Thayer Terrorism Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia

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Linkages Between Regional and International Terrorism

Paper to Workshop on

Re-envisioning Asia-Pacific Security: A Regional-Global Nexus?

Carlyle A Thayer

Professor of Politics

School of Humanities and Social Sciences

The University of New South Wales

at the Australian Defence Force Academy

Canberra, A.C.T. 2614

[email protected]

Organised by

Department of International Relations

Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies

The Australian National University

Common Room, University House

Canberra, A.C.T. 0200

August 2-3, 2006
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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LinkagesBetweenRegionalandInternationalTerrorismCarlyleA.Thayer1

For purposes of this assessment a terrorist organization and its leadership is

defined as those groups and individuals that have been proscribed by the

international community through the United Nations and are currently active in

Southeast Asia. There are three groups in this category: al Qaeda, Jemaah

Islamiyah (JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). This analysis provides an

historical overview of Al Qaedas emergence as a global jihadist network, it then

reviews Al Qaedas links with Southeast Asia before turning to the regions

premier terrorist group, Jemah Islamiyah and its leadership dynamics. This

analysis concludes with a net assessment of political terrorism in Southeast Asia

in 2005.

Al Qaeda and Global Jihad

Ever since the events of September 11, 2001 (9-11), international terrorism experts

and regional security analysts have analyzed the activities of local militant

Muslim organizations in Southeast Asia through what might be termed an al

Qaeda-centric paradigm. There are three key methodological problems in

discussing the role of al Qaeda in Southeast Asia in this manner. The first is how

to characterize al Qaeda as an organization. The second problem is how to

account for change over time. The third problem is how to assess the question of

agency in al Qaedas relationship with militant Muslim groups in Southeast Asia.

1Professor of Politics and Director of The University of New South Wales Defence Studies Forum,Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra. In 2005, he was the C. V. Starr DistinguishedVisiting Professor of Southeast Asian Studies at The Paul H. Nitze School of AdvancedInternational Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C. In 2008, he will take up theinaugural Margaret and Stephen Fuller Visiting Professor at the Center of Southeast AsianStudies, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio.


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International terrorism experts and regional security analysts differ in their

characterization of al Qaeda as an organization. Jason Burke has written what

may be considered one of the best analysis of al Qaeda and a powerful critique of

the al Qaeda-centric paradigm. Burke dismisses the notion that al Qaeda was a

coherent and tight-knit organization, with tentacles everywhere, with a defined

ideology and personnel, that had emerged as early as the late 1980s (2003 12).

Burke argues that to accept such a view is to misunderstand not only its true

nature but also the nature of Islamic radicalism then and now. The contingent,

dynamic and local elements of what is a broad and ill-defined movement rooted

in historical trends of great complexity are lost (2003 12).

According to Burke, al Qaeda, as it is popularly conceived, consisted of three

elements. This tripartite division is essential to understanding the nature of both

the al-Qaeda phenomenon and of modern Islamic militancy (2003 13). The first

of these elements composed the al Qaeda hardcore, numbering around one

hundred active pre-eminent militants, including a dozen close long-term

associates of Osama bin Laden, many of whom had sworn an oath of loyalty to

him. The inner core was comprised of veterans of the Afghan war or veterans ofthe conflicts in Bosnia or Chechnya. They acted as trainers and administrators in

Afghanistan and on occasion were sent overseas to recruit, act as emissaries or,

more rarely, to conduct specific terrorist operations. But, Burke cautions, it is a

mistake to see even this hardcore as monolithic in any way (2003 13).

The second element comprises the scores of other militant Islamic groups

operating around the world. But, injecting another note of caution, Burke

concludes a careful examination of the situation shows that the idea that there is

an international network of active groups answering to bin Laden is wrong. To

label groups included in this second element as al Qaeda is to denigrate the

particular local factors that led to their emergence (2003 14). According to Burke

though they may see bin Laden as a heroic figure, symbolic of their collective


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struggle, individuals and groups have their own leaders and their own agenda,

often ones that are deeply parochial and which they will not subordinate to those

of bin Laden or his close associates. Until very recently many were deeply

antipathetic to bin Laden. As many remain rivals of bin Laden as have become

allies (2003 14).

Burkes third element comprising al Qaeda consists of those individuals who

subscribe to the idea, worldview, ideology of al-Qaeda in other words, the

vast, amorphous movement of modern radical Islam, with its myriad cells,

domestic groups, groupuscules and splinters (2003 16 and 207). In October

2004, for example, a key leader of the Iraqi insurgency, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,pledged his networks allegiance to bin Landen and al Qaeda. U.S. Intelligence

analysts who have studied the flow of communications between bin Laden and

Zarqawi concluded both are still independent operators rather than activists

who have fully combined their efforts(Pincus 2005 15). The cases of Indonesias

Laskar Jihad and Free Aceh Movement are instructive. Both groups received and

held discussions with al Qaeda representatives and both rejected offers of

support in order to retain their operational autonomy. Burke concludes that thepopular view of al Qaeda as comprising the three major elements discussed

above is misguided. In Burkes view it is the hardcore alone that comprises al

Qaeda (2003 207).

The second methodological problem in discussing al Qaedas role in Southeast

Asia is how to account for change over time. International and regional terrorism

experts adopt an approach that can be characterized as back to the future. In

other words, their analysis of al Qaedas operations in Southeast Asia in the late

1980s and 1990s begins with the events of September 11, 2001 and works

backwards in an ahistorical manner. Al Qaeda is portrayed as a purposive

organization, endowed with virtually unlimited resources, from the very start. It

is as if Osama bin Ladens announcement of the formation of the World Islamic


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Front declaring jihad against Jews and Crusaders was made in 1988 not 1998.

Burke correctly argues that al Qaeda as an organization was limited in time and

space:

Something that can be labeled al-Qaeda did exist between 1996 and 2001. It

was composed of a small number of experienced militants who were able to

access resources of a scale and with an ease that was hitherto unknown in

Islamic militancy, largely by virtue of their position in Afghanistan and the

sympathy of so many wealthy, and not so wealthy, Muslims across the

Islamic world, though particularly in the Gulf (2003 208).

Burkes view is echoed by the U.S. The 9/11 Commission (2005 59), which

concluded in its final report:

In now analyzing the terrorist programs carried out by members of this

network, it would be misleading to apply the label al Qaeda operations too

often in these early years [1992-96]. Yet it would be misleading to ignore the

significance of these connections. And in this network, Bin Ladens agenda

stood out.

Bin Laden spent the crucial years from 1991 to 1996 in the Sudan. During his stay

he maintained training camps and guesthouses in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

These formed part of a larger network used by a diversity of extremist groups for

recruiting and training jihadis. Bin Laden also managed a complex structure of

global business operations and enterprises that funded terrorist activities.

Increasingly, however, bin Laden began to encounter serious money problems as

several of his companies went bankrupt.

Bin Laden also wore out his welcome with the Sudanese government, which

canceled the registration of the main business enterprises he had set up and

seized everything [he] had possessed there (quotations in this paragraph are

from The 9/11 Commission 2005 62-65). According to an assessment by the 9/11


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Commission, Bin Laden was in his weakest position since his early days in the

war against the Soviet Union. When he left for Afghanistan in May 1996, he and

his organization were significantly weakened, despite his ambitions and

organizational skills.

It should be noted that bin Ladens decision to leave the Sudan for Afghanistan

and shift his main objective from the near enemy to the far enemy provoked

grave dissension within his ranks. Many of his supporters went off in their own

directions. According to Marc Sageman (2004 45), bin Laden returned to

Afghanistan with about 150 followers and [m]any people stayed behind and left

the jihad, which they believed was taking an uncomfortable turn. The return toAfghanistan was the occasion for another large purging of al Qaeda of its less

militant elements, who hesitated to take on the United States, with whom they

had no quarrel and no legitimate fatwa.

In other words, it was only after bin Laden returned to Afghanistan in May 1996

that al Qaeda emerged as an international jihadist terrorist organization in its

own right. In August 1996, al Qaeda shifted its focus from the near enemy and

defensive jihad to the far enemy by declaring War Against the Americans

Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places. In sum, al Qaeda facilitated a

global terrorist network through funding, services and facilities but did not

control or direct local agents. As noted by Simon Reeve (1999 192), bin Laden

was a powerful figure funding many Islamic militants, but his level of day-to-

day control over al Qaeda must be questioned.

Al Qaeda and Southeast Asia

Muslim militants from Southeast Asia flocked to Pakistan to join the anti-Soviet

jihad in Afghanistan beginning in 1980 or at least eight years before al Qaeda was

founded and eighteen years before bin Laden launched his global jihad. It was

during this early period that Southeast Asians forged personal links with leading


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figures in the mujihaden. One particularly influential figure was Abdul Rasul

Sayyaf, a Pushtun warlord and leader of one of the four major mujihaden

factions. It was under Sayyafs patronage that key future leaders of the ASG and

JI were trained at his camp in Afghanistan. Sayyaf provided training facilities to

the bulk of Southeast Asias Muslim militants. Increasingly Afghanistan became

embroiled in a civil war as the Taliban initiated its drive to power. Because of

this turmoil, in 1995 Southeast Asias militants decided to relocate their training

camps to the southern Philippines.

The al Qaeda-Southeast Asia relationship may be viewed as having passed

through at least three distinct phases following the Afghan war. The first phase(1989-95) primarily involved the establishment of networks and provision of

training facilities in Afghanistan under Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. During this period,

while bin Laden was in exile in the Sudan, individual contacts were initiated

between Southeast Asian leaders and personalities affiliated with al Qaeda.

Equipment and training assistance was provided to the ASG, JI and the Moro

Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). During the second phase (1995-2001), the

leaders of the MILF, ASG and the JI relocated to Southeast Asia. There was anintensification of links between them and the al Qaeda leadership. These links

weakened when two key leaders, Abdullah Sungar (the founder of JI) and

Abdulrajak Janjalani (founder of the ASG) both died in the late 1990s.

The period after 2001 marks a third and distinctive phase. The U.S.-led attack on

the Taliban regime and al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan in the final quarter of

2001, resulted in the death or capture of key al Qaeda leaders, and greatly

degraded and disrupted al Qaedas international network. Al Qaeda members

were forced to seek refuge in remote areas of eastern Afghanistan and in

Pakistans North West Frontier. Other al Qaeda members dispersed overseas

mainly to Yemen, Chechnya, and Iran (Stern 2003) but also to Southeast Asia.


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The third methodological problem is how to assess the question of agency in al

Qaedas relationship with Jemaah Islamiyah and other militant Muslim groups.

International terrorism experts and regional security analysts are often

ambiguous when they use the term al Qaeda. Who or what represented al

Qaeda in its dealings with Southeast Asian militant groups in these formative

years? These analysts fail to consider that several al Qaeda figures may have

been acting at freelancers. Consider this assessment by the 9/11 Commission,

There were also rootless but experienced operatives, such as Ramzi Yousef and

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who though not necessarily formal members of

someone elses organization were traveling around the world and joining in

projects that were supported by or linked to Bin Laden, the blind Sheikh, or their

associates (The 9/11 Commission 2005 59). With the decimation of al Qaeda in

Afghanistan in late 2001, the initiative for political terrorism in Southeast Asia

rested in the hands of indigenous leaders with some collaboration with al Qaeda

remnants left stranded in the region. By 2003 most of the high-level al Qaeda

leadership that had links with Southeast Asia, such as Omar Faruk, Khalid

Sheikh Mohammed, and Riduan Isamuddin (Hambali) were captured.

Terrorist Leadership Dynamics in Southeast Asia

Marc Sageman provides perhaps one of the most insightful accounts into why

individuals become terrorists based on his study of the biographies of nearly 400

individuals who were members of the global jihad (2004 and 2005). 2 Most of

Sagemans sample came from three clusters, core Arab countries, immigrant

communities in the West, and Southeast Asia (2005 80). Sageman considered

three main explanatory approaches to the study of why individuals join terrorist

2 Sagemans 2004 study considered the backgrounds of 172 international terrorists. This data setwas expanded to about 400 in his 2005 study.


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groups: social background, common psychological make up, and situational

factors. Sageman evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of each approach.

It is beyond the scope of this assessment to provide a full elaboration of

Sagemans theory of social networks as the key variable in explaining why

individuals decided to join the global jihad. In summary, Sageman argues that

joining the jihad was a three-pronged process of social affiliation (social bonding)

involving membership in small-world groups based on friendship, kinship

and discipleship. Over time members of these cliques experienced a progressive

intensification of their beliefs and faith leading them to embrace the global

jihadist ideology. The next stage involved an encounter by the small group witha link to the jihad. The final stage involved intense training and voluntary

recruitment usually marked by a formal ceremony such as swearing an oath of

loyalty.

Sagemans findings reject the arguments that individuals become terrorists

because of top down recruitment and brainwashing. In his view, social bonds

predating formal recruitment into the jihad are the crucial element of the process.

Groups of friends that spontaneously assemble in mosques constitute the main

venue for joining the jihad. Sagemans two studies provide a parsimonious

framework for the analysis of Southeast Asian leaders who joined the global

jihad and the factors that account for their decision to do so

Sagemans original study included a sample of twenty-one individuals from

Southeast Asia who were associated with JI. Indonesians formed the majority of

this cluster (12 or 57%); other nationalities included Malaysia (3), Singapore and

the Philippines (2 each), and Australia and Kuwait (1 each). Most of the members

of JI were former students and/or staff at two boarding schools, Pondok Ngruki

in Indonesia and Pesentren Luqmanul Hakiem in Malaysia, founded by the

groups leaders. The Southeast Asia cluster was formed in 1993 when the leaders


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Indonesia for terrorist activities after the October 2002 Bali bombings, only half

were members of JI (Bonner 2005).

Sagemans analysis of the historical formation of four terrorist clusters repeatedly

highlights how different the Southeast Asia cluster is from the other global

clusters along two dimensions. First, the bonding of students to their religious

mentors, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir, was particularly noticeable.

Sageman findings thus underscores the importance of discipleship in JIs

organization. Second, the Southeast Asia cluster is more hierarchical in

leadership structure than the other clusters. JIs founder, Abdullah Sungkar,

intentionally created JI from above.

In terms of social network theory, a terrorist organization may be viewed as a

network composed of individuals in small groups (relatively isolated nodes)

linked by hubs (well connected nodes). According to Sageman, a few highly

connected hubs dominate the architecture of the global jihad. But in the case of

Southeast Asia one hub dominated the cluster the leadership group around

Abdullah Sungkar (until his death in late 1999) and then Abu Bakar Baasyir.

According to the General Guidelines for the Jemaah Islamiyah Struggle, JI is led by an

amir (initially Abdullah Sungkar) who appoints and controls four councils:

governing council, religious council, fatwa council, and disciplinary council. The

governing council is headed by a central command that oversees the leaders of

four territorial divisions or mantiqis. The mantiqi was in practice sub-divided

into three levels (wakalah, kirdas and fiah), although organizational charts made

provision for six sub-divisions.

According to the International Crisis Group (2003 11 and 2004 2, note 4) the term

mantiqi (literally region) is more appropriately viewed as a military structure

with brigades (mantiqi), battalions (wakalah), companies (khatibah), platoons

(qirdas) and squads (fiah).


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In its ideal form, JI comprised four major divisions as follows:

Mantiqi 1 Singapore, peninsula Malaysia and southern Thailand

Mantiqi 2 Indonesia (except Sulawesi and Kalimantan)

Mantiqi 3 southern Philippines, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, eastern Malaysia and

Brunei

Mantiqi 4 Australia and Papua

When JI was first set up it was organized into two mantiqi. Mantiqi 1 had

responsibility for Malaysia and Singapore and was assigned fund raising as its

major objective. Mantiqi 2 covered Indonesia and was given the promotion of jihad at its prime mission. Mantiqi 3 was created in 1997 due to logistical and

communication problems with existing arrangements. Mantiqi 4 was never

established as a proper administrative or territorial unit. The ICG asserts a

mantiqi based in Australia was never a going concern (2004 2). In sum, in

organizational terms JI was a fairly traditional organization in contrast to the rest

of the global jihad.

After bin Laden issued his fatwas in 1996 and 1998, serious fissures developed

within the JI leadership over the organizations long-term goals and strategy.

Broadly speaking, a group of JI militants formed around Abdullah Sungkar.

These comprised his former students including Hambali, Imam Samudra and Ali

Ghufron. After the collapse of President Suhartos New Order in 1998, this group

cited bin Ladensfatwas as authority to wage violent jihad in Indonesia in order

to create an Islamic state.

When Abdullah Sungkar returned to Indonesia in 1999 he discovered that the

leaders of Mantiqi 2 had an entirely different agenda. They wanted more

resources and time to build up a mass support base through religious education

and training. Leaders of Mantiqi 2 argued that there was no clear enemy in


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Indonesia and that it would be a mistake to expend limited resources on

prematurely launching a jihad. The majority faction within JI viewed the fatwas

implementation as inappropriate for Indonesia and damaging to the longer-term

strategy of building a mass base through religious outreach (2004 1). They

argued for a strategy of building up a core of cadres and set a target date of 2025

for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia (ICG 2004 3).

Sungkars disciples were dissatisfied when Abu Bakar Baasyir became JIs leader

following Sungkars death in November 1999. They viewed Baasyir as too weak,

and too accommodating. In 1999, Hambali issued instructions to activate

operational cells in Malaysia. These cells were ordered to commence planning fora series of high-profile attacks against selected western diplomatic missions in

Singapore, U.S. warships in the Strait of Malacca and U.S. military personnel in

transit on shore leave, Changi airport and Singaporean defense facilities. JI

emissaries went to Afghanistan to present their terrorist prospective to al Qaeda,

but al Qaeda took no action. In late 2000, Hambali initiated a coordinated

campaign involving thirty church bombings in eleven cities in six different

Indonesian provinces. Hambalis ambitious terrorist plans for Singapore came toan abrupt end when Malaysian and Singaporean security authorities conducted a

series of arrests of JI suspects in 2001 and 2002. Hambali escaped to Thailand

where he met in Bangkok in February 2002 with Noordin Mohammad Top and

Azahari Husin to discuss a shift in strategy to soft targets. This led to the Bali

bombings in October 2002.

The antagonism between the majority and extremist minority within JI further

intensified when Baasyir founded the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) in

August 2000. Baasyir became so involved with MMI that he turned over day-to-

day running of JI to an assistant (ICG 2004 3). JIs extremist faction argued that

the JI should continue to pursue its aims as an underground organization. Even

more importantly, JIs radicals objected to working with Muslim political parties


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who sought to bring about Islamic law in Indonesia through elections and the

parliamentary process. The militants viewed this as accommodation with a non-

Islamic state that would contaminate the faithful and was therefore forbidden.

The eruption of sectarian violence in Poso in Central Sulawesi in late 1998 and in

Ambon (Maluku) in 1999 also exposed the growing fissures in JI. It took the JI

leadership a full six months to decide to send forces to Maluku. The conflict in

Ambon revealed differences between Mantiqi 2 and Mantiqi 3. At a June 1999

meeting of JI leaders, for example, the head of Mantiqi 2 was heavily criticized

for being too slow and bureaucratic (ICG 2004 4). By the time the head of

military operations for JI was dispatched there were many other militant groupsactive on the scene. Some members of JI even joined a local militia groups before

the JI leadership had decided on its policy. JIs role was mainly confined to

training.

The Bali bombings of October 2002 entrenched the deep rift within JI. Just prior

to the bombings, Baaysir addressed several meetings of MMI-JI members and

argued strenuously that bombings and the armed struggle for an Islamic state

should be put on hold for the time being because they would have negative

repercussions for the movement (ICG 2002 4) In other words, Baasyirs

objections were tactical. Baaysirs advice was not accepted by JIs extremist

faction. Although they continued to show respect and acknowledge him as head

of the JI, the radicals began searching for new leaders closer to their way of

thinking (ICG 2002 4). In August 2003, Australian intelligence noted a clear

split between some JI cells strongly pushing for a return to political agitation and

propaganda and others that advocate nothing less than increased militancy

(Chulov and Walters 2003).

JIs extremist minority carried through on their plans. In August 2003 and

September 2004, respectively, they conducted suicide bombings outside the J. W.


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Marriott Hotel and Australia Embassy in Jakarta. Once again internal differences

surfaced within JI, the militants were criticized for conducting an operation that

resulted in mostly Indonesian deaths. When sectarian conflict between Christians

and Muslims re-erupted in Poso in October 2003, this precipitated another debate

in JI over how, where, and when to wage jihad (IGG 2004 1). The majority of JI

members in south Sulawesi were mainly focused on building up military

capacity and creating a mass base through religious indoctrination to support

what would effectively be an Islamic revolution in the country when the time is

ripe(ICG 2004 24).. JIs extremist faction argued that encouraging violence in

Poso and extending sectarian conflict to Malaysia and Thailand would attract

more recruits and funding to the global jihadist cause.. This split in JI pitted the

leaders of Mantiqi I against those of Mantiqi 2.

Each of JIs terrorist outrages has generated actionable intelligence that has led to

the arrest or killing of key JI militants. The cumulative impact of these losses

impacted on all levels of JIs organization and leadership resulting in a severe

dislocation of JIs internal structure. JIs mid-level organization was seriously

degraded. JI has had to pare down the table of organization set out in itsguidelines. The regional shura reportedly no longer functions and the mantiqi

level of organization also reportedly no longer operates. By mid-2003, the JI had

been so decimated by the arrest of its members that some wakalahs collapsed

entirely.

According to a senior member of Australias counter-terrorism effort, JI has

become a bit fractured from within with a disparate collection of cells working

at cross purposes due to deep divisions over strategy and no clear leader. In

August 2003, for example, the head of JIs military operations cell in Jakarta was

planning to bomb the Bank Central Asia office, unaware that another cell was

planning the suicide bombing of the J. W. Marriott Hotel. To take another

example, although JI is able to recruit new members some of JIs recruitment is


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being conducted by individuals who are deeply opposed to Hambali and

targeting of westerners. In sum, new recruitment does not necessarily produce

more foot soldiers for the radical extremists within JI. JI training activities are

now being conducted on a reduced scale in Sulawesi and Mindanao but the

quality of this training does not match that which was offered in Afghanistan or

at Camp Abu Bakar in the southern Philippines before it was overrun.

JI has never had a strong financial base and al Qaeda funding has been marginal

to its operations. The Bali bombers, for example, had to rob a bank to finance

their operation. JI reportedly received only $140,000 from al Qaeda over a three

year period. The separate arrests of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Hambaliresulted in drying up of this source of funds. JI also has relied heavily on public

donations to support its operations in conflict areas such as Maluku and

Sulawesi. The dampening down of sectarian conflict has closed off this avenue

for mobilizing domestic funding. JI has also been the beneficiary of external

funds from Saudi Arabia. However the arrest of a courier in 2004 disrupted this

source of funds as well. According to Indonesian police sources, JI members

turned to selling mobile phone vouchers to raise funds. JIs precarious financialposition has proved an impediment to its operations and may explain the turn to

explosives carried in backpacks by suicide bombers. JI, for example, is unable to

support the families of all its arrested members. Some members of JI have had to

hire out their services to other militant groups. Other JI members have taken to

robbery to raise cash. But overall there is little evidence that JI has become

involved into criminal activities in a systematic way (narcotics trade, credit card

fraud or people smuggling).

In summary, by 2003 JI had become a badly fractured organization in disarray.

According to Nasir Abbas, a former JI regional leade now in custody, speaking in

2004: JI is in ruins now. Anybody who was a JI member is no longer claiming to

be a JI member now. Azahari and Noordin are the most dangerous, but even


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they dont say they are part of JI now. There is no management, no

administration anymore (Rekhi 2004).

As ICG reports on terrorism and political violence make clear, terrorism

analysis in Indonesia has focused too much on JI to the exclusion of smaller

groups with local grievances (ICG 2004 1). With respect to the re-emergence

of sectarian violence in Poso in 2003, for example, the main instigators were local

members of a militia group called Mujahidin KOMPAK. This militia was

spawned by but independent of JI (ICG 2004 1). There were also many other

local actors involved as well, such as Laskar Jundullah in Sulawesi. For example,

the extremist faction led by Azahari bin Hussin had to draw in recruits fromoutside JI to execute the suicide bombing outside the Australian Embassy in

2004. The suicide bomber was a member of Darul Islam (Rekhi 2004).This leads

to the conclusion that just as with the case of the al Qaeda-centric paradigm, it is

also a mistake to view political violence by extremist Muslim groups in

Indonesia exclusively through a JI-centric framework.

A Net Assessment

Al Qaeda, defined as Jason Burkes hardcore, has been decimated globally. But

the appeal of Osama bin Laden and al Qaedas ideology lives on. Al Qaedas

links with Southeast Asia have been disrupted but not severed. According to

Australian Federal Police Commissioner Mick Kelty, al Qaeda is still

infiltrating the region by exploiting popular frustrations and grievances. In a

recent speech he stated, We are still witnessing the development of various

groups, including Jemaah Islamiah and al-Qaida, all of which are directingresources and energies in training, mobilization, recruitment and radicalization

(OBrien 2005).

JIs organizational development, and regional outreach to likeminded militant

groups in Southeast Asia, was severely disrupted in Malaysia and Singapore due


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to the action by security authorities in 2001-02 and subsequently. JI in Indonesia

has been similarly decimated by police operations; but like al Qaeda JI continues

to function. According to police intelligence reports, JI in Indonesia has been

reduced to roughly one thousand followers and JIs militant pro-bombing faction

is estimated to number up to fifty. JI remnants are concentrated in four main

areas: Lamongan, East Java; Semarang, Central Java; Banten, West Java and Poso,

South Sulawesi. The wakalah structure and training camps reportedly continue

to function in Poso.

Indonesias Defence Minister, Juwono Sudarsono, stated in late 2005 that JI was

virtually finished as a tight knit terrorist network in Indonesia. He estimatedthe hard core to number between 150 and 200 persons (quoted in Walters 2005).

A confidential Indonesian government intelligence report noted in 2006 that the

JI terrorist network survived death of Azahari bin Husin, its master bomb maker,

by going further underground into independent cells called thoifah muqatilah or

combat unit. These cells continue to recruit suicide bombers. (Associated Press,

February 24, 2006).

In 2005 there were reports that two key JI leaders, Azahari bin Husin and

Noordin Mohammad Top, both Malaysians, had either broken off from JI to form

their own splinter group or were operating independently of JIs central

command structure. Azahari and Noordin were responsible for the second

bombing attacks on Bali on 1st October 2005. The three suicide bombers were

unknown both to authorities and veteran JI members. They had been trained in

Mindanao and entered Indonesia immediately before the attack.

As on previous occasions, the bombing outrage on Bali led to actionable

intelligence and the arrest of nearly forty suspects. Most notably Indonesian

police killed Azahari in a shoot out in November 2005 and captured a treasure

trove of documents with details of planning methods and future operations.


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Among the captured material was a video containing the testimonies of the Bali

suicide bombers and a statement by Noordin Top, claiming to be head of an

organization called Tandzim Qaedat al-Jihad. In choosing this name, Noordin

appeared to mimicking Abu Musab al-Zarqawis Iraq insurgent group, Tanzim

Qaedatal-Jihad fi Balad al-Radidin (Organization of the Base of Jihad in the Land

of the Two Rivers). A similar generic name was used by a group claiming

responsibility for the July 7, 2005 London Underground bombings Tanzim

Qaedatal-Jihad fi Europa. Analysts believe these groups are engaged in political

posturing by ideologically aligning themselves with bin Laden and al Qaeda.

Intelligence specialists can discern no evidence of operational links.

As noted above, Southeast Asias Afghan veterans relocated their training camps

from South Asia to Mindanao in 1995 where they made common cause with the

MILF. In July 2000, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) overran a major

training complex known as Camp Abu Bakar. JI remnants fled and set up

training camps elsewhere. Due to Indonesian police action against JI, the

southern Philippines has become the JIs major training base. In addition,

Filipino security officials report that local extremist groups receive funding fortheir operations from both JI and al Qaeda.

On the eve of the first Bali bombings in October 2002, two key JI planners,

Dulmatin and Umar Patek, fled to Mindanao to avoid arrest. There they joined

other JI members who were working with elements of the MILF and the Abu

Sayyaf Group. Patek played an instrumental role in two major bombing incidents

in Davao in 2003. In recent years, the ASG has reinvented itself from a criminal

gang into a jihadist organisation. For example, the ASG was responsible for the

February 2004 bombing of the SuperFerry 14 which killed 130 passengers, the

worst terrorist outrage in the Philippines. Dulmatin assisted this operation by

priming the main explosive device. A year later, the ASG carried out three

simultaneous bombings in Manilas financial district and two cities in Mindanao.


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In June 2005, Dulmatin and Patek met with Azahari bin Husin, Janjalani (the

leader of the Abu Sayyaf Group) and Hilarion del Rosario Santos, the head of the

Raja Solaiman Movement (RSM), in Mindanao to plan operations. The RSM

consists of Filipino Christian converts to Islam. Analysts speculate that Dulmatin

and Patek have in effect separated themselves from JI and are now part of the

ASG structure (The Weekend Australian, December 3-4, 2005). Dulmatin and Patek

continue to train Indonesians for operations in their home country. According to

documents seized by Filipino security officials, JI ran three terrorist training

classes in Mindanao in 2004. The most recent class graduated thirty-four

members in January 2005. Intelligence analysts estimate that up to thirty JI

members regularly cross back and forth from Indonesia to Mindanao for

training. As a result of AFP pressure on the JI-ASG infrastructure they have been

forced to conduct training on the run (Channel News Asia, October 5, 2005). In a

major success, Philippine security authorities captured RSM leader Santos in

October.

According to the Philippines Defence Secretary, Avelino Cruz, JI does not pose a

serious threat at present. Such is not the case in southern Thailand where adormant Muslim separatist movement flared up in 2004. In January, separatists

conducted a spectacular raid on an armoury. This was followed up in April

when one hundred young men were killed in poorly executed assault on police

and army troops. In April 2005, the Thai government placed three southern

Muslim majority provinces (Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala) under martial law. In

July these provinces were placed under an emergency rule.

Tensions in the southern provinces skyrocketed after an incident at Tak Bai on

25th October 2005 in which seventy-eight Muslims were suffocated to death in

army trucks. Five years ago Thai authorities estimated the number of active

separatists at no more than two hundred. Now the figure in put in the

thousands. More than 1,300 persons are estimated to have been killed since


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January 2004. Muslim separatists have targeted Thai government officials,

Buddhist monks and Muslim Thais accused of collaborating with authorities.

So far the separatist insurgency appears to be rooted in local grievances with no

discernable connections to outside jihadist groups such as JI or al Qaeda. Thai

police and security officials are unsure who is responsible for initiating the wave

of violence. Two groups are frequently mentioned in intelligence reports: Barisan

Revolusi Nasional-Co-ordinate (BRN-C) and Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani

(GMIP). The former includes remnants of earlier separatist groups, while the

GMIP core consists of fifty or more Afghan veterans. A key concern of regional

security officials is that the ethno-nationalist conflict in southern Thailand couldattract militant Muslims from outside the country and transform itself into a

jihadist conflict. Or, southern Thai separatist groups could seek outside

assistance. For the moment that is no documented evidence of external jihadist

support for the conflict in southern Thailand.

In summary, a net assessment of political terrorism in Southeast Asia would

have to conclude that al Qaeda is no longer a central actor in regional affairs. A

Thai Army intelligence officer stated, for example, that al Qaedas network in the

region has been all but destroyed (The Bangkok Post, December 1, 2005). But

individuals who forged bonds during the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan

and subscribe to al Qaedas jihadist ideology still maintain contact through a

diffuse network to promote their cause.

JI has been contained but not eliminated. JI is unlikely to recover from its

setbacks in Malaysia and Singapore. The JI network in Indonesia has been

reconfigured into a loosely defined network of independent cells, which initiate

their own actions, with intermittent contact with national leaders. The majority of

JI members still plan and train in the hope of transforming Indonesia into an

Islamic state by violent means if necessary. The main threat today comes from


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the coalition of JI-ASG-RSM militants in the southern Philippines. Filipino police

report that Dulmatin and Patek regularly use satellite phones to contact militants

in Malaysia and Indonesia.

JIs militant minority, now operating independently, clearly poses a major

security threat. Key figures such as Zulkarnaen and Noordin Mohammad Top

remain at large. They possess the operational and technical skills to mount

further terrorist outrages. Due to its decentralized nature JI is harder to detect

and penetrate. This is all the more so because of the trend to recruit and train a

new generation of post-Afghan jihadi suicide bombers. The activities of other

militant groups, which are not part of the JI structure but which interact with JImilitants on a local level, also pose a security threat due to their proclivity to stir

up sectarian violence.

Finally, two of the major challenges facing regional governments are how to deal

with Muslim separatism in the southern Philippines and southern Thailand.

There are hopeful signs that the government of the Philippines and the MILF

may reach a political settlement that addresses Muslim grievances (Inquirer

News Service, October 5, 2005). This would be a major step forward in isolating

the ASG-JI network. The current linkage between the ASG and JI breakaway

operatives poses a threat to both Indonesia and the Philippines. Mindanao

currently serves as a secure base area and spring board for Indonesian terrorists.

JI remnants also bolster the ASGs technical capacity to conduct sophisticated

bombing operations. The situation in southern Thailand may be entering a

slightly more optimistic phase as well. The Thaksin governments initial heavy

handed approach to counter-terrorism is now clearly perceived as having been

counter-productive. Greater stress is now being given to a political strategy that

addresses local grievances.


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References

Bonner, Raymond, 2003. Officials Fear New Attacks by Militants in Southeast

Asia, The New York Times, November 22.

Bonner, Raymond, 2005. JI No Longer an Organizational Threat, The New York

Times, November 16.

Burke, Janon, 2003.Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror. London: I. B. Tarus.

Chulov, Martin and Patrick Walters, 2003. JI Deeply Divided on Use of

Violence, The Australian, August 14.

International Grisis Group, 2002. Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah IslamiyahTerrorist Network Operates, Asia Report No. 54, Jakarta and Brussels, December

11.

International Grisis Group, 2003.Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But

Still Dangerous, Asia Report No. 63, Jakarta and Brussels, August 23.

International Grisis Group, 2004. Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi,

Asia Report No. 74, Jakarta and Brussels, February 3.

OBrien, Natalie, 2005. Al-Qaida growing in Southeast Asia, The Australian,

November 21.

Pincus, Walter, 2005. Analysts See Bin Laden, Zarqaqi as Independent

Operators, The Washington Post, March 5.

Reeve, Simon, 1999. The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future

of Terrorism. Boston: Northeastern University Press.

Rekhi, Shefali, 2004. Terror in South-east Asia, The Straits Times, October 25.

Sageman, Marc, 2004. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of

Pennsylvania Press.


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Sageman, Marc, 2005. The Normality of Global Jihadi Terrorism, The Journal of

International Security Affairs, 8, 79-90.

Stern, Jessica, 2003. The Protean Enemy, Foreign Affairs, July/August, 82(4), 27-

40.

The 9/11 Commission, 2005. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist

Attacks Upon the United States. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Walters, Patrick, 2005. JI Near Death But Still a Threat, The Australian,

December 8.

Thayer Terrorism Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia

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