Genealogies

of

Religion

DIS

CIP

LIN

EA

ND

RE

AS

ON

S

OF

PO

WE

RIN

CH

RIS

TIA

NIT

Y

AN

DIS

LA

M

TalalAsad

Th

eJohns

Hopkin

sU

niversityP

ress

Baltim

oreand

London

t’?’13

INT

RO

DU

CT

ION

The

essaysbrought

togetherin

thisvolum

edeal

with

historicaltopics

thatvary

intim

eand

place,ranging

fromthe

ritesof

medieval

European

monks

tothe

sermons

of

contemporary

Arab

theologians.W

hatlinks

themall

togetheris

theassum

ptionthat

Western

historyhas

hadan

overridingim

portance—for

goodor

ill—in

them

akingof

them

odernw

orld,and

thatexplorations

of

thathistory

shouldbe

am

ajoranthropological

concern.It

hassom

etimes

beennoted

thatpeo

plesfrom

non-Western

countriesfeelobliged

toread

thehistory

ofthe

West

(butnot

eachother’s

histories)and

thatW

esternersin

turn

donot

feelthe

same

needto

studynon-W

esternhistories.

The

historyof

modern

Western

thought,for

example,

canbe

(andis)

written

onits

own,

but

notso

thehistory

of contem

poraryA

rabthought.

One

op

positionbetw

eenthe

West

andthe

non-West

(andso

am

odeofcon

nectionbetw

eenthem

)is

constructedhistorically

bythese

asymm

etricaldesires

andindifferences.

My

anthropologicalexplorations

intoC

hristianand

post-Christian

historyare

thereforem

otivatedby

theconviction

thatits

conceptualgeology

hasprofound

implications

forthe

ways

inw

hichnon-W

esterntraditions

arenow

ableto

growand

change.M

oreparticularly,

Ihold

thatanthropologists

who

would

study,say,

Muslim

beliefsand

prac

ticesw

illneed

some

understandingof

how“religion”

hascom

eto

beform

edas

conceptandpractice

inthe

modern

West.

Forw

hilereligion

isintegral

tom

odernW

esternhistory,

thereare

dangersin

employing

itasa

normalizing

conceptwhen

translatingIslam

ictraditions.

The

genealogyof

religionis

acentral

theme

inm

yessays.

Thus,

chaptersxand

2sketch

theem

ergenceofreligion

asa

modern

historical

aIniroductirn

object.In

thenexttw

ochapters

Iapproach

theproblem

obliquely,by

discussingin

turn

two

elements

inm

edievalC

hristianitythat

areno

longergenerally

acceptedby

modern

religion:the

productiverole

of

physical painand

thevirtue

of self-abasem

ent.F

romthe

pointof view

of theologicalm

odernism,

asw

ellas

of secular

morality,

theyare

both

archaic(“uncivilized”)

conditions.C

hapterssand

6address

aspectsof

theasym

metry

between

Western

andnon-W

esternhistories:

thefo

r

mer

dealsw

ithproblem

sof anthropological

translation,the

latterw

ith

thelim

itationsof a

non-Christian

religioustradition

when

juxtaposed

with

theE

nlightenment

doctrineof

criticalreason.

They

dealw

ith

translationin

adouble

sense:interpreting

fromone

languageinto

another,and

conveyingsacred

relicsfrom

oneshrine

toanother.

The

two

finalchapters

(and

8)w

erew

rittenat

theheight

of the

so-called

Rushdie

affairin

responseto

theangry

positionsthen

takenup

inthe

name

ofliberalism

aboutreligious

intolerance.A

llthe

chaptersthus

dealw

ithfragm

entsof

theW

est’sreligious

history,because

Iassum

e

thatthe

West’s

definitionofitself—

andtherefore

itsengagem

ent with

non-Western

cultures—includes

thathistory.

Am

onganthropologists,

“history”is

anotion

thatfew

would

nowdare

todespise.

On

thecontrary,

allof us

solemnly

acknowledge

it.B

utw

hatkind

ofhistory?

More

oftenthan

not,it

ishistory

inthe

activevoice:

everywhere,localpeople

are“m

akingtheir

own

history,”

“contesting”it,

“borrowing”

meanings

fromW

esterndom

inators,

and“reconstructing”

theirow

ncultural

existence.’T

hisnotion

of

historyem

phasizesnot

onlythe

unceasingw

orkof

human

creators

butalso

theunstable

andhybrid

characterof

theircreation.

Insom

e

versions,therefore,

thedeterm

iningcharacter

of

“world

system”

and

“dependentstructure”

isrejected;

inothers,

what

isrepudiated

are

claims

about“authenticity,”

“adifferent

people,”“a

unitaryculture,”

“traditio

n,”

andso

on.Intelligent

andinfluential

peoplew

ritingto

dayare

comm

ittedto

thisview

ofhistory

making.

Nevertheless,

I

i.A

sJ.

andJ.

Com

aroff(1

99

1,

18)put

itin

theintroduction

totheir

fascinating

accountof

missionaries

andcolonialism

innineteenth-century

South

Africa:

“Here,

then,w

asa

processin

which

signifiersw

ereset

afloat,fought

over,and

recapturedon

bothsides

of

thecolonial

encounter.W

hatis

more,

thisencounter

ledto

theobjec

tificationofth

e’

cultureof the

colonizedin

oppositionto

thatof w

hitesW

hile

signs,social

relations,and

material

practicesare

constantlyopen

totransform

ation—

andw

hilem

eaningm

ayindeed

become

unfixed,resisted,

andreconstructed—

history

ccrvw

hcre

isactively

made

ina

dialecticofo

rder

anddisorder,

consensusand

contest”

cmphasis

inoriginal).

Introductwn

3

remain

skeptical.So

Ishall

beginby

rehearsingbriefly

what

Ifind

tobe

unconvincingabout

it,and

atthe

same

time

sketch—through

aprocess

ofresistance—

alternativeconceptions

thatorient

thefo

llow

ingchapters,

eventhough

most

ofthese

conceptionsare

nottreated

explicitlyin

them.

Early

inhis

recentR

adcliffe-Brow

nlectu

re,2

Marshall

Sahlins(1988,

2—3)

declaredhis

intention“to

jointhe

anthropologicalchorus

of

protestagainst

theidea

thatthe

globalexpansion

of

Western

capitalism

,or

theW

orldSystem

so-called,has

made

thecolonized

and‘peripheral’

peoplesthe

passiveobjects

oftheir

own

historyand

notitsauthors,

andthrough

tributaryeconom

icrelations

hastu

rned

theircultures

likewise

intoadulterated

goods.”Sahlins

proceedsto

chideE

ricW

olffor

reducingthe

historiesof

non-European

peoplesto

thehistory

of

globalcapitalism

,despite

Wolf’s

proclaimed

wish

tom

akenon-E

uropeansthe

authorsof

theirow

nhistory.

The

troublew

ithW

olf,Sahlins

tellsus,

ishis

attachment

toeconom

isticM

arxism.

Ifonlyw

ehad

am

oresophisticated

Marxist

understandingof

productionas

aculturalprocess,

we

would

atonce

seethe

falsityof

assuming

that“the

world

expansionof

capitalismbrings

allothercultural

historyto

anend”

(6).

SahIinss

historiesof the

British

openingup

ofim

perialChina,

theE

uropeancom

mercial

penetrationinto

Haw

aii,and

theK

wakiutl

ap

propriationof

European

goodsare

intendedto

showhow

eachen

counterw

asguided

bythe

culturallogic

ofthelocalpeople

concerned.Sahlins’s

narrativesare

learnedand

persuasive—although

arigorous

Marxist

might

want

topoin

tou

tthat

hedraw

shis

examples

fromthe

earlyphases

ofE

uropeanexpansion,

which

makes

iteasier

toidentify

capitalismw

ithexchange

andconsum

ptionrather

thanw

iththe

trans

formation

ofproduction

andthe

reorganizationof pow

errelatio

ns.

3

2.

This

lectureelaborates

anargum

entpresented

inS

ahlins1985.

3.M

arxhim

selfw

ouldsay

thatthe

buyingand

sellingof

comm

oditiesis

asold

asrecorded

history;that

thedistinctive

featureofm

oderncapitalism

,bycontrast,

was

thebuying

andselling

oflabor

power

andthe

consequentpenetration

of

capitalinto

theproduction

processin

theunceasing

drivefor

profitat

home

andabroad;

thatat

home

thisprocess

requiredreform

of the

law,new

factorydiscipline,

andtechnologicalin

no

vation,w

hileabroad

itfueled

trade,colonization,

andim

perialreconstruction.

One

might,

ofcourse,w

anttoshrug

offwhatM

arxsaid

aboutindustrialcapitalism,

butthat

would

notbe

consistentw

ithalso

wanting

toinvoke

hisauthority—

asS

ahlinsin

factdoes.

Incidentally,auseful

discussionfrom

aneo-M

arxistperspectiveof the

inco

rpora

4IntrE

4uctionIntroduction

Ihave

now

ishto

defendeconom

isticM

arxismhere—

orW

olf,for

thatm

atter.4

What

worries

me

isthat

theargum

entsespoused

bythis

“anthropologicalchorus”

(nowjoined

bya

chorusof

historians)are

notas

clearas

theym

ightbe.

Thus,

when

Sahlinsprotests

thatlocal

peoplesare

not“passive

objectso

ftheir

own

history,”it

shouldbe

evidentthat

thisis

notequivalent

toclaim

ingthat

theyare

its“au

thors.”T

hesense

of

authoris

ambiguous

asbetw

eenthe

personw

hoproduces

anarrative

andthe

personw

hoauthorizes

particularpow

ers,including

theright

toproduce

certainkinds

ofnarrative.

The

two

areclearly

connected,but

thereis

anobvious

sensein

which

theauthor

of

abiography

isdifferent

fromthe

authorof

thelife

thatis

itsobject—

evenif

itis

truethat

asan

individual(as

an“active

subject”),that

personis

notentirely

theauthor

of

hisow

nlife.

Indeed,since

every

oneis

insom

edegree

orother

anobject

forother

people,as

wellas

anobject

of

others’narratives,

noone

isever

entirelythe

authorof

herlife.

Peopleare

neveronly

activeagents

andsubjects

intheir

own

his

tory.T

heinteresting

questionin

eachcase

is:In

what

degree,and

inw

hatway,

arethey

agentsor

patients?“W

esterncapitalism

,”Sahlins

observes,“has

loosedon

thew

orldenorm

ousforces

of

production,coercion

anddestruction.

Yet

pre

ciselybecause

theycannot

beresisted,

therelations

andgoods

ofthe

largersystemalso

takeon

meaningful

placesin

localschemes

of things”

(.).Ifthat

isso,

thenlocal

peopleshave

tobe

seenin

acrucial sense

as“the

passiveobjects

of

theirow

nhistory

andnot

itsauthors.”

Their

authorshipconsists

merely

inadjusting

consciouslyto

thoseforces

andgiving

thatadjustm

enta

meaning.

Butin

thatsense

theyare

nod

ifferent

fromlocalpeoples

inW

esternsocieties

forwhom

therelations

andgoods

of

“thelarger

system”

alsotake

onm

eaningfulplaces

inthe

localschem

eofthings.

To

takean

extreme

example:

eventhe

inmates

of

aconcentration

camp

areable,

inthis

sense,to

liveby

theirow

ncultural

logic.B

utone

may

beforgiven

fordoubting

thatthey

aretherefore

“making

theirow

nhistory.”

tionof

theO

ttom

anE

mpire

into

thew

orldeconom

yis

Islamoglu-Inan’s

(1987)co

llecnon.

Inher

intro

ductio

n,

sheoutlines

afram

ework

inw

hichthe

transfo

rmatio

no

fO

ttom

anstructures

canbe

understo

od

with

referenceto

thechanging

optio

ns

availableto

localactors

asa

consequenceof

European

economic

andcultural

pen

etration.

Al

thoughshe

rejectsthe

ideath

atin

hab

itants

of

theO

ttom

anE

mpire

were

thepassive

objectsof

theirhistory,

shedoes

notfind

itnecessary

toresort

insteadto

theidea

of

“cultu

rallogic.”

.M

ydiscussion

of W

olf1982

appearedin

Asad

1987.

To

theextent

thatw

hatSahlins

callsthe

largersystem

determines

theconditions

within

which

thingstake

onm

eaningfulplaces, allpeo

plescan

besaid

tobe

thepassive

objectsof

theirow

nhistory

andnot

itsauthors.

And

thatis

preciselyw

hatSahlins

sometim

esseem

sto

besaying:

“No

tto

suggest,then,

thatw

eignore

them

odernjuggernaut,

onlythat

itshistorical

coursebe

viewed

asa

culturalprocess”

(.).B

utw

hyessentially

asa

culturalprocess?

One

couldput

itthis

way,

per

haps:the

main

storyline

isauthored

bythe

capitalist juggernaut,and

localpeoplesprovide

theirow

ninterpretations

inlocal perform

ances.Y

eteven

herew

eare

offeredthe

thoughtthat

world

capitalismis

theprim

aryagent,

localpeoples

atbest

thesecondary

ones.In

aw

idelyread

reviewarticle

oncontem

poraryanthropological

theory(w

hichm

ustbe

includedin

theanthropological

chorusSahlins

alludesto),

Sherry

Ortner

(1984)has

written

feelinglyagainst this

veryview

:“W

hetherit

bethe

hiddenhand

of structure

orthe

juggernautof capitalism

thatis

seenas

theagent

ofsociety/history,

itis

certainlynot

inany

centralw

ayreal

peopledoing

realthings”

(144).

Her

sug

gestionseem

sto

bethat

“Western

capitalism”

isan

abstraction(a

mere

fiction,to

besignaled

byquaint

metaphors

orironic

quotationm

arks)w

hichdoes

not,therefore,

determine

thelives

of

“realpeople

doingreal

things.”T

histheoretical

objectionis

notO

rtner’sonly

com

plaint,nor

isit

always

compatible

with

othersshe

makes.

“Specifically,”

shesays

atone

point,“I

findthe

capitalism-

centeredview

ofthe

world

questionable,to

saythe

least,especially

firanthropology”

(142,em

phasisadded).

We

shouldnotassum

e,she

goeson,

eitherthat

everythinganthropologists

encounterin

thefield

must

alreadyhave

beenaffected

bythe

capitalistw

orldsystem

orthat

everythingis

bestexplained

asa

responseto

thelatter.

Now

thisin

itselfis

anem

piricalpoint

aboutthe

extentof

capitalistinfluence

throughoutthe

world.

But

itis

basedon

theassum

ptionthat

“world

capitalism”

existsand

thatits

effectscan

beconfirm

edor

deniedin

theplaces

where

anthropologistsw

ork.It

thereforealso

presupposesthe

theoreticalproblemofidentifying

world

capitalism—

whether

assom

ethingprior

to,

oras

inclusiveof,

itslocal

effects.It

suggests,especially

foranthropology,

thatsom

etheoretical

ideaof

world

capitalismis

necessaryif

itshistorical

consequencesare

tobe

recognized.T

hereis,

however,

yetanother

senseof

disquietthat

Ortner

hasaboutthe

capitalism-centered

world-view

,this

time

relatedto

thesp

e

I

6Introduction

Introduction7

cialrole

thata

fieldwork-defined

anthropologycan

playin

theacad

emy—

asite

thatitshares

with

otherhum

ansciences:

The

attempt

toview

othersystem

sfrom

groundlevel

isthe

basis,perhaps

theonly

basis,ofanthropology’s

distinctivecontribution

tothe

human

sciences.Itis

ourcapacity,largely

developedin

fieldwork,

totake

theperspective

ofthe

folks[am

ongw

homw

eresearchj,

thatallow

sus

tolearn

anythingat

all—even

inour

own

culture—beyond

what

we

alreadyknow

..

..It

isour

location“on

theground”

thatputs

usin

aposition

tosee

peoplenot

simply

aspassive

reactorsto

andenactors

ofsome

“system,”

butas

activeagents

andsubjects

intheirow

nhistory.

(i)

The

ethnographerm

aycom

efrom

anothersystem

(say,a

major

capitalist

country),but

hertask

isto

observeand

describethe

practicesof

people“on

theground,”

notto

intervenein

what

shesees.

For

Ortner,

thereis,

therefore,a

sensein

which

anthropology’sview

pointis

complem

entaryto

thatof

thesciences

thatstudy

world

capitalism,

sinceit

directsthe

attentiono

fresearchers

ata

differentlevel

of

othersystem

s.H

owever,

ifanthropology’sdistinctive

contri

butionrequires

itto

takeaground

levelviewofthings,

itis

difficultto

seehow

confiningoneself

tothat

levelis

sufficientto

determine

inw

hatdegree

andin

whatw

ayother

levelsbecom

erelevant.

The

difficultyw

iththis

kindof

talkis

thatit

employs

two

differ

entim

agessim

ultaneously—one

havingto

dow

ith“realpeople”

(which

implies

thatsystem

sare

unreal),and

theother

with

“groundlevel”

(which

concedesthat

thereare

otherlevels

butclaim

sthatthe

latterare

dependenton

theform

errather

thanthe

otherw

ayaround).

The

two

images

arethen

usedto

definethe

theoreticalautonomy

asw

ellas

thedistinctive

contributiono

ffieldwork-based

anthropology.T

hefact

isthat

allthe

human

sciencesdealw

ithreal

people(even

psychiatrydeals

with

realpeople

thinking/feelingunreal

things).It

isan

oldem

piricistprejudice

tosuppose

thatthings

arereal

onlyw

henconfirm

edby

sensorydata,

andthat

thereforepeople

arerealbut

struc

turesand

systems

aren’t.T

hereare

systematic

featuresof

human

col

lectivitiesthat

arereal

enougheven

thoughyou

can’tsee

themdi

rectly—for

example,

lifeexpectancies,

crime

ratios,voting

patterns,and

ratesofproductivity.

(You

cansee

themonce

theyare

representedas

tables,graphs,

andm

aps,on

asheet

ofpaper

ora

computer

screen:here

seeingand

manipulating

areclosely

connected.)V

ariouskinds

of

socialpractice

areinconceivable

without

suchrepresentations.

Gov

ernments,

businesses,churches,

andother

socialbodies

inthe

con

temporary

world

cannotdo

without

them—

evenin

placesas

“pe

ripheral”as

Papua

New

Guinea.

But

notethat

theissue

hereis

notw

hetheralocalculture

ispure

orderivative,

unitaryor

contested.N

oris

it beingproposed

thatthere

isa

supercausality

(thehistoricallaw

of

capitalism)

thatdetermines

howeverybody

onthe

groundm

ustlive.I

amconcerned

with

howsystem

aticity(including

thekind

thatis

es

sentialto

what

iscalled

capitalism)

isapprehended,

represented,and

usedin

thecontem

poraryw

orld.W

henquantitative

datarelating

toa

localpopulation

areaggregated,

analyzed,and

manipulated,

there

sultscan

beused

toinform

particularkinds

of

systematic

practicedirected

atthat

population.T

herepresentation

of

thedata

alsobe

comes

essentialto

adistinctive

styleofargum

entby

which

suchp

ractices

arejustified

orcriticized

.T

hesystem

with

which

Iam

con

cernedhere

thereforerelates

toa

mode

of hum

anagency

(“real peopledoing

realthings”),

onethat

conditionsother

people’slives.

The

imm

ediateobjective

of

thisagency,

however,

isnot

tocause

individualactors

tobehave

inone

way

ratherthan

another.It

isto

changeag

gre

gatehum

anconditions

(distributions,trends,

etc.)that

areprofitable

oruseful—

in,for

example,

matters

oflanded

property,disease,

andliteracy.

Itssystem

aticitylies,

therefore,in

probabilities,not

causalities

(Hacking

1990).

But itis

akind

of system

aticity(and, therefore,

of

power)

thatisnoteasily

graspedthrough

whatis

typifiedas

anth

rop

ological fieldw

ork.F

oralthough

itrepresentspeople

andtheir

activitiesat ground

level,itdoes

notm

irrorthem

.In

fairness,it

shouldbe

saidthat

Ortn

erm

aynot

reallysubscribe

tothe

empiricist

prejudiceI

haveadverted

to,in

spiteofthe

languageshe

uses.P

robablyall

shew

antsto

say,som

ewhat

likeS

ahlins,is

thatw

orldcapitalism

hasnot

homogenized

thecultures

oflocal

peoples.A

ndthat,

Irepeat,

isprim

afacie

areasonable

claim,

althoughit

doesn’ttellus

whether,

andifso

how,local

peoplesm

aketheir

own

history.T

heterm

localpeoples—now

increasinglyused

byethnographers

insteadof

theolderprim

itive,tribal,

simple, preliterate,

andso

on—can

.T

hisis

anextension

ofIan

Hacking’s

conceptof

“stylesof

reasoning”(in

turn

borrowed

anddeveloped

fromrecent

historianso

f science),which

Create,

ashe

putsit,

“thepossibility

fortru

thand

falsehood.”T

hus,the

emergence

of statistical

reasoninghas

broughtintobeing

newpropositions

ascandidates

fortrue-or-false

judgments.

SecH

acking1982.

I,I1.

8Introduction

Introduction9

bem

isleadingin

aninteresting

way

andcalls

forsom

eunpacking.

Ina

literalsense,

of

course,all

peoplem

ostof

thetim

eare

“local”in

thesense

of

beinglocatable.

Sinceanthropologists

nowgenerally

claimthat

theirdistinctiveness

restson

am

ethod(fieldw

ork)rather

thanan

object(non-E

uropeancultures),

thissense

recomm

endsitselfto

them:

fieldwork

definesprivileged

accessto

thelo

cal.6

Yetnoteveryone

who

islocal

inthis

sensehas

thesam

eopportu

nity

form

ovement,

orthe

same

practicalreach:

nationalpoliticians

inthe

Sudanese

capitaland

nomads

andpeasants

inthe

provinces;corporation

directorsin

anA

ustralianm

etropolisand

minew

orkersin

theN

ewG

uineanH

igh

lands;generals

inthe

Pentagon

andfront-line

soldiersin

thegulf,

andso

on.T

heyare

aLllocatable,but

not equallyso

byeach

other.T

osay

of

peoplethat

theyare

localis

toim

plythat

theyare

at

tachedto

aplace,

rooted,circum

scribed,lim

ited.People

who

arenot

localarethoughto

feitheras

displaced, uprooted,disoriented—

orm

orepositively

asunlim

ited,cosm

opolitan,universal,

belongingto

thew

holew

orld(and

thew

orldbelonging

tothem

).T

hus,Saudi

the

ologiansw

hoinvoke

theauthority

of

medieval

Islamic

textsare

takento

belocal; W

esternw

ritersw

hoinvoke

theauthority

of m

odernsecu

larliterature

claimthey

areuniversal.

Yet both

arelocated

inuniverses

thathave

rulesofinclusion

andexclusion.

Imm

igrantsw

hoarrive

fromS

outhA

siato

settlein

Britain

aredescribed

asuprooted;

English

offi

cialsw

holived

inB

ritishIndia

were

not.A

nobvious

differenceb

etw

eenthem

ispow

er:the

former

become

subjectsof

theC

rown,

thelatter

itsrepresentatives.

What

arethe

discursivedefinitions

ofau

tho

rizedspace?

Everyone

canrelate

themselves

(oris

allocated)to

am

ulti

plicityof

spaces—phenom

enaland

conceptual—w

hoseextensions

arevariously

defined,and

whose

limits

arevariously

imposed,

transgressed,and

reset.M

oderncapitalist

enterprisesand

modernizing

nation-statesare

thetw

om

ostim

portantpow

ersthat

organizespaces

today,d

efin

6.

Inhis

briefsketchof

thehistory

of

anthropologicalfieldw

ork,E

vans-Pritchard

(19

51

,.)w

rote:“W

ehave

nowreached

thefinal,

andnatural,stage

ofdevelopm

ent,in

which

observationsand

theevaluation

of

themare

made

bythe

same

personand

thescholar

isbrought

intodirect

contactwith

thesubject

ofhisstudy.

Form

erlythe

anth

ropologist,

likethe

historian,regarded

documents

asthe

rawm

aterialo

fhisstudy.

Now

theraw

material

was

sociallife

itself.”M

ostcontem

poraryanthropologists

havecom

eto

identifyfieldw

orkw

ithdirect

accessto

“sociallife

itself,”thereby

underwriting

theeye’s

epistemological

sovereignty.“D

ocuments”

arenot

regardedas

parto

fsocial

lifeitself

butas

(unreliable)evidence

of

it—not

aselem

entsthat

enableor

preventor

sub

vertsocial

events,only

as(incom

plete)traces

thatrecord

them.

ing,am

ongother

things,w

hatis

localand

what

isnot.

Being

locat

able,localpeoplesare

thosew

hocan

beobserved,reached,and

man

ipulated

asand

when

required.K

nowledge

aboutlocal

peoplesis

notitselflocal

knowledge,

assom

eanthropologists

havethought

(Geertz

1983).N

oris

ittherefore

simply

universalin

thesense

of

beingaccessi

bleto

everyone.A

nthropologistssuch

asSahlins

andO

rtnerassum

ethatthe

thesisof

agencyand

creativityin

thenon-E

uropeanw

orldrequires

thatthe

ideaofculturalautonom

ybe

defended.M

orerecently,a

verydifferent

argument

hasbeen

advancedfor

thatthesis.

Am

onganthropologists,

James

Clifford

isits

most

eloquentexponent:

This

centuryhas

seena

drasticexpansion

ofmobility,including

tou

rism

,migrantlabor,im

migration,urban

sprawl.

More

andm

orepeo

ple“dw

ell”w

iththe

helpofm

asstransit,

automobiles,

airplanes.In

citieson

sixcontinents

foreignpopulations

havecom

eto

stay—m

ixing

inbut

oftenin

partial,specific

fashions.T

he“exotic”

isu

ncan

nilyclose.

Conversely,

thereseem

nodistantplaces

leftonthe

planetw

herethe

presenceof“m

odern”products,

media,and

powercannot

befelt.

An

oldertopography

andexperience

oftravel

isexploded.

One

nolonger

leaveshom

econfident

offindingsom

ethingradically

new,

anothertim

eor

space.D

ifferenceis

encounteredin

thead

join

ingneighborhood,

thefam

iliarturnsup

attheends

oftheearth.

“Cultural”

differenceis

nolonger

astable,

exoticotherness;

self-other

relationsare

matters

ofpow

erand

rhetoricrather

thanof

essence.

Aw

holestructure

ofexpectations

aboutauthenticity

incu

lture

andin

artisthrow

nin

doubt.(C

lifford,ig8S

,13—

14.)

Inthis

visionofa

fractured,fluid

world,

allhum

anbeings

livein

thesam

eculturalp

redicam

ent.

7T

hereis

nosingle,

privilegednarrative

of

7.T

homas

(1991)

hasm

adesim

ilarpoints,

althoughhe

doesnot

holdto

quitethe

same

positionas

Clifford.

He

attacksethnographic

discoursefor

itsattachm

entto

“ex

oticism”

andfor

“suppressingm

utualentanglem

entand

theperspectival

andpolitical

fracturingo

f thecultures

ofboth

observersand

observed.”L

ikeC

lifford,he

doesnot

denythe

existenceofcultural

differencesbut condem

ns“ethnographic

representationso

fstableand

unitarycultures”

(30

9).

There

issom

ehesitation

inthe

positionT

homas

wants

totake,

however.

Thus,

heconcedes

that“anthropology

hasdealt

effectivelyw

ithim

plicit meanings

thatcanbe

situatedin

thecoherence

ofone

culture”but

pleadsthat

“contemporary

globalprocesses

ofcultural

circulationand

reificationdem

andan

interestin

meanings

thatareexplicitand

derivative.”T

hisseem

sto

imply

thatun

itaryculture

monographs

may

besuccessful

atrepresenting

some

thingsbut

notothers.

Yet

toIntroductw

n

them

odernw

orld,and

thereforethe

historyof

globalcapitalism

is

rejected.E

veryoneis

dislocated;no

oneis

rooted.B

ecausethere

isno

suchthing

asauthenticity,

borrowing

andcopying

donot

signifya

lack.O

nthe

contrary,they

indicatelibidinal

energiesand

creativehu

man

agency.F

oreveryone,

Clifford

insists,cultural identity

ism

ixed,

relational,inventive.

Not

allreaders

will

findsuch

representationsof

modern

history

(ofwhich

thereare

many

within

asw

ellas

outsideanthropology)

ac

ceptable.W

hatis

striking,how

ever,is

thecheerfulness

with

which

thispredicam

entof

cultureis

proffered.Indeed,

inspite

of

frequent

referencesto

unequalpow

er(w

hichis

exploredonly

inthe

contextof

fieldwork

andethnography),

we

areinvited

tocelebrate

thew

idening

scopeof

human

agencythat

geographicaland

psychologicalm

obility

nowafford.H

annahA

rendthad

avery

differentresponse

tom

obilityin

her

famous

analysiso

fE

uropeantotalitarianism

,first

publishedin

the

1950s.

There

shespoke

of

“uprootednessand

superfluousnessw

hich

havebeen

thecurse

of

modern

masses

sincethe

beginningof

thein

dustrial revolutionand

havebecom

eacute

with

therise

of im

perialism

atthe

endof

thelast

centuryand

thebreak-dow

nof

politicalin

stitu

tionsand

socialtraditionsin

ourow

ntim

e”(A

rendt.75).

Arendt’s

senseof

deeppessim

ismm

aybe

put

down

tosom

eone

who

hadherself experienced

thehorrors

of N

azism,and

her analysisof

totalitarianismm

aybe

criticizedfor

some

oversimplifications.

Sheis,

nevertheless, aware

ofa

problemthat

hasescaped

theserious

attention

ofthose

who

would

haveus

celebratehum

anagency

andthe

decen

teredsubject:

theproblem

of

understandinghow

dominant

power

realizesitself

throughthe

verydiscourse

of

mobility.

For

Arendt

is

veryclear

thatm

obilityis

notm

erelyan

eventin

itself,but

am

oment

Introductionii

inthe

subsumption

ofone

actby

another.If people

arephysically

andm

orallyuprooted,

theyare

more

easilym

oved,andw

henthey

areeasy

tom

ove,they

arem

oreeasily

renderedphysically

andm

orallysu

per

fluous.F

romthe

pointofview

ofpow

er,m

obilityis

aconvenient

featureof the

actsubsumed,

butanecessary

oneofthe

subsuming

act.F

orit is

bym

eansof

geographicaland

psychologicalm

ovement

thatm

odernpow

erinserts

itselfintopreexisting

structures.T

hatprocessis

neces

saryto

definingexisting

identitiesand

motives

assuperfluous,

andto

constructingothers

intheir

place.M

eaningsare

thusnot only

created,they

arealso

redirectedor

subverted—as

som

anynovels

aboutin

dig

enous

lifein

thecolonies

havepoignantly

depicted.T

hepositive

connectionbetw

eenm

obilityand

modernity

isfairly

wellestablished

insociologicalliterature.

Itake

oneinstructive

exam

ple.In

1958,D

anielL

ernerpublished

anacadem

icbestseller

onm

od

ernizationin

theM

iddleE

astentitledT

hePassin.g

of TraditionalSociety.

Itsthesis

was

thatm

odernityin

theW

esthaddepended

principallyon

“them

obilepersonality”—

thatis,on

atype

ofperson

eagerto

move,

tochange,

andto

invent.E

mpathy

was

saidto

becentral

tothat

per

sonality,and

Lerner

(1958,so)defined

itas

“thecapacity

tosee

oneselfin

theother

fellow’s

situation.”O

nlythe

mobile

personality,he

con

tended,was

ableto

relatecreatively

tothe

modern

condition.M

anyof

usin

Middle

East

studiescriticized

itin

the196os

and1

97

0S

forits

inadequatescholarship

andcareless

methodology.

How

ever,the

most

illuminating

engagement

with

thatbook

was

undertakenin

19

80

bya

studentof

sixteenth-centuryE

nglishliterature.

Inchapter

6of

hisR

enaissanceSelf-Fashioning,

Stephen

Greenblatt

developedthe

bril

liantinsightthat

“what

Professor

Lerner

calls‘em

pathy,’Shakespeare

calls‘lago’”

(22

5).

He

proposedthat

theidea

sharedby

Lerner’s

“em

pathy”and

Shakespeare’slago

was

improvisation:

“theability

bothto

capitalizeon

theunforeseen

andto

transformgiven

materials

intoone’s

own

scenario.”I

quotein

full:

The

spur-of-the-mom

entqualityofim

provisationis

notascriticalhere

asthe

opportunisticgrasp

ofthatwhich

seems

fixedand

established.Indeed,

asC

astiglioneand

othersin

theR

enaissancew

ellunderstood,the

improm

ptucharacter

ofan

improvisation

isitselfoften

acalcu

latedm

ask,theproduct

ofcarefulpreparation.

Conversely,all

plots,literary

andbehavioral,inevitably

havetheirorigin

ina

mom

entprior

IIhe

alsow

antsto

saythat

theynever

were

valid:“It’s

notclear

thatthe

unitarysocial

systemever

was

agood

model

foranthropological

theory,but

theshortcom

ingsare

nowm

oreconspicuous

thanever”

The

universalexistence

of cultural

borrowings

and

accretionsdem

andsa

differentapproach,

asin

thestudy

ofcreoles:

“Derivative

lingua

francahave

always

offendedthose

preoccupiedw

ithboundaries

andauthenticity,

but

theyoffera

resonantmodel forthe

uncontainedtranspositions

andtransculturalm

ean

ingsw

hichculturalenquiry

must

nowdeal w

ith”(3

17).T

homas

hasp

ut

hisfinger

onan

areaof

unclarirythat

haslong

disturbedanthropology:

howto

representhistorical

differencesand

connectionsin

aw

orldw

heresocial

identitieschange.

Leach,

it may

be

recalled,made

afam

ousattem

pttoresolve

thisproblem

bydraw

ingon

theneo-K

antian

philosopherV

aihingerand

speakingof “scientific

fictions.”

IntroductionIntroduction

13

toform

alcoherence,

am

oment

of experim

ental,aleatory

impulse

in

which

theavailable, received

materials

arecurved

toward

anovelshape.

We

cannotlocate

apoint

ofpure

premeditation

orpure

randomness.

What

isessential is

theE

uropeans’ability

againand

againto

insinuate

themselves

intothe

preexistingpolitical,

religious,even

psychicstru

c

turesof the

nativesand

toturn

thosestructures

totheir

advantage.

Professor

Lerner

isrightto

insist thatthis

abilityis

acharacteristically

(thoughnot exclusively)

Western

mode,

presentto

varyingdegrees

in

theclassical

andm

edievalw

orldand

greatlystrengthened

fromthe

Renaissance

onward;

hem

isleadsonly

ininsisting

furtherthat

it isan

actof im

aginativegenerosity,

asym

patheticappreciation

of the

situa

tionof the

otherfellow

.F

or when

hespeaks

confidentlyof the

“spread

of em

pathyaround

thew

orld,”w

em

ust understandthat he

isspeaking

oftheexercise

ofWestern

power, pow

erthat is creative

as wellas destruc

tive,but

thatis

scarcelyever

wholly

disinterestedor

benign.(227—

28)

The

poin

tI

want

todraw

ou

tfrom

thisperceptive

accountof W

estern

power

relatesnot

tothe

moral

statusof

itsin

tentio

ns

but

toits

trans

forming

work.

Inany

case,the

European

wish

tom

akethe

world

inits

own

image

isnot

necessarilyto

bedisparaged

asungenerous.

Ifone

believesoneself

tobe

thesource

of

salvation,the

wish

tom

akeothers

reflectoneself is

notunbenign,

however

terriblethe

practicesby

which

thisdesire

isput

into

effect.B

esides,in

atrad

ition

that

connectspain

with

achievement,

thein

flicting

of

sufferingon

othersis

not

initself

reprehensible:itis

tobe

condemned

onlyw

henitis

gratuitous—w

here

thepain

asm

eansis

out

ofp

rop

ortio

nto

anobjective

end(hence,

the

subjectiveenjoym

entof

painis

regardedas

both

imm

oraland

path

o

logical).B

utthe

questionI

want

toraise

hereis

this:to

theextent

thatsuch

power

seeksto

normalize

oth

erpeople’s

motivations, w

hosehistory

is

beingm

ade?N

ote

that

my

questio

nis

not

about

theauthenticity

of

individual agencyb

ut

about

thestru

cture

ofnorm

alperso

nhood

(no

r

mal

inb

oth

thestatistical

andthe

medical

sense)and

thetechniques

forsecuring

it.I

askw

heth

erim

provisationbecom

esirrelevant

when

theagents

arenon-E

uro

pean

sacting

with

inthe

contexto

ftheir

own

politicallyin

dep

enden

tstate

toim

plement

aE

uropeanproject:

the

continuousphysical

andm

oralim

provement

of

anentire

governable

populatio

nth

rough

flexiblestrategies.

Whose

improvised

storydo

theseagents

construct?W

hois

itsauthor,

andw

hoits

subject?

The

ideath

atcu

ltural

borro

win

gm

ustlead

toto

talhom

ogeneityand

toloss

of

auth

enticity

isclearly

absurd,but

theidea

of

projects’having

translatablehistorical

structu

resshould

not

beconfused

with

it.W

hena

projectis

translatedfrom

onesite

toanother,

fromone

agentto

another,versionsofpow

erare

produced.A

sw

ithtranslations

of

atext,

onedoes

no

tsim

plyget

arep

roductio

nof

identity.T

heacquisition

ofnew

forms

oflanguage

fromthe

modern

West—

whether

byforcible

imposition,

insidiousin

sertion

,or

volu

ntary

borrowing—

isparr

of

what

makes

fornew

possibilitiesof

actionin

non-Western

societies.Y

et,althoughthe

outcome

of these

possibilitiesis

neverfully

predictable,the

languagein

which

thepossibilities

areform

ulatedis

increasinglyshared

byW

esternand

non-Western

societies.A

ndso,

too,the

specificform

sofpow

erand

subjection.

Choices

anddesires

make

actionsbefore

actionscan

make

“h

istory.”

But

predefinedsocial

relationsand

languageform

s,as

well

asthe

body’sm

ateriality,shape

theperson

tow

hom“n

orm

al”desires

andchoices

canbe

attributed

.T

hat

isw

hyquestions

about

what

itis

possiblefor

agentsto

dom

ustalso

addressthe

processby

which

“n

or

mal

persons”are

constitu

ted.

Meanings

arenever

simply

generatedby

acultural

logic;they

belongvariously

toconventional

projects,occa

sionalin

tentio

ns,

naturalevents,

andso

on(see

Grice

1989).F

orth

eologians

suchas

Augustine

andal-G

hazali,they

alsorelate

toall-

encompassing

divinepurposes.

The

medieval

Christian

monk

who

learnsto

make

theabbot’s

will

into

hisow

nlearns

therebyto

desireG

od’spurposes.

Inan

imp

ortan

tsense,

them

eaningof

hisactions

isw

hatit

isby

virtueof

theirbeing

part

of

atran

scend

ent

project.(A

ndso,

too,the

actionsof

allagents

arepart

of

transcen

den

ttem

poral

structures.T

hefact

that

thefu

rther

significanceo

factions

becomes

apparentonlyw

hena

certaintim

ehas

elapsedis

oneto

which

working

historiansare

likelyto

bem

oresensitive

thanw

orkingethnographers.)

Even

among

nonbelievers,few

would

claimth

atthe

human

agentis

sovereign,although

post-E

nlig

hten

men

tm

oralth

eory

insiststh

atshe

ought

tobe

autonomous.

This

theo

ryhas

longbeen

criticizedby

conservativeas

well

associalist

writers.

Moral

considerationsap

art,it

isevident

that

theincreasingly

sophisticateddivision

of

laborand

theconsum

erculture

of

modern

capitalismrenders

individualautonom

yless

andless

feasibleas

apractical

possibility.M

orerecently,

some

radi

calcritics(particularly

thoseconcerned

with

third

world

studies)have

14.Introduction

Intro

ductio

n15

drawn

onpoststructuralist

ideasto

attackthe

Enlightenm

entidea

of

autonomy.

Athoughtful

example

isthe

IndianistRosalind

O’H

anlon,

who

questionsthe

“liberalhumanist

notionsof subjectivity

andagency”

ina

reviewof

thew

orkof

theS

ubalternStudies

groupof

historians

(O’H

anlon1988). T

hestarting

pointfor

thelatter

was

theirdissatisfac

tionw

iththe

“elitehistoriography”

of India,w

hichdenied

subord

i

natepeoples

aconsciousness

of

theirow

n,and

hencethe

capacityto

make

theirow

nhistory.

Orientalist

andfunctionalist

anthropologies

of

Indiaw

erealso

condemned

fortheir

allegedessentialism

8(N

ote

thefirst

assumption

ofthe

“history-making”

thesis:that

historyis

not made

unlesssignificant change

occurs.It

isnot sufficient for

events

tosucceed

oneanother;

something

substantialm

ustbe

transformed.)

O’H

anlonsym

pathizesw

iththe

Subaltern

historians’w

ishto

re

cover suppressedhistories

but pointsto

thetheoretical danger

suchan

agendaconceals

ofslipping

into“essentialist

humanism

.”O

nem

ust

reject,she

says,

them

yth.

..

ofthe

self-constitutingsubject,

that aconsciousness

or

beingw

hichhas

anorigin

outsideitselfis

nobeing

at all.From

sucha

rejection, we

canproceed

tothe

ideathatthough

historiesand

iden

ti

tiesare

necessarilyconstructed

andproducedfrom

many

fragm

ents,

frag

ments

which

donot

containthe

signsof any

essentialbelonging

in

scribedin

them,

thisdoes

notcause

thehistory

ofthe

subalternto

dissolveonce

more

intoinvisibility.

This

isfirstly

becausew

eapply

exactlythe

same

decentringstrategies

tothe

monolithic

subject-

agentsof elite

historiography;and

second,because

itis

thecreative

practiceof the

subalternw

hichnow

becomes

thefocus

of ouratten

tion,his

abilityto

appropriateand

mould

culturalmaterials

ofalmost

anyprovenance

tohis

own

purposes, andto

discardthose.

.. w

hich

nolonger

servethem

.(1

97;em

phasesadded)

O’H

anlon’scriticism

reachesits

target,although

occasionallyat

thecost

of

reproducingthe

ambiguity

inthe

differentsenses

of“au

thoring”that

Itouched

onearlier.

Thus,

todecenter

“subject-agents”

8.A

ndyet

some

ofthe

Subaltern

historianshave

invokedstructural-functionalist

ethnographies(ofplaces

otherthan

India)to

developtheir

own

comparative

ideas.(See,

forexam

ple,the

interestingcontributions

byPandey

andC

hatterjee,in

Guha

andSpivak

1988.)W

hatthis

indicatesis

thatno

erhnographiesare

essentiallyessentialist,that

likeall

verbalrepresentations

theycan

bebroken

up,appropriated,

andre-presented

inthe

serviceof different

intentions.

of

elitehistoriography

isnot

atall

identicalw

ithsubverting

peoplein

positionsofgovernm

entalauthority.

The

ideaof

self-constitutionis

notmerely

ahistoriographical

optionbut

aliberal

humanistp

rinci

plethat

hasfar-reaching

moral,

legal,and

politicalim

plicationsin

modern/m

odernizingstates.

That

isw

hyw

efind

O’H

anlon—as

aprogressivist_obliged

toreintroduce

thatprinciple

inorder

toau

thenticatethe

subalternsubject.

For

howelse

couldthe

subaltern’sauthentie

purposes(“his

own

purposes”)be

distinguishedfrom

thoseofhis

master’s

ifnotthrough

thestruggle

forself-constitution?

(Note

thesecond

assumption

of

thehistory-m

akingthesis:

thatan

agentcannot

make

his“ow

n”history

unlesshe

isautonom

ous.It

isnot

enoughthathe

actspurposively;

hispurposes

must

bein

conflictwith

others’.)T

heessence

of

theprinciple

of

self-constitutionis

“conscio

us

ness.”T

hatis,

am

etaphysicalconceptofconsciousness

isessentialfor

explaininghow

them

anyfragm

entscom

eto

beconstrued

asparts

ofa

singleself-identifying

subject.Y

etifwe

setasidethe

Flegelianconcept

of

consciousness(the

teleologicalprinciple

startingfrom

sense-certainty

andculm

inatingin

Reason)

andthe

Kantian

conceptof

thetranscendental

subject,w

hichH

egelrew

roteas

consciousness,it

will

haveto

beadm

ittedthat

consciousnessin

theeveryday

psychologicalsense

(awareness,

inten

t,and

thegiving

of

meaning

toexperiences)

isinadequate

toaccount

foragency.

One

doesnot

haveto

subscribeto

afull-blow

nF

reudianismto

seethat

instinctivereaction,

thedocile

body,and

theunconscious

work,

intheir

differentw

ays,m

orepervasively

andcontinuously

thanconsciousness

does.T

hisis

partofthe

reasonw

hyan

agent’sactis

more

(andless)

thanher

consciousness

ofit.

Another

parthasto

dow

iththe

subsumability

ofher

actsinto

theprojects

of

otheragents:

beyonda

certainpoin

t,an

actno

longerbelongs

exclusivelyto

itsinitiator.

Itis

preciselybecause

thisfact

isoverlooked

thatthe

historicalim

portanceofconsciousness

isexagger

arcdin

theliterature

thattakes

consentand

repressionto

bethe

two

basicconditions

of

politicaldom

ination.F

orto

explainthe

latterin

terms

of

theseconditions,

whether

singlyor

incom

bination,is

toresortto

explanationexclusively

interm

sofconsciousness.

Itis,

con

sequently,toignore

thepolitically

more

significantcondition

thathasto

dow

iththe

objectivedistribution

ofgoods

thatallows

orprecludes

certainoptions.

The

structu

resofpossible

actionsthat

areincluded

and

Intro

ductio

nIntroduction

17

excludedare

thereforelogically

independentof

theC

onsc

iousn

eS

Sof

actorsAnother

way

of

puttingthis

isto

saythat

thesystem

atick

no

wl

edge(e.g.,

statisticalinform

ation)on

which

anagent

must

drawin

orderto

act inw

aysthat

“make

history”is

not subjectivein

anysense.

Itdoes

not imply

“theself.”

The

subject,on

theother

hand,is

founded

onconsciousness

of self.

My

argument,

inbrief,

isthat contrary

tothe

discourseof

many

radicalhistorians

andanthropologists,

agentand

subject (where

theform

eris

theprinciple

of effectivity

andthe

latterof

consciousness)do

notbelong

tothe

same

theoreticaluniverse

and

shouldnot,

therefore,be

coupled.G

yanP

rakashis

atalented

Subalternist

who

appearsto

haveread

andapproved

of 0’ H

anlon’scritique.

Inan

invigoratingessay

on“p

ost

Orientalist”

historiographyof

India(P

rakash1

99

0),

heargues

fora

more

radicalpoststructuralist

positionintended

tosupersede

conven

tionalethnography

andhistoriography.’°

Anthropologists

drawn

to

theidea

of

“realpeople

making

theirow

nhistory”

will

want

toread

thisprovocative

piece,because

itexposes

metaphysical

tracesin

his

toricalnarration

that,he

argues,reproduce

thecapitalist-centered

viewofthe

world.

Prakash

isagainst

“foundational”history,

byw

hichhe

means

two

things:(t)

ahistory

whose

subject(individual,

class,or

structure)is

takento

beirreducible,

and(2

)teleological

history—for

example,

a

historical narrativeof (aborted,

delayed, or distorted)capitalism

. Fo

un

dationalismin

thesetw

oform

sis

rejectedin

orderto

widen

thespace

for“excluded

histories.”W

hilenarrative

historydoes

nothave

tobe

teleological,’it

does

presupposean

identity(“India,”

say)that

isthe

subjectof

thatnar

rative.E

venw

henthat

identityis

analyzedinto

itsheterogeneous

parts

(class,gender,

regionaldivisions,

etc.),w

hatis

done,surely,

isto

reveal

.I

haveargued

thispoint

with

referenceto

ethnographicm

atenal inA

sad1970

and

19

72

.,and

more

generallyin

Asad

1987.

so.Prakash’s

name

isacknow

ledgedin

O’H

anlon’s(1988)

text,am

ongothers.

This

doesnot

proveanything

about influence,of course;

it onlysuggests

am

easureof ag

ree

ment,

which

isconfirm

edin

noteof P

rakash5990.

That

agreement

was

short-lived,

however.

Ina

subsequentpolem

ic,coauthored

with

D.

Washbrook

(O’H

anlonand

Washbrook

1992)

anddirected

againstP

rakash,O

’Hanlon

retreatsto

am

oreco

nven

tionalM

arxism, w

hilein

hisrejoinder

Prakash

(1992)

takesup

am

oredefiant

Derridean

position.ii.

An

earlycriticism

of

teleolo

gical histories

isB

utterfield1

93

1.

itsconstitution,

notto

dissolveits

unity.T

heunity

ism

aintainedby

thosew

hospeak

inits

name,

andm

oregenerally

byall

who

adjusttheir

existenceto

its(som

etimes

shifting)requirem

ents.T

heclaim

of

many

radicalcritics

thathegem

onicpow

ernecessarily

suppressesdif

Ièrencein

favorof

unityis

quitem

istaken.Just

asm

istakenis

theirclaim

thatthatpow

eralw

aysabhors

ambiguity.

To

secureits

unity—to

make

itsow

nhistory—

dominant

power

hasw

orkedbest

throughdif

krentiatingand

classifyingpractices.

India’scolonial

historyfurnishes

ample

evidenceof

this.In

thiscontext

power

isconstructive,

notpressive.

Furtherm

ore,its

abilityto

select(or

construct)the

dif

frrencesthat

serveits

purposeshas

dependedon

itsexploiting

thedangers

andopportunities

containedin

ambiguous

situations.A

ndam

biguity—as

we

sawin

Greenblatt’s

example—

isprecisely

oneof

thethings

thatgives“W

esternpow

er”its

improvisational quality.

By

acurious

irony,Prakash’s

rejectionof“the

modernization

nar

rative”on

thegrounds

thatit

isteleological

indirectlyreveals

som

ething

aboutthesense

ofthe

phrase“m

akingone’s

own

history,”w

hichm

anyanthropologists

alsoem

ploy.F

orw

hilethe

expressionindicates

adisapproval o

f historicalnarratives

ofthe

non-West in

which

Europe

istoo

prominent

(asactor

oras

norm),

italso

concealsa

conceptof

historym

akingthatis

parasiticon

thosevery

narratives.If

them

odernizingproject

ism

orethan

merely

anaccum

ulatingnarrative

ofIndia’s

past,ifw

eunderstand

itasthe

project of co

nstru

ctuzg

“India”(an

integratedtotality

definedaccording

toprogressive

principles),w

hichrequires

thecontinuous

calculationof

India’sfu

ture,then

teleologyis

preciselyw

hatthat

projectm

ustreflect.

(Aprojectis,

afterall,

bydefm

itionteleological.)

The

careerofthe

Indiannation-state

isitselfpart

of that

project.T

osay

thisis

tosay

something

notm

erelyabout

thosew

horuled

Indiain

theeffort

tochange

itin

aparticular

directionbut

alsoabout

thosew

hostruggled

againstthem

.T

hcstruggle

iscarried

outm

oreoften

thannot

ina

newlanguage

uunaredby

theE

uropeanE

nlightenment:

liberty,equality,

reason,progress,

human

rights,and

sofo

rth,

and(m

oreim

portant)w

ithinacw

political-legalspaces

builtup

underB

ritishcolonialism

.T

ore

count thecareer

oftheIndian

nation-stateis

totry

tounderstand

howand

why

them

odernizationproject succeeds

orfails

inparticular

times

andplaces—

andhow

itconstructsand

redefinesitselfas

aproject.

One

yw

ishto

opposethat

project,and

henceto

redescribeit

interm

sthat

itssupporters

would

reject,b

utit

mustbe

understoodas

ateleology,

i8Introduction

Introductüm‘9

whose

desiredfuture,

inim

portantrespects,

isforeshadow

edin

the

presentof W

esternliberal

capitaliststates.

Itdoes

notfollow

thatthe

project isdriven

bylaw

likeforces, that its

ultimate

successis

inevitable

orthat

itcannot

bereform

ulated.H

owever,

tothose

who

havebeen

taught toregard

essentialismas

thegravest

of

intellectualsins,

itis

necessaryto

explainthat

certain

thingsare

essential tothat

project—as

indeedthere

areto

“India”as

a

nation-state.T

osay

thisis

notequivalent

tosaying

thatthe

project(or

“India”)can

neverbe

changed;it

isto

saythat

eachhistorical

phe

nomenon

isdeterm

inedby

thew

ayit

isconstituted,

thatsom

eof

its

constitutiveelem

entsare

essentialto

itshistorical

identityand

some

arenot.

Itis

likesaying

thatthe

constitutiverules

of a

game

defineits

essence—w

hichis

byno

means

toassert

thatthat

game

cannever

be

subvertedor

changed;it

ism

erelyto

poin

tto

what

determines

its

essential historicalidentity,to

imply

thatcertain

changes(though

not

others)w

illm

eanthat

thegam

eis

nolonger

thesam

egam

e.

The

projectofm

odernization(W

esternization),including

itsaim

of m

aterial andm

oral progress,is

certainlya

matter

of historym

aking.

But

itis

aproject

whose

innumerable

agentsare

neitherfully

auto

no

mous

norfully

consciousof

it.Indeed,

ina

crucialsense

itis

that

project,inaugurated

inE

uropeover

two

centuriesago,

thatarticulates

ourconcept

of

human

beingsm

akinghistory.

For

thatproject

was

intertwined

with

anew

experienceo

f historicaltim

e,and

thusw

itha

novelconception

of

historicity—historical

time

dividedinto

three

greatperiods

(Antiquity,

theM

iddleA

ges,and

Modernity),

accelerat

ingforw

ardinto

anopen

future.T

heW

estdefines

itself,in

op

po

si

tionto

all non-Western

cultures,by

itsm

odernhisto

ricitD

espitethe

disjunctionsof m

odernity(its

breakw

ithtradition),

“theW

est”th

ere

foreincludes

within

itself itspast

asan

organiccontinuity:

from“the

Greeks

andR

omans”

and“the

Hebrew

sand

Early

Christians,”

through

“Latin

Christendom

,”“the

Renaissance,”

and“the

Reform

ation,”

to“the

universalcivilization”

ofm

odernE

uropeans.A

lthoughit

is

spatiallydiscontinuous

andinternally

diverse,“the

West”

isnot

am

ere

Hegelian

myth,

nota

mere

representationready

tobe

unmasked

bya

handfulof

talentedcritics.

For

goodor

ill,it

informs

innumerable

intentions,practices,

anddiscourses

insystem

aticw

ays.T

hisis

notto

saythat

thereis

anintegrated

Western

culture,or

afixed

Western

identity,or

asingle

Western

way

of

thinking,but

thata

singularco

l

lectiveidentity

definesitself

interm

sof

aunique

historicityin

con-

trastto

allothers,a

historicitythatshifts

fromplace

toplace—

Greece,

RD

me,

Latin

Christendom

,the

Am

ericas—untilit

embraces

thew

orld.It

was

inE

urope’seighteenth

centurythat

theolder,

Christian

attitudestow

ardhistorical

time

(salvationalexpectation)

were

com

binedw

iththe

newer,

secularpractices

(rationalprediction)to

giveus

ourm

odernidea

ofprogress

(Koselleck

1988,17).

Anew

philosophyo

fagency

was

alsodeveloped,

allowing

individualactionsto

berelated

tocollective

tendencies.F

romthe

Enlightenm

entphilosophes,through

theV

ictorianevolutionist

thinkers,to

theexperts

oneconom

icand

politicaldevelopm

entin

thelatter

halfof

thetw

entiethcentury,

oneassum

ptionhas

beenconstant:

tom

akehistory,

theagent

must

createthe

future,rem

akeherself,

andhelp

othersto

doso,

where

thecriteria

ofsuccessfulrem

akingare

seento

beuniversal.

Old

universesm

ustbe

subvertedand

anew

universecreated.

To

thatextent,

historycan

bem

adeonly

onthe

backof

auniversal

teleology.A

ctionsseeking

tom

aintainthe

“local”status

quo,or

tofollow

localm

odelsof

sociallife,

donot

qualifyas

historym

aking.F

romthe

Cargo

Cults

ofM

elanesia

tothe

Islamic

Revolution

inIran,

theym

erelyattem

pt(h

ope

kssly)“to

resistthefuture”

or“to

turn

backthe

clockofhistory.”

Anthropology

isthus

insertedinto

modern

historyin

two

ways:

first,through

thegrow

thin

Europe’s

political,econom

ic,and

scientific

powers,

which

hasprovided

anthropologistsw

iththeir

means

of

pmfessional

existenceand

theirintellectual

motive;

andsecond,

throughthe

Enlightenm

entschem

atizationof

progressivetim

ethat

haspro

videdanthropology

with

itsconceptual

site:m

odernity.It

isnot

justthatanthropology

isa

modern

creationborn

outo

fEurope’s

enco

un

terw

ithnon-E

uropeans.It

isthat

them

ajorideas

ituses

tograsp

itssubjects

(nonmodern,

local,traditional)

areoften

dependenton

itscontrastive

senseofthe

modern

12

Modern

anthropology’stheoretical

focuson

human

diversityhas

itsroots

inR

enaissanceE

urope’sencounter

with

“thesavage.”

That

brutalencounter

inA

fricaand

theN

ewW

orldproduced

disturbingtheological

problems

forreflective

Christians

How

toexplain

thevariety

ofhuman

beings,given

theM

osaicaccount

of

Creation?

This

was

theprim

aryquestion

thatanim

atedscholars

who

readthe

exotic

u.

Tw

ooutstanding

examples

of

studiesby

anthropologistsin

which

suchideas

hse

beencritically

examined

areS

teiner1956

andS

chneider1984.

20

IntroductionIntroductum

25

descriptionsby

explorers,and

thegreat

rangeof

religiousbelief

and

practiceam

ongother

peoplesw

asthe

primary

objectof

theiratten

tiOfl.1

3

Itis

oftensaid

thatthe

Renaissance

“discoveredm

an,”

14

butthat

discoveryw

asin

effecta

psychologicalreconstruction

of

European

individuality.T

heaccounts

of

savagesby

explorersreturning

from

Africa

andthe

New

World

pro

duced

avery

differentphenom

enon’

5—

am

anw

hosekinship

toC

hristianE

uropeansw

ashighly

problematic.

Some

writers

evenheld

thathe

was

notquite

human.

The

eventual

solutionadopted

inthe

lateseventeenth

andearly

eighteenthcen

turies,according

toM

argaretH

odgen,w

asa

synthesisof

two

old

ideas:the

chainof

beingand

thegenetic

principle.In

thisw

ay,“a

spatial arrangement o

fforms

[was

converted]into

anhistorical,

devel

opmental,

orevolutionary

series”(H

odgen1

9ó

.,389-9

0).

Acom

mon

human

naturew

asthus

accordedto

allhuman

beings,butone

thatwas

assumed

toexist

invarious

stageso

fm

aturityand

enlightenment.

A

prehistoricperiod

was

addedto

thehistoricaltriad—

thetim

eo

f”prim

i

tive”m

an.A

ndjust

assom

econtem

poraneous“local

peoples”could

beassigned

tothe

prehistoricperiod,

othersw

ereplaceable

inthe

medieval.

The

earlypreoccupation

with

savingthe

biblicalstory

of

man’s

Creation

andFallgave

way

toa

newconcern

with

narratingthe

secularstory

of

European

world

hegemony

indevelopm

entalterm

s.’6

As

aresult

of

developments

inH

igherC

riticism,

aproblem

of

Chris-

13.See

theabsorbing

studyby

Ho

dg

en(1

964).

14

.T

hus,B

urckhardt’sclassic

(1950); part

4is

entitled“T

heD

iscoveryof the

World

andofM

an.”i.

Itw

asnot

onlyverbalaccounts

thatthe

explorersbroughtback:

“When

Ch

risto

pherC

olumbus

droppedanchor

inthe

Tagus

River

at theport

of L

isbonon

thefateful

dayof his

return

tothe

Old

World,

hebroughtw

ithhim

sevenkidnapped

Indianso

f the

so-calledT

ainoculture

of

theA

rawack

linguisticgroup.

..

.D

uringthe

yearsw

hich

followed,

Indianscaptured

byother

explorersw

ereexhibited

inother

capitalsofE

u

rope..

..T

hefirst

Indiansto

appearin

France

were

broughtby

Thom

asA

ubertin

1506.T

akento

Rouen,

theyw

eredescribed

ina

Parischronicle

assooty

incolor,

black-

haired,possessing

speechbut

noreligion.

..

.In

duringa

festivalin

Bordeaux,

300

men

at arms

conducteda

showing

ofcaptives

fromtw

elvenations,

includingG

reece,

Turkey,

Arabia,

Egypt,

Am

erica,T

aprobane,the

Canaries,

andE

thiopia.O

utsidethe

cityw

all,in

them

idstof an

imitation

Brazilian

landscape,a

veritablesavage

villagew

as

erectedw

ithseveralhundred

residents,m

anyofw

homhad

beenfreshly

abductedfrom

South

Am

erica”(H

odgen1

96

4,

ui—

ia).

16.N

otentirely

secular,though.

SeeB

owler

1989for

thew

aythe

ideao

f”pro

gres

siveevolution”—

biologicalas

well

associal—

respondedto

Christian

sensibilitiesin

the

latterpart

of the

nineteenthcentury.

hantheology

hasvirtually

evaporated,but

some

of the

ideasgenerated

toaddress

itrem

ainin

seculardisciplines,

formed

inpursuit

of a

newuniversality.

Of

course,significant

mutations

haveoccurred

inthe

historicalschem

atafor

classifyingand

explaininghum

andiversity

duringthe

eighteenth,nineteenth,

andtw

entiethcenturies.

But

therehave

beencontinuities,

too,including

historicalperiodization

anddirection.

Another

continuity,as

George

Stocking

notes,w

asthe

assumption

of

asingle

human

natureunderlying

culturalplurality

(Stocking

1987,333). In

practice,how

ever,anthropology

andorientalism

between

themdealt

conceptuallyw

ithexisting

“localpeoples”

leftbehind

inthe

progressiveevolution

of

modern

(European)

“civilization,”w

hilea

number

ofspecialistdisciplines

dealtwith

thelatter.

17In

thisw

ay,the

ideaof

asingle

naturefor

allhum

ansappeared

toconcede

thatsom

earc

evidently“m

orem

ature”than

others.Ithas

become

atruism

tosay

thatm

ostanthropologistsin

Britain

andthe

United

Statesw

ereantievolutionjst—

andtherefore

relativist—in

thefirst

halfofthe

twentieth

century.Som

ehistorians

ofthe

disci

plinehave

connectedthis

tothe

generalm

oodof

disillusionw

iththe

ideaofprogress

prevailingin

theW

estafter

World

War

1.18

This

viewis

notentirely

accurate,how

ever—atany

ratefor

British

socialanthropology.

Neither

Malinow

ski(i.s,

i-a;

1938)nor

Rad

difiè-Brow

n(1

952)

rejectedthe

ideaofhigherand

lowercultures

andof

theupw

arddevelopm

entof

thelatter.

Godfrey

andM

onicaW

ilson(1945)

sawno

difficultyin

presentingthe

evolutiono

frelations

andak

asin

Africa

“fromprim

itiveto

civilized”;nor

didM

axG

luckman

at

depictingthe

adoptionof

“White

culture”by

Africans

as“pro

Vtssiv

e.”

9L

ucyM

airspoke

unapologeticallyof

theeffects

ofE

uro

ii.E

.B

.T

ylor(1893,

805)delineated

thereg

ion

tow

hichorientalists

andan

thro

pol

apnm

arilyapplied

themselves:

“Inthe

largedefinition

adoptedby

thisC

ongress,rie

nta

lw

orldreaches

itsextrem

elim

its.It

embraces

thecontinent

of A

sia,stretch

throughE

gyptoverA

frica,and

intoE

uropeover

Turkey

andG

reece,w

hileex

tend

uthc

farE

astfrom

groupto

groupo

focean

islands,w

hereIndonesia,

Melanesia,

icxie

sia

,and

Polynesia

leadon

tothe

continentof

Australia

andits

outlier,T

asau

Imm

ensealso

isthe

rangeof

time

throughw

hichthe

culture-historyo

fthis

(irnta

iregion

may

be,ifoften

butdim

ly,traced.”

See,for

example,

thefine

studyby

Kuklick

(ii),

thoughit

shouldbe

bornein

dthat

thisdisenchantm

entdid

notsignificantly

affectthose

responsiblefor

thetn

un

en

to

fcolonial

peoples.T

herethe

effortat

them

aterialand

moral

impro

ve

to

fnon-European

subjectscontinued

infull

force.E

zemplifying

theinterdependence

ofcauseand

effectinprocesses

ofsocialchange,

22

Introductwn

Introductwn

23

peancolonial

rulein

Africa

as“the

spreadofciv

ilization,”

20

andM

aryD

ouglasreaffirm

edthe

importance

ofan

evolutionaryp

erspectiv

e.2’

Sotoo,

some

inw

aysm

oreexplicit

andothers

inw

aysless

so,did

thescores

ofanthropologists

who

attendedto

problems

ofparticularsocial

changein

thenon-W

esternw

orld.T

heirlack

of interestin

tracingthe

development

ofC

ultureas

ahum

anuniversal,

andtheir

attachmentto

theidea

of

socialsystem

sin

(temporary)

equilibrium,

didnot

mean

therejection

of

progressiveevolution

inevery

form.

Indeed,it

couldbe

arguedthat

therew

asless

concernw

ithdem

onstratingthe

prin

ciple

ofa

comm

onhum

annature,

andm

orew

ithdescribing

“normal”

historicaldevelopm

entsin

variousparts

ofthe

non-European

world.

The

major

poin

t,atany

rate,is

thatwhether

theyw

ereconcerned

with

customary

beliefsand

practicesor

with

contemporary

socialand

culturalchanges,

anthropologistssaw

themselves—

andw

ereseen

byothers—

asdealing

typicallyw

ithnonm

odernlives.

Certainly,

ifan

thropologyw

asexpected

todeal

with

political,econom

ic,religious,

legal,m

edical,poetic,

andhistorical

events,it

was

onlyw

henthese

objectsof

modern

disciplinesw

eresituated

ina

nonmodern

socialtotality.

Like

otherm

odernw

riterson

thenonm

odernw

orld,an

thro

pologistsused

adualm

odalityofhistorical

time,w

hichenabled

them

torepresentevents

asatonce

contemporaneous

andno

nco

ntem

po

raneous

(Koselleck

1988,

24.9)—and

thussom

econditions

asm

orepro

gressivethan

others.It

hasbeen

saidthat

thisfocus

hasm

adeanthropology

am

arginaldiscipline

incom

parisonto

thosethat

dealw

ithm

oderncivilization

itself,“culturally

marginal

toits

own

societyas

well

asto

thegroups

that were

thesubjecto

fethnographicfieldw

ork”(S

tocking1987,

28

9).

The

rejectionof

anthropologyby

Westernizing

elitesin

former

cob

mal

countriesis

well

known,

andthe

reasonsfor

itare

nothard

tounderstand.

But

theassum

ptionthat

anthropologyis

culturallym

arginal

tom

odernE

uropeansociety

needsto

bereexam

ined.It

istrue

thatanthropological

theorieshave

contributedvery

littleto

thefo

rm

ationof

theoriesin

politics,econom

ics,and

othersocial

sciences.A

ndyet,

paradoxically,aspects

ofanthropology’s

discourseon

thenonm

odern—those

addressing“the

primitive,”

“theirrational,”

“them

ythic,”“the

traditional”—have

beenof

centralim

portanceto

several

disciplines.T

hus,psy

cho

analy

sis,22

theologicalm

od

ernism

,23

andm

odernistlitera

ture

,24

among

others,havecontinually

turn

edfor

supportto

anthropologyin

theirattem

ptsto

probe,accom

modate,

celebrate,or

qualifythe

essenceofm

odernity.A

nthropology,then,

appearsto

beinvolved

indefinitions

of

theW

estw

hileW

esternprojects

aretransform

ingthe

(preliterate,p

recapitalist,

premodern)

peoplesthatethnographers

claimto

represent.B

othprocesses

needto

bestudied

systematically.T

ounderstand

betterthe

localpeoples

“entering”(or

“resisting”)m

odernity,an

thro

pol

ogym

ustsurely

tryto

deepenits

understandingof

theW

estas

som

ething

more

thana

threadbareideology.

To

dothat

will

includeat-

L

Gluckm

an(1958,

75)could

observequite

unselfconsciouslythat

“progressiveintelligent

men

tendto

findscope

fortheir

abilityin

educationand

Christianity,

andC

hristians,freed

fromintellectually

cloggingbeliefs

andsom

esuspicion

of

theW

hites,tend

toprogress

inthe

acceptanceof

White

culture.”In

respectto

whole

societies,too,

Gluckm

anw

asa

progressivist:“In

thisrespect

astudy

of

Lozi

law,

aso

flaw

inm

ostsim

plesocieties,validates

Maine’s

mostw

idelyaccepted

generalization,‘thatthe

mo

ve

mento

fprogressivesocieties

hashith

ertobeen

am

ovementfrontStatus

toC

ontract’i.e.

thatearly

lawis

dominantly

thelaw

ofstatus”

(Gluckm

an28).

so.“T

he[E

uropean]individuals

who

putthese

policiesinto

practicew

eresustained

inthe

difficultiesof

theirtask,

andin

over-rulingopposition,

bythe

dogma

thatciv

ilization

was

ablessing

thatitspossessors

oughttospread;just as

theycivilized

theirown

childrenby

obligingthem

todo

thingsthey

didnotw

antto,and

sometim

esby

pu

nish

ingthem

severely.A

ndnobody

todayis

sayingthat

theyought

notto

havespread

civi

lization;today’s

complaint

isthat

theydid

notspread

enoughof

it,or

theright

parts”(M

air1962,

25

3).

21.“T

herightbasis

forcomparison

isto

insistonthe

unityofhum

anexperience

andat

the

sam

etim

eto

insist

on

itsvariety,on

thedifferences

thatm

akecom

parisonw

orth

while.

The

onlyw

ayto

dothis

isto

recognisethe

natureofhistorical

progressand

thenature

of prim

itiveand

ofm

odernsociety.

Progress

means

differentiation.T

husprim

itive

means

undifferentiated;m

odernm

eansdifferentiated.

Advance

intechnology

involves

differentiationin

everysphere,

intechniques

andm

aterials,in

productiveand

politicalroles.

..

.Differentiation

inthought

patternsgoes

alongw

ithdifferentiated

socialconditions”

(Douglas

1966,

77—78).

22.

Freud’sm

ajorinterest

inthe

primitive

isto

ow

ellknown

tobe

rehearsedhere.

23.

Theological

modernism

,strictly

speaking,refers

toan

intellectualtrend

inlate

nineteenth-and

earlytw

entieth-centuryC

atholicismconcerning

methods

ofin

terpreting

Scripture:

seeV

idler1961,chap.

16.How

ever,I

useithere

toindicate

thegeneral

movem

entam

ongliberal

Christians

toapply

tothe

Scriptures

approachesin

keepingw

iththe

findingsofanthropology

andhistorical

methodology.

For

areview

of biblical

scholarshipthat

hasdraw

non

successivetheories

inanthropology

sincethe

nineteenthcentury,

seeR

ogerson1978.

a...T

heim

portanceo

fFrazerforliterary

modernism

isam

plydocum

ented.See,

forexam

ple,T.S.

Eliot’s

referencesto

him,

asw

ellas

toother

anthropologicalw

riters,in

hisnotes

to“T

heW

asteL

and.”T

heattem

ptby

modern

aestheticsto

recapturethe

freshnesso

f“childhood

perception”and

tom

akenew

beginnings(de

Man

1983,157)

ledat

onceto

anappropriation

ofa

conceptof

theprim

itiveand

toa

rejectiono

fa

conceptoftradition.

24

Introduction

tempting

tograsp

itspeculiar

historicity,the

mobile

powers

thathave

constructedits

structures,projects,

anddesires.

Iargue

thatreligion,

inits

positiveand

negativesenses, is an

essential partof that construction.

The

following

chaptersengage

with

fragments

ofW

esternhistory

approachedas

genealogies,archaism

s,translations,

andpolem

ics.

They

areintended

asa

contributionto

ahistorical

anthropologythat

takesthe

culturalhegem

onyofthe

Westas

itsobject

of inquiry.M

ore

precisely,they

explorew

aysin

which

Western

conceptsand

practices

of religiondefine

forms

of historym

aking.

Genealogies