Teoria Funcionalista Valores Gouveia(2014)
Transcript of Teoria Funcionalista Valores Gouveia(2014)
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Functional theory of human values: Testing its content and structure
hypotheses
Valdiney V. Gouveia a,⇑,1, Taciano L. Milfont b, Valeschka M. Guerra c
a Department of Psychology, Federal University of Paraíba, Brazilb School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealandc Department of Psychology, Federal University of Espírito Santo, Brazil
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 17 March 2013
Received in revised form 4 December 2013
Accepted 9 December 2013
Available online 29 December 2013
Keywords:
Human values
Value functions
Value content
Value structure
a b s t r a c t
A theoretical analysis of the functions values fulfill is described by focusing on two widely accepted value
functions: values guide actions and express needs. The interplay between these two functions yields a
three-by-two framework differentiating values according to their pursued goals (personal, central or
social goals) or their expressed needs (survival or thriving needs). The three-by-two framework results
in six subfunctions or basic values (structure hypothesis) assessed with specific marker values forming
the Basic Values Survey (content hypothesis). The present paper tests these theoretical hypotheses in a
large national sample of Brazilian physicians (N = 13,414). The results support both hypotheses and pro-
vide further empirical evidence for the functional theory of values. Discussion centers on the theory as a
refinement of existing value models due to its parsimonious and theoretically-driven approach, and its
merit as an additional theoretical tool for understanding the structure of the value domain.
2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Schwartz’s theory of values is an important legacy in social
psychology that provides conceptual, methodological, and empiri-
cal contributions to map a set of universal values (Maio, 2010;
Schwartz, 2011). Throughout the years the theory has promoted
multiple configurations of the value domain, including seven (Sch-
wartz & Bilsky, 1987), ten (Schwartz, 1992), eleven (Schwartz,
1994) or nineteen (Schwartz et al., 2012) motivational value types.
As a result of these multiple (and somewhat conflicting) configura-
tions, some researchers have tried to identify a congruent pool of
dimensions, suggesting between six and eight motivational types
(Hinz, Brähler, Schmidt, & Albani, 2005; Perrinjaquet, Furrer, Mar-
guerat, Usunier, & Cestre, 2007), whereas others have preferred to
consider only the two bipolar higher-order dimensions of self-tran-
scendence/self-enhancement and conservation/openness (e.g.,
Caprara, Alessandri, & Eisenberg, 2012; Strack & Dobewall, 2012).
We believe these multiple configurations lack parsimony and
theoretical focus, and might also hinder scientific advancement
when studies are to be compared or meta-analyzed. In the present
article we discuss a parsimonious and theory-driven approach
explaining the functions values fulfill that canbe useful in integrat-
ing previous theoretical value models. In particular, the theory
integrates models that conceptualize values as guiding actionsand expressing needs. We start by describing the functional theory
of human values (Gouveia, 1998, 2003, 2013), and then report a
study gathering empirical evidence for its appropriateness in a
large national sample of Brazilian physicians by testing two spe-
cific theoretical hypotheses.
2. Primary functions of values
The functional approach is popular in attitude research (Maio &
Olson, 2000), but research examining the functions that values ful-
fill has received less attention (Gouveia, 2013). Nevertheless, two
primary functions of values can be identified in the psychological
literature: values guide actions (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992)
and are cognitive expressions of needs (Inglehart, 1977; Maslow,
1954). The recognition of these two value functions has led to
the development of the functional theory of human values (Gou-
veia, 1998, 2003, 2013; Gouveia, Milfont, & Fischer, submitted),
which attempts to explain the underlying characteristics of the
value domain structure.
The parsimonious selection of these value functions is in line
with research showing that the general structure of motivational
systems is consistently subsumed by a two-dimensional structure
(Fontaine, Poortinga, Delbeke, & Schwartz, 2008; Grouzet et al.,
2005; Ronen, 1994). However, a theoretical and explicit explana-
tion of the underlying functional characteristics of this structure
has not been explored by the extant literature.
0191-8869/$ - see front matter 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2013.12.012
⇑ Corresponding author. Address: Department of Psychology, Federal University
of Paraiba, 58.051-900 Joao Pessoa, PB, Brazil.
E-mail address: [email protected] (V.V. Gouveia).1 URL: http://vvgouveia.net/
Personality and Individual Differences 60 (2014) 41–47
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Personality and Individual Differences
j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / p a i d
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2013.12.012mailto:[email protected]://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2013.12.012http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01918869http://www.elsevier.com/locate/paidhttp://www.elsevier.com/locate/paidhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01918869http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2013.12.012mailto:[email protected]://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2013.12.012http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1016/j.paid.2013.12.012&domain=pdfhttp://-/?-
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The theory posits that the two value functions form distinct
functional dimensions. The first dimension outlines ‘circle of goals’
based on the type of orientation values serve when guiding human
behaviors (personal, central or social goals). The second dimension
outlines ‘level of needs’ based on the type of motivator values serve
when cognitively representing human needs (survival or thriving
needs). These value functions most likely arise from evolutionary
conditions associated with human development.
In order to survive in a hostile environment, humans need to:
(a) establish bonds with others, while being able to make personal
decisions for one’s own survival, (b) resist threatening group
demands, and (c) make sense of the multiple meanings present
in social interactions (Baumeister, 2005; Tooby & Cosmides,
1990). This demand to simultaneously act autonomously and bond
with a larger group leads to a functional and integrated set of val-
ues that guide actions. The second functional dimension underlies
the expression of needs that would threaten the survival of the
individual, the immediate social group, and the species if not ful-
filled, such as basic biological and social needs (e.g., food, self-con-
trol) as well as needs that become more important once the basic
needs are addressed (Baumeister, 2005; Maslow, 1954; Welzel,
Inglehart, & Klingemann, 2003).
2.1. Guiding actions
Personal and social values are the two terminal value types iden-tified by Rokeach (1973). Individuals guided by personal values
(e.g., an exciting life, inner harmony) are self-centered or intraper-
sonal in focus, while those guided by social values (e.g., true friend-
ship, a world of peace) are society-centered or interpersonal in
focus. Personal and social values lead individuals to emphasize
respectively themselves or the group as the principal unit of
survival (Schwartz, 1992). Empirical studies have also identified
values that are neither completely social nor personal, such as
personal stability, health, knowledge and maturity (Mueller &
Wornhoff, 1990). Although some scholars refer to this set of valuesas representing mixed interests (e.g., Schwartz’s universalism and
security value types) and in opposition to other values (e.g., Sch-
wartz’s stimulation value type), a different perspective is taken
here.
According to the functional theory, values that are neither
exclusively personal nor social are located almost exactly between
personal and social values because they are not restricted to the
dichotomy of self-centered or society-centered interests. This set
of values is thus congruent (and not in opposition) with both
personal and social goals. The theory further posits that this set
of values is the central reference source for the other values inthe sense that they express general purposes of life corresponding
to basic needs (e.g., survival) and more general needs (e.g., self-
actualization). Therefore, the first functional dimension differenti-
ates values according to the orientation of their pursued goals
(type of orientation: personal, central or social goals).
2.2. Expressing needs
Although the correspondence between values and needs is pro-
posed (Maslow, 1954; Rokeach, 1973), there is little empirical re-
search on values as based on needs (Calogero, Bardi, & Sutton,
2009). Nevertheless, the literature suggests that all values can be
classified as materialistic ( pragmatic ) or humanitarian (idealistic )based on the needs they express (Braithwaite, Makkai, & Pittelkow,
1996; Inglehart, 1977). Materialistic/pragmatic values express ba-
sic biological and social needs such as food and control acquisition,
ensuring the survival of the individual, the immediate social group
and the species. Humanitarian/idealistic values express needs that
become more salient when the basic needs have been addressed
(Inglehart, 1977; Maslow, 1954), including needs for information,
self-esteem and intellectual and emotional stimulation (Baumei-ster, 2005).
Materialistic values imply an orientation toward specific practi-
cal goals and normative rules. Individuals guided by materialistic
values tend to think in more biological terms of survival, empha-
sizing their own existence and the conditions to secure it. Human-
itarian values, in contrast, are based on more abstract principles
and ideas. Emphasizing humanitarian values is associated with
creativity and open-mindedness, suggesting less dependence on
material goods. Compared with materialistic values, humanitarian
values are not necessarily directed toward concrete goals, and are
generally non-specific (Braithwaite et al., 1996; Inglehart, 1977).
Materialistic values express survival needs while humanitarian
values express thriving needs. The second functional dimension
thus differentiates values according to their expressed needs (typeof motivator: survival or thriving needs).
3. Content and structure of the value functions
The functional dimensions can be mapped on a three-by-two
framework, with three broad pursued goals (personal, central or
social goals) and two broad expressed needs (survival or thriving
needs). The interplay between goals and needs yields six specific
subfunctions or basic values. Figure 1 presents the three-by-two
Values as guides of actions (circle of goals)
Personal goals(the individual by
itself)
Central goals(the general
purpose of life)
Social goals(the individual in
the community)
V a l u e s a s e x p r e s s i o n s o f n e e d s
( l e v e l o f n e e d s )
Thriving needs
(life as source of
opportunities)2
Excitement
Values
Emotion
Pleasure
Sexuality
Suprapersonal
Values
Beauty
Knowledge
Maturity
Interactive
Values
Affectivity
Belonging
Support
Survival needs
(life as source ofthreats)1
Promotion
Values
Power
Prestige
Success
Existence
Values
Health
Stability
Survival
Normative
Values
Obedience
Religiosity
Tradition
Fig. 1. Facets, dimensions and basic values. Note. (1) Under pressing conditions that impose existential threats. (2) Under permissive conditions that provide existentialsecurity.
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framework, indicating the specific marker values used to represent
each of the six basic values further described below.
3.1. Existence values
The most basic physiological needs and the need for security are
cognitively represented by existence values (Maslow, 1954; Ronen,
1994). These values are compatible with personal and social goals
within the expression of survival needs because the principal
purpose of existence values is to assure the basic conditions for
individual biological and psychological survival. As such, existence
values are the source of reference for promotion and normative
values.
3.2. Promotion values
These values express survival needs and focus on personal
goals. Promotion values stem from a personal and materialistic ori-
entation and are essential for securing self-esteem (Maslow, 1954;
Ronen, 1994). Although driving personal and material accomplish-
ments, such values are also important for successful social interac-
tions and institutional functioning (Schwartz, 1992). Individuals
guided by promotion values view hierarchy as an important
demonstration of personal competence. Such individuals also cher-
ish their own personal benefits and are practical decision-makers.
3.3. Normative values
These values also express survival needs, but have a focus on so-
cial goals. Normative values cognitively represent the need for
security and control as well as the pre-conditions for the satisfac-
tionof basic needs (Korman, 1974; Maslow, 1954; institutional and
social demands according to Schwartz, 1992). These values focus
on social rules with a materialistic guiding principle, reflecting
the importance of preserving one’s culture and conventional
norms. Endorsing these values also implies a vertical orientation
(Gouveia, Albuquerque, Clemente, & Espinosa, 2002), wherebyobedience to authority is important.
3.4. Suprapersonal values
Like existence values suprapersonal values also focus on central
goals, but express thriving needs. Suprapersonal values represent
the higher-order needs of aesthetics, cognition and self-actualiza-
tion (Maslow, 1954; Ronen, 1994), emphasizing more abstract
ideas over absolute or material goals (Inglehart, 1977) and leading
to a better understanding and mastery of the physical and social
realms (Baumeister, 2005). Suprapersonal values are the source
of reference for excitement and interactive values.
3.5. Excitement values
These values represent thriving needs with a focus on personal
goals. The physiological need for gratification, variety and pleasure
(i.e., hedonism; Maslow, 1954; Ronen, 1994) is cognitively repre-
sented by excitement values. These values express a more personal
orientation and non-conformity, contributing to a promotion of
change and innovation (Gouveia, 2013). Individuals guided by such
values tend not to be orientated toward material goals in the long
run (Guerra, Gouveia, Sousa, Lima, & Freires, 2012).
3.6. Interactive values
These values also represent thriving needs, but have a focus on
social goals. Interactive values are essential in regulating, estab-lishing and maintaining one’s interpersonal relationships. The
common fates and affective experiences of individuals are stressed
by these values, representing the needs of belonging, love and
affiliation (Korman, 1974; Maslow, 1954). Individuals guided by
interactive values view social contact as a goal in itself.
Since the proposed model is based on primary value functions
discussed in the extant literature, it has similarities with existing
models, particularly with those of Schwartz (1992) and Inglehart
(1977). Testing similarities with the Schwartz model, Gouveia
(2003) analyzed together the ten motivational types and the six
basic values. Despite the numerical difference, the motivational
types were easily identified according to the functional dimen-
sions. For example, promotion values subsumed Schwartz’s
achievement and power, normative values incorporated Schwartz’s
conformity and tradition, while existence values (reflecting sur-
vival needs) are underrepresented in Schwartz’s value instrument
and model (see also Gouveia, Milfont, Fischer, & Schultz, 2007).
The functional theory also resembles the Inglehart (1977) model
as both make a distinction between materialistic/pragmatic versus
humanitarian/idealistic values. Notwithstanding these similarities,
the functional theory strikes new conceptual ground by reconciling
distinct value traditions into a single framework. The proposed
theory is thus an improvement or refinement of existing models.
4. Hypotheses and study overview
The present study further evaluates the usefulness of the func-
tional theory of values. Building on the theoretical considerations
just presented, we proposed hypotheses related to the content
and structure of the value functions. The hypotheses are in line
with the configuration depicted in Figure 1.
First, value items used in several measures (e.g., Braithwaite &
Scott, 1991) were selected as the marker values for the six specific
subfunctions or basic values. We hypothesize that the selected 18
marker values will be strong indicators of their correspondent ba-
sic values (Hypothesis 1). Second, the horizontal axis in Figure 1
corresponds to the circle of goals (personal, central or social). Wethus predict that values reflecting central goals will be located in
the center of the multidimensional space, and located on either
side will be values reflecting personal or social goals (Hypothesis 2a). Finally, the vertical axis corresponds to the level of needs, with
values expressing survival and thriving needs expected to be pro-
jected into two separate regions in the proposed two-dimensional
space (Hypothesis 2b).Besides testing these theoretical hypotheses, the present study
also assesses the psychometric properties of the Basic Values Sur-
vey and its appropriateness for measuring the proposed value
space in a large national sample of Brazilian physicians. Analysis
of this data has been reported in another publication (Fischer, Mil-
font, & Gouveia, 2011), but the studies have completely distinct
aims. While Fischer and colleagues examined the influence of so-
cial context on the structure of values at an aggregated level (i.e.,
physicians data grouped within Brazilian states), the present study
focuses on individual-level analyses, the particular hypotheses de-
rived from the theory, and the psychometric properties of the Basic
Values Survey.
5. Method
5.1. Participants and instrument
The participants were 13,414 physicians (70% males) between
the ages of 22 and 85 (M = 40.8, SD = 10.14) from all 26 Brazilian
states and the Federal District. Participants completed an online
questionnaire investigating Brazilian physicians’ professionalcharacteristics, which also included the Basic Value Survey (BVS;
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Gouveia, 2003). The BVS is composed of 18 marker values with two
brief descriptions presented after each value (see Supplementary
Online Material). Participants rated each item-value on a 7-point
scale, ranging from 1 (completely unimportant ) to 7 (of the utmost importance), considering how important each value was for themas a guiding principle in their life.
The alpha coefficients ranged from .53 (interactive) to .60 (nor-
mative) (amean
= .56), and the mean inter-item correlations ranged
from .28 to .33 (average = .30; see Table S1). Consistent reliability
indicators were also observed across subsamples from the five
geo-social regions in Brazil: North, n = 655; Northeast, n = 2518;Central-West, n = 1397; Southeast, n = 6968; and South, n = 1876
(see Table S2). Low alphas are not uncommon in value measures
(e.g., Schwartz, 2005), and these results provide indication of
acceptable internal consistency and homogeneity for research pur-
poses on values. All six basic values were positively correlated, with
correlations ranging from .12 to .47 (average = .35; see Table S1).
5.2. Procedure
The questionnaire was available on the internet for six months.
Participants had to enter their physician’s register number andbirth date to access the questionnaire. Only registered physicians
could take part in the study and participants could only complete
the questionnaire once. Participants’ identification was later dis-
carded to preserve their anonymity. The average completion time
was 15 min.
6. Results
6.1. Content hypothesis
To test the content hypothesis, confirmatory factor analyses
were performed using the covariance matrix among the 18 values
as input and maximum likelihood estimation procedures in LISREL.
Standard goodness-of-fit statistics were used to assess model fitand to compare competing models. We tested four alternative
models against our hypothesized six-factor model. Since the six
basic values were all positively interrelated, we first tested an
undifferentiated one-factor latent model with all items. We then
fitted oblique latent models. The level of needs might be a parsi-
monious explanation of the value structure; hence we tested a
correlated two-factor latent model differentiating values express-
ing survival versus thriving needs. Third, a correlated three-factor
latent model was tested by differentiating personal, central and so-
cial values. Finally, we proposed that central values form the core
of the values structure; therefore, we tested a correlated five-factor
latent model combining existence and suprapersonal values.
As can be seen in Table 1 and Figure S1, the six-factor model
without any constraint or change to improve fit was statisticallybetter fitting than other theory-based alternatives. We also cross-
validated the six-factor model across the five geo-social regions
in Brazil. Configural equivalence of the six-factor model was
confirmed (CFI = .91, RMSEA = .08). These results support Hypothe-
sis 1 and indicate that participants distinguish six basic values as
measured by the BVS.
6.2. Structure hypotheses
To test the structure hypotheses, we first employed a confirma-tory Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) with proximity transforma-
tions into z -transformed Euclidean distances with PROXSCAL algorithm in SPSS. Like a confirmatory factor analysis, a confirma-
tory MDS compares a theoretical model to the observed data; but
instead of fixing relations between items and factors the researcher
fixes the coordinates of the observed data in the multidimensional
space based on the theoretical model.
The confirmatory MDS was performed by specifying the theo-
retical structure shown in Figure 1, and then comparing to the fit
of the observed structure. A two-dimensional structure was im-
posed in line with the theory and because it best represents the
dimensionality of the value space (Fontaine et al., 2008). The
following parameters were specified for the first dimension:
excitement [1.0], promotion [1.0], existence [0.0], suprapersonal[0.0], interactive [1.0], and normative [1.0]. For the second
dimension the following parameters were specified: excitement
[0.5], promotion [0.5], existence [1.0], suprapersonal [1.0],
interactive [0.5], and normative [0.5]. Tucker’s coefficient of con-
gruence (also known as Tucker’s phi) was used as a measure of
model fit, with values higher than .90 indicating good fit ( van de
Vijver & Leung, 1997).
Figure 2a and 2b respectively show the results of the uncon-
strained and confirmatory MDS. The unconstrained solution clearly
shows that the personal-central-social distinction was more well-
defined than the survival-thriving distinction. Nevertheless, the
Tucker’s phi of .98 indicates that forcing the location of the marker
values to fit the theoretical structure provides good fit.
We then ran a generalized procrustes analysis in the GPA soft-
ware (Commandeur, 1991) and Orthosim (Barrett, 2005) to com-
pare the coordinates of the unconstrained and confirmatory MDS
configurations (see Table S3), with values close to .90 or higher
indicating acceptable fit. The total fit between the configurations
was .81. In line with Figure 2a, the double-scaled Euclidean
similarity coefficient showed that the first dimension had a better
congruence match (.90) than the second dimension (.55). These re-
sults confirm Hypothesis 2a: central values were located between
personal and social values. Less support was observed for Hypoth-
esis 2b suggesting that survival and thriving values are separated
into two regions.
7. Discussion
The present article describes a theoretical model that focuses on
the functions human values fulfill. Two primary value functions
Table 1
Fit indices for alternative models.
Model v2 (df) GFI CFI RMSEA (CI90%) SRMR ECVI CAIC Dv2 (df)
One-factor 19702.25 (135) .86 .84 .10 (.10–.11) .074 1.47 20080.40 –
Two-factor 19600.62 (134) .86 .85 .10 (.10–.11) .074 1.47 19989.27 101.63* (1)
Three-factor 14835.71 (132) .89 .88 .091 (.090–.092) .066 1.11 15245.37 4764.91* (2)
Five-factor 13360.51 (125) .90 .89 .089 (.088–.090) .066 1.00 13843.70 1475.20* (7)
Six-factor 13170.15 (120) .90 .90 .090 (.089–.091) .064 .99 13705.86 190.36* (5)
Note. N = 13,414. One-factor model: all values combined. Two-factor model: values expressing survival versus thriving needs. Three-factor model: values focusing on social
versus central versus personal goals. Five-factor model: central values combined. v2 = chi-square, df = degrees of freedom, GFI = goodness-of-fit index, CFI = comparative fit
index, RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation, CI90% = 90% confidence interval, SRMR = standardized root meansquare residual, ECVI = expected cross-validation
index, CAIC = consistent Akaike information criterion.* p < .001.
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were selected – values guide actions and express needs – and a
three-by-two framework was proposed based on their interplay.The three-by-two framework yields six basic values (existence,
promotion, normative, suprapersonal, excitement, and interactive)
and marker values were selected from the values literature asobserved indicators. Theoretical hypotheses were supported in a
Fig. 2. Spatial representation of the marker values from (a) unrestricted and (b) confirmatory multidimensional scaling. Note. Triangles refer to social values, circles to central
values and squares to personal values. Black symbols refer to survival values and white symbols refer to thriving values.
V.V. Gouveia et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 60 (2014) 41–47 45
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large national Brazilian sample of physicians. The theory has been
previously tested with student populations (Gouveia, Milfont, &
Fischer, submitted) and outside Brazil (Ardila, Gouveia, & Medei-
ros, 2012; Gouveia et al., 2010), but the present study provides
the first empirical test of the three-by-two framework in a national
sample constituted exclusively by non-students.
The prediction that the 18 marker values would be good indica-
tors of their corresponding theoretical basic values was confirmed.
This finding provides support for the Basic Values Survey as a psy-
chometrically-sound measure for assessing the proposed theoreti-
cal model. Instead of having an extensive list of values and then
creating value dimensions ex post facto based on empirical data,
the proposed framework was theoretically driven and determined
beforehand, and only then were the specific marker values selected
to represent the proposed dimensions.
Besides providing a more parsimonious and theory-driven ap-
proach, this procedure also means that researchers could select
other value markers as indicators of the core basic values. Indeed,
it seems more reasonable to work with the core basic dimensions
of values, avoiding specific and less fundamental facets – an ap-
proach that has been supported by others (Strack & Dobewall,
2012). Although researchers are encouraged to select and use dis-
tinct marker values, the findings reported in the present study and
others (Gouveia, 2003; Gouveia, Milfont, & Fischer, submitted) pro-
vide strong empirical support for the use of the Basic Value Survey
as a tool for testing the functional theory.
In line with the theoretical model depicted in Figure 1, values
focusing on central goals are located between values with personal
and social goals. The prediction that values expressing survival and
thriving needs are projected into two separate regions in the two-
dimensional space was not fully supported. Results using the same
dataset (Fischer et al., 2011) as well as other values research (Fon-
taine et al., 2008) have shown that the dimension representing
personal versus social values is relatively more stable than the
dimension representing survival versus thriving values. These find-
ings combined with the nature of the present sample could explain
this unexpected result.Overall, the empirical evidence accumulated so far strongly sug-
gests that the two functional dimensions and the six basic values
resulting from their interplay can parsimoniously explain the
structure of the value space. Going beyond earlier studies showing
that motivational systems are organized in a two-dimensional
structure (Fontaine et al., 2008; Grouzet et al., 2005; Ronen,
1994), the theory is the first to explicitly propose the functional
interplay between the two dimensions. The usefulness of the
theory has also been shown by initial studies using the model to
predict external variables, including sexual liberalism (Guerra
et al., 2012) and organizational commitment (Gouveia, Milfont,
Fischer, & Coelho, 2009).
Future studies should attempt to test the functional theory in a
broad cross-cultural sample, and also test the usefulness of themodel in predicting other criterion variables. Future studies should
also attempt to test other hypotheses derived from the theory, in
particular the compatibility and congruence hypotheses (Gouveia,
2013). Drawing from two primary functions values fulfill, and
providing a parsimonious and theory-driven account of the value
domain, the functional theory of values improves upon current
dominant value models. We believe the functional theory is an
additional theoretical tool for understanding the structure of the
value domain.
Acknowledgements
This research was partially supported by a Grant (308388/2011-
9) from the Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technolog-ical Development (CNPq) awarded to Valdiney V. Gouveia.
Preparation of this manuscript was also partially supported by a
Marsden Fast Start Grant from The Royal Society of New Zealand
(Te Putea Rangahau a Marsden) awarded to Taciano L. Milfont.
Valdiney V. Gouveia and Taciano L. Milfont contributed equally
to the writing of this article. The authors thank Christian Welzel
and Paul Barrett for their comments and encouragements during
the preparation of this manuscript. The authors also thank Ronald
Fischer for his contribution in the development of the functional
theory of human values and his comments on an earlier draft of
this manuscript.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2013.12.012.
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