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Michelle B. Dold            

I n t e r n a t i o n a l D e v e l o p m e n t S t u d i e s 1 9 1 D e c e m b e r 2 0 1 4

 

Urbanization Without Economic Development: Causes and Crises

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Urbanization Without Economic Development: Causes and Crises

I. Introduction Since the dawn of civilization, large settlements have been synonymous with

advancement- beacons of a society’s prosperity and symbols of its power and influence.

The greatest cities in history have inspired legends, etched into the collective memory of

the human population: Jericho, Babylon, Carthage, Rome, Baghdad, Beijing, London-

each the center of a booming empire characterized by technological innovation and living

standards extraordinary for their time and cradles of some of the greatest achievements in

human history. Beginning in 2008, for the first time in demographic history more than

50% of the world population lived in urban areas, a trend that demographers predict will

continue for decades to come. Not only is our world becoming increasingly urban, but the

process of urbanization itself has transformed in recent history as the benefits and

repercussions of globalization diffuse across the globe. Though whereas historically the

world’s wealthiest nations have played host to its largest cities, many megacities of today

have sprung up in some of the world’s least developed countries, oftentimes absent

significant economic growth. In recognizing such profound shifts occurring in

urbanization patterns globally, I seek to examine, first, possible mechanisms behind these

changes and, second, how such changes impact or should impact policy making in these

places. Three central questions provide a framework for the research that follows: Why

have some countries undergone rapid urbanization without increases to GDP per capita?

What are the dangers associated with this brand of urbanization? Should these

governments implement policies to slow down the pace of urbanization? Governments in

poor, rapidly urbanizing countries face unique challenges in administering enormous

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cities without sufficient financing to do so effectively often resulting in disastrous

consequences for the urban poor. Some developing countries have undergone rapid

urbanization absent significant increases in national wealth as the global agricultural

system creates widespread impoverishment of their rural populations. When these

countries lack strong political and economic institutions, they fail to take advantage of the

benefits of urban agglomeration, falling prey to the negative externalities of extreme

population density.

II. Characterizing Modern Urbanization The world population has undergone profound demographic shifts in the past half

century due, in large part, to changing trends in urbanization across the globe. While

recent increases in the scale of urbanization are impressive- megacities like Mexico City,

Shanghai, and Delhi have populations of 20 million, 23 million, and 25 million

respectively- the most striking shift, perhaps, has been the changing geography of

globalization. The map below (Figure 1) of growth rates of urban agglomerations from

1970-1990 demonstrates that already at this point in demographic history most of the

highest urban growth rates of 3% or more annually, illustrated by orange and red dots,

were concentrated in the global south- especially in regions such as Central America,

Western Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Moderate growth, however, was

still occurring throughout much of North America, Europe, and Australia. Boxes on the

map represent megacities, somewhat arbitrarily defined by the United Nations as urban

agglomerations of ten million or more residents, which are scattered across the globe.

Figure 2 depicts urban growth rates from 1990 to 2014, showing that urban growth has

slowed to under 1% in most North American agglomerations and across most of the

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European continent. During this period, high growth rates of 3% or more were

concentrated almost exclusively in Asia and Africa, a trend that demographers predict

will continue in coming decades.

 

Figure  1:  Growth  Rates  of  Urban  Agglomerations,  1970-­‐1990  [United  Nations  World  Urbanization  Prospects:  2014  Revision]

 

Figure  2:  Growth  Rates  of  Urban  Agglomerations,  1990-­‐2000  [United  Nations  World  Urbanization  Prospects:  2014  Revision]

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Note: Designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

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The following graph (Figure 3) from the United Nations’ World Urbanization

Prospects 2014 Revision illuminates in more detail what can be gleaned from the maps

above: that the greatest contributors to growth in the urban population in the coming

decades will be from Asia and Africa, especially from exceptionally rapidly urbanizing

countries such as China, India, Nigeria, and Indonesia. Excluding the United States,

North American and European countries are notably missing from the list. Perhaps the

most striking takeaway from

the graphic is that the greatest

contributors to urban growth

will be from a massive range

of income brackets- from the

US with a 2013 per capita

income of $53,143 to Nigeria

with a GDP per capita of

$3,006 to the Democratic

Republic of the Congo, whose

average income was just $454

in 2013 (World Bank). The

graphs below (Figures 4 and 5) further substantiate this notion of a loosening correlation

between a nation’s wealth and its level of urbanization. One can observe the relationship

between percentage urban on the y-axis and purchasing power parity-adjusted income per

capita on the x-axis transform from a somewhat tight positive linear pattern, suggesting

that richer countries tended to be more urban in 1960, to a more cloud-like shape,

World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision12

Just a few countries are home to half of the world’s urban population. China has the largest urban population (758 million), followed by India (410 million). These two countries account for 30 per cent of the world’s urban population and, with another five countries, the United States of America (263 million), Brazil (173 million), Indonesia (134 million), Japan (118 million) and the Russian Federation (105 million), account for more than half of the world’s urban population.

Future increases in the world’s urban population are also expected to be highly con-centrated in just a few countries (figure 7). Taken together, China, India and Nigeria are projected to account for 37 per cent of the increase of nearly 2.5 billion people in the urban population by 2050. Between 2014 and 2050, the urban areas are expected to grow by 404 million people in India, 292 million in China and 212 million in Nigeria. Seven other countries, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Pakistan, and the United States of America, are projected to contribute more than 50 million each to the urban increment and will constitute together another 20 per cent of the total increase in urban population. In a few countries, the urban population will decrease, despite projected increases in the level of urbanization. The larg-est declines between 2014 and 2050 are projected for Japan, with a decline of 12 million urban dwellers and for the Russian Federation, expected to decline by 7 million.

Figure 7.Contribution to the increase in urban population by country, 2014 to 2050

China and India will contribute more than one third of the global urban population increase between 2014 and 2050

Note: The countries shown are projected to contribute 25 million or more to the global urban increment between 2014 and 2050. The category “Other countries” includes countries with urban increments of less than 25 million each.

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

Other countries

Democratic Republic of the Congo

China

India

nearly 2.5 billion urban population increase by 2050

50%

Nigeria

IndonesiaUnited States of America

Pakistan

Urba

n po

pula

tion

incr

ease

(mill

ions

)

Iraq

AngolaViet NamSudanIran (Islamic Republic of )UgandaKenya

EgyptMexicoBrazilPhilippinesEthiopiaUnited Republic of TanzaniaBangladesh

Figure  3:  Contribution  to  the  Increase  in  Urban  Population  by  Country,  2014-­‐2050  [United  Nations  World  Urbanization  Prospects:  2014  Revision]

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suggesting that by 2011 wealth was no longer a requisite nor a guaranteed outcome of

urbanization. Osaka, Japan, for example, one of the wealthiest megacities, is projected to

fall from its former place as second largest city in 1990 to the thirteenth largest city in

2030, whereas demographers predict that Lagos, Nigeria will grow to become the ninth

largest city in 2030 from its position as thirty-third in 1990 (United Nations). As the

association between urbanization and average income slackens, lower living standards in

emerging poor megacities are inciting debate within academia and popular discourse over

whether governments should adopt policies that encourage or abate urbanization in their

countries.

 

Figure  4:  GDP  per  Capita  vs.  Urban  Population  (%  of  Total),  1960  [Gapminder  World]

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Figure  5:  GDP  per  Capita  vs.  Urban  Population  (%  of  Total),  2011  [Gapminder  World]

III. Positive and Negative Externalities of Urbanization The process of absorbing rural migrants into cities includes both positive and

negative externalities, which in economics are defined as “situations in which the private

costs or benefits to the producers or purchasers of a good or service differs from the total

social costs or benefits entailed in its production and consumption” (Johnson). There are

well-known and well-researched benefits to urbanization, especially with regards to

industry, as a concentration of economic agents tends to increase productivity via

agglomeration economies. In the 1960s, urban planner Jane Jacobs characterized cities as

incubators of innovation and knowledge spillovers resulting from the collision of many

people with diverse educational backgrounds and skillsets (Rigby). However, a focus on

these assumed benefits of urbanization, sometimes referred to in the literature as the

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“density cult” (Kotkin), are actually part of a problem that diverts attention away from

what is really happening in some of the world’s poorest megacities- widespread suffering

and inequality.

The negative externalities of rapid and intense urbanization abound and can result

in lower living standards in large cities when governments are ill equipped to mitigate

them. One such negative externality is the widespread unemployment of rural migrants

lacking in education or skills outside of agriculture; many of these migrants end up

working in the informal sector doing jobs like peddling small goods or driving rickshaws,

untaxed income that does not contribute to national wealth. Understandably, larger

populations means more stress on public services such as education and health care and

on infrastructure like roads and highways. One consequence of intense urbanization that

perhaps does not receive as much attention as it should is traffic congestion; one recent

survey estimated that 85% of traffic deaths worldwide take place in developing nations

(Kotkin). Additionally, pressure on a city’s housing supply can drive up prices and drive

urban poor into slums, where sanitation issues and dense inhabitance can facilitate the

spread of infectious disease. Other negative externalities such as environmental

degradation and massive income inequalities that characterize large cities in poor

countries typically take a back seat to more pressing issues of providing citizens with the

basic means of survival.

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Figure  6:  Positive  and  Negative  Externalities  of  Urbanization  

  None of these externalities are new per se and it is not so much their existence

that sets new global megacities apart from older ones- these dangers exist in all large

cities regardless of average income. The worry is, rather, that poorer governments often

lack the financial and institutional resources to mitigate their negative effects on the

urban population, leading to very low living standards.

IV. Glaeser’s Insight- “A World of Cities” In order to understand the mechanisms behind these profound shifts in the

urbanization process, Harvard economist Edward Glaeser points to recent increases in

globalization, especially over the past half century. While no all encompassing or agreed

upon definition of globalization exists because of the phenomenon’s enormous scale, this

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investigation uses the term to refer to globalized supply networks of agricultural goods

coupled with liberalized trade policies. To assess the impact of globalization on growth in

cities Glaeser, in his study “A World of Cities: The Causes and Consequences of

Urbanization in Poorer Countries”, considers the links between agricultural productivity,

country size, which he uses as a proxy for openness, and urbanization in 1961 and 2010.

In their essence, his findings demonstrate that agricultural productivity was more strongly

associated with urbanization in large than small countries and that the relationship

between local agricultural productivity and city growth became less prominent during

this period (Glaeser 3-4).

Glaeser postulates that, as globalized trade networks break the traditional links

between urban areas and the agricultural hinterlands that historically sustained them,

displaced and impoverished rural populations flood cities in search of other economic

opportunities. The macroeconomics of development tend to support this theory; as

countries orient their economies toward export to international markets and away from

subsistence agriculture, typically this process involves governments and/or private

enterprises investing large sums of capital to mechanize agriculture and make it more

efficient and opening borders to international trade. Unable to compete with the lower

prices of imports, especially when agricultural prices are artificially depressed by

government subsidies in developed nations (eg. of the US to its domestic sugar industry),

small farmers are often put out of business. When this occurs, such farmers often must

sell their land, the main source of wealth and form of inheritance in most rural societies,

or government simply seizes land for commercial agriculture and impoverished rural

dwellers must look to cities for economic opportunity.

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Figure  8:  Potential  Paths  to  Urbanization-­‐  Closed  vs.  Open  Economies  

 

Figure 8: This very simplified schematic illustrates theoretically how huge cities can develop in

poorer nations. In relatively closed economies, like those of North American and European

countries during their period of urban development, urban populations are dependent on the

surrounding rural areas for sustenance, which leads to local agricultural prosperity assuming the

country has fertile soil and a climate conducive to cultivation. Agricultural abundance means that

a city can sustain larger populations and nearby urban areas will grow gradually in that much of

the rural population will stay put given high demand, and therefore high prices, for its products.

Conversely, in economies that are more open to trade, like those of many small developing

nations today, urban areas no longer necessarily depend on local agriculture for sustenance in that

they can purchase cheap imported food from international markets. In the context of a global

system of trade in agricultural products, small scale and subsistence farming become less

financially feasible. Displaced rural dwellers flood cities in search of work.

closed economies (dependence on local agriculture)

local agricultural prosperity  

gradual growth in nearby urban areas  

open economies (dependence on

global agricultural trade)  

rural impoverishment  

rapid growth in nearby urban areas  

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The danger in this, Glaeser points out, is that huge cities with massive populations

in need of service and infrastructure provision can develop in poor countries whose

political and economic institutions tend to be weaker and whose governments are less

well-equipped to handle the challenges that large-scale urbanization can bring. The core

of Glaeser’s insight centers upon poor versus rich governments’ responses to the negative

externalities of urbanization. He holds that “the ability to punish bad behavior is limited

by the institutional strength of a particular society” (Glaeser 20). When a country’s

institutions are weak, meaning they lack a well-established rule of law or property rights

and there is lots of public sector corruption, the outcome of intense urbanization is either,

as Glaeser terms it, “anarchy” or “draconian prevention” (Glaeser 4).

One example of what Glaeser would consider anarchy in the face of urbanization

comes from Dhaka, Bangladesh, which is tied with Lagos as the most rapidly

urbanization city in the world with an estimated growth rate of 3.6% from 2010-2015

(World Bank). In addition to boasting the fastest growing, but also one of the poorest

megacities, Bangladesh also has one of the most corrupt governments in the world,

ranking 145th out of 175 countries recently surveyed by Transparency International

(Transparency International). Many urban poor in Dhaka do not have access to basic

social services that the government is constitutionally bound to offer either inexpensively

or for free. For example, a recent survey of Bangladeshi households found that 44% of

patients in public health facilities had to pay bribes for care (Manzoor 13), demonstrating

an anarchic lack of enforcement of government regulations.

At the other end of the spectrum, some poorer governments may choose to curb

negative externalities through authoritarian policies. For example, in 1958 the

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Communist Chinese government began mandating that rural migrants carry proof of

formal residence and employment in cities like Shanghai in order to receive social

services such as education or healthcare (“Migrant Workers and Their Children”). Such a

policy suggests that some poor and rapidly urbanizing countries may face a tradeoff

between economic growth and political repression should governments choose to take

that route. Such examples support the notion that there is a link between institutional

quality and development, especially in large cities.

V. Support from Acemoglu and Robinson Research by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson on the effects of institutional

quality on development, as articulated in their book Why Nations Fail, has become

foundational in the field of political economics. Their findings further substantiate the

hypothesis that weak institutions make large cities in poor countries more vulnerable to

the negative externalities of intense and rapid urbanization. Their thesis holds that the

density and quality of rules put in place to structure politics (the level of democracy),

economics (the extent of free markets), and society (inclusive or extractive institutions)

either foster or inhibit economic growth (Acemoglu and Robinson). The authors write

extensively about the fact that development requires investment, not just by governments,

enterprises and capitalists, but also by everyday people. This investment, however, will

only occur when people and businesses can trust in the institutional foundations of the

country to protect their property rights so that can reliably expect a return on that

investment.

Rampant corruption and bribery in the public sector greatly increase the cost of

accomplishing almost anything in a country, discouraging capitalists from starting or

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growing businesses that could potentially act as sources of national wealth or keeping

poor individuals from receiving the services that they need.

VI. Case Study- Dhaka, Bangladesh To coalesce all of these abstract concepts, as they do not carry much significance

without application, I will zero in on one example of a rapidly urbanizing low-income

country- Bangladesh. Dhaka is the political, commercial, and industrial epicenter of the

country, its economic activity concentrated in the production of textiles, garments,

chemicals and pharmaceuticals (“Dhaka”). As noted above, Dhaka is the fastest growing

city in the world with a current population of roughly twelve million that has quadrupled

over the past 25 years, but is the world’s poorest megacity with an average annual income

of just $829 (Kotkin). The city adds 300,000 to 400,000 people annually, mostly migrants

from poor rural areas motivated by push factors of overpopulation, natural disaster and

loss of land. According to a 2008 survey by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 4.5

million rural Bangladeshis are completely landless, which has especially impoverishing

effects given that land is the main source of wealth in the countryside. Author Shahadat

Hossain notes

In this agriculture based country, land is the main means to generate subsistence and surplus and is the most valuable asset to the rural poor. Increased loss and fragmentation of land among the poor and increased concentration of land among the rich, coupled with a high natural growth rate of the population raise the number of landless and hungry. (Hossain 18)

Pull factors to Dhaka can include employment opportunities in the informal sector that do

not necessitate extended education or training and relative freedom for female workers in

the city (Hossain 18).

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Unfortunately most rural migrants to Dhaka experience very low living standards,

especially from the lack of public services available for the 3.4 million people that live in

Dhaka’s slums. Estimates show that in these informal housing communities only 65% of

households are literate, 37% of people have access to safe drinking water, and only 10%

of shelters are built from concrete, the other 90% being built from scrap metal, bamboo,

and other temporary building materials (World Bank). The majority of Dhaka’s

population lives below the official poverty line, historically measured by caloric intake,

quantifying the absolute poor as those who intake 2122 k.cal or less daily. While

nationally the percentage of people living under this threshold decreased from 47.8% to

44.5% from 1988-2000, the percentage of urbanites meeting this criterion for poverty

increased from 47.6% to 52.5% during the same period (Hossain 14).

Infrastructural degradation occurs throughout the city both because of strain from

large populations and overuse, but also because of government neglect and corruption.

For example, in 2013 one garment factory in the industrial zone of Savar, just outside

Dhaka, collapsed killing over 1,000 people and injuring countless others. Upon

inspection, the factory was found to have been constructed with “substandard materials

and in a blatant disregard for building codes” (Yardley) and factory owners have been

accused of bribing local officials for construction permits (Yardley). One report from the

investigation of the collapse even found that “10% of lawmakers in the national

parliament are owners of garment businesses in Bangladesh” (Hussein). Such anarchic

neglect of regulation and impunity on behalf of the government shows that weak

institutions particularly harm urban poor.

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As previously mentioned, the Bangladeshi government performs abysmally in

Transparency International’s annual survey of public sector corruption. In the most recent

rankings, the country came in 90th out of 142 countries in judicial independence, 146th out

of 187 in the human development index, 129th out of 179 in the press freedom index, and

in the 27th and 38th percentiles in the rule of law and accountability categories,

respectively (Transparency International). Not only do such weak institutions increase

transaction costs and encourage capital flight, but they also keep poor from receiving

social services that the Bangladesh government is obligated to provide. For example, in

order to raise literacy rates, the government extends stipends to females pursuing

secondary education, though a survey found that 22% of these women paid illegal bribes

to enroll and 38% of program participants reported receiving less money than they were

promised (Manzoor 7). Weak regulatory institutions coupled with government impunity

have kept Dhaka from realizing the positive externalities of its rapid urbanization, leaving

the vast majority of its residents to suffer.

VII. An Intriguing Solution- Paul Romer’s Charter Cities

Another notable economist to weigh in on the issue of poor country urbanization

and institutional quality is Paul Romer, a former Stanford economist now researching at

the NYU’s Stern School of Business. Romer recognizes the same malady that bars poor

countries from utilizing urbanization for development in many cases and, in his

promotion of “charter cities”, he offers a work around for the poor institutions in these

countries. Romer proposes that governments construct new cities entirely from scratch

governed by charters that lay out regulations and enforcements mechanisms different

from those that govern the rest of the country, especially ones that encourage investment

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by emphasizing property rights (but also rules about sanitation, traffic control, service

administration, etc.). Romer compares charter cities to the Special Economic Zones that

China established during the 1980s to attract foreign capital. He holds that foreign

investors could finance construction of these cities’ infrastructure in exchange for “fee

income use from the users” (Freakonomics). These countries could then enter into written

commitments with governments known for having strong, credible institutions, like the

US or Canada for example, which could act as guarantors to ensure that these countries

do not renege on promises made in the charter. Romer insists that these charters would be

further legitimized by rural dwellers choosing, without being coerced, to move to cities.

Though in theory this sounds positive, the implementation of charter cities poses

profound problems. First is the question of why corrupt officials who benefit from the

status quo would be willing to essentially renounce control over a part or parts of their

territory. This introduces the other glaring issue of enforcing rules laid out in the charter;

the reason that these types of cities would be necessarily in the first place is that

institutions that govern the rest of the country are too weak to encourage investment, so it

is unlikely that such weak or corrupt regimes would adhere to agreements, even if third

party guarantors were involved. Additionally, though the special economic zones were

largely successful in fomenting economic growth in China, such success has not come

without a price. Protests against land acquisition have sprung up in rural China,

especially in the Guangdong province, as the zone is taking over rural areas to

accommodate foreign investors (Ismaylova). Such development also comes at the

expense of Chinese laborers who endure poor working conditions in these factories.

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While Romer’s charter city idea is riddled with logistical and perhaps ethical

complications, I included it in this discussion because it further proves that institutions

are at the heart of development. Romer recognizes what Glaeser, Acemoglu, and

Robinson do- that weak institutions can keep poor countries from benefitting from

urbanization and that development requires governments to make credible and long-term

commitments to protecting property rights and enforcing the rule of law. Though charter

cities may not be the correct avenue to development, that strong institutions are necessary

for economic growth has become widely accepted.

VIII. Conclusions Throughout this research, it has become apparent that despite the popular notion

that large, dense cities go hand-in-hand with national wealth, urbanization in and of itself

is not necessarily beneficial for a country or a population unless paired with good

governance. Edward Glaeser notes, however, that, “The connections and social

movements that form readily in the dense confines of urban areas can ultimately be

strong enough to change and discipline government” (Glaeser 41). Just as cities can act as

incubators for innovation in industry and technology, they can also generate

agglomeration economies for political reform as people share their grievances and ideas

for change. Large populations of suffering urban poor have the potential to form

coalitions to pressure their governments into greater accountability, the only way that true

change can occur when corrupt bureaucrats benefit from the status quo of extractive

institutions. Future political, economic, and demographic research on urbanization should

keep in mind not only the objective of economic growth, but also pursuing equity

alongside development

Works  Cited  Acemoglu, Daron, James Robinson, and Simon Johnson. "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth." Handbook of Economic Growth. Vol. 1A. Elsevier B.V., 2005. 386-472. Web. 1 Oct. 2014. "BANGLADESH: Landless Numbers on the Rise." IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis. IRIN, 1 Jan. 2014. Web. 1 Nov. 2014. "Can "Charter Cities" Change the World? A Q&A With Paul Romer."Freakonomics. Freakonomics LLC, 29 Sept. 2009. Web. 1 Nov. 2014. "Corruption by Country/Territory." Transparency International. Transparency International, 1 Jan. 2014. Web. 1 Dec. 2014. Chakrabortty, Aditya. "Paul Romer Is a Brilliant Economist – but His Idea for Charter Cities Is Bad." Guardian 27 July 2010. Web. 5 Dec. 2014. "Dhaka." Encyclopaedia Brittannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013. Print. Glaeser, Edward. "A World of Cities: Causes and Consequences of Urbanization in Poorer Countries." NBER Working Paper Series 19745 (2013): 1-58. National Bureau of Economic Research. Web. 1 Oct. 2014. Hasan, Manzoor. "Public Sector Corruption in Bangladesh: Political and Bureaucratic." (2007). Institute of Governance Studies, BRAC University. Web. 1 Nov. 2014. Hossain, Shahadat. "Rapid Urban Growth and Poverty in Dhaka City."Bangladesh E-Journal of Sociology 5.1 (2008): 1-24. Web. 1 Nov. 2014. Hussein, Sajjad. "Six Months after Bangladeshi Factory Collapse, Workers Remain in Peril." CNN.com. Cable News Network, 24 Oct. 2013. Web. 1 Dec. 2014. Ismaylova, Eugenia. "Special Economic Zones: Select Advantages and Substantial Problems." Illinois Business Law Journal (2007). University of Illinois. Web. 1 Dec. 2014. Johnson, Paul. "Externality." A Glossary of Political Economy Terms. Auburn: U of Auburn, Department of Political Science, 2005. Print. Kotkin, Joel. "Megacities And The Density Delusion: Why More People Doesn't Equal More Wealth." Forbes 16 Apr. 2013. Print.

Kotkin, Joel. "The Problem With Megacities." Forbes 4 Apr. 2011. Print. "Migrant Workers and Their Children." China Labour Bulletin (2013). The China Labour Bulletin. Web. 1 Oct. 2014. Rigby, David . "Agglomeration." Economic Geography. University of California, Los Angeles, Department of Geography. Haines Hall, Los Angeles. 19 Feb. 2014. Lecture. Romer, Paul. "Why the World Needs Charter Cities." TEDGlobal 2009. TED. Oxford University, Oxford. 1 July 2009. Lecture. "South Asia- World Population Day - July 11(South Asia Growth)." The World Bank. The World Bank Group, 1 Jan. 2013. Web. 1 Dec. 2014. "Transparency International Bangladesh." Transparency International. Transparency International, 1 Jan. 2014. Web. 1 Dec. 2014. "World Development Indicators." World Bank. The World Bank Group, 1 Jan. 2014. Web. 1 Nov. 2014. World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision (2014): 1-32. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. Web. 1 Nov. 2014. Yardley, Jim. "Report on Deadly Factory Collapse in Bangladesh Finds Widespread Blame." New York Times 22 May 2013. Print.