Tarawa Campaign History (1944)

8/8/2019 Tarawa Campaign History (1944)

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SEVENTH AIRFORCE

mcLissituiUSAFICPA PARTICIPATION IN GALVANIC OPERATIO


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-SECTION XXIII SEVENTH AIR FORCE.A. GIKERAL.

1 . Objective. Objectives of the Galvanic operation were the attack and occupation of the Japanese held islands of Tarawa, Makin, andApamama, in order to deny these atolls to the Japanese and provide basesfor future operations of our own forces. The major effort was directedagainst the island of Tarawa where a Jap airfield was located.2. Air Force mission. The primary mission of the Seventh AirForce was to prevent use oi1 the airfields at Makin, Tarawa, M ili ,Nauru,Jaluit, and Maloelap by Japanese air units prior to and during the operation.3, Task Group 57.2 formed.

a. To insure maximum coordination with other participatingunits, designated air units of the Seventh Air Force were assigned toCTF 57, under command of COMAIRCENPAC* fo r operational control, anddesignated as Task Group 57.2. As commander, TG 57.2, the CommandingGeneral, Seventh Air Force, also commanded all land-based aircraftstrike units participating in Galvanic.

b. Although the land-based strike units were under operationalcontrol of the Navy, their successful participation was largely due tothe planning, preparation, training, security precautions, and logisticsupport of the Seventh Air Force and its associated agencies.4. Unusual problems presented. The Galvanic operation was difficult in that the entire Seventh Air Force, less certain defensive unitsfor Oahu, was committed. Over-all plans fo r committment and generaloperations of the campaign could not be made by the Seventh Air Forcestaff. Therefore itwas necessary to be prepared to carry out alltypes of missions on extremely short notice. Support of the task group

units in their forward areas required much ingenuity and specially formed provisional organizations. Because of lack of adequate maintenanceand supply facilities in these forward areas, detailed plans were madeto meet all conceivable emergencies. Facilities of the Hawaiian AirDepot, the Air Force Service Command, and mainland supply agencies wereutilized to the maximum.B. ACTIVITIES OF A-l. The primary responsibility of A-l was to provide th e staff and personnel necessary to support air units assigned toCTF 57 fo r operational control.

1, Organization of provisional units.a. The staff for CTG 57,2 was formed by selecting key personnel from the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadrons of the Seventh Air

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Force and VIIAir Force Service Command, The Adjutant General, A-l,A-2, and A-3 made up the Air Force Commander's staff; the A-4 sectionoperated under control of the Service Commander.b. Part of the service organization of the VIIAir ForceService Command had to be changed from a permanently based defensiveforce, organized under a manning table, to a group of highly mobileunits suitable for island operations in the Ellice and Gilbert Islands,The number of tactical organizations, ranging from one to three squadrons, that could be based on any given island determined the size ofthese units.

(i)On 12 August 1943, the Ist Provisional Air ServiceSupport Squadron was formed to occupy Baker Islandin the Phoenix Island group. This composite unit,set up on a manning table basis, consisted of 20officers and 200 enlisted men selected from thevarious Air Force arms and services.

(2) The 2d Air Service Support Squadron was formed21 September 1943, to occupy the Makin, Betio, andApamama atolls in the Gilbert Island group. Thisunit of 42 officers and 745 enlisted men was constituted early to insure proper ground and amphibious training, as it was to follow the assault forces.

(3) The 3d Provisional Air Service Support Squadron,formed 26 September 1943 to occupy Funafuti,Nukufetau, and Nanomea atolls in the Ellice Islandgroup, had a strength of 43 officers and 747 enlisted men*

(4) The Advance Headquarters of the Seventh Air Forceand the VIIAir Force Service Command was constituted 21 October 1948, as indicated in paragraphB 1 a, and comprised approximately 48 officers and140 enlisted men.

(5) Provisional Signal Air Warning units were drawnfrom the Fighter Command and attached to each"ASSRCN" in numbers necessary to perform theirmission. On completion of the Galvanic operationthere were 28 Signal Air Warning officers and 319enlisted men in the forward area.

(6) The 804th Engineer Battalion Aviation was continuously employed during the Galvanic operation until completion of the Makin airstrip.

(7) Signal construction personnel, 14 officers and

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237 enlisted men, were furnished from the 443 dSignal Construction Battalion.(8) The 809-th Medical Air Evacuation Transport Squadron,statiored at Hickam Field and Canton Island, evacuated sick and wounded*

2. Total troops employed.Officers EM

Tactical 627 3425Service 154 2697Total 781 6122

C. ACTIVITIES OF A-2.1 Functi onalorganization at ADVON.

a* An advance party from A-2, Seventh Air Force, arrived atFunafuti on 16 October 1943 wiih the responsibility of coordinatingwith the V II Air Force Service Command the construction of the advancedheadquarters of the Seventh Air Force (ADVON). By 13 November 1943 allADVON A-2 personnel (9 officers and 13 enlisted men) had arrived andthe section was prepared to perform its functions.b. There were also 3 officers and 5 enlisted men in the PhotoInterpretation Detachment which was controlled by A-2, and a Technical

Crash Intelligence Team, consisting of one officer and on e enlisted man,previously secured from Washington. This was the only Technical CrashIntelligence Team from the Central Pacific present immediately afterMakin and Tarawa were occupied. Personnel from the Public RelationsSection and the Combat and Documentary Photographic Unit, operatingunder A-2 control, completed the A-2 group;2. Intelligence planning.

a. All possible intelligence of the enemy and his capabilitieswas obtained and evaluated in preparation fo r tiie Galvanic operation.Liaison officers were sent to the South and Southwest Pacific fo r aperiod of three months to collect and return pertinent information.Much information was obtained from JICPOA. Other current intelligencewas obtained from adjacent and higher commands in this and other areas.Considerable information had been obtained from long range combat andphotographic missions flown at irregular intervals by the Seventh AirForce from December 1942 through October 1943, A Photo InterpretationUnit had been procured from Washington,b. Special reports on the Gilberts were prepared. Briefing

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material and target charts of enemy objectives were prepared in ad-van oe by JICPOA, 64th Topographical Engineers, Objective Data Sectionof the Seventh Air Force, the Photo Interpretation Detachment, andA-2 of the Bomber Command, and reproduced in quantity* Terrain,weather, flying conditions to be expected, characteristics of thePacific theater, distances, geological construction of its islands,and many oilier important items of intelligence were disseminated tocombat crews. Immediately upon arrival at ADVQN a safe-hand intel-ligence pouch service between ADVON and A-2, Rear Echelon, was established, resulting in rapid dissemination of mission reports, photographs, and similar intelligence material.

3. Combat intelligence.n The A-2 section at ADVON maintained a War Room and fur-nished the Commanding General with intelligence necessary fo r plan-ning, and decisions as strike commander* In addition to intelligenceobtained from photographs furnished by Commander, Task Group 57.3(Search and Reconnaissance Group), considerable photo intelligencewas obtained from strike aircraft of the Seventh A ir Force of idiichapproximately one- third were equipped with cameras* Briefing andtarget charts with up-to-date information of what remained to bedestroyed on each particular target were furnished participatingunits fo r planning and executing missions.

b* All preliminary and flash radio intelligence reportswere submitted direct to COMAIRCEtJPAC (information strike commander)by island air commanders* As the camp of the Bomber Command wasadjacent to the Air Force and the Force Flagship of COMAIRCBNPAC wasbased in the harbor at Funafuti, communications between these -threeagencies were ordinarily satisfactory* Ho separate net was availableto the Bomber Command and all radio communications were handled byjoint communication centers; the flow of intelligence was often hin-dered to a considerable degree by excessive traffic on availablecircuits*

Briefing and interrogation of our combat crews weredone by Army Air Force squadron intelligence officers* The weatherinitially was furnished in brief reports from Navy sources to islandair commanders* These forecasts were unsatisfactory and later SeventhAir Force personnel were procured to furnish this information*

4* Training*Training in the use of additional navigational aids andthe use of air pilot guides over long over-water flights was an abso

lute necessity for combat crews with little experience other thanthat obtained in over- land flying in the Ttoited States* A supply ofaccurate navigation maps and charts was procured from the Maps andCharts Division, Washington, D* C*

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b Particular stress was placed on training in recognitionof aircraft and surface vessels. Although sorely handicapped by lackof equipment, all personnel received adequate training.

c. Combat intelligence officers were given additional trainin g during the period that units were in training in Hawaii to includethe lessons learned by the intelligence officers in the South and Southwest Pacific,d. Intelligence personnel of ASSRONS (Air Service SupportSquadrons) utilized in the Galvanic operations were thoroughly trainedprior to their departure from Hawaii. In addition to special lecturesgiven these personnel, they were furnished a guide which outlined indetail their functions of furnishing current intelligence of the enemyto their commanders, supervision and execution of counter-intelligencemeasures, and obtaining adequate publicity for the personnel and accom*plishments of their units.

D. ACTIVITIES OF A-3.1. Planning .

a. Planning of the Galvanic operation was done by Joint Armyand Navy Staff personnel. Intelligence information was fairly completeon the enemy situation, showing that a number of airfields were available to the enemy in the Gilbert and Marshall groups which could causeconsiderable difficulty to our forces in accomplishing their mission.Striking units in sufficient strength to deny the use of these airfieldsto the enemy was of primary importance to success of the operation. Inplanning the operational role of the Seventh Air Force, based on itsassigned mission of neutralization of enemy airfields within supportingrange, two important factors entered the picture: First, the size offorce available for such an operation and its capabilities; second, theforce necessary to adequately defend Oahu during this operation. Theentire planning of Galvanic had to be aggressive, bold, thorough, andbased on the shortest possible time schedule. It was necessary to strikethe enemy with all force available, coordinating the action of all unitsconcerned for maximum concentration.

b. Most difficult operational problem solved was the tremendousdistance to enemy bases which required pinpoint navigation and offeredfew, if any, intermediate check points. Length of flights varied from926 to 2,408 nautical. miles.2. Organization.

a. The task force under the command of Major General Willis H.Hale, organized and constituted to accomplish this mission, consisted ofthe following units.

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small runways approximately 6,000 feet in length, carved out of coconut groves.

4. Training, Training of bombardment groups presented widelyvarying problems.a. The 11th Bomb Group had previously distinguished itselfin combat in the Solomons area. Upon return to Hawaii, with the exception of a few cadre personnel, it was completely reconstituted with

new personnel and airplanes. New crews had to be thoroughly trainedby the Seventh Bomber Command, their instruction including the SeventhAir Force Gunnery School and additional training in navigation, bomb-ing, and long over-water flights.

b. The 30th Bomb Group which arrived on Oahu 11 October 1943had less than six weeks in which to complete its training before leaving fo r the forward area* This group initially, however, consisted ofmuch more experienced crews than the rehabilitated 11th Bomb Group sothat although their training period was short the combat crews werewell trained for the operation.E. ACTIVITIES OF THE A-4.

1. Joint staff arrangement.a* The Commanding General, VIIAir Force Service Command wasnot provided with a separate staff, but utilized the Seventh Air Force

staff jointly with the Commanding General, Seventh Air Force, Thisarrangement made the A-4 responsible for the preparation of supply plans,orders to execute the plans, and supervision over the execution of ordersfor both the tactical and service commands. Special staff sections ofthe Seventh Air Force were utilized by both commanders in the same man-ner as the A-4. In effect, ths special staff supply sections actuallyexecuted that portion of the supply plan which was fixed as the responsibility of the Seventh Air Force.

b A forwarl^chelon (ADVOtf) of A-4 was established at Funafuti, operating as a joint A-4 for Headquarters Seventh Air Force andHeadquarters VII Air Force Service Command, The ADVON made all necessary arrangements, and prepared orders to make adjustments in the supply,evacuation, and maintenance establishments in the forward area to furnish adequate air service support to meet changes in tactical dispositions directed by COWAIRCENPAC. The rear echelon A-4 mounted all troops,equipment, and supplies fo r the forward area and advised ADVON A-4 oftheir routing, time of departure, vessel, and tire of arrival, thendisengaged from further responsibility. Upon receipt of this informationADVON A-4 assumed responsibility for supervising the placing of troops,equipment, and supplies on positions. Close contact was maintained between rear 3chelon A-4 and ADVON A-4 throu^i weekly summary reports.

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2. Procurement of supplies and equipment.a. Upon receipt of information concerning Galvanic, anestimate of the situation concerning equipment and supplies was made,

and requisitions covering the required maintenance supplies fo r 90days, and ASSROM organizational equipment to support the Air Forcewere prepared. Upon completion of this estimate, it was ascertainedthat: (1) Equipment in possession of the 17th Base Headquartersand Air Base Squadron was of the wrong type, and inadequate to equipthe ASSRONS, and (2) USAFICPA stocks were inadequate to supply boththe Air Force and Garrison Force requirements. Certain items wereavailable, but the time element precluded processing the Air Forcerequisitions through USAFIGPA supply depots.

b. Because of this situation, all Air Force requisitionson requirements for the Galvanic operation were forwarded throughHeadquarters Army Air Forces to Headquarters Army Service Forces andHeadquarters Air Service Command to be filled and deadlined in SanFrancisco Port of Embarkation, 1 October 1943. In view of the in -dividual characteristics of each supply arm and service, the magnitude and unusual nature of the requisitions, and the fact that itemsrequisitioned were not included in the General Schedule of Supplies,supply representatives from the Air Depot, Ordnance, and Signal Corpswere sent to Washington to expedite shipment, make spot decisions,and coordinate the shipment of the supplies and equipment requisi-tioned.

c. Headquarters Army Service Forces, Headquarters AirService Command, and the San Francisco Port of Embarkation madespecial efforts to effect delivery of the supplies and equipment atthe Port of Honolulu by the deadline date. As an operational pro-ject, Army Service Forces had assigned this shipment a project num-ber, Honolulu port authorities expedited the movement of thismaterial to Hickam Field, where it was broken down, re-boxed intoorganization equipment and maintenance supply packups, and marked bySeventh Air Force supply services, in accordance with instructionsissued by the A-4.

3, Allocation of supplies and equipment.a. Based on recommendations of observers who had been sent

to the South and Southwest Pacific Areas fo r the specific purpose ofobserving air service operations and constant study of the type ofair service unit and supplies and equipment required fo r atoll warfare, tentative Tables of Organization and Tables of Equipment hadbeen prepared for an ASSRON prior to assignment of Galvanic, Inplanning fo r Galvanic, correlation of the ASSRON with the garrisonforce (GARFOR), and information that adequate air transport servicewould be unavailable initially made several changes in the ASSRONorganization, and consequently the ASSRON T/E, necessary. Other

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minor changes necessitated continuous revision of the t/e to keep pacewith the changing orgarization of the ASSRDI.b . On Army Service Forces information that certain suppliesand equipment would be unavailable before the deadline date, or werenot available at all, USAFICPA depots supplied such articles as wereavailable in their stock; these items to be returned to USAFICPA stocks

on receipt of the Air Force shipmmt from Array Service Forces, In manycases the Navy or the Marines had equipment available which we wereshort, or which was superior in design to our own. Full cooperationwas obtained from these services in exchange of equipment.4. Location of supply, evacuation, and maintenance establishments.

Based on a recornaissance of the Ellice Islands and studyof available information on th e Gilbert Islands, locations of supply,evacuation, and maintenance establishments we re determined, consideration being given to : (1) Disposition of tactical units, (2) Availability and disposition of service installations of the Navy and Marines,(3) Anchorage and unloading facilities, (4) Size of the island andairdrome, and availability of suitable area, and (5) Centralized location to facilitate service to the outer area.

b. To avoid initial congestion in unloading ships at destination, supplies, troops, and construction supplies for installation ofmaintenance establishments were echeloned by priority in movement topositions.c. A forward supply reserve of 30 days Class IV (E) supplies

for all Air Force aircraft was established in a supply barge afloat atFunafuti , This reserve, under the control of the ADVON A-4, Headquarters V II Air Force Service Command, was utilized in the Ellice-Gilbert area as emergency supply.5. Transportation of organizations and supplies.

To expedite movement, equipment and supplies were preload-Ed on spotted freight cars and held awaiting call of the port regulatingofficer. Each car was carefully tallied to expedite checking at thepier. Ifctit Liaison Officers were assigned to coordinate movement oftheir organization to the port and supervise loading aboard ship.b. An Air Force Cargo Booking Agency was established under theA-4 to book all supporting supplies not moved by COMFIFTRPHIBFOR withthe GARFOR and AS3RON to Ihe destination. This agency in turn bookedits cargo with th e Army Port and Service Command, which issued instructions for movements of cargo to the port when bottoms were made availableOrganization movements were handled directly by tiie A-4*c. Tonnage requirements for water movement of organizations and

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supplies were made known to the Navy Joint Shipping Control throughTJSAFICPA. Daily conferences with the Joint Shipping Control wereheld to secure allocation of bottoms for movement. Due to shortageof bottoms, priorities had to be established to insure that theorganizations and supplies which were of the greatest importance toguarantee the success of the operational plan were placed on position in time to accomplish their mission. This shortage of bottomscaused air echelons of tactical units to operate from airdromes inthe Ellice Islands without effective support from ground echelonsand air service units for a short period of time.

6. Construction of airdromes.a. Based on information available from A-2, the Air Bagineer under supervision of the A-4, prepared plans for the construc

tion of the air strip at Makin. These plans included taxiways, revetments and hardstandings. The BO4th Aviation Efagineer Battalionwas assigned to GARFOR at Makin for this construction. Upon completion of the air strip the Aviation Engineer Battalion was withdrawn, to Oahu for rehabilitation.

b. Assembled bulk fuel systems were furnished where required. These systems consisted of the Army Air Force bulk fuelsystem (canvas Mareng cell, portable pipeline and dispensing system)-and the Navy bulk fuel system (10 1,000 barrel prefabricated steel-tanks revetted above ground, portable pipeline, 4 5,000 gallonready banks, and dispensing system). Both systems were installed atMakin Island and interconnected. Filling was accomplished from asingle submarine pipeline tied into a tanker anchorage 2,000 yardsoffshore, or from a barrel dumping stand which was actually a suction assembly to fillthe bulk storage or gasoline trucks from thedrummed gasoline reserve in an emergency.

c. A ir Force technical, administrative, supply, mess, andlatrine construction at advanced bases was planned by the Air Engineer under the supervision of A-4, the work being done by groundforce engineers furnished to the Fakin CtARFOR. Construction requirements were set up by type unit in order to keep pace with tacticaldecisions effecting changes in dispositions of tactical units. Plansincluded blueprints of buildings required arid complete bills of material for each type building. A ll construction was of th e prefabricatedtype, designed to be torn down and moved to a new base when required.Full use was made of mainland prefabricated buildings, such as QuonsetHuts and the Army Air Forces tropical type. The requirements werebound into book form and published as "Seventh Air Force ConstructionRequirements at Advanced Bases."

d. Public utilities were planned jointly with GARFOR andASSRON at the bases concerned. In most cases joint use of utilitieswas limited, as it was necessary for the AS3RON to remain independent

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of GARFOR due to the probability -that it would be leap-frogged tonew base.

7. Mobility,, In order to effect a rapid landing and set up airservice as rapidly as possible, a major effort was extended to provideASSROMS with the greatest degree of mobility possible. To effect this,motorized equipment and shops were procured or manufactured locally.

8. Bombs and ammunition.a. Seventh Air Force requirements for bombs and ammunition at

advanced bases were planned by the Air Force Ordnance Officer undersupervision of the A-4. Types of bombs and ammunition ratios recommend-ed by VII Bomber Command and VIIFighter Command were given high consideration in computing requirements. These requirements were submittedthrough channels to CCMAIRPAC to COMSERVFOR who was charged witii placingthe bombs and ammunition on position. Bombs and ammunition approved byCOMAIRPAC to accompany assault and GARFOR to positions were supplied bythe Seventh Air Force and moved to position by COMFIFTHPHIBFOR. Supportshipments were moved to position by COMSERVFOR.

b. Full cooperation was obtained with the Navy and Marines inutilizing types of bombs and ammunition which were common to all ser-vices. A single agency, Army, Uavy, or Marine, was designated to supplybombs and ammunition fo r the base where i2ie service concerned had thegreatest concentration of tactical and service units.

9. Hospitalization, sanitation, and evacuation of casualties*a. ASSSON dispensaries were provided with a flight surgeon incharge, who was charged with assisting tactical unit flight surgeons inremoval of casualties from aircraft, or in case of an emergency landing,with removal of casualties. Evacuation was direct from squadron aidstations and ASSRON dispensary to the base hospital. Upon arrival ofMedical Air Evacuation Squadrons and assignment of 5 C-54 type aircraftto the Air Transport Command fo r primary use by the Seventh Air Force,the medical air evacuation system was placed in operation. Casualtieswere evacuated from the Gilbert area by Navy PB2Y type ambulance planeto Funafuti where the medical air evacuation collecting station waslocated and from there to the Hawaiian Area by C-54 air craft ?b. ASSRON flight surgeons were charged with sanitation of theAir Force area on the bases. Provision was made to meet the unusualsanitary, insect, rodent, and disease conditions encountered in Pacificatolls by sending the necessary supplies and equipment. Extreme empha-sis was placed on keeping latrine and refuse pits above the water lineof the extremely low islands.

10. Assignment of supply, technical and labor troops.Troops of all supply arms and services were required to

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operate the General Air IForce Assembly and Intransit Depot set up tofacilitate staging and preparations fo r Galvanic. The Seventh AirForce had no complement of labor troops, so supply troous were with-drawn from the Air Base Detachments in "the Hawaiian Area, whose re-quirements fluctuated dependent upon the rate of flow of suppliesfrom the intransit depot, to operate this installation. As the deadline loading date approached, the overload placed on the Air Forcesupply services by eighteen hour a day operation of the intransitdepot caused an acute labor situation* This labor shortage was re-lieved by disbanding the Air Base Security Battalions which wereconsidered as a nonessential unit, and forming aviation squadronsto supply labor to meet the deadline date.

b. Sufficient aircraft repair personnel in the mechanicalclassifications were not available to effect the desired distributionto ASSRONS. Because this shortage might seriously effect the ASSROITability to produce effective aircraft repair service, it was necessary to place these troopjs in ASSRCTIS located where th e major repaireffort would be required.

11. Salvage of unserviceable supplies and equipment.a. The unavoidable probability that supplies and equipmentwould continually be damaged and lost in th e difficult amphibiousoperations required that every man be imbued with a personal interestin property responsibility. During the formation of ASSRCNS, supplyofficers were continuously reminded of the importance of supply dis-cipline. All supply directives repeatedly emphasized the importance

of supply discipline to the proper implementation of the supply plan.Both ASSRON and tactical units were very conscious of wastage beforetheir departure from Oahu.

b. Repairable and serviceable parts were salvaged from dam-aged aircraft and other major items of equipment. Exchange of a re-pairable or non-serviceable part fo r a serviceable part was directedas standing procedure for all supply arms except in emergencies.Parts not repairable by A3SRONS were returned to Oahu.

12. Captured supplies and equipment. Captured supplies andequipment which were of value fo r study were forwarded to Oahu. A llairborne equipment was turned over to the Air Depot for careful analysis and report. -A large quantity of enemy bombs was captured, andare now under study to determine the possibility of their use againstthe enemy. All captured bulk supplies were utilized in the forwardarea. A considerable amount of enemy av^as, low in octane rating butsuitable fo r use as motor fuel, is available in the forward areaobviating the necessity of making motor fuel shipments from Oahu.Captured enemy oil is utilized for road stabilization.

13. New types of equipment and modification of standard types.

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Standard types of equipment were constantly studied to determine modifications required to better equipment for field conditions. Modifications known to be required were made prior to departure of units fromOahu. Other modifications were made in the field as necessity was determined. New types of equipment were service tested in the field.

14, Administrative order. Administrative orders covering all administrative instructions and the supply plan applicable to Air Forceunits were prepared* Supplementary administrative instructions werecovered in the Base Development Plan for the island concerned.F. ACTIVITIES OF THE HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT.

1. Engineering Department. During the preparation for andthroughout th e actual campaign, this department modified aircraft,trained and supplied engineering personnel fo r the ASSRONS, and augmented and supplied engineering personnel and equipment.a. Aircraft were modified to meet special requirements ofthe situation or better adapt -them for intended operations. Some ofthese changes were standard modifications, others were original developents

(1) Heavy bombers 50 modifications were made oneach plane, initial combat and replacement, as listedon Inclosure No. 2. Rate of processing was 2- planesper day.

(2) Medium bombers 23 modifications were made oneach plane, as listed on Inclosure No. 3, Rate ofprocessing was 3 planes per day.-(3) Fighters 38 P-39Q1 and P-39Q5 aircraftwere modified to facilitate launching from a carrier.Other changes to these planes and 12 P-40's are list-Ed on Inclosure No. 4.

(4) Fighter-bombers 13 A-24's were assembled and test-Ed No modifications were made.b. The Signal Section trained and furnished 1 officer, 1 warrant officer, and 20 enlisted men; assembled and packed Signal Corps

equipment and supplies for T/E plus 90-day maintenance level, totalingover 800 packing cases; and fabricated the following special equipment:(1) 2 Invasion type combination Early-Warning and GCIradars (Navy' SC-2 installed in AA S/L trailer).(2) 2 VHF sets (SCR-522 with aircraft generator) installedin Radio Command Cars.

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(3) 4 combination air-borne radio and radar testbenches

c. 5 officers and 251 enlisted men were furnished for 3ASSRONS, and special repair trucks were manufactured fo r use by theASSRONS.

d. 3 officers and 150 enlisted men were furnished for air-craft maintenance and repair work at the 422 dSub-Depot which wasestablished at Canton. Through its operation, many airplanes of alltypes were quickly returned to combat; emergency repairs were madeon others enabling them to return to the Control Depot for completionof repairs.

c. Approximately 180 enlisted men, the majority from AirForce squadrons, were trained in specialized work and returned totheir units, 49 Navy personnel were given training, mainly in sheetmetal fabrication pertinent to aircraft modification.f Civilian mechanics and supervisors were sent to advanceed bases on call fo r third and fourth echelon work.

2. Supply Department. The supply department of the HawaiianAir Depot took a continuous part in all phases of the Galvanic operation from the inception of the earliest preparations up to and in-cluding re-supply and procurement in the operation of the established bases and base detachments. The following summary highlights thecoordinating functions of the supply department in the combinedoperations of the several departments of the Hawaiian Air Depot withthe Seventh Air Force and the Air Force Service Command.

a. In th e initial planning stages of the ASSRDNS involved,the supply department selected from its personnel 7 officers suffi-ciently experienced to serve efficiently as Supply Officers in "theFirst, Second, and Third Base ASSRCNS and their detachments. Duringpreparation of the Table of Equipment for the ASSEDNS, the entireresources of th e supply department organization were devoted to analytical and fimdamental research work for the determination of operational excellence of the t/e Equipment. As the T/E was preparedlocally and modifications were necessary as preparation of the T/Sprogressed, the supply department organization and personnel weremade available day and ni^ht fo r complete cooperation with the Com-manding Officer and the Supply and Engineering Officers of eachASSRCN. All decisions with respect to changes in the T/E were coordinated with A-4 of the Seventh Air Force.

b. The t/e necessary fo r the operational success of Galvanichaving been determined, the supply department be^an the immediate issueand procurement planning fo r the many items of supply and equipment tabulated therein. Having been advised that the Galvanic operation would

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Include a definite number or quantity of tactical squadrons of certaintypes, the Depot Supply Officer coordinated the t/e v s and computed theamount of equipment and supplies required for the operation, for bothtactical and service squadrons. All balances of Air Corps supply stockinvolved were checked for availability and obligated for the Galvanicoperation* Emergency requisitions were instituted for those items noton hand* Balances on hand and available for issue accounted for about84% of the Air Corps items required by the final approved t/E's for theASSRONS and tactical squadrons. About 1,888 items, or approximately16$ of the required items, had to be requisitioned from the mainland.Every priority procurement means was used to carry on procurement operations in accordance with the addition or deletion of articles of equipment as caused by modifications to equipment. By constant initiationand close follow-up of emergency radios and requisitions over 500 itemsof equipment and supply were secured from the mainland to fillshortagesresulting from such modifications*

(1) To maintain extreme secrecy throughout preparation forthis operation, the plans and ultimate purpose of theseinvolved detailed supply activities were divulged toonly -three individuals, the Depot Supply Officer, theProperty Control Officer of the Supply Department, andthe Chief Clerk of the Property Control Branch of theSupply Department* Because it was necessary to makea deadline of 8 days from tbe starting time of preparation of balance check and procurement requirements,tills portion of -the supply departments work was mostdifficult.The supply department organisation of the Hawaiian Air Depot geared itself into a day and night working program fo r most of itspersonnel over the month of October, 1943* Deadline set for the delivery of requisitioned equipment and supplies at the Port of Embarkation on the mainland was 15 September 1943, with arrival at Honoluluset at 1 October 1943* As these A ir Corps items arrived at the Port ofHonolulu, they were received by the Steamship Dock Section of the Shipping and Receiving Branch of the Supply Department, and transportationby trailer, truck, and railroad flat car was arranged to dear all cargofrom the docks* The deadline dates for completion of packing and crat-ing of all T/B items were set for eaoh ASSRQN. Coordinating the handling of this equipment and supplies received from the mainland with theprogram of packing and crating of Air Corps equipment and supply on handas required by the t/E for Galvanic, presented no little difficulty.Most of these supplies from the mainland were received in one huge influxat the Honolulu docks. Storage space was, as always, a pertinent factor,making dispersion througiout the island of Oahu a necessity. This dis-persion was so planned as to coordinate with requirements fo r packing andcrating to make deadline dates for the Galvanic operation.

d. In -the classification and preparation of equipment and sup

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plies for movement, a system was magu rated and followed involvingpreparation of Shipping Tickets (AAF Form #104) for eaoh using ser--vice and organization (ie; Signal Ist Base ASSRCN) listing allitems of it's equipment and supplies, followed by issue and packingor crating in accordance with these shipping tickets* Preparationof these forms required 9,844 pages of Shipping Tickets (AAF Form#104) upon which were typed 87,031 items for issue, packing andcrating, and took 1600 man hours*

(1) Many difficulties were encountered during theissue, packing, and crating, since these operations were being carried out while the shippingtiokets were still in process of typing* Forexample, supply for the ASSBDNS was prepared fo ra period of ninety days and issue, packing, andcrating were made up in 3 30-day increments.Considerable re-planning and much additional workwas occasioned when destination or consignee pointof one of these increments was changed after tfiesupply department had completed fully one-half ofthe shipping tickets involved, both as to typingand issue and packing* Also, the tactical squadrons' positions were moved from time to timethroughout the preparation so that by -the timethe supply department was ready to prepare certainmateriel for shipment the bases and their numberhad actually changed, resulting in the necessityof compiling the equipment and supplies going outinto a different collection of supplies becauseof the change in tactical organization*

c* Speoial precautions were taken to insure that no timewould be wasted in segregating materiel upon arrival at destination Materiel was marked for each section of each ASSROT for each operat ion as follows jEngineering SectionSupply SectionTransportation SectionDefense and Operations SectionWeather SectionMedical Section.

All shipping tickets were cross referenced in their marking to theboxes in which supplies were packed, and further cross referencedto the sections for which they were made* The boxes were each marked in code for the section to which they belonged in eaoh ASSRON.Copies of idie shipping tickets applicable were not only affixed tothe outside of the boxes but were placed inside the boxes along withthe materiel listed thereon*

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f As part of the training program for the enlisted personnelof the ASSBONS the complete facilities of the Supply School were madeavailable to the commanding officer of each ASSRCN. Many enlisted mendesignated as supply personnel attended the regular classes carried onconcurrently at the Supply School. The following outline of the concentrated course in supply procedure fo r enlisted personnel illustratesthe thorough fundamental training given these men before their departure*CURRICULUM OF STUDY IN SUPPLY PROCEDURE

I* OrientationII Review of Organisation of Amy Air ForceslII* Sohelons of Maintenance, Supply, and Reclamation (Stress laid on Echelons of TechnicalSupply)IV* Army Air Force Classification of Material(T*o* 00-36-A-l)

V. Status of Army Air Force Equipment and SuppliesVI. Army Air Force Stock List (T.O. 00-35A-6)VII* General Provisions for Storage of AAF Equipmentand Supplies (AAF Regulation 65-19)VIII. RegulationsIX . Army Air Force VouchersX. Army Air Force Supply Forms.In addition to the Supply School classes throughout October, the supplypersonnel of the ASSRCNS were given practical, demonstrations and exhi-bits by the Hawaiian Air Depot supply organization. Property ControlUnit personnel and Warehouse Branch personnel of the supply departmentworked with the ASSRON supply enlisted personnel on practical solutionsof detailed problems.

g. Ifhen the equipment and supplies required for the Galvanicoperation were boxed and crated, the shipping organization of tiie supply department was held in readiness to move equipment and supplies tothe port of embarkation upon call* Calls fo r delivery to piers fo rvessel loading came at all hours of the day and night, necessitatingimmediate organization of personnel and automotive equipment for loading and transporting equipment and supplies to the port designated.Many nights, long hours of overtime were completed to meet the vesselsailing deadline* Inasmuch as the depot supply of automotive vehiclesfor heavy transportation is barely adequate for normal transportationrequirement, a considerable strain was put upon the use of this equipment* Dispersion of these vehicles, especially throughout the day whenthey were dispatched on sundry routine tasks, created many problems insecuring immediate servioe fo r loading to meet sailing time.h. The following pertinent statistics summarize the work done

in preparing and moving equipment and supplies into the port of embarkation for Galvanic operations

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(1)(2)(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

10,000 boxes of supplies were moved.6,000 drums of aviaticn gasoline were moved toBaker*Total weigit of general equipment and suppliesmoved fo r shipment to Baker:General 1,884,672 pounds"Vehicles and Gasoline 185,400TotalWeight for GalvanicGeneralVehiclesTotalWeight fo r Galvanic

2,070,072 poundsoperation inNorember 1943:

1,363,136 pounds1,058,410 B2,421,546 pounds

operation 1 December 1943through 15 January 1944:GeneralVehiclesTotalTotal GeneralTotal VehiclesGrand TotalSummary and GrandBakerNovemberDec 1 Jan 15

(*) Approximately

351,900 pounds"476,300828,200

3,599,7081,720,1105,319,818

Total Weights:2,070,0722,421,546828,2005,319,818

9,850 measurement

pound 8pound 8"pounds

pounds"pounds (* )

tons.i. Ihe supply department gave immediate attention nightand day to the earliest possible shipment of re-supply items *hichwere ordered from the Depot Supply Officer on priority and routinerequisitions, both on standard Air Corps forma and by radio fromthe several bases and base detachments in the Galvanic area ofoperations. Of the total requisition items thus received, fo r re -supply by the supply department, 89$ were supplied by immediate

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cations between the airfields at Tarawa was assumed by the SeventhAir Force. Air Warning and Fighter Direction for Canton, Baker, andHakin was also the responsibility of the Seventh Air Force, Theoperation of the SCR- 588 at Funafuti again was under the jurisdic-tion of the Seventh Air Force. Bomber strike and air search and re-connaissance stations were set up at the Joint Centers at each base.Radio aids to navigation such as radio ranges and low frequencyhoming transmitters were installed by the AACS. Radar and YG beaconswere installed by the Navy.b. Headquarters of the Seventh Air Force and the headquarters of the V II Bomber Command were established adjacent to eachother at Funafuti and were served by the Funafuti Joint Communications Center and were linked to the center by teletype. A singleswitchboard consisting of two TC-2O*s was installed to handle bothheadquarters telephone systems, with a field wire end cable linkinstalled between the USS Curtis and the switchboard providing con

tact with COMAIRC13?PAC. To coordinate the telephone system on theisland of Funafuti, the Commanding General, Seventh Air Force, wascharged with the responsibility of coordinating the various services.At Nanomea and Nukufetau, the wire sections of the ASSRON detachmentsinstalled field cable and field wire fo r radio key lines and fortrunk telephone circuits between headquarters on the island. Theinternal communications systems at Baker and Canton were alreadyestablished. However, additional teletype circuits were added atCanton to expedite the delivery of messages to tactical organisations.c. The operation of communications from November 13 toDecember 6 through Joint Communications Centers was not entirely

satisfactory. This may be attributed to the fact that the idea wasnew, construction of Joint Centers was continuing throughout theaction, and personnel were not accustomed to the new system of communications. There were many delays in the transmission of operational messages* Aggressive corrective action was taken by communications officers of the Seventh Air Force to speed traffic in thiscommunications system* Through these efforts time delays decreasedcontinually but never reached a condition considered satisfactory*

d. A small signal section was established at Funafuti forthe supply and repair of radio and radar equipment. The Sub-Depotat Canton provided an advance repair and supply depot for work whichcould not be handled by the small section at Funafuti* The operationof this section was hampered by delay in constructing a suitablebuilding fo r housing the repair equipment.

Radio aids to navigation were also provided. A radiorange was established at Funafuti, but operated intermittently to arange of about 200 miles due to technical and physical difficulties.The homer which was established at Funafuti was not satisfactory dueto transmitter and antenna difficulties. These difficulties were

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remedied but not in time to be of maximum use for the Galvanic action.A radio range was established at Nanomea on the 4th of December. Aradio homer was operating at Baker Radio range and radio homer woreboth available at Canton. These last ranges and homers worked verysatisfactorily throughout the action. YG equipment was installed atNanomea. YH homing equipment was installed at Funafuti, Baker, andCanton. The AACS established circuits between Canton, Funafuti,Nanomea, and Baker. Ihe station at Nukufetau was not available forthis action* Ihe vital communications circuits for "ttie Gilbert groupwere installed by December 6.

f Air Warning and Fighter Direction was provided at Cantonutilizing on e SCR-270, one SCR-271, and one SCR-588 with VHF communication equipment and VHF homer. At Baker an SC-2 was mounted in asearchlight trailer to provide Fighter Direction and one SCR-270-D wasprovided for Air Warning. V#F communication equipment and homer wereprovided fo r Fighter Direction communications. These VHF communications worked admirably and operated in an excellent manner. On November 30 the 45th Fighter Squadron moved from Baker to Nanomea and itwas necessary for the Seventh Air Force to establish VHF homer and VHFequipment at Nanomea fo r this squadron, since the Argus unit at thisbase was not equipped for VHF operation. At Makin two SC-2's withassociated VHF equipment went in with the attacking troops and one wasoperative 20 November. One SCR-270-D was operative 28 November andreporting to Ihe SC-2. Ihe complete VHF SCS-3 system, the second SCR270-D, and the Air Defense Command Post were operative at a later date.H. LESSONS LEADED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN.

1. Personnel. Air Service Support Squadrons were not furnishedsufficient labor troops to perform nan-technical duties, resulting inhighly trained technical personnel being employed as laborers on docksand barges, ration details andof operations. Labor troops areleased when no longer required.

sanitarybeing assigneddetails

duringto ASSR

initial phaseto be re-NS,

2. Intelligence.a. As ADVON moves forward, the A-2 section, ADVON, with its

entire physical equipment, should be set up and ready to operate onarrival of A-2 personnel, to eliminate difficulties of setting up campand carrying on intelligence operations simultaneously. Action is bein g taken to insure that, if at all possible, complete duplicate A-2physical equipment is forwarded in advance to each new ADVON headquarters.

b. It is essential that an estimate of the enemy air orderof battle be furnished to lower units fo r the following reasons: (1)So that proper bcmb loading may be prescribed (if estimates indicatestrong concentration of enemy aircraft on the ground at a particular

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of missions is also necessary. Such policy has been placed in effect.4. Service units and supply.

a. ASSRON detachments are not required at each base and arenot properly organized to provide an effective degree of air service.One or two tactical squadrons operating from an airdrome are self sufficient providing there is an ASSRON in the area to provide third echelon repair &ud supply service on call or requisition. Future ASSRONSdispatched to the forward area wil l be complete units, assigned an airservice area in which they will be responsible for all air service.This method of operation introduces the following additional requirements:

(1) Tactical units should be provided with reefers,mobile Air Force repair units, and additional powerand water distillation units to increase their self-sufficiency when operating on a base away from anASSRCN. Tactical units based on island airdromesinhere there is no ASSRON willbe made as self-sufficient as possible by issuing each unit this ClassIV equipment. Tactical units wil l request suppliesand repair service direct from the ASSRON chargedwith air service in the area.

(2) ASSRCNS should be assigned transport aircraft toeffect priority deliveries of supplies and repairpersonnel to airdromes within the ASSRCN servicearea, to facilitate immediate temporary repairs oneconomically repairable aircraft so that such planescan be flown to the main base for completion of repairs. ASSRONS are being assigned transport aircraftfo r this purpose.b. The method of marking supply shipments fo r the forwardarea and identification at destination was excellent; the advancecopies of shipping tickets effectively facilitating the identification of a box in which a specific item of supply was located*

Recommended that this method be continued.c. Initial maintenance stocks should be shipped in 30-day ,

increments until ihe supply is built up to the authorized level, toalleviate the initial congestion upon landing, reduce initial shipping requirements, facilitate rapid and orderly establishment of supply dumps, and release units from loading details for the establishment of camps, maintenance, and supply installations. This changehas been made.d. The rapid and unpredictable tactical development in theCentral Pacific Area requires maximum mobility in the movement of

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g . To provide proper air service upon the initial landing oftactical aircraft on a new strip, facilities fo r aviation gasoline andoil, third echelon aircraft repair, and bomb and ammunition supplyshould be installed concurrently with the construction of the a ir strip,The aviation engineer battalion should remain at the airdrome until allaviation facilities have been completed. Premature removal of the 804thAviation Engineer Battalion from Makin Island delayed the constructionof the above facilities* Recommendation has been made that the aviationengineer battalions not be relieved from an advanced base until releasedby the Air Force Commander.

h. On islands where sufficient land mass exists, the Air Service Center can be more effectively employed than ASSRONS. Plans arebeing formulated to replace ASSRONS with Air Service Centers as theCentral Pacific offensive moves into islands where sufficient land massexists to facilitate their employment*i. To supervise the execution of air service plans in the for-ward areas an advanced echelon of the Air Service Command headquartersshould be established in a central location in the forward area. Without an adequate staff arrangement within the forward area, the Air Service Commander is placed in the position of trying to execute his re-sponsibility without the means to exercise his authority* Plans fo rthe organization and operation of an advanced echelon will be placed ineffect when completed.

5. Hawaiian Air Depot.Organizations were over- equipped with heavy machinery.

Recommendations for future operations have been forwarded to the V IIAir Force Service Command.b . Construction and engineer troops were not made available

soon enough for the preparation of facilities. Recommendations fo rfuture operations have been forwarded to V II Air Force Service Command.c . A small number of repair troops should have been trainedand available for the commencement of operations. Recommendations fo rfuture operations have been forwarded to VII Air Force Service Command.d. Mobile repair shops, such as the Depot manufactured sheet-

metal truck, furnish ample facilities for third echelon maintenance;however, a greater supply of raw material, particularly sheet aluminumand bar stock, should accompany the vehicles. Recommendation fo r futureoperations has been forwarded to V II Air Force Service Command.c. Field repairs should be definitely limited to third echelon;repairable items should be forwarded more quickly to the repair base.

Recommendation for corrective action to be taken in future operations hasbeen forwarded to V II Air Force Service Command.

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f Automatic supply of Technical Data for the advanced basesfrom the mainland was too slow to arrive on schedule for use in theGalvanic operation, for which it was intended. Requisitions were entered at once by the Air Depot Supply Department for emergency handlingfrom the mainland to this Depot followed by immediate shipment to thebases involved*g. The first reports from the advance bases indicated it wasnecessary to pack all AAF material with only one classification in abox, as due to lack of storage space, material is often stored in theoriginal boxes; making no segregation of classes possible without unpacking the boxes. Allfuture packing, therefore, kept AAF classification material separate, even though such a method required additionalpackages*h. It was necessary to include many additional items of mater

ial over and above the original estimate, because of subsequent lossesthrough accidents, theft , and ordinary deterioration caused by inadequate storage facilities at the disposal of the ASSRDNS* The automaticsupply increased to cover these abnormal supply conditions.

i. In many cases planned manufacturing operations such as thegeneration of oxygen breathing gas could not be depended upon, due tofailure of equipment to function on occasion. The reserve supply ofmaterial thus affected was increased.j. The quantities and variety of Aircraft Spares and Supplieslisted in Prepared Combat Tables from the mainland were not sufficient

in this theater, proving short in variety as well as in quantity ofmany items* New and improved tables which were built up by the supplydepartment based on experience reported in this theater are now beingused.

k* Full company t/o and E's are essential fo r tactical combatoperations, with all teams self-sufficient in every detail possible*All communications teams were dependent upon the ASSRON headquarters fo radministration and mess* Companies are now being sent with full t/o andE*s, the standard set-up being a Signal Headquarters (with a Major asSignal Officer, one Lieutenant as assistant, and three clerks) and twocompanies: one Aircraft Warning Company, formed under t/o and E 11-400,and a Signal Communications Company, formed under T/o and E 11-500* Thetotal number of officers and men is 337 for future assignments*1* Personnel should be trained, as nearly as possible, in alljobs of the Joint Communication Center to provide flexibility* When-ever possible all Seventh Air Force personnel are given diversifiedtraining so that they may filldifferent positions if required*m* A standardized procedure is necessary for the Joint Com-munication Centers, to eliminate differences in procedure and terminology

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and speed up the message handling process* The Joint CommunicationCenter personnel from all services should be trained together beforethey land on an enemy beach* A suggested Standard Operating Procedurehas been prepared and included in the Advanced Base Officer's Guide assuggested means of standardization*n. Pre-fabricated equipment for the Joint CommunicationsCenter, suoh as operating tables and radio receiver position^ shouldbe made in the rear area* Plans are being prepared for the Joint Communications Center building and the furniture for it is being built*o. Certain radio circuits which the Joint CommunicationsCenter cannot provide are necessary fo r internal communications withinthe Seventh Air Force. A radio circuit from ADVON Headquarters, SeventhAir Force, to its rear echelon has been installed, and a functional VIIBomber Command circuit was installed recently and is now being tested*p. All radio equipment should be set up and operated prior toshipping to an advanced base, as many radio sets are damaged in shipmentfrom the mainland* All radio equipment, no matter how well packed, isnow opened, set up and operated, then carefully repacked and in somecases covered with water-proof paper and then double packed* Thisdouble packing, in addition to better protection, also gives additionallumber that is always needed after landing*q* Radio equipment assigned to a net must have sufficientfrequency coverage to accommodate all frequencies which may be assignedto that net* During Galvanic operation it was found, too late* thatequipment would not tune to assigned frequencies* A ll transmitters are

now set up and operated before leaving this area* All transmitters nowin use have extended frequency coverage*r. AACS radio circuits, ranges, homing beacons* control towerequipment and personnel are needed early in the operation* These fa-cilities were not planned to be installed until D plus 15 and D plus 20,as they were not believed necessary until then* This plan was correotedby sending in mobile radio transmitter and radio receiving stations,portable radio ranges and temporary radio homers* This equipment is bein g improved fo r future operations.s. To provide for quick and dependable switchboard installa-tion, one (1) TC-4 and one (1) TC-12 should be installed in a K-19trailer. This was done at Funafuti, using two TC-20s in a K-19 trail-er, with great success. This was not done at Makin and resulted inslow installation of telephone switchboards. Trailers are being builtfor future operations*t* Radar efficiency is greatly reduced by tall palm trees inthe vicinity, making 100 foot towers a necessity to get radar antennasabove the palm trees, as well as to inorease th e range.

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v. Sufficient spare parts must be readily available fo rall signal equipment including an abundance of spare parts for unitswhere trouble is known to occur. This applies mainly to electricpower plant equipment and to special radar installations*

v. A large bulldozer should be available to ASSRON com-munications section upon landing to assist in full revetment of allequipment* A bulldozer has been assigned from the Engineers to thecommunications section fo r the initial installation of radar, radio,and telephone equipment.w. Deviations between Army and Navy cryptographic practiceswhen working on joint systems tended to give away the organisationenciphering the message. CinCPAC in collaboration with the SeventhAir Force, drafted a letter for submission of the differences to theCombined Communications Committee in order that the deviations mightbe overcome*x Both officers and enlisted men should be trained in theoperation of the ECM, and officers should be trained in all crypto-graphic devioes* Thorough instruction is now being given to allcryptographic personnel*y. Navy personnel are not always familiar with the Armysystems that are available in the Joint Communication Centers, whichresults in many unnecessary "services " The Cryptographic SecurityOfficer at ADVON Seventh Air Force, has sent a letter to the Joint

Communications Centers on checking Army system and Army indicatorsbefore sending "services*" in addition, all new cryptograph officersare instructed to keep Navy personnel conscious of the presence ofArmy systems in the Joint Communications Centers*

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established or authorized by CinCPOA.(d) In accordance with a directive from the Joint Chiefsof Staff to avoid duplication of circuits and facilities, fixed circuits shall be established only asauthorized by CinCPOA. This principle applies only

to long range circuits employing frequencies below20 mcs. Internal tactical circuits required by assault or defense forces, tactical circuits requiredfor air-amphibious operations, and circuits employing low power on frequercies above 20 mcs, are excluded from the provision.(1) Circuits or facilities, when authorized in accordance with (d) above, which ere peculiar to

the needs of one service usually shall be pro-vided and operated by that service.(2) Ttfhere circuits are employed jointly the servicehaving paramount interest shall provide andoperate such circuit or facility.

(c) Ihe respective services shall provide the materialnecessary to meet their own internal communicationtelephone, telegraph, and teletypewriter require-ments* A ll wire communications at the base shallbe coordinated by the Senior Signal Officer toavoid duplication or confusion, and will be install-ed and maintained under his supervision*(f) (1) Visual and harbor control communications underthe joint communication center shall be in -stalled and operated by the Navy.

(2) The base air commander shall , upon installa-tion of aircraft operating facilities, pres-cribe the approach and recognition procedureto be employed by aircraft.

(s) Communications fo r the Filter Director and AirWarning Services are under the operational controlof the local air commander and shall be coordinatedwith base joint communications by the base command-er.00 An airways communication service way be establishedby the Navy, or Army Airways Commurication Serviceas required at island bases in ihe Central PacificArea as part of the joint communication center toprovide any or all of the following services:

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(1) Point to point circuits for aircraft movementsand other messages relating to the airwaysservice.(2) Air-ground communication for i t inerant, transport , and combat aircraft moving between baseson non-combat missions*(3) Airdrome local air traffic control*(4) Seadrome traffic control*(5) Radio Aids to aerial navigation.(6) Instrument landing systems as required.

Tiiless absolutely essential these services shall not beduplicated and will be utilized by both Amy and Navyaircraft insofar as may be practicable*(i) Permanent equipment, once provided, shall normally

remain in place regardless of changes in commandbetween the services* Every effort shall be madeto avoid duplication of personnel, equipments, andcircuits*

2. (a) Communications plans fo r island bases shall be formulated in accordance with Chapter XI, Subsection Vof reference (a)*(b) Communication facilities shall be planned in theorder of establishment as required by the operationplans*

3* The following rules governing the expression of time oforigin, and time in message texts, shall be observed*(a) The time of origin will be expressed as six figures,followed by a zone suffix letter, the first pair ofdigits denoting the date, the second pair hours, thethird pair minutes except that the first two digitsdenoting the date may be omitted ifnot required*Time of origin will be expressed in teims of G*C*T*(G.M*T*) unless considerations of security and/orexpediency require otherwise.(b) All times in the text of messages wil l be expressedwith a zone suffix letter except that in the text

of messages involving a large number of times, acovering expression such as "all times zone Baker"

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may be used instead of appending zone suffixletter to each.(c) When referenoe is made to a message by its time oforigin, the method of expression of that time of

origin willbe preserved in its original form. Themonth and/or year may be added if necessary.Example t "Your 161412Z DEC 42."

(d) A major task force commander may prescribe a partic-ular zone time to be used inmessage texts for hisforce regardless of the fact that more than one timezcne may be involved in the area of operations ofhis force.

4* Cryptographic aids to be employed at advanced base shallbe determined by each service to meet its needs, within the limitationsto be prescribed by CinCPOA. No. E.C.M. (SIGABA) shall be landed atany base unti l approved by CinCPOA* Commanders of all services shallbe kept apprised of the class (category) of cryptographic aids held byisland bases.

5. (a) All services should maintain adequate levels ofequipment and personnel initially in the HawaiianArea, readily available fo r immediate employmentwherever they may be required, as directed by para-graph 6 of enclosure (A) to reference (c). Uponthe replacement of mobile equipment by permanentbase equipment ,material replaced shall be madeavailable for reassignment by the material poolor depot of the appropriate service o

(b) Each, service shall be responsible fo r the supplyof spare parts aid replacements of its own typesof equipment regardless of the use to which itis put.

6. All base communication services shall be directlyunder the operational control of the local Officer in Tactical Command*

C. W. NIMITZ.

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DISTRIBUTION: (13BT-43):LIST IIP, SP, MC, HTS, XI, 2, 3, 4, 5, V, Z.873, 3V, 11. 23, KS3, 4,NAll54 , NBIB, 49, NDll-15,HYB-10,

P. V.Mercer,Flag Secretary.

Special:C.G. CentpaoC.G. SowespacC6* SopacC.G. Samoan Def. For*C.G. 7th A. F.C.G. sth A. F.C.G* Army Air ForceaC.G. 11th A. F.C.G. 4th A. F.

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45. Install blister window fo r Pilot and Co-pilot and widen the open-ing and equip for emergency release (Mod. No. 69).46. Install quick release baggage racks.47. Relocate pilot 's seat lock handle (to opposite side of seat)*48. Install wind deflector fo r lower ball turret.49. Install deflector and braces for nose turret when needed*50. Remove relief tube near bomb bay door handle and reinstall in back

of pilot* s seat near right front le g of navigator * table (Mod.No. 42).

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B-25 Modifications

1. 75mm gun firing switch installed an the pilots wheel.2. Remove miscellaneous de-icer lines and equipment -throughout theairplane*3. Remove all lines to rear fuselage heater.4. Install twin bottle C02 engine fire extinguisher system (Mod,No, 58).5. Remove canvas cover from battery.6. Install the N6A gunsight in front of the pilot in place of theN3B sight (Mod. No. 59, part B).7. Replace stocking boots that cover the nose wheel strut and elbowswith boots that cover the shock strut only (Mod. No. 60, part B).8. Install safety wire on mounting bolts for upper turret.9. Install turret stop for protection of tail from own fire whennecessary.

10 Comply with T.O. 01-60G-63, and install tf6A gunsight.11. Install oil tank sump bottom self sealing, part No. 82-47083, fo r

left side and part No. 82-47083-1, fo r the right side (Shortageof parts).12. Cover wing openings into Navigators compartment in the airplanethat did not come so equipped (Mod* No* 60, part A).13. Install SCR-522 and frequency crystals (T.O. 08-10-105)*14. Comply with T*o* 01-600*45, and install buffer plates on nosewheel door and nose as per drawings Nos. AP0953AD44D438, -443,and -458.15. Modify fuselage hood at hinge point (UR APO 959 43-481)*16. Install G.S.A.P. camera gun and mount in nose.17. Install K-21 or K-25 camera mount (Proposed Modification)*18. Comply with NAA Modification Center Report No. A-18, StructureReinforcement plus additional APO 953 reinforcement (Mod. No. 65).

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19. Move Waist gun to middle of window, and install spoiler in frontof waist gun window. Install N6A sight (Mod. No. 64 )?20* Beaded trailing wire antennae from reel to transmitter (UR ADAPO 43-387).

21. Install "Push to Talk11 switches on waist and tail guns (ProposedModification)*22* Install extended blast tubes.23. Strengthen bulkhead blast plate for package guns (Same as Item

N o, 18).

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Fighter Aircraft Modifications

1* Launching, tow-holdback, installation, P-39 series aircraft (NAF).2. Supercharging of V-1710-81 engine ignition systems in P-39Q-1-BEand P-398-5-BE series aircraft (Mod. No. 63) 3. Supercharging of ignition systems of V-1710-73 and -85 enginesInstalled in P-40K-1 and P-40N-SCU aircraft (Mod. No. 62).

1 Incl. No. 4 toSECTION XXIII


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MHH^^y

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commanders and their staffs prepared boat assignment tables, boatdiagrams, shore party organization, landing diagrams, debarkationand approach schedules.ed by the BL T commandertraining.

In addition, officer schools were ccnductto complete the indoctrination in amphibious-3. BL T amphibious training Waianae. During the week following the training at Schofield Barracks each BLT received one week f straining at the Waianae Amphibious Training Center. Here a pier wasused to simulate a transport with the necessary booms and nets and a

specially constructed barge was anchored off shore to give personnelthe experience of embarking and debarking from a listing vessel.Winch operators were also trained with the existing equipment. Durin g the training period at TiTaianae, each BL T received instruction inthe embarkation and debarkation of troops, equipment, and supplies.Three landing exercises were conducted as follows:

a. A daylight landing "where the mechanics of debarkation,operation of the shore party, and handling of supplies were stressed.b. A night landing involving the same problems.c. A dawn landing covering all phases of the landing operation, debarkation, clearing the beach, reorganization, advance to

th e objective, operation of shore party, handling of supplies andequipment. The final exercise was made as realistic as possible withthe use of simulated strafing and bombing by planes, bangalore tor-pedos, barbed wire obstacles, smoke, and explosives.4. Physical ccnditioning. During the period from the Ist ofJanuary to the end of July, special attention was given to physicalconditioning. Vehicles were used only when necessary for the trans

portation of troops* Every individual not required to participate instrenuous training was required to run a mile a day as a step towardproper conditioning.C. TRAINING AFTER ASSIGNMENT OF MISSION.

1. Subjects to be stressed. It was most apparent that prior toemployment in amphibious action, the division required further train-ing and equipment. A complete study of the equipment required toaccomplish the assigned mission was initiated. Efforts to obtaindefinite information as to the personnel and cargo transports to beassigned were continued. Training was commenced, stressing riflemarksmanship, battle conditioning, and small unit training, vihileefforts were being made to obtain sufficient ships fo r the finalphases of amphibious training in ship-to-shore movement.

2. Training camps. At the time the division was assigned tothe Galvanic operation, three RCT training camps were made available

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to the division. These camps made training aids available so that theunits could complete basic training, known-distance firing, battlecourses, specialists l training and team work in the employment of oombined arms. In addition, each BLT was given one week of amphibioustraining at the VTaimanalo center; this training was similar to thatconducted at Waianae. The 165th RCT conducted ship-to-shore exercises-during the period 3 October 22 October, employing the 20th TransportDivision. Shore Fire Control Parties were trained by the DivisionArtillery fo r the purpose of directing Naval gunfire after arrival onthe beach.

3. Transport Quartermaster School. A school was conducted forTransport Quartermasters, commencing on 17 September and continuinguntil the troops embarked fo r the Galvanic operation. Under supervisionof Lieutenant Colonel Ferris, G-4, 27th Infantry Division, the coursestressed the following:a. Familiarity with APA's and AKA's by visiting Pearl Harbor,measuring the ships and observing the loading of ships.b. Study of stowage plans used in the Attu operation.c. Preparation of stowage plans, using the concepts preparedby G-4 and based on tentative operational plans.

This school was of immense value. Itnot only trained transport quartermasters fo r the assault troops for the Makin operation, but also madepossible the detail of officers in Vnis capacity fo r ships transportingthe defense battalion*D' PIANNIFG. As previously stated, the original objective assigned the27th Division was the Island of Nauru. On 2 October, this objective waschanged to Makin Atoll. Because of this change, the planning phase bythe 27th Division was divided into two parts.

1. Objective; Nauru.Intelligence. In obtaining information on Nauru, everyeffort was made to preserve security. All available information onNauru was obtained from the planning section of CinCPOA* Aerial photographs, objective reports, photo interpretation reports and studies were

obtained from the Seventh Air Force. A feigned interest in guano andphosphate was successful in locating three information sources, namely,National Geographic Magazine, December, 1921; Ocean and Nauru Islandsby Ellis; the Year Book of the South Pacific, 1942. A study of thisdata made possible a good informational foundation of Nauru prior to theestablishment of Headquarters, Fifth Amphibious Corps and Headquarters,Fifth Amphibious Force.(1) A request was made to Admiral Nimitz to obtain the aid

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of an inhabitant of Nauru with the result that M r,Bott, an employee of the British Phosphate Company,arrived on Oahu about 18 August. He brought withhim printed data on Nauru, pictures (both stilland moving), and a large scale company map of theplateau on the island. This data, plus other verbal information, proved extremely valuable, Mr.Bott remained with the division for approximately3 weeks* During this period, his time was employed as follows:(a) Discussion of the characteristics of Nauru,(b) Advice to PRISIC in their construction ofrelief map of Nauru.(c) Study of possible use of types of landing

craft on Nauru.(d) Advice to G-2 during his preparation of aterrain study of Nauru.(c) A thorough reconnaissance of Oahu with G-2in quest of examples of reefs, cliffs, andvegetation with such characteristics asthose found on Nauru.(f) Correction of Engineer topographical map

(2) By the middle of August, PRISIC had prepared arelief model of Nauru from the information theyhad at hand but the scale was too small to givemore than a general impression of the island,A second model was requested on a scale ofl/5,000, exaggerated 2-g- times vertically. Thisrelief map, though not accurate in detail, wasdeclared amazingly true -when seen by Mr, Bott,A third relief map of the same scale was Ihenprepared under Mr, Bott*s supervision. It wasplanned to make sufficient copies of this re lief map so that every troop ship in the operation would have one available during thevoyage.

(3) The large scale map of ihe plateau area, furnished by Mr. Bott, was used in the preparation of a1/20,000 topographical map by the 64th EngineerTopographical Company. This map, as originallyprepared, was unsatisfactory due to the method ofover-printing grid lines. Ihe l/20,000 map was

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(c) 50 LVT*s and as many DUKWs as could be obtainedwere also requested. Late in October, information was received that the LVT 2 f s which hadbeen requested, would be available fo r employment in the attack. This equipment actuallyarrived and was delivered to the 27th InfantryDivision on 30 October. A provisional organization, composed of members of the 193 dTank Battalion had previously been organised to operatethese vehicles* This detachment, under commandof Major Inskeep, performed an outstanding pieceof work in the servicing prior to combat andoperation during combat*

(3) Signal.(a) A request for signal/ items, including portable

radios for communication from company to platoon,1 280 radar, 1 274 radar, K5l and K52 (truck andtrailer) and SCR 299 radios , as well as radiosfor tanks and ship-to-shore communication*(b) The CPA Signal Officer offered the use of detachments* 75th Signal Company, which had participated in the operation at Attu and had recentlyarrived here*

(4) Filler personnel. At the time information was received that the 27th Infantry Division was to participateIn Galvanic, the division was under strength over1,000 men* G-l, CPA, made plans for the reduction ofthis deficiency by the assignment of troops from othercombat divisions in the area* Due to the limitationson personnel caused by the size and number of transports available, it was at all times apparent that afull table of organizational strength could not beemployed* The Division Commander requested that he beallowed to remain under strength* This request wasapproved*

(6) Graves registration* The attachment of quartermastergraves registration troops was requested but not provided by higher headquarters due to their unavailability.A graves registration section, consisting of 1 officerand 2 enlisted men from the 27th Quartermaster Company,augmented by 5 enlisted men from participating units wasorganized for the operation* This section was trainedunder the direction of the Division Quartermaster andfunctioned adequately during combat in the dispositionof American dead. However it was insufficient to cope

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with the problems of hostile dead. An assistant G-4of the division was given the responsibility of theburial of enemy dead -which he accomplished by theemploymait of the 165 th Infantry Band in conjunctionwith native labor detail of approximately 50 men.(6) A bakery unit was requested but refused.(7) Mail* It was apparent that in the event the operation progressed as planned and the troops were with-drawn from their objective immediately after itscapture that delivery of mail to the participatingtroops would be impractical* On the other hand,prompt delivery of mail to troops remaining on theisland was an essential morale factor It was there

fore necessary to determine the exact units that wereto remain on the island before definite arrangementscould be made When the island had been capturedand air evacuation of wounded commenced, the divisionG-l requested that mail be forwarded by plane at once.Through his efforts, arrangements were made withUSAFICPA fo r prompt mail delivery. The operation ofthe mail service when once begun was conducted in amost superior manner. All Christmas packages weredelivered to the troops on the island prior to Christ-mas and with the return of the remaining combat troopsto Oahu deliveries were stopped in time to prevent theunnecessary voyage to Makin and return* The men wereoutstandingly impressed by the fact that they had re-ceived their Christmas packages and the fact that thedelivery of mail for them to Makin had been terminatedso that upon their arrival at Oahu, their current mailwas awaiting them* This matter of mail delivery cannot be over-emphasized.

(8) QM Supplies and equipment requested and obtained.(a) 30 days 1 maintenance from which the 27th InfantryDivision on its own initiative deleted a number

of such non-essential items as stationery andprotective clothing*

(b) Requested 2 machettes per squad (obtained 600).(c) 12 days* combination "C", "D", and "X" ration*,(d) 30 days' MBfl ration, salt tablets, cigarettes pand pipe tobacco*(c) One additional canteen and cover per individual.

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(f ) Eh trenching tools for all personnel*(g) 1 set of HBT's for each man in place of one setof cotton khaki clothing.(h) 2 5-gallon water containers per individual*

(9) Medical.(a) During "the month of August, the Division Surgeonand the G-4 visited the Surgeon CPA, CinCPAC,and the Naval Surgeon, PH, obtaining informationregarding expected casualties in the type ofoperation contemplated*(b) Numerous conferences were held with General King,CPA Surgeon, regarding the supporting hospitalization units for "the task force but General Kingwas unable to supply the Field Hospital inhich werequested. However, he did furnish the followingassistance:

Medical officers to fillvacancies existing inthe 27th Infantry Division.Additional medical officers necessary fo r 2portable surgical teams*66 trained medical EM for the portable surgicalteams, to be replaced from personnel of thedivision from the best of limited servicepeople of any branch. The division thereforeactually had to furnish its own enlisted personnel for an additional Clearing Company and2 Surgical Teams*

(10) Regulating Point. In the last week of September, itbecame evident that a regulating point would have tobe established for the assembly of supplies which wererequired for loading on shipboard. The assistant G-4made arrangements with higher authority to use certainportions of Fort Kamehameha for such a regulatingpoint and operating procedure was drawn up accordingly,ttie division special staff was instructed to shipmateriel to the regulating point for palletizing. Thedivision experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining necessary equipment for the palletizing operationand for handling pallets*

2. Objectie; Makin. The change in target was confirmed the firstweek in October. Although the objective had been changed to Makin Atoll,all the planning during the previous two months had not been wasted*

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Valuable staff contacts had been established, the training preparationsremained unchanged* and supply requirements (including reequipping)were changed only by reduction in the number of items required.Intelligence*(1) 3y 1 October, several officers of the AustralianForces, who had intimate knowledge of Malein, had

arrived at Fifth Amphibious Force Headquarters*Lieutenant Commander Heyen, of the Royal AustralianNavy, remained with the Fifth Amphibious Force Head-quarters during the entire operation and was constantly available to the division for information.(2) On 15 October, Private Fred C. Narruhn, Ist FijiInfantry, a native of Makin, reported to the divi-

sion for duty and was assigned to the G-2 section.By this time. Battalion Commanding Officers of the165 th Infantry, 105th Field Artillery, and 193 dTank Battalion had been informed of the missionassigned to the division and were familiar with thetentative ground force plans fo r the operation.Since Narruhn had played as a child over all partsof Butaritari Island, he was well informed as tothe conditions of the reefs, taro pits, swamps, and-lakes even to a greater extent than the Englishmenwho had lived there* Thus he was of greatest valueto the commanders who were to be in immediate chargeof the BLTfs.

(3) The submarine which had been dispatched to reoonnoiter the Galvanic objectives was informed of thechange from Nauru to Makin and was able to obtainpanoramic pictures of the west and south shores ofButaritari Island as well as some previously unknownhydrographic information. Every effort was made toobtain all observations made by the submarine offi-cers as well as by Captain Neuman, Headquarters,27th Infantry Division, iflio had accompanied the expedition*(*) Excellent air photographs were available, includingair observer's reports nhich, together with the in -terpretations of the photographs, were invaluablein the preparation of the plan of attack*(6) A team of 10 Nisei (American soldiers of Japaneseancestry) was received from the mainland approximately 4 weeks prior to departure* Due to the tacti-cal plan, it was necessary initially to divide the

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group into several teams so as to accompany each landing unit* Plan 8 were made by which Ihe section was reunited in division headquarters as soon as practicableafter arrival ashore*

(6) Maps of Makin Atoll were prepared on a scale ofl/20,000, with sufficient sets fo r issue to all headquarters and all officers and platoon sergeants*(V) During the month of October, a great amount of infor-mation data was received from the Fifth AmphibiousCorps, Fifth Amphibious Force, JICPOA, and Head

quarters, Central Pacific Area. Regimental and Battalion Commanders received single copies of all available data. The general distribution of this information was finally made as follows:(a) Maps, Makin Atoll, l/20,000 indicated above*-(b) Aerial mosaics, Butaritari and Kuma Islands to

all officers* -(c) Intelligence snnex and terrain studies allorganizations to include every squad and allofficers* -(d) Information folder, Gilbert Islands one peraquade

-(c) Aerial mosaics, stereo pairs one set per bat-talion and higher headquarters and each separateorganization* -(f ) Submarine panoramic strips battalion and higherheadquarters and one per LVT driver. .(8) Due to the flatness of Butaritari Island, large hand-

drawn maps showing terrain features cf the island andanticipated enemy installations were substituted forrelief maps* These maps were drawn to a scale ofapproximately l/500 and were distributed to each troopship.

b* Plan of attack*(1) Based on enemy information and terrain study, a planwas prepared whereby the task force (less one BLT(reinforced) was to land on the western shore of

Butaritari Island beginning at nH"-hour, which wasto be set according to tidal conditions and time

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required for preliminary naval, and air bombardment,1 BLT, reinforced, was Initially held as a floatingreserve with the intention of landing on the lagoonside of Butaritari Island in the center of the organised Jap positions at "If-hour, which hour was to bedetermined dependent upon the success of the initiallanding.

(2) In order to insure the success of landing troops,heavy naval gunfire bombardment and aerial bombardment were employed. The naval gunfire plan was carefully prepared by the Division Artillery Commanderin conjunction with the appropriate staff officersof the Fifth Amphibious Force and Fifth AmphibiousCorps* The air strikes were coordinated with thebombardment and the ap

Tarawa Campaign History (1944)

Documents

Transcript of Tarawa Campaign History (1944)