The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

The 1964 U.S. Presidential Election

A Case of Extreme Values

Nicholas Neuteufel

POLI 412H: United States National Elections

Prof. Jason Roberts

May 3, 2023

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The landslide of the 1964 United States presidential election may seem boring to some or

even just an interesting outlier within the scope of more competitive elections. However, the

massive electoral defeat of Barry Goldwater by President Lyndon Johnson offers very interesting

insights into the essential components of US electioneering and a demonstration of the

hypotheses of political scientists. A careful data-focused analysis reveals interesting lessons

about the effectiveness of presidential campaigns and the so-called fundamentals of electoral

politics (economic growth, presidential approval, etc.).

This essay will argue that the 1964 Republican presidential primaries were structurally

flawed and could have led to a better outcome—that is, a candidate with a higher probability of

winning the general election—despite the wariness of “strategic candidates.” In its second part,

this essay will argue that the only truly significant campaign event was the Republican Party

convention and that fundamentals were overwhelmingly in Johnson’s favor. This essay also

argues that Goldwater’s campaign may have been very effective—despite the tremendous loss—

as it overcame constraints in vote share such as party identification, presidential approval, and

inter-party ideological difference. This conclusion is robust to considering Alabama’s exclusion

of Johnson from the ballot and confronts the narrative of Goldwater being a weak candidate.

The Primaries

Fifteen states and the District of Columbia held voting primaries for majority party

nominees in 1964, though only the fifteen states held primaries for the Republican Party

(McGillivray and Scammon 910). The Democratic primary cycle was very uneventful. Keech

and Matthews go so far as to say that the primaries had literally “no effect on President

Johnson’s prospect for nomination” (100). This claim comes despite the fact that there was a

candidate challenging the incumbent president. Governor George Wallace of Alabama

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campaigned in the Democratic primary, “seeking to prove a point more than to challenge” the

President (100). Wallace campaigned in three states and received a sizable minority of votes

(34% in Wisconsin, 30% in Indiana, and 43% in Maryland), but did not seriously threaten

Johnson’s nomination at the Democratic convention in Atlantic City (101). The lack of strong

competition most probably derived from the existence what Sides and Vavreck call “strategic

candidates” (35). Strategic candidates are individuals who seek out “election years in which the

playing field is tilted toward” either their party or their individual candidacy (35).

Strategic candidates were most probably dissuaded from running in the 1964 Democratic

primaries for two reasons. First, Johnson was an incumbent president. Sides and Vavreck note

that “incumbent presidents are hard to beat” (35). They are very strong in contests in which they

run. Since 1900, only five incumbents lost the presidency, compared to fourteen incumbent

winners (35). Second, Johnson was not only an incumbent, but an incumbent that was enjoying

record levels of average presidential approval ratings (Gallup, “Presidential Approval Ratings”).

There was also tremendous economic growth during the 1964 primary season. Hibbs shows that

the growth of real personal disposable income during Johnson’s first term was more than four

percent (150). This is tremendous growth. The landslide of the 1972 presidential election when

Nixon won re-election with 49 states only saw a growth in real personal disposable income of

3.5% (ibid). Given Johnson’s great approval ratings and the great economic growth of the United

States at the time, it is hard to imagine that any viable candidate within the Democratic Party

would chose to try to seriously challenge Johnson rather than wait until an incumbent-free 1968.

This suspicion is confirmed by the post-Johnson primary battle during the 1968 Democratic

primary cycle.

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The Republican primary process, however, was much more of a contest. It began with no

“clear-cut choice” or front-runner for the nomination (Keech and Matthews 80). In fact, the New

York Times speculated in 1960 that Nixon’s service as vice president for eight years, his

popularity with the party’s “rank and file,” and his ideological moderation would make him the

favorite (80). However, an electoral defeat for Nixon in the California’s governor’s race seemed

to make Nelson Rockefeller the favorite in 1962 (81). Rockefeller was never able to transfer that

reputation into polling success, however. Barry Goldwater, a US Senator from Arizona won the

Republican nomination, despite never being a media-picked “favorite,” according to Keech and

Matthews (82). Goldwater managed to win 38.33% of the primary popular vote as well (despite

the fact that some of the fifteen states’ primaries were effectively “off-limits” to Goldwater

because of “favorite son” candidates).

Goldwater secured a strong minority of the votes and the nomination, despite a lack of

national popularity among Republicans. Table 1 and Figure 1 show the Gallup preferences for

GOP nominees among Republicans nationally throughout the primary season.

CANDIDATE JAN

FEB APR

MAY JUNE

JULY

NIXON 29%

31% 26%

28% 25% 22%

GOLDWATER

23%

20% 14%

14% 10% 22%

LODGE 19%

12% 42%

37% 26% 21%

ROCKEFELLER

12%

16% 6% 9% 9% 6%

G. ROMNEY 8% 5% 4% 3% 5% 0%SCRANTON 4% 7% 4% 4% 9% 20%

Table 1: Data from the Center for Range Voting, citing Gallup

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Jan Feb Apr May June July0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

Preference of Republicans polled by Gallup for Republican nominee for Pres-ident, 1964

Nixon Goldwater Lodge Rockefeller G. Romney Scranton

Month of Poll

Perc

enta

ge o

f Rep

ublic

ans p

olle

d

Figure 1: Data from the Center for Range Voting, citing Gallup

Nixon held a consistent twenty percent to 31% share of Republican preferences

nationally. Despite that national popularity, Nixon dropped out of the race before the convention.

Nixon was not too serious of a campaigner and was probably a strategic candidate who dropped

out thinking that campaigning against Johnson was futile. This assertion is supported by his

efforts and success during the 1968 election cycle. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. peaked in April with

42% and led for most of the race, despite the fact that he spent the entirety of the primary season

in Saigon acting as America’s ambassador to South Vietnam (Keech and Matthews 81). The

group of citizens organizing a write-in campaign for Lodge was not able to translate his

popularity with Republicans in general into a significant number of primary victories or

delegates to the Republican convention in San Francisco (81).

Given that Goldwater won the nomination, there is a noticeable gap between the polling

data and the results from the primaries. There are a few factors that likely played a role. The first

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is the limited number of primaries—there were only fifteen voting primaries for the Republican

nomination, rather than one for each state and territory. The specific demographics and “favorite

son” trend of certain states made it hard for candidates actively campaigning to translate any

national popularity into specific primary victories in multiple contests. The second problem with

the primary process was the fact that there was little active campaigning by candidates other than

Goldwater. As stated previously, Lodge was acting as Ambassador to South Vietnam; all votes

for Lodge were write-in votes (McGillivray and Scammon 910-914). Nixon dropped out early in

the contest and Rockefeller was plagued by personal issues such as a divorce and infidelity

accusations (Keech and Matthews 82).

However, there was more to the primaries than weaker-than-desire candidate

competition. The nature of the primary’s plurality forced-vote system allowed a relatively

unpopular candidate, even among the general Republican base, to win the contest (“The 1964

Republican Primary”). The Center for Range Voting demonstrates that William Scranton would

have been the Condorcet winner of the primary campaigns and “probably would have won [a]

range vote” as well (ibid). Gallup polling data pitting other Republican candidates for the

nomination versus President Johnson are very interesting and helpful in evaluating the impact of

the primary system used in the 1964 cycle. Table 2 details the results of Gallup polling asking

voters’ preferences among the three choices of Johnson, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and undecided.

CANDIDATE

10-JAN 28-FEB 18-MAR

19-APR

JOHNSON 66 68 68 65HC LODGE 23 27 27 30UNDECIDE

D11 5 5 5

Table 2

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Table 3 details the results of Gallup polling comparing voters’ preferences among the three

choices of Johnson, Richard Nixon, and undecided.

CANDIDATE

28-FEB 18-MAR

1-JUL

JOHNSON 69 68 70NIXON 27 27 27

UNDECIDED

4 5 3

Table 3

Table 4 shows the preferences of persons polled by Gallup between the actual nominees:

Johnson and Goldwater. This set includes polls both before and after the conventions, unlike

Tables 2 and 3, which have only polls before the conventions.

CANDIDATE 1-JAN 1-JUL 13-JUL 9-AUG 16-SEP 18-OCT 2-NOVJOHNSON 75 77 77 59 65 64 64

GOLDWATER

20 18 20 31 29 29 29

UNDECIDED 5 5 3 10 6 7 7Table 4

The Gallup data illustrate that before the Republican nominating convention (which took

place from July 13th to the 16th), both Scranton and Nixon fared better against Johnson than

Goldwater did in polls of all voters. In a Gallup poll on January 22nd, Republicans polled only

preferred Goldwater to President Johnson by 6 percentage points—47% for Goldwater to 41%

Johnson (“The 1964 Republican Primary”). These data show that Goldwater was divisive among

Republicans when they were asked before the convention.

The problem, however, is that the plurality voting system and limited number of states

holding a primary allowed Goldwater to win delegates more easily, as voters either split their

votes among non-Goldwater candidates and “unpledged”/“uncommitted” or started a large write-

in campaign. Perhaps a different voting system would have nominated a candidate more up to the

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task of the defeating President Johnson, even if one accounts for the impact of strategic

candidates not running. (The Center for Range Voting indicates that the actively campaigning

Pennsylvania Governor William Scranton would probably have been the nominee in an alternate

voting world.) The strategic failure of the Republican primary was illustrated in a Gallup poll

asking Democratic county chairs in several states which Republican candidate had the “best

shot” (or the highest probability) of defeating Johnson in the general election. The results of the

poll are shown in Table 5.

CANDIDATE VOTES

PERCENT

SCRANTON

302 21.53%

GOLDWATER

297 21.17%

NIXON 246 17.53%ROCKEFE

LLER246 17.53%

LODGE 243 17.32%OTHER 69 4.92%

Table 5: Data from the Center for Range Voting, citing Gallup

Almost 70% of Democratic county chairpersons stated that a candidate other than

Goldwater had the “best shot” of defeating Johnson. Thus the Republican primary system led to

the nomination of a candidate that almost 70% of Democratic leaders said did not have the “best

shot” to defeat President Johnson.

The Center for Range Voting argues that any of the other candidates would have had a

better chance of beating Johnson, as they were more popular among Republicans and because

they were considered “more moderate” than Goldwater (“The 1964 Republican Primary”). One

cannot, however, truly know that a different voting system would have resulted in a candidate

with a better chance of defeating President Johnson, as a different voting system may have

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changed the calculus of candidates, changing their decisions to enter the primary campaign or

not and whether to campaign in a different matter or not.

The General Election Campaigns

Even with the possibility of a “better” Republican candidate, the data bear out that the

1964 election was Johnson’s to lose first and foremost. The fundamentals of economic growth,

partisanship, and presidential approval were very much on Johnson’s side. In addition, the

Republican nominating convention was the only “game-changer” in terms of popular vote share.

Popular vote intention, as show through Gallup trial-heat polling, was very stable

throughout the general election season. This rule has two exceptions: the time period surrounding

the major party nominating conventions and just before Election Day. (There were no debates

between Goldwater and Johnson, so the impact—or lack thereof—of presidential debates cannot

be tested with 1964 data.)

There is a notable increase in those declaring a preference or intention to vote for

Goldwater from the month of June to the remaining months. This is most probably a result of the

Republican nominating convention, which took place from July 13 to July 16. Campbell, Cherry,

and Wink show that Goldwater had a bump of +12.9 percentage points in pre-and-post-

convention trial heat polls, while Johnson had a net change of 0 (295). Given the lack of a bump

for Johnson, Goldwater’s bump most probably came from Republicans previously disenchanted

with the idea of supporting Goldwater. The bump certainly did not come solely from

Goldwater’s selection of William Miller as his running-mate; Miller and Goldwater were very

similar in ideological terms (Keech and Matthews 87). These voters most probably declared

themselves as “undecided” or uncertain and then became more confident in selecting Goldwater

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as a result of positive media coverage of the Republican convention. The hypothesis is also

supported by the magnitude of the bump—12.9 percentage points is above the mean for both out-

party and Republican conventions (8.7 and 7.0 points, respectively; Campbell, Cherry, and Wink

295), which makes sense given the fractured nature of the primary popular vote and Gallup

polling.

Table 6 and Figure 2 show the results of Gallup trial-heat polling asking the voters’

preferences for President.

Month of Poll Lyndon B. Johnson (D) % Barry Goldwater (R) %

June77% 18%76% 20%

July62% 26%59% 31%

August 65% 29%

September65% 29%62% 32%

October64% 29%64% 36%

Table 6: Gallup trial-heat polling data throughout the general election season

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 90%

10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

Gallup Trial Heat Presidential Polling (June - October 1964)

Lyndon B. Johnson (D) % Moving average (Lyndon B. Johnson (D) %)Barry Goldwater (R) % Moving average (Barry Goldwater (R) %)

Chronological Number of Poll(1 & 2, June; 3 & 4, July; 5, August; 6 & 7, September; 8 & 9, October)

Perc

enta

ge o

f Res

pond

ents

Figure 2: Data taken from Gallup (“Gallup Presidential Election Trial-Heat”)

The trial-heat polling pitting Goldwater against Johnson mirror the approval and

disapproval ratings of Johnson as president for the most part. This is because in general

presidential approval is a significant signal and a good proxy for vote intentions throughout a

campaign (Erickson and Wlezien). In fact, when including presidential approval in a model for

popular vote share, the independent impact of the economy as a fundamental disappears (ibid).

1964 is a good example to demonstrate presidential approval’s impact on US presidential

elections. Figure 3 shows the approval versus disapproval of President Johnson from his

ascension to office after the Kennedy assassination to November 25th (after the election), using

Gallup data. Note that “against” includes both actual against votes and all “other.” Since no

approval data exist from June 25th to November 25th, the data are interpolated.

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12/5

/196

312

/15/

1963

12/2

5/19

631/

4/19

641/

14/1

964

1/24

/196

42/

3/19

642/

13/1

964

2/23

/196

43/

4/19

643/

14/1

964

3/24

/196

44/

3/19

644/

13/1

964

4/23

/196

45/

3/19

645/

13/1

964

5/23

/196

46/

2/19

646/

12/1

964

6/22

/196

47/

2/19

647/

12/1

964

7/22

/196

48/

1/19

648/

11/1

964

8/21

/196

48/

31/1

964

9/10

/196

49/

20/1

964

9/30

/196

410

/10/

1964

10/2

0/19

6410

/30/

1964

11/9

/196

411

/19/

1964

0

20

40

60

80

Johnson Approval versus Disapproval, December 1963-November 1964

Approve Disapprove

Date of Poll (Interpolated from 6/25 to 11/25, as no data exist)

Perc

enta

ge

Figure 3: From Gallup (“Gallup Presidential Approval”) and Roper Center (“Presidential Approval for President Johnson”)

Johnson’s approval was very high during his first term. In fact, it set a precedent for

highest average approval rating of a presidential term (Gallup, “Gallup Presidential Approval

Ratings”). Figure 4 shows the average Gallup approval rating for select US Presidents during

their first terms of office. Johnson had the highest average of all of the presidents since Gallup

began collecting presidential approval data—his first-term approval rating average was 74.2%

(ibid). This 74.2% is very high in comparison to the average first-term approval rating of the

presidents considered (excluding Johnson): 56.68%. In fact, Johnson’s first-term approval rating

is 1.686 standard deviations above the mean first-term presidential approval rating. This

achievement is more impressive when one considers that Johnson’s peak approval was only fifth

among the eleven presidents. His peak approval rating came at 79% in February 1964 (ibid),

helping to ward off serious primary challengers, but not helping to seriously distort the average

approval rating of his first term.

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Har

ry T

rum

an

Dw

ight

Eis

enho

wer

John

Ken

nedy

Lynd

on J

ohns

on

Ric

hard

Nix

on

Ger

ald

Ford

Jim

my

Car

ter

Ron

ald

Rea

gan

Geo

rge

H.W

. Bus

h

Bill

Clin

ton

Geo

rge

W. B

ush0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Average first-term Gallup Presidential approval rating

Presidents of the United States

App

rova

l Rat

ing

(%)

Figure 4: Data from Gallup (“Presidential Approval Ratings”)

Johnson’s record high approval ratings throughout the polling window (from his

ascension to office until the election) and the relatively stable trial-heat polling data demonstrate

a lack of true “game-changing” events outside of the Republican convention. A true game-

changer would probably have shifted voters’ approval or disapproval of the sitting president in

some way. One problem with this analysis, however, is a lack of presidential approval data—the

time period from June to November is interpolated. One significant historical event during this

time period was Congressional passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorizing the use of

conventional military force by President Johnson in Southeast Asia (“Iraq versus Vietnam”).

Gallup did not begin polling on the Vietnam military incursion until May of 1965. There is little

reason to believe that this was controversial or meaningful for the election since the American

public has a general ignorance of foreign policy matters and bipartisan support for the Resolution

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(it passed the Senate 88-2). This hypothesis is supported by a lack of meaningful change in

Gallup trial-heat polling data during or just after August (see Figure 2).

Breaking down the Returns

The 1964 election became notorious as a landslide, a result which surprised none at the

time (Keech and Matthews 84). Despite the landslide status of the election, however, there is

evidence that the Goldwater campaign performed very well and exceeded the expectations of

vote share models. This is most probably because Goldwater’s popular vote share exceeded the

constraints of party identification, inter-party ideological difference, and presidential approval,

even when one considers Alabama’s exclusion of Johnson from the ballot.

Erickson and Wlezien identify partisanship as a fundamental for the general election, as it

sets the terms for how party-affiliated voters determine for whom they will vote. 1964 offers a

mixed bag of examples and support for this idea. Democratic Party identification in 1964 was the

highest it has ever been in recorded US history. 51% of registered voters identified as Democrats

in 1964 (“Independents Take”). That majority represented a net partisanship rate of 26

percentage points over Republicans, who appealed to 25% of the registered voting population

(ibid). 1964 marked the apex of net partisanship, at least since 1939 (ibid). This stark divide does

help to partially explain the magnitude of the landslide that occurred in 1964.

While a record partisan divide almost certainly helped drive the margin between Johnson

and Goldwater, national exit polling done by Gallup shows that there was significant cross-party

voting during the election. Twenty percent of Republicans polled voted for the Democratic

nominee, Johnson (“Election Polls”). This divide probably occurred because of division within

the Republican Party (discussed previously). However, cross-party voting went both ways, at

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least in responses to exit polling. Thirteen percent of registered Democrats polled voted for

Goldwater (ibid). Independents split 56-44 for Johnson (ibid). Thus national exit polling suggests

that partisanship was not as much a constraining factor in vote choice in the 1964 election as

other elections, when cross-party voting was lower (ibid).

One possible explanation for the increase in cross-party voting is an increase in

ideological difference. Paddock analyzes the platforms of eleven states’ Republican and

Democratic parties, looking at seven different areas: capitalism, redistribution, internal

sovereignty, labor, universalism, foreign/defense, and overall ideology (756-757). Figure X

details the inter-party differences in ideology scores from 1956, 1960, and 1964. Larger values in

either the positive or negative direction indicate a larger difference; positive values indicate

when the Democrats were more liberal on an issue than Republicans that year and negative

values indicate when Republicans were deemed more liberal than Democrats that year.

Cap

italis

m

Red

istri

butio

n

Inte

rnal

Sov

erei

gnty

Labo

r

Uni

vers

alis

m

Fore

ign/

Def

ense

Ove

rall

-0.5

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

Inter-party differences in mean ideology scores for eleven states

1956 1960 1964

IssueDiff

eren

ce (D

em L

iber

alis

m -

GO

P Li

bera

lism

)

Figure 5: Data from Paddock (756)

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In each of the seven areas, the inter-party difference grew from 1960 to 1964. This

increase in difference most probably comes from the platforms of selected state Republican

parties becoming more conservative. This hypothesis makes sense given an increase in

Democratic Party affiliation (to a historic high), the activism and direction of Goldwater

Republicans, and the relatively common agenda of Kennedy and Johnson. This increase in inter-

party ideological difference makes the results more impressive for the Goldwater campaign, as it

probably distanced the Republican Party from the median voter—in a year where 51% of voters

identified as Democrats.

A third constraint on a candidate’s voter share is the approval of the sitting president

(whether or not the election is a re-election). This is because presidential approval serves as a

good proxy for Americans’ view of the economy, partisanship, and more (Erikson and Wlezien).

Presidential approval also models actual vote intentions extremely well—even better than actual

vote intention polls at times (Erikson and Wlezien). Thus presidential approval can be seen as an

expectation of vote share for candidates (or at least, as a constraint on possible vote share). For

the challenger, presidential disapproval serves as the expectation, which makes sense given a

“referendum” view of re-elections (or in the case of Johnson, incumbent first election).

The fact remains that Goldwater was trounced in popular vote. He won only 38.233% of

the popular vote, excluding Alabama, to Johnson’s 61.677% (Leip; Peters, “1964 Presidential

Election Results”). However, Goldwater outperformed expectations given by presidential

approval. Considering Johnson’s highest disapproval of 1964 (30% of those polled on

11/25/1964, after the election; Gallup), Goldwater won an additional 8.2% of the popular vote

(Gallup; “Presidential Approval for President Johnson”). If one uses interpolation to find the

expected approval on Election Day, Goldwater beats presidential disapproval by nine percentage

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points. If one uses the last day of full presidential approval data available before Election Day,

Goldwater beat expectations by thirteen percentage points. These performances above

expectations came despite both an all-time high in Democratic Party identification and a greater

distance of Republican ideology from the median voter.

Another piece of evidence showing the possibility of an effective Goldwater campaign is

James Stimson’s measure of the “national policy mood,” which attempts to show how liberal or

conservative the general public of the United States is. Stimson’s data are especially useful

beginning at the end of 1958, when data are given on a quarter-year basis. Figure 6 shows the

national policy mood of the United States from 1952 (the beginning of data collection) to the

fourth quarter of 1964.

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1958

d19

59a

1959

b19

59c

1959

d19

60a

1960

b19

60c

1960

d19

61a

1961

b19

61c

1961

d19

62a

1962

b19

62c

1962

d19

63a

1963

b19

63c

1963

d19

64a

1964

b19

64c

1964

d40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

47.703

54.021

52.015

56.397

58.646

60.31664.726

63.663

63.829

64.039

65.85765.668

65.23167.167

71.00171.89670.6

65.848

66.179

65.629

66.13364.663

57.07256.123

58.83661.075

56.444

58.47 58.903

55.769

53.294

60.712

National Policy Mood of the United States (1952 - 1964)

Year (1952-1958) or Quarter-Year (4Q 1958 to 4Q 1964)(Dotted line is the two-period moving average)

Libe

ralis

m (h

ighe

r = m

ore

liber

al)

Figure 6: Data from Stimson (n.p.)

The window in question is from 1963d to 1963c, the period from Johnson’s succession of

Kennedy to the day of the 1964 election. The US national policy mood experiences a noticeable

decrease beginning in the first quarter of 1964 (1964a) to the third-quarter of 1964 (1964c). Such

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a conservative shift did not occur at all during the 1960 presidential election. During the 1960

general election season, there was a remarkable increase in liberalism according to Stimson’s

data. A very different shift occurred during the 1964 election cycle. The 1964 decrease in

national policy mood score meant a more conservative population, or at least, a population more

receptive to conservative arguments. This probably resulted from conservative activism and

political mobilization for Republicans, as presidential approval remained stable throughout the

period (Gallup, “Presidential Approval Ratings”). This is supported by the previous analysis of

Goldwater’s vote share exceeding expectations set by presidential approval despite the height of

Democratic affiliation in 1964 and greater ideological distance from the median voter.

One last piece of evidence for a more generous evaluation of Goldwater’s campaign

comes from Douglas Hibbs’ “Bread and Peace” model of presidential election vote share. His

model uses the weighted-average growth of real disposable personal income per capita during

the sitting presidential term and casualties from US involvement in foreign wars to predict the

vote share of the incumbent party’s candidate (149). Since 1964 did not see a significant number

of casualties in the Vietnam conflict before Election Day, the economic indicator is the one used

to predict the vote share for Johnson. Figure 7 is Hibbs’ (150) diagram showing the vote share of

the incumbent party as a percentage on the y-axis and the economic growth indicator on the x-

axis. The line shows the expected vote share.

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Figure 7: From Hibbs (150)

Hibbs’ model actually predicts a one-to-two percent greater vote share for Johnson.1 However,

the decrease in the national policy mood and Goldwater’s performance above presidential

disapproval demonstrate that the election result was not Johnson underperforming, but perhaps a

better-than-expected Goldwater campaign. Goldwater’s 1964 vote share thus beats Erikson’s and

Wlezien’s measure focusing on presidential approval and Hibbs’ model focusing on economic

growth in spite of two constraints and even when one considers the fact that Alabama excluded

Johnson from the ballot.

Conclusion

1 Though he does not account for the impact of Alabama’s exclusion of Johnson, as this paper did earlier. However, Alabama’s impact on national vote share is negligible.

Neuteufel 19

The 1964 election has a great deal of implications for both US electoral politics and the

conservative movement that arose from the ashes of Goldwater’s defeat. George F. Will wrote in

1998 that Goldwater knew that he meant more than the loss of 44 states in one election,

including a change of his party to a more conservative one. Will went on to say that Goldwater

did not need to fear, as “[p]erhaps he sensed that he had won the future” and that 1964 was only

a premonition and a beginning, that the “27,178,188 of us… who voted for him in 1964 believe

he won, it just took 16 years to count the votes.”

Will conveniently forgets the context in which Goldwater won the nomination. The 1964

Republican primary process was not nearly as competitive as other Republican primary years. It

only included fifteen voting states in which Goldwater competed against a man living in South

Vietnam propelled by a write-in campaign (Lodge), a strategic candidate who dropped out of the

race early (Nixon), and other moderates among whom many Republicans split their votes. The

plurality system of voting helped Goldwater by fracturing votes. A change of voting systems

from a plurality system to a range or Condorcet vote could have helped Republicans pick a more

moderate candidate, even in spite of the reluctance of strategic candidates. This means that

Goldwater may not have shifted the Republican Party solely through his primary campaign, as

some would argue.

Will’s argument does, however, make more sense in the general election context of 1964.

The only significant event (or “game-changer”) in terms of popular vote share in polling data

seems to have been the Republican convention, which led to a 12.9 percentage point bump for

Goldwater. The convention and Goldwater’s campaign seemed to help Republican unity, despite

animosity between Rockefeller and Goldwater. At the very least, the convention probably

persuaded more Republicans to oppose Johnson and vote for Goldwater. No other event had a

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truly significant on the available data from Gallup, including the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin

Resolution which led to later escalation in Vietnam. The lack of “game-changer” events

underlined the importance of the fundamentals, including record high average presidential

approval for a first term and tremendous economic growth.

This essay, however, confronts the notion that Goldwater was a weak candidate. Perhaps

there is something to Will’s argument in that respect. Goldwater lost in a tremendous land-slide,

of course, but he did outperform the expectations of two notable vote share models. He

outperformed presidential disapproval (a standard put forth by Erikson and Wlezien) by at least

eight percentage points and Hibbs’ model of “bread and peace” by at least one percentage point.

He beat these models despite a greater ideological difference from the median voter (compared

to 1960) and an all-time high in Democratic Party identification. Additional support for this

hypothesis comes from quarterly national policy mood data showing that the general public of

the US became more conservative in mood over the course of the 1964 campaign cycle, in

contrast to the becoming-more-liberal trend of the 1960 general election season. These claims are

robust to account for Alabama’s exclusion of President Johnson from the ballot.

1964 thus acts as an example of the importance of fundamentals in structuring

presidential elections and constraining the possible vote share of the candidates. Nevertheless,

there is a good deal of evidence that Goldwater’s campaign was more effective than is generally

believed, even when one accounts for the exclusion of Johnson from the ballot in Alabama.

Despite this campaign effectiveness in terms of popular vote share over expectations, Goldwater

was not able to translate that campaign effectiveness into Electoral College success. There was

little for Goldwater to do meaningfully while Johnson was enjoying incredible success in

presidential approval and economic growth.

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There is some solace, then, for conservatives in the fact that Reagan served to take up the

mantle of Goldwater during a time in which the fundamentals were much more favorable for

Goldwater’s and Reagan’s party and were much less a constraint on the campaign asserting

Goldwater’s ideas. Further research should be done to see how Goldwater outperformed these

models or if there is some ceiling on the effectiveness of these models in cases of extreme values

(in terms of economic and political fundamentals). Given Goldwater’s possible impact on

national policy mood and his outperforming multiple models, however, there may be some credit

due to Goldwater and Republicans from 1964 that has not been given yet.

Neuteufel 22

Works Cited

Campbell, J. E., L. L. Cherry, and K. A. Wink. "The Convention Bump." American Politics

Research 20.3 (1992): 287-307. SAGE Publications. Web. 30 Mar. 2014.

"Election Polls -- Presidential Vote by Groups (1964)." Gallup Dot Com. Gallup, Inc., 2014.

Web. 30 Mar. 2014.

Erickson, Robert S., and Christopher Wlezien. The Timeline of Presidential Elections: How

Campaigns Do (and Do Not) Matter. Kindle ed. N.p.: Amazon, 2012. Print.

"Gallup Presidential Election Trial-Heat Trends, 1936-2008." Gallup Presidential Election

Trial-Heat Trends, 1936-2004. Gallup, Inc., n.d. Web. 07 Apr. 2014.

Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. "Bread and Peace Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections." Public

Choice 104 (2000): 149-80. Douglas Hibbs' Personal Website. Web. 29 Mar. 2014.

"Independents Take Center Stage in Obama Era." Pew Research Center for the People and the

Press RSS. N.p., 21 May 2009. Web. 30 Mar. 2014.

"Iraq Versus Vietnam: A Comparison of Public Opinion." GALLUP. Gallup, Inc., 24 Aug. 2005.

Web. 05 Apr. 2014.

Keech, William R., and Donald R. Matthews. The Party's Choice. Washington: Brookings

Institution, 1976. Print.

Leip, David. "1964 Presidential Election." US Election Atlas. N.p., 2012. Web. 30 Mar. 2014.

McGillivray, Alice V., and Richard M. Scammon. America at the Polls, 1960-1992 Kennedy to

Clinton: A Handbook of American Presidential Election Statistics. Vol. 1. Washington,

D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1994. Print.

Paddock, Joel. "Inter-Party Ideological Differences in Eleven State Parties: 1956-1980." The

Western Political Quarterly 45.3 (1992): 751-60. JSTOR. Web. 29 Mar. 2014.

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Peters, Gerhard. "1964 Presidential Election." 1964 Presidential Election. The American

Presidency Project, n.d. Web. 28 Mar. 2014.

Peters, Gerhard. "1964 Presidential Election Results." 1964 Presidential Election. N.p., n.d.

Web. 04 Apr. 2014.

"Presidential Approval for President Johnson." Presidential Approval for President Johnson. The

Roper Center, n.d. Web. 08 Apr. 2014.

"Presidential Approval Ratings -- Gallup Historical Statistics and Trends." Presidential Approval

Ratings. Gallup, Inc., n.d. Web. 29 Mar. 2014.

"Reading Book "The Gallup Polls, Public Opinion 1935-1971"" Gallup Data. The Center for

Range Voting, n.d. Web. 1 Apr. 2014.

"The Republican 1964 Primary." Keech & Matthews on Republican 1964 Primary. The Center

for Range Voting, n.d. Web. 05 Apr. 2014.

Sides, John, and Lynn Vavreck. The Gamble: Choice and Chance in the 2012 Presidential

Election. Kindle ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013. Kindle Edition.

Stimson, James. "Policy Mood." Policy Mood. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,

2011. Web. 05 Apr. 2014.

Will, George F. "The Cheerful Malcontent." The Washington Post. N.p., 31 May 1998. Web. 8

Apr. 2014.

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Appendix: Union Membership

0102030405060708090

Union Membership versus Johnson Vote Share (1964)

Union Membership Percentage Johnson Vote Share Percentage

US State or D.C. (in alphabetical order, omitted for clarity)(First orange dot is Alabama, where Johnson was not on the ballot)

Perc

enta

ge

r = 0.341176 (with Alabama); r = 0.381499 (without)

r2s = 0.116401 and 0.145541

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

Union Membership versus Turn-out of Voting Age Population (VAP)

Union Membership Rate Turn-out of VAP

US State and D.C. (alphabetically, excluded for clarity)

Perc

enta

ge

r = 0.502540057 with Alabama; r2 = 0.252546509

r = 0.50724746 without; r2 = 0.257299986