Testing the Saudi Will to Power

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MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. X, NO. 4, WINTER 2003

TESTING THE SAUDI “WILL TO POWER ”:

CHALLENGES CONFRONTING PRINCE ABDALLAH

Joseph A. Kechichian

Dr. Kechichian is the author of Succession in Saudi Arabia (New York:

Palgrave, 2001) and (Beirut and London: Dar Al Saqi, 2002 [in Arabic]);

and co-author, with R. Hrair Dekmejian, of The Just Prince: A Manual of

Leadership (London: Saqi Books, 2003), which includes a full translation

of the Sulwan al-Muta by Muhammad Ibn Zafar al-Siqilli.

I

f the Al Saud faced the wrath of

extremist elements in November

1979, when the Makkah Mosque was

occupied for three long weeks byhundreds of neo-Ikhwan supporters, the

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia faced a double

rage in 2003. Riyadh confronted the fury

of Western authorities in the aftermath of

the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on

American soil and, after the May 12, 2003,

terrorist bombings, the vengeance of

radical Islamists at home. Although

surrounded by a very large retinue, the heir

apparent and regent, Abdallah bin Abd al-

Aziz, faced these challenges more or less

alone. Epoch-making changes have

unfolded on his watch, and how he

“guides” them will probably mark the fate

of the kingdom and the Al Saud for at least

a generation. What confronts the affable

Abdallah, much like what faced his half-

brother the late King Faysal bin Abd al-

Aziz in the early 1960s, is a test of will.How he responds to accusations that Saudi

Arabia supported terrorist activities

throughout the Muslim world and how

successfully he introduces sorely needed

sociopolitical reforms, will surely shape the

kingdom’s immediate future. Yet, much

like his older brother, who saved the AlSaud dynasty in 1964, Abdallah may well

restore the ruling family’s tarnished image

in the West as well as reinstate its influ-

ence throughout the Muslim world.1

THE 9/11 WRATH

According to the U.S. Federal Bureau

of Investigation (FBI), 15 of the hijackers

believed to have taken part in the coordi-

nated suicide missions on September 11,

2001, were Saudi nationals. This claim

was quickly disputed by Interior Minister

Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz, and at least two

Saudis whose names were on the FBI’s

initial terrorist tally sheets received official

apologies from Washington. Others were

less fortunate because undeniable facts

pointing to the active participation of

several Saudi nationals soon emerged.Dozens were held and questioned for long

periods of time, even if the main designated

culprit, Osama bin Laden (who was


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K ECHICHIAN: CHALLENGES CONFRONTING PRINCE ABDALLAH

stripped of his Saudi citizenship in 1994),

was unaccounted for in late 2003. The

relentless bombardment of Afghanistanfrom October 7, 2001, onwards may well

have dismantled bin Laden’s al-Qaeda

network, but it failed to produce the hermit

or the Taliban regime’s self-declared

leader, Mullah Omar. Likewise, the

American decision to remove the Baathist

regime in Baghdad, allegedly because Iraqi

weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)

represented an “imminent threat” to thesecurity of the United States (as well as to

that of its junior partner, Britain), added

pressure on Saudi Arabia to follow the

American-British “logic,” even if conclu-

sive evidence was lacking several months

after Saddam Hussein was toppled on

March 9, 2003.

For much of the past two years, senior

U.S. officials have voiced their generaldispleasure with Saudi Arabia, even if most

were aware of how critical the kingdom

remained to U.S. national security. Simply

stated, Riyadh controls 25 percent of the

world’s proven oil reserves, a truism that

did not alter the undeniable fact that U.S.-

Saudi relations were severely bruised

because of the attacks on the World Trade

Center and the Pentagon. The kingdom’s

reputation was further damaged after a

U.S. Congressional Report implied that

Riyadh played a role in the attacks.2

Washington deleted a substantial section

detailing alleged Saudi complicity, and,

while Riyadh made a bid to have these

sections made public, it was unsuccessful.

In fact, it is now clear that no amount of

diplomatic finesse will likely eliminate the

mistrust on either side that, unless carefullymanaged, could generate new clashes.

Although U.S. government officials

measured their criticisms of Saudi Arabia,

its Wahhabi creed and Islam in general,

gratuitous remarks abounded in the media

and the instant-analysis industry.Laurent Murawiec, a RAND Corpora-

tion analyst specializing in the kingdom,

briefed the powerful Defense Policy Board

at the Pentagon in July 2002, describing

Saudi Arabia as “the kernel of evil, the

prime mover, the most dangerous oppo-

nent” in the Middle East.3 Murawiec

labeled Saudi Arabia an “enemy” of the

United States and reportedly argued in his briefing that the United States should

demand Riyadh end all funding of funda-

mentalist groups, stop all anti-U.S. and

anti-Israeli statements in the kingdom, and

“prosecute or isolate those involved in the

terror chain,” including in the Saudi intelli-

gence services. If the Saudis refused to

comply, the briefing emphasized, Saudi oil

fields and overseas financial assets should be “targeted,” although specifics were not

outlined. The Saudis, maintained the

analyst, were active “at every level of the

terror chain” and, clearly, needed to be

reminded of their limitations.4

Others identified the kingdom’s reli-

gious beliefs as defective, going so far as

to declare that “Wahhabism has been a

movement of total intolerance toward those

who did not adopt its principles, including

other Muslims.”5 For Americans who

considered Saudi Arabia as Washington’s

“anchor in the Arab Middle East [that]

banked our oil under its sand,” a frontal

assault was necessary to tame Saudis who

had strayed.6 Instantaneously, the primary

focus centered on the kingdom’s education

system, which purportedly taught nothing

but hatred, especially hatred of the UnitedStates.7 When religion and education were

discussed in tandem, the resulting assess-

ments bordered on the highly subjective, a


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litany of emotional sermons.8

The sum total of such negative public-

ity fundamentally altered American publicopinion of the kingdom. On February 26,

2002, The Washington Post reported that

54 percent of Americans viewed Saudi

Arabia as a state supporting terrorism,

compared with a mere 35 percent who had

a similar perception of Syria, a country long

on the State Department’s “Terrorism

List.”9 This general view remained

constant for the balance of the year and,after the spring 2003 American-British war

on Iraq, anti-Saudi perceptions solidified.10

A less charitable British commentator

predicted a total collapse of the long-

standing relationship between the United

States and Saudi Arabia, as gloom and

doom forecasts dominated media as well

as scholarly outlets.11

THE WRATH OF MAY 12, 2003

Then on May 12, 2003, powerful

bombs ripped through three foreign com-

pounds in Riyadh, killing 34 people, includ-

ing eight Americans, along with 9 attack-

ers. Another 194 people were wounded.

The terrorist bombings stung senior Saudi

officials, as most were criticized for doing

little to combat militancy in the kingdom

and throughout the Muslim world. After

this tragedy, Saudi officials displayed

unusual openness and determination to

confront extremist militants. “Saudi Arabia

must deal with the fact it has terrorists

inside its own country,” White House

spokesman Ari Fleischer declared.12

Cautious Saudi commentators and officials

quickly concluded that radical elements

represented as much of a threat to SaudiArabia as to the United States. Heir

Apparent Abdallah went on national

television vowing to “confront the murder-

ous criminals” and their supporters behind

the attacks, a very bold statement that

expanded the circle by taking on themilitants’ sympathizers. He pledged to

remain “vigilant about security” and “to

confront and destroy the threat posed by a

deviant few.”13 In fact, Saudi newspapers,

which are government controlled even if

privately owned, carried editorials using

unusually harsh language. Most lashed out

at extremists who, they posited, used

religion to rally misguided and mostlyunemployed youths to carry out suicide

attacks.14

Within a few days, Saudi Arabia linked

a 19-member al-Qaeda team to the car-

nage, as a direct connection was made

between these latest attacks and a May 6,

2003, gunfight between police and al-

Qaeda operatives in the same part of

Riyadh. According to Saudi authorities, the19 who escaped included 17 of its nation-

als, a Yemeni, and an Iraqi with dual

Kuwaiti and Canadian citizenship. Interior

Minister Nayif declared that they were

believed to take orders directly from

Osama bin Laden.15 Speaking to the daily

Ukaz , Nayif did not rule out the possibility

of more attacks: “We must not sit back

and say this will not happen,” he said.

“This is life, and incidents occur in every

country and we are in a period of anxiety

and terror acts. The kingdom is one of the

countries being targeted.”16

By late 2003, Riyadh successfully

apprehended most of those on its initial list

of al-Qaeda suspects, and then some.

Dozens were hunted down and hundreds

were arrested. Heir apparent Abdallah’s

pledge that he would go after terroristswith a vengeance, proved true. Various

sweeps in Riyadh but also in Makkah,

Madinah, Abha and elsewhere throughout


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the kingdom netted potential terrorists who

stood accused of collaborating with al-

Qaeda. Equally important, several hundredclerics were fired from their highly visible

posts and, according to an official spokes-

man, Riyadh actually suspended many

preachers for allegedly promoting hatred

and intolerance.17

WHAT AILED THE KINGDOM

The firing of several hundred clerics

from their state-appointed posts and the“retraining” of many others in special

religious schools illustrated what ailed the

kingdom. Indeed, much of what hurt Saudi

society may well be traced to its complex

socioeconomic makeup and the myriad

problems it has helped create since 1932.18

Although the Al Saud did not face an

imminent risk of instability, they entered the

twenty-first century in the midst of signifi-cant political, social, economic and military

transitions.

Political transitions

The most critical internal transition

facing the Al Saud in 2003 was the ques-

tion of who might succeed a frail King

Fahd. In fact, Riyadh was likely to have a

non-Sudayri at the helm, in the person of

Heir Apparent Abdallah. That is, a son of

King Abdul Aziz whose mother was not a

member of the Sudayri family. Almost

inevitably, this has raised a succession

question among policy makers, focusing

attention on how the Saudi regime might

change under his rule and whether there

might be significant shifts in Saudi foreign

and domestic policies. Irrespective of how

this transition develops, Abdallah’s acces-sion to the throne seems assured (assuming

good health), even if the number-two post

“promised” to Defense Minister Sultan bin

Abd al-Aziz has not been etched in stone.

Questions of this forthcoming succession

aside, Saudi Arabia could face a politicalcrisis, once the winnowing of senior Al

Saud family members accelerates.19

Abdallah, who assumed authority to

run the day-to-day affairs of the kingdom

in December 1995, when King Fahd bin

Abd al-Aziz suffered a debilitating stroke,

was sensitive to this central question.

Although he became regent in 2000, the

heir apparent probably represents aminority voice within the ruling family.

Defense Minister Sultan and several of his

full brothers, the so-called Sudayris, tend to

be far more conservative. They also reject

any changes in the alliance that stands at

the center of the family’s legitimacy in the

eyes of the religious establishment. It may

thus be safe to assume that while Fahd is

alive, even if barely, Abdallah cannot relyon the full complement of brotherly support

that he desperately needs to solidify his

position. Needless to say, such support is

critical if one is simultaneously to accede to

rulership, win a war against terrorism, and

– no small feat – introduce social, eco-

nomic and political reforms.

Another important transition was

earmarked for the Majlis al-Shura (Consul-

tative Council), which was enlarged to 120

members at the end of May 2001, as it was

called upon to offer genuine advice rather

than rubber stamp government policy.

Observers of the kingdom’s political scene

perceived the expanded Council as a way

for technocrats to enter government

service rather than act as real parliamen-

tarians.20 Nevertheless, Riyadh sought to

empower the institution, even if it hesitated.“We need political reform first of all.

Parliament has to have the right to hold

government to account,” insisted Talal bin


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Abd al-Aziz, a half-brother of the custodian

of the two holy mosques, to Reuters in

early July 2003.21Talal, never the shy royal, went even

further in his assessment of what ailed the

kingdom. “So far the intellectuals agree on

the unity of the Kingdom, that we should

have an Islamic Shari’ah law but an

enlightened version, and that we retain the

royal family but with reform.” These were

powerful words that could only be voiced

after being vetted with the country’s senior leaders. What Talal and, through him, Heir

Apparent Abdallah were clearly seeking

was to curtail the immense power of the

religious establishment. Moreover, what

the regent sought was to institute substan-

tial reforms to overcome whatever political

problems Saudi society may have to face,

including terrorism, to ensure Al Saud rule.

Talal was specific in his criticism of thereligious police, and he called on the

government to rein in the Committee for

the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of

Vice, known as the mutawwain or “en-

forcers,” a semi-independent institution

created and supervised by the ruling family.

According to this logic, the enforcers

would no longer have free license to arrest

at will but would be accountable to the

police. “If,” clarified Talal, enforcers of

public morality “see violations, it is not they

who should take action; they should just tell

the police.”22 Few Saudis and even fewer

members of the Al Saud had ever spoken

with such clarity of purpose on a topic this

sensitive.

The call to further institutionalize

religious activities was not limited to

members of the ruling family. Shaykh Abdal-Aziz bin Abdallah Al Shaykh, the

kingdom’s grand mufti and chairman of the

Council of Senior Ulama [religious schol-

ars], declared in May 2003 that “terrorism

ha[d] nothing to do with Islam [and that]

Islam should not be blamed for the acts of other people.” “People,” underscored the

learned scholar, “should be held responsible

individually for their own acts.” In August

2003, Al Shaykh cautioned believers to

abandon extremism and fanaticism, empha-

sizing that “Muslims must understand that

the path of reform never comes through

violence. Islam is not a religion of vio-

lence. It is a religion of mercy for every-one.”23 Speaking in Makkah in early

September 2003, he further indicated that

Friday sermons should address the inter-

ests of the entire Muslim community.24 For

his part, the minister of Islamic Endow-

ments, Dawa, Awqaf and Guidance

Affairs, Shaykh Salih bin Abd al-Aziz Al

Shaykh, cautioned Saudi youth to remain

vigilant about religious and political devia-tions. Shaykh Salih called on Saudis to

oppose hatred in all its forms and pledged

to allocate a larger portion of his ministry’s

resources to programs that will propagate

truth.25

Needless to say, such a global perspec-

tive required coordination and, more

important, cooperation among religious

authorities, who would have to accept a

certain degree of uniformity. Yet, and it

may be worth underscoring, the kingdom’s

religious figures would neither utter such

declarations nor embark on radical ap-

proaches were it not for the heir apparent’s

specific instructions. In fact, Abdallah’s

outlook on religious tolerance was changing

so quickly that, at the end of his historic

September 2003 visit to Russia, he called

on Muslims and Christians in that countryto preserve “social harmony.” Receiving

members of the Russian Orthodox Church,

he forcefully declared that Russians were


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capable of opposing evil that sought to

separate or harm their respective reli-

gions.26 At a time when Saudis wereaccused of doing little to promote concord

among various religious communities,

Abdallah was certain that Russian Muslims

and Christians were capable of preventing

divisions. Although this statement was

meant to be supportive of Russia’s esti-

mated 20 million Muslims, it also reflected

the heir apparent’s desire for tolerance

among all believers. By making such astatement in Moscow, Abdallah further

cautioned radical Islamists at home,

insisting that extremism and intolerance

would not be condoned.

Economic transitions

Abdallah faced equally daunting

challenges on the economic front that pre-

occupied him far more than generallyassumed. He realized that the kingdom’s

estimated 30-percent unemployment rate

stood as a stark reminder of past failures.

Unless major economic reforms were

implemented, and sooner than many

wished, Riyadh could not hope to emerge

out of its sociopolitical doldrums.

In 1973, before the beginning of the

infamous oil boom, Saudi Arabia had a

population of roughly 6.8 million. It grew

to 15.8 million by 1990 and 22 million by

2000. It is currently projected to reach

25.8 million in 2005 and over 30 million in

2010. At an annual growth rate of 3.7

percent, the Saudi population will have

nearly doubled between 1990 and 2010.

The World Bank forecasts that Saudi

Arabia’s population will grow by about 3.3

percent per year over the next few years.As a result, even conservative estimates

project a total Saudi population approaching

30 million in 2010. This will add substantial

pressures on Riyadh.27 What the kingdom’s

demographic data clearly illustrate is that

Saudi Arabia is a very young country ruled by old men. Abdallah, who is 80, must

therefore rule with a young heart if he is to

address the concerns of his people.

Similarly, in 1973, Riyadh’s gross

domestic product (GDP) stood at less than

100 billion riyals (approximately $35 billion),

and per capita income was less than

$2,500. The economy was largely rural

and pre-industrial. By 2002, however, theSaudi GDP rose to 700 billion riyals (ap-

proximately $200 billion) with per capita

income hovering around $9,000 (having

peaked at $15,000 in 1981). These figures

indicated that a largely agricultural entity

had slowly become a heavily urbanized

welfare state with a significant service

sector. Yet, because of dramatic transi-

tions, Saudi Arabia faced a critical threat tothe welfare state it created after 1974,

especially because the anticipated popula-

tion growth was not matched by liberalized

economic policies. Clearly, oil income

alone would not – and will not – offset a

steady drop in per capita income, as

Riyadh encourages rapid diversification

and prepares for the day when many

subsidies, a significant drain on its unbal-

anced budgets, are permanently re-

moved.28

To some extent, these changes ex-

plained why Heir Apparent Abdallah

continued his efforts to seek major reforms

in the Saudi economy, to reduce depen-

dence on foreign labor, encourage private

domestic and foreign investment, and open

up the nation’s economy to help make it

globally competitive (as well as qualify for membership in the World Trade Organiza-

tion). In fact, the need for substantial

foreign investment, especially in the oil and


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gas industries, was deemed a priority.

Towards that end, Abdallah invited leading

oil-industry titans to return to the kingdom,even if no agreement had been reached by

the fall of 2003.29 The heir apparent

understood that Saudi Arabia remained far

too heavily dependent on oil revenues (for

around 90 percent of total export earnings,

about 70 percent of state revenues and 40

percent of GDP), despite repeated at-

tempts to diversify. Still, without high oil

prices, Riyadh was poised to face budgetand investment problems, the major

challenge on this front being whether

Abdallah could fund both entitlements and

development programs simultaneously.30

Military transitions

The kingdom’s military transition was

even more complicated. Despite large

defense expenditures and vast programs toabsorb Western military hardware, the

Saudi military remained relatively weak

against its opponents, chiefly because

Riyadh lacked the minimum manpower

required to defend Saudi Arabia. Pressure

on the Al Saud to form a capable fighting

force increased after the 1991 war for

Kuwait, not only because of the country’s

small population base, but also because

able-bodied Saudi men have in large part

stayed outside the military, essentially to

manage businesses. To compensate for

chronic manpower shortages among the

kingdom’s population, the Al Saud have

now opened military service to various

tribal elements, in order to maintain the

armed forces at a reasonable level. Tribal

and cultural aversions, combined with a

lack of technical education, have severelylimited Riyadh’s ability to raise an efficient

force, one capable of using its sophisticated

weapons without massive and unabated

outside assistance. In this instance as well,

Heir Apparent Abdallah encouraged a

different approach.31If the Al Saud mistrusted their military

before 1990, the Iraqi invasion and occupa-

tion of Kuwait and the 2003 war in Iraq

have dramatically altered their assess-

ments. Although Riyadh spent some $18 to

$22 billion annually on defense during the

past decade, new financial austerity

measures were implemented after 2000.

To be sure, Saudi Arabia signed new armsagreements, but these paled in comparison

to what was purchased earlier.32 What

preoccupied Al Saud officials in 2003 were

the preparedness levels of many units

rather than the latest sophisticated equip-

ment. Even the Royal Saudi Air Force,

certainly the crown jewel of the Saudi

military, faced austerity measures.33

Abdallah insisted that the military prove itself and, in so far as it may be

possible, rely less on outsiders for training

and maintenance. The heir apparent

maintained the longstanding cooperation

accords with the United States, which

allowed the latter’s Special Operations

Forces to operate out of key Saudi bases

during the attack on Iraq but simulta-

neously welcomed Washington s decision

to redeploy a U.S. Air Force Wing out of

Sultan Air Base at Al Kharj in the summer

of 2003.34 Abdallah understood that his

“will” and massive military expenditures

notwithstanding, such austerity measures

were absolutely necessary, as he concen-

trated on internal and regional distur-

bances.

THE DOMESTIC WAR ON

TERRORISM

Critics of the heir apparent view his

pledges and limited actions to date with


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skepticism. Many have concluded that

Abdallah is window dressing and that there

is little substance to his promises. Yetsignificant changes have already taken

place, and, while hardened perceptions are

difficult to dissipate, the desire to reform

while conducting a full-fledged war on

terrorism is genuine. To be sure, some

diehard Al Saud members may have little

interest in introducing modernizing features,

but the regent has probably crossed the

Rubicon. There is no going back, even if Abdallah knows all too well that there are

few “liberals” throughout the kingdom that

stand ready to support him in his many

endeavors.

Internally, Riyadh now faces the

prospect of sustained turbulence, even if

not all of the countrys difficulties are

socioeconomic. As the demographic bulge

cited above illustrates, half of the popula-tion (which is under the age of 15) will

continue to demand increasing political

accountability. Moreover, opposition

groups link Al Saud policies on the domes-

tic front with Saudi Arabia’s standing at the

international level. Within the Arab world,

Riyadh is criticized for paying lip service to

the core concern of Palestine and, within

the world at large, for kowtowing to

American policies. The regent’s declara-

tion of war on terrorism must, therefore, be

assessed within these parameters. At

stake is Al Saud rule itself.

Although the tragedy of September 11,

2001, dramatically altered Abdallah’s

perceptions of the war on terrorism, the

fact remained that the Bush administration

had squandered several peacemaking

opportunities during its first year in office.At the height of the Palestinian intifada

Abdallah was dismayed by how callous the

new president was towards the Palestin-

ians. According to The Washington Post ,

the regent drafted a 25-page letter to

President George W. Bush in late August2001, in which he vociferously complained

about U.S. policy on Israel. Abdallah

noted that repeated American vetoes at the

U.N. Security Council illustrated this

bias.35 In fact, Arab and especially Saudi

perceptions were so negative that the heir

apparent turned down an invitation to visit

Washington in June 2001. Interior Minister

Nayif, for his part, regretted that Washing-ton came at the top of the list of countries

that have an unfair stance as regards the

cause of the Arabs and the Palestinians in

particular.36

Whether the letter and such comments

were meant to assuage a growing anti-

American sentiment throughout the Arab

world – in fact, throughout the Muslim

world – was difficult to determine.37

Whatwas irrefutable, however, was Heir Appar-

ent Abdallah’s frustration with U.S. Middle

East policy. When Abdallah turned down

the invitation to visit Washington, he

announced that Riyadh must abide by

principled stands on behalf of Palestinians.

He voiced his bewilderment at international

inaction while visiting several European

capitals. He insisted that Israeli violence

was a kind of “state terrorism,” highlighting

the dangers associated with Israel’s

aggressive retaliatory measures, along with

confiscating land, building settlements and

laying economic siege to an entire captive

population. The heir apparent called for a

more balanced U.S. position to better

protect vital American interests throughout

the region.38 Riyadh’s unrelenting criticism

of Washington necessitated an intervention by George H.W. Bush (who nurtured

special contacts with senior Al Saud

figures during his own political career).


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The former president telephoned Abdallah

in June 2001 to reassure the Saudi that his

son was “going to do the right thing.” Hereportedly confided to Abdallah that his

son’s heart was “in the right place” as far

as the conflict between the Palestinians

and Israel was concerned.39

Such assurances notwithstanding, Al

Saud rulers were not overjoyed by the U.S.

decision to limit its direct involvement in the

peace process, as Washington argued that

it was up to the two parties to resolve long-standing differences. It may well be that

Abdallah then took the decision, before

September 11, 2001, to reduce the U.S.

military presence in Saudi Arabia. In other

words, Abdallah had to contend with

growing anti-U.S. sentiment across the

kingdom, directly related to developments

elsewhere in the Middle East. While the

Al Saud have never allowed the Arab-Israeli conflict to infringe on their special

relationship with successive American

administrations, Abdallah and several other

senior ruling-family members were finally

reconsidering whether existing strategic

ties could proceed as in the past.

Saudi Arabia then embarked on a

major peace initiative to collectively commit

the entire Arab world to normalizing

relations with Israel in exchange for the

establishment of an independent Palestinian

state. It was probably designed with full

American blessings.40 The fanfare that

preceded the plan’s formal unveiling at the

League of Arab States Beirut Summit

bordered on the comical.41 It was entirely

possible that the United States sought Saudi

assistance – through the kingdom’s reli-

gious clout within the larger Muslim world – to advocate an acceptance of Israel.

Riyadh, for its part, was eager to ingratiate

itself with Washington in a full-fledged

rehabilitation effort. Yet, although the Saudi

plan was unanimously adopted by the

League on March 28, 2002, Israeli “condi-tions” ensured its premature death.42

When, a few months later, Washington

turned to its latest peace initiative, the so-

called Roadmap (which was also derailed),

Saudi Arabia’s role was significantly

marginalized. Although Abdallah s initiative

flopped, the heir apparent had taken a

calculated risk in Beirut when he promoted

inter-Arab reconciliation, including a thawin Iraqi-Kuwaiti and Iraqi-Saudi ties.

These significant measures were

followed by a major rapprochement effort

with the Bush administration in April 2002.

The Saudi regent visited Crawford, Texas,

where he confided his personal views on

the Middle East peace process, Afghani-

stan, Iraq and the war on terrorism. He

pleaded for action on the Palestinian-Israelifront and promised to muzzle radical

Islamists in the kingdom. By all accounts,

the meetings were fairly blunt and did not

go as well as many anticipated. The two

determined men stood their ground.43

Riyadh then took several practical

steps to address intrinsic internal problems

ranging from measures to prevent money

laundering to ordering banks and other

financial institutions to strictly monitor any

large transactions. Against a plethora of

evidence, Friday sermons throughout the

kingdom’s mosques stressed the need to

combat terrorism, offering support to the

coalition to defeat Osama bin Laden’s al-

Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The Iraq situation was more delicate, as it

necessitated a sophisticated response. In

fact, Saudi officials went out of their wayto differentiate between Iraq and the

Baathist regime. They opposed Saddam

Hussein but strongly objected to the


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economic sanctions that were strangling a

hapless population. Equally important,

Saudi and Gulf leaders were – like their own residents – exposed to television

reports from Iraq that displayed the

horrible impact that sanctions had visited

on the Iraqi public.44 Consequently, the

flood of anti-American sentiment in-

creased; pro-American Saudi elites were

not able to stem the tide.

Throughout the kingdom, sermons

routinely raised these critical nuances.Even if some preachers warned against

“unmeasured” responses, radical clerics

routinely issued critical statements on the

American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Abdallah, for his part, knew that his

decision to crack down on Islamists would

actually increase their popularity within the

kingdom.45 Even before the polarizing

debate over Iraq, leading Saudi clericsopenly challenged Riyadh to distance itself

from the West in general and the United

States in particular. Shaykh Hammud Al-

Shuaybi of Burayda, for example, wrote

that “helping the infidels against Muslims is

defecting from Islam,” and that “whoever

helps America and its fellow infidels

against our brothers in Afghanistan is an

apostate.”46 Another Saudi cleric, Shaykh

Abd al-Aziz bin Salih al-Jarbu, penned a

fiery pamphlet that concluded that Osama

bin Laden was Muhammad bin Abd al-

Wahhab’s natural inheritor.47 This was a

clear affront to the Al Saud.

Not surprisingly, and in the aftermath

of the American-British attacks on Iraq,

the fiery radical Islamist message in-

creased once again, escalating into armed

confrontation. By the time the May 12,2003, terrorist attacks hit the capital,

Riyadh was embarked on a full-fledged

internal war against radical Islamists.

These facts, as well as the overall

criticism of the ruling family, riled the Saudi

government because they struck at thevery heart of its claim to legitimacy.

Moreover, such arguments echoed Osama

bin Laden’s view of the ruling dynasty as

too doctrinaire, too corrupt and too un-

Islamic to rule. From an internal Saudi

perspective, what the suicide bombings

revealed was the extent to which some

Saudis were ready to defy the Al Saud,

especially in light of the latter’s discreet butsustained support of the United States over

the years. The regent’s mission was and

is to conduct a war on terrorism without

appearing to conduct a war on religion.

Riyadh certainly favored a public distance

between its policies and American de-

mands for more action. It was paramount

to ensure that anti-American criticisms did

not translate into anti-Al Saud measures.

CONCLUSION

Heir Apparent Abdallah faced several

key transitions in 2003. Within the region,

these challenges ranged from the removal

of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, a

major force in Gulf security, to Iran’s

welcome shift towards political moderation

and regional cooperation. While Saudi-

Iraqi ties, which had deteriorated through-

out 2001 and 2002 due to continued border

skirmishes, cannot but improve in the

future, diplomatic strains with the United

States have continued. Simply stated, the

United States is now a Gulf power that

shares a border with Saudi Arabia, a reality

that weighs heavily in Riyadh. In fact,

Washington’s regional footprint in Iraq and

throughout the Gulf region has changed perceptions that many Saudis had of the

United States.

Likewise, while Saudi-Iranian ties


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were also improving, Riyadh was wary of

Tehran’s long-term political and military

capabilities. Iran no longer played the roleof a balancer in the Gulf (vis-à-vis Iraq)

but risked a confrontation with the United

States. Needless to say, such an outcome

was not in Saudi Arabia’s interest, as

Abdallah did not wish to drag the Gulf

region into a fourth war in less than two

decades.

If the Saudi heir apparent appreciated

Washington’s “inclination to seek a just andcomprehensive peace,” in Iraq, as in

Palestine after Mr. Bush vowed to support

the establishment of an independent

Palestinian state, Saudi Arabia remained

suspicions of U.S. motives.48 Abdallah

pledged to exert special effort to serve

security and stability in the region but

wondered whether Washington aimed

solely to entice Arabs and Muslims into joining the campaign against terrorism. In

his mind, as in the minds of many Arab and

Muslim leaders, this duality was illustrated

with strong steps in Afghanistan or Iraq

and lukewarm, indeed reluctant, ones on

the Arab-Israeli front. Nevertheless, even

the Al Saud realized that the United States

could no longer distance itself too far from

obligations of its making, in Iraq for obvious

reasons, but also on the peace process,

because the Bush administration has

committed the United States to supporting

the principle of a Palestinian state.

Few doubt that Saudi relations with its

erstwhile staunch American ally are now in

dire straits. In fact, ties are so strained

that Prince Bandar bin Sultan, son of the

powerful defense minister and dean of the

diplomatic corps in Washington, because of his long-established presence in the Ameri-

can capital, has sought advice from the

president’s father, as well as from Vice-

President Dick Cheney. These urgent

meetings were meant to halt the slide in

Washington’s confidence in Riyadh amidconcerns that some Saudis, including some

serving in the government, were linked to

terrorists who may have targeted the

United States. Prince Bandar left nothing

to chance. He flew to Kennebunkport,

Maine, in late August 2003, before going to

Wyoming to meet the vice-president, both

to show respect and to seek advice.49

These meetings followed a very strongstatement by Richard Armitage, the deputy

secretary of state, who declared that

terrorists attacking American troops in Iraq

“were slipping across the border from

Saudi Arabia.” Although Riyadh denied

the change, and called on the occupying

forces to seal their border, the Saudis were

dismayed that Armitage and other senior

American officials would place SaudiArabia on the same level with Iran and

Syria. Even if an official State Department

spokesman insisted that Armitage’s com-

ments about the kingdom were “over-

played” and that the deputy secretary “was

not trying to lump Saudi Arabia in the same

category as Iran,” Bandar’s visits were

telling.50

To be sure, both Washington and

Riyadh have managed their numerous

differences with aplomb for over 50 years.

Whether Saudi Arabia, or for that matter

the United States, can afford to place the

Al Saud ruling family at risk will be a key

strategic question for both countries in

2004. Although some American and some

Saudi officials may be fed up with each

other’s policies, inevitable and tangible

progress in the Middle East peace processcan only help preserve long-term interests.

A modicum of evenhandedness will likely

accelerate the process and, equally impor-


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tant, allow Heir Apparent Abdallah to

introduce sorely needed economic and

political reforms to his kingdom.For Abdallah is aware that serious

internal problems cannot be resolved by

fiat. Acknowledging the existence of

poverty in the kingdom, disparities between

rural areas and urban sprawls, rising

unemployment levels, intrinsic structural

weaknesses within the economy, as well as

unrepresentative government, all necessi-

tated serious action. Much like his older brother, King Faysal bin Abd al-Aziz, the

current regent took several key decisions

even if most were long overdue. In fact,

these were taken to address popular

demand and ensure that Al Saud rule was

preserved.

Towards that end, in the spring of

2003, Saudi Arabia’s first independent

human-rights organization was authorized.It held its first major conference on Hu-

man Rights in Peace and War in mid-

October 2003, when some 70 papers were

discussed.51 According to press reports, the

conference emphasized the need to adopt

common international standards for human

rights that respect all religions, cultures and

traditions. Significantly, one of the partici-

pants, Princess Hussa bint Salman, daugh-

ter of the powerful governor of Makkah,

addressed Saudi Arabia’s stand on human

rights and clarified several recent changes

in the law.52 Her participation as well as

her interventions revealed the importance

that the Al Saud have attached to this key

question.

Simultaneously, a “National Dialogue

Panel” as well as a 30-strong “Saudi

Intellectual Dialogue” group emerged. Thelatter forwarded a series of recommenda-

tions to the heir apparent. They called on

him to widen freedom of expression,

broaden the decision-making process,

improve communication lines between

rulers and ruled, empower women, acceptintellectual diversity within society, and

balance economic and commercial devel-

opment. They also asked the heir apparent

to confront extremism by differentiating

between terrorism and jihad, while paying

more attention to youth concerns. Finally,

they pleaded for an accelerated pace for

the implementation of ongoing reform

programs that recognize the impact of regional and global situations.53 A tall order

indeed.

To his credit, Abdallah pushed through

the Saudi Cabinet a number of measures

that addressed several of these recommen-

dations. In an earthshaking step, the Saudi

cabinet announced that it was contemplat-

ing elections to choose half of the members

of each of 14 municipal councils.54

Riyadh decided to widen participation of

citizens in running local affairs through

elections within one year.55 While long-

overdue elections were perceived as a

beginning, an al-Watan columnist in Riyadh

hoped that they would lead to elections in

the Shura Council, in universities, and [in]

the right to form syndicates.56 Still,

Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal insisted

that Saudi leaders are not experimenters,

and that they are only seeking to do what is

the wish of the Saudi citizen.57

Another significant item, which could

only have been addressed with the heir

apparent’s full consent, was the Shura

Council debate on Saudi Arabia’s natural-

ization laws. Although the Council could

not reach a consensus, discussions were

taking place on relaxing citizenship laws for foreigners, especially those who have lived

in the kingdom for ten years or more.58

The need to alter existing regulations,


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including the much-despised sponsorship

(kafeel ) system, was first raised in public

by Prince Abd al-Majeed bin Abd al-AzizAl Saud, the governor of Makkah. More

recently, Shura Council members weighed

how to change naturalization rules to

narrow geographical gaps and remove

differences based on gender, religion and

color.59

In national addresses, Heir Apparent

Abdallah referred to the need for such

genuine debates on a slew of key ques-

tions, including tolerance, national unity and

reform. As a listener willing and eager tolearn from ordinary citizens as well as from

intellectuals, Abdallah repeatedly insisted

that Riyadh would combat regional, tribal

and ideological discord. Much like his

brother, the late King Faysal bin Abd al-

Aziz, the current heir apparent relished the

opportunity to confront the challenges that

tested his will.

1 For a discussion of the key 1979 Makkah mosque takeover, see Joseph A. Kechichian, “Islamic Revivalism

and Change in Saudi Arabia: Juhayman Al-Utaybi’s ‘Letters’ to the Saudi People,” The Muslim World , Vol.

70, No. 1, January 1990, pp. 1-16; and, idem., “The Role of the Ulama in the Politics of an Islamic State: The

Case of Saudi Arabia,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1, February 1986, pp. 53-

71. For an analysis of the will to power in a contemporary setting, see idem., “Saudi Arabia’s Will to Power,”

Middle East Policy, Vol. 7, No. 2, February 2000, pp. 47-60.2 S. Rept. No. 107- 351, 107th congress, 2d session and H. Rept. No. 107-792, “Joint Inquiry into Intelli-

gence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001,” Washington,

DC: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelli-

gence, September 2003.3 Thomas E. Ricks, “Briefing Depicted Saudis as Enemies: Ultimatum Urged To Pentagon Board,” TheWashington Post , August 6, 2002, p. A1.4 Jack Shafer, “The Power Point That Rocked the Pentagon: The La Rouche Defector who’s Advising the

Defense Establishment on Saudi Arabia,” August 7, 2002, published online by Slate at http://slate.msn.com/id/

2069119/.5 Dore Gold, Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism (Washington, DC:

Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2003), p. 12.6 Robert Baer, Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude (New York: Crown

Publishers, 2003), p. xxvii [emphasis added].7 A carefully researched and analyzed study of the Saudi education system – that debunks most of the instant

analysis arguments – is available in Eleanor Abdella Doumato, “Manning the Barricades: Islam According to

Saudi Arabia’s School Texts,” The Middle East Journal , Vol. 57, No. 2, Spring 2003, pp. 230-47.8 Many anti-Saudi reports are widely available on the Internet. For a more serious assessment, but still in the

same “genre,” see Stephen Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Saud from Tradition to Terror

(New York: Doubleday, 2002).9 “Saudis Seen As Supporting Terror, Poll Shows,” The Washington Post , February 26, 2002, p. 19. The poll,

by the Institute for Jewish and Community Research, ranked Saudi Arabia ahead of both North Korea and

Syria as a supporter of international terrorism.10 Lisa Beyer with Scott MacLeod, “Saudi Arabia: Inside the Kingdom,” Time, September 15, 2003,

pp. 38-51.11 Paul Michael Wihbey, “The End of the Affair,” The Spectator , September 6, 2003, pp. 20-21.12 Quoted in Donna Abu-Nasr, “Saudis More Open About Recent Attacks,” The Associated Press, May 15,

2003.13 Press Release, “Address to the Nation by Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz,” Washington, DC:

Embassy of Saudi Arabia, May 13, 2003.14 See, for example, Khalid al-Ghanami, “Al-Insan wal-Watan Ahamun min Ibn Taymiyyah” [The Human

Being and the Nation are More Important than Ibn Taymiyyah], Al-Watan, May 22, 2003, p. 6. Al-Watan,

which championed the anti-extremist cause, was mired in controversy and suffered significant setbacks when


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36 “Iran Attacks Iraq-based Rebels as Saudi Minister Meets Iraqi Dissident in Tehran,” Mideast Mirror , April

19, 2001, Section B.37 In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, a number of research institutions have started to canvass Arab

public opinion with some regularity. The attempt to answer semi-prophetic questions of the “why do they

hate us” genre suddenly required attention as the need to know overwhelmed customary patterns of neglect.

Not surprisingly, available results were telling, even if consistently devastating to Americans. See, for

example, The Pew Global Attitudes Project, What the World Thinks in 2002 (Washington, DC: The Pew

Research Center for The People and The Press, December 2002); idem, Views of a Changing World (Washing-

ton, DC: The Pew Research Center for The People and The Press, June 2003). Pew researchers did not poll

in Saudi Arabia but they conducted detailed interviews in several Muslim countries. See Brian Knowlton, “A

Rising Anti-American Tide,” The International Herald Tribune, December 5, 2002, p. 6. When questioned

about such anti-American feelings, President George W. Bush replied: “I hope the message that we fight not a

religion, but a group of fanatics which have hijacked a religion is getting through. . . . We’ll do everything we

can to remind people that we’ve never been a nation of conquerors; we’re a nation of liberators.” See Richard

Morin, “World Image of U.S. Declines,” The Washington Post , December 5, 2002, p. A26. These assessmentsdid not resonate and, even more telling, the American position – despite undeniable post-9/11 sympathy best

illustrated by the French daily Le Monde headline “Nous Sommes Tous Americains” [We Are All Americans]

– many dismissed the cartography painted by senior American officials. For the majority of world public

opinion, dividing the world between good and evil was infantile or even comical. More recently, a study

commissioned by Congress, under the chairmanship of former Ambassador Edward P. Djerejian, has con-

cluded that the United States overlooks public diplomacy at its peril. See Report of the Advisory Group on

Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic

Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World (Washington, DC: U.S. House of

Representatives, October 1, 2003). See also Sonni Efron, “U.S. Advised to Invest in Its Image,” The Los

Angeles Times, October 1, 2003, p. A8; and Steven R. Weisman, “U.S. Must Counteract Image in Muslim

World, Panel Says,” The New York Times, October 1, 2003.38 Michael Jansen, “Saudi Arabia: Displeasure with the U.S.,” Middle East International, No. 653, June 29,

2001, pp. 10-11.39 Jane Perlez, “Bush Senior, on His Son’s Behalf, Reassures Saudi Leader,” The New York Times, July 15,

2001, p. 6. See also Michael Jansen, “Saudi Arabia: Pressure on the U.S.,” Middle East International , No.

655, July 27, 2001, pp. 12-13, and Reuters, “Bush Senior Calls Saudi on Mideast Report,” July 15, 2001.40 Lamis Andoni, “Saudi Arabia: The Prince’s Peace Plan,” Middle East International , No. 670, March 8,

2002, pp. 8-10.41 Thomas Friedman, a columnist for The New York Times, just happened to uncover the carefully designed

initiative during his interview with the heir apparent. See Thomas Friedman, “Dear Arab League,“ The New

York Times, February 6, 2002, p. A21.42

Israeli negotiators insisted that Riyadh use its full leverage to pressure Yasser Arafat to end the intifada andcalled on Palestinian leaders to acquiesce to an annexation of certain settlement blocks. See Michael Jansen,

“Arab Summit: Palestine and Iraq,” Middle East International , No. 672, April 5, 2002, pp. 7-9.43 “America and the Arab World: A Delicate Balance,” The Economist , 363:8271, May 4, 2002, pp. 27-28.

See also Caroline Montagu, “Saudi Arabia: Crown Prince in U.S.,” Middle East International , No. 674, May

3, 2002, p. 17.44 Many of these reports highlighted the social humiliation that Iraqis endured, including long lines at food

stores and disintegrating health services. Beggars emerged where the phenomenon was rare. Many Iraqis

were forced to sell household goods and more personal items, including books – and in the Iraqi context this

represented a most visible sacrifice – to purchase food. Saudis and others watched a relatively learned society

lose the intrinsic capability to function, blaming Western-imposed sanctions on what befell their Arab

brethren.45 Radical Islamists became more popular since 2001, commanding the sympathy as well as support of the

masses and, as noted above, the so-called liberal campaign – criticizing the kingdom’s religious institutions –

remained weak. Jamal Khashoggi, the influential editor of the daily Al-Watan, who wrote several articles

against religious authorities and criticized Wahhabi doctrine, was summarily dismissed after a senior cleric

issued a fatwa calling for a boycott of the newspaper. Khashoggi accepted an advisory post to Prince Turki


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al-Faysal who, in turn, was appointed ambassador to London.46 Shaykh Al-Shuaybi, considered a learned scholar in the kingdom, was briefly imprisoned in 1995. In 2001,

he threatened to excommunicate the king and senior members of the ruling family, especially if the latter were

to support a military offensive against Afghanistan. What concerned the regent was the frequency with which

junior clerics, many of whom sympathized with Al-Shuaybi, were resorting to issuing their own religious

decrees, which turned the Al Saud into “legitimate targets.” See Nicolas Pelham, “Saudi Clerics Issue Edicts

Against helping ‘Infidels’,” The Christian Science Monitor , October 12, 2001, p. 4.47 Abd al-Aziz bin Salih al-Jarbu, “The Foundations of the Legality of the Destruction that Befell America,” at

www.saaid.net/book/kotop.htm.48 Although the Bush and Blair administrations argued Iraq’s WMDs were the most compelling reason for the

United States and Britain to resort to war, in the summer of 2003, the emphasis changed. At first, Deputy

Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz testified to congressional committees that “the evil, dictatorial nature of

former president Saddam Hussein’s defunct government and the opportunity to turn Iraq into a beacon of

hope for the rest of the Middle East,” were equally valid reasons to go to war. See Michael Dobbs,

“Wolfowitz Shifts Rationales on Iraq War: With Weapons Unfound, Talk of Threat Gives Way to Rhetoricon Hussein, Democracy,” The Washington Post , September 12, 2003, p. A23. The logic of war shifted shortly

thereafter, when Mr. Wolfowitz maintained that the WMD issue was a “bureaucratic fudge,” and that the real

reason was America’s need to shift its military bases from Saudi Arabia. The nuance was not lost on Gulf

pundits. A particularly perceptive commentator opined that “the world recognized what Washington refused

to admit, that this was not a war of liberation but a war of occupation. Iraqis understood this immediately,

which is why their relief at Saddam’s departure has not translated into a welcome for American troops.” See

M. J. Akbar, “Bush has run out of ideas, but he had only one to begin with,” Gulf News (online Edition),

September 15, 2003.49 Reuters, “Amid Tensions, Saudi Envoy Meets Bush’s Father,” Gulf News, August 29, 2003, p. 16.50 Ibid.

51 Raid Qusti, “First Rights Conference in Kingdom,” Arab News (online edition), October 14, 2003.52 Raid Qusti, “Conference Ends With Call to Stress Islam’s Protection of Human Rights,” Arab News (online

edition), October 16, 2003; and Idem., “Saudi Constitution Guarantees Human Rights,” Arab News (online

edition), October 22, 2003.53 In September 2003, 300 Saudis signed a petition, the third of the year, urging “rulers to speed promised

reforms to ward off the influence of militant Islam in the Kingdom,” The Associated Press. “Saudi Arabia

Announces First Local Council Elections, but No Date,” The New York Times, October 14, 2003.54 Reuters, “Saudi Announces Plans to Hold First Elections,” The New York Times, October 13, 2003.55 Isa Mubarak, “Saudi Arabia Says it will Hold First Elections,” The Washington Post , October 14, 2003,

p. A19.56 Ibid.57

Slobodan Lekic, “AP Interview: Saudi Touts Vote as Reform,” The Associated Press, October 14, 2003. Aday after Riyadh announced these anticipated elections, hundreds took to the streets in front of the Al-

Mamlaka shopping mall in the capital city demanding political, economic and administrative reforms.

According to Saad al-Faqih, the spokesman for the London-based Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia

(MIRA), protesters called for the freedom of jailed activists. An estimated 300 protesters were arrested,

although the interior ministry reported 150 arrests. Shaykh Abd al-Aziz Al Shaykh, the grand mufti,

condemned the demonstration “as an act of anarchism,” and urged protesters to obey the law [that bans

demonstrations]. See The Associated Press, “Saudis Protest for More Freedoms,” October 14, 2003; see also

Badr Almotawa, “150 Arrested During Demo: Naif,” Arab News, October 16, 2003, p. 1.58 Raid Qusti, “No Consensus on Citizenship Rules for Foreigners,” Arab News, October 27, 2003, p. 2. See

also “Majlis al-Shura al-Saudi Yuajilu Iqrar Tadilat ala Nizam al-Jinsiyat [Shura Council Postpones Calls to

Amend Citizenship Laws], Al-Hayat

, No. 14826, October 27, 2003, p. 3.59 Mazen Balelah, “Scrap the Sponsorship System,” al-Watan, October 26, 2003, reproduced in Arab News,

October 27, 2003, p. 3.

Testing the Saudi Will to Power

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