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Occasional Paper #284The 1999 OSCE Istanbul SummitDecisions on Moldova andGeorgia: Prospects forImplementation

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Occasional Paper #284

The 1999 OSCE Istanbul Sum-mit Decisions on Moldova andGeorgia: Prospects forImplementation

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INTRODUCTION: BY AMBASSADOR WILLIAM HILL

In November 1999, members of theOrganization for Security and Coopera-tion in Europe convened in Istanbul. Oneof the most noteworthy provisions of thedocuments signed by the heads of state atthe summit was the commitment by theRussian Federation to withdraw its troopsand military equipment from Moldovaand Georgia by 31 December 2002.Although Russia had agreed in previousOSCE ministerial and summit documentsto withdraw from Georgia and Moldova,implementation of these Russian prom-ises had been steadily delayed, makingthese unfulfilled commitments a source oftension between Russia and a largenumber of OSCE participating states. Forthe first time, the specific deadlines agreedin the Istanbul summit documents heldout the hope for a near-term resolution ofthese lingering irritants in relationsbetween Russia, the neighboring newlyindependent states of the former SovietUnion, and the major states of westernEurope and North America.

The establishment of Georgia andMoldova as independent, sovereign statesand the removal from them of a Russianmilitary presence were difficult andcomplicated processes. The majorityGeorgian and Moldovan populationswere deeply resentful of what they saw asalmost two centuries of Russian andSoviet occupation, and uncompromisinglyinsistent on national self-determination asthe Soviet Union disintegrated in the late1980s and early 1990s. However, bothGeorgia and Moldova were part of theRussian empire and Soviet Union formuch of the nineteenth and twentiethcenturies, and by 1991 both countries hada substantial indigenous ethnic Russianpopulation. Over the course of centuries,the Russians and the Soviets had estab-lished a number of important militaryobjects in Georgia and Moldova. Thesemilitary facilities and their weapons andpersonnel remained in place when the

USSR suddenly collapsed in December1991, leaving their status and future totallyunclear.

Both Georgia and Moldova also hadregions and populations—Abkhazia,South Ossetia, and Transnistria—that didnot desire to leave the Soviet state or tobecome parts of independent Georgia orMoldova. These separatist entities foughtarmed conflicts with forces of the Geor-gian and Moldovan governments. Russiantroop remnants of the Soviet Armyintervened in both countries to stop thehostilities and separate the belligerents. Itis widely believed, especially among pro-independence Georgians and Moldovans,that the Russian troops actually suppliedand supported the separatist forces. Thereis probably some—perhaps consider-able—truth to these allegations. A decadelater, all three conflicts remain unresolved.In both countries the Russian troopsremain as part of the peacekeeping forcesthat monitor and enforce the ceasefiresand serve to discourage a resumption ofhostilities.

Since 1992 the policy of all OSCEparticipating states, including the RussianFederation, has been to support theindependence, sovereignty, and territorialintegrity of Georgia and Moldova. Nostate recognizes the separatist entities inSouth Ossetia, Abkhazia, or Transnistria.All OSCE participating states accept andsupport the request of Georgia andMoldova for the withdrawal of foreign(i.e. Russian) military forces from theirterritories.

Within Georgia and Moldova, pro-independence and nationalist forces havecontinuously and impatiently demandedthe withdrawal of Russian military forces,and angrily denounce Russia for allegeddeceit and foot dragging in implementingits stated intention to withdraw. However,portions of the local population in Geor-gia and Moldova, in particular someethnic Russian elites, are hesitant to see

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all the Russian forces go. There are alsosome noisy and influential groups in theRussian government, legislature, andacademic establishment that desire tomaintain a Russian presence and connec-tion in Georgia and Moldova and vehe-mently oppose Russian governmentefforts to withdraw military forces fromGeorgia and Moldova. Finally, even if thecommanders are prepared to withdraw,they have nowhere in Russia for theirtroops to go—that is, no billets and nobudget.

Despite the political, technical, andfinancial obstacles, Russia has madeprogress over the past decade in removingits weapons, ammunition, and troops fromboth Georgia and Moldova. The numberof Russian troops and amounts of weap-onry, ammunition, and equipment aremuch less than they were a decade ago, inmany cases by an order of magnitude ormore. The OSCE Istanbul Summitdecisions on Georgia and Moldova playeda crucial role in achieving a large measureof this success.

The major innovations at theIstanbul Summit with respect to theRussian withdrawal from Georgia andMoldova were the adoption of specific,near-term deadlines for implementationof the withdrawal, and the linkage of theentire process in both countries to theadapted Treaty on Conventional Forces inEurope (CFE). The Russian Federationhad committed itself in a string of high-level OSCE documents from 1992 for-ward to withdrawal of its military forcesfrom Georgia and Moldova, but alwaysfound convenient explanations whycircumstances prevented for the momentimplementation of these commitments.Adoption of a set of deadlines at Istanbulput increased pressure on Russian au-thorities to begin real operational plan-ning for the withdrawals. Linkage of thewithdrawals to ratification and entry intoforce of the adapted CFE Treaty gaveRussian leaders much greater political and

military incentives for fulfilling theircommitments. Finally, at the IstanbulSummit participating states expressed awillingness to provide financial supportfor the Russian Federation in the with-drawal of its forces and equipment fromGeorgia and Moldova.

Following the Istanbul Summit, theRussian Federation made progress inboth Georgia and Moldova on the with-drawal of its weapons and troops. To besure, the Russian withdrawal in bothcountries was uneven, often interrupted,and plagued by arguments and delays.Nonetheless, in 2000-2001 the Russiansremoved considerable amounts of heavyweaponry from Georgia and successfullyemptied some of the key facilities specifi-cally mentioned at Istanbul. However,contentious disputes arose over delays byRussian forces in removing equipmentand abandoning other sites. Spillovereffects from the conflict in Chechnya,including an OSCE border monitoringoperation and political tensions over thepresence of Chechen and foreign combat-ants in Georgia’s Pankisi gorge have,especially during the past year, somewhatovershadowed public discussion ofprogress (or the lack of it) in meeting theIstanbul deadlines. Under the pressure ofevents, Georgian President Shevardnadzehas backed away somewhat from absoluteinsistence of full implementation of theIstanbul decisions.

The process of the Russian with-drawal from Moldova took somewhatlonger after Istanbul to get going than inGeorgia. All of the Russian militaryfacilities in Moldova are located in theTransnistrian separatist region, andseparatist leaders sought to prevent anymovement on the withdrawal. Also,financial assistance to Russia for thewithdrawal from Moldova was providedthrough the OSCE Mission, a first for theOSCE and for Russia, which required thenegotiation of formal procedures, includ-ing observation and verification. In 2001

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the Operative Group of Russian Forces inMoldova overcame Transnistrian resistanceand destroyed or withdrew all of its heavyweaponry, as required by the interimIstanbul deadline. Agreement was alsoreached in October 2001 on a project forthe destruction or removal of the vastamount of Russian ammunition stored innorthern Transnistria. However, separatistresistance resuming in November 2001has stalled implementation of the ammu-nition project since that time.

In recent weeks Russian FederationDeputy Foreign Minister Trubnikov andState Duma Speaker Seleznev have bothadmitted it is likely Russia will not meetthe overall 31 December 2002 deadline forcomplete withdrawal of all troops, arms,and ammunition from Moldova. Like otherRussian officials, they blame the resistanceof Transnistrian separatist authorities, andpledge Russia will finish the job as soon aspolitical circumstances permit.

Thus at the end of this year Russianmilitary forces will not have withdrawnfully either from Georgia or fromMoldova, contrary to the formal politicalcommitments adopted at the IstanbulSummit. This failure to meet all thedeadlines set raises several questions: 1.) isthis a failure for the OSCE as an institu-tion, and does it reflect poorly on thecapabilities and prospects of the organiza-tion? 2.) whether a failure or not, whyshould the Istanbul commitments and theprocess of Russian military withdrawalfrom Georgia and Moldova matter to theU.S.? 3.) given the impending failure tomeet these Istanbul deadlines, whatshould the U.S. and other OSCE partici-pating states do about it?

These issues and others were ex-plored at a Kennan Institute seminar atthe Woodrow Wilson International Centerfor Scholars on 24 October 2002.

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The 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit Decisions on Moldova and Georgia:Prospects for Implementation

24 October 2002

Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, D.C.

Panelist List

Chair: Blair A. Ruble, Director, Kennan Institute.

Panelists:

Rudolf Perina, Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakh and Eurasian Conflicts, U.S.Department of State.

William Hill, former Head of Mission, OSCE, Moldova, and former Public PolicyScholar, Woodrow Wilson Center.

Ceslav Ciobanu, former Ambassador of the Republic of Moldova to the United States,and Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center.

Craig Dunkerley, former Special Envoy for Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, U.S.Department of State.

Charles King, Assistant Professor, Department of Government and School of ForeignService, Georgetown University, and former Short-term Scholar, Kennan Institute.

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Ruble: Welcome to today’s sessionon the 1999 Istanbul summit decisions onMoldova and Georgia. Let me introducetoday’s speakers… Ambassador Perina,Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakhand Eurasian Conflicts, U.S. Departmentof State, is on my right. AmbassadorWilliam Hill, former Head of Mission,OSCE, Moldova, and a former PublicPolicy Scholar at the Wilson Center isnext. Ambassador Ceslav Ciobanu, formerAmbassador of the Republic of Moldovato the United States and Public PolicyScholar at the Wilson Center is to my left.Ambassador Craig Dunkerley, formerAssociate Dean at FSI, is to his left. AndProfessor Charles King from Georgetownis at the end. And what’s exceptional isnot just the presence of four ambassadorsbut four ambassadors who really havequite substantial academic credentials aswell. I actually have their extensive bios,and I could go on and tell you all thewonderful things that they’ve done, but Ithink in the interest of time we will justbegin. What I do want to emphasize,however, is that these are all people whopersonify the Wilsonian idea of bringingtogether the world of ideas and the worldof public affairs, and they’ve done so fordecades very effectively both as diplomatsand as scholars. The plan is to start on myfar right and move to my far left. So let usbegin with Ambassador Perina.

Perina: Thank you very much. Firstof all let me thank the Wilson Center fororganizing this event and this discussion. Ithink it’s a particularly timely discussiongiven that some of the original deadlinesin the Istanbul commitments are comingup this year quite rapidly. I also want tothank you and congratulate you on theparticipation that you have gotten. Cer-tainly it is very impressive. When I lookaround I see a number of people who inthe past have worked directly on theimplementation of the 1999 commitmentsin Moldova. Ambassador Dunkerley, of

course, had a very direct role in theoriginal negotiation of these commit-ments in Istanbul. And that is a very directsource for these commitments. And I seein the audience also—I will not let himescape—Ambassador Swartz, who is nowdirectly involved in Moldova as head ofthe OSCE mission and the currentimplementation of these commitments, atleast in the case of Moldova. So it really isa very impressive gathering to look at thisimportant subject. Let me just begin, sincethere are a number of us who will begiving oral remarks, and I think then thatwe probably want to get as quickly aspossible into questions and discussion,which always tends to be, I think, themost interesting part of these seminars.

Let me make a few broad commentsabout how I think we look at this at themoment in the State Department, to thedegree that it’s a mixture of official andpersonal views on this subject. In a broadsense, let me say that, getting right to thecrunch of the matter of our discussion, the“Prospects for Implementation of theIstanbul Commitments,” there is obvi-ously an element of concern about theprospects for implementation. We havemade progress on both the commitmentsin Moldova and the commitments inGeorgia. And I’m starting out here withthe presumption that most people knowwhat the commitments are. Rather thangetting into a historical discussion, I thinkwe can get right to the crunch of thematter. We have not been happy, veryfrankly, with the amount of progress thatwe have seen over the past year. It is amatter of some concern, and it is a matterof concern for us as we approach thePorto OSCE Ministerial in Decemberwhere obviously this issue will have to belooked at and will have to be reviewed.

I think the commitments are some-what different, and we should take themone at a time because they do differ innature. If we look at Moldova, for ex-

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ample, we have basically, over the pastyear, only had one train leave very re-cently with the armaments that are allsupposed to be withdrawn this year. Nowwe did have last year, to look at the past alittle bit, we did have last year the TLE[Treaty Limited Equipment] commitmenton equipment withdrawal. The CFE[Conventional Forces in Europe] treatywas completed last year. It was expectedthat that would be completed last year. Ithink we should be glad that was imple-mented. It was not an exceptionallychallenging task, I think, to withdraw theTLE equipment by the end of 2001.

Everybody always knew the biggerchallenge was to withdraw all the remain-ing aspects of Russian forces by the endof 2002. Everybody knew that this wouldbe a difficult task, because there is a lothere to withdraw. I mean, the estimatesare over 40,000 tons of ammunition in theColbasna Arsenal alone. So this was goingto be a challenge. Nobody ever doubtedthat. There was a voluntary fund estab-lished to help the Russian Federation inthis task because we all knew that it wasalso going to be expensive to move thisamount of ammunition and weapons. ButI must say we have been disappointed. Wehave been disappointed that over the pastyear really only one train has left. There issome discussion now of a subsequenttrain going, but obviously we have notmade the progress over the past year thatis necessary to fulfill this commitment.

Now the reasons for this, I am sure,will be discussed here. Frankly, a varietyof reasons were given, but they all camedown to what the Russian Federation saidwas obstruction caused by theTransnistrian regime in Tiraspol. Onedemand after another kept coming fromTiraspol, all of which, I think, could beput in the general category of sort ofextortion, frankly, and wanting money andpayment and claiming that this wasmateriel belonging to Transnistria, andthat it could not be exported and so on.

We all recognize that this problem ex-isted, but frankly we were and we aredisappointed that greater efforts were notmade to deal with this. These after all arecommitments made by the RussianFederation, a very significant power inEurope today, and it’s always difficult tobelieve that somebody like Mr. Smirnovin Transnistria can effectively block theimplementation of an important seriouscommitment that was made to the entireinternational community at the highestlevel in Istanbul in 1999. Looking at thesituation now, it is of course unlikely andperhaps physically impossible that thecommitment as stated in Istanbul will beimplemented by the end of this year. Itseems very difficult if not impossible toimagine how that can be done.

But I would say one very importantfact to keep in mind is that there is stilltime left in this year to do a lot and, in asense, to turn the situation around. We dohave several months left when the de factostalemate that has existed here, the paraly-sis that has existed here, can be turnedaround. The obstacles which have beenput forth in the withdrawals can beremoved, and a lot can be done betweennow and the end of December. Andfrankly, I think how much is done will bea crucial factor in determining how thisissue is looked upon and how it is dis-cussed at the Porto Ministerial at thebeginning of December. If we have thesituation as it is now, where very little ishappening with the exception of the onetrain that left several weeks ago, I thinkthis will become a real problem at thePorto Ministerial. It will have to beaddressed, and it will clearly not be asuccess for OSCE, and it will not be oneof the positive aspects of the Ministerial.

Hopefully we can, though, get aprocess going between now and the endof the year, where we see that the road-blocks that the Russian Federation hasbeen dealing with are removed, that thetrains are moving, and that the removal of

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this ammunition is underway. It wouldalso be helpful to see some things that webelieve can be done despite the obstruc-tion of the Transnistrian authorities; forexample, the removal by air of small armsand a lot of destruction that could perhapsbe undertaken in place in Transnistria. Ifefforts are being made to implementthis—and let me say that there’s been a lotof Western assistance given here. There’sbeen technology put in place at consider-able expense to Western countries and tothe World Voluntary Fund in order tofacilitate this, and this technology hasunfortunately not been taken advantageof. If all of these things are reversed, andwe see that serious efforts are underwayand serious efforts are being taken andthat some of these problems are beingaddressed, I think then this would be seenin a very different light at Porto.

We would certainly regret that theoriginal deadline has been missed, but wewould clearly see evidence of an intentionhere to fulfill the commitment. We wouldsee evidence that the problems are beingeffectively dealt with, and we could, tosome degree, feel that we have had asuccess and that we are on track and aremaking progress in these commitments.So I think a lot will depend on whathappens in the next few months. And as Isay, even though the deadline itselfprobably will not be met, and this willhave to be addressed at the Porto, a lotdefinitely can be done in the next fewmonths, and a lot depends on in fact howmuch is done. That’s in regard toMoldova.

In the case of Georgia, we have asomewhat different situation in that thematter relates not so much to removal ordestruction of large amounts of weaponsand ammunition, but it relates to agree-ments regarding bases on Georgianterritory which were used and in somecases are still being used by the Russianforces, and to agreements on the disposi-tion of these bases and the return of these

bases to Georgian authorities. This is whatwas in the Istanbul commitments. Someof the deadlines, in fact, have already beenmissed here, but I think the good newshere is that, in our assessment, this doesnot involve sort of a physical process thatby definition takes a certain amount oftime and cannot be hastened. This reallyinvolves a question of political will andmaking the effort to reach agreements onthe disposition of these bases and to cometo some agreement between Georgia andthe Russian Federation on when thesebases will be handed over to Georgianauthorities and the conditions of transpar-ency under which this will be done.

We think that since this is a politicalprocess, it is a matter of agreement thatthis eminently can be done. It can even bedone in time for the Porto Ministerial,and we certainly hope that it will be done.It is not a question of physically removinglarge amounts of weapons, which in somecases is just physically impossible to do.This is something that is eminentlypossible to do. It depends very much onthe negotiation process between Georgiaand the Russian Federation and theirpolitical will. We believe that Georgiadoes want to resolve these issues, and ismaking an effort to engage in a seriousnegotiating process. We think that if this isreciprocated by the Russian Federationwe do have a chance of resolving theseissues and of coming to a conclusion here,and we think this would be a very positivedevelopment. But, again, as in the case ofMoldova, an enormous amount dependson what happens in the next few months,and I think that will be the key to deter-mining how both of these issues are dealtwith at the Porto Ministerial. Perhaps Ishould stop there and let all the othersspeak, and then we’ll have a chance to getinto discussion. Thank you very much.

Ruble: Before Ambassador Hillspeaks, I would like to welcome Ambassa-dor Manoli, Moldovan Ambassador to theUnited States, Ambassador Stewart, the

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former U.S. Ambassador to Moldova, andAmbassador Mikeladze, Georgian Ambas-sador to the United States, to our discus-sion.

Hill: Thank you very much, Blair. Ihave a brief paper of prepared remarksthat, if anyone is interested, afterwards I’llbe happy to give you a copy, but justdrawing briefly from that, I’d like to saythat what’s new about the OSCE Istanbulsummit commitments was not the com-mitment by Russia to withdraw itsmilitary forces from Georgia or Moldova.Since 1992 Russia has recognized thesovereignty, independence, and territorialintegrity of Moldova and Georgia, hadaccepted both states as members in theUN and the OSCE, and had promised orundertaken obligations to regularize thestatus or remove troops and bases fromthe territory. But Russia had always foundexcuses or circumstances that preventedthis from happening quickly.

What you had in the Istanbulsummit, at least from the perspective ofsomebody who then worked in thetrenches on this, first of all there weredeadlines set for things to happen withthe withdrawal of Russian military forces.And this had not been done in previousdocuments. There had been politicalcommitments, but general ones, withoutspecifics. And second, the withdrawal ofthe Russian forces was linked to theadapted CFE treaty, and the adapted CFEtreaty made explicit at the time of adop-tion that the CFE treaty would not beratified by a number of states and wouldnot go into force until and unless therewas satisfactory progress on the Russianwithdrawal from Georgia and Moldova.And this provided a very importantpolitical reason, in addition to those thatexisted beforehand, driving the with-drawal. Now, in the wake of Istanbul,progress was made on removing Russiantroops, military equipment, arms, andammunition from both states. The processwas uneven. It was different in Georgia

and in Moldova. In each place it was besetby difficulties, disputes, delays, starts andstops; but real progress was made. Thenumbers are lower now, sometimes by anorder of magnitude or more. And I wouldargue that things happened because of theadditional pressure afforded by thesedecisions.

Things happened that might nothave happened had events simply contin-ued as they had in the 1990s. But thesimple fact is, looking at the arithmetic,and in terms of Moldova particularly, atrecent statements by Russian DeputyForeign Minister Trubnikov and byRussian Duma Speaker Seleznev, whowas in Moldova early this week, some ofthe deadlines are going to be missed.Now you can argue over who is at fault. Ican see from being in Moldova andTransnistria, there was real Transnistrianresistance. It is also true that somehowRussian Federation officials managed toovercome this resistance every year justbefore OSCE Ministerials. So there are atleast two sides to that coin, but the pointis that looking at the things that have to bedone and the time left to do it, it’s notgoing to happen by the Porto Ministerial.

So there are three questions that Iask about this. Does this mean that theIstanbul Accords, and the OSCE byimplication, are failures? Secondly, whyshould we care? Why should the U.S.care? Is it important that the Istanbulcommitments be met? And, third, whatshould the U.S. and other OSCE partici-pating states do about this?

Well, I think I’ve already hinted atthe answer to the first question. I thinkthe decisions adopted at Istanbul onMoldova and Georgia provided theimpetus for progress that otherwise wouldnot have been made. And I think theOSCE and the states involved have hadsuccesses in both Georgia and Moldovasince that time. Unfortunately, thesesuccesses are not total. One could re-criminate over why the successes weren’t

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greater, but I don’t think there’s a terriblygreat use in that. Why is this important?Well, I think generally for two reasons.There’s a geopolitical reason. The conflictson the periphery of the former SovietUnion are unresolved conflicts. Theyconstitute an irritant in relations, certainlyin the case of Georgia and Moldova, withmost of the states in the Black Sea Basin—including two current allies (Greece andTurkey), two presumptive allies (Romaniaand Bulgaria), and others—and in Russia’sunsettled relations with the other indepen-dent states of the former Soviet Union, alsoin its unsettled relations with WesternEuropean states and ultimately with theUnited States.

The U.S. alone can’t find solutions tothese conflicts, but we can work in concertwith European allies and other states totry to promote reasonable solutions andthe achievement of stability, because withwhat else is going on with Central Asiaand the Gulf, it’s in our interest to seekand achieve stability and cooperation inthese areas where there are not, at least interms of the United States, vital interestsat stake. Secondly, the argument of armscontrol, the CFE regime: the CFE regimeis a cornerstone of stability, predictability,and basically peace in Europe. When youthink that this is a continent that experi-enced the two largest wars in history and aforty-year period of an armed stand-off,then the degree of stability, the reductionin the number of arms, and really theevaporation of the danger of conventionalwar in Europe since the MBFR [MutualBalanced Force Reductions] and CFEprocess began and succeeded, are reallyremarkable historical achievements. Andthe CFE treaty maintains a regime ofinspection, reporting, predictability, andconfidence. It eliminates or reduces thefear of surprise attack. It increases confi-dence in the behavior of other states. It’s acornerstone, really, of this entire regimethat’s been built up since the first confi-dence-building measures were included

in the Final Act in 1975. And this issomething that is in the overridinginterest of all of the states’ parties and allof the states in Europe to continue.

With the CFE tied to the Istanbuldecisions on Moldova and Georgia, it’s inthe interests of all the parties to work tofind a satisfactory resolution to theseparticular issues or problems so that thetreaty can proceed towards entry intoforce. So what should we do now? I thinkthis is a classic case of the glass being halffull or half empty, and I would look at itand say that as a result of the OSCEsummit decisions in Istanbul, considerableprogress towards a resolution has beenmade in both Georgia and Moldova.Circumstances have changed. Unforeseencomplications have arisen. And we’re notgoing to meet all the deadlines. But allthe states of the OSCE, including Russia,remain committed to the substance ofthese commitments. So my view wouldbe that the Ministerial at Porto shouldadopt decisions that provide new drivingmechanisms, whether these are reviseddeadlines or measures in addition to thedeadlines, such as increased inspection ormediation. But the substance of thecommitments should be reinforced.Recriminations should be avoided:simply say that for various reasons thedeadlines weren’t met but the statesremain committed and will fulfill thesecommitments in a prescribed time.

The other thing that needs to bedone is the unspoken part of the accords.The conflicts in Ossetia, South Ossetia,Abkhazia, and Transnistria remain unre-solved. In each case there is still a neces-sity for interposition forces. These inter-position forces are currently Russian. Andin many ways the current peacekeepingforces have provided a rather thin andshaky justification for the continueddeployment of Russian forces in Georgiaand Moldova. Something needs to bedone about this. The question I raised is ifall the Russians are withdrawn from

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Moldova on 31 December 2002, who aregoing to be the peacekeepers on 1January 2003? There is still going to be aneed, I believe, certainly in Moldova andAbkhazia. You’ll need something in SouthOssetia also. In any case, there’s no reasonwhy the OSCE could not provide man-dates, or the OSCE together with the UN,could not provide mandates and trulyinternational forces. I see no reason whythe Russians couldn’t take part in suchinternational forces—they do so in Bosniaand Kosovo—but it is time to address thispart of the problem associated with theconflicts to provide a more stable interna-tional framework in which the conflictscan proceed to resolution. The Russianpresence, or the presence of relics ofRussian and Soviet bases, is part of theproblem, but it’s not all of the problem,and one needs to address the rest of theproblem. So this would be my prescrip-tion for Porto, looking from the outsidenow rather than from the inside. We’ll seewhat happens. Thank you.

Ruble: Thank you for those re-marks, now we will hear from Ambassa-dor Ciobanu, currently a Public PolicyScholar here at the Wilson Center.

Ciobanu: Thank you. This issue wasthe subject of United States HelsinkiCommission hearings last year, in Sep-tember, as well as a seminar at theWoodrow Wilson Center last December.The majority of today’s panelists partici-pated in these events. Last year’s hearingson Capitol Hill reconfirmed the interestin the destruction or removal of Russianmateriel in Moldova and the withdrawalof Russian armed forces by 31 December2002, the deadline specified by the OSCEDeclaration. At the same time, concernwas expressed that “the status ofTransnistria within the sovereign nation ofMoldova is still very unclear.” What is thestatus of this problem now? What will bethe next step if the provisions of theIstanbul Declaration are not met? Can therecently proposed project of the OSCE

mission to federalize Moldova lead to thesettling of the Transnistrian conflict andthereby create a precedent for other suchfrozen and forgotten conflicts in theregion?

Addressing these questions inconnection with today’s subject is impor-tant for Moldova and Georgia, the inter-ests of which are deeply affected by thepresence of foreign troops on theirterritory. But this is also important forother countries involved in these conflictsand in the process of negotiated solutions,because it acts as a test for their politicalwill and maturity. This subject is impor-tant for the United States, which investeda lot of effort and money to facilitate asolution and create a good precedent forother hot spots. Finally, this is the prob-lem of credibility of the OSCE and theinternational community as a whole, asrepresented by the fifty-five heads of statewho signed the Istanbul Declaration.

I’d like to address this issue fromMoldova’s perspective and as an indepen-dent Public Policy scholar on the part ofthe Wilson Center and Senior ResearchScholar at James Madison University. Firstof all I’d like to summarize the currentsituation as already mentioned by mycolleagues. Thirty days ago, on the eve ofthe CIS summit in Chisinau, a trainload oftwenty-four carriages, which carried 320ground-to-ground missiles, Urgan rocketlaunchers, and over 5,000 howitzer projec-tiles, left Transnistria for Russia. The trainwas prepared for departure as far back asDecember 2001, but was allowed to beevacuated from Transnistria only afterRussian Deputy Defense Ministers andthe leader of the Transnistrian separatistregime, Igor Smirnov, signed a protocol.According to this protocol, Moscow hadto pay $100 million for the opportunity toexecute its commitment from the OSCEIstanbul summit and withdraw the armsand troops from Transnistria. This amountrepresents so-called compensation to theregion in place of the property of the

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Russian authority, which has already beenwithdrawn. They are assessed at onebillion dollars. According to the signeddocument, the Transnistrian region’s debtof approximately $400 million for Russiangas was decreased by $100 million. Inexchange, separatist authorities promisednot to interfere with the evacuation ofRussian armaments and ammunition. Mr.Isakov, the Russian Deputy DefenseMinister, stated that the Russian military isprepared to move one trainload of muni-tions out of the region every three days inorder to fulfill the time limits fixed by theOSCE summit. He also said that Russiaplans to withdraw half of its 2,500 soldiersfrom Transnistria by the end of 2002. ARussian official made these statementstwo weeks ago.

Two days ago, on 22 October,Gennady Seleznev, the speaker of theRussian Duma, headed a Russian parlia-mentarian delegation visit to Moldovaand declared that the Russian Federationmay not meet the deadlines for militarywithdrawal. “We are doing the best wecan, but circumstances that do not dependon us, including the transit of trainloadsthrough Ukraine may break the succeed-ing holiday starts by the end of this year,”he said at a news conference. He men-tioned this because if the delay is not dueto the bad will of Moscow, the OSCE islikely to accept a new deadline for theevacuation of weapons and troops. I donot know what are the impeding circum-stances to which Russia must refer, butI’m asking myself, “Was three years notenough to comply with the establishedtime limits? What kind of circumstancesdid not permit the Russian Duma to ratifythe OSCE 1999 Istanbul documents?”

Recently the Duma overwhelminglyvoted for the opening of a consulate inTiraspol, capital of the breakaway enclaveTransnistria in eastern Moldova. It takesjust a few days for the Russian lawmakersto accept this way, an initiative fromZhirinovski’s Liberal Democratic Party, at

the request of Prime Minister MikhailKasyanov. The political analysts areconsidering that this is practically de jurerecognition of the separatist regime. Iwant to emphasize that in keeping withthe Istanbul commitments, the RussianFederation is supposed to evacuate andscrap about 42,000 tons of ammunition,about 150 trainloads, before the year is up.If they maintain the current speed ofrepatriation, one trainload in ten months,it takes 122 years before the last load ofammunition leaves Moldova. The totalcost of ammunition withdrawal, accordingto Smirnov’s accountants, amounts to $500million, which is almost ten times morethan the Transnistrian budget but is fourtimes less than the annual profit of itsmafiosi clan from contraband, smuggling,money laundering, et cetera. This lastfigure was mentioned by MoldovanPresident Vladimir Voronin in one of histelevised speeches.

In my opinion, there really are somenew circumstances, linked first of all withthe proposed federalization project fromMoldova, and the interest of Moscow tochange the status of the OperationalGroup of Russian Forces, formerly the14th Army, as some political analystsspeculated, into a peacekeeping force inthe region under the OSCE umbrella.Addressing this issue, I would like tofocus on the federalization plan forMoldova proposed by the OSCE Rus-sian-Ukraine mediators as a solution forTransnistrian settlement. At first glance,these two problems (withdrawal ofammunition and troops and settlement ofthe conflict with separatist leaders) areunrelated issues. De facto, they are veryclosely linked with each other. The mostintriguing comments, which I found onthis situation, are those of Stefan Kitsak,Minister of Defense of the so-calledTransnistrian Republic. According to him,Transnistria has billed Russia only after itbecame clear that Russia would leave theregion. As is known, during the referen-

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dum, the population of Transnistriasupported the presence of the RussianArmy in the region as a guarantee for itssafety and, what is implicitly understood,as the current status. Now, citizens of theunrecognized Republic say that Russia isgiving up its place in the region to theAmericans. When asked this question, theTiraspol representatives replied, “Natureabhors a vacuum…”

Another comment regarding thisissue is that of Mr. Stepaniuk, leader ofthe Communist majority fraction of theMoldovan Parliament. One month ago, inan interview to Moscow, he declared thatRussian troops should not be removedfrom Moldova until the new federaliza-tion agreement proposed by the OSCE issigned. In his opinion this may happenwithin next 18 months. Stepaniuk alsostated that it is too early to replace thesetroops with other peacekeeping forces orto transfer these responsibilities to theOSCE Mission. Finally, an article recentlypublished by Moscow’s Noviye Izvestiyaentitled “Chisinau Does Not HurryMoscow” stressed that there is no reasonto move Russian troops until partiesinvolved in the conflict solve theTransnistrian problem. Unfortunately,neither Tiraspol nor Chisinau are rushingMoscow to liquidate its military base inTransnistria. Period.

So, the question, “Are the Russiantroops really leaving?” probably should bereformulated: “Are any of the involvedparties really interested in withdrawal ofRussian troops from Transnistria?” Some-one can put the question even in a moredrastic manner, concluding that there is nostrong interest in a settlement, at least forthe moment, in Chisinau, Moscow, orKyiv—not to mention Tiraspol. I don’twant to argue with such an attitude.Instead, I would like to point to somefacts concerning the federalization initia-tive as an eventual solution for Transnistriasettlement, a “historical opportunity toresolve that long-standing problem,” as

recently mentioned by the HonorablePamela Smith, U.S. Ambassador toMoldova. I share the Ambassador’sopinion that a reintegration of the country“would have overwhelming benefits forthe people, for all parties of Moldova, bypromoting stability, economic growth, andthe rule of law.”

Because of federalization, thesolution for conflicts like Transnistria isneither new nor definitive. Although thisapproach has been suggested among othermajor principals of common settlement,particularly by the OSCE 1996 Lisbonsigning, and was accepted by someleaders—President Shevarnadze, forexample—it never brought the desiredresult. In the case of Moldova, it mightlead to a solution if some major obstaclesare eliminated. First, the proposed modelbased almost entirely on Russian Federa-tion practices—twenty-three of the forty-two articles were borrowed from theRussian Constitution—is asymmetrical inits socioeconomic and constitutionaldimension. The ten years of Moldova’sindependence, also harshly criticized bythe country’s current Communist govern-ment, was marked by radical economicreform, successful privatization, demo-cratic transformation, and declaration ofdemocratic institutions, including freeelections from which, by the way, theCommunist Party benefited at the lastelections. Moldova’s economic, social, andpolitical structure is totally different fromthat of Tiraspol’s Soviet-style regime. Itwould take time and a confrontation onprinciples to reconcile these incongruitiesin a functioning federal state, even thoughto do so is questionable.

Second, in the short run, federaliza-tion can possibly create a framework forintegration of the separatist regions andoffer a compromise to balance the con-flicting interests. It can create a precedentof successful conflict resolution under theumbrella of OSCE. But the experience ofthe last decade, including that of Russia

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and other former Soviet states, has gener-ated a lot of doubt that federalization canprevent ethnic and political conflicts.There are no guarantees at all against theevolution of a separatist regime into asecessionist one in the frame of a federalstate and against discrimination towardother ethnic groups. The presence ofRussian troops and materiel inTransnistria and their eventual transfor-mation into peacekeeping forces maycause rather than prevent destabilization.The closed relations between separatistleaders and Russian military forces inTransnistria and the North Caucasus arefairly well known.

Third, it is obvious that, for example,within the Caucasian context, autonomyhas been a source of conflict and not asolution to it. Will federalization as thehighest level of autonomy offer a viablesolution for Moldova? It is clear thatTransnistria’s separatist leaders will nevervoluntarily give up their ability to retaincontrol on the illegal multimillion dollartransiting of drugs, tobacco and weapons.Federalization can legalize the regime onthat but not eradicate the causes of con-flict. In my opinion, the problem is not inthe proposed federalization model, whichmight be perfect from my point of view.The problem is to understand why thesestalemates—unrecognized separateregimes and territories—have continuedfor so long. The existing “no peace/nowar” situation permits the consolidationof these regimes, encourages their trans-formation into effectively independentstate-like structures. The solution is foundin the fact that not only separatist leadersbenefit from cash flows generated by thestatus quo in these conflict regions. For acomplete explanation, it is necessary tofollow the money trail—in the case ofTransnistria, for example, from its capitalTiraspol to the capitals of Moldova,Ukraine and Russia.

Obviously there is no universalgenerally applicable resolution for such

frozen and forgotten conflicts. Even if asettlement for one conflict can be foundsuccessfully, remember it cannot beapplied to others as a pattern. The situa-tion differs from case to case, and ofcourse that is mildly different. From mypoint of view, the closest to a peacefulsolution is the Transnistrian conflictbecause of a combination of favorablefactors such as acceptance in principle byleaders, by the leaders of legitimate andseparatist regime of the OSCE proposedfederalization project, tolerance andindifference of the population on bothsides of the Nistru River, and the lack ofstruggle in the Moldovan Parliament.Conflict resolution might be facilitatedeven by the similarities of the Moldovanand Transnistrian Russian-speaking eliteswith a Pan-Eastern Slavic and Sovietappeal/orientation, as it was observed byTaras Kuzio recently. Nevertheless, it willnot be easy to win acceptance of theOSCE proposal, which has alreadyattracted heavy criticism and provokedharsh turbulence in the political life ofMoldova. Mr. George Soros, who recentlyvisited Moldova has spoken out categori-cally against settling the Transnistrianconflict through federalization. Mr. Sorossaid he had been shocked at the USA’ssupport of that document. He believesthat the effect of that document would beMoldova’s complete falling under theprotectorate of Russia. Walter Schwimmer,the Council of Europe’s Secretary Gen-eral, referring to Transnistrian settlement,suggested during his visit last week toMoldova that the negotiators not cling tothe term “federalization,” or to limitthemselves to only one plan for solvingthe conflict that must be settled through anational consensus.

Ruble: Thank you AmbassadorCiobanu. We will now hear from Ambas-sador Dunkerley, former Associate Deanat the State Department’s Foreign ServiceInstitute and a key participant in the 1999Istanbul negotiations.

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Dunkerley: One of the inevitabledisadvantages of speaking in the latter halfof a panel like this is quite often you runthe risk of simply ending up noddingvigorously in assent to good lines thathave already been delivered. And certainlythere’s a lot that I would want to sec-ond—points that have already been madeby the first three speakers. I think RudyPerina is correct. We shouldn’t get in-volved in a long discussion of history,counting individual trainloads and suchlike that. But I do think it is worthwhile atthis point to step back a little and reflect abit more about how we actually got hereto this particular point in regards to theseIstanbul commitments, with the idea that,by looking at those elements, they maygive a certain sense of where we might gonext.

How did the CFE treaty end upgetting so intimately involved in theseissues related to Russian bases inMoldova and Georgia? And there is, ofcourse, an irony here, because the CFEtreaty was originally conceived of andoriginally negotiated in very differentcircumstances, and focused on verydifferent sorts of political/military prob-lems. At times, the CFE treaty in the pasthas been used as a political vehicle.Certainly the original CFE treaty playedan important political role in facilitatingacceptance of German unification. CFEadaptation, the updating of the CFE treatyin the late 1990s, played a similar roleregarding NATO’s first tranche of post-Cold War enlargement. The adapted CFEtreaty is going to continue to play a rolein connection with the next round ofNATO enlargement, probably withregards to the accession of Baltic States. Ata certain point in the negotiation of theadapted CFE treaty, running in the period1997-99, it began to become increasinglyclear that the adaptation negotiations andCFE could provide a powerful vehicle forcountries such as Moldova and Georgia topursue their security concerns with regard

to residual Russian forces on their territo-ries.

Bill Hill has touched upon some ofthe reasons why that was so. In the firstinstance, CFE—the treaty, the negotiationprocess, and the like—provided a meansby which there could be much greaterspecificity of commitments. CFE movedbeyond simply the reference in pastOSCE documents about an early andorderly withdrawal of Russian forces byestablishing levels, by establishingtimelines, and by providing the means formonitoring and verification. It provided amuch-needed specificity to the generalprinciple that’s written into the treaty ofthe necessity of host state consent for thestationing of forces on a country’s terri-tory.

Even more important than that,however, the adapted CFE treaty provideda means of legitimizing “multilateralkibitzing” of what had previously beentreated as bilateral basing issues betweenthe Russian Federation and these indi-vidual countries. I think back to theOSCE discussions of some of these issuesin Vienna in the early 90s when thequestion of the 14th Army in Moldovawould come up. And essentially theresponse at that time was, “That’s abilateral basing issue being handledelsewhere.” By putting this question intothe CFE treaty context, however, it be-comes a multilateral issue. And in thatcontext, both Georgia and Moldovagained the ability to draw more effectivelyon political and material support from therest of the international community.

And finally and most importantly,during this period of 1997-99, these issuesbegan to be linked to questions of highpolitical importance for a variety ofcapitals—that is, the successful conclusionof an adapted CFE treaty, a point of greatimportance in Moscow, in Washington,and in Western capitals. And it alsoprovided a linkage to specific decision-forcing events. In this case it was the

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OSCE Istanbul summit in November of1999, which provided the pressure forgovernments—not just the RussianFederation, but Western governments andthe two governments involved—to taketough decisions. The Istanbul commit-ments laid out in detail commitments bythe Russian Federation to do certainthings with regards to withdrawal ordestruction of their forces in Georgia andMoldova.

Now, I would suggest as we looktowards the future we keep in mind thoseelements which made that possibility ofarriving at the commitments; that is to saythe specificity of these commitments, themultilateral context of these commit-ments, and not least their political linkage.I agree with Bill Hill’s characterizationthat as we think about the implementationof these commitments, we take a view thatrecognizes there has in fact been somevery significant progress achieved. Signifi-cant numbers of Russian TLE (includingtanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles)have either been withdrawn or destroyed.Important bases have been already turnedover. I’ll leave to Ambassador Mikeladzeof Georgia to comment, if he wishes to,about just how important the Russianturnover of Vaziani Air Base can be forGeorgian security in this regard. Weshould not be at all surprised that this hasnot been an easy process. There are avariety of equities and interests involved,certainly on the Russian side but also inthe countries concerned, includingelements which are at best grudginglyambivalent about the implementation ofthese commitments and at worst areactively opposed to these commitments.So it is not at all surprising that at thisparticular point progress has been made,but significant problems continue.

Of more interest, what do we donow? Fortunately, my current duties donot include having to write the memo tothe Secretary of State outlining the gameplan on the way ahead in CFE, although I

see at least some people in the room whoprobably will have to work on that memo.I would suggest the following game-plan.Given the fact that such memos mustconcentrate on the basics, the first point isthat progress on this issue needs to be aregular item in our high-level dialogue,not just with the Russians but also withother concerned states in this regard.Now, the Porto Ministerial, the OSCEMinisterial that is coming up at the end ofthe year, provides one such reason forinjecting that into our high-level dialogue,but I would make the point that it needsto be there more regularly. That’s easy tosay, with the luxury of speaking here on apanel in the halls of academe. We know,however, it’s hard to implement in prac-tice. Whenever we have high-level ex-changes with the Russians, there’s alreadyan awfully packed agenda. I don’t have tospell out the more pressing, immediatecrises that need to be addressed when wemeet at that level. But I do think that wedo need to do a better job of registeringan interest in the Istanbul commitmentsmore regularly. Bill Hill spoke of theimportance of this particular issue in thatcontext. Here again, that’s easy for us tosay in this particular room. I have to saythat those of us involved and interested inthis particular issue within the govern-ment have to do a better job of spellingout just why this issue is important.

As we think about pursuing a morecooperative partnership with the RussianFederation that our two presidents haveoutlined and suggested, the degree towhich this issue of withdrawal eitherreinforces or undercuts the pursuit of thatpartnership needs to be made clearer.Again, I would emphasize it should be anissue in our dialogue as well with Georgiaand Moldova, because I have to say that atcertain points in the past there has beenambiguity or uncertainty as to the specificsof their course as well.

The second basic point I wouldmake in that notional game plan is the

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absolute importance of keeping theseissues firmly linked to CFE. It is notenough to treat these solely as OSCEissues. Why? Because CFE is a vehiclewhich provides the best context in whichsome of these issues can be discussed inspecific and detailed terms. In this regard,the U.S. has made clear that we would notgo forward with submitting the adaptedtreaty for ratification by the Senate unlessand until there is full implementation ofthe Istanbul commitments. I think that is agood and wise posture to hold. I think it’sone that we should actively encourage ourNATO allies to support as well. At thisstage I do not see any reason to step backfrom making clear that absolute linkage.

On the question of specifics, it’s notenough simply to suggest, to hector, or toaccuse. I think it is very important, andhere I very much second Rudy’s point, tofocus on specifics of process. If particulardeadlines are not being met, we shouldcontinue to press the Russian Federationand other parties for specific follow-ondates, follow-on processes, and the like.In turn, I think the U.S. and other like-minded members of the CFE/OSCEcommunity also need to do what hasbeen done quite effectively in the last yearor so, which is to continue to put forwardvery specific suggestions aimed at over-coming practical operational problems onthe ground. And here I’m thinking of theactive financial assistant program managedby the OSCE Mission in Moldova.

I’m thinking also of some of thethings that have occurred in the Georgiancontext. I think we need to think moreimaginatively, more creatively, in thisregard. For example, one of the mainroadblocks relating to one of the remain-ing Russian bases in Georgia, Akhalkalaki,relates to the very dismal economiccircumstances of that particular region ofGeorgia. And under that circumstance, it isnot surprising that the local community isindeed resistant to the closure of thatparticular military base. I know that the

Georgian government has been trying tothink about ways to enlist more effectiveinternational assistance to address theeconomic problems of that region, whichwould facilitate withdrawal. Those areareas in which I think we in the Westneed to think more creatively.

Bill Hill has brought up the issue ofpeacekeepers. I agree that fairly soon weshould think more seriously about how topursue meaningful, credible alternativesto the current peacekeeping arrangementsin Transnistria and in Abkhazia. But thatwill require a very clear decision on ourpart to address this seriously. In years past,in months past, we’ve tried to get such adiscussion going in Vienna and elsewhereabout other alternatives, but we’ve also, asa government, been very, very carefulabout not suggesting our own participa-tion or a more ambitious role or commit-ment on the part of the U.S. And at somepoint we need to think about a moreeffective way to enlist others in makingthat option meaningful. But I’ll pausehere.

Ruble: Thank you for your com-ments Ambassador Dunkerley; we willnow turn to our last panelist, ProfessorCharles King, Assistant Professor ofGovernment at Georgetown University.

King: Thank you very much. I’m inan even more difficult position than CraigDunkerley was, but I found myselfagreeing with just about everything hehad to say, and especially the point aboutthinking more creatively about how weassist some of these processes. There is agreat deal of expertise in this room onboth these countries as well as on theOSCE and on military/political affairs ingeneral, so let me not stand in the way ofa broader discussion. What I want to do isjust make three very brief points, as a wayof wrapping up.

First of all, I think even though weoften do want to separate the disputesongoing in Georgia and Moldova withregional separatists from the CFE com-

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mitments, I do think they are inextricablylinked in many instances. We have to keepin mind, of course, that in the wars of theearly 1990s, separatists in every case—inSouth Ossetia, in Abkhazia, in Transnistria,if you wanted to expand the discussion wecould also talk about Karabakh—won thewars militarily. We are now in a ratherdifficult position of trying to convince thevictors to negotiate with the vanquished,which is never a terribly easy thing to do.

The status of Russian forces there, Ithink, is inextricably linked to the out-come of these particular negotiations. TheCFE commitments, and particularly theIstanbul commitments from 1999, are notjust aspects of the bilateral relationsbetween these individual countries andthe Russian Federation. They are generalOSCE commitments now. Nor are theysimply a matter of U.S.-Russian relations.They’re wrapped up in domestic politicsnot only between the capitals and theseparatist zones but also within thecapitals themselves, and within the sepa-ratist zones. Some of the bases, of course,are in the separatist areas themselves, inTransnistria and, in the case of Gudauta,in Georgia. Even beyond those areas, asCraig Dunkerley pointed out, the basesare wrapped up in ongoing discussionsabout regional development and so forthin other parts of Georgia. He mentionedthe base in Akhalkalaki, which is vital tothe regional economy there. Very recentlythe Georgian government has made aneffort to think more broadly aboutregional development in the south. Butthere’s also, of course, the base in Batumi,which is wrapped up in discussionsbetween Georgia and the autonomousRepublic of Adjar, perhaps even wrappedup in the personal political ambitions ofAslan Abashidze, the ruler of Adjar.

Secondly, the longer the conflictshave ground on, the larger the constitu-ency has become for keeping the situationexactly the way it is. Not only in terms ofrelationships between the separatist zones

and the central government, but also, aspart of that, keeping either the baseswhere they are or Russian equipmentwhere it is as well. Ambassador Ciobanuaddressed this point in some detail. In theMoldovan case one can also make paral-lels with the Georgian case. The situationshave not yet reached what a colleague ofours just over at Johns Hopkins, BillZartman, famously called “a hurtingstalemate,” the kind of situation that leadsto resolution in any sort of conflict. In fact,these situations are at the very leastacceptable stalemates in both Georgia andMoldova. And to some degree we mighteven describe them as “winning stale-mates” for lots of people concerned.

Finally, the tragedy at the heart ofmany of these disputes, and their connec-tions to the status of Russian troops andequipment, is that where there is aconstituency for resolving the conflicts,that constituency is virtually powerless.Where there are groups that have thepower to resolve the conflict, there are notconstituencies for resolving it. For ex-ample, you might think that the close to300,000 internally displaced persons inGeorgia who have been living in tempo-rary housing for close to a decade wouldbe a genuine constituency for resolutionand change. That group is virtually power-less when it comes to real political powerin the country. In fact, they have becomesomething of a political football used bythe government in exile from Abkhazia,which still has set-aside seats in theCentral Georgian Parliament, which so farhas been a major block on real resolutionwith Abkhazia.

Perhaps one of the most worryingthings in terms of a long-term resolutionof these conflicts, of the long-termstability of both Moldova and Georgia,and of when, especially in the Georgiancase, bases in Abkhazia in the south of thecountry, in Batumi, are closed down, is thedegree to which over the last several yearsRussia has made citizens of what were

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simply either ethnic Russians or, in somecases, people with no connection to theRussian Federation itself other thanpolitical sympathy. It may well now be thecase that a plurality, perhaps even in someof the conflict areas, a majority, of inhabit-ants of these areas are now Russianpassport holders, which raises an ex-tremely important question about thedegree to which Russia now has created,in fact, a legitimate political interest inwhat happens in those areas on theground. We’re not talking any more aboutillegitimate Russian attempts to influencethe affairs of countries on its border. It hasnow created a situation in which it has,under international law, quite a legitimateinterest in the affairs of its own citizens inother countries.

Now that certainly doesn’t extend tothe right to keep a base there indefinitely,but it does mean that there is a certainpiquancy to Russian arguments now thatwas not there in the past. In all of theseways there are a variety of complex issuesthat are intertwined. We can separate themfrom the point of view of analyzingseparately the commitments that theRussian Federation made in 1999, but interms of moving forward and thinkingmore creatively about how we assist in theresolution of these conflicts, I think we dohave to recognize the ways in which theyinterrelate. I’m going to stop there. Thankyou.

Ruble: Let me ask if a panelist whospoke earlier would like to make asecond intervention. You’re under noobligation, but I want to be sure peoplehave a chance to respond before I open itto discussion. If no one on the panel hasanything they would like to add, I knowthat there are a lot of people in the roomwho have direct experience with theissues on the table, and so I think we’llopen the discussion. We have approxi-mately one hour left and I would ask thatpeople please identify themselves. Iwould also remind you that we are taping

this event.Stewart: I’m Todd Stewart. Just to

clear up any possible misunderstandings,I’m the former U.S. Ambassador toMoldova, having left that job in 1998 andretired from the Foreign Service. Thismeans that I do enjoy the luxury offrankness in my retirement and conse-quently can go ahead and say the follow-ing in that spirit. Given the levers ofpower and influence that Moscow exer-cises over Tiraspol, it’s laughable tomaintain, as Moscow has, that Tiraspol caneffectively block a determined effort byMoscow to implement its obligationsunder the 1999 Istanbul declaration. Thereal question, therefore, is why Moscowhas not made that determined effort.Some motives were suggested, particularlyby Ambassador Ciobanu, but I would beinterested in hearing from other membersof the panel who are free to speculate onthis sort of thing as to exactly what theRussian motives are in this situation—inother words, why they have not donewhat they said they were going to do.

Ruble: Would anyone on the panellike to address that question?

Hill: I think I can say a couple ofthings about it at the moment, and even inthe hopes that I’ll be able to get back toMoscow, but I think in what I wrote Isuggested that this is as much not just aquestion of Transnistrian resistance but apolitical problem in Moscow. There arepolitical reasons. There are economic/commercial reasons. There are reasons ofnostalgia for empire. There are reasons ofthe presence of ethnic Russian popula-tions. And they come together, but for along time one of the reasons the Russiansgave for not submitting the bilateral treatyreached with Moldova in October of 1994to the Duma was that it would be rejectedby the Duma. And I think this case fits theold adage that I got from my superiors inMoscow when I served there years ago.They said, “Never exclude the possibilitythat they might actually be telling the

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truth.” The Duma has remained a centerof support both because of political tiesand economic ties for support forTransnistria and other separatist move-ments, and it’s ultimately, I think, been apolitical calculation in Moscow for sometime.

What needs to be done is to get thegovernment to act, to overcome, to makeit important enough for them to overridethe interests of the separatists so thatthey’re willing to take whatever politicalflack they’re going to get from domesticopponents in Moscow. But the factremains that the Tiraspol regime—it’s notthe only one, but it’s one that I knowintimately—has strong connections, and ithas strong connections not only in Mos-cow. It has strong connections with highlyplaced political circles in Kyiv. And theseparatists work these, and it’s been forsome time a situation where one canrecognize that the executive branch inMoscow has the levers to overcome localresistance, if it makes a political decisionand exercises the political will to use theselevers. But the political calculationsdomestically, within Moscow, have beensuch that it’s been rare that you have beenable to get a government in Russia tomaintain an extended push on this thathasn’t been eroded by internal opposi-tion, especially from the Duma but alsowithin the executive branch and particu-larly old defense and intelligence minis-tries.

Ruble: Would any of the otherpanelists care to respond to the pointsraised by Ambassador Stewart?

Perina: I agree with what Bill issaying, but I would maybe phrase it a littledifferently in one sentence, and that is tosay that I think simply in the past it hasnot been a high enough priority forRussia to act on this, that some of theseother considerations that Bill has men-tioned (Duma pressure and so on) justmade it difficult to really deal with thisissue. And the countervailing pressures

have not been strong enough to overcomethe pressures of inertia. Now, I also thinkthat this is changing to some degree. It’salways easy to kick issues down the road,and I guess we’re all guilty of that to somedegree, but it catches up with us. And Ithink that is what is happening in thisissue. The deadlines are coming due.There is this linkage to CFE that has beenmentioned by all of the other speakers.CFE, in turn, is related to many otherissues that have been mentioned (NATOexpansion, and so on).

I also sense that it is becoming alarger issue internationally, with Westerngovernments. A lot has been done ingood faith by Western governments interms of the Voluntary Fund and so on tofacilitate this. Significant amounts ofmoney have been donated, not just by theUnited States but also by Western govern-ments. All of this has made this a greaterpriority, I think, among Western govern-ments. It has given the issue greatervisibility. And I think all of these are alsoexerting greater influence.

Finally, I would say on the groundthat the frustration is rising. I think there’sa new situation in Moldova with thepresent Moldovan government. PresidentVoronin is absolutely determined to dosomething about this, and I think he isupping the ante here and exerting his ownpressures. I think, likewise, in Georgia thefrustration is growing. It is growing yearby year with the continuation of thepresent situation. It is becoming a realpolitical problem domestically. So in thepast when the commitments were made itwas easy to kick this issue down the road,but all of this is catching up. And if itwasn’t a high priority in the past, I thinkpeople are going to have to look at thisagain, and I think it is becoming certainlya bigger problem for the Russian Federa-tion.

Ruble: Another question from theaudience, may I remind you to pleaseremember to identify yourself.

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Joyal: Paul Joyal, Daily Report onRussia, Intercon International. Ambassa-dor Mikeladze was the Georgian Ambas-sador to the OSCE during this period,and I would be very interested to hear hisview both from a personal and a profes-sional level of the discussion today and hisinside views into the decisions that we’respeaking about.

Ruble: I have no problem givingthe Ambassador the floor if he feelscomfortable, but my rule of thumb is thatpeople who are in the audience have theright not to participate. They have theright to speak or remain silent, as theyfeel comfortable.

Mikeladze: Thank you very much,and I thank my old friend Paul Joyal forinviting me to say a couple of words, butfirst of all I’d like to thank—I recognizehere in this hall a number of people whodirectly participated in this process beforethe Istanbul, in the process of adaptationof the CFE treaty and of course at thesummit and then afterwards in the imple-mentation of the CFE treaty, adapted CFEtreaty. I don’t want to name them sinceI’m afraid to miss someone, but they havemy admiration. First of all, of course, theIstanbul commitments are extremelyimportant for my country since they havecontributed immensely to our move toindependent statehood, but again I don’twant to go into history, into a historicaldiscussion, as Craig has said, but tocomment on some of the ideas which Iheard today, and maybe raise a couple ofquestions which seem important to me.

First of all, about the assessment ofwhere we are, assessment of the state ofwhere we are, and what has been done,and what has to be done. In general, inmy view, there was a very provoking,intriguing question from Mr. Hill onwhether it is a failure or not. In my view,of course, this state of affairs cannot becalled a “victory,” but at the same time Iwouldn’t call it a complete failure. We aresomewhere in between, and I think that

one should not turn blind eyes to whathas been really achieved and I have torecognize that there was a certain level ofprogress both in Moldova and in Georgia.But I will speak about Georgia, first of allin terms of reduction of the overallnumbers of the conventional armed forceson the Georgian territory and also withregard to the closure of one of thebases—Vaziani, as was mentioned byAmbassador Dunkerley.

And, of course, again, Georgia alsonever closed its eyes, let’s say, neverlooked through fingers to what was doneby the Russian Federation. We were thefirst, in fact, who have recognized theprogress achieved by the Russian Federa-tion in the Georgian territory. But at thesame time, of course, one cannot turn ablind eye at what has not been achieved.And there are significant, very importantelements still in the Istanbul statementand the joint statement of the RussianFederation in Georgia—elements that arestill open. And I have to admit, I have torecognize again, that unfortunately there isno progress in the discussion on theseproblems. Again, in the Georgian case,these are the duration for the remainingtwo bases in Georgia. We have the prob-lem of Gudauta Military Base, withdifferent, much deeper aspects to theseproblems. But, again, I think we do nothave the time, the possibility, to go intodetail.

My next question is—and I thinkthis somehow will be the answer to thequestion of the Ambassador—what arethe reasons of not having achieved bigprogress? Our own impression is that atthe operative basis, the Russian Federa-tion lacks the political will, and as Ambas-sador Perina said, “the reciprocity on theRussian Federation side.” But in general,and in broader terms, in my view, themajor problem is that of course theRussian Federation has de jure officiallyrecognized the state of independence ofthese two states but de facto the Russian

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government speaks absolutely opposite.And we can bring a number of proofs, anumber of examples to prove this idea.Another thing, since the separatist move-ments and the end result of these frozenconflicts also have been mentioned, in myview the policy, official or unofficialpolicy, of the Russian Federation is thefull integration of the separatist regionsinto the Russian Federation. And thisregime, which Mr. King spoke about, ofthe introduction of Russian citizenship tothe separatists, of course serves thisinterest. And since we have again alsotouched this problem of unresolvedconflicts and citizenship and these sorts ofthings, in my view this policy also puts avery big question mark about the peace-keeping and mediator role/function ofthe Russian Federation in the peaceprocess both in Moldova and Georgia. SoI simply do not understand what sort ofmediation…how Russia can mediatebetween its own citizens and anothercountry, independent state.

Now, in answer to your question,what can be done? First of all, in my view,I share fully what Craig said, that we haveto all recognize that this is the question ofthe CFE and, of course, that this is amultilateral problem. It is a problem ofthe international community. And I thinkthe multilateral means and multilateralmethods should be applied. Otherwise,leaving this question at the bilateral levelwould mean not solving the issue formany years. And the next point I want tocomment on is what Craig said about thenecessity to generate very concrete andspecific ideas concerning both the with-drawal of the military bases and thesolution of the consequent possiblehypothetical problems which couldemerge afterwards in the post-withdrawalprocess.

Finding some financial resources tosupport the development of the localinfrastructure and so on and so on wouldbe, of course, of crucial importance. And

not only the varied concrete projects butalso it seems to me that sometimesGeorgian fantasy and imagination is verylimited in this regard because all that I’vewitnessed personally, all our new sugges-tions/offers/proposals are rejected. Andthe suggestion of new ideas, new viewson this issue, would be welcomed, ofcourse, by us. Thank you very much.

Ruble: I’d like to thank the Ambas-sador for offering his insight on this topic.Another question from the audience,please go ahead.

Cheney: Owen Cheney, the ArmyStaff. The question I have is with regard toAmbassador Hill. You mentioned theinternationalization of the peacekeepingforce. In each one of these places youhave the OSCE and perhaps the UNthere as observers, especially in the case ofGeorgia. Georgia has asked and severaltimes been rebuffed on either making theforce more international, maybe have theUN take over the peacekeeping role aswell as have observer status. And the U.S.has also been very reluctant, especiallynow with the global war on terrorismgoing on. What approaches do you have,or what new ideas do you have, in orderto break the resistance either on theRussian side (the reluctance to give uptheir presence, which is justified byperforming those peacekeeping duties inthose countries) and also the Westernresistance (in order to place the amount ofresources and troops on the ground inorder to make a sufficient UN or OSCEpeacekeeping mission really work inthose areas)? If you could comment onthat, please.

Hill: Sure. Well, first of all, in over-coming or convincing the Russian Fed-eration, I don’t think this would be easy,but I think increasingly Russia has real-ized that in the case of the peacekeepingpresence in both Georgia and inMoldova, the legal basis of this presence islimited and shaky and increasingly is seenby partners, whose acceptance Russia

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desires in other areas and for otherreasons, as insufficient and simply maskingthe perpetuation of a Russian militarypresence there for other reasons. There’s along history with this where Russia triedas early as 1992 to get an OSCE mandate asa justification for CIS peacekeeping in anumber of these areas. And it’s popped upagain from time to time. But from mypersonal experience I’ve come to believethat the Russian Federation might be opento a serious discussion of finding a broaderinternational mandate for a truly interna-tional force in both of these countries thatwould provide some real solid interna-tional legitimacy to a peacekeeping opera-tion beyond simply bilateral agreementsseen as fig leafs reached under pressure forcontinuing a Russian imperial presence.

Now, in terms of the force in each ofthe conflict areas here, looking at adifferent kind of force with somewhatdifferent tasks and functions facing it, inno case do I think it has to be terriblylarge, and in no case do I think that itnecessarily has to include U.S. forces. Ithink you can look for the inclusion oftruly neutral forces to provide the bulk, ifyou’re putting in national troop units. Inthe case of Moldova I think we’re prob-ably talking companies. In the case ofAbkhazia, maybe battalions, but not largeunits. In all of the cases, the other thingsyou’re talking about are military observers.They can be very, very small, but mobile,groups. And there, I think, both the localsand the Russians would be prepared toaccept forces from say all of the statesparticipating in PFP, which gives you awide range. The details are difficult orcomplicated, but they’re not insuperable.This has been done in other places. Butthe transition to such forces and to such amandate accomplishes a couple of thingsthat are highly desirable in terms of reallyconsolidating the independence andsovereignty of the states involved andputting the actions of all the states, includ-ing the Russian Federation, into corre-

spondence with generally acceptedinternational law and internationalpractices. And, therefore, it’s something topoint to rather than simply accepting acontinuation of the status quo.

Dunkerley: Well, I’d certainlysecond what Bill has just said. One, thispeacekeeping force need not be unusu-ally large or ambitious in terms of size.Two, it doesn’t require U.S. forces, thoughwe should be careful that our own deci-sion not to be engaged in such peace-keeping not become a political excuse forothers not to face up to tough decisions. Ithink the details, as Bill says, are difficult,but workable. But the problem is to getother nations to take tough decisionsinvolving their own participation. AnOSCE agreement to the formation ofsuch forces really would, one, require amajor political push in which we wouldhave to be actively engaged in promotingsuch a venture. And two, it would not takeplace in isolation. It would have to be inthe context of some meaningful move-ment towards a genuine political settle-ment, whether that is in a Transnistrian orAbkhazian venue.

Ruble: Dr. King, would you like toadd anything to what Ambassador Hill orAmbassador Dunkerley have said?

King: Well, I just think Craig’s lastpoint is absolutely key. I mean, in thecurrent context I can’t imagine why theUN or OSCE would want the peace-keeping role in either of these conflicts.The only reason that Russian peacekeep-ing in both Abkhazia and Transnistriaworks, insofar as it does, is preciselybecause it’s not really a peacekeepingmission. It is a Russian troop presencethat by and large turns a blind eye tosmuggling that goes on back and forthacross those boundaries. It turns a blindeye to the actions of the military forces ofthe separatists that are active in that zone.And so having a group in that would be areal peacekeeping mission actually tryingto control what was going on across those

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boundaries would be incredibly destabi-lizing, it strikes me.

Hill: Well, I was basically just goingto endorse the view that Craig andCharles both made. Really, I think in thiswhole debate about the Russian peace-keeping forces, people don’t often say itdirectly, but the debate is are these peace-keeping forces part of the problem or partof the solution? I think this is how it isseen in the countries themselves. In truth,the answer is mixed, because on the onehand nobody really wants to see a returnto violence and conflict and to a real hotwar in these areas. And probably theRussian presence does prevent that. Onthe other hand, when you just have atroop presence without progress towardpolitical settlement, it is something that isseen as perpetuating the status quo,freezing the conflict, freezing the statusquo, and not providing motivation to-wards solution of the fundamental prob-lem. And I think, increasingly, the prob-lem that Russia faces in both Moldovaand Georgia, but particularly in Georgia,is its presence is increasingly seen by mostGeorgians as being part of the problemand not part of the solution.

Obviously the way to deal with thisis that we have to have more progress onthe fundamental issue here, which isreally behind Istanbul and behind peace-keeping forces and behind everything,and that is finding a settlement to theseconflicts. And everything else we’re doingis in a sense dealing with the symptoms ofthis fundamental problem. And I think wehave to always keep that in the back ofour minds. I did not originally speak verymuch about the political settlement, thespecific topic of this discussion, but if Icould, let me just say that in the case ofMoldova where we have come, I think,closest, closer than we have probably everbeen to a political settlement of theconflict, this is really key. I mean, Istanbuland a political settlement are not strictlyspeaking linked in any way, in the sense

that we would still want withdrawal andimplementation of the Istanbul commit-ments if there were no political settle-ment, and we would still want a politicalsettlement even if there were no progresson Istanbul. But clearly, in a realistic sense,they are very, very much interrelated. Andif we had a political settlement, in fact itwould greatly, greatly facilitate the imple-mentation of Istanbul, and it wouldresolve many of the issues that we’refacing.

One other point on the issue ofmaking a mandate for the peacekeepingforces in the absence of a political settle-ment: I feel a little uneasy about this,frankly, because we are in a sense thencreating a situation to make the status quomore acceptable, to make it easier not tofind a solution here. In the case ofMoldova, our position has always beenthat we would like to see a politicalsettlement, to see what a political settle-ment looks like, in order to be able tojudge what kind of a peacekeeping forceor implementation force would benecessary. And I still think there’s a lot tobe said for that sort of logic. So, really,when you get down to it, the key thinghere is a political settlement. We reallyhave a ways to go on that, very frankly, inGeorgia. But we have made considerableprogress in the last six months in the caseof Moldova. Ceslav Ciobanu referred toaspects of this: the federalization program,the federalization concept that was putforward by the mediators. We have, for thefirst time, a document that is endorsed byall of the mediators and basically acceptedby the Moldovan government. And, again,the obstacle here seems to be Tiraspol.And the question is, in this case, can wereally deal with Tiraspol now to changethis fundamental situation?

Ruble: Thank you for your re-sponse. We will take a question from thisgentleman here in front and then we willtake a question from the back of theroom.

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Merry: Wayne Merry, AmericanForeign Policy Council. A couple ofpoints: one, I’ve noticed no one hasmentioned the GUUAM, which isinteresting since it was created as a reac-tion to CFE adaptation issues, not justwith Georgia and Moldova but also, ofcourse, Azerbaijan and Armenia andUkraine, and is somewhat indicative ofthe nature of multilateral diplomacy herebecause it was an entirely reactive mea-sure driven by the unwillingness ofWashington initially to take concerns ofthe regional new states seriously, when wereally wanted to deal just with Moscow,given our sense of the greater importanceof CFE. And my conclusion from that, tosome degree fast forwarding, is that Iwould question whether it is in theinterest of the United States to make theadapted CFE treaty ratification hostagejust to Istanbul Summit fulfillment,because there’s an enormous amount, Ithink, of American national interestinvolved in CFE. And given the vagariesof treaty ratification, not just in thiscountry but in other places, anything thatdelays bringing that treaty into full force, Ithink, is a very risky proposition. I simplythink that the issues involved in theIstanbul Summit are much less importantthan what’s incorporated in that treaty asin the interest of the United States to getit into force right away.

Second, while I would never everquestion Moscow’s willingness to bemendacious in its conduct in its periph-ery—I didn’t spend all those years in theservice and not learn something—still,there’s a tendency, I think, to see Moscowas more monolithic than it is in many ofthese issues. I think in the Caucasus,obviously, its perspective in recent yearshas been overwhelmingly driven by itsdisastrous policies in Chechnya. I remem-ber very well how the positions onTransnistria in the Ministry of ForeignAffairs and the Ministry of Defensevirtually inverted with change in leader-

ship. When Primakov came in and whenRodionov came in, those two ministriesalmost traded the positions that they hadcarried out under Grachov and Kozyrev.But I think Moscow is a little moredynamic over time than some peoplewould think it is, and I think personalitiesoften have a lot to do with it. Obviously,the personality of Shevardnadze has agreat deal to do with it, but the personali-ties of the top leadership in all of thesethings, I think, sometimes determines agreat deal as to how much the diplomacycan conduct.

But there’s a very strong tendency ofboth those governments, Georgian andMoldovan, to try to portray this as beingall Moscow’s fault. And that reflects theextent to which the Istanbul Summit andthese weapons issues and deploymentissues are really sort of the tail of the dogof the regional disputes—first Ossetia,then Transnistria and Abkhazia. And theyreflect the extent to which, bluntly,Georgia and Moldova are two of the moredysfunctional states that emerged from thecollapse of the Soviet Empire. They maynot be the most dysfunctional, but they’refairly dysfunctional, and neither of themhas even begun the process of takingserious political responsibility for thesituations that created those regionaldisputes in the first place. And I thinkthat’s particularly true in Georgia, wherethere’s been very little effort to try tocome to grips with the legacy of theGamsakhurdia Period, and what thatmeant both in Ossetia and for the Abkhaz.And as both Charles King and Ambassa-dor Ciobanu mentioned, the web ofcorruption that’s involved with flows ofmoney—not just from Transnistria toMoscow and to Kyiv, but heavily throughChisinau—has created what I think inboth of these countries is considerablebody of shared cynicism and a shared self-interest in not bringing these issues to anykind of resolution.

And, finally, I will end on a really

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dreadful point, which is to questionwhether or not the continuation of multi-lateral diplomacy in these two cases mayalso be perpetuating the stalemate. Now, asa former diplomat, I know diplomatsabhor the thought that diplomacy couldever not make things better or mightpotentially make things worse. There areother instances of multilateral diplomacythat are smokescreens that prevent localand regional leaders from dealing withissues that they don’t want to deal with. Ithink these two are classic candidates forprecisely that. And some of the participantswill know that the State Department has onseveral occasions tried to get me to go outto some of these missions and, despite theconsiderable temptations, I declined to doso, largely because I’d come to the conclu-sion that Abkhazia and Transnistria weretwo instances in which multilateraldiplomacy, while it was not perhaps partof the problem, certainly was no longerpart of the solution and, like the Russianpeacekeepers themselves, had become aninstitutional mechanism for perpetuatingthe status quo rather than getting politicalleaders to face up to local issues.

Ruble: I suspect that commentmight warrant a response from ourpanelists. Ambassador Dunkerley willrespond first to Mr. Merry’s comments.

Dunkerley: Well, I’ll respond to thefirst point, in regards to the question ofCFE ratification. I readily agree with thebasic proposition that the CFE treaty andparticularly the adapted CFE treaty is verymuch in the U.S. national interest, and isin the interest of our allies and othersparty to the treaty. It is already bringing usparticular and important benefits. I thinkwhen the time comes and the adaptedtreaty is submitted to the Senate, therewill be a very good story to tell on behalfof ratification of the treaty. Underlying thetreaty, however, is a basic political questionof confidence in compliance and imple-mentation of the obligations undertaken.And this is a real world concern. You

alluded to the vagaries of Senate supportfor arms control treaties. I would submitthat to go forward now with submitting atreaty on which the U.S. Government andNATO allies have all attached greatimportance to full compliance in particu-lar obligations—to change and to submitthe treaty at this particular time, essentiallygiving up on the problems that we’vebeen discussing today regarding fullRussian compliance and fulfillment ofparticular commitments—would be amistake. In that particular situation wewould in fact be inviting even moretrouble and more questions aboutwhether or not that treaty should beratified by the Senate.

I take your point. It’s a particularjudgment call as to at what point oneshould submit the treaty, but I wouldsubmit that there are some very goodreasons for following the course that weand the other members of the alliance atthis stage have taken. As for your com-ments about our OSCE missions, I’lldefer to one or two of my colleagues.

Ciobanu: I would like to make justa few comments. Sometimes it seems tome that multilateral diplomacy is anexcuse to not do anything. I’m sorry to beso leery, but we had multilateral diplo-macy in Moldova during the last ten years.And what really happened in these lastten years of conflict is Transnistrianseparatists. The Transnistrian region ismuch more close to being recognizednow—officially recognized—than it wasten years ago. And the solution of thisconflict is still uncertain. Is federalizationthe solution or isn’t it? In my opinion,sometimes it’s necessary to apply bilateraldiplomacy in a more active way, a moredrastic manner, let’s say.

I remember meeting with one highofficial from the Ministry of ForeignAffairs of Russia when I used to beDeputy Minister of Foreign Affairs ofMoldova. He told me that we know aboutthe leader of the Transnistria region, this

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guy, you know, this son of a bitch, but wehad no time to deal with him. And that’sit. I think that sometimes it’s necessary tojust be more active in bilateral diplomacyand to combine both approaches, bilateraland multilateral. Second comment:recently I saw some very interestinginformation. Moldova was ranked num-ber ten in the world among weaponstrader specialists. Number ten. It is veryinteresting. Moldova exports a lot of wine,and wine especially now is like a politicallife, especially young wine. You know thatMoldova hosted an international winefestival, which was a successful event.Moldova was at the CIS Summit, so-called presidential club, but Moldovabecame a leader in weapons tradingbecause of Transnistria, first of all. And it’sa very serious issue, which affected notonly the security of Moldova, Ukraine,and other countries, but internationalsecurity as well.

Hill: I wanted to say particularly toWayne’s concluding shot, as a formercolleague in Moscow, I would say youreally missed a chance. I don’t agree withyour assessment of the multilateral diplo-macy. I do know, with all due respect tomy friend Ambassador Ciobanu, thatwhen I used to go into the MoldovanForeign Ministry they would tell me thatthe mission wasn’t being active enough.What they usually meant was the missionwasn’t doing what they wanted, but it wasdoing something with which they dis-agreed or with which they had problems.

I think that the OSCE missions inparticular in Moldova and Georgia aretwo of those—and you can exclude myperiod, but certainly with my predeces-sors and successor and the mission inGeorgia—these are two of the missionsthat have functioned and done some ofthe best work that OSCE has done. OSCEmissions in the Baltics and Ukraine andothers have produced effects, and theeffects of the activities of the OSCEmissions have varied. And in some of the

places you haven’t had success. Othermultilateralizations also have stunning, notonly lack of success but stunning failures.But the point is that if a multilateralinstitution is going to be worth anything,it has to take on the tough problems, thestubborn problems, as well as those thatare subject to easy resolution. And it’s notalways a measure of the effectiveness ofthe diplomacy that you don’t produceimmediate and newsworthy results. Imean, I think in some of these cases youhave to look rather to Arthur ConanDoyle and talk about the dogs that don’tbark, because there’s an element of thatthere, too.

It’s hard to argue about what-might-have-beens or could-have-been-worse,but there are records, I would say, if yougo back and we went into the details inboth of these places where you couldlook at things that have been done. No,the problems haven’t been solved here,but that’s because the conflicts in bothstates are part of larger historical processesinvolving the disintegration of the SovietEmpire, the relationship of Moscow withits former vassal states, and the shifting oftectonic plates in Eurasia. And to expect itall to be settled n a few years, I think, isoverly optimistic. To draw a very broadhistorical analogy, in 1989 you had aprocess start in Europe that’s somewhatakin to what happened in 1789, and if youremember in 1802 what was Napoleondoing and what was the status of thevarious European states? So I think interms of historical transitions, we mayactually be in much better shape than theEurope of the end of the 18th and thebeginning of the 19th Centuries. And partof that is because we’ve developed bettertools, including the multilateral institu-tions. They’re not perfect yet, but my owninclination is to look at how to makethem more effective and better rather thanto give up the ghost on them.

Perina: Just very briefly, because assometimes has been the case in the past, I

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could not disagree with my friend WayneMerry more on most of the points hemade, but let me address the one aboutwhere he said that these are basicallydysfunctional states, which I think is avery unfair characterization. But it’s also aself-fulfilling prophecy, given the currentsituation, because certainly these states dohave very big problems, but these prob-lems are compounded and made all themore difficult to resolve by the existenceof secessionist states on their territory. Inthe case of Moldova, it is hemorrhagingfunds and taxes and custom duties thanany state that size desperately needs. Andit is hemorrhaging these because of theexistence of a secessionist Transnistria,which is Europe’s biggest duty-free shopnow. I think, also, in the case of Georgia,the solution for Georgia is to create a statethat controls its own territory and controlsits own borders, and this is key to makingit a viable state. And these secessionistmovements are a key part of the problem.

But, moreover, if Wayne is right and,you know, these are dysfunctional states, Iwould argue that this is all the morereason for Western engagement ratherthan for Western disengagement. It is akey interest of the United States that thesestates prove successful, because if they donot prove successful, you will have a majorregional crisis. For the same reason, weare interested in Macedonia becomingsuccessful in the Balkans, and for otherstates being viable; because if they did notexist there would be a vacuum whichwould draw in many countries and whichwould create a crisis far greater than thepresent one. Basically, our experienceover the last decade, particularly lookingat Yugoslavia, has been that when you seeregional crises, it is better to engageearlier rather than later. As in the case ofKosovo, the subsequent consequenceswere greater, and the international com-munity was still in the end drawn in,perhaps much more deeply than it mighthave been if it had tried to resolve those

conflicts earlier.Ruble: Thanks to each of you for

your responses. Currently, we have aboutten or fifteen minutes left and I see thereare other people who have responses tothe points raised by Mr. Merry. Followingthose remarks, I will then give Wayne avery brief rejoinder, if he feels he needs it.And there’s a gentleman in the backwho’s been very patient who will get thelast question. So let’s begin to keep thetime frame in mind.

Mikeladze: I’m sorry to be so late. Ithink Ambassador Perina already statedwhat I wanted to say, and my thoughts goin line with what Ambassador Perina hasexpressed with regard to the notion ofdysfunctional states. It may be partly true,of course, and we regret to recognize it.But at the same time if we try to analyzewhat are the reasons, the simplest expla-nation for this failure or dysfunction isthat these are the only two states wherewe still have the presence of the Russianmilitary troops, which of course contrib-utes significantly to first the instigationand then the non-resolution of the ethnicconflicts in Georgia and Moldova. Andwhen we speak about the problemsexisting in these countries (crime, corrup-tion), of course the level of these thingsare very high in Georgia and Moldova,and we recognize this fact, but at the sametime we have to think also how theseproblems were created. Of course, mostlythey are result of the non-resolvedconflicts in Moldova and Georgia.

When one-third of the populationbecame refugees in their own country,when the government simply does nothave all methods to control its ownterritory, when the country cannot get ridof the foreign military presence in viola-tion of the principle of the host nation’sfree consent of foreign military presence,then how can one speak about the failureof these states and the dysfunction ofthese states? And now aboutmultilateralism: like democracy, of course,

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it is not perfect, but we do not see any-thing better than multilateral diplomacy inthe solution of these conflicts. The prob-lem, again, is not the peacekeeping itself,which I like… and you reminded me of avery interesting idea of one well knownanalyst who said that peacekeeping in theRussian interpretation is to keep thispiece and that piece of land. [Laughter]

So the problem is to break throughthe Russian monopoly over the peaceprocess in these countries, Moldova andGeorgia. It’s been completely monopo-lized by one neighboring country that hasdirect strategic interests in this area. Then,if not multilateral, then what? A bilateralframework for the solution? I wouldgladly invite you to one of the bilateralmeetings between Georgia and Russia,either on political/military issues or thegeneral framework agreement. Then youwill see everything with your own eyes.Thank you very much.

Ruble: It appears that several otherpeople would like to comment on thatsubject. We’ll take a comment fromAmbassador David Swartz, current Headof the OSCE Mission in Moldova.

Swartz: I had a brief comment onAmbassador Perina’s linkage between thepolitical settlement and the carrying outof the 1999 Istanbul Summit commit-ments. Ambassador Perina argued, I thinkquite rightly, that indeed if there were apolitical settlement it would be easier tocarry out the 1999 commitments, but Iwould argue that the reverse is true also,that the presence of Russian forces overand above the peacekeeping forces iswidely seen as a sign of Moscow supportfor the Tiraspol regime. If those forceswere removed in accordance with theIstanbul commitments, this would be apretty clear signal to Tiraspol and toeveryone else in the region that thatsupport was substantially weakened andwould certainly encourage Tiraspol tocome to the table and arrive at a settle-ment.

Ruble: Thank you for your remarks,Ambassador Swartz. Would anyone elselike to comment on this?

Joyal: Yes, Paul Joyal again. I justwanted to follow up on a point thatCharles King made in his presentation. Inyour first point, Dr. King, you emphati-cally stated that the separatists did winthese conflicts. The Georgian ambassadorjust referred to an instigation of at leastthe Abkhazian conflict—I assume theimplication is Russian instigation. Well,whatever the case is, could you pleasebetter define how you define the Abkhazseparatist victory and how they were ableto constitute an Air Force and Navyduring that conflict as quickly as they did?

Ruble: We will have Dr. Kingrespond to Mr. Joyal’s question, and thenwe’ll finish with one final question.

King: Two points. First, very fewpeople in Washington are more support-ive of the OSCE and CFE than I am. Infact, the American cynicism towards thesetwo organizations depresses me enor-mously. I have the greatest regard for thework that OSCE missions do. But, two, it’san axiom in mediation theory that theparties to a dispute have to want to settleat least as much as the mediator. In labormediation there are certain modalities thatare established that determine when themediator should walk away from thetable. Multilateral diplomatic institutionshave not yet established mechanisms fordetermining how and when to do that,but there are times when multilateraldiplomacy could contribute by at leastholding out the credible threat to theparties that it will walk away.

Ruble: One final question from thisgentleman and then we’ll wrap up.

Shayan: Scott Shayan, former internhere at the Center. I was wondering, inlight of the mediator’s proposal to federal-ize Moldova, I was wondering howfeasible you fellows think it would bewith men like Smirnov holding power inTiraspol. In other words, to actually

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maybe paraphrase some of Dr. King’swork, why be a mayor of a city when youcan be the president of your own country?And using that logic, how many of theseleaders who have tasted state-like sover-eignty already, how do we avoid a zero-sum game in coming to a political solu-tion, especially with something likefederalization?

Ruble: Since we have a couplequestions on the table, I’ll give Dr. Kingthe opportunity to respond and then I’llgive each panelist an opportunity to makea final observation.

King: Just very briefly, on PaulJoyal’s point, all I meant was of course weall know that in the origins of all of theseconflicts, the Russian Federation—eitherin the form of individual military unitsand military commanders on the groundor even in terms of the support of thedefense and foreign ministries—theRussian Federation plays a key role insupplying weapons, even men and sol-diers and officers to the separatist sides. SoI wouldn’t contest that at all. But it is clearthat that separatist side with Russiansupport won militarily, which sets up avery difficult negotiating arrangementnow. That was my only point.

Let me make just a brief point that Ididn’t get to make earlier, then I’ll com-ment very briefly to the question offederalization, and that is Wayne Merry’sissue about the sides actually wanting asettlement. The real difficulty is, even ifwe charitably concluded that all of theelite negotiating sides really did want aquick settlement to this (I think that evenis being charitable in the extreme whenwe look at various negotiating positions)farther down there is very little constitu-ency to solve the separatist issue. The greatirony here is that the more democraticany of these countries become —and wecan add Azerbaijan into the mix—themore democratic they become, the lessthese conflicts matter to individual citi-zens. If you take a poll in Azerbaijan

about the greatest threat facing the coun-try, Karabakh comes very close to the top.If you take a poll in Moldova, Transnistriacomes very close to the bottom. That is,the more democratic the countriesbecome, the more individuals feel thatthey have other issues, other politicalissues on the table that they want todiscuss. The more authoritarian thecountry is, the more these issues can beused for popular mobilization. One onlyhas to look for the degree to which nowparliamentarians in Azerbaijan havestarted a voluntary fund to increase thestrength of the Azeri military to fightgroups that are increasingly being knownin Azerbaijani parlance as terrorists, as theArmenian terrorists in Karabakh. So thatputs anyone from the outside in a verydifficult position.

On the federalization plan, I’m notterribly keen on it. I agree with much ofwhat Ambassador Ciobanu said. I dothink it yokes what has been a relatively,relatively successful process of democrati-zation and openness in Moldova proper,with a regime that has done very little toreform itself. The great irony here is thatthe old idea of a common state, putforward by Primakov, looks actually ratherbetter than the plan I think currently onthe table, but that’s my own view, andAmbassador Perina and others may havedifferent ones.

Ruble: Ambassador Dunkerley,would you care to add any final observa-tions or comments?

Dunkerley: When we were on theshores of the Bosphorus in 1999 negotiat-ing late-night the substance of theIstanbul commitments, all of us recog-nized at the time that we were not creat-ing some new silver bullet. We recognizedthe complexity of the problems in Geor-gia and Moldova. We recognized that whatwe were trying to eke out might representa modest step towards affecting aspects ofthe problem, which might hopefullyfacilitate broader positive movement.

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When the agreement on the Istanbulcommitments was concluded, I recallturning to the Georgian Foreign Ministerand observing that now the hard partbegins. There has been a great deal ofenergy and imagination—and dare I say it,even creativity—expended, in trying tomove this implementation forward. Therehas been some significant results, somesignificant success, but also—and it’s nosurprise, nor should we be particularlydismayed—some outstanding problemsstill persist. All of this underscores a neednot for despair but a renewed, patient,determined diplomatic effort. And forthose multilateral diplomats who fearedunemployment, this simply confirms thatthere are more jobs there.

Ruble: Ambassador Ciobanu, anyfinal thoughts on the points that havebeen raised here today?

Ciobanu: Yes. As Lee Hamiltonrecently observed in one of his commentsabout the new Middle East initiative byPresident Bush, it is not enough to setclear goals in crisis resolution; it is impor-tant to provide a mechanism for achievingthese goals. So I have a lot of respect and Iappreciate the personal contributions ofAmbassador Hill, Ambassador Perina,Ambassador Dunkerley, AmbassadorStewart, and many present key actors tothe solution, but I think it is the righttime to make some conclusions after allthese efforts and activities. In the case ofMoldova and Transnistria, the situation isnot very much different from that of theMiddle East in this respect. It is difficult toreach a reasonable solution. Finally, Iwould like to thank you, Blair, for puttingon these discussions.

Ruble: Ambassador Hill, would youcare to add any final comments?

Hill: Thank you very much. Twoquick points that have come up in thediscussions: First, on the sequence ofdoing a mandate for peacekeeping orinterposition or stabilization or whatever-you-want-to-call-them forces and reach-

ing a political settlement: This is and hasbeen a chicken-and-egg process, and inthe end I think, in terms of practicalities,what is needed right now is a force thatseparates and keeps the former combat-ants apart. What you call it and how it’scomposed and other details (what it does)are things that need to be worked out.Right now, it’s basically Russians andrepresentatives, in Moldova at least, offormer combatants who are in directcontact. Now, we can do better than this,and I think changing it might well, asProfessor King suggested, be somewhatdestabilizing in the sense that it will beconducive, leading towards conditions thatmight actually promote or make easier apolitical settlement by enforcing moreconsistently and more effectively existingagreements. But it’s a complicated andinterrelated process.

Secondly, on the federalization plan,the reaching of a political settlement inboth Georgia and Moldova—I’m muchmore familiar with Moldova—but thecrux of the problem here is sharing powerfrom the center with areas outside thecenter. And in Moldova it’s certainly aproblem that Moldova is a multiethnic,multinational, multilingual state. And astate that is unitarist in terms of thepolitical center, linguistics, or other thingsis not going to be successful in enlistingthe cooperation of all its citizens. TheOSCE mission recognized this early on inits activity, if you read Report 12 fromAugust or September of 1993 of theoriginal OCSE mission. It pointed outthat the interference from the north, fromoutside, was not the sole reason, in itsestimation, for the secession conflict, andthe remedy of that was not going to bethe only thing necessary in order to reacha political solution. There are otherpossible solutions. Federalization is one.Autonomy is another. If you look at it,though, the autonomy agreement withGagauzia is working badly. And why is itworking badly? It’s not just the Gagauz

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being unreasonable, but it’s the fact thatespecially in the executive branch inChisinau now there are ministries thatdon’t want to share authority with theconstituent parts. And until this is rem-edied, I have no brief for the Transnistrians,and it may well be the only way to reachan agreement with them is to removecertain of the individuals who are in theTransnistrian regime. But nonetheless,there are actions that are going to have tobe taken from Chisinau now.

I personally believe that federaliza-tion is a workable and perhaps desirablesolution. In fact, this is what a group ofacademics and diplomats from the rest ofEurope—the Council of Europe andfrom Moldova and Transnistria—reachedat an informal seminar in Kyiv that we hadin 2000. It remains a workable solution ifall parties will commit to it and work outthe details. But solutions require allparties and not just some.

Ruble: Ambassador Perina, any finalthoughts you would like to add in clos-ing?

Perina: Just two quick points onwhat Charles King said, and then thequestion back there about federalization.Charles made a valid point that solutionsto these secessions, conflicts may begetting less important to local populations.I would say that that’s interesting, but it isnot the decisive factor. I would againargue that the international communityhas its own interests, regardless of whetherthe local population wants to solve theseconflicts or doesn’t want to solve them. Itis in the interests of the internationalcommunity to resolve these, in a sense,black holes in Europe, these sources ofpotential instability, in very sensitiveregions, regions where there are nowpipelines going out, where there aremany, many important things taking placethat are vital to the international commu-nity. And, again, if there is not enoughinterest locally to solve these conflicts, it isall the more argument for engagement of

the international community to do all itcan with negative and positive incentivesto motivate the parties to reach a solution.

Secondly, on federalization, this is acontroversial issue in Moldova. I verymuch agree with what Bill said. I thinkultimately any solution to this conflict isgoing to have a federalist type of structure.Of course, with Smirnov around, it willhave to be imposed. Smirnov does notlike this kind of a solution, but inherentlymany people just react to federalism asthough it is an unworkable model in acountry of this size, which I think is nottrue. You have many federal models fromBelgium to Switzerland of small countrieswhere this kind of a solution would beacceptable. But the key thing here—andwe really don’t have time to get intothat—is that if you look at the draftdocument and you cannot separate theconcept of federalism from a specificproposal in a specific document, I think ifyou look at the document itself that hasbeen put forward by the mediators, it isclear that the overwhelming authority insuch a structure would be with the centralgovernment and that a separatist entitylike Transnistria would lose many of thesources of viability that it now uses, fromcustoms duties to a monopoly on taxes, toall kinds of things. This, in fact, wouldlead, I am confident, to a transformationof Transnistria from what it is now tosomething different. I think what goes onnow in Transnistria, the kinds of actorswho are now active in Transnistria wouldfind it very, very difficult to continue thesekinds of activities in the kind of federalstructure which has been proposed by themediators. And I would say, ultimately, thegreatest source of argument for this is thatall of the key players now accept thisdocument or are supportive of it exceptMr. Smirnov, and that is not a coinci-dence. Thank you.

Ruble: I’d like to thank each of thepanelists for what has been a very engag-ing conversation. I’d like to thank the

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audience for being perhaps particularlyprovocative this morning. I especiallywould like to thank Ambassador Ciobanufor arranging the session. I have observedthat it appears that we need to have acontinued discussion on the fate of futurefederalism in Moldova at some futureseminar. We opened the question; wedidn’t answer it. Thank you very much.

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