Taliban's Factor in U.S.-Iran Relations:...

Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 2011, pp. 157-182

Taliban's Factor in U.S.-Iran Relations: 2001-2009

Majid Behestani∗

Mahdi Hedayati Shahidani∗∗

Abstract Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the state of interaction between Tehran and Washington has seen considerable ups and downs. Conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran's national interests and those of the United States gave rise to the dominance of strategic confrontation between the two states, though some cooperative actions have been witnessed between the two sides. The last example refers to some collaboration between Iran and the United States concerning the question of Afghanistan. In this article, we seek to analyze the trend governing the two actors' behavior in the region between 2001 and 2009, using a historical approach and considering the Taliban's agency.

Keywords: Iran, United States, Taliban, Cooperative Process, Interactive Process

∗ Lecturer at the Department of Political Science, University of Guilan ∗∗ PhD Candidate of International Relations at Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs University

Taliban's Factor

158

Introduction After the victory U.S.-Iran relations has been replete with significant ups and downs. Due to its revisionist approach to the principlesbehavior of the Pahlavi regime, the interests of the Islamic Republicof Iran have coconfrontational fthe two states whave been seen between the two sides. The last example rsome collaboration between the two states regarding the question of Afghanistan. Despite existing enmity between the two states, the diplomatic apparatus of both countriesparticipatory cooperation from the other sideWest’s row with Idiversity of sanctionsdiplomats in Iraq.

Such a cooperative approach has resonated in the Taliban in relation to trans-regional interests. Thlevels, from the issue of reto security and intelligence affairs. A study of the two actors'towards each other shows that at least two stages can be distinguished. We call the first stage the complete cooperation period and the second stage the interactive period. In this article, we seek to analyze the reasons for cooperation and then iand the United States on the Afghanistan question over the past decade (2001-2009need to identify and analyze three factors or players in the region. On the one hand, we have Iran and variables and on the otherthis process, whose nature and effects on the two specific actors have to be investigated. In other words, the article addresses the question

tor in U.S.-Iran Relations: 2001-2009

y of the Islamic Revolution, the political history of ns has been replete with significant ups and downs. nist approach to the principles, domestic and foreign Pahlavi regime, the interests of the Islamic Republicllided with U.S. national interests. Within such a

framework, the pattern of strategic enmity between was established, although some cooperative actions between the two sides. The last example refers to on between the two states regarding the question of spite existing enmity between the two states, the atus of both countries have in recent years expected peration from the other side over such issues as Iran over its nuclear energy program, continuity and ctions against Tehran, and detention of Iranian .perative approach has resonated in the battle against elation to Iran and the United States’ regional and erests. This collaboration has taken place at vissue of reconstruction and economic development,

ntelligence affairs. A study of the two actors' coother shows that at least two stages can be e call the first stage the complete cooperation period tage the interactive period. In this article, we seek to ns for cooperation and then interaction between Iran States on the Afghanistan question over the past 09). In order to carry out the aforementioned, and analyze three factors or players in the region. On we have Iran and the United States as dependent the other, the Taliban as an independent variable in

ose nature and effects on the two specific actors have d. In other words, the article addresses the question

tory of downs. foreign epublicsuch a etween actions fers to tion of es, the pected as the

ity and Iranian

against nal and various pment, onductan be period

seek to en Iran he past ed, we on. On endent able in rs have uestion

of what characteristiccloser cooperation between two contemporary international system. For this purpose, look at the nature of the Taliban movement in ideological and historical terms. ThenU.S. and Iranian national interesttwo actors behaved towards approach, we will display the between these two actors.

I. The Rise of TWith the Soviet invasion and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan, various Islamist Afghan groups rose up against the course of this struggle, regional nations like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan became involved along withSoviet Union, which they viewed as pagan. With the withdrawal of the Red Army, the religious groups gaincontinued political anarchy and instability for almost a decade, forces with a mainly Pashtun character Mohammed Omartraditionally followed the the Taliban's leaders were students of or affected by the Deobandi School (Hanafi withdenomination and Wahhtendencies became stronger in(Kaplan, 2009 and Program for Culture

With the start of the U.S.Afghanistan, as well as Pakistani territory, the militants’ ideational proximitWahhabi teachings w60). The Haqqani and Deobandi schools of thought are highly influential in the areas in Pakistan where the Taliban took refuge.

Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs

eristic of the Taliban has provided the grounds for on between two long-running adversaries in the ternational system. For this purpose, firstly, we ure of the Taliban movement in ideological and Then, considering the most important elements in national interests, we will examine how each of these ed towards the Taliban. At last, adopting a historical display the vestiges of cooperation and interaction o actors.

aliban invasion and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan, Afghan groups rose up against the USSR.ruggle, seminary students and religious forces from like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates ame involved along with Afghan militants against the hich they viewed as pagan. With the withdrawal of he religious groups gained power. However, with the al anarchy and instability for almost a decade, forces ashtun character called the Taliban, led by Mullah

mar, captured Kabul. The Pashtun community wed the Sunni Hanafi denomination. However, ders were students of or affected by the Deobandi

with an ideational proximity to the Hanbali nd Wahhabi thinking), Hanbali and Wahhabi

me stronger in the Taliban's thinking and practiced Program for Culture, 2007). art of the U.S.-led “War on Terror” and invasion of well as subsequent retreat of the Taliban

y, the militants’ ideational proximity to Hanbali and gs was intensified for several reasons (Afsar,

ani and Deobandi schools of thought are highly areas in Pakistan where the Taliban took refuge.

s

159

nds for in the

we will al and ents in f these storicalraction

nistan, In the s from mirates nst the wal of ith the forces

Mullah ity has r, since obandi

Hanbali ahhabi actices

sion of n into ali and

2008: highly

refuge.

Taliban's Factor

160

Moreover, they were joined by Wahhabi forces,Chechens and Kashmiris. Against the backdrop of intensified fighting against Western forces in Afghanistan, all of the aforementioned radicalized the ideology of the members a sense that they are protecting the abode of Islam and battling pagans. Tperspective, the Taliban Hanbali school of though

Abuzahreh considers the most important traits of the Hanbali denomination as exagainst ruthless rulerCompanions of thAbdulwahhab, influenced by Ibn Taymiyyah, the hardline Hanbali scholar, propagated his viewpoints in the Peninsula. The exderived from Ibn Taymiyyah

Although this outlArabian Peninsulacentury when British colonialism viewed the suitable for governing the Arabian Peninsula. The adopted Wahhabism as their formal denomination

Wahhabi thinking in various territories from the Middle East and Central Asia to Southeast Asia. Pakistan has also never been afar from the spherinfluence of the Salafists (those who believe in returning society and government to that of the early Islamic period). Shah Waliullah Hindi began the Islamic revival movement in the Indian SubcontinentDeobandi school of thought (the most hardlitraining Wahhabi students) has been widely influenced by his The Taliban represent the militarythinking which has ultimate goal of the Talib


were joined by hardline regional and trans-regional including those associated with al-Qaeda, such as

ashmiris. Against the backdrop of intensified fighting forces in Afghanistan, all of the aforementioned

ideology of the Taliban even further, giving its e that they are protecting the abode of Islam and Therefore, it can be suggested that from a theological

Taliban are a political movement based on the f thought. considers the most important traits of the Hanbali ex-communication, serious objection to uprisingrulers and refraining from cursing d

he Prophet. (Abu Zahreh, 145-153). Muhammad Ibn nfluenced by Ibn Taymiyyah, the hardline Hanbali ed his viewpoints in the 18th century on the A

x-communication of many Shiite and Sunni sects was Taymiyyah (Masjed Jamei, 2001: 10-14).

this outlook garnered certain advocates oa, it was not the dominant power until the early

British colonialism viewed the House of Saud asrning the Arabian Peninsula. The Al Saud ultimatelyism as their formal denomination (Sobhani, 1986inking has managed to attract a number of followers ories from the Middle East and Central Asia to

Pakistan has also never been afar from the spherSalafists (those who believe in returning society and

hat of the early Islamic period). Shah Waliullah Hindi c revival movement in the Indian Subcontinentl of thought (the most hardline religious seminary i students) has been widely influenced by his wesent the military-political dimension of the Wahhabi as penetrated the region during the past decades.

the Taliban movement is to capture Kabul and

egional uch as ighting

ntioned ing its m and

ological on the

Hanbali prisingsdeviant ad Ibn

Hanbali Arabian cts was

on the rly 20th aud asimately86). llowers

Asia to here of ety and h Hindi nt. The minary works.ahhabi es. The ul and

establish an Islamic Afghanistan (Dorronsoro

The seminary schools in Pakistanand Barelvi schools of thought; both denomination. The Deobandi School is influenced by the Hanbali and Wahhabi currents(Shafiee, 2009b). Subcontinent and Afghanistan owe their thinking to Peninsula. The Taliban means the students from these schools. Indeed, "Talibanism is an amalgamation of Deobandi radicalism and Wahhabism in Pakistan and Afghanistanbreak-out of the civil war in Afghanistan in the Talibanism have further enhanced the status of the Deobandi School in Pakistan (Mohammad Sharifi

According to estimates, the population of eight million of Afghanistan's demographic composition. They are a branch of Aryan race, stretching from the southern outskirts of the Hindu Kush and in central, eastern and southeastern areas, mainly in the KabulKandahar line. Tnear Herat, as wellsignificant part of the Pakistani population northwestern areas Pashtuns in Pakistan maintain ethnic andcounterparts in Afghanistan. They were the second generation of Afghan emigrants to Pakistan who went to religious schools out of poverty. Thus, tUlema's funding,(Akhtar, 2008: 56power included closing down female schools, bandown cinemas, restrictions on TV and photography, ban on women's employment and so on (New York

The Taliban


amic government based on Sharia teachings in rronsoro, 2009: 10). ry schools in Pakistan are divided into the Deobandi ools of thought; both offshoots of the Hanafihe Deobandi School is influenced by the Hanbali and s extensively financed by Saudi and Emirati sources For this reason, the Hanbali students of the Indian

d Afghanistan owe their thinking to the Arabian Taliban means the students from these schools. ism is an amalgamation of Deobandi radicalism and Pakistan and Afghanistan" (Shafiee, 2009b)civil war in Afghanistan in the 1990s and the rise of further enhanced the status of the Deobandi School ammad Sharifi, 2009: 26). to estimates, the Afghan Pashtun community,ght million (www.data.un.org), comprises 42 pdemographic composition. They are a branch of

ching from the southern outskirts of the Hindu Kush astern and southeastern areas, mainly in the Kabul

They live in some areas neighboring Iranian borderswell (Pahlavan, 1994: 37). They also constitute a of the Pakistani population living in northern and as in Pakistan; particularly in Quetta and Peshavar

kistan maintain ethnic and blood ties with theAfghanistan. They were the second generation of s to Pakistan who went to religious schools out of hey were taken care of with the Saudi Wahhabi, shaping their rigid interpretations of the Q

6). Some of the Taliban government's orders when in closing down female schools, banning music, closing estrictions on TV and photography, ban on women's so on (New York Times, February 2, 1996).

n emerged after the Afghan Mujahideen's war against

s

161

ngs in

obandi Hanafiali and ources Indian

Arabian chools. m and ). The rise of School

with a percent

of the u Kush Kabul-orders,itute a rn and shavar.h their ion of out of ahhabiQur’an

when in closing omen's

against

Taliban's Factor

162

Soviet troops in the host of events, which will be dealt with briefly.withdrew from Afghanistthe Najibullah government, the Afghan Mujahideen found a chance to get ready for the easy and complete conquest of Kabul. With the realization of the Mujahideen's entry into the two questions were raised for the Mujahideen: First, abundance of vestiges of an entirely militarized society in Afghanistanrevival of ethnic and racial prejudices among the various tribes. These two factors led the Mujahideen to resort to a traditionavarious groups and tribes for the creation of a national government, gaining legal legitimacy and consensus over power sharing. Under such circumstancesPakistan with Navaz Sharif's presence (thein order to create a framework for First, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, leader of a small Pashtun Mujahideen group, led a government for two months. After him, Burhanuddin Rabbani, the leader of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan, as movement militarily supported by Ahmad Shah Masgovernment for 1

Under such circumstances, conditions became ripe for the appearance of an armed group with rise of the Taliban in in Afghanistan's contemporary politics. They sucmany young men the Taliban did not situation in Afghanistan,regional foreign network (SaEmirates) and an extraKingdom) were also influential in Afghanistan. Taliban rise to power as a group that was entirely in coordination with them and in opposition to Iran Rashid, 2002: 408


the 1980s as domestic armed rivalry took shape in a hich will be dealt with briefly. After the Soviet forces

Afghanistan in 1989 and the reduced financial aidovernment, the Afghan Mujahideen found a chance the easy and complete conquest of Kabul. With the Mujahideen's entry into the Afghan capital in

ere raised for the Mujahideen: First, abundance of tirely militarized society in Afghanistan; second, and racial prejudices among the various tribes. These he Mujahideen to resort to a traditional coalition of nd tribes for the creation of a national government, itimacy and consensus over power sharing. Under ces, an agreement was signed on April 24, 1vaz Sharif's presence (then Pakistani prime minister) e a framework for an interim Afghan government. h Mojaddedi, leader of a small Pashtun Mujahideen

vernment for two months. After him, Burhanuddin ader of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan, as arily supported by Ahmad Shah Massoud led the 8 months.

h circumstances, conditions became ripe for the n armed group with a majority ethnic backing. Thean in 1994 is one of the most complicated dilemmas

contemporary politics. They successfully recruited n in religious school in Pakistan. It is noteworthy not just suddenly emerge. In addition to the critical hanistan, which gave rise to a violent civil war, a network (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the United Arab extra-regional one (the United States and the United also influential in Afghanistan. They helped the

ower as a group that was entirely in coordination with position to Iran (Danesh Bakhtiari, 2000: 2878-409).

pe in a forces aid to

chance ith the

n 1992, nce of nd, the These

tion of nment, Under 992 in inister) nment. hideen nuddin an, as ed the

or the g. Theemmas cruited hy that critical war, a d Arab United ed the

on with 87 and

In 1994, the Taliban sent a delegation to Kabul in order to meet with Burhanuddin Rabbani, obtaining his support in return for financial assistance. Athe Taliban’s offer was rival HezbHekmatyar bombardment of Kabul with rocketscease-fire was enforced between Hekmatyar and Rabbani and the premiership was gto working with the troops towards K

As described above, eximportant theological consequently a major political practice employed by the Taliban. In Pakistan, the extremist Wahhabi group Sepahmurdering Barelvis and Shiconsidered as the main enemy Sharifi, 2009 26).massacre in the Afghan city of Mazardiplomats in the city in the late including the Islamic Republic of Iran, will be below.

The Taliban have been classified as a variety of things, depending on the analytical approach. WTaliban as a group influencing the political and ideational differences andTaliban. In one of the are divided into the following three groups: the most hardhardcore group, which provides most of the forces when the Taliban were in power in Afghanistan, iMullah Mohammed Omar. Since they represent the most ideologically hardline element within the Taliban, rejecting any negotiationconcessions to the forces, the United Stfirst degree enemy.


e Taliban sent a delegation to Kabul in order to meet in Rabbani, obtaining his support in return for ce. Another factor behind Rabbani’s acceptance of

offer was rival Hezb-e-Islami leader Gulbuddin bardment of Kabul with rockets. However, anforced between Hekmatyar and Rabbani and the granted to Hekmatyar, the Taliban stopped agreeing the Afghan government and started dispatching its

Kabul. (Gharayagh Zandi, 2001: 16-20). ed above, ex-communication is one of the most ogical components of Deobandi thinking and

major political practice employed by the Taliban. In xtremist Wahhabi group Sepah-e-Sahabahvis and Shiites as necessary, although Shiites became he main enemy of Wahhabi thinking (Mohammad

Such viewpoints were one of the main causes ofAfghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif and slaying of Iranian city in the late 1990’s. Such enmity against Shiites,

lamic Republic of Iran, will be further elaborated

an have been classified as a variety of things, he analytical approach. We intend to present the up influencing the region. Hence, we will not address d ideational differences and cleavages within the of the classifications mentioned above, the Taliban the following three groups: the most hard-line and which provides most of the forces when the Taliban n Afghanistan, is the Quetta Shura (Council),

med Omar. Since they represent the most ideologically within the Taliban, rejecting any negotiation

he Afghan central government and the occupation d States describes them as the 'bad Taliban' and the my. The Quetta Shura is closely connected

s

163

o meet rn for nce of buddin after a nd the greeing hing its

e most g and ban. In deems

became ammad

of the Iranian Shiites, borated

things, nt the

address in the

Taliban ne and Taliban led by

ogically ns and upation nd the to al-

Taliban's Factor

164

Qaeda. Its aim is to establish basis as inspired by the tribal pattern of the early Islamic age (Shafiee, 2009a).

There is also the more moderate Miranshah Council, led by Jalaleddin Haqqani. It is based in Pakistan’s agency. This group is more politically oriented and does not negate the possibility of negotiationis on the withdrawal of pagans from the region and gaining power, which has instability as well as religious impetus constitute the main the Miranshah CouncilThe least hard-line of the main groups making up the Taliban is Shamshato Refugee CKhyber Pakhtunkwa province). It is led by Hezb-e-Islami. Hagainst the Russians. They do not like to be considered as part of the Taliban, but are in practice status quo" (Farrall

Hekmatyar's Afghanistan and his participation has enhanced although he has refused to work with(Giustozzi, 2010:current government are occupied by former members of Hekmatyar's movement. The Adismiss them because ofTaliban, Hamshahri Newspapermaintained a presence resorting to arms under duress. Since tolerant outlook tonegotiate with themconditions dominating tribes have practically ddifferently (e.g. u


s to establish an Islamic government with a tribal by the tribal pattern of the early Islamic age (Shafiee,

so the more moderate Miranshah Council, led by ni. It is based in Pakistan’s North Waziristan up is more politically oriented and does not negate negotiations with the enemy, although the emphasisawal of pagans from the region and gaining as complicated negotiations. Poverty and politicas religious impetus constitute the main motives

ouncil's activities (Shafiee, 2009a, and Bagchi,ne of the main groups making up the Taliban is gee Camp and Bajawa Council (based in Pakistan’s kwa province). It is led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's

Hekmatyar’s “forces played a crucial role in the Jihad ans. They do not like to be considered as part of the n practice called as such because they act against the all, 2009 & Giustozzi, 2010: 6). s Hezb-e-Islami is the most organized force in his participation has enhanced the Taliban's power, refused to work with the Taliban at most occasions 14). Most of the powerful positions in Afghanistan's

ent are occupied by former members of Hekmatyar's Americans are suspicious of them, but are unable to cause of their heavy political weight (Return of the ahri Newspaper, March 7, 2004). This party esence in the political scene and has a history of

ms under duress. Since its members have atowards religious commandments, it is possible to hem. However, the radical political and religious nating Pashtun tribal culture and Pakistan's northern ctically deprived them of the chance to behave unlimited cooperation with the central government

a tribal hafiee,

led by n tribal negate

mphasisg more olitical ves for 2009).

n is the kistan’s

matyar's e Jihad of the

nst the

rce in power, casions nistan's

matyar's able to of the ty has ory of

more ible to

eligious orthern behave rnment

and acceptance of

II. Relations between the Taliban and the United StatesRelations between the United States and the Taliban are among the most secret of America’s ties with foreign governments and movements in the late the Taliban movement as the result of intelligence, military and financial cooperation among the security services of the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan, some other experts do not consider their role in essential.

A group of analysts Central Treaty Organization after the Islamic RevolutRevolution in Afghanistan and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan support the then Communist governmentdesigned to prevent Communist forces The Afghan army was not capable enough to fight, thStates paid attention to Islamist political parties and armed groups in Afghanistan. These groups, in addition to possessfight with the religious motivation popular support within Afghan tribal society. The most important objectives shared by the United States and states included victory over the Red Army, controlling these parties and groups for further management oand establishing a presence oalso sought to present world at a time when might spread. Adinsecure and “prevolution or government Shahkarami, 2002

Nonetheless, there are certain observers who despite the deterioration


f Kabul’s conditions).

tween the Taliban and the United Statesn the United States and the Taliban are among the

America’s ties with foreign governments and e late 20th and early 21st centuries. While some view vement as the result of intelligence, military and tion among the security services of the United States, e United Arab Emirates and Pakistan, some other onsider their role in the Taliban's rise to power as

f analysts believe that Iran's withdrawal from the Organization after the Islamic Revolution, the Red fghanistan and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

n Communist government, disrupted the beltent Communist forces from proceeding southwards. y was not capable enough to fight, thus the United tion to Islamist political parties and armed groups in ese groups, in addition to possessing the ability to ligious motivation contained in jihad, enjoyed firm within Afghan tribal society. The most important by the United States and the other aforementioned

ictory over the Red Army, controlling these parties urther management of Afghanistan's political system a presence on Iran's eastern borders. Those states esent a violent image of Islam in the region and the

when there were fears that Iran’s Islamic Revolution dditionally, they aimed to make Iran's eastern borders rotect” Iran's eastern neighbors from an Islamic government (Vaezi 2001, Rashid 2000,2, and Keynzer 2008). s, there are certain observers who maintain that ioration in the relations between the United States

s

165

ng the s and e view ry and States, other

wer as

om the he Red tan to t once

hwards. United

oups in ility to d firm

portant ntioned parties system states

nd the olution borders Islamic

Amir

n that States

Taliban's Factor

166

and the Taliban, although the façade of the game has changed. That is tochange in conditions for a U.S. presence in developments --Taliban had to be defined as 57).

A second group of analystreasons paving the way for the formation of the Taliban as sufficient, negating the importance of the role played by foreign intelligence services. On this instability - incluPashtun ambitions to gain control over the central government viewed as reasons for the significant role played by Pakistan(ISI) in the process of formation and continued support for this group in line with its strategic strategic depth in Afghanistan cannot be ignored.

When did the United States start opposing the Taliban? The end of the Cold War was the harbinger of a redefinition of U.S. regional objectives and the start of a new regional order based on those objectives. A number of theorists view the relationship between self and othernessto preserve national identity. In this analysis, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and even since the advent of the Islamic Revolution, the United States sought to(Melissen, 2009:bodies and more specifically Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), hardline Wahhabi groups were identified in Central and South Asia (Mottaghi, 2008: 8

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, U.S. attention to the country decreased considerably. It was manifested in U.S.-Soviet agreement


n, their strategic relationship continues to existade of the game has changed. That is to say, due to ions -- most notably the existence of a justification sence in the Asian heartland amid 21st cU.S. regional planning and tactics have varied. e defined as an adversary (Gharayagh Zandi,

roup of analysts view the aforementioned domestic he way for the formation of the Taliban as sufficient, portance of the role played by foreign intelligence his basis, tribal conflicts and domestic political uding the rise of a pagan government along with ns to gain control over the central government s for the formation of the Taliban. In the meantime, ole played by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence cess of formation and continued support for this ith its strategic interests and gaining access to the Afghanistan cannot be ignored.

he United States start opposing the Taliban? The end was the harbinger of a redefinition of U.S. regional

he start of a new regional order based on those mber of theorists view the relationship between s as a pillar of politics; thus, a foreign enemy is a way nal identity. In this analysis, with the collapse of the

d even since the advent of the Islamic Revolution, the ught to create a new ‘other’ to maintain its identity

25-26). Therefore, from within Western security re specifically Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), bi groups were identified in Central and South Asia 80)oviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, U.S. attention to reased considerably. It was manifested in the ment, which stipulates that both sides will stop their

o existue to afication century ed. So , 2001:

omestic ficient, ligence olitical g with t – are

antime, ligence or this to the

he end egional

those en the

s a way of the

on, the dentity ecurity (CIA), h Asia

tion to e 1989 p their

military support forcountry. The other sign the United Nations Madeline Albright was reluctant to point to Afghanistan as a critical region in need of (Shintamani Mahapatra

Iran backed tMeanwhile, the Taliban contiInitially, the Taliban's dominance over Afghanistan implicit approval of Uof Global Terrorismspokesman spoke of security as well as the formation of an elected government, all became convinced that the national level. building process fundamentalists' presence, given their antisuitable solution to (P. Stodan, 1999)be able to fulfill such expectations as disarmament of the paramilitaries, struggand the establishment of a uniform stable point in U.S. support for the Talibancompany Unocal, in a statement, viewed the new Taliban government in Afghanistan as a positive development

Nonetheless, relationships and developments (both pharsh reaction to the attitudes backed by the United States. Such behavior on part of the Taliban viewed this groupabout the serious pThe main function of the Taliban, supposed to be thedramatically (Karkowski


for the Afghan state and insurgent forceser sign is that in her speech, then U.S. ambassador to ons Madeline Albright was reluctant to point to a critical region in need of the world’s attention apatra, 1998: 116). ed the formation of Rabbani's governmentTaliban continued to be supported by the West. liban's dominance over Afghanistan received theof U.S. authorities (Kelenzi, 1998: 132 and Patterns

rism, 2003: 3). When the Taliban's Foreign Ministry e of the group's determination to restore order and as the formation of an elected government, all d that the processes of reconciliation would occur at . While concerned about the non-inclusive coalitionin Afghanistan, the United States also viewed the presence, given their anti-modern outlook,to implement order and its influence in Afghanistan . The United States estimated that the Taliban would lfill such expectations as disarmament of the ruggle against narcotics, expulsion of alien terrorists ment of a uniform stable state system. "The turning port for the Taliban occurred when the American oil , in a statement, viewed the new Taliban government a positive development (Marzden, 1999: 153).

s, the Taliban's tendency to challengedevelopments (both political and cultural) led to its

o the attitudes backed by the United States. Such of the Taliban led the United States, which already

p as anti-modern rather than anti-Western, to learn s problems arising from Taliban policies in practice. n of the Taliban, envisaged by the United Statesthe disarmament of militant groups, which failed kowski, 2001).

s

167

in the ador to oint to tention

nment.West.

ed theatterns

Ministry er and ll sides ccur at alition-ed the , as a anistan would

of the rrorists turning can oil

rnment

world d to its . Such already o learn ractice. es, was

failed

Taliban's Factor

168

On the other hand, Taliban obstruction ridding Afghanistan of terrorist groups occurred while regional concerns over such increased (AkhtarDepartment of State states that hub and a suitable operational base for global terrorist activities. In light of such a development, to Afghanistan from Egypt, Algeria, Pakistan, Central Asian republics and Saudi Arabia were trained by al(Patterns of Global Terrorismfacilities and support including the issuance of passportinternational terrorists was among the other activities undertaken by the Taliban.

The Taliban's hosting with bombing two American diplomatic premises in east Africaanother point raised in the report. Their support for transformation of their territory deterioration inexacerbation of regional tensions

Production and distribution of narcotis the subsistence method of more than one million Afgregard, due to itstransit route of narcotics to the Middle East and Europe, Iran has suffered a lot (Sullivanreducing the production of narcotics was one of between the United Statessubsistence of many people caused the Talibanthe agreement, leading to

With the government in Afghanistan Following the September demanded the extradition of alUnited States and the


her hand, Taliban obstruction clouded the goal of stan of terrorist groups (Karkowski, 2001)egional concerns over such conduct by the Tar, 2008: 50). In its 1999 annual report, the U.S. tate states that Afghanistan had turned into a training

ble operational base for global terrorist activities. In evelopment, individuals who were largely dispatched om Egypt, Algeria, Pakistan, Central Asian republics a were trained by al-Qaeda, assisted by the Taliban obal Terrorism, 1999). The provision of special upport including the issuance of passportorists was among the other activities undertaken by

n's hosting of Osama bin Laden, who was charged wo American diplomatic premises in east Africaised in the report. Their support for bin Laden and f their territory into a backyard for al-Qaeda led to a U.S. relations with the Taliban movement and

egional tensions and challenges. and distribution of narcotics, a major U.S. concern,

e method of more than one million Afghan. Is proximity to Afghanistan and location along narcotics to the Middle East and Europe, Iran has llivan, 2002: 194 and White Paper, 2009: 4-6).

oduction of narcotics was one of the agreements nited States and the Taliban, disruption of the any people caused the Taliban to fail to implement ading to a negative U.S. outlook towards the Taliban.

Taliban's obstruction, debates about a change fghanistan started at the Pentagon in the late

September 11 attacks in 2001, the United States tradition of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Ladend the Taliban’s cooperation with the U.S.-led “War

goal of . This

Taliban e U.S. raining ties. In atched publics Taliban special ts for ken by

harged ca, was en and ed to a nt and

oncern, In this ng the an has While

ements of the lement

Taliban. nge in 1990s. States to the

d “War

on Terror”. Withplan for invading Afghanistan accelerated by theWithin weeks, Afghanistan had been occupied by U.S.

Following the fall of the Talibanof Afghanistan, the group's hostility tointensified in a way that both althe region have becomeworld. The withdrawal of become the primary The reasons for U.S. hostility towards the Taliban caas follows: threat to U.S. interests throughout the world by aland supporters of the Talibanrestaurants, sports teams, offices and troopsinternational peace and security

Other items government accountable, eliminatforming an efficient government, transparency andconditions. This, as a lack ofwill contribute to the and Dorronsoro,

On the other hand, due to its nonmade the situation more difficult for actors opposiinternational scene. In this respect, alterrorist group - aterritory-is equipped with strategies of asymmetrical warfare. For Twin Towers and the Pentagon To battle such threats proves more difficult, because they can come from anywhere and against anybody. Use of military force in relation to such cases as expthen in Iraq would not lead to a long


h the Taliban's refusal to hand over bin Ladenng Afghanistan was initiated at the Pentagon, e presence of neo-conservatives in the White House. fghanistan had been occupied by U.S.-led forces.he fall of the Taliban regime after the U.S. invasion the group's hostility towards the United States has

way that both al-Qaeda and the Taliban movement in become the number one enemies of the U.S.drawal of American troops from Afghanistanary goal of the Taliban movement and its offshoots.

U.S. hostility towards the Taliban can be enumerated to U.S. interests throughout the world by al-of the Taliban, such as attacks on American

rts teams, offices and troops and threat to ce and security.s can be added to the list, such as making the Afghan countable, eliminating administrative corruption, fficient government, improving administrative d developing the Afghan economy and living as a lack of efforts to carry out the aforementioned the rise of terrorism in the region (Sajjadpour2009: 9). er hand, due to its non-state character, al-Qaeda has ion more difficult for actors opposing it in the ne. In this respect, al-Qaeda as an international apart from the fact that it does not have any specific pped with modern military hardware, using new mmetrical warfare. For this reason, the attacks d the Pentagon were "conducted by a non-state actor. hreats proves more difficult, because they can come nd against anybody. Use of military force in relation experienced by the United States in Afghanistan and ould not lead to a long-term solution for such a

s

169

en, the ntagon, House. es.nvasion tes has

ment in in the

an has shoots.

merated Qaeda

merican eat to

Afghan uption, strative

living ntioned r, 2009

da has in the ational pecific g new on the

e actor. n come elation an and such a

Taliban's Factor

170

problem” (SukmaThe West’s

Afghanistan and Pakistan centers of training aof the strongest reasons for cooperationStates – although proximity to Afghanistan United States and Iran

III. Iran and TalibanAfter Washington’s decision to invade Afghanistan, crucial part in the United States’ overthrow of the Taliban regime(Kagan, 2008: 37)the U.S. to invite Iranreasons for Western states, andto the need to engage Tehran in order to solve regional crises is Iran’s geopolitical and geothe issues Afghanistan is facingstate to help resolve a crisis and reconstruct a crisisapart from proving the state's historical capabilities and prestige. It is noteworthy that NATO member statessince the very start ofcalled for Iran's constructive presence in this 2, 2009). This invithe decades-old cwhich has been program.

Contrary to the initial perception among Coalition commanders, the invasion of a territoeasy task. The protracted war of attritionfatigue among the NATO military forces (Fars News6, 2010 and Decembrumors about behind the scene


a, 2004: 86). s failure to successfully fight Taliban militants Pakistan for almost a decade and destroy their

ng as well as al-Qaeda safe havens has provided one reasons for cooperation between Iran and the United gh superficial and temporary. Iran's geographical fghanistan justifies close cooperation between the d Iran on issues in the region.

libann’s decision to invade Afghanistan, Iran played a

he United States’ overthrow of the Taliban regime). The lapse of time has not eliminated the needte Iran to cooperate on Afghanistan. Among tern states, and particularly the U.S., to pay attention gage Tehran in order to solve regional crises is Iran’s geo-strategic status and constructive outlook towards nistan is facing (Dehghani, 2009: 489-490). Inviting a olve a crisis and reconstruct a crisis-ridden country, ing the state's historical importance, will add to its

prestige. It is noteworthy that NATO member statesart of the U.S.-led occupation of Afghanistanconstructive presence in this arena (Fars News, May vitation becomes more significant when considering conflict between the Islamic Republic and the West

exacerbated by a row over Iran’s nuclear energy

the initial perception among Coalition commanders, territory with a tribal fabric did not prove to be an

rotracted war of attrition in Afghanistan has led to e NATO military forces (Fars News Agency, January cember 9, 2009). That is the reason why there are behind the scenes compromise and negotiations

ants in major ed one United aphical en the

ayed a regimeeed for ng the tention s Iran’s owards viting a ountry,

d to its states,

n, have s, May idering West,

energy

anders, be an led to anuary ere are iations

between the occupation forces' commanders and Taliban leaders (Rahimi, 2008: 23

In 2009, news reports surfaced saying interaction between Iran and the West in regards to Afghanistan antaken place. Fars News Agency reported Hillary Clinton on April 2009 as sayingAfghanistan and we believe that this issue can help us have Iran's cooperation once again. We have had thibeginning of our presence in Afghanistan. Iran has been fairly useful in the Afghanistan question and participated in the Afghanistan aid conference in Tokyo, promising to contribute to the realization of stability in Afghanistan. Thisadopted towards Iran, but there are numerous issues ahead and we are at the start of the road to see if Iran is willing to become committed along with us (Fars News

The fact that officials froparticipate in the establishment of peace and stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan attests to their inability to resolve regional problems without Iran's involvementActing Deputy Uinternational Afghanistan conference in The Hague, described thgathering without BBC, Gordon Dpositive role in Afghanistan all the time." But he expressed hope that this conference would indicate the beginning of a positive role for Iran in Afghanistan more international efforts to establish peace and security in Afghanistan, a conference was held in London on January which Iran was invitedNews Agency, January outcomes and repercussions of this meeting, Iran's diplomatic apparatus declined to take part in it

Since the Taliban's very appearance, the Islamic Republic of Iran


cupation forces' commanders and Taliban leaders 3). ws reports surfaced saying interaction between Iran regards to Afghanistan and its reconstruction has News Agency reported Hillary Clinton on April that the current Hague meeting referred to

we believe that this issue can help us have Iran's e again. We have had this cooperation at the presence in Afghanistan. Iran has been fairly useful

an question and participated in the Afghanistan aid okyo, promising to contribute to the realization of anistan. This is one of the strategies that we have Iran, but there are numerous issues ahead and we of the road to see if Iran is willing to become with us (Fars News Agency, April 28, 2009).

hat officials from various countries invited Iran to establishment of peace and stability in Afghanistan

ests to their inability to resolve regional problems nvolvement. For instance, on March 27, 2009U.S. State Department Spokesperson, before

ghanistan conference in The Hague, described thut Iran's presence as imperfect. According to the

Duguid added: "Iran's government has not played a Afghanistan all the time." But he expressed hope that would indicate the beginning of a positive role for tan (BBC, May 12, 2009). In this relation, as part of nal efforts to establish peace and security in

onference was held in London on January 28, 2nvited to participate actively and constructively anuary 2, 2010). Nonetheless, assessing the possible repercussions of this meeting, Iran's diplomatic d to take part in it (BBC Persian, January 28, 2aliban's very appearance, the Islamic Republic of Iran

s

171

leaders

en Iran on has

April 2, red to

Iran's at the useful

tan aid tion of e have and we ecome

ran to anistan oblems 09, the re the ed theto the ayed a pe that ole for part of rity in 2010 to y (Fars ossible omatic 010). of Iran

Taliban's Factor

172

has stood firmly behind the North(Sullivan, 2002: 1position is perhaps the backed government and Kabul's call for Western implicit and explicit support for the are more reasons for Iran’s support for the Northern Alliance when examining the situation more closely.

The formal ideology of Ian's central government is based on Shiite teachings. Meanwhile, theinterpretation of Islam, negating any compromise with other Islamic denominations (Gthe Taliban showed moderation, to avoid any friction withIran's other neighbors. civilians - including women and children unsuitable, violent image of Islamancient monuments(Gharayagh ZandiShiites, murder ofproduction and tborders and attackin Iran’s Sistan and Baluchistan relations. Since the Taliban's very formation, Iran held the perception that the establishment of the Taliban in Kabul might turn Iran's eastern borders tensions, hostilities and enmities to Iran

In the almost a decade that has passed since the U.S.invasion of Afghanistan, expanded. During the same period, supporting the TalibIran in PakistanAbdulmalek Rigi,Such issues have strained including Pakistan.


y behind the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan 193). One might argue that the reason behind this aps the Taliban's uprising against Rabbani’s

ment and Kabul's call for Iranian help visand explicit support for the Taliban. However, there

s for Iran’s support for the Northern Alliance when uation more closely.

ideology of Ian's central government is based on Meanwhile, the Taliban have adopted a Wahhabi Islam, negating any compromise with other Islamic

Gharayagh Zandi, 2001: 93). Still, Iran was ready, if wed moderation, to avoid any friction with them ghbors. However, the Taliban's savage killings of ding women and children - and presentingnt image of Islam, including the destruction of nts, minimized the chance of ameliorating conditions di, 2001: 97). The Taliban's genocide of Afghan of Iranian consular officers and a journalist,

trafficking of narcotics, insecurity on Iran's eastern cks on border checkpoints and spillover of insecurity nd Baluchistan Province resulted in hostile bilateral

he Taliban's very formation, Iran held the perception hment of the Taliban in Kabul might turn Iran's into the most critical ones for Iran, transferring

es and enmities to Iran (Shafiee, 2008). most a decade that has passed since the U.S.

anistan, production and trafficking of narcotics g the same period, Pakistan has become a hub for

Taliban forces. The presence of militants opposing n, exemplified by the terrorists formerly led by , is among Iran's top concerns in its eastern borders.

ve strained Iran's relations with regional powers, n. In this relation, Abdulmalek Rigi's confession that

anistan nd this s Iran-is-à-vis r, there e when

sed on ahhabi Islamic eady, if em like ngs of of an

ion of ditions

Afghan rnalist, eastern ecurity ilateral

ception Iran's

ferring

U.S.-led cs have ub for posing led by orders. owers,

on that

the (Jamejam Onlinewith one of the Taliban's leaders, and collaboracommander O(www.tebyan.net,

In this relation, Revolutionary Guards Corps, General Salami, observes: "Iran's southeast area is among the regions that in geopoliticallarge capacity for the coincidence of policies adopted by the transregional and intraregional states, creating worrying security functions. This area is a hub for world transit of narcotics for which Iran has paid hefty human and material cosProvince, such groups as alby U.S. regional policies are active as well" (Fars NewsNovember 6, 2009possibly insecurity near adjacent to Pakistani

States adjust national interestsenumerates Iran's national of the political systemTerritorial integrityPeople's substantial subsistenceExistence of Islam and Political independenceSpread of justice and welfare in societysecurity, 13- Protection of

Considering the tensions onnational interests, we can identify major threats posed by the Taliban to Iran as follows:

Discrediting the image of Islam and political Islam propagated by Iran: Iran's Islamic Revolution and the Taliban movement share the idea that both seek to implement society. Due to the


nline, May 20, 2010) new leader of his group has met Taliban's leaders, and collaborated with al-

Omar al-Baghdadi is worthy of mentionMarch 4, 2010).

lation, the deputy commander of the Islamic Guards Corps, General Salami, observes: "Iran's

among the regions that in geopolitical terms hasr the coincidence of policies adopted by the transaregional states, creating worrying security functions. ub for world transit of narcotics for which Iran has an and material costs. In Sistan and Baluchistan roups as al-Qaeda and the Taliban which are affected

policies are active as well" (Fars News A09). Other writers have pointed to the dangers of ty near Iran's eastern borders, particularly in areas tani territory (Sullivan, 2002). t their relations with other countries on the basis of

s. Iranian political scientist Mohammad Reza Tajik s national interests as follows: "1- Islamic character stem, 2- Republican nature of the political systemity, 4- National sovereignty, 5- National unity

ntial subsistence, 7- Public order and safetyam and specifically Shiite Islam in the worlddence, 10- National prestige and distinctionsand welfare in society, 12- International peace and

ection of the environment" (Tajik, 2002: 18). g the tensions on Iran's eastern border and Iran's , we can identify major threats posed by the Taliban :

g the image of Islam and political Islam propagated slamic Revolution and the Taliban movement share oth seek to implement Sharia commandments in he use of a violent extremist approach to introduc

s

173

as met Qaeda

mention

Islamic "Iran's

s has atrans-

ctions. an has chistan ffected

Agency,gers of n areas

asis of a Tajik aracter tem, 3-nity, 6- ety, 8- rld, 9-

ns, 11- ce and

Iran's Taliban

pagated t share ents in roduce

Taliban's Factor

174

and implement Sharia Law is hurt, undermining the spread of the Islamic Revolution,

- Religious and Ethnof non-Pashtun ethnicgroups, particularly Shiite Muslims,

- Deployment of the MujahedinAfghanistan underMoreover, an aorganization and the Rigi terrorist growhich collaborati(Tabnak, February

Michael Rubin suggests that when a state is entangled in serious challenges, its neighbors the Baker-Hamilton Report asked the U.S. administration to engage Iran in the resolution of questions in Iraq and Afghanistan (Rubin, 2005: 5).

IV. Taliban in the U.S.During the past two years, the Coalitiondisappointed with the elimination of the Taliban from Afghanistan's political scene, calling for negotiation with good” Taliban. It is not intended to pave the way for thefull presence in Kabul's presiwith the other political and ethnic groups within the framework of a coalition government. this manner may reduce tensions to some extent asgrounds for the reemergence of Taliban beliefs and conductsAfghan government's Afghan presidential election, former U.S. Afghanistan and Pakistan, Taliban to sit downprocess and agree to share powerhave the Taliban rejected this call


haria Law by the Taliban, the image of political Islam ing the spread of the Islamic Revolution,and Ethnic Cleansing: This means violent treatment ethnic groups and members of minority religious

rly Shiite Muslims,ment of the Mujahedin-e-Khalgh Organization in

er the Taliban's rule (Gharayagh Zandi, 2001agreement was reached in 2009 between this

the Rigi terrorist group in Pakistan according to ion for conducting terrorist acttacks was envisaged ry 18, 2010), bin suggests that when a state is entangled in serious ighbors automatically try to stabilize it. On this basis, ton Report asked the U.S. administration to engage ution of questions in Iraq and Afghanistan (Rubin,

he U.S.-Iran Relations t two years, the Coalition Forces have become h the elimination of the Taliban from Afghanistan's calling for negotiation with what’s labeled as “t is not intended to pave the way for the militants’

Kabul's presidential palace, but to engage them along olitical and ethnic groups within the framework of a ment. The Taliban's return to the political scene in reduce tensions to some extent as it will provide the reemergence of Taliban beliefs and conducts

ment's policies (Rahimi, 2008). Ahead of the second ntial election, former U.S. special envoy Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, formally called on the wn at the negotiation table, take part in the electoral ee to share power (Hossein Miri, 2009). "Not onln rejected this call, but also with the Taliban's

l Islam

atment eligious

ion in : 100): n this ding to visaged

serious s basis, engage Rubin,

ecome nistan's s “the ilitants’

m along rk of a cene in ide the in the

second oy to on the ectoral

ot onlyaliban's

withdrawal, the Pashtun community has had the least partithe elections"intimidated people with death threatpolls. According to experts, production and distribution of narcotics and theare among the most important reasons for (Shariatinia, 2009)

Such a reemergence would serve neither Iran nor those of the United States. As Ashley Tellis has once indicated, a prolonagainst the interests of Afghanistan’s neighborsthis sense, a longcooperation in the region, because the general ground for U.S. confrontation with the Taliban, which is closely related to national interestsground on which Tehran and Washington may agree to shortcooperation on regional issues. But in what form will Iran cowith the United States? Pakistan’s dilemma. Pakistan by extending its military or NATO drones in northwestern Pakistan serve this Tellis, 2009: 75; PIran to grant it the right to use its territorial space in Terror” in Pakistan a

One of the other strongest motives for Iran's engagement with the Coalition is that like other Muslim countries, Iran wishes to prevent the discrediting of Iran and Muslim countries in global terrorism. Muslim countries (Iran and Iraq) in the of al-Qaeda as the main enemy of Western civilization countries - including Iranterrorism off Islam by siding with the world coalition against


Pashtun community has had the least participation in (Mollazehi, 2009). Moreover, the Taliban had le with death threats if they cast their votes in

g to experts, the Taliban's domination over distribution of narcotics and their opium-like ideology ost important reasons for the Taliban's reemergence ).

mergence would serve neither the national interests of of the United States. As Ashley Tellis has once onged American presence in Afghanistan is clearly ests of Afghanistan’s neighbors (Tellis, 2009: 3ng-term future cannot be imagined for Iranthe region, because the general ground for U.S. th the Taliban, which is closely related to American, contradicts Iranian interests. There is only limited

h Tehran and Washington may agree to shortegional issues. But in what form will Iran coo

d States? Pakistan’s tribal areas seem key to the n will either resolve the security issues in the region full control over the tribal areas or allow the U.S.

O to enter the area via land. Frequent attacks by U.S. western Pakistan serve this goal (Mollazehi,Peters, 2009: 23). The United States had oncethe right to use its territorial space in the “War on an and Afghanistan (Aftab News, February 6, 2other strongest motives for Iran's engagement with that like other Muslim countries, Iran wishes to

rediting of Iran and Muslim countries in relation to The invasion of Afghanistan, U.S. inclusion of two (Iran and Iraq) in the “Axis of Evil” and illustration

e main enemy of Western civilization has led Muslim ding Iran - to make efforts to cleanse the taint of lam by siding with the world coalition against

s

175

tion in n had in the

er the eology rgence

rests of s once clearly 39). In an-U.S. r U.S.

mericanlimited rt-term operate to the region

he U.S. by U.S.

2009, e asked War on 2009). nt with hes to tion to of two tration

Muslim aint of against

Taliban's Factor

176

terrorism and objecting to the Taliban 2004: 87-88).

The massive protracted presence ofrefugees on Iran's soil instability within AfghanistanIranian society is another reason that compels Iranian authorities to take advantage of all leverage including the United States in order to bring stability to Afghanistan and subsequently repatriate Afghan refugees (Sullivan

The Islamic Consultative Assembly'sin a paper studied the impact of Taliban andeastern borders of Iran on the ideconcludes that there is a strong correlation between youth motivations and identity policies related to social uprisings, public insecurity, armed ethnic conflicts, and serious domestic and foreign threats (Research Centforeign policy malong with other cthe outcome of the

Conclusion One of the beauties of diplomacy is between two enemies. Although there has been a shift from strategic amity to strategic enmity between Iran and the United States since the victory of the Islamic Revolution, we have seenimplicit collaborationactors. The last examplecollaboration concerning

In the course of theremoval of the Taliban regime, foreign forces have role, but Iran's role cannot be deniedsegment of domestic Afghan actors and other regional players, Iran managed to provide the conditions for


ecting to the Taliban interpretation of Islam (Sukma,

ve protracted presence of Afghan emigrants and n's soil during the past 30 years due to wars and n Afghanistan, and the adverse consequences for

another reason that compels Iranian authorities to f all leverage including the United States in order to

o Afghanistan and subsequently repatriate Afghan n, 2002: 193-4). c Consultative Assembly's (Majles) Research Center d the impact of Taliban and militant activity along the of Iran on the identity of Iranian youths. The author

there is a strong correlation between youth identity policies related to social uprisings, public

d ethnic conflicts, and serious domestic and foreign h Center, 2009). Hence, there is a need for rational

management on part of Iran’s diplomatic apparatus concerned institutions to take optimum advantage of he U.S.-led “War on Terror” in Afghanistan.

ies of diplomacy is its ability to facilitate cooperation mies. Although there has been a shift from strategic enmity between Iran and the United States since the lamic Revolution, we have seen some explicit and

ation between the two influential regional and global example, which is still underway, refers to their

ncerning Afghanistan. rse of the U.S.-led occupation of Afghanistan and aliban regime, foreign forces have played the crucial ole cannot be denied. Because of its influence on a estic Afghan actors and other regional players, Iran ide the conditions for the presence of foreign forces

Sukma,

ts and rs and es for ities to rder to Afghan

Center ong the author youth public

foreign ational paratus tage of

eration rategic

nce the cit and global

o their

an and crucial e on a s, Iran forces

to cause less friction in Afghanistan. September 11th events, Washington and Tehran have worked together silently: Iran engaged in training, equipping and financing most of the anti-Taliban North Alliance mwho cooperated with the United States in toppling the Taliban and alQaeda" (Alef News Website

Interaction between the two countries has years. This can be seen inlatest international conference on the which was held in London in January Iran has been concerned with the reconstruction of its eastern neighbor more than anysecurity and interestsand developing state. Afghanistan's economic growth and development will lead to the repatriation of more than two million Afghan refugees,decreased insecurity in Iran's eastern borders and it will opereliable large market to

Iran desires Taliban were in power U.S. ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crothe support of regional states for forging a coalition Terror” after September Iranian diplomats who expressedinvasion of Afghanistan 2009).

If we put this data together, we can conclude that firstagain, despite a history of political coreach peaceful agreements. Iran and the United States should be sought issues rather than in general, as overarching positions are fixed on both sides. If we dependent variable, friendly


tion in Afghanistan. Bobby Ghosh writes: "After the vents, Washington and Tehran have worked together aged in training, equipping and financing most of the th Alliance militants and commanders in Afghanistan with the United States in toppling the Taliban and alws Website, December 11, 2009). between the two countries has persisted after nine e seen in Western countries’ invitation of Iran to the al conference on the reconstruction of Afghanistan, n London in January 2010. "The Islamic Republic of concerned with the reconstruction of its eastern han any other country, and it basically considers its rests as being contingent on the creation of a stable g state. Afghanistan's economic growth and l lead to the repatriation of more than two million , reduced production and transit of narcotics,

urity in Iran's eastern borders and it will opeket to Iranian goods" (Shafiee, 2008). peace and stability in the region. The years that

power were bitter for the Islamic Republic. Fto Iraq Ryan Crocker, who was tasked with gaining gional states for forging a coalition for the “War on ptember 11, has spoken of is meeting with thts who expressed Iran's approval of the Uhanistan (Islamic Republic News Agency, July

his data together, we can conclude that firstly;istory of political conflict, two enemies have and can greements. Areas for possible cooperation beited States should be sought in relation to particular n in general, as overarching positions are fixed on

we set the two countries' national interests as our le, friendly interaction between the two countries on

s

177

fter the ogether

of the anistan and al-

er nine to the nistan,

ublic of eastern ders its

stable h and million cs, and open a

hat the Former gaining War on h three U.S.-led uly 29,

y; once nd can etween rticular xed on as our ries on

Taliban's Factor

178

major international questionsMoreover, t

At least two phases can be discertowards the Taliban. The first period begattacks when there was participatory cooperation the United States in coalition against terrorism. Thisoccurred within foreign policy, aiming at maximum cooperation with the West, which ended in 2005. Wfailed to react positively to Iranian diplomatic overtures under Khatami. This wpresidential elections in Iran, a government sufficient reasons to reduce collaboration with the United Statesin regards to shared interestspowers. The reduction in cooperation has however not led to a complete cut in relations. Rather, it has changed the character of Iranian cooperation with the U.S. from participatory cooperation to mere interaction. To Iran, Western states have to pay further cosorder to attract itheir conduct.

In this regard, weIran and America to cooperate in this paper. include the struggle against tnarcotics, Taliban's threateningopposition againstfactor of instability in the region, the danger of Taliban rule Afghanistan and Pakistan and subsequent disruption in regional peace and stability, terrorists' access to nuclear weapons, and securing oil transit.

In order to show its willingness to reduce tensions in accordance with the logic of cooperation at the time, the Islamic Republic of Iran seized the chance to cooperate with the coalition against terrorism to prove this claim and simultaneously to provide


nal questions is logical. this relationship has been uniformly moving ahead. ses can be discerned in the two countries' positions ban. The first period began with the September ere was participatory cooperation between Iran and s in coalition against terrorism. This development the framework of Khatami's détente approach in

ming at maximum cooperation with the West, which Western powers, and most notably the United States

positively to Iranian diplomatic overtures under was one of the causes of why after the next ions in Iran, a government was formed that hato reduce collaboration with the United States

hared interests, as part of resistance againstduction in cooperation has however not led to a

relations. Rather, it has changed the character of ion with the U.S. from participatory cooperation to To Iran, Western states have to pay further cos

its cooperation, making mutual respect a basis for

rd, we have tried to identify the particular reasons fora to cooperate in this paper. Some of these reasons

uggle against the production and distribution of n's threatening of both countries' national interests, st acts of terrorism, recognition of the Taliban as ility in the region, the danger of Taliban rule Pakistan and subsequent disruption in regional peace rorists' access to nuclear weapons, and securing oil

show its willingness to reduce tensions in accordance cooperation at the time, the Islamic Republic of Iran e to cooperate with the coalition against terrorism to

m and simultaneously to provide the grounds for

ahead. ositions

er 11th

an and opment ach in which States,under

e next at hads, even major

d to a cter of tion to osts in sis for

ons foreasons ion of terests, an as arule in l peace ing oil

rdance of Iran rism to ds for

lowering the high wall of distrust between Iran and the United States. In spite of the aforementioned reasons for proximity between Tehran and Washington, the unsuitable treatment of Iran by the United States and its regional allies led thesuffice to interaction with the Coalition Forces, while preserving Iran's interests in Afghanistan.


h wall of distrust between Iran and the United States. orementioned reasons for proximity between Tehran , the unsuitable treatment of Iran by the United gional allies led the Iranian authorities to decide to ction with the Coalition Forces, while preserving Afghanistan.

s

179

States. Tehran United cide to serving

Taliban's Factor

180

Refrences - Abuzahreh Mohammed (No Date),

and Jurisprudence- Amir Shahkarami Maryam Sadat

Taliban in Afghanistan," MA Thesis, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran (Persian).

- Tajik Mohammad Reza Security Strategies: Approaches and StrategiesPublishing (Persian).

- Pahlavan Changiz ((Persian).

- Hossein Miri Mirhamed No. 38 (Persian).

- Dehghani Firouzabadi Seyed Jalal Iran, Tehran: Samt Publications (Persian).

- Rahimi Mohammad Impact on Iran's Security," Research Institute of Strategic Studies (Persian).

- Rashid Ahmad (2000)- Sobhani Jafar (1986), - Sajjadpour Mohammad Kazem

Diplomatic Hamshahri- Shariatinia Mohsen

Extremism to Afghanistan)," - Shafiee Nozar (2008

www.drshafiee.blogfa.com- Shafiee Nozar (2009a)- Shafiee Nozar (2009

blogfa.com (Persian).- Gharayagh Zandi Davoud

Its Impact on the Security of the Islamic Republic of IranDepartment of the Revolutionary Guards Corps School of Command, (Persian).

- Kelenzi Richard (1998


ed (No Date), Ibn Hanbal and His Life and Age: His Views nce, Cairo: Arab Thinking House (Arabic). aryam Sadat (2002), "Mujahideen's Ethnocentrism and the Rise of the nistan," MA Thesis, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of

eza (2002), A Preface to Islamic Republic of Iran's National egies: Approaches and Strategies, Tehran: Culture of Discourse an).(1994), "Afghanistan in Spring 1994," Donya-ye Sokhan,

med (2009), "The Trace of the Red Army," Diplomatic Hamshahri

di Seyed Jalal (2009), Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of mt Publications (Persian).(2008), "Pakistan after Musharraf: Rereading Taliban's Case and Its Security," Research Institute of Strategic Studies (Persian)., The Taliban, Trans. Najleh Khandagh, Tehran: Bogheh (Persian).Wahhabi Cult, Qom: Institute of the Holy Koran, Vol. 2 (Pad Kazem (2009), "U.S. Foreign Policy and Challenge of Afghanistanamshahri, No. 38 (Persian)..

(2009), "Addiction to the Taliban (Elections and the Return of ghanistan)," Diplomatic Hamshahri, No. 34 (Persian). 08), "Iran's Role in the Process of Afghanistan's State-Bogfa.com (Persian). ), "Typology of the Taliban," www.drshafiee.blogfa.com (Persian).09b), "Talibanism in Pakistan and Afghanistan," www.drshafiee.ian).avoud (2001), The Appearance of Taliban's Phenomenon and the Security of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran: Research

he Revolutionary Guards Corps School of Command, (Persian).998), "The United States and the Taliban," in William Milli ed.,

s Views

se of the versity of

National Discourse

No. 61

mshahri,

public of

e and Its

Persian).Persian). hanistan,"

eturn of

Building,"

ian).drshafiee.

non and Research ).Milli ed.,

Afghanistan, the Taliban and World PoliticsMashad: Taraneh Publications (Persian).

- Commission on Codification of UU.S. National Security Strategy in the International Studies and Research of Contemporary Tehran's Abrar (Persian).

- Kinzer Stephen (2008Hawaii to Iraq,(Persian).

- Mottaghi Ebrahim (2World, Qom: Islamic Culture and Thinking Research Institute Press (Persian).

- Mohammad Sharifi Alireza Taliban," Political

- Islamic Consultative Assembly Research Center Assembly Research Center concerning the CounDemographic Fields," Tehran: Markaz Publications (Persian).

- Masjed Jamei Zahra (2Danesh Publications (Persian).

- Mollazehi Pirmohammad Diplomatic Hamshahri

- Mollazehi Pirmohammad Power in Afghanistan,"

- Mellisen John et al Mohsen Rouhani and Reza Kalhor, Tehran: Imam Sadegh University Press (Persian).

- Vaezi Hassan (2001)Dispatching Troops to the Muslim World(Persian).

- Afsar, Shahid & Samples, Chris & Wood, Thomas Organizational Analysis,https://jsoupublic.socom.milPres

- Akhtar, Nasreen (2008World Peace. Vol.

- Bagchi, Indrani (2009March 5, 2009.

- Dorronsoro, Gilles Endowment for International Peace.

- Farrall, Leah (2009),http://allthingscounterterrorism.com

- Giustozzi, Antonio Century Foundation,

- Kagan, W. Fredrick &the Levant, Iraq and Afghanistan.


he Taliban and World Politics, Trans. Abdulghaffar Mohaghegh, Publications (Persian).

dification of U.S. National Security Strategy (2004), Document ol Security Strategy in the 21st Century, Tehran: Institute of dies and Research of Contemporary Tehran's Abrar (Persian).08), Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from aq, Trans. Feyzollah Tohidi, Tehran: Samadieh Publications

2008), Contemporary Western Confrontation with the Muslim lamic Culture and Thinking Research Institute Press (Persian).

Alireza (2009), "Pakistan's Role in Religious and Ethnic Training of the al-Economic Ettela'at, Vol. 23, No. 7 (Persian). Assembly Research Center (2009), "Report by the Islamic Consultative ch Center concerning the Country's Security Challenges in Ethnic and lds," Tehran: Markaz Publications (Persian).2001), An Overview of the History of Wahhabism, Tehran: Sarir ons (Persian).mmad (2009a), "Passing by Karzai (Change Policy in Kabul)," amshahri, No. 34 (Persian). mad (2009b), "Elections Game (Foreign Actors and the Struggle for istan," Diplomatic Hamshahri, No. 38 (Persian). (2009), Soft Power in International Relations, Trans. Seyed and Reza Kalhor, Tehran: Imam Sadegh University Press (Persian).

), Terrorism: Origins of Terrorism and U.S. Objectives in Troops to the Muslim World, Tehran: Soroush Publications

Samples, Chris & Wood, Thomas (2008), The Taliban: an l Analysis, Joint Special Operations University Press, c.socom.milPress. May-June 2008. 08), “Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Taliban”, International Journal on l. xxv, No.4, December 2008. 9), In search of "Good" Taliban, http://timesofindia.indiatimes

(2009), “The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan”, International Peace. www. Carningendowment.org/pubs

“There are three kinds of Taliban” – interesting little forumounterterrorism.com, October 2009. (2010), "Negotiating with the Taliban: Issues and Prospects", The ion, www.tcf.org. & Kagan, Kimberly & Pletka, Danielle (2008), Iranian Influence in aq and Afghanistan. A Report of the American Enterprise Institute.

s

181

haghegh,

ment oftitute of

ge from s, Vol. 2

Muslim

ng of the

nsultative thnic and

ran: Sarir

Kabul),"

uggle for

ns. Seyed rsian).ctives in blications

an: an Press,

urnal on

mes.com.

Carnegie

um post,

cts", The

uence in Institute.

Taliban's Factor

182

www.AEI.org. - Kaplan, Eben (2009),- Katzmzn, Kenneth

Policy”, Congressional Research Service- Peters, Gretchen (2009

Peace. Www.USIP.org- "Patterns of Global Terrorism- "Patterns of Global Te- Program for Culture &- Rubin, Michael (2007

Defense College. J- Rubin, Barnet R with Batmanglich

Gone Awry”, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, October 2008.

- Sukma, Rizal (2004)Europe Journal.

- Sullivan, Paul (2002),Journal of International Relation

- Tellis Ashley J (2009Strategy in Afghanistan”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Www. Carningendowment.org/pubs.

- “White Paper of the International Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan”. Council on Foreighttp://www.cfr.o

- Fars News Agency, w- Islamic Republic News Agency, - Aftab News Website- Alef News Website - Hamshahri Newspaper- New York Times Newspaper


The Taliban in Afghanistan, www.cfr.org , August 3, 2009. (2009), “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S

sional Research Service, October 6, 2009. 009), “How Opium Profits the Taliban”, United States Institute of P.org , August 2009.

Terrorism:1998" (1999), www.state.gov /www/global/terrorism Terrorism:1999" (2000), www.state.gov /www/global/terrorism & Conflict Studies (2007),"The Taliban", www.nps.edu. 07), “Understanding Iranian Strategy in Afghanistan”, Royal Danish June 14, 2007.

h Batmanglich, Sara (2008), “The U.S. and Iran in Afghanistannter for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,

, “War on Terror. Islam and the Imperative of Democracy”, Asia

“US-Iran Relation since 9-11: a Monologue of Civilizations”,ational Relation, vol.1, No2, summer 2002. 09), “Reconciling with the Taliban? Toward an Alternative Grand hanistan”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Www.

ent.org/pubs.the International Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy toward d Pakistan”. Council on Foreign Relation, Marsh 29org/publication/18959/. www.farsnews.irws Agency, www.irna.ir

erwspaper

and U.S

stitute of

m /1998 m /1999

l Danish

n: Policy chnology,

cy”, Asia

, Turkish

e Grand . Www.

y toward 9, 2009,

Taliban's Factor in U.S.-Iran Relations:...

Documents

Transcript of Taliban's Factor in U.S.-Iran Relations:...