Task Force Report on Streamlining and Consolidating ... · oversight of DHS. Since the 9/11 report...

Task Force Report onStreamlining and ConsolidatingCongressional Oversight of the

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

September 2013

About the Annenberg Foundation Trust at SunnylandsThe Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands, which operates The Annenberg Retreat atSunnylands and Sunnylands Center & Gardens at Rancho Mirage, Calif., is an independent501(c)(3) nonprofit operating entity established by the Annenberg Foundation to hold high-levelretreats that address serious issues facing the nation and the world community and to educatethe public on the historical significance of Sunnylands. More information may be found online atwww.sunnylands.org.

About the Aspen Institute Justice & Society ProgramThe Justice & Society Program convenes individuals from diverse backgrounds to discuss justice and how a just society ought to balance fundamental rights with the exigencies of publicpolicy in meeting contemporary social challenges and developing the rule of law. The annualJustice & Society Seminar in Aspen, co-founded by Supreme Court Justice Harry A. Blackmun,continues to be led each summer by preeminent judges and law professors. JSP’s Washington,D.C.-based public programming component brings together public officials, established andemerging opinion leaders, and grass-roots organizers to share their perspectives in a neutral andbalanced forum. For more information, see www.aspeninstitute.org/jsp.

The Aspen Institute is an educational and policy studies organization based in Washington,D.C. Its mission is to foster leadership based on enduring values and to provide a nonpartisanvenue for dealing with critical issues. It has campuses in Aspen, Colo., and on the Wye River onMaryland’s Eastern Shore.

AT SUNNYL ANDS THE ANNENBERG RETREAT

Nearly a decade after the 9/11 Commissionissued its report on the greatest act of terrorismon U.S. soil, one of its most significant recommendations has not been acted upon.The call for consolidated Congressionaloversight of the U.S. Department ofHomeland Security (DHS) is, in the words ofCommission co-chair Thomas H. Kean,“maybe the toughest recommendation”because Congress does not usually reformitself.

To underscore the importance of thisreform, The Annenberg Foundation Trust atSunnylands and the Aspen Institute’s Justiceand Society Program convened a task forcein April 2013, including 9/11 Commission co-chairs Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, formerDHS officials under Presidents BarackObama and George W. Bush, and membersof Congress (Appendix). While the failure toreform DHS oversight may be invisible to thepublic, it is not without consequence or risk.Fragmented jurisdiction impedes DHS’ abilityto deal with three major vulnerabilities: the

threats posed by small aircraft and boats;cyberattacks; and biological weapons.

“I think we’ve been distinctly less securefrom a biological or chemical attack than wewould have been had we had a more rationaland targeted program of identifying the mostserious threats,” said former Sen. BobGraham (D., Fla.). As the 9/11 CommissionReport noted: “So long as oversight is governed by current Congressional rules andresolutions, we believe that the Americanpeople will not get the security they want andneed.”

Earlier work by policy groups such as theHeritage Foundation and BrookingsInstitution attests to the consensus that consolidated oversight of DHS is needed.Among the concerns: More than 100Congressional committees and subcommitteesclaim jurisdiction over it. In 2009, the department spent the equivalent of 66 work-years responding to Congressional inquiries.Moreover, the messages regarding homelandsecurity that come out of Congress sometimesappear to conflict or are drowned out

Streamlining and Consolidating Congressional Oversight of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 3

Task ForceExecutive Summary

Congressional leaders are best able to judge what committee should havejurisdiction over this department and its duties. But we believe that Congressdoes have the obligation to choose one in the House and one in the Senate,and that this committee should be a permanent standing committee with anonpartisan staff.

—9/11 Commission Report

altogether. As former DHS Secretary MichaelChertoff noted, “When many voices speak,it’s like no voice speaks.”

The task force recommends that:

● DHS should have an oversight structure that resembles the one governingother critical departments, such as Defenseand Justice.

● Committees claiming jurisdiction overDHS should have overlapping membership.

Since a new committee structure cannotbe implemented until the 114th Congress isseated in 2015, the task force also recommends these interim steps towardmore focused oversight:

● Time-limiting subcommittee referralsto expedite matters of national security.

● Passing, for the first time since formation of the department in 2002, anauthorization bill for DHS, giving the departmentclear direction from Congress.

4 Streamlining and Consolidating Congressional Oversight of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security

In 2002, the federal government’s third-largest department, the Department ofHomeland Security, was created by puttingunder one umbrella 22 departments andagencies, from the Coast Guard in theDepartment of Transportation to the BorderPatrol in the Department of Justice to the U.S. Secret Service in the TreasuryDepartment. In July 2004, the 9/11Commission issued 41 recommendations,including one that the Commission itselfnoted was among “the most important” butalso “the most difficult to realize” — reform ofCongressional oversight of the U.S.Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Inthe words of Commission co-chair Thomas H.Kean, “We had a number of members of thecommission like [co-chair and former Rep.Lee H.] Hamilton who had served in the body,and they all said the same thing: This may bethe toughest recommendation” becauseCongress doesn’t usually reform itself.1

The recommendation of the 9/11Commission addressed problems that hadcontributed to the United States’ vulnerabilityto attack on 9/11. Former Sen. Bob Graham(D., Fla.), co-chairman of the SenateIntelligence Committee on 9/11, recalls:

We found among other things that therehad been inadequate communicationamong the agencies with a responsibilityto alert us to a security threat. The FBIand the CIA had information which,had it been brought together, might wellhave allowed us to have avoided 9/11.2

The 9/11 Commission reached the sameconclusion. In the words of former Gov. Kean:

Before 9/11, Congress was not doingits job of oversight of the intelligenceagencies that were not doing the jobthemselves. That was one of the lessons of 9/11. This recommendation[resulted from asking the question],“How can we make sure that …Congress is in fact … doing the mostthat [it] can to protect [us]?”3

In the nine years since the 9/11Commission issued its findings, the vastmajority of its recommendations have beenimplemented in whole or in part. Not so theone urging the streamlining of Congressionaloversight of DHS. Since the 9/11 report waspromulgated, independent reports by a


Streamlining and ConsolidatingCongressional Oversight of the

U.S. Department of Homeland SecuritySo long as oversight is governed by current Congressional rules and resolutions, we believe that the American people will not get the securitythey want and need.


variety of groups – including the BipartisanPolicy Center, the Heritage Foundation, theBrookings Institution, George WashingtonUniversity’s Homeland Security PolicyInstitute, and the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies-Business Executivesfor National Security – have underscored theneed for oversight reform. They have charac-terized the current system as “balkanizedand dysfunctional” (CSIS-BENS, 2004)4,“jurisdiction … carved up to accommodateantiquated committee structures” (BPC,2011),5 “duplicative and wasteful” (HSPI,2004),6 a “crushing … failure” (Brookings,2006),7 and “byzantine” (Heritage, 2012).8

To raise awareness of the need forCongress to respond to this 9/11 Commissionrecommendation, The Annenberg FoundationTrust at Sunnylands and the Justice andSociety Program of the Aspen Institute, inpartnership with the Annenberg Public PolicyCenter of the University of Pennsylvania, convened a high-level bipartisan Task Force onStreamlining and Consolidating CongressionalOversight of the U.S. Department ofHomeland Security, in April 2013, at TheAnnenberg Retreat at Sunnylands in RanchoMirage, Calif. Among its members are 9/11Commission co-chairs Hamilton and Kean,former DHS officials under PresidentsBarack Obama and George W. Bush, andpast and present members of Congress (seeAppendix, p. 24).

The task force members examined fivequestions:

● Why does Congressional oversightmatter?

● What are the characteristics of aneffective oversight structure?

● How does fragmented oversight affect

the nation’s well-being and security?● What are the structural and political

barriers to reform?● What should be done now and when

the new Congress convenes in January 2015?

Drawing on the experience of its members as evidence, this report offers theSunnylands-Aspen Task Force’s answers.

Why Congressional Oversight Matters

Congress’ job is to look into every nookand cranny of the executive branch tosee that the laws are being properlyexecuted, to make suggestions [about]where improvements can be made. Tounderstand what the policy of theexecutive branch is. To try to be constructive and to be a critic as well ifthey don’t like what the executive isdoing. If it is properly done, if the rightquestions are asked, it can greatlystrengthen the operation of a department. … Proper, tough, robustoversight can put the bureaucracy onits toes, can make sure that the law isbeing implemented, can see thatthere’s not a lot of hanky-panky goingon, corruption. And to make sure thatthe people are being well served.9

—9/11 Commission co-chair and former Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D., Ind.)

“Properly executed” oversight, as formerDHS Secretary Michael Chertoff notes,enables members of Congress to better“understand the department that they’re looking at, understand the issues well, asksharp and informed questions and get answersthat are helpful in determining whether the


department or agency is performing mostefficiently.”10 Former Homeland SecurityAdviser Kenneth L. Wainstein agrees:Effective Congressional oversight “enhancesour national security” by helping “to informthe legislative process. The more Congressconducts oversight, the more [its members]understand the workings of the executivebranch, and the better the legislation thatthey produce, which assists the executivebranch in its efforts to protect the country.”11

“We oversee to make sure that they’redoing what we ask them to do — that’s thelaw,” observes Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D.,Calif.), a member of the House Committeeon Homeland Security. “We oversee them toknow that they’re not spending too much or toolittle money in an arena, that there’s no cor-ruption.”12

“Congressional oversight,” says formerRep. John Tanner (D., Tenn.), “is probably asimportant a function of Congress as anyother. … It has to do with the wise utilization ofwhatever resources come to the government.And it has to do at the end of the day with the confidence level people have … the confidencethat the government is actually functioning ina way that makes sense to people.”13

The Characteristics of an EffectiveCongressional Oversight Structure

Effective oversight occurs when correspondingcommittees in each House hold a departmentaccountable and use their power to ensurethat it has the authorizations and resources itrequires to accomplish its mission well and ina way that makes efficient use of tax dollars.

Congressional oversight is most constructive when a Congressional committeebuilds expertise and is in a position to see the

big picture, ensuring that existing legislationis implemented properly and new legislationresponds to evolving threats. For example,as Chertoff notes, “Over time the committeesin the defense area in Congress have hadquite a lot of influence on the direction ofdefense policy because there’s been a singlefocal point in each House for authorizingwhat the Department of Defense does.”14

The Constitution, in Article I, Section 9,provides, in part: “No Money shall be drawnfrom the Treasury, but in Consequence ofAppropriations made by Law.” This gives theCongress the power over federal spending.This legislative provision is broadly enforcedby laws, such as the Antideficiency Act, thatlimit what executive branch officials can dowith the funds given them.

As the size and role of government hasgrown, Congress has realized that it needs todivide policy deliberations from spending.Both Houses have established separateauthorizing and appropriations committees toachieve this. Programs and their administrationare to be funded through an annual


Congressional oversight is most constructive whena Congressional committeebuilds expertise and is in a position to see the big picture, ensuring that existing legislation is implemented properly andnew legislation responds to evolving threats.

appropriation process, while overseen andauthorized by a separate authorizing committee. The Congress exercises its “powerof the purse” through this authorization andappropriation of funds.

Most executive agencies are chieflyassociated with and scrutinized by a singlelegislative committee in each chamber ofCongress. For instance, the operations of theDepartment of Labor are principally overseenin the Senate by the Committee on Health,Education, Labor & Pensions and in theHouse of Representatives by the Committee

on Education & the Workforce. Likewise, thesetwo committees have the main responsibilityfor developing and drafting legislation relatingto the Department of Labor.

The same is true of most of the otherdepartments and agencies of the ExecutiveBranch. The State Department is closelyaligned with the House Committee onForeign Affairs and the Senate Committee onForeign Relations. As the following tableshows, major Cabinet departments correspondwith one or two substantive committees ineach chamber of Congress.


Department House Committee Senate Committeeor Agency

Agriculture Agriculture Agriculture,Nutrition & Forestry

Defense Armed Services/ Armed Services/Intelligence Intelligence

Education Education & Health, Education, Laborthe Workforce & Pensions

Energy Energy & Commerce Energy & NaturalResources

Justice Judiciary Judiciary

Labor Education & Health, Education, Laborthe Workforce & Pensions

Director of National Intelligence Intelligence Intelligence/CIA

State Foreign Affairs Foreign Relations

Treasury Financial Services/ Finance/Banking, Housing Ways and Means and Urban Affairs

Veterans’ Affairs Veterans’ Affairs Veterans’ Affairs

However, when jurisdiction is diffuse —asserted, in this case, by more than 100committees and subcommittees, each with adifferent mandate — good oversight is difficult. As Chertoff, DHS Secretary from2005 to 2009, said at Sunnylands:

A fragmented oversight structuremeans conflicting direction, maybeuncertainty about what Congresswants, and it certainly means a burdenof appearing at hearings or producingpaper for Congress that multiplies in a way that actually impedes the department’s ability to focus on itsoperations.15

The lack of alignment between the Houseand Senate committees claiming jurisdictionis problematic as well. Currently, the SenateHomeland Security and Governmental AffairsCommittee has less oversight of homelandsecurity than its counterpart, the HouseCommittee on Homeland Security. CarynWagner, who worked both on the HousePermanent Select Committee for Intelligenceand for DHS as Under Secretary forIntelligence and Analysis, explains the difficultycreated when House and Senate committeejurisdiction does not match up:

The House passes a bill and theSenate passes a bill. Then they gettogether in conference and come upwith one bill that ideally the presidentsigns into law. If you don’t have jurisdiction over the same elements,it’s really impossible to conference a comprehensive bill.16

How Fragmented Oversight Affectsthe Nation’s Well-Being and Security

The current state of DHS oversight hampersthe department’s functioning in three primaryways: redundant requests from committeesdrain valuable resources; the overlap of legislative roles complicates Congressionaloversight and results in less Congressionalcontrol; and that same fragmentation preventsCongress from addressing pressing concernsin a timely fashion.

1. A Drain on Resources

Forcing people who should be doingtheir jobs securing our homeland tospend more of their time reporting toCongress than doing their job is wrong.17

—Former Rep. and House RulesCommittee chair David Dreier (R., Calif.)

The complications created by fragmentedoversight were on vivid display in November2012 when a DHS official decided not to fulfill a request to testify before aCongressional committee. As Administratorof the Transportation Security Administration(TSA), a part of DHS, John S. Pistole oversees a 61,000-person workforce, thesecurity of more than 450 U.S. airports, andthe Federal Air Marshal Service, as well ashighway, railroad, port, mass-transit andpipeline security throughout the nation. Inlate 2012, he drew attention to the issue ofdivided oversight when he declined a requestby the House Subcommittee on Aviation totestify on passenger policies on the groundsthat the panel lacked jurisdiction over the TSA.

At that time, Pistole said the TSA wouldcontinue to work with its committees of


jurisdiction to pursue effective security solutions. What appeared to the TSA to be ameasured response to a redundant demandwas taken by the subcommittee as a symbolicfinger in the eye. While conceding that the sub-committee does not have “direct jurisdiction,”Rep. Bill Shuster (R., Pa.), the incoming chair,observed of the TSA, “When they impede thetraveling public, they need to answer to thecommittee.”18 Although the TSA head challenged the subcommittee’s jurisdiction,the Homeland Security Department’s InspectorGeneral’s office tacitly granted it by acceptingan invitation to testify at the same hearing.19

In the 112th Congress (2011-2013), TSApersonnel testified at 38 hearings and provided425 briefings for members of Congress,numbers consistent with the worry expressedin 2010 by then-Homeland Security SecretaryJanet Napolitano that:

Our principals and their staff [are]spending more time responding toCongressional requests and require-ments than executing their mandatedhomeland security responsibilities.20

Every request for a briefing or invitationto attend a hearing requires a commitment ofresources. By one estimate, no other agencyspends as much time on Capitol Hill as DHS.In 2007 and 2008, for example, officials atthe Department of Veterans Affairs, a depart-ment of comparable budget and size to DHS,testified at half the number of hearingsbefore just two committees, and gave lessthan one-tenth as many briefings as DHS.21

By contrast, Congress recently brought DHSofficials before five committees for almost adozen hearings on cybersecurity issues inless than a year, requesting answers to

dozens of redundant questions on networkprotection.22 Nonetheless, Congress has beenunable to pass a comprehensive cybersecuritybill.

“When you have different Congressionalcommittees all asking questions or conductingoversight into the same areas of an agency’soperations,” Wainstein says, “that meansthat their officials … who are responsible for,in the case of DHS, protecting the homeland[are] spending hours responding to redundantquestions. … That’s time that they’re not committing to protecting the nation.”23

In the 112th Congress, more than 100Congressional committees and subcommitteesasserted jurisdiction over DHS (comparedwith the 36 committees and subcommitteesthat oversee the Department of Defense,which has a budget 10 times greater and millions more employees). DHS personnelparticipated in 289 formal House and Senatehearings, involving 28 committees, caucusesand commissions, which required testimonyfrom more than 400 DHS witnesses. Thedepartment also participated in more than4,300 briefings and other non-hearingengagements with Congress.24


Every request for a briefing or invitation toattend a DHS hearingrequires a commitment of resources. By one estimate, no other agencyspends as much time onCapitol Hill as DHS.

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Think of having 100 bosses. Think ofreporting to 100 people. It makes nosense. You could not do your job underthose circumstances.25

—9/11 Commission co-chair and former New Jersey Gov. Tom Kean

Three buzzwords used in Washingtonare “accountability,” “disclosure,” and “transparency.” Those three words arethrown out all the time. If you look atthe notion of the people at theDepartment of Homeland Security beingaccountable, the difficult thing here is,to whom are they accountable?26

—David Dreier

These numbers understate the timecommitment required to respond effectively.Drafting testimony for each hearing typicallyrequires the work of two or three subject matter experts. The Office of LegislativeAffairs and the general counsel must reviewthe prepared remarks. Depending on theissue, senior managers may need to approvethe substantive content of the testimony. Oneor more preparation sessions are required.And after the hearing there typically will be aseries of questions for the record, for whichresponses must be drafted. One estimatesuggests that each hearing requires one month’s worth of person-hours of preparation.27 In 2009 alone, DHS spentroughly 66 work-years responding to questions from Congress, at a cost to taxpayers of $10 million.28

Rep. Lamar Smith (R., Texas), chair ofthe House Judiciary Committee, which oversees part of DHS, asserted in 2011 thatCongress meant to create a “purposefulredundancy” with its oversight.29 But as Kean

noted in a recent interview, “You can’t haveoversight with over 90 committees … [and]it’s gotten worse, not better. And so in thatarea, it continues to be dysfunctional. Andeverybody knows it.”30

So, for example, in the House theTransportation Committee, which usedto have the Coast Guard and FEMAunder its supervision, will continue totry to insert itself into supervising thoseparts of the Department of HomelandSecurity, even though there actually isa Homeland Security Committee that’ssupposed to look at the whole department. As a consequence it’s alittle bit like childhood soccer games.Everybody runs after the ball, and theywind up colliding into each other.31

—Former Homeland SecuritySecretary Michael Chertoff

2. Diminished Congressional Influence

The fractured system of Congressional oversight makes it difficult for Congress toenact substantive legislation guiding DHS.Emblematic of this difficulty: In the 10 yearssince it was established, DHS has never hada comprehensive authorization bill. Such legislation, routine for comparable agenciessuch as the Department of Defense, is theforum in which Congress sets its prioritiesand offers comprehensive policy direction toa department, while providing it with the legislation necessary to effectively performits daily operations. In the absence of such a bill, most DHS policy is made through the already overextended appropriations committees (a process that severely diminishesthe Congressional “imprint” on DHS),


through piecemeal authorizations such asthe SAFE Port Act, or through executiveinterpretation of statute.

“The authorizing legislation is the primary means by which the Congress tellsthe executive branch what it wants done,”Hamilton notes.32 “They write it into law in theauthorization law. Totally absent in theDepartment of Homeland Security. There’snever been an authorization bill. Why not?Because responsibility is so fragmented within the House and the Senate that theycan’t get a bill out. … What this means is thatthe power of the Congress is sharply diminished. And it shifts over to the executivebranch because they don’t have any guidance … from Congress.”

To get an authorization bill [for theCoast Guard] requires that bill to besent to a lot of committees becausethey have jurisdiction over portions ofthe bill. … In my four years as commandant of the Coast Guard, I didnot get an authorization bill in any year.So every year I was appropriatedmoney. But to the extent that therewere changes in law needed for howwe deal with oil spill response, thesafety of vessels, these kinds of things,there was no vehicle by which to makethose policy changes or seek changesin those laws for four years.33

—Thad Allen, retired Admiral and23rd Coast Guard Commandant

While DHS is not the only departmenthampered by the recent trend toward operatingthrough appropriation and continuing resolutions, the negative effect of this lack ofguidance on a relatively new department is

more severe. In the words of Caryn Wagner,DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence andAnalysis during President Obama’s first term,“The lack of an effective authorizationprocess for the Department headquarterscompounds the difficulties of the Departmentin maturing its foundational business processesand in properly structuring and resourcing itselfto achieve the type of synergy envisioned whenthe Department was created.”

Moreover, the messages regardinghomeland security that come out ofCongress sometimes appear to conflict orare drowned out altogether. With so manyCongressional voices dictating to DHS, thereis little cost to the department in ignoring themessages that it dislikes or the policies itwishes not to implement. As Chertoff puts it:“When many voices speak, it’s like no voicespeaks.”34

The [DHS] winds up getting a mixedmessage. … So either the departmenthas no guidance or, more likely, thedepartment ignores both becausethey’re in conflict. And so the depart-ment does what it wants to do.35

—Michael Chertoff


The fractured system ofCongressional oversightmakes it difficult forCongress to enact substantive legislation guiding the Department of Homeland Security.

Among the problematic results is areduced rather than enhanced Congressionalrole in protecting the homeland. So, forexample, a 2012 study examining the degreeof influence that Congress has over policy invarious federal departments and agenciesfound an inverse correlation between thenumber of committees exercising oversightof an agency and Congressional influence onpolicy matters. Indeed, looking at DHS, thestudy said that the “108 committees and sub-committees overseeing the Department ofHomeland Security may provide memberswith access to DHS resources but also affectthe ability of Congress to compete with presidential influence over the general directionof agency policy. Members overly focused onsecuring district resources … may be unwillingor unable to focus on the larger policy goals.”36

Proceeding hand-in-hand with the proliferation of oversight committees hasbeen a decline in interest in serving on theHouse Committee on Homeland Security. In theimmediate aftermath of 9/11, the magnitudeof that tragedy elicited a strong desire toserve on the Committee in order to enhance

the nation’s security and resilience. As thememories of 9/11 have dimmed and no comparable attack has occurred, interest inserving has waned.

In the beginning, the committee actuallywas populated with some of the appropriators and some of the chairmen or more senior members ofother committees that would have avested interest in making homelandsecurity a real being in the Congress.But after a while it became prettyapparent that those chairmen were notreally interested in vesting the realmeat of some of the problems in over-sight issues in the committee, and sosoon they fell off of the committee.They decided they didn’t want to be onit any longer, and it became populatedby people with less seniority, and todayhas many, many freshmen on it.37

—Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D., Calif.),Homeland Security Committee member

The erosion of interest in serving on theCommittee has been accompanied by a declinein the age, homeland-security experience, andinfluence of its members, and thus in the influence of the Committee itself. In the process,overall Congressional participation in DHS oversight has — at least in part — degeneratedinto turf battles, as indicated by the cases of biological and cybersecurity threats and unregulated vehicles noted below. Moreover,where other departments and agencies enjoythe benefits of having a champion on their primary committee, DHS does not.


The erosion of interest inserving on the Committeehas been accompanied by a decline in the age, homeland-security experience, and influenceof its members, and thus in the influence of theCommittee itself.

3. Delayed Response to PressingConcerns

In a fragmented structure, no one committeeis tasked with — and as a result accountablefor – seeing the big picture. At the same time,getting legislation passed is complicated bycompeting demands from multiple committeesand by a process that is filled with opportunitiesfor intervention by those whose interests arenot served by passage of the bill. Routinepieces of legislation that would enable theDepartment to function more effectively can takemonths to go through multiple committees withdiffering agendas, and may never be enacted.

I believe that the worst thing that happens by not concentrating oversightinto a committee like the HomelandSecurity Committee is that everybodyknows a little bit but nobody is really taking a look at the overall picture. Andthat’s very dangerous because that’show things fall between the cracks.38

—Rep. Loretta Sanchez

The Homeland Security Act was successful in creating a single subcommittee on appropriations forhomeland security. But the act … didn’t resolve overlapping jurisdictions,gaps in jurisdictions [on the authorizingstructure]. One of the things at the 10thanniversary of DHS that’s sorely neededis a baseline evaluation of all thosestatutes that were merely aggregatedagainst what we think Homeland Securityought to be 10 years later. And it’s hardto do that with the current oversight structure with multiple committees.39

—Thad Allen

During the retreat at Sunnylands, taskforce members identified vulnerabilities thathighlight the need to consolidate oversight assoon as possible: unregulated small aircraftand boats, cybersecurity, and biologicalthreats.

Unregulated Small Vehicles

Suppose I’ve got a small plane cominginto Teterboro. I walk out to the airportand get into the plane. I don’t gothrough any screening. The sameproblem occurs with boats. We have toget control of our air space and ourwaterways to make sure nothing thatcould harm us comes in by thatmethod.40

—Tom Kean

Task force members voiced concern thatDHS and Congress have not done enough toprotect against the prospect that small, general aviation aircraft and unregulated seavessels will transport weapons of massdestruction into the United States, be usedas weapons themselves (as were the planeson 9/11), or will transport individuals into thecountry intent on doing it harm. Admiral ThadAllen said that he spent years attempting toadvance draft legislation on small-vesselsecurity:

What size vessel should carry an identification device [of the sort]required on aircraft? Should there belicensing so you know who’s operatinga boat? Should there be areas wheresmall boats shouldn’t operate becauseof the vulnerable infrastructure that’s inthe area? … If you try to come up with


a framework to deal with unregulatedsmall boats and the vulnerabilities thatexist there, and you look at the numberof committees that would have to beinvolved, it becomes very, very hard.And frankly there hasn’t been anappetite to take this on.41

Cybersecurity

“A lot of our national leaders — militaryleaders, leaders of our intelligence agencies— think that one of the great growing threatsto American security are these cyberattacks,”notes former Rep. Howard Berman (D., Calif.).Meanwhile, efforts to combat cyberthreats,including those originating from countriessuch as China and Iran, have been caughtup in disputes over whether DHS or theNational Security Agency has authority. Taskforce members fear that divided jurisdictionover this complex issue has made it more difficult for the nation to respond effectively toa major cyberattack, with one participantpressing for much greater attention to the difficulties of managing the nation’s “virtualborder in a global commons.”42

The Armed Services Committee hasthoughts about the subject [of cyber-security]. The Homeland SecurityCommittee thinks this is about makingthe homeland more secure. … So it isharder to get a consensus. It’s harderto give the authority to the ExecutiveBranch to create the defense than itmight otherwise be. That’s a problem.43

—Former Rep. and Foreign AffairsCommittee chair Howard Berman

(D., Calif.)

The cyberthreat is a big threat to thiscountry. Congress can’t pass a bill onit. They’ve worked at it for years.They’ve not been able to agreebetween the House and Senate. …What that means is that the House andSenate – the Congress, if you will — isdeferring power to the president. Thepresident writes an executive order. Anexecutive order is not as good as apiece of legislation. It pertains to theexecutive branch. So there are limitationsto that.44

—Lee Hamilton

Cybersecurity is not an issue aboutpartisanship because many of the proposed bills have had bipartisansupport. It’s really an issue of so manydifferent committees that all have theirparticular interest and they can’t gettogether with a coherent plan to pass alaw to help protect the United Statesagainst very real cyberthreats.45

—Arif Alikhan, deputy executivedirector for law enforcement and

homeland security, Los Angeles WorldAirports

Attempts to clarify oversight have beenfrustrated. In 2005, for instance, a plan togive jurisdiction over cybersecurity to theHouse Homeland Security Committee wasmet by protests from the Energy & CommerceCommittee, and the matter was dropped.46

The seven Congressional committees thatclaim some jurisdiction over cybersecurityissues often clash, producing bills that conflict with one another by vesting jurisdictionin favored agencies within and outside DHS.The result: Bills are reported out of commit-


tee but fail to secure the needed votes on theHouse or Senate floor, or are so watereddown that they fail to address the threat.

For example, in 2012 the HouseHomeland Security Committee’s Promotingand Enhancing Cybersecurity and InformationSharing Effectiveness Act sought to givecybersecurity regulatory authority to DHS.But it competed with the House IntelligenceCommittee’s Cyber Intelligence Sharing andProtection Act, the House Oversight andGovernment Reform Committee’s FederalInformation Security Amendments, and theHouse Committee on Science, Space &Technology’s Cybersecurity EnhancementAct – all of which put the authority elsewhere.47

None got the traction to pass both houses ofCongress.

In April 2013, for the second year in a row,the House passed the Cyber IntelligenceSharing and Protection Act. But the Senatehas refused to vote on the measure.Senators now are reportedly drafting bills inat least three committees: Homeland Security,Commerce, and Intelligence.48

Biological Threats

The need for a more systematicapproach to bio-threats was voiced at theretreat by retired Sen. Bob Graham (D., Fla.),former co-chair of the Congressionally mandated Commission on the Prevention ofWeapons of Mass Destruction Proliferationand Terrorism, who said:

Unless the Congress is in a position tolook at an issue like biological attacksin a strategic way and not just focus onthe one piece of the problem that maybe within the jurisdiction of a particular

committee, you’re not likely to get itright, and the American people aretherefore more vulnerable to what theWMD Commission found to be the mostlikely weapon of mass destruction to beused.49

We haven’t been able to get Congressto act because the responsibility forsetting priorities for biological mechanismsis scattered in several committees andthey have disagreed as to which federalagencies should have the ultimateresponsibility for making these prioritydecisions and about how these decisions should be made. … If thecommittee is responsible for, say, theCenters for Disease Control, it wouldlike the responsibility to be in theCenters for Disease Control becausethen it would have oversight of it.50

Though experts say that only a dozen orso deserve close scrutiny, the federal government maintains a list of 75 biologicalthreats. Legislation recently introduced to prioritize those threats failed to pass. One ofthe primary reasons was disagreement overwhich agency will retain control. “We’ve beentrying,” Graham noted, “…to redo this list andhave those 12 or so that are the majorthreats put in a category where they will getthe highest level of attention and security. …We haven’t been able to do that because theCongress has the jurisdiction of theDepartment of Homeland Security in onecommittee and the jurisdiction of theDepartment of Health and Human Servicesin another, and they haven’t been able to decidewhich executive agency should have theresponsibility for managing this new list.”51


Structural and Political Barriers to Reform

Despite the advantages that would accrue tothe nation, task force members and otherexperts have noted roadblocks to consolidatingand streamlining DHS oversight. Chief amongthem: strong resistance from the chairs ofcommittees who would lose some of theirpower were oversight to be streamlined andthe challenge of capturing the media’s attention and the public’s imagination with anissue that at first glance appears remote frommost people’s lives.

Those seeking to reform oversight musttake into account the political realities thatundergird the jurisdictional structure. Serviceas chair of the House Committee onHomeland Security or the Senate HomelandSecurity and Governmental Affairs Committeeis unlikely to carry electoral payoffs, sinceenhancements to public safety are mostoften experienced at the national level ratherthan as specific benefits to a district or state.Moreover, if oversight reform is implemented,some existing committee chairs will losesome power and turf.

Members of Congress have tried tokeep as much of the power that theyhad historically through this concept oflegacy jurisdiction over the agencieseven though the agencies have technically been moved under anothercommittee.52

—Bob Graham

One of the things I concluded 20 yearsago was that members of Congresswould just as soon give up their first-born [as] give up jurisdiction over theexecutive branch in particular areas.53

—David Dreier

All of this suggests that the most promising strategy for reform lies in convincingCongressional leadership that it is the rightthing to do. Only a leadership convinced ofthe benefits to the country is likely to makesuch oversight reform happen.

Finally, the issue of Congressional oversight has long been seen as an “inside-the-Beltway” problem, one hidden beneath layers of procedure and mundane logistics.As a result, even though Congress’ failure toact may jeopardize the safety and security ofthe country, it has been difficult to mobilizepublic interest in remedying the problem.Former Rep. Dan Glickman (D., Kan.), executive director of the Aspen Institute’sCongressional program, recently observedthat the American people are most concerned with issues that affect their day-to-day lives, and that is why more peoplehave an opinion about the TSA than aboutmost other DHS component agencies.

Americans encounter DHS’ FEMA in timesof disaster, its Customs and Border Protectionduring international travel, and its CoastGuard employees in coastal communities andat sea. Yet a decade after DHS was formed,most Americans still don’t understand thedepartment’s “all hazards” mission, or how all


Americans should not settle for incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a systemdesigned generations ago for a world that no longer exists.


its components fit together. As a result, the public is unlikely to tell members ofCongress that they ought to reform theoversight structure of DHS. And an issueinvolving oversight is, admittedly, a distinctlyunsexy topic, far less likely than others to capture media attention.

What Should Be Done Now andWhen the New Congress Convenesin January 2015

To meet the ongoing security challenges ourcountry faces, the task force recommendsspecific actions by the executive and legislativebranches, as well as a role for the media:

1. Congress

Fragmented oversight, the task forceconcluded, increases security risks for theUnited States by reducing the coherence ofour national focus on prevention, protectionand planning at a time when more needs tobe done. Under the current arrangement,retired Coast Guard Admiral and task forcemember Thad Allen said, Congress all toooften “engages in random acts of after-sight.”

Consistent with the 9/11 Commission’srecommendation, this report has argued:

To ensure that the oversight processworks efficiently, Congress should significantly reduce the number ofcommittees with jurisdiction overhomeland security and consolidate primary oversight of the key DHS component agencies under one committee in the House and one in theSenate, with coordinated jurisdiction.

Task force members were united in theconviction that:

Consolidating Congressional oversightof DHS would enhance accountability.

If it is to function effectively, such over-sight should be consistent with that ofCabinet departments that bear similarlevels and kinds of responsibility forthe safety and resilience of Americansin the face of both man-made and natural threats and disasters.

The task force believes that the oversightprocess in both houses should be significantlystreamlined and the Senate and House oversight structures aligned with each otherto the extent possible.

The task force noted that previous studiesagree that streamlined Congressional oversight of DHS would benefit the nation.Their reform proposals include separatingthe supervision of DHS’ immigration andhomeland security roles and retaining themain oversight committees while cancelingthe jurisdiction of other Congressional committees considered redundant.



This task force believes that Congress isbest positioned to decide which structurebest satisfies the 9/11 Commission’s goal.But it recommends that any structure be consistent with the following principles:

● The oversight structure for DHSshould resemble the one governingother critical departments, such as thedepartments of Defense and Justice.● Congress should align the jurisdictional oversight of the Houseand Senate committees to the greatestextent possible.● Committees claiming common jurisdiction should have some over -lapping membership to encourage thesharing of information and curtailredundant requests.

The consolidation and simplification ofoversight depends largely upon Congressionalleadership. The best chance for major reformcomes during reorganization at the beginningof a new Congress. In the meantime, thereare ways that Congress can enhance theeffectiveness of oversight without requiringcommittees to relinquish jurisdiction. Forinstance, it can pass authorizing legislationand ensure expedited action by imposingtime limits on committee referrals.

Pass Authorizing Legislation The needto pass authorizing legislation extendsbeyond DHS. By some estimates thecountry is operating with approximately$400 billion of spending unauthorizedannually. As this report contends,passing authorizations improvesCongressional oversight and prioritizesprograms within DHS. When large

segments of the Department ofHomeland Security operate with“unauthorized appropriations,” theadministration is able to set its prioritiesunguided by Congress and might notbe spending money on programs thatCongress considers important.

Limit the Time for Action When a billcomes under the jurisdiction of multiplecommittees that ask to review it insequence after the primary committeeacts, the process is all but stoppedawaiting committee action unless thereis a time limit on the referrals. Timemay run out with nothing enacted. Thetask force believes that Congressshould limit the time for action ofsequential referrals to another committee,ensuring that if committees fail to acton what has been sent to them withina set period of time their jurisdictionwould lapse, with the matter returningto the primary committee.

2. The Executive

The White House could increase the likelihood that pressing issues move onto thenational and Congressional agenda by creatinga more robust role for the Homeland SecurityAdviser, and by placing the Secretary ofHomeland Security on the National SecurityCouncil.

3. Media and Public Information

If Kean is correct that Congress is unlikelyto reform itself, then reform must be jump- started by external demand. As shown by thecountry’s experience with the Boston

Marathon bombing, recent ricin threats againstpublic officials, and natural disasters fromHurricane Sandy to the May 2013 Oklahomatornado, the fourth estate has a vital role toplay in informing the public about nationalsecurity concerns, and the nation’s editorialpages have the capacity to increase the likelihood that Congress will see the wisdomof implementing this important recommendationof the 9/11 Commission Report.

The Bottom Line

In sum, while reform of Congressional oversight can’t make the nation 100 percentsafe, it is a key component of any nationaleffort to manage evolving threats. We closewith the words of two task force members:

We have a really important issue. Howdo we keep America secure? And wehave a structure in the Congress thatmakes it harder to maintain that focuson that very important issue. And that’snot good.54

—Howard Berman

If the [oversight] recommendation ofthe 9/11 Commission on HomelandSecurity is put into law and becomeseffective, the American people in theirpursuit of their daily lives will besafer.55

—Lee Hamilton


NOTES

1 Lee H. Hamilton and Thomas H. Keaninterview, 6 April 2013, The AnnenbergRetreat at Sunnylands.2 Bob Graham interview, 1 August 2013,New York, N.Y.3 Thomas Kean interview, 12 August 2013,Far Hills, N.J.4 “Untangling the Web: CongressionalOversight and the Department of HomelandSecurity,” 10 December 2004, Center forStrategic and International Studies-BusinessExecutives for National Security.5 “Tenth Anniversary Report Card: The Statusof the 9/11 Commission Recommendations,”September 2011, Bipartisan Policy Center.6 “Consolidating the House’s HomelandSecurity Efforts: The Time to Act Is Now,” 29December 2004, George WashingtonUniversity Homeland Security Policy Institute.7 Norman J. Ornstein and Thomas E. Mann,“When Congress Checks Out,” November/December 2006, Brookings Institution.8 Jessica Zuckerman, “Politics OverSecurity: Homeland Security CongressionalOversight In Dire Need of Reform,” 10September 2012, the Heritage Foundation.See also “Stopping the Chaos: A Proposal forReorganization of Congressional Oversightof the Department of Homeland Security,” 4 November 2010, the Heritage Foundation.9 Lee Hamilton interview, 8 August 2013,Bloomington, Ind.10 Michael Chertoff interview, 6 April 2013,The Annenberg Retreat at Sunnylands.11 Kenneth Wainstein interview, 6 April2013, The Annenberg Retreat at Sunnylands.12 Loretta Sanchez interview, 17 July 2013,Washington, D.C.

13 John Tanner interview, 16 July 2013,Washington, D.C.14 Michael Chertoff interview, 25 July 2013,Washington, D.C.15 Michael Chertoff interview, 6 April 2013,The Annenberg Retreat at Sunnylands.16 Caryn Wagner interview, 16 July 2013,Washington, D.C.17 David Dreier interview, 19 July 2013, LosAngeles, Calif.18 Jeff Plungis, “TSA to Mica: You Have NoJurisdiction,” Bloomberg, 27 November 2012,http://go.bloomberg.com/political-capital/2012-11-27/tsa-to-mica-you-have-no-jurisdiction/.19 Jim Barnett, “TSA Chief Will be a ‘NoShow’ at Congressional Hearing,” CNN, 29November 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/28/politics/tsa-friction.20 “Inside Washington: DHS MostOverseen Department,” Associated Press,17 May 2011, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=136382414.21 Sarah Laskow, “Is Congress Failing onHomeland Security Oversight?” Center forPublic Integrity, 16 July 2009, http://www.publ ic in tegr i ty.org /2009/07/16/2822/congress-failing-homeland-security-oversight. 22 Aliya Sternstein, “House HomelandSecurity Lawmakers Request Sole Oversight,”Nextgov, 25 January 2012, http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2012/01/house-homeland-security-lawmakers-request-sole-oversight-of-dhs/50515/.23 Kenneth Wainstein interview, 16 July2013, Washington, D.C. 24 Data provided by the DHS Office ofLegislative Affairs.25 Thomas Kean interview, 12 August 2013,Far Hills, N.J.26 David Dreier interview, 19 July 2013, LosAngeles, Calif.


27 DHS, Office of Legislative Affairs InternalAnalysis (2007).28 “Inside Washington: DHS MostOverseen Department,” Associated Press,17 May 2011, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=136382414.29 Jeff Plungis, “TSA to Mica: You Have NoJurisdiction,” Bloomberg, 27 November 2012,http://go.bloomberg.com/political-capital/2012-11-27/tsa-to-mica-you-have-no-jurisdiction/.30 Thomas Kean interview, 12 August 2013,Far Hills, N.J.31 Michael Chertoff interview, 25 July 2013,Washington, D.C.32 Lee Hamilton interview, 8 August 2013,Bloomington, Ind. 33 Thad Allen interview, 17 July 2013,Washington, D.C.34 Michael Chertoff interview, 6 April 2013,The Annenberg Retreat at Sunnylands.35 Michael Chertoff interview, 25 July 2013,Washington, D.C.36 Joshua D. Clinton, David E. Lewis, and JenSelin, “Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Ironyof Congressional Oversight,” Center for theStudy of Democratic Institutions, 3 May 2013,http://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/research/cls_csdiwp_5_2012.pdf.37 Loretta Sanchez interview, 6 April 2013,The Annenberg Retreat at Sunnylands.38 Loretta Sanchez interview, 17 July 2013,Washington, D.C.39 Thad Allen interview, 17 July 2013,Washington, D.C.40 Thomas Kean interview, 12 August 2013,Far Hills, N.J.41 Thad Allen interview, 17 July 2013,Washington D.C.42 Thad Allen interview, 6 April 2013, TheAnnenberg Retreat at Sunnylands.43 Howard Berman interview, 19 July 2013,

Los Angeles, Calif.44 Lee Hamilton interview, 8 August 2013,Bloomington, Ind.45 Arif Alikhan interview, 19 July 2013, LosAngeles, Calif.46 A draft report for the Sunnylands-AspenTask Force, 17 March 2013, prepared byWilliam Pitts, who was chief policy adviser toformer Rep. Robert Michel (R., Ill.) and chiefof staff to former House Rules CommitteeChair Rep. David Dreier (R., Calif.).47 Mickey McCarter, “House to Vote on 4Cybersecurity Bills But Not Homeland SecurityCommittee Measure,” Homeland SecurityToday, 23 April 2012, http://www.hstoday.us/industry-news/general/single-article/house-to-vote-on-4-cybersecurity-bills-but-not-homeland-security-committee-measure/1be33a8fe12129b1bf5e87c40da1c40a.html.48 Jason Koebler, “ACLU: CISPA Is Dead(For Now),” U.S. News & World Report, 25April 2013, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/04/25/aclu-cispa-is-dead-for-now.Chloe Albaneisus, “Senate Will Not ConsiderCISPA, Citing Privacy,” PC Magazine, 26 April2013, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2418228,00.asp.49 Bob Graham interview, 6 April 2013, TheAnnenberg Retreat at Sunnylands.50 Bob Graham interview, 1 August 2013,New York, N.Y.51 Bob Graham interview, 6 April 2013, TheAnnenberg Retreat at Sunnylands.52 Bob Graham interview, 1 August 2013,New York, N.Y.53 David Dreier interview, 19 July 2013, LosAngeles, Calif.54 Howard Berman interview, 19 July 2013,Los Angeles, Calif.55 Lee Hamilton interview, 8 August 2013,Bloomington, Ind.


Arif AlikhanThad Allen

Howard BermanMichael Chertoff

David DreierBob Graham

Lee H. Hamilton

Juliette KayyemThomas H. Kean Sr.

Loretta SanchezJohn Tanner

Caryn A. WagnerKenneth L. Wainstein

Appendix

Task Force on Streamlining and ConsolidatingCongressional Oversight of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Task Force Members

Meryl Justin Chertoff Kathleen Hall JamiesonRetreat Organizers

Biographical Information on RetreatParticipants and Organizers

Arif Alikhan Counterterrorism and homeland securityexpert Arif Alikhan joined Los Angeles WorldAirports as the new deputy executive directorfor law enforcement and homeland security onNov. 7, 2011. Prior to that, Alikhan was aDistinguished Professor of Homeland Securityand Counterterrorism at National DefenseUniversity in Washington, D.C. Alikhan previously served as assistant secretary forpolicy development at the U.S. Department ofHomeland Security. His federal service alsoincludes 10 years with the U.S. Department ofJustice as a federal prosecutor and senioradviser to two U.S. attorneys general oncybercrime and intellectual property.

Thad Allen Thad Allen is senior vice president of theVirginia-based consulting firm Booz Allen

Hamilton. Allen supports the firm’s work withthe departments of Justice and HomelandSecurity. Allen completed his distinguishedcareer in the U.S. Coast Guard as its 23rdcommandant. Prior to that assignment, Allenserved as Coast Guard chief of staff. Duringhis tenure in that post, in 2005, he was designated principal federal official for theU.S. government’s response and recoveryoperations in the aftermath of hurricanesKatrina and Rita in the Gulf Coast region.

Howard Berman Howard Berman is a former representativefrom California who served 15 consecutiveterms in the U.S. House of Representativesfrom 1982 to 2012. In 2008, he was appointedchairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee.In addition, Berman served on the JudiciaryCommittee and the Subcommittee onImmigration, Citizenship, Refugees, BorderSecurity & International Law.


Meryl Justin Chertoff Meryl Justin Chertoff is director of the AspenInstitute’s Justice and Society Program andan adjunct professor of law at GeorgetownLaw. From 2006 to 2009, Chertoff was directorof the Sandra Day O’Connor Project on theState of the Judiciary at Georgetown Law.She served in the Office of Legislative Affairsat the Federal Emergency ManagementAgency, participating in the agency’s transition into the Department of HomelandSecurity. Chertoff has been director of NewJersey’s Washington, D.C., office under twogovernors, and legislative counsel to thechair of the New Jersey State AssemblyAppropriations Committee.

Michael Chertoff Michael Chertoff served as secretary of theU.S. Department of Homeland Security from2005 to 2009. He is chairman and co-founderof the Chertoff Group. At the Chertoff Group,Chertoff provides high-level strategic counselto corporate and government leaders on abroad range of security issues, from riskidentification and prevention to preparedness,response, and recovery. Before heading theDepartment of Homeland Security, Chertoffserved as a federal judge on the U.S. Courtof Appeals for the Third Circuit.

David Dreier David Dreier was elected to Congress fromCalifornia in 1980 and became a member ofthe House leadership when he took the helmof the House Committee on Rules in 1999.As the youngest Rules chairman, he playeda pivotal role in fashioning legislation fordebate in the House. He authored the 1995Congressional reform package. He is amember of the Council on Foreign Relations

and serves on the board of the InternationalRepublican Institute. Dreier is the foundingchairman of the House DemocracyPartnership and the founding chair of theCongressional Trade Working Group.

Bob Graham Bob Graham is the former two–term governorof Florida and served for 18 years in the U.S.Senate. Graham retired from public servicein January 2005, following his presidentialcampaign in 2004. After retiring from publiclife, Graham spent a year as a senior fellowat the Harvard Kennedy School of Government.In recent years, he was appointed byPresident Obama and served as co-chair ofthe National Commission on the BPDeepwater Horizon Oil Spill and OffshoreDrilling. This followed his service as a commissioner on the Financial Crisis InquiryCommission, as chairman of the Commissionon the Prevention of Weapons of MassDestruction Proliferation and Terrorism, andon the CIA External Advisory Board.

Lee H. Hamilton Lee H. Hamilton is director of the Center onCongress at Indiana University. He served inthe U.S. House of Representatives from 1965to 1999, representing Indiana’s 9th District.Since retiring from Congress, Hamiltonremains at the center of efforts to addresssome of the nation’s major homeland securityand foreign policy challenges. He served asvice chair of the 9/11 Commission, co-chairof the Iraq Study Group, and co-chair of theU.S. Department of Energy’s Blue RibbonCommission on America’s Nuclear Future. Heis a member of the President’s IntelligenceAdvisory Board, the President’s HomelandSecurity Advisory Council, the CIA External


Advisory Board, and the U.S. Department ofHomeland Security Task Force on Preventingthe Entry of Weapons of Mass Effect onAmerican Soil.

Kathleen Hall Jamieson Kathleen Hall Jamieson is the ElizabethWare Packard Professor of Communicationat the Annenberg School for Communicationand Walter and Leonore Annenberg Directorof the Annenberg Public Policy Center at theUniversity of Pennsylvania. She is a fellow ofthe American Academy of Arts and Sciences,the American Philosophical Society, theAmerican Academy of Political and SocialScience, and the International CommunicationAssociation. Jamieson is the author or co-author of 16 books. She is co-founder ofFactCheck.org, founder of the new politicalliteracy site FlackCheck.org, and programdirector of The Annenberg Retreat atSunnylands.

Juliette Kayyem Juliette Kayyem is a lecturer in public policyat the Harvard Kennedy School ofGovernment, a former national security andforeign policy columnist for The BostonGlobe, and a former contributor to CNN. Sheserved President Obama as AssistantSecretary for Intergovernmental Affairs at theDepartment of Homeland Security. Sheserved as co-chair of the Congressionallymandated Preparedness Task Force, and asa member of President Obama’s Task Forceon Puerto Rico and the Defense Department’sCouncil of Governors. Before joining theObama Administration, Kayyem served asMassachusetts Gov. Deval Patrick’s homelandsecurity adviser.

Thomas H. Kean Sr. Tom Kean served as president of DrewUniversity from 1990 to 2005 and as governorof New Jersey from 1982 to 1990. In 1986,he was re-elected governor by the largestmargin in state history. Prior to serving asgovernor, Kean was a member of the NewJersey Assembly from 1968 to 1977. In 2002,President George W. Bush named Kean aschairman of the 9/11 Commission. He headed the American delegation to the U.N.Conference on Youth in Thailand, was vicechairman of the American delegation to theWorld Conference on Women in Beijing, andserved as a member of the President'sInitiative on Race.

Loretta Sanchez Congresswoman Loretta Sanchez was firstelected to the House of Representatives in1996, and is currently serving her ninth termas the representative for California's 46thDistrict. Sanchez is the second highest-rankingDemocrat on the House Armed ServicesCommittee. She is the ranking member of theTactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee.Rep. Sanchez is also a senior member of theSubcommittee on Strategic Forces. She isfounder and co-chair of the Women in theMilitary Caucus and is the highest-rankedfemale on the Armed Services Committee.She also serves on the House Committee onHomeland Security, where she is the second-ranked Democrat and most senior femalemember.

John Tanner John Tanner is vice chairman of Prime PolicyGroup. He joined the firm after serving in theU.S. House of Representatives for 22 years,representing Tennessee’s 8th District. In


Congress, Tanner served on the HouseForeign Affairs Committee and the Ways &Means Committee. He also served on theHouse Armed Services and House ScienceCommittees and served as Chief DeputyWhip for the Democratic Congress in the109th, 110th, and 111th Congresses. InNovember 2008, Tanner was elected to atwo-year term as president of the NATOParliamentary Assembly.

Caryn A. Wagner Caryn Wagner served as Under Secretary forIntelligence and Analysis in the Departmentof Homeland Security from 2010 to 2012.She served on the intelligence agencyreview team of the Obama-Biden TransitionProject. She retired from federal service fromthe House Permanent Select Committee onIntelligence on Oct. 1, 2008, for which sheserved as budget director and cybersecuritycoordinator. Prior to that, Wagner served inthe Office of the Director of NationalIntelligence as an assistant deputy director of

National Intelligence for Management and wasthe first chief financial officer for the NationalIntelligence Program. Her final position wasthat of the senior Defense IntelligenceAgency Representative to Europe.

Kenneth L. Wainstein Kenneth L. Wainstein is co-chair of the business fraud group at the law firm ofCadwalader, Wickersham & Taft. In 2008,after 19 years at the Justice Department,Wainstein was named homeland securityadviser by President George W. Bush. Priorto his White House service, he was twicenominated and confirmed for leadershippositions in the Justice Department. In 2006,the U.S. Senate confirmed him as the firstAssistant Attorney General for NationalSecurity. In 2004, he was appointed, andlater confirmed, as the U.S. attorney inWashington, D.C. In 2001, he was appointeddirector of the Executive Office for U.S.Attorneys, where he provided oversight andsupport to the 94 U.S. Attorneys' Offices.


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