Task Force 150 anti-piracy operations Commodore Per Bigum ...

Task Force 150 anti-piracy operations

Commodore Per Bigum Christensen

25. January 2009

UNCLASSIFIEDReady TogetherCombined Maritime Forces 1


Danish Task Group commandingCombined Task Force 150

15. September 2008 – 12. January 2009

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Flagship HDMS ABSALON


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Agenda

• TF150 mission, priorities and geo strategic situation

“Th i ”• “Thesis”

• Characteristics of pirates and their tactics

• Counter piracy tactics• Counter piracy tactics

• Coordination with non-coalition naval forces

• Recommendations to shipping• Recommendations to shipping

• Conclusion and next step


Agenda









CFMCC task organization

CFMCC

Supported CommandersSupported Commanders

DCFMCC

CTF – 152Central & Southern Arabian Gulf

Iraqi MaritimeNorthern Arabian Gulf

CTF – 150Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of

Oman and Arabian Sea

CTF – 151Mission Specific –within CMF AOR

Supporting CommandersSupporting Commanders

CTF- 59CM

CTF- 561Special

Operations

CTF- 56Ordnance Disposal

CTF- 54Submarines

CTF- 55Patrol Boats

CTF- 57Maritime Patrol

CTF- 50CSG

CTF- 51ESG


CTF- 53Logistics

CFMCC is a true Coalition: C2 spans all Coalition members and U.S. forces often operate under non-

U.S. leadership

TF 150 mission

CTF 150 is to counter or defeat acts of violent extremism, aggression and associated terrorist networks in littoral and maritime TF 150 AOR. Work with regional, joint and other partners to improve overall security, stability and regional nations maritime capabilities. Be ready to respond to full range of crises, including environmental and humanitarian events UFN IOT achieve secure and stable maritime environment free from terrorist activity.


Piracy

• International problem that requires international solution

• Ultimate solution is ashore in Somalia• Ultimate solution is ashore in Somalia– Establish conditions that preclude criminal activity at sea and ashore– Stability, security, economic prosperity, governance, rule of law

• Piracy is about money – no ties to terrorism – yet

• Historical perspective in Somalia– < 1991 Piracy controlled by functional Coast Guard / Navy– 1991-1995 UNOSOM maintains maritime security– 1995-2000 Somali fishermen begin armed clashes with foreign fishing vessels– 2000-2004 Somali militias board / seize international fishing vessels– 2000-2004 Somali militias board / seize international fishing vessels– 2005-2007 Eastern clan seizes 31 vessels as far as 200nm from east coast

Shipping lanes moved from 50nm to 200nm off coast – Aug 2008 Sharp spike in piracy in Gulf of Aden – northern clan


Geo Strategic Situation

1000 NM

1000 NM

27 regional nations (14 with coastline)3 chokepoints16 8 million km2

1000 NM

16.8 million km2

80% of global energy reservesReligious center for 1.5 billion Muslims23.000 ships passing the Gulf of Aden


Traffic in Gulf of Aden (MAR 08)


Traffic in Gulf of Aden (JAN 09)


TF150 operations – 23 Sep

OAK HILLBADR

ABSALON

IROQUOISCHATHAM

CDT BIROT

ABSALON

MYS TG

PVST

DIRECT SUPPORT TO CTF150

ASSOCIATED SUPPORT TO CTF150J LENTHALL

COURBET


NATIONAL TASKING

HALSEYVILLE DE QUEBEC

TF150 operations – 17 Nov

YUUDACHI TIPPU SULTAN

HAMANA

MVP

CUMBERLAND

TABAR

MVP

KARLSRUHE

MAHAWANGSA MASON

VARAL DAMMAM

NIVOSE

PVST

DIRECT SUPPORT TO CTF 150

ASSOCIATED SUPPORT TO CTF 150ABSALON COURBET

NEUSTRASHIMY

KENTDE LA PENNE


NATIONAL/NATO TASKING

VELLA GULF

DE RUYTER

TG 432.01

NEUSTRASHIMY NORTHUMBL. WAVE KN.

TF150 operations – 18 Dec

TIPPU SULTAN

TOWADA

TIPPU SULTAN

ARIAKE

GOKOVAGORKOVAJEAN DE VIENNE

MYSORESRI INDERA SAKTI NEUSTRASHIMY

DILIGENCEABHAYELNYA

PVST

DIRECT SUPPORT TO CTF 150

ASSOCIATED SUPPORT TO CTF 150

ABSALON

WAVE KN.

KARLSRUHE

MASONPORTLAND

PSARA.

PRE M LHER

MVP

YELNYA


NATIONAL TASKING

NORTHUMBL.

NIVOSE EU

PRE M LHER

Agenda










Thesis: A combination of international focus, naval ,forces intervention and improved self protections measures from merchant vessels is now keeping the piracy in Gulf of Aden at bay - maintaining a more safepiracy in Gulf of Aden at bay - maintaining a more safe but fragile situation from where medium to long term efforts can and must be implemented.


Agenda









Piracy activity

15 Sep. 2008 – 12 Jan. 2009

62 attacks of which 20 were successful!


Piracy characteristics and tactics

• Somalian pirates constitute a limited number of more experienced seamen and pan unlimited number of “soldiers” – uneducated and unable to understand the situation

• Pirates are recruited from different small villages in Puntland/Somalia, mainly from fishing societies andfrom fishing societies and with Xabo and Calulla as the origin of the piracy activities. Piracy team members normally knowmembers normally know each others

• Combination of old and young men and boys



• Some preparation and training are conducted. There is a standard for organising and equipping the teams, and they have a code of conduct. Discipline is high –p gpunishment is severe.

• Direct connection between sea state and piracy activities (very littlepiracy activities (very little activity in sea state above 1.0 m)

• Pirates have become more determined but not

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more determined, but not more violent

More than 90% of all piracy i id t d i d


incidents occur during day light hours.


• Pirate leaders know they are “safe” when onboard and in

t l f M/Vcontrol of M/V• When met with with over-

whelming force all pirates in ll kiff illi tsmall skiffs are willing to

surrender. Only dhow mother ships have resisted apprehensionapprehension

• Reappearance (repeat offenders) of pirates rarely observedobserved



• Pirates use different kinds of mother vessels to disguise their movementsdisguise their movements and for element of surprise. AIS-information is most likely utilized from the larger mother ships.

• Pirates coordinate their attacks. Cell phonesPi t l d h• Pirates leaders ashore or in larger mother ships are using spoofing/fake distress calls etc.d st ess ca s etc

According to IMB:Risk for attack 1:340Risk for being hijacked 1:907


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Weapons and equipment used


Pirates Attack Multiple Times

Overseas Hercules

STX Ace 6

Ginga Saker


Agenda









Piracy activity20 OCT: ABS helo and rhib fires warning shots. Pirates looses skiffs, ladder and RPG.

13 DEC: MYS detains 12 pirates.

04 NOV: ABS disarms 10 pirates.

07 NOV: CMB disarms 8 pirates.

17 DEC: ABS disarms 9 pirates.

19 DEC: JDV disarms 7 pirates.

02 JAN: MYS disarms 7 pirates

20 SEP: ABS disarms 10 pirates.

disarms 8 pirates.

11 NOV: CMB disarms a total of 31 pirates in 2 incidents.

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S t b D bN b JO t bSeptember

17 SEP: ABS detains 10 pirates.

December

03 NOV: ABS disarms 10 pirates

25 DEC: KAR foils attack and disarms 4 pirates.

November January

04 JAN: JDV

October

16 NOV: Update to Commanders guidance and intent for MSPA

02 OCT: BRT disarms 12 pirates.

disarms 10 pirates.

30 NOV: JDV disarms 4 pirates.

04 DEC: ABS disarms 7 pirates.

02 JAN: ABS detains 5 and disarms 19 pirates

04 JAN: JDV detains 19 pirates

Kinetic encounter

Hijacking


and intent for MSPA operations. 18 NOV: TAB destroys

Ekawatnava 5.01 JAN: LHR detains 8 pirates

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Failed Attack

Encountered pirates (1)

Date UnitNo of pirates Rifles

RPG launchers

Other arms Ladders Action taken

17SEP08 TF150 10 8 1 0 2 Detained – later released, 1 skiff and 1 mother ship destroyed

20SEP08 TF150 10 9 1 2 2 Disarmed

02OCT08 TF150 12 ? ? ? ? Disarmed

20OCT08 TF150 ? ? 1 ? 1 1 skiff destroyed

03NOV08 TF150 10 2 0 0 1 Disarmed

04NOV08 TF150 10 8 1 0 0 Disarmed

07NOV08 NATO 8 6 1 0 0 Disarmed, 1 skiff destroyed

11NOV08 NATO 16 7 1 0 1 Disarmed, 1 skiff destroyed

11NOV08 NATO 9 5 1 1 1 7 detained, 2 killed - 1 skiff confiscated

18NOV08 TAB ? ? ? ? ? Hi-jacked vessel destroyed, killing all but one.

30NOV08 TF150 4 4 0 0 0 Disarmed - 1 skiff destroyed

04DEC08 TF150 7 5 1 0 0 Detained, 1 skiff destroyed

13DEC08 MYS 12 7 1 3 0 Detained, 1 skiff confiscated

17DEC08 TF150 9 5 1 1 1 Disarmed, 1 skiff destroyed

19DEC08 TF150 7 5 2 0 1 Disarmed

25DEC08 EU 4 3 1 1 0 Disarmed

01JAN09 TF150 8 6 1 0 2 Detained

02JAN09 MYS 7 ? ? ? ? Disarmed


02JAN09 TF150 5 ? ? ? 1 Detained . 1 skiff destroyed

Encountered pirates (2)

Date UnitNo of pirates Rifles

RPG launchers

Other arms Ladders Action taken

02JAN09 TF150 7 3 1 0 1 Disarmed

02JAN09 TF150 3 3 0 2 0 Disarmed

04JAN09 TF150 10 6 1 0 1 Detained, 2 skiffs confiscated

04JAN09 TF150 9 5 1 0 1 Detained, 1 skiff confiscated

Total 177 97 17 10 16 14 skiffs destroyed or confiscated, 3 motherships retaken

Of the 177 pirates encountered 063 were handed over to authorities107 were released after disarming002 died005 are still in custody in TF150 unit

No confirmed reappearance by any of the 177 but not all had their biometrics


No confirmed reappearance by any of the 177, but not all had their biometrics registered

Counter Piracy• Most effective efforts are provided

by the M/V themselves, but the presence of naval forces is required in order to deal the qproblem.

• We must maintain a posture which undermine and remove the courage and willingness of thecourage and willingness of the pirates.

• Piracy activity is obviously not deterred yet, however indications are that teams do not come backare that teams do not come back after a failed operation ending with apprehension

• After initial attempt or attack, i t t b t tl t k dpirates must be constantly tracked

and suppressed by air assets, until warship can arrive on scene for disarming the pirates (weapons

d l dd )


and ladders)

Counter Piracy

• The traffic corridor is only a temporary solution, but it enables naval forces to concentrate resources

• Naval forces are spread along the corridor, ready to react with helo, if attack or suspicious activity is p yobserved by M/V

• Quick reporting by M/V is essential. (Use UKMTO or MARLO).

• Air surveillance is crucial to• Air surveillance is crucial to success

• Corridor should be moved south• Convoy/escort operations are no y p

solution. It does not remove the threat, it only helps the few, and there will never be naval forces enough to provide escort to all M/V


gor convoys

Fishing areas in GOA


New Transit CorridorThe image cannot be displayed. Your computer may not have enough memory to open the image, or the image may have been corrupted. Restart your computer, and then open the file again. If the red x still appears, you may have to delete the image and then insert it again.

100-150 merchant vessels in the corridor at any time

The present corridorp

The new corridor


Agenda









Co-ordination with Non coalition Forces

Non coalition Naval Forces(ships only)

D t h it (1 it S N 2008)• Dutch unit (1 unit Sep. – Nov. 2008)• Malaysian units (1-2 units since Sep. 2008)• Russian units (2-3 units since Oct. 2008)

I di it (1 it i N 2008)• Indian units (1 unit since Nov. 2008)• TG 169 (Chinese units) (2-3 units since Jan. 2009)• TF 432 (NATO force) (4-6 units Oct. – Dec. 2008)

6 ( ) (3 2008)• TF 465 (EU Force) (3-4 units since Dec. 2008)• Additional US/UK/FR naval units under national control


Co-ordination with Non coalition Forces

• Welcome paperwork – exchange of e-mail addresses– Reference grid for area allocation– HF/VHF/UHF COMPLAN including call sign allocation

Air safety issues– Air safety issues• Staff visit – explaining about pattern of life• CTF 150 visit to clarify mandate and rules of engagement• At least twice daily exchange of SITREPs including area allocation y g g

for units, convoy schedules, and reports on any actual piracy activities

• Daily summery of all activities, intelligence information and assessments (classified but releasable to all military forces)assessments (classified, but releasable to all military forces)

• UKMTO and MARLO mailing lists including all naval forces.• De facto succesful tactical coordination including tasking of units,

aircraft and alert helicopters.

• Each force provider, however, has a national/political requirement to promote own presence (MAC, reporting centres, public medias)


Agenda









CTF 150 recommendations 1/2

Preparations for the transit

• Consider professional protection team and clarify companyConsider professional protection team, and clarify company policy and flag state legal issues.

• By appearance demonstrate willingness to defend yourself.y pp g y

• Prepare ship and crew. Protection team, safe room, fences, barbed wire, water hoses, flares, close and lock all hatches, train procedures.

• Use the new corridor. Stay clear of the Somali east coastf bl 300 NMpreferably 300 NM or more.

• Continue to show navigation lights and transmit AIS.


• Increase look outs, ensure quick internal warning and reporting.

CTF 150 recommendations 2/2

• Listen IMM VHF CH 16. Report any suspicious activity to call sign “Coalition Warship”. Use CH 8 as back up in case of jamming

• Proceed with max. speed, and be prepared for quick evasive manouevres

• Join other ships proceeding at equal speed for mutual support

• Be alert and stay calm throughout. Piracy threats may appear from all directions even from close to the Yemenite coastdirections – even from close to the Yemenite coast

• Avoid areas with small fishing boats or skiffs. If necessary, leave the corridor until clear of fishing activitycorridor until clear of fishing activity

• Call “Coalition Warship”, if suffering from technical problems causing reduced speed


CTF 150 recommendations

When under attack

• Sound the general alarm in the ship. Execute evasive manoeuvres andSound the general alarm in the ship. Execute evasive manoeuvres and other preplanned responses.

• Make emergency call or mayday on IMM VHF CH 16 or CH 8. Give ships g y y y pname, position and describe the situation. Listen carefully to the questions and directives from “Coalition warship/aircraft”.

If ibl d i t th t hi h t d• If possible, proceed up into the sea at highest speed.

• Report to UKMTO, MARLO or any other immediate point of contact (phone e mail)(phone, e-mail)

• If considered safe to do so, take photos or videos and post these immediately to UKMTO or MARLO


immediately to UKMTO or MARLO.

Agenda









Conclusion

• Combined Maritime Forces / Navies and international organizations have taken actions:

– Maritime Security Patrol Area and traffic corridor establishedV l bl hi i d W ld F d P id d t– Vulnerable shipping and World Food Program provided escorts

– Naval Forces assigned to deter, disrupt, capture, and destroy pirate equipment– Coordinate, de-conflict, share intelligence / information– Provide best practices to shipping industry– New UNSCRs passed, providing robust legal mandate for military actions, also ashore

• These actions alone will not solve the problem

• More aggressive naval actions will not succeed until other elements are ggin place

– Expanding operations and further improve effectiveness requires coordinated tasking of naval assets from all nations present

– Establish legal framework to hold pirates accountable. No incentive to capture pirates when countries are unwilling to adjudicate casesg jShipping industry must continue to follow recommended best practices

– Shipping industry must embark armed security detachments or other effective self-protection measures

• Improvement of conditions ashore in Somalia is the long term solution


Next step

• Based on UNSCR 1816, 1838 & 1846 a new mission specific TF151 has been established by 12. January 2009TF 151 i ti l t d t t i ti i th• TF 151 is actively to conduct counter piracy operations in the CMF battlespace to deter, disrupt and defeat piracy in order to protect global maritime commerce, enhance maritime security and secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nationsand secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations

• Will include TTW for those nations with agreements in place to enter themNATO EU ( t ATALANTA) ld d TF 151• NATO or EU (post-ATALANTA) could command TF 151


DNK CTF 150

Thank youThank you


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