Telos Volume 1987 Issue 72 1987 [Doi 10.3817%2F0687072214] Grosshans, H. -- Political Romanticism

8/17/2019 Telos Volume 1987 Issue 72 1987 [Doi 10.3817%2F0687072214] Grosshans, H. -- Political Romanticism

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214 SAMPLES

transforms society without contravening democracy may be possible. The

danger of dictatorship remains, however, particularly for those who claim a

higher consciousness, i.e., the intellectuals. Schmitt

was,

in retrospect, one of

the first critics of the New Class.

John Samples

Carl Schmitt, Political Romanticism, translated by Guy Oak es,

(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986), 168 pp.

In

Modern

Germany:

Its History and Civilization,

1

Pinson makes three passing

references to the political theorist Carl Schmitt. In one, he characterizes

Schmitt as an extremely clever scholar who was, widi odiers, responsible for

the destruction of the struggling German democracy in the 1920s. In the sec-

ond, with reference to the July 1932 dismissal by von Papen of the Socialist

government in Prussia, he describes Schmitt as the darling of the conserva-

tives. In die third, he writes that Schmitt delivered die funeral oration on die

'spiritual breakdown of parliamentarism' and heralded die advent of die au-

dioritarian and corporative state. Pinson dismisses Schmitt by comparing

him to Naphta in Thomas M ann's Magic M ountain, about whom his antagonist

Settembrini remarks: His form was logic bu t his essence is confusion.

2

Pinson would be chagrined to discover diat Schmitt has not faded into die

never-never land of incidental footnotes, easily skipped and as easily ignored.

Not only did Schmitt live until 1985, when he died at die age of ninety-six; his

life and work remain die focus of scholarly attention.

Schmitt was active during die troubled years of die Weimar Republic. As a

professor at Bonn (1922-1928), he was a supporter of Heinrich Briining, die

leader of die Cadiolic Center Party. He advocated a broad interpretation of

presidential emergency powers and opposed attempts to limit such audiority.

He moved to Berlin in 1928, where he became an adviser to General

Kurt von Schleicher and dien to die Hindenburg government when Briining

became chancellor. In 1932 he argued diat anti-constitutional parties (die Na-

zis and die Comm unists) should not be granted die equal chance available

to odier parties and diat constitutional provisions could and should be used

against diose intent upon destroying die constitution.

1. Kop pel Pinson, Modern Germany: Its History and Civilization, (Bonn: University

Press, 1965).

2.

Od dly enou gh, the ma n widely regarded as M ann's mode l for Naphta, Georg

Lukacs, in 1925 favorably reviewed Schmitt's

Political Romanticism

for its critique of bou r-

geois culture. Later, in The Destruction of Reason, Lukacs condemned Schmitt and m uch of

G erm an bo urg eo is intellectual history for having prep ared the way for Hitler.


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REVIEWS 2 5

Nevertheless, Schmitt had little trouble adjusting himself when the Nazis

came to power. He accepted the Nazi party as die dominant force in German

politics, ann oun ced his adhere nce to the new regim e after d ie passage of die En-

abling Act in March, and o n M ay 1, 1933 beca me a party m em be r. H e enjoyed

die patronage of He rm ann Goering and Ha ns Frank and was regarded as one of

die most important academic sympadiizers of die new Reich. As Guy Oakes

notes in die introduction to his translation of die expa nde d and revised edition

of Political Rom anticism , Schm itt even showed his allegiance to die new m asters

of German politics by inserting in his scholarly work gratuitous comments

about Moses Mendelssohn, die Rodischilds and odiers attesting to what was

term ed di e cunnin g, duplicitous and o ppo rtunistic Jewish m entality. Schmitt's

association widi die Nazis came to an end in 1936, when an investigation by die

Security Service resulted in a demand diat he cease posing as a Nazi dieorist

A few central ideas dom ina te Schm itt's philoso phy of politics. Since every cul-

ture is rooted in distinctive national attitudes, any idea of universal mo rality and

law is m ere fantasy. There are only what Schmitt describes as concrete hu m an

groupings which fight widi odie r concrete hu m an grouping s in die nam e of

jus-

tice, hum anity, order, and p eace. Th e question of wh o decides what is just or

lawful, humane or peaceful, depends on historical circumstances. Schmitt was

not interested in moral purpose in history. On die contrary, he continually

stressed die concrete situation as defined by diose who speak widi audiority.

For him, obedience to die legally-constituted audiority is fundamental.

Th e con crete situa tion is inevitably die result of conflict. Significant polit-

ical action can be reduced to die struggle between friend and enemy — a situ-

ation which necessitates die drawing of an absolute distinction between one-

self and die opponent. The political enemy is not necessarily morally evil; he

is merely di e odier, die stranger. Private feelings are no t involved; die polit-

ical enemy is solely die public enemy. There is no place in diis interpretation

for die liberal concept of politics as discussion and compromise or the liberal

dieory of die state

vis-d-vis

politically neutral spheres (religion, economics,

family, etc). In Schmitt's view, conflict widi die alien is a precondition for die

state and cultu re to dirive: Fo r life struggles no t widi dead i and spirit not

wid i spiridessness: Spirit struggles widi spirit, life widi life, and ou t of die pow -

er of an integral understanding of diis arises die order of human diings.


illustrates man y of die basic prem ises of Schm itt's philoso-

phy. As Oak es' points out, die dirust of Schmitt's argum ent is diat die Eu ropean

bourgeoisie embraced romanticism and diereby depoliticized die liberal social

order by transforming political debate into an endless conversation which ren-

dered genuine political decisions impossible. Romanticism destroyed reality

and replaced it widi die dream of unlimited possibilities, dius paralyzing politi-

cal action in die finite world of mundane existence. In Schmitt's definition, ro-

manticism is subjectivized occasionalism which reduces politics to an exercise

in artistic imagination. The romantic is aware only of fragmented occasions, to

which he resp onds w idi melodiou s poetry, enfeebled dialectical argum ents, and


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2 6 GROSSHANS

dulled m oral altitudes. Th e attraction to the occasio — the incidental and startling

political event withou t substance o r function — is responsib le for the rom antic 's

impressionable attitude towards actual historical events. In retrospect, roman-

tics m ad e audacious plans and bold prom ises. They mad e intimations and

held out prospects . . . . But the enorm ous possibilities that they had oppo sed to

history never becam e reality. In fact, they set themselves against history an d, as

untrustworthy and superficial

Utirateurs,

they substituted emotional states, per-

sonal experiences, and unco ntrolled day-dream ing for the reality of political life.

To illustrate his argu m ent, Schmitt exam ines die political rom antic ism of

Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1823) and Adam Muller (1779-1829). Bodi were

poor, drif ting troubadors who assumed one could speak in die name of hu-

manity and dius bring about the brotherhood of man widiout reference to

ealpolitik

They were irresponsible prophets, who argued diat feelings could

substitute for d ea r analysis. In dieir search for som e personally satisfying d oc-

trine, diey moved from one allegiance to anodier. Of Muller, Schmitt writes:

Because he was widiout his own center of gravity and not constrained by

matter-of-fact experience and his own responsibility, die consistency of die

view diat impressed him at any given time easily carried him to die extremes

of die pro gra m . Ultimately, such people be cam e servile functionaries, allow-

ing diemselves to be used by any political system.

Oakes observes that Schmitt's attack on romanticism was basically an attack

on bourgeois liberalism, diat political romanticism was die consummation of

die liberal mov em ent, diat die bourgeoisie became die bearer of die ro m antic

movement and romanticism die aesdietic of die liberal middle class. Once

diis liberal ord er lost die consciousness of die foun datio n of culture, its aware-

ness of die state of na tur e (die political), it began to formula te its ow n con cep t

of culture and attempted to free itself from die state and every restriction on

individual liberty. Liberalism diu s leads to a distrust of all political forces bu t

never produces on its own any positive dieory of

politics.

There is no liberal

politics, only a liberal critique of politics. Liberalism is concerned widi die

struggle against die power of die state in favor of individual freedom and pri-

vate property. Widi its emphasis on die detached, isolated, and emancipated

individual as die court of last resort, liberalism expresses itself as di e

revolutionary de m iur ge against history as die conservative dem iurg e. As

Schm itt writes: T he corrective to revolutionary license is die secon d

demiurge, history. It is die conservative god who restores what die odier has

revolutionized. It constitutes die general human community as die historically

concretized people, which becomes a sociological and historical reality by

means of diis delimitation and acquires die capacity to produce a particular

law and a particular language as die expression of its individual nationa l spirit.

Therefore, what a people is 'organically' and what die

Volksgeist

signifies can be

ascertained only historically. In ad dition , here die pe ople is not its own master,

as in Rousseau, but radier die result of historical development. The idea of an

arbitrary power over history is die real revolutionary idea.


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REVIEWS 217

Here is die crucial point in Schmitt's quarrel with political romanticism.

Along widi so many of his contemporaries, he was still at war widi the Enlight-

en m en t (diat vulgarization in die great style ) and d ie French Revolution.

Thus,

in


Schmitt calls on opponents of the Revolution —

Ed m un d Burke, Jo sep h d e Maistre, and Louis de Bonald — for supp ort of his

diesis diat die activity of die individual, based on rationalistic m axim s, can cre-

ate nodiing. It can only delay, destroy, and abrogate die natural course of

diings; but it cannot produce anything of perm anen ce. Th e Enlightenment's

denial of original sin inevitably led to dreams of a new religion, a new gospel, a

new creativity, and a new ar t Th e carrier of die rom antic virus was die m od em

bourgeoisie.

Recent interest in Schmitt is indicative of changes diat have taken place in

die past diree or four decades. Well into die 1940s and 1950s, conservative

diou ght was regarded as the province of cranks and anti-Semites. H ob bes was

considered an anomaly, while Maistre and Bonald were dismissed as sick

souls haun ted by die sou nds of die French revolutionary crowds. Even B urke,

who se writings were given m or e serious at tentio n, was seen prim arily as a foil

to balan ce di e discussion. Th e failures of die left, dissatisfaction widi m idd le-

class politics, bankrupt political leaders, etc. have created conditions widiin

which conservative diought has flourished.

Clearly, today die Western imagination is resting in shallow waters. But

diere is some stirring, and die debate over die meaning of politics may in die

future take interesting turns. There is enough material now available to study

Schmitt to determine what there is of value in his work diat may be useful in

und erstan ding die present concre te situation. It is ironic diat all diis will

take place widiin th e security of a bourg eois , liberal society still suffering

from die romantic ideas Schmitt deplored.

Henry Grosshans

Carl Schmitt nella Stampa Periodica Italiana (19 73-1986)* edi ted by

Centra Documentazione (Naples, 1986). 294 pp.

Before 1972 only a few Italian scholars were familiar widi Schmitt's work. In

August 1922 die manuscript of his

Die Diktatur

was destroyed when die fascists

attacked d ie prin ting h ouse of die socialist jo ur na l

Avanti.

This explains why

Schm itt was hardly known in Italy durin g die 1920s, wh en o nly two reviews of

his work


and

Die Diktatur)

were published. When fascist

culture soug ht to com e to term s widi National Socialism in die 1930's, interest

in Schmitt was renewed. But die m ain credit for know ledge of Schmitt in Italy

Translated by Camilla R. Nielsen

Telos Volume 1987 Issue 72 1987 [Doi 10.3817%2F0687072214] Grosshans, H. -- Political Romanticism

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Transcript of Telos Volume 1987 Issue 72 1987 [Doi 10.3817%2F0687072214] Grosshans, H. -- Political Romanticism