteach one goes along, so as not to be perceivedas a ‘‘spoiler’’ of the group. Upon returningexhausted and disgruntled, the family mem-bers recognize that not a single one of themwanted to make the trip. They are unable tojustify their original decision to take a 106-miledrive in a dust storm merely to eat a mediocrelunch in such hot weather.

In the organizational realm, the AbileneParadox occurs when agreement/consensusis used in a decision-making process to maskorganizational problems. Once the masks fall,the consequences can be very detrimental forthe organization (economic loss due to wide-spread conflict) and the people involved(feelings of misery disrupting cooperation).Professor Harvey gave an example of howthe Abilene Paradox evolved in a companywhere top management wanted to go with itspet project to Abilene, while all the individualmembers of the research and development(R&D) department wanted to go somewhereelse. Fearful of being accused of insubordina-tion, the R&D director and his team memberswrote ambiguous progress reports so thepresident and vice presidents could interpretthem ‘‘to suit themselves.’’ As the reportswere slanted to the positive side—with heapsof praise—a unanimous decision was madeto continue the questionable project for yetanother year. Symbolically, the organization‘‘had boarded a bus to Abilene.’’

The underlying tenet of the Abilene Para-dox is that reliance on formal agreementand/or consensus is sometimes a riskymethod for a group or an organization touse in making a decision. Basically, the Abil-ene Paradox highlights the collective inabil-ity to manage agreement and reach an

acceptable decision, particularly when indi-vidual participants privately feel that analternative decision would be better. Thereare five interrelated components of the Abil-ene example that contribute to the occurrenceof the Abilene Paradox. The first componentrefers to public mutual agreement amonggroup members that the current situation isnot acceptable. Privately, however, the mem-bers might not be dissatisfied with the cur-rent situation once they have compared itto a proposed alternative. This type ofgroup ‘‘agreement’’ decision reflects plura-listic ignorance—a manager misperceivesthe level of disagreement in the covert atti-tudes held individually by group membersin a given situation, and therefore goes alongwith the overt group consensus. The secondcomponent refers to ineffective communica-tion among group members when severalindividuals express strong support for thedecision because they presume that is thedesire of others. This flow of communicationreinforces the silent assumption of groupmembers that their private thoughts are aminority. They are therefore motivated toremain silent (this phenomenon is com-monly referred to as the spiral of silence)and support the formal decision of thegroup.

The third component of the AbileneParadox is the vocalization of group senti-ment based on inaccurate assumptions ormisinterpretation of the ‘‘signals’’ given byother group members. Such vocalization mayresult in actions that no one in the groupdesires or supports. As the group does some-thing that lacks support, members maybecome individually dissatisfied with thegroup as a whole. The fourth componentrefers to the decision-maker’s reprise of thedecision in the form of questions: Why didwe do this? How did we come up with thissolution? How can we justify our final deci-sion to others? Upon reflecting on these ques-tions in hindsight, group members oftenbecome frustrated and dissatisfied—not onlywith the joint decision, but also with thegroup as a whole. The fifth component refersto the failure of the manager to recognize the

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process that occurred in making a poor deci-sion so to avoid making similar poor deci-sions in the future. These interrelatedcomponents led Jerry Harvey to infer thatunsatisfying, dysfunctional decision-makingbased upon false consensus or pluralisticignorance is the foundation for the misman-agement of group agreement. The outcome ispoor decision-making, in spite of a situationwhere formal consensus was reached amongthe management team members.

The insight of the original OrganizationalDynamics article is that the greater the fearabout being ‘‘outed’’ in the group for notsharing the collective attitudes, the greaterthe risk of poor decision-making that themanager wants to avoid. A group member‘‘agrees,’’ fearful of ‘‘earning’’ the label of the‘‘outsider,’’ which is oftentimes attached tothose who do not ‘‘go along to get along.’’Unfortunately, the emphasis on out-grouplabeling has contributed to the seeming dis-missal of the Abilene Paradox due to theconfusion with the related, but distinctlydifferent, phenomenon of groupthink.

COMPARING ANDCONTRASTING THE ABILENEPARADOX AND GROUPTHINK

The groupthink threat frequently oversha-dows managerial attention to the AbileneParadox. Managers have been warned toavoid groupthink—a mode of thinking thatoccurs in a cohesive group when seekingconcurrence overrides the critical evaluationof alternatives. Groupthink, as a ‘‘collectivepattern of defensive avoidance,’’ is based onthe premise that agreement in groups ismostly due to the desire to maintain cohe-siveness in a group. The in-group unanimitytends to override the group members’ moti-vation to objectively assess alternativeactions. The primary factor contributing togroupthink is the emotional attachment ofindividual members to the group, whichleads them to value cohesiveness more thanimproved functioning of the group. As thispersonal bond of in-group team members

reduces their impartial reasoning, the resultis an inability of individual members to con-sider objectively possible alternatives. Suchindividual unwillingness protects the cohe-siveness of the group to the detriment ofimproved group functioning.

The defensiveness of members engagedin groupthink can manifest itself in a numberof ways: (1) fabricating information that issupportive of the leader’s or group’s posi-tion; (2) omitting superior alternatives thatchallenge the entrenched position; (3) mis-judging the limitations of the group positionand the long-term impact of a poor decisionon cohesiveness; and (4) underestimating thewarning signs and negative consequences ofnot enacting the best alternative for thegroup. The bottom line is that decisions areless functional, due to each individual mem-ber’s emotional dedication to the groupand the position taken by the group. As aresult, groupthink lowers group efficiencyand effectiveness. The dimensions indicatinghow the Abilene Paradox is distinct fromgroupthink are shown in Fig. 1. Both phe-nomena lead to dysfunctional group beha-vior, but are different and should be treatedas distinct from a management point of view(see Fig. 1). In particular, global factors mightlead an organization down the road to Abileneand away from groupthink. Therefore, theidentification of these factors may effectivelyprovide signals for management to recognizein time to avoid potential difficulties.

GLOBAL FACTORS INCREASETHE LIKELIHOOD OF THEABILENE PARADOX

We think that now would be an appropriatetime to outline and explain the main driversof change that contrast the business environ-ment of the 1970s (when the Abilene Paradoxwas introduced in Organizational Dynamics)with today’s business environment. Under-taking such an exercise will emphasize thecontinued, and arguably increasing, impor-tance of the Abilene Paradox for contempor-ary managers.

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Acceleration of the Speed ofBusiness

Today’s manager must be able to make deci-sions in a fraction of the time previouslydevoted to similar decisions. As the needto utilize time as a strategic tool has beenrecognized, companies that cannot adapt tothis modification in their decision-makingwill suffer. The pressure to act quickly ismore of a problem when one considers thatmany managers do not possess the experi-ence to make non-programmed decisions in aglobal environment.

Digital Equipment Corp.’s (DEC’s) chiefexecutive officer (CEO) Ken Olsen and hismanagement team had been building a suc-cessful global minicomputer business formore than 20 years. By 1990, DEC ranked27 on the Fortune 500 list of the largest U.S.companies. That same year, the threat ofworkstations and client-server architecturedeveloped by global competitors to meetthe changing customer needs became evidentprivately to individual members of DEC’s topmanagement team. However, as a team they

still remained faithful publicly to the KenOlsen’s credo, ‘‘We always say that customersare right, but they are not always right.’’ Ineffect, DEC’s return from Abilene started witha sharp decline and heavy losses in 1992 and1995; it continued with an attempted turn-around in 1996; and it ended with the acquisi-tion by Compaq Computer Corp. in 1999.

Increase in the Uti l ization ofCooperative GlobalRelationships

Given the complexity and increased riskassociated with global business, decisionsare frequently made to enter strategic alli-ances or joint ventures in order to minimizerisk in the current environment. Interorgani-zational relationships have always been ameans to address markets, but these looselycoupled systems frequently did not have thelevel of interdependence or the level of coop-eration necessary for long-term success.Today, it is necessary to form networksof relationships with foreign counterparts,along with hybrid organizational cultures

FIGURE 1 COMPARISON OF ABILENE PARADOX AND GROUPTHINK

Abilene Paradox Groupthink

Group Cohesiveness

Not Central & Becomes

Lower after Defective Decision

Members wanting to be

Accepted Most Powerful

Nonexistent, Incompetent or

Ineffective Leadership

Overpowering or Laissez-Faire

Leadership Styles

No Salient External Enemies

External Enemies Show Increased

Group Solidarity

Committed to Private Views

Bring about Pain/Suffering

Preoccupied with Shared

Group Vision/Unanimity

Feeling of Being Coerced

Not Responsible for the Decision

Feeling of Choice Being Made of

Their Own Freewill

Dissatisfaction with the Decision Expressed Satisfaction with the

Group Decision

Blaming of Others in the Group Protect the Leader/Others from

Negative Information

* Adapted from Kim, Y., A Comparative Study of the ‘Abilene Paradox’ and

‘Groupthink’, Public Administration Quarterly, 25 (2), 2001: 168-189.


that work effectively. However, managementof global networks (involving cross-culturalcoordination and collaboration) is an area inwhich many managers have no experience.

Increased Opportunity forEscalation of Commitment dueto the Complexity of theDecision and/or Environment

The risks associated with conducting busi-ness in a global context are exponentiallygreater than in a domestic market. In parti-cular, the threshold of commitment comesfaster than in domestic decisions. Therefore,managers may be forced to defend continuedfunding of projects ‘‘because so much hasalready been invested.’’ The escalation ofcommitment to global projects can increasethe insecurity of a manager and will likelymagnify the need for group support. Forexample, prior to becoming the CEO of glo-bal toy industry leader Mattel Inc., Jill Baradowed her success to effectively developingcollectible versions of the Barbie doll. As thenew CEO, Ms. Barad announced her furthercommitment and increased deliveries of col-lectible Barbie dolls, despite flat prospects ofglobal toy industry growth. Although thisstrategic orientation made little sense pri-vately to the rest of the Mattel managementteam, nobody questioned. Rather, everybodysupported Barad’s strategy. The result ofMattel’s drive to Abilene was excess produc-tion and depressed margins of the HolidayBarbie line, one of the company’s premiercollectible products.

Increasing Util izat ion of VirtualWork Relationships

Most managers understand the difficultyinherent in managing workers in virtual set-tings. The growth of workplace virtualnessmay erode confidence when managing insuch a socially fragmented setting, becausethe conventional wisdom and ‘‘rules ofthumb’’ do not appear to provide managerswith much assurance in their positions.Furthermore, a manager may not even per-

sonally know some employees, or, at a mini-mum, may know them less well than was thecase in the more traditional face-to-face rela-tionships of the past. One of the cornerstonesof management, social knowledge of thepeople one supervises, is removed in globaland virtual organizations.

Competing on the Edge of Chaos

A number of well-known authors havelikened today’s business environment tocompeting in chaos. If a manager internalizesthis feeling of ‘‘hanging-on’’ and becomesrisk-averse, the level of confidence will bereduced, thus diminishing the capacity topersevere and plan for the future. Risk-aversemanagement is costly when global rivalsare striving to enter myriad markets simu-ltaneously and capitalize globally on theirincreased presence in emerging markets.The inability of managers to thrive on chaoswill inhibit them in exploiting the organiza-tion’s global presence and transforming itinto global dominance.

With other complexities evolving inthe environment, the drivers of change men-tioned in this discussion illustrate howthe context of decision-making is fluid andcomplex for consensus in managementteams. As this type of environmental changeaccentuates uncertainty and lack of confi-dence in top managers, it may push manage-ment teams toward the Abilene Paradox.Due to this increased complexity and theunknown nature of environmental change,it is crucial to identify the early signs of thepotential occurrence of the Abilene Paradoxin management teams and other groups in aglobal organization.

IDENTIFYING THE WARNINGSIGNS OF THE ABILENEPARADOX

The effective management of agreementtakes on increased importance in the global,hypercompetitive and increasingly virtualbusiness environment. Therefore, it is crucial

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for managers to identify the early warningsigns when groups, teams or the organizationas a whole are being ‘‘driven’’ toward Abil-ene. The following set of ‘‘signals’’ can be usedto identify the mismanagement of agreement:

1. Mangers who publicly do not fear theunknown: Disdain for what is not known incomplex situations may be characteristic ofmanagers who have not recognized howlittle they know. This form of arroganceleads managers to go along because theylack knowledge or do not have insights intocomplex problems. As a result, such man-agers tend to acquire the ‘‘that sounds goodto me’’ syndrome. For example, Prodigy, anIBM Corp. and Sears Roebuck & Co. jointventure, was the global leader in on-lineshopping in 1990. It was evident privately toProdigy’s top management that new-entrantAOL was growing at a faster rate, due to itsfocus on early computer adopters (in con-trast to Prodigy’s focus on its averageconsumers). Still, Prodigy’s top manage-ment was publicly very vocal about its‘‘unbeatable’’ complementarities betweenIBM’s competence in computers and Sears’competence in retailing. Specifically, one ofProdigy’s executives commented on AOL’srise as ‘‘just a little thing off to the side.’’This arrogance led the company to visitAbilene and fail in the on-line shoppingindustry, while AOL became a global leaderby the end of the 20th century.

2. An organization with little to no conflictor debate on critical issues: Functional conflictis a means of making diversity valuable bystimulating divergent inputs to solve com-plex problems. When this resource is under-utilized, the lack of visible debate anddissent becomes the foundation for misman-agement of agreement. The red flag indicat-ing a climate of conflict avoidance is the ‘‘Iwill go along with that’’ syndrome.

3. Overriding leaders and a strong organi-zation culture: While on the surface bothgood leadership and a strong supportiveculture would generally appear to be assets,a dominating leader like Jacques Nasser ofFord Motor Company may not only intimi-date subordinates to the point of submis-

sion, but also may also induce tension inalliance relationships. In particular, the pastrelational culture of Ford-Firestone, havingfostered private silence and public denial,created a context for the Ford-Firestone tirescandal to occur. The breakdown of thishundred-year-old relationship occurred dueto the low-quality Firestone tires mountedon Ford’s sport utility vehicles (SUVs),which in turn caused a series of deadlyaccidents. The reputation of both companieswas later gradually repaired only when thecompanies publicly admitted responsibilityfor flawed tires and replaced them freeof charge. This example illustrates how adominating organizational culture oftentends to silence managers who disagree forfear of questioning the corporate culture. Thecatch phrase for this concern is ‘‘they mustknow something more than I do’’ syndrome.

4. Lack of diversity and pluralistic perspec-tive in organization: Homogeneous groupstend to reproduce themselves, due to similarlearning and thinking styles. Without avariety of diverse viewpoints and the me-chanisms to elicit dissenting perspectives,groups will value consensus (even falseconsensus) more than searching for andgetting to the ‘‘right’’ idea. This form of erroris known as the ‘‘I don’t want to stand out, asacceptance is more important that beingright’’ syndrome. To prevent the occurrenceof this syndrome that opens the path to eitherAbilene or groupthink, the Nissan Motor Co.board appointed Carlos Ghosn, a Braziliannational, as the company’s CEO. This pro-vided the company with a global mindsetthat could help to prevent the reoccurrence ofthe Abilene Paradox.

5. Recognition of a dysfunctional decision-making environment: An environment thatrewards ‘‘A’’ while hoping for ‘‘B’’ isdysfunctional because incentives are notaligned with desired behaviors. Manage-ment in this environment has lost control,as the directional prerogative of manage-ment has succumbed to wanting to be likedby avoiding conflict. This is commonlyreferred to as the ‘‘misplaced means andends’’ syndrome.


6. Indifference of employees to the organiza-tion: Indifference breeds complacency, andwith complacency comes reduced effort andcaring. Lack of caring for the outcomes ofthe organization leads individual employeesto give in to the ‘‘it is only a job’’ syndrome.

7. The feeling of a ‘‘messiah’’ in theorganization and action anxiety on the part ofmanagement: When an organization is inten-sifying global activities, there is usually oneperson (or a small group) who has experi-ence to manage in that situation. As a result,there is a tendency to acquiesce to them.While this would normally be a positiveoutcome, the ‘‘messiah’’ is oftentimes notright, while other managers in the group donot have the frame of reference or back-ground to challenge the top manager. Thislack of challenge leads the managementgroup to exhibit the ‘‘great person’’ syn-drome, discounting their own insights.

When ‘‘Chainsaw’’ Al Dunlop, a re-nowned turnaround artist, joined SunbeamInc. as a CEO and a proclaimed ‘‘messiah,’’Sunbeam stock jumped 50 percent over-night. Having implemented several radicaldownsizing measures, Dunlop announcedan ambitious global growth strategic planwith a focus on Latin America and Asia.Although this combination of contradictorystrategies made little sense privately to themanagement team, the Sunbeam board-of-directors, or to Wall Street analysts, nobodydared to question the wisdom of the‘‘messiah’’ publicly. When Dunlop’s artifi-cial profits from global ‘‘growth’’ wereeventually revealed, it was too late forSunbeam to return from its trip to Abilene.

8. The development of a ‘‘spiral of silence’’ inthe organization: The spiral of silence occurswhen one’s perception of the majority opi-nion in the organization suppresses one’swillingness to express any challenging opi-nion against the most visible point of view.The spiral of silence when managers assessthe distribution of opinions in an organiza-tion in order to evaluate the chances forsuccess of their minority viewpoints. Thisminority opinion assessment can escalate tobecome prevalent throughout the organiza-

tion, resulting in the ‘‘keeping my head downand off the radar screen’’ syndrome. Forexample, the spiral of silence among itspartners about Enron Corp.’s off-balancesheet accounting ‘‘practices’’ destroyedArthur Andersen, formerly a leading globalaccounting and auditing company.

Any of the above warning signals can bediscounted by management, and thereforemay go unobserved for some time in anorganization. Without a proactive surveil-lance process, the organizational climatemay encourage managers and employeesto fall into the trap of the Abilene Paradoxin their group decision-making processes.The challenge is how to effectively remediatethese processes in an organization so man-agers and groups can avoid the trap of theAbilene Paradox.

THE SYSTEMATIC APPROACHTO CURING THE ABILENEPARADOX

Managers might ask themselves, ‘‘Now thatwe have a clearer picture of the issues asso-ciated with managing agreement, what canbe done if my group or organization haslapsed into this dysfunctional behavior?’’Modifying a corporate culture is a difficult,time consuming, and high-risk option. How-ever, if the Abilene Paradox is a reality, itmust be addressed in a systematic fashion.The steps in the process of wrenching groupsin an organization out of this problem areillustrated in Fig. 2. Each of these steps willbe discussed separately; however, one mustrecognize that the whole sequence of stepsneeds to be undertaken to break the hold ofthe Abilene Paradox.

Development of anOrganizational AssessmentTeam

The first step in the assessment process is todecide the membership of the assessmentteam. The managers assigned to determinethe organizational ‘‘health’’ need to bebroadly selected and representative of the

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various functions and sub-cultures in anorganization. While it is important to havefunctional areas represented in the assess-ment process, it is equally important to havediversity of perspectives. A pluralistic cul-ture on the team allows for a wide variety ofperspectives. This reduces the tendency ofthe team to have the corporate ‘‘logic’’ as itsmental model. Such diversity is necessary toassess the tendency to support the dysfunc-tional management of consensus. This step iscritical, as the worst outcome would be forthis team to succumb to the Abilene Paradoxwhile trying to address that problem.

Assessment of OrganizationCulture and Sub-Culture

The first step in the formal assessment of theorganization is for the team to examine the

gap between the organizational culture andsub-cultures. In this gap analysis, the teamcan gauge the strength of the corporate cul-ture over the various sub-cultural contextswithin the organization. The principle of astrong culture has often been seen as anattractive characteristic of global organiza-tions (e.g., IBM, Microsoft Corp., GeneralElectric Co., Unilever PLC, and Philips Elec-tronics N.V.). However, problems arise whenthis culture becomes a blueprint for manage-ment of agreement that suppresses dissentby depicting it as a behavior not ‘‘supportiveof the corporate culture.’’ The key elementsthat should be assessed relative to this pro-blem of strong organizational culture are:(1) hiring practices (inside vs. outside), aswell as the socialization process and integra-tion of newcomers to the organization; (2) theidentification of the in-group and the com-

FIGURE 2 STEP-BY-STEP ABILENE PARADOX ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Establishment of Assessment/Audit Team

Assessment of Organization Culture & Subculture

Assessment of Communication Patterns/Flows

Key Group Membership/Culture

“Reality”, Knowledge, Information Assessment by Subgroups

Feedback

Encouragement of Transparency of Decision-Making


position of that group; (3) analysis of theorganization’s informal structure and therelated in-group influences; (4) determiningwho the ‘‘gatekeepers’’ are relative to theflow of information; (5) the level of consensusin the organization; and (6) the opportunityfor dissent and input from outside. Thisassessment would provide the team withkey information for ascertaining the potentialfor dysfunctional management of agreementin the organization.

Assessment of CommunicationFlows and Patterns

By identifying the flow (downward/upwarddirection) and pattern (within-group/between-group frequency) of communica-tion, the assessment team can determinethe likelihood of dysfunctional behaviorresulting from bottlenecks of communica-tion. The identification of key gatekeepersmay provide valuable insights into the cul-ture’s openness to change. In addition, thebarriers to modifying the decision processesin the organization can be assessed. Overall,communication analysis may provide themost important insight whether the corpo-rate culture is conducive to the Abilene Para-dox.

Key Group Membership andCulture Determination

The identification of group membership andthe overlapping in memberships can providethe assessment team with valuable insightsto the relational and political centrality of keyindividuals. The stock of political influencethat managers have, both individually andas members of power groups, accentuatesthe gravity points of power distribution inthe organization. For example, some man-agers often have significantly more influencein an organization than the formal orga-nization chart indicates. Therefore, theirinvolvement in important groups in the orga-nization, due to the informal dedication ofothers to these individuals, may make themopinion leaders.

‘ ‘Reali ty , ’ ’ Knowledge, andInformation Assessment ofSubgroups in the Organization

Jerry Harvey, in his original article, indicatedthat if the Abilene Paradox does exist in anorganization, then it is important to reframeorganizational ‘‘reality’’ so that the organiza-tion’s groups can begin to address how tobreak internal cycles of silence. Once theassessment team has identified the problemand its realistic magnitude, outsiders usuallyaccomplish such modification to the basiccultural foundation of the organization.The reality of the problem must be identifiedfor two reasons: to know who in the companyhas the insights and knowledge to bringabout change, and to know who is the leastlikely to want to change—because they havecontrol of knowledge (often translated intopower). Identifying these bottlenecks ofinformation is the key to unlocking the dys-functional aspects of a culture, and therefore,pivotal in the dismantling of the AbileneParadox.

Encouragement of Transparencyin Decision-Making

It is important for executives and seniormanagers to ‘‘open’’ the organization up toparticipation in decision-making. This canbe accomplished by providing access to cri-tical operating data, having open discus-sions about key strategic aspects of theorganization and insuring meaningful invol-vement of managers. The key to this trans-parency of decision-making is to encouragemanagers to ask questions, in order to betterunderstand how decision-making in theorganization operates, and how to gaininsights into its successes or its failures.One technique that has been successful isto initiate a regularly scheduled manage-ment information exchange (MIX) meeting.In this type of interaction, the various groupsin the organization are ‘‘taught’’ how theorganization operates and how each of theirfunctions impacts the ‘‘bottom line.’’ At thesame time, there should be an open forum for

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managers to ask questions that will helpthem do a better job. This MIX practice pro-vides the communications forum to bringdecisions into the light, and to cross-com-municate the interrelationships that are cri-tical to understand relative to making newdecisions in the complex global businessenvironment.

CONCLUSION

The notion of the Abilene Paradox has beenso popular in the past, in part, because it issuch an intuitive concept. All of us havefaced group decisions that we do not sup-port, but agree to nonetheless. Today’s globalbusiness environment further accentuatesthe need to recognize how the Abilene Para-dox can negatively influence group decision-making, as well as the need to understand the

steps necessary in identifying and alleviatingthe problem. In effect, managers can addressthe factors contributing to the Abilene Para-dox and improve decision-making in theirteamwork.

In summary, the Abilene Paradox hasbeen an intractable problem. The complexityof the existing business environment willcreate a myriad of novel opportunities forthe Abilene Paradox to negatively influencethe performance of organizations. It is ourhope that we have provided some advice thatwill minimize its occurrence. Doubtless, thenext 30 years will bring novel changes thatwill require new ways for managers to navi-gate the route away from Abilene.


SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

In 2002, an article in Organizational Dynamicshighlighted the problems associated with theuse of managerial ‘‘conventional wisdoms’’in a chaotic globalizing marketplace, see: M.Harvey and M. Buckley, ‘‘Assessing the Con-ventional Wisdoms of Management for the21st Century Organization,’’ OrganizationalDynamics, 2002, 30 (4), 368–378.

The classic article that is the foundationfor this article was: J. Harvey, ‘‘The AbileneParadox: The Management of Agreement,’’Organizational Dynamics, Summer 1974, 63–80. The same author provided a moredetailed discussion of the issues associatedwith dysfunctional agreement managementin his book The Abilene Paradox and otherMeditations on Management (San Diego, CA:Lexington Books, 1988).

Groupthink has been discussed in theliterature over the past 30 years. It is impor-tant for the reader to note the differencesbetween groupthink and the Abilene Para-dox. These works should help to clarify thedistinctions: I. Janis, Groupthink (Boston:Houghton-Mifflin, 1982); J. M. Esser,‘‘Groupthink: Effects of Cohesiveness andProblem-Solving Procedures on Group Deci-sion-Making,’’ Social Behavior and Personality,1984, 12 (2), 157–164; and D. Goleman, ‘‘Fol-lowing the Leader,’’ Science, October 1988,18–24.

For a detailed discussion of the defensivepostures that group members revert to whenin a groupthink mode, see R. Sims, ‘‘Linking

Groupthink to Unethical Behavior in Orga-nizations, ’’ Journal of Business Ethics, 1992, 11(9), 651–663.

The importance of emerging markets isdiscussed in the following articles/book: J.Garten, ‘‘The Big Emerging Markets,’’ TheColumbia Journal of World Business, 1996, 31(2), 6–31; The Big Ten: The Big Emerging Mar-kets and How They Will Change our Lives (NewYork: Basic Books, 1997); and ‘‘TroublesAhead in Emerging Markets,’’ Harvard Busi-ness Review, 1997, 75 (2), 38–49.

A discussion of hypercompetitive mar-ket conditions is presented in the followingarticles/book by Richard D’Aveni: Hyper-competition: Managing the Dynamics of Strate-gic Maneuvering (New York: Free Press, 1995);‘‘Waking up to the New Era of Hypercom-petition,’’ The Washington Quarterly, 1997, 21(1), 183–195; and ‘‘Strategic Supremacythrough Disruption and Dominance, SloanManagement Review, 1997, 40 (3), 127–136.

The spiral of silence is explained in thefollowing articles: G. Taylor, ‘‘PluralisticIgnorance and the Spiral of Silence: A FormalAnalysis,’’ Public Opinion Quarterly, 1982, 46(3), 311–335; C. Glynn, A. Hayes, and J. Sha-nahan, ‘‘Perceived Support for One’s Opi-nions and Willingness to Speak Out: AMeta-Analysis of Survey Studies on the‘Spiral of Silence,’’’ Public Opinion Quarterly,1997, 61 (3), 452–463; R. Sternberg, ‘‘Cost andBenefits of Defying the Crowd in Science,Intelligence, 1998, 26 (3) 209–215.

Michael Harvey received his Ph.D. in marketing from the University ofArizona in 1976. He has held teaching and research positions at SouthernMethodist University and the University of Oklahoma. Harvey was thePuterbaugh Chair of American Free Enterprise at the University ofOklahoma. Presently, he holds the Hearin Chair of Global Business in theSchool of Business Administration at the University of Mississippi.

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Harvey has been an active consultant in global organizations as well as tofamily owned and operated companies for the last 25 years. ([email protected])

Milorad M. Novicevic (Ph.D., University of Oklahoma, 2001) is anassistant professor of international management at the University ofMississippi. His teaching interests include international management,strategic management and international human resource management.His research has appeared in Journal of World Business, InternationalJournal of Human Resource Management, Human Resource ManagementJournal (U.S.), European Management Journal, among others.

M. Ronald Buckley (Ph.D. in industrial psychology, Auburn University)is the McCasland Professor of Management in the Michael F. PricesCollege of Business and a professor of psychology at the University ofOklahoma. His research interests include decision-making in the employ-ment interview, performance appraisal, organizational entry processes,and the issues surrounding unethical behavior in organizations. Hehas published over 60 refereed articles in, among others, Academy ofManagement Review, Journal of Applied Psychology, Journal of Management,Organizational Behavior and Human Processes on topics related to humanresource management.

Jonathon R.B. Halbesleben (Ph.D., University of Oklahoma) is a visitingassistant professor of management in the Michael F. Price College ofBusiness at the University of Oklahoma. His research interests includesocial comparison, stress and burnout, and the role customers play in thedelivery of services.


http://mharvey@-

http://bus.olemiss.edu

The Abilene Paradox After Thirty Years

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Transcript of The Abilene Paradox After Thirty Years