ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS: A LOOK AT CHINA’S CAPABILITIES

Joseph S. DuprasGovernment 380-002, Dr. Charles Murphy

December 2, 2013

Abbreviations

ASAT Anti-Satellite

DEW Directed Energy Weapon

HEO High Earth Orbit

LEO Low Earth Orbit

PRC People’s Republic of China

SAM Surface-to-air missile

SASTIND State Administration for Science,

Technology, and Industry for Nation

Defense

Introduction

Anti-Satellite weapons were first developed during the cold war in conjunction with the

satellite race between the United States and the Soviet Union. In an attempt to further progress

one’s weapon defense capabilities, the United States sought after policies that will discourage an

attack while simultaneously pushing for the disarmament of weapons globally. Today, satellites

hover over the earth’s atmosphere in a large celestial field at varying orbiting heights. Developed

nations have all placed satellites in earth’s orbit for various specificities. Commercial and

military satellites orbit side-by-side, each completing its own task as specified. The information

they provide is now considered essential for the daily operations of every human. Weather,

communication, GPS, and surveillance are all by-products of satellites, without them a country’s

capability to do its most basic tasks become difficult.

Originally meant to destroy military and clandestine satellites, anti-satellite weapons

could be pushing new boundaries. Enhanced technologies have made it increasingly easier to

disarm satellites, potentially risking all satellites. The pacts and agreements with the Soviet

Union and other signers have been tested by a new potentially hostile threat. China has emerged

with new anti-satellite tests, which question not only their capabilities but also their intentions.

The United States has done nothing more but fashion a watchful eye on a nation that has pushed

capabilities in the past. However, little has been done to warn or prepare for a potential threat

against key United States’ satellites. Questions of what constitutes an armed anti-satellite

weapon and what type of action would constitute a sanctioned act of war are still being debated.

Before policy can be drafted, it is important to first map China’s technological capabilities,

understand their space policy initiatives, and access potential threats China places on the United

States with the use of an anti-satellite weapon.

Literature And Historical Review

The terms “anti-satellite weapon” or ASAT, are used to mean any weapon capable of

destroying a satellite in space.1 Anti-satellite weapons can be sea, air, ground, mobile-ground, or

space based, and may contain various debilitating vehicles. Ground, sea, air, and ground-mobile

based weapons may include directed energy, missile launched kill vehicles, and frequency

jammers. Space-based weapons may contain the same three weapons, but in addition they seize

the capability of housing themselves in earth’s orbit for the purposes of a delayed or defensive

objective. Various kill methods have been tested amongst the global and modern military

community. The destroying of a satellite via an anti-satellite weapon can be used in a non-hostile

manner when used to destroy one’s own satellite, but the early developments were developed for

offensive and defensive military tenacities.

The space age and the satellite race that would eventually encapsulate both the United

States and Soviet Union’s military aspirations, have helped in the present development. Early

satellites were designed and operated by the U.S. military for communications, reconnaissance,

weather collection, early warning of ballistic missiles, and eventually arms control verification.2

Today they perform these same functions and have integrated further enhancements, making

them more active. Military satellite enhancements have lead to better wartime support. Demands

for faster and more secure communication have pushed for a large fleet of satellites. Threats to

the United States are mobile, meaning more and better reconnaissance satellites are needed in

order to maintain a strategic and tactical advantage. 1 US Congress. Office of Technology Assessment, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control: Report given to House Armed Services Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee. OTA 1.SC: U.S. Government Printing office, September 1985.2 Union of Concerned Scientists: A History of Anti-Satellite Programs (Cambridge: Union of Concerned Scientists, 2012), 1. (Bureau of Arms Contro-Verification and Compliance 1967)(Grego 2012)(Office of Technology Assessment 1985)(Hays 2011)

1

The Soviet Union’s launch of a low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite named Sputnik I on

October 4, 1957, marked the new age of the space race.3 The small radio satellite brightened

concerns of the United States soon thereafter. The United States began to recognize the value

satellites could have in military engagements. During the period of the late 1950s to the 1960s,

both the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in the militarization of space. Along with

satellites, both countries invested in developing ASAT technologies for the first time.

Immediately, treaties were signed between the two rivals such as the 1963 Limited Test Ban

Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty of 1966.

The United States would soon progress into anti-ballistic missile defense as it sought to

stretch the verification clause. The United States did not wish to limit itself because of the

aggressive Soviet military and their previous regressions. In correlation with new anti-ballistic

missiles, the United States created the first ground-based anti-satellite weapons, as the treaties

loosely regulated ground-based capabilities. The first generation of anti-satellite weapons of the

1950s and 1960s included non-nuclear and nuclear ballistic missiles. They were also direct hit-

to-kill vehicles, or a satellite variation able to come into close proximity to the target satellite and

detonate, sending shrapnel at the target satellite.4 The United States would conduct the world’s

first ASAT test in 1959 by air-launching a missile four miles pass the Explorer VI satellite from

a B-47 bomber.5 This was conducted under Project Orion and shortly after the 1959 test the

United States Army and Air Force implemented their own programs using nuclear tipped ASAT

missiles stationed in the Pacific. The United States Air Force’s program 437 using Thor ASAT 3 US Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control-Verification and Compliance, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, October 10, 1967, narrative, accessed November 20, 2013, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/5181.htm. 4 Gil Marshal, “Anti-Satellite Weapons,” Space for Peace, accessed November 23, 2013, (Congressional Research Services 2007)(Cloud 2007)(Sino Defense 2008)(Richard Fisher 2008)(Information Dissemination 2008)(Union of Concerned Scientists 2007)(Ministry of Science and Technology of the People's Republic of China n.d.)(Global Security.org n.d.)(Parsch 2004)http://www.space4peace.org/asat/asat.htm.5 Peter L. Hays, Space and Security: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2011), 17.

2

missiles, was operational from 1964 to the early 1970s, and while it did have minor success it

possessed greater operational deficiencies including, “ an inability to attack many satellites in

different types of orbits due to the range and azimuth limitations imposed by the missiles

themselves and by having only two launch sites for these direct-assent systems….”6

The Limited Test Ban treaty was the product of the United States and the Soviet Union

recognizing their shared interests in limiting aggressive military capabilities in outer space.

President Eisenhower, in an address to the United Nation’s General Assembly in September

1960, proposed that a resolution be drafted between the United States and the Soviet Union,

which mirrored that of the Antarctic Treaty and have it expanded to include outer space and the

celestial bodies.7 The Soviet Union shared the same concerns in the peaceful custom of outer

space, but the Soviet Union did not intended to isolate disarmament issues and outer pace, nor

did they intend to contain outer space to peaceful uses unless the United States eliminate bases

that housed medium-range missiles.8 They eventually signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty in

1963 but immediately began to change their position and proposed to the United Nations that it

wished to include an agreement in the treaty banning the orbiting of any space object carrying a

weapon of mass destruction, as well as the installation of celestial bodies capable of stationing

such weapons.9

The United States sought for a treaty that would include the use of verification methods

to provide stability and reassurance that western powers and the Soviet Union were adhering to

the previous treaties. Both nations submitted draft treaties to the United Nations, and after

6 Hays, “Space and Security,” 17-18. 7 US Department of State, “Treaty on Principles,” 1967.8 Ibid9 Ibid

3

minimal debate, both parties signed the Outer Space Treaty on September of 1967. This treaty

stresses two main provisions:

First, it contains an undertaking not to place in orbit around the Earth, install on the moon or any other celestial body, or otherwise station in outer space, nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction. Second, it limits the use of the moon and other celestial bodies exclusively to peaceful purposes and expressly prohibits their use for establishing military bases, installation, or fortifications; testing weapons of any kind; or conducting military maneuvers.10

The interpretation of this treaty has been fraught to include other global treaties, but the ability to

monitor for treaty verification still means satellites are needed and at a grater number.

New diplomacy strategies in the 1970s and 1980s went along with a second generation of

ASATs. The newest ASAT programs included the SAINT program: an initiative to create orbital

machinery that could plainly snatch a satellite via a robotic arm, and disarm its abilities.11 Further

progress in United States ASAT weapons would later include the ASM-135 ASAT in 1984: an

air-launched missile from a F-15 Eagle using infrared homing seekers for its guidance system.12

The ASM-135 ASAT is one of the first missiles using a kinetic energy kill vehicle as the

warhead. Programs like these were favored more because the early nuclear warhead ASATs also

had the capability of unintentionally destroying nearby U.S. satellites. The United States Air

Force began a new program in 1978 to develop prototypes of Air-Launched Miniature Vehicles

(ALMV) for low Earth orbit targets. The program led the USAF to issue a contract to LTV

Aerospace for work on ALMVs and the creation of the ASM-135 ASAT.13

With a renewed interest in anti-satellite weapons under President Reagan, new

technologies were developed as more funding for ASATs became available. Newer generations

10 Ibid11 Hays, “Space and Security,” 17.12 Andreas Parsch, “Vought ASM-135 ASAT,” Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and Missiles, 2002-2004, accessed November 21, 2013, http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-135.html. 13 Parsch, “Vought ASM-135 ASAT.”

4

of weapons called “Directed Energy Weapons” (DEWs) were added to the existing cache of

ASAT weapons.14 High-energy particle beam weapons simulating the affects of a nuclear

explosion would disrupt satellite electronics by producing abnormally high surface currents that

would likely produce a magnetic field and cause electronic disruption, similar to an electro-

magnetic pulse from a nuclear explosion.15 Lasers are incorporated with DEWs. Several types of

lasers are used as ASATs because they ensure a range of energy sources such as x-rays, light

waves, or microwaves. All push a stimulate emission of radiation at a high speed. Lasers are

favored because they can be accommodated on several sources and because they offer a direct

strike without a debris field.

Perhaps the newest ASAT weapons effort lies with electronic signal manipulation.

Creating a louder electro-magnetic signal that competes on the same waves as the target satellite

can disturb signals arriving or departing from a satellite. This is often referred to as ‘jamming’

and the ability to redirect signals to an adversary using signal-jamming techniques, make this

type of weapon more favorable for espionage-like missions as compared to total destruction of a

satellite. However, various electronic signals can be used such as radio waves, infra-red waves,

ultra violet waves, and even microwaves; thus it is important to know what type of waves a

target satellite is expending for electro-magnetic communication.

China’s Modern ASAT Technologies

China has developed ASAT weapons for as long as the United States and the Soviet

Union. Fundamental technologies were first developed in the 1960s under the PRC’s 640

Program. The 640 Program was created primarily to develop new SAM sites but in 1970 the

program, “…set out to field a viable antimissile system, consisting of a kinetic kill vehicle, high

14 Marshall, “Anti-Satellite Weapons.”15 Ibid

5

powered laser, apace early warning, and target discrimination system components,” all of which

were consistent with ASAT weapons of the time.16 The 640 Program was replaced in 1986 with

Program 863 in order to introduce the newest research and developments of the time for critical

information infrastructure.17 New systems including lasers were developed and deployed during

this time, and speculations that the technological development program had close ties to the

operations of the PRC’s General Armaments Department (established in 1998) and the State

Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND).

ASAT Systems

Presently, China is working on three types of ASAT systems. The PRC does not

publically declare these systems as ASAT weapons, but investigation and replication have

suggested these systems have capabilities to destroy satellites.

Directed Energy Weapons

As discussed earlier, DEWs include any system which use directed particle distribution to

push electro-magnetic charges at a high speed towards a target. The electronics damage done to

the satellite is enough to cause catastrophic damage but they do not physically destroy a satellite.

The inability of a DEW to produce physical damage is viewed both as a flaw and as an

advantage. The damage from a DEW does create a debris field that could be potentially

catastrophic for other celestial satellites in the same orbit. China’s first test of a DEW18 was a

16 “Anti-Satellite Capabilities,” Global Security.org, accessed November 18, 2013, http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/asat.htm. 17 “National High-tech R&D Program (863 Program),” Ministry of Science and Technology of the People’s Republic of China, accessed November 21, 2013, http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/programmes1/200610/t20061009_36225.htm. 18 Several reports after the incident suggested the test was actually a Satellite Laser Ranging test conducted by the PRC. SLRs do not have ASAT capabilities but the SLRs targets may have included US satellites.

6

laser developed in 1995 and later rumored to have been tested on orbiting US satellites in

September 2006.19

Direct Fire Systems

A direct fire system includes any technical vehicles capable of delivering a missile strike

to a satellite. This system deploys a kinetic energy kill warhead to satellite were physical damage

to a satellite is conducted. Debris fields are the likely product of a destroyed satellite, causing

some concern amongst nations with satellite capabilities all ready in place. The warhead can be

of ballistic or blunt force nature. A ballistic warhead would not require precise impact with a

satellite; rather it would just need to be in range of the explosion. A blunt force instrument would

require precise impact guidance but could reduce debris field damage. Thus far, the PRC has

only launched a land-based kinetic kill vehicle but sea capabilities have become the newest

concern.20

Micro-satellites

Although their ASAT capabilities were discovered by accident, micro-satellites pose a

threat. The BX-1 micro-satellite placed into orbit by the PRC narrowly missed the International

Space Station at relatively high velocity on September 27, 2008.21 The potential collision would

have caused fatal damage and the incident raised awareness of the dangers of strategically placed

micro-satellites as a kinetic kill system in co-orbital systems. Although no evidence has been

found to an existing action, the likely hood that a micro-satellite could collide with a satellite

19 “Satellite Laser Ranging in China,” Union of Concerned Scientists, last modified January 8, 2007, accessed November 21, 2013, http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issues/chinese-lasers-and-us.html#1. 20 “Chinese Submarine Launched ASAT Program,” Information Dissemination, last modified January 19, 2008, accessed November 21, 2013, http://www.informationdissemination.net/2008/01/chinese-submarine-launched-asat-program.html. 21 Richard Fisher, Jr., “Closer Look: Shenzhou-7’s Close Pass by the International Space Station,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, October 9, 2008, accessed November 19, 2013, http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.191/pub_detail.asp.

7

travelling at higher relative velocity has gained more attention. Debris fields from previously

destroyed satellites retain the same risk as a micro-satellite; although a debris field is

unpredictable in its path trajectory it will cover more area.

ASAT Deficiencies

While anti-satellite weapons are a modern threat to the modern technologies, their

juvenile state has exploited key deficiencies that suggest ASAT weapons still need improvement

in order to be entirely destructive.

Micro-satellite Deficiencies

In order for a micro-satellite to have maximum impact damage, the micro-satellite must

first possess a mass greater than the object is will impact. In addition, orbit trajectories must

match and the micro-satellite must possess a higher relative velocity to the target satellite. Micro-

satellites are typically low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites by nature. They are typically used for

tactical means and are produced relatively cheaper than higher orbiting satellites. Any satellite

that is to be produced for middle to high Earth orbit is usually a large financial undertaking and

will not likely be subject to destructive missions in which it too would be damaged.

Directed Energy Weapons

The main deficiency of a directed energy weapon such as a high-powered laser is that it

must remain stationary on a ground-based station. This means a satellite must pass in the direct

path of the laser. Laser’s are also subject to monitors on various satellites, meaning they are

easily detected when used. Also, because no physical damage is administered, satellites targeted

by a directed energy weapon can survive electronic failure. Most directed energy impulses are

too weak to cause serious electro-magnetic harm to a satellite.

Direct Fire Systems

8

As demonstrated by early tests conducted by the United States Army and Air Force,

azimuth limitations due to a small number of launch platforms will limit missile paths. As with

all other systems, the orbiting height of the satellite poses the greatest difficulty. Multiple

boosters need to be engaged if a missile is to reach high Earth orbit (HEO) satellites. This

requires a greater cost and a very precise azimuth; perhaps multiple launches will need to be

used. Air-based launches occupy the greatest hope for a kinetic kill vehicle reaching high Earth

orbit satellites. Nuclear warheads run the risk of damaging other satellites as they are unable to

discriminate, and although targeting systems have become more precise, accuracy is still a key

issue.22

China’s Space Initiatives and Policies

Assessing China’s ASAT status is often difficult because the PRC’s policy intentions are

challenging to decipher. While there is no government institution or program directly involved in

developing and testing anti-satellite weapons, there is substantial evidence proving China does

have ASAT capabilities. Space initiatives are governed under technological advancement

policies that have very few barriers and limitations on testing and development. The policy

deriving from the PRC, encourage such practices. As a growing industrialized nation, the United

States needs to decide quickly whether such policies are harmful to its security. Does a freely

regulated space initiative warrant supervision from an international community? During the Cold

War, it was easy to conclude that an ASAT test conducted by the Soviet Union would most

likely be an offensive act. The United States is indecisive as to how to define the PRC’s space

initiatives and the ASAT weapons that have made their presence.

863 Program

22 Hays, “Space and Security,” 17-18.

9

The PRC developed the “National High-tech R&D Program” or 863 Program in 1986 in

order to,”… meet the global challenges of new technology revolution and competition.”23 The

structure of this program is composed of five-year plans that are approved by the Chinese State

Council after certain goals and proposals are met. The latest five-year plan has stated it’s newest

objective as such:

Objectives of this program during the 10th Five-year Plan period are to boost innovation capacity in the high-tech sectors, particularly in strategic high-tech fields, in order to gain a foothold in the world arena; to strive to achieve breakthroughs in key technical fields that concern the national economic lifeline and national security; and to achieve “leap-frog” development in key high-tech fields in which China enjoys relative advantages or should take strategic positions in order to provide high-tech support to fulfill strategic objectives in the implementation of the third step of our modernization process.24

The major tasks undertaken by the 863 Program include the development of information

infrastructure; development of biological, pharmaceutical, and agricultural technologies;

improvement in environmental protection technologies; and implementation of advanced

manufacturing technologies. By itself, the 863 Program is an ordinary government initiative for

economic and technological advancement, but it lays a foundation for weak interpretation as to

what actually falls into these categories. Military technologies are not specified as being

excluded from such efforts.

General Armaments Department

In 1998 the PRC merged two agencies to create the General Armaments Department,

giving it the responsibility of, “… policymaking and supervision of weapon system design,

development, production, procurement, maintenance, and the life-cycle management across all

services in the PLA.”25 This jurisdiction also includes anti-satellite weapons. Their responsibility

23 Ministry of Science and Technology of the People’s Republic of China, “National High-tech R&D Program.”24 Ibid25 “PLA General Armament Department,” sinodefense.com, last modified August 24, 2008, accessed November 19, 2013, http://www.sinodefence.com/overview/organisation/gad.asp.

10

also falls into space related activity, and all ASAT weapons must be first approved by the

General Armaments Department. Their obligations also stretch into the SASTIND’s

development branch and the actions of the 863 Program.

SASTIND

The State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for Nation Defense is a

PRC defense department branch. It acts as the scientific branch of the military and although it is

very closely tied to the General Armaments Department, it reports directly to the PRC’s military

department. This close relationship to the General Armaments Department make it difficult to

understand when a new technology is meant for defense or for civil services. The SASTIND is

the primary developer of the PRC’s ASAT weapons and tools. All ASATs developed will be first

approved by the General Armaments Department before testing and deployment.

China’s Use of ASAT Weapons

Reports streaming from various outlets reported that a Chinese ASAT completed its test

mission on January 11, 2007. Although this was the first successful anti-satellite test in nearly

twenty-years, this was not China’s first attempt. A New York Times report later in 2007 revealed

that the United States government knew of two failed tests by the PRC to launch anti-satellite

weapons in 2005 and 2006.26 Both failed to impact with their target. The second test came

dangerously close to an American satellite, but President Bush did not wish to address the

Chinese, the New York Times article reported.27

The events surrounding the January 2007 ASAT test reveled not only new capabilities

but it also warranted a new strategy for the defense and intelligence communities. On January

26 Michael R. Gordon and David S. Cloud, “U.S. Knew of China’s Missile Test, but Kept Silent,” New York Times, April 23, 2007, accessed November 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/23/washington/23satellite.html?_r=3&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&ref=asia&pagewanted=print&adxnnlx=1177412634-gIokCeqAhuEUTz6obSrvpQ&. 27 Gordon and Cloud, “U.S. Knew of China’s Missile Test.”

11

11, 2007 at 5:28 pm EST, China launched a ballistic missile carrying a kinetic kill vehicle to

destroy their Fengyun-1C weather satellite.28 The satellite was 530 miles into low Earth orbit

(LEO). The test was conducted at China’s Xichang Space Center and the missile was delivered

from a ground-mobile base.29 Reports conclude that the weapon used a two-stage, solid-fuel

medium-range ballistic missile. Intelligence reports clarified the exact identification as matching

a Chinese SC-19.30 While the launch did warrant an immediate response from the White House,

little international condemnation occurred. Great concern from the United States was present

because the PRC did not give advance warning to international bodies. The Foreign Minister of

the PRC did not give an official address until January 23, 2007.31

Concerns

The immediate concern stemming from the January 2007 ASAT test is the

potential damage from a debris field after physical damage was confirmed. The

destruction took place in low Earth orbit (LEO) where the United States houses a

majority of its reconnaissance and weather satellites. The International Space Station is

also in low Earth orbit and the likelihood that a debris field could intercept the ISS’s path

may seem bleak, but if further tests are conducted more debris fields are likely. The

debris field is likely to make its way out of orbit and into the earth’s atmosphere where it

will burn up, but the debris field from the last ASAT test conducted by the United States

in 1986 took nearly twenty years to eventually make such a decent. Testimonies from

various defense agencies all concluded that the ASAT test in 2007 possessed a limited

28 Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: China’s Anti-Satellite Weapon Test (Washington: Congressional Research Services, 2007), accessed November 12, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22652.pdf. 29 Congressional Research Service, “China’s Anti-Satellite Weapon Test.”30 Ibid31 Ibid

12

capability to destroy vital US satellites, but with mass production and improved mobile

launch platforms, it could make it difficult for the United States to react in time. The test

did not surprise U.S. assessments despite criticism and the United States has always had

watchful eye on PRC’s space activity.32

What are the Options?

The ASAT test in 2007 did not violate any arms control treaties, but it did breach

a 1980s suspension on satellite destruction. Immediate arms control agreement drafts

were pressed for careful review before a medium was reached which would ban kinetic

ASAT weapons capable of creating space debris.33 The Bush administration opted not to

seek arms control agreements and even refused to send official remarks of condemnation

to the leaders of the PRC. It is very likely Chinese officials would disregard official

remarks and suggestions from the United States leadership. The ASAT test clearly

demonstrates China’s push to isolate and experiment its technological limits. However,

intelligence analysts should begin to map a plan as how best to answer a capability vs.

intentions conundrum. If intelligence analysts misinterpret another test as an isolated

incident, could it be interpreted by the PRC as a sign of leadership weakness? Should the

United States react with arms control agreements? Likewise, if immediate restrictions are

place on China, will they retaliate with war-like gestures?

It is in the best interest of the United States to prepare an arms control agreement

with the PRC in the instance of another ASAT, but with very strong international

backing. The arms control terms and conditions ought to mirror those between the United

States and the Soviet Union. If one attack is committed on a U.S. satellite or if a test

32 Ibid33 Ibid

13

comes dangerously close to a U.S. satellite, it may be in the best interest of the United

States to initiate in a retaliatory measure as to eliminate any and all future threats.

Bibliography

Bureau of Arms Contro-Verification and Compliance. Treaty on Principles Governing the

Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and

14

Other Celestial Bodies. narrative, US Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control-

Verification and Compliance, DC: US government printing office, 1967.

Cloud, Michael R. Gordon and David S. "U.S. Knew of China's Missile Test, but Kept Silent."

New York Times, April 23, 2007.

Congressional Research Services. China's Anti-Satellite Weapon Test. Congressional,

Washington: Congressional Research Services, 2007.

Global Security.org. Anti-Satellite Capabilities.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/asat.htm (accessed November 18,

2013).

Grego, Laura. A History of Anti-Satellite Programs. Public Report, Union of Concerned

Scientists, Cambridge: Union of Concerned Scientists, 2012.

Hays, Peter L. Space and Security: A Reference Handbook. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO,

2011.

Information Dissemination. Chinese Submarine Launched ASAT Program. January 19, 2008.

http://www.informationdissemination.net/2008/01/chinese-submarine-launched-asat-

program.html (accessed November 21, 2013).

Marshal, Gil. Anti-Satellite Weapons. http://www.space4peace.org/asat/asat.htm (accessed

November 23, 2013).

Ministry of Science and Technology of the People's Republic of China. National High-tech R&D

Program (863 Program). http://www.most.gov.en/eng/programmes1/200610/t20061009

15

36225.htm (accessed November 21, 2013).

Office of Technology Assessment. Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control.

Assessment, House Armed Services Committee, US Congress, DC: US Government

Printing office, 1985.

Parsch, Andreas. Vought ASM-135 ASAT. 2004. http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-

135.html (accessed November 21, 2013).

Richard Fisher, Jr. Closer Look: Shenzhou-7's Close Pass by the International Space Station.

October 9, 2008. http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.191/pub_detail.asp

(accessed November 19, 2013).

Sino Defense. PLA General Armament Department. August 24, 2008.

http://www.sinodefense.com/overview/organisation/gad.asp (accessed November 19,

2013).

Union of Concerned Scientists. Statellite Laser Ranging in China. January 8, 2007.

http://www.ucusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/

technical_issues/chinese-lasers-and-us.html#1 (accessed November 21, 2013).

16