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Project no. 003956

Project acronym NOMIRACLE

Project title Novel Methods for Integrated Risk Assessment of Cumulative Stressors in Europe

Instrument IP

Thematic Priority 1.1.6.3, ‘Global Change and Ecosystems’ Topic VII.1.1.a, ‘Development of risk assessment methodologies’

Deliverable reference number and title:

D.4.3.2., part DIAReport on approaches to the characterization of knowledge of risks, uncertainties and ambiguity and their use and quality assurance in the IP domain

Due date of deliverable: 1 March 2006 Actual submission date: October , 2006

Start date of project: 1 November 2004 Duration: 5 years

Organisation name of lead contractor for this deliverable: DIA

Revision: 1

Project co-funded by the European Commission within the Sixth Framework Programme (2002-2006)Dissemination Level

PU Public XPP Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission Services)RE Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission Services)CO Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Commission Services)

EU-Project NoMiracle, Deliverable no D 4.3.2., part DIA Ortwin Renn and Christina Benighaus

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Authors and their organisation:

Ortwin Renn, Christina Benighaus DIA

Deliverable no:D. 4.3.2, part DIA

Nature:R

Dissemination level: PU

Date of delivery:October, 2006

Status: submitted Date of publishing:October, 2006

Reviewed by (period and name): April-2006, Ad Ragas, RU

Framing the Perception of Cumulative Stressorsespecially Chemical Risks

Ortwin Renn & Christina Benighaus, DIA, Stuttgart, Germany

ABSTRACTChemical substances have the potential to effect or harm human health as well as all parts of the biosphere. At the same time, the chemical industry contributes to the well-being of society, e.g. fighting against serious diseases, tackling agricultural problems or rising hygiene levels.Risks represent mental constructions about what people expect to happen as a result of human activities or natural events and what they may experience based on observations of the past or simulations of future events. The link between risk as a mental concept and reality is forged through the experience of actual harm (the consequence of risk).Risk perception, in general, denotes the processing of physical signals and/or information about potentially harmful events or activities and the formation of a judgement about seriousness, likelihood and acceptability of the respective event or activity. Signals refer to direct observation by human senses; information refers to verbal and non-verbal exchange of messages (communication with others).This list of individual and social factors that shape risk perception demonstrates that the intuitive understanding of risk is a multidimensional concept and cannot be reduced to the product of probabilities and consequences. Risk perception studies have revealed the various elements that shape the individual and social experience of risk. Context and supporting circumstances are significant characteristics of risk perception. These perception patterns are not just individual perceptions cobbled together: they originate from cultural evolution, have been shaped by trial and error and have become and trusted concepts in everyday life. Perceptions control our actions when facing decisions with uncertain outcomes or being exposed to a dangerous situation.

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Little is known about how society perceives combined effects of chemical stressors. Preliminary empirical study indicates that the majority of respondents perceive the combined effects of noxious substances in the environment as being additive or even super-additive. There is no convincing concept up to now of how to use the results for risk perception studies for risk management and regulation. But most analysts agree that data on perception contain not only interesting insights about how people process complex and uncertain information but also imply value for normative decision makers. Science may help to determine the magnitude of the risk but the results of professional risk assessments alone are not sufficient to make decisions about the acceptability of risks. Risk communication is a necessary step towards bridging the gap between risk analysis and perception. The goal of risk communication should not be to persuade people to accept whatever the communicator thinks is best for them. The ideal communication program envisions a receiver who processes all the available information to form a well-balanced judgment in accordance with the factual evidence, the arguments of all sides, and his/her own interests and preferences.

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Table of Contents

1. Current Risk Debate1.1 Chemical products in every day live1.2 Risk in social context1.3. The NoMiracle Context

2. Definition of risk and risk perception

3. Review on Risk Perception Research3.1. Cognitive heuristics3.2. Semantic Images3.3. Psychometric Factors (Qualitative Characteristics)3.4. Cultural approaches to risk perception 3.5 Reflexive modernization approach to risk perception3.6 Summary: Approaches for perceptions of chemical risks

4. Central findings: What shapes risk perceptions?4.1. Comparative empirical studies about risk perception4.2 Institutional Trust and Confidence

5. Perception of combined cumulative risks, especially chemical risks5.1 Survey in Baden-Württemberg5.2 Perception of combined risks: interaction between environment and lifestyle5.3 Interpretation of results

6. The Influence of the Media

7. An integrative model of risk perception

8. Conclusion

9. Bibliography

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1. Current risk debate

1.1 Chemical products in every day live

Chemical products are in public use everywhere in the world. They are as much part of ordinary life as automobiles or electronic devices. Many consumers use chemical products without deeper knowledge about the risks for human health and the environment and impacts on all aspects that human societies value (ethical implications). They may also not be aware of how these products are manufactured and which chemical ingredients these contain. Due to the variety of substances that the chemical industry has at its disposal, individual consumers have difficulties to oversee the potential consequences to their health and the environment. Chemical substances have the potential to effect or harm human health as well as all parts of the biosphere. At the same time, the chemical industry contributes to the well-being of society, e.g. fighting against serious diseases, tackling agricultural problems or rising hygiene levels.

Although knowledge about risks and benefits of chemical products is fragmented at best, people normally have strong beliefs about the positive and negative impacts associated with these products. Many studies show that most people tend to associate negative images with chemical substances rather then benefits (RENN & KASTENHOLZ 2000: 17; JAEGER 2002). There are many reasons for the revealed propensity of most people in industrial countries to be critical of chemical products (cf. cultural differences in risk perception RENN & ROHRMANN 2000). Chemical risks are difficult to detect by human senses, they are perceived as artificial rather than natural, the negative side effects are regarded as hideous and “creeping into the body” and chemistry is often associated with poison and non-organic substances. These risks may also induce negative associations in combination with other negative images pertaining to “big industry”, lack of personal control and missing governmental oversight. Furthermore, most people are convinced that the long-term risks are not known to society and that combined effects are hardly ever studied.

Talking about chemical risks and specifically about combined chemical effects faces the danger that everybody talks about something different. In fact, the understanding of the concept of risk differs widely across sciences and scientists (see DROTTZ-SJÖBERG 1991, FISCHHOFF, WATSON & HOPE 1984, RENN 1992a, SHORT 1984, RENN & ROHRMANN 2000). There is no commonly accepted definition for the term risk - neither in public understanding nor in the sciences. Since risk refers to a potential of "real" consequences, it is both a social construction and, in its consequences, a representation of reality (RENN 1992a; RENN et al. 1992; ROSA 1998). This implies chemical risk is not a physical entity but refers to a mental inference about implications of a current activity or event in the future. Risks do not represent real phenomena but originate in the human mind (IRGC 2005). Actors, however, creatively arrange and reassemble signals that they get from the 'real world' providing structure and guidance to an ongoing process of reality enactment. So risks represent mental constructions about what people expect in reality and what they may experience based on observations of the past or simulations of future events. The link between risk as a mental concept and reality is forged through the experience of actual harm (the consequence of risk) in the sense that human lives are lost, health impacts can be observed, and the environment is damaged or buildings collapse. The invention of risk as a hybrid between a real phenomenon and mental construct is contingent on the belief that human action can prevent harm in advance (assumption of human agency).

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The status of risk as a mental construct to anticipate real consequences has major implications on how risk is looked at. Unlike trees or houses, one cannot scan the environment for risks, identify the objects of interest, and count them. Risks are created and selected by human actors. What counts as a risk to someone may be an act of God to someone else or even an opportunity for a third party. Although societies have over time gained experience and collective knowledge of the potential impacts of events and activities, one cannot anticipate all potential scenarios and be worried about all the many potential consequences of a proposed activity or an expected event. By the same token, it is impossible to include all possible options for intervention. Therefore societies have been selective in what they have chosen to be worth considering and what to ignore (THOMPSON et al. 1990; DOUGLAS 1990; BECK 1994: 9 et seqq.). Specialised organisations have been established to monitor the environment for hints of future problems and to provide early warning of some potential future harm. This selection process is not arbitrary. It is guided by cultural values (such as the shared conviction that each individual life is worth protecting), by institutional and financial resources.

Particularly, technology-induced hazards get substantial publicity and are widely discussed in society. Different assessment and management approaches exist and are being discussed in the science community for dealing with these risks in a broader and more inclusive sense (IRGC 2005; IAEA 1995; IEC 1993; IPCS 2004; NRC 1983). However, the understanding of chemical risk perception and its relation to combined effects and is not yet sufficiently investigated. More research is needed to advance the theoretical foundation of the field as well as the empirical knowledge.

1.2 Risk in social context

Risk issues create controversies. In many societies, severe conflicts about the evaluation of risks have emerged, especially with respect to large-scale technologies such as chemical industries and chemical products, nuclear energy and genetic engineering (BECHMANN 1993, BECK 1986/1992, JUNGERMANN, ROHRMANN & WIEDEMANN 1991, SJÖBERG 1987, v. WINTERFELDT & EDWARDS 1984). Two concerns are often raised: risks to human health and well-being and risks to the state of the environment, emerging from the impact of human activities. In addition, social issues such as equitable risk burden sharing, environmental justice, or the disturbance of social cohesion.

Furthermore, there is a considerable gap between how experts estimate risks, and how non-professional people judge and evaluate risks. Depending on the underlying definitions and criteria, very heterogeneous risk evaluations are given by different groups (EDWARDS & v. WINTERFELDT 1987). Many of the risks most prominent in the view of the public are not those which - according to statistical data - actually result in high accident figures, mortality rates, health impacts, and so on. Many surveys and psychological experiments have shown that the perceived seriousness of risks was almost diametrically opposed to the calculated risk numbers of the risk professionals (COVELLO 1983, SLOVIC 1987, RENN 1990, PIDGEON et al. 1992). Juxtaposing professional estimates of risks and public perceptions of risk has been a popular activity among risk researchers ever since the EPA published its "Unfinished Business" report (US-Environmental Protection Agency 1987, 1990). Most of these studies confirm a clear discrepancy between the priority list of experts and the mean values of concerns among the general public. Apparently many more factors than those data influence

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risk perception, risk behaviour and risk management, including a variety of social, psychological, ethical aspects (O'RIORDAN 1983). Furthermore, cultural factors are crucial for people's risk evaluation. In fact, "each society has its own distinctive portfolio of risks that are believed to be of concern" (JOHNSON & COVELLO 1987).Under these circumstances, chemical risk analysis in the natural sciences or economics is increasingly complemented by social-science approaches in order to expand how "risk" is conceptualized, and to understand the way in which humans experience, rate and evaluate risks they are (or might be) exposed to.

1.3. The NoMiracle Context

This report is worked out as a deliverable in work package 4.3. undertaken by DIALOGIK as one of the consortium partners in the integrated project1. It is the objective of this part within the overall NoMiracle project is to integrate a social science perspective in the mainly technical-economic assessment of risks. The current outcome refers to two of in total seven purposes of the whole NoMiracle project:

To quantify, characterise and reduce uncertainty in current risk assessment methodologies, e.g. by improvement of the scientific basis for setting safety factors

To improve the provisions for the application of the precautionary principle and to promote its operational integration with evidence-based assessment methodologies.

This article reviews approaches and models from the social sciences related to risk perception. It investigates which of the core findings are transferable to cumulative risks especially chemical mixtures. The paper is guided by the following questions:

Which are the most important approaches of risk perception that fit best the phenomenon of cumulative stressors?

How can one classify risks arising from the production or distribution of chemicals? Does risk perception differ from country to country? What factors influence risk perception (of chemicals risks)?

This report reviews the scientific literature on risk perception with a special focus on chemical risks. The paper starts with a general introduction about chemical products and risk in social context (section 1), and it subsequently outlines the concepts of risk and risk perception (section 2). The third section provides an overview of different approaches to risk perception. The fourth section summarizes the findings of selected empirical studies and it discusses the impact of some factors (e.g. institutional trust, risk acceptance and value commitments) on risk perception. Section 5 discusses the perception of combined chemical risks based on an empirical study performed in Germany. The influence of the media on risk perception is discussed in Section 6, and Section 7 outlines an integrative model of risk perception. Finally, section 8 lists the conclusions.

1 Parts of this report will be published in scientific journals later after some more analysis is completed. This Report might help to foster the theoretical discussion about risk perception of cumulative stressors among the various disciplines and areas of expertise represented in NoMiracle, an EU-financed integrated project (European Commission, FP6 Contract No. 003956).

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2. Definition of risk and risk perception

Within the social sciences, people's evaluations of risks are usually labelled risk perception. Principally, chemical risks cannot be "perceived" in the sense that they are taken up by the human senses and processed. However, this terminology has become the standard convention in the social scientific communities. Risk perception, in general, denotes the processing of physical signals and/or information about potentially harmful events or activities and the formation of a judgement about seriousness, likelihood and acceptability of the respective event or activity. Signals refer to direct observation by human senses, information refers to verbal and non-verbal exchange of messages (communication with others).Judgements about seriousness, likelihood and acceptability are governed by internal and external factors which will be described later in this section. For the purpose of this paper, we define “chemical risk perception” as individual and social processing of signals and information as well as the formation of resulting judgments about chemical hazards. Both experiences and beliefs are part of people’s perceptions. It appears appropriate to juxtapose results from Quantitative Risk Assessments as, for example "statistical", "probabilistic" or "predicted" risk estimates- to those estimates of risks that non-professional laypersons associate with the risk in question. The first estimates are called risk assessment results, the second perceived risk.

Psychological research has revealed different meanings of risk depending on the context in which the term is used. Whereas in the technical sciences the term risk denotes the probability of adverse effects, the everyday use of risk has different connotations. In most social contexts, "risk" refers to the likelihood of an adverse effect resulting from an event or an activity, rather than an opportunity for desired outcomes. Hence, risks are defined in this paper as the possibility that human actions or events lead to consequences that affect aspects of what human’s value. Then "chemical risk" can be defined as the possibility of physical, social and/or financial harm/detriment/loss due to an exposure to a chemical hazard within a particular time frame. "Chemical Hazard" refers to a situation, event or chemical substance that has the potential to harm people, nature, capital or human-made facilities. Hazards differ in terms of sources and impacts, principal disparities are to be expected for both perceived risk level and acceptance of risks.

After defining the term risk, it is important to shed some more light on activities that are associated with the analysis of chemical risk from the social science perspective. How people think about the seriousness and acceptability of risks and how they make their respective judgments is influenced by knowledge, values and feelings. The mental models and other psychological mechanisms which people use (e.g., cognitive heuristics; risk images) are internalized through social and cultural learning and constantly moderated (reinforced, modified, amplified or attenuated) by media reports, peer influences and other communication processes. Technical and solely quantitative approaches for characterizing risks are obviously inadequate to reflect the complex pattern of individual risk perception. This has been stressed by many authors, see, e.g., COVELLO 1983, FISCHHOFF et al. 1984, FREUDENBURG 1988, HEIMER 1988, JUNGERMANN & SLOVIC 1993, O'RIORDAN 1983, RAYNOR 1987, RENN 1993, ROHRMANN 1995, SJÖBERG 1987, SLOVIC 1991, SLOVIC et al. 1982, v. WINTERFELDT & EDWARDS 1984.

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3. Review on Risk Perception Research

In total, five approaches of risk perception discussed in literature are summarized and interpreted here, which gives the reader a quick overview of different “schools of thought” and how these could be interpreted for chemical risks.

3.1. Cognitive heuristics

The term perception as used in cognitive psychology applies to the mental processes through which a person takes in, deals with and assesses information from the environment via the senses (JUNGERMANN & SLOVIC 1993a). Perception as an intuitive risk process is based on how information of risk is mentally processed. This mental process results in perceived risk – a collection of notions that people form on risk sources relative to the information available to them and their basic common sense (RENN 1989). The two major aspects are information processing and formation of judgements or attitudes.

Most risks that modern society faces are not experienced by human senses but learned through communication. Rarely do we face disasters personally; however, the media provide us ample information about hazardous events wherever they take place. The dangers of technologies or nature, the risks of food additives or chemicals in drinking water, the threat of nuclear disaster or a chemical explosion would probably never reach public attention unless society communicates about these adverse possibilities. Risk perception is less a product of experience or personal evidence than a result of social communication (LUHMANN 1986).

This observation has major consequences: Today’s society provides an abundance of information, much more than any individual can digest. It is assumed that the average person is exposed to 7,000 bits of information each day of which s/he perceives around 700, acknowledges 70, stores seven in the short term memory and may remember less than one in the longer term (CONARD 2005, p. 4; cf. also COVELLO 1983). Most information to which the average person is exposed will be ignored. This is not a malicious act but a sheer necessity in order to reduce the amount of information a person can process in a given time. Human evolution has provided us with an almost automated and often subconscious tool of selecting the important information from the abundance of information supplies.

The attention and selection process is not random although random elements may play a role. People have developed special strategies to select information that they feel is relevant to them. This is also true for risk information. The major criteria for selection are ability and motivation (CHAIKEN and STANGOR1987). Ability refers to the physical possibility that the receiver can follow the message without distraction; motivation to the readiness and interest of the receiver to process messages. The conditions for both, ability and motivation are listed in Table 1.

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TABLE 1: CONDITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR INFORMATION SELECTION

Conditions Elements of Conditions

Ability - Physical access to information- Time to process information- Absence of sources of distraction

Motivation - Reference to personal interests, salient values, or self-esteem

- Inducement of personal involvement with issue, the content, or the source

Three conditions have to be met to satisfy the criterion of ability: the information has to be accessible, the receiver must have the time to process the information, and other sources of distraction should be absent. Several factors influence the motivation of a receiver to process actively the information. The information content has to be relevant (referring to personal interests, salient values, or self-esteem) and it should trigger personal involvement (with the issue, the content, or the source). Both motivational factors are reinforced if the receiver has some prior knowledge or interest in the subject or is in need for new arguments to back up his/her point of view.

If both criteria are met, the individual is ready to absorb the information. Having gained the receiver's attention does not determine the process, however, by which the information is acknowledged and further evaluated. A complex procedure of information selection and processing takes place after the initial attention drawing stimulus. This procedure can be described in several steps of information processing. Distinguishing concrete steps of information processing is an analytical tool since in reality individuals perform these steps simultaneously. After information has passed the initial selections filters, people draw inferences from this information, compare the content of the information with previously held beliefs or memories, evaluate the significance, truthfulness and personal relevance of the information, construct new beliefs (or more often reassure old beliefs) and form an opinion (initial mental response) or an attitude (enduring mental response) to the object or activity to which the information provided new insights. These steps are summarized in the following table (Table 2):

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TABLE 2: STEPS OF INDIVIDUAL INFORMATION PROCESSING

Steps Description

Passing of attention filters to select and further process signals coming from the

environment or from other social actors Decoding of signals to decipher the meaning of the signals (investigating

factual content, sources of information, value statements, overt and hidden intentions of information sources and transmitters)

Drawing one's own to come to conclusions about the allegedly revealedinferences intentions of the source and the transmitter, to employ

intuitive heuristics (common sense reasoning) for generalizing the information received and to use symbolic cues for judging the seriousness of the information

Comparing the decoded to analyze the meaning of the message in the light of related message with encoded messages from other sources or previous attitudes and beliefs experiences stored in memory

Evaluating messages to rate the importance, persuasiveness and potential for personal involvement on the basis of the perceived accuracy of the message, the potential effect on one's personal life, the perceived consistency with existing beliefs (to avoid cognitive dissonance), reference group judgments (to avoid social alienation), and personal value commitments.

Forming specific beliefs to generate or change beliefs about the subject of the

message or to reassure previously held beliefs Propensity to take to generate intentions for future actions that are in corresponding actions accordance with the newly formed beliefs

In order to economize information processing, individuals are likely to evaluate whether it is necessary to study the content of the information in detail or to make a fast judgment according to some salient cues in the message received. The first strategy refers to the central route of information processing, the second to the peripheral route (PETTY & CACIOPPO 1986; RENN & LEVINE 1991). The central route is taken when the receiver is so highly motivated by the message that s/he studies each argument carefully. The peripheral route is taken when the receiver is less inclined to deal with each argument, but forms an opinion or even an attitude on the basis of simple cues and heuristics.

In the central mode, the receiver performs two types of evaluations: first, an assessment of the probability that each argument is true; and second, and an assignment of weight to each argument according to the personal salience of the argument's content. The credibility of each

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argument can be tested by referring to personal experience, knowledge, plausibility, and perceived motives of the communicator. The major incentives for changing an attitude in the central mode are the proximity with and the affinity to one' own interests, values, and world views. In the peripheral mode, receivers do not bother to deal with each argument separately, but look for easily accessible clues to make their judgment on the whole package. Examples of such cues are the length of a message, the number of arguments, the package (colour, paper, graphic appeal, and others), and the presence of symbolic signals that trigger immediate emotional responses (cf. KASPERSON et al. 1988).

Once information has been received, common sense mechanisms process the information and help the receiver to draw inferences. These processes are called intuitive heuristics. They are particularly important for risk perception since they relate to the mechanisms of processing probabilistic information. Early psychological studies focused on personal preferences for probabilities and attempted to explain why individuals do not base their risk judgments on expected values, i.e. the product of probability and magnitude of an adverse effect (POLLATSEK & TVERSKY 1970; LOPES 1983). One of the interesting results of these investigations was the discovery of systematic patterns of probabilistic reasoning that are well suited for most everyday situations. People are risk averse if the stakes of losses are high and risk prone if the stakes for gains are high (KAHNEMANN & TVERSKY 1979). Many people balance their risk taking behaviour by pursuing an optimal risk strategy which does not maximize their benefits but assures a satisfactory payoff and the avoidance of major disasters (LUCE & WEBER 1986).

Another important rule of thumb is the overrating of exposure and hazard rather then probability of harm (RENN et al. 1991). This intuitive heuristic is probably the most powerful factor for rejecting or downplaying information on chemical risks. If any exposure above zero or above a defined threshold (including a safety factor for taking variability into account) is regarded as negative, the simple and intuitively reasonable rule to minimize exposure makes perfect sense. Most regulatory regimes are based on this simple rule ranging from the ALARA principle to the application of the best available control technology (BACT). Such principles imply that any exposure might be negative so that avoidance is the most prudent reaction.

Another application of such a strategy is to use combinations of risks that are able to compensate for each other’s losses. This specific deviation from maximizing expected utilities has been adopted as a normative guideline by portfolio theory used by investors in the stock market. According to this theory, investors should select a portfolio of stocks in which the risks of losing money on one share is correlated with the probability of gaining money for another share (mathematically through co-variance analysis). This example and many other show that deviations from the rule of maximizing one’s utility are not so often a product of ignorance or irrationality but an indication of one or several intervening context variables that often make perfect sense if seen in the light of the context and the individual decision maker’s values (LEE 1981; BREHMER 1987).

Second, more specific studies on the perception of probabilities in decision making identified several biases in people’s ability to draw inferences from probabilistic information (FESTINGER 1957; KAHNEMANN & TVERSKY 1979; RENN 1990; ROSS 1977). These biases are summarized in the following table (Table 3):

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TABLE 3: INTUITIVE BIASES OF RISK PERCEPTION

BIASES DESCRIPTION

Availability: Events that come to people's mind immediately are rated as more probable than events that are less mentally available.

Anchoring effect: Probabilities are estimated according to the plausibility of contextual links between the cause and the effect but not on knowledge about distributions (People will anchor the information which is significant and available for them).

Representativeness: Singular events experienced in person or associated with properties of an event are regarded as more typical than information based on frequencies.

Avoidance of Information that challenges perceived probabilities that are already part cognitive dissonance of a belief system will either be ignored or downplayed.

Although these biases constitute clear violations of logical rules, they might have been overrated in the literature (FISCHHOFF et al. 1981). Many laboratory situations provide insufficient contextual information to provide enough cues for people on which they can base their judgments (LOPES 1983). Relying on predominantly numerical information and being unfamiliar with the subject, many subjects in these experiments retrieve to “rules of thumb” in drawing inferences. In many real life situations, experience of and familiarity with the context provide additional information to calibrate individual judgments, particularly for nontrivial decisions (cf. HEIMER 1988). Nevertheless, risk managers should be aware of these biases because they are found in public perception and may be one of the underlying causes for the discrepancy between layperson judgement and professional assessments.

3.2 Semantic Images

Psychological research has revealed different meanings of risk depending on the context in which the term is used. Whereas in the technical sciences the term risk denotes the probability of adverse effects, the everyday use of risk has different connotations. With respect to human-induced risks Table 4 illustrates the main semantic images.

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TABLE 4: THE FOUR SEMANTIC IMAGES OF RISK IN PUBLIC PERCEPTION (STREFFER et al. 2003)

1. Pending Danger• artificial risk source• large catastrophic potential• inequitable risk-benefit distribution• perception of randomness as a threat

2. Slow Agents• (artificial) ingredients in food, water, or air• delayed effects; non-catastrophic• contingent on information rather than experience• quest for deterministic risk management• strong incentive for blame

3. Cost-benefit Ratio• confined to monetary gains and losses• orientation towards variance of distribution rather

than expected value• asymmetry between risks and gains• dominance of probabilistic thinking

4. Avocational Thrill• personal control over degree of risk• personal skills necessary to master danger• voluntary activity• non-catastrophic consequences

The semantic images allow individuals to order risks and risk sources on the basis of a few salient characteristics. Reducing complexity by creating classes of similar phenomena is certainly a major strategy for coping with information overload and uncertainty. The four semantic images are powerful guides to help individuals to navigate through an abundance of often contradicting information and provide a rather efficient method to balance the time for collecting and processing information with the personal need for orientation and attitude formation. The following list describes the conditions for placing risks in one of the four image boxes and the consequences with respect to perception and evaluation.

Risk as a pending danger (Damocles sword): Risk is seen as a random threat that can trigger a disaster without prior notice and without sufficient time to cope with the hazard involved. This image is linked to artificial risk sources with large catastrophic potential. The magnitude of the probability is not considered. It is rather the randomness itself that evokes fear and avoidance responses. Natural disasters, in contrast are perceived as regularly occurring and thus predictable or related to a special pattern of occurrence (causal, temporal or magic). The image of pending danger is therefore particularly prevalent in the perception of large-scale technologies. People respond to these risks by looking at the catastrophic potential and the possibilities to cope with the consequences of a disaster once the unlikely event of an accident occurs. If the catastrophic potential is high and people perceive hardly any possibility to avoid the consequences of the disaster

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by taking protective actions (such as shelter or evacuation), a negative evaluation of the risk is almost certain. The probability of an accident is irrelevant for this evaluation.

Slow agents (Pandora’s Box): Risk is seen as an invisible threat to one’s health or well-being. Effects are usually delayed and affect only few people at the same time. Knowledge about these risks is based on information by others rather than on personal experience. These risks pose a major demand for trustworthiness in those institutions that provide information and manage the hazard. If trust is lost, people demand immediate actions and assign blame to these institutions even if risks are very small. Typical examples of this risk class are food additives, pesticides, and chemicals in drinking water. Most individuals develop a "zero-risk-mentality" in responding to slow agents. The threat of being exposed to risks without sensing the danger or being aware of the creeping hazard overshadows and even impedes the alternative response of balancing risks and benefits. Most people are only willing to accept risks if they face the danger and willingly admit to exposing themselves to the concomitant risk.

Cost-benefit ratio (Athena’s Scale): Risks are perceived as a balancing of gains and losses. However, this image is only used in peoples’ perceptions of monetary gains and losses. Typical examples are betting and gambling both of which require sophisticated probabilistic reasoning. People are normally able to perform such probabilistic reasoning but only in the context of gambling, lotteries, financial investment, and insurance. Horse betting is an excellent example about the degree of sophistication in probabilistic reasoning that average people master in many countries. The common prejudice of many technical experts that laypeople are unable to handle risk information and to understand probabilities is certainly not true in this context. However, some of the biases of processing uncertainty apply to the perception of financial risks, too. Laboratory experiments show that people orient their judgment about lotteries more towards the variance of losses and gains than towards the expected value (POLLATSEK & TVERSKY 1970). Prospect theory is the mathematical expression of individual preferences for risk aversion and gain proneness (KAHNEMANN & TVERSKY 1979). Such deviations from the expected value model (probability times magnitude of damage) can be a very rational response as explained earlier. If people perceive a risk as falling in this category, they normally apply a risk-benefit balancing model based on their subjective values and accept or even seek the risk if this balance turns out to be positive. Potential conflicts arise when benefits and risks are distributed among different social groups. The experience of inequities is one of the major driving forces of social responses to risk situations and a lead to a public debate about fairness and social justice (Mac Lean 1986; Young 1993).

Avocational thrill (Hercules Image): Often risks are actively explored and desired (MACHLIS & ROSA 1990). These risks include all activities for which personal skills are necessary to master the dangerous situation. The thrill is derived from the enjoyment of having control over one’s environment or oneself. Such risks are always voluntary and allow personal control over the degree of risking. People often resist attempts by governments to regulate these risks even if they pose major threats to those who are exposed. As long as these risks can be individualized and do not pose major threats to third parties (such as passive smoking), most people feel that regulatory actions are not necessary and pose a potential threat to personal freedom. The degree to which external effects are perceived (and sometimes ignored) and the relative importance of freedom vis-

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à-vis regulatory actions depend, of course, on personal values and cultural traditions (VOGEL 1986).

Some risk sources evoke more than one image. Particularly interesting are combinations of the slow agents and pending danger images. For example, nuclear power is associated with large-scale accidents and slow deterioration of human health induced by low-dose radiation from normal operation. The same applies to many of the climatic risks. Such combinations can act as risk amplifiers in public perceptions leading to strong personal as well as social reactions (KASPERSON et al. 1988).

Risks from chemical products are mostly to be found in the category of slow agents. This has far-reaching implications. Most agents belonging to this category are regarded as potentially harmful substances that defy human senses and "poison" people without their knowledge. Risks associated with food additives, air pollutants, water impurities, and other chemical agents are mostly invisible to the person exposed. They require warning by regulators or scientists. Food additives, chemicals or pharmaceuticals are always associated with negative side effects. Along with that image people tend to believe that toxicity depends less on the dose than on the characteristics of the substance. Hence they demand a deterministic regulatory approach when it comes to controlling chemicals in the environment.Many surveys show that people demand zero-risk-levels for slow agents in the chemical sector, at least as the ideal target line. Chemical risks in particular when their hazard profile is characterized by high ubiquity, high persistency and high irreversibility, trigger responses of avoidance and desires for strict regulatory prohibitions. Something that is regarded as truly bad and vicious is almost impossible to link with a positive connotation. The only exception may be the exposure to "natural" agents. Most people believe that anything which exists in nature cannot be harmful for people if consumed in modest amounts. That is why allegedly “natural” drugs are associated with fewer or even none negative side effects compared to chemical drugs. The perceptions of natural toxins as benign reflect the modern impression or myth of "Mother Nature" who offers an invaluable set of beneficial resources to humankind in response for taking good care of her. Chemical compounds, however, are associated with artificiality and seen as threats to human health.

3.3 Psychometric Factors (Qualitative Characteristics)

In addition to the images that are linked to different risk contexts, the type of risk involved and its situational characteristics shape individual risk estimations and evaluations. Psychometric methods have been employed to explore these qualitative characteristics of risks. This approach to risk research was developed by the "Oregon Group" B. FISCHHOFF, S. LICHTENSTEIN and P. SLOVIC, (see SLOVIC, FISCHHOFF & LICHTENSTEIN 1980; cf. also SLOVIC 1992). A number of researchers followed their approach, most of them in the USA and European countries. For a comprehensive review and documentation of this body of research see ROHRMANN 1995; overviews are provided by JUNGERMANN & SLOVIC 1993, PIDGEON, HOOD, JONES, TURNER & GIBSON 1992, RENN 1986, 1990; methodological issues are discussed in ROHRMANN 1995, SLOVIC 1992.

The psychometric approach is based on four characteristics:

to establish "risk" as a subjective concept, not an objective entity,

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to include technical/physical and social/psychological aspects in risk criteria, to accept opinions of "the public" (i.e., lay people, not experts) as the matter of interest, to analyse the cognitive structure of risk judgments, usually employing multivariate

statistical procedures such as factor analysis, multi-dimensional scaling or multiple regression.

Table 5 lists the major qualitative characteristics and their influence on risk perception.

TABLE 5: LIST OF IMPORTANT QUALITATIVE RISK CHARACTERISTICS

Qualitative Characteristics Direction of Influence1. Personal control increases risk tolerance

2. Institutional control depends on confidence in institutional performance

3. Voluntariness increases risk tolerance4. Familiarity increases risk tolerance5. Dread decreases risk tolerance6. Inequitable distribution of risks and

benefitsdepends on individual utility, strong social incentive for rejecting risks

7. Artificiality of risk source amplifies attention to risk, often decreases risk tolerance

8. Blame increases quest for social and political responses

Furthermore, the perception of risk is often part of an attitude that a person holds about the cause of the risk, i.e. industrial activity, consumption of food, production method (such as genetic engineering) and others. Attitudes encompass a series of beliefs about the nature, consequences, history, and justifiability of a risk cause. Due to the tendency to avoid cognitive dissonance, i.e. emotional stress caused by conflicting beliefs, most people are inclined to perceive risks as more serious and threatening if the other beliefs contain negative connotations and vice versa. Often risk perception is the result of these underlying beliefs rather than the cause for these beliefs.

With respect to the qualitative characteristics, one would expect that chemical products are associated with many of the negative qualitative characteristics. First, most chemicals are associated with negative risk characteristics such as dread, lack of personal control, and artificiality. The perception of health risks induced by chemicals is usually linked to an absence of personal control and the preponderance of dread thus amplifying the impression of seriousness. These characteristics make people even more concerned about the negative impacts than warranted by the predicted health effects alone. Second, the beliefs associated with the risk source, for example industry, center around greed, profit-seeking and alleged disrespect for public health. Third, the possibility of consumers being exposed to risks without their consent touches upon serious equity concerns if susceptibility to these risks vary considerably among individuals or rest on probabilistic balancing. For chemical risks factor 6 “Inequitable distribution of risks and benefits” also plays an important role. The more risks are seen as unfair for the exposed population, the more they are judged as severe and unacceptable (KASPERSON & KASPERSON 1983; SHORT 1984).

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The importance of these qualitative factors in risk assessment offers a plausible explanation for the fact that precisely those risk sources that technical risk assessment classifies as particularly low-risk are the source of greatest concern among the general public. Risk sources that are deemed controversial, like phthalates, are very often burdened with negative attributes while leisure activities are associated with more positive ones (JUNGERMANN/SLOVIC 1993).

Psychological research on risk perception brings us a step closer towards an analysis of how most people assess risk. The observed discrepancy between the results of technical risk assessment conducted by experts and intuitive assessment of the same risk by society is not, in the first instance, due to ignorance about the statistically derived expected values or an expression of erratic thought processes, but rather an indication of a multidimensional assessment process in which anticipated harm is only one among many factors.

One of the interesting points with respect to the perception of uncertainty is that the professional distinction in probability distribution and different degrees of remaining uncertainties (expressed in confidence intervals or in other forms of uncertainty characterisation) is not echoed in risk perception studies (SPARKS, P. and SHEPHERD, R. 1994). There is a basic understanding among most people that the preferred dichotomy of judging a situation either as safe or unsafe needs to be replaced by a mental model that differentiates degrees of certainty. The open space between safe and unsafe, however, is perceived as an one-dimensional indication of knowledge gaps and less as an indication for (genuine) probability distributions. The more people associate uncertainties with a specific risk the more they believe that society needs more science and research to reduce these uncertainties. Very often they also require that the risk is not taken unless these knowledge gaps are being bridged and a high degree of safety is accomplished through knowledge improvement (FREWER, L.J., MILES, S., BRENNAN, M., KUSENOF, S., NESS, M., and RITSON, C. 2002).

Studies conducted on an international scale also show that people everywhere, regardless of their social or cultural background, use practically universal risk perception criteria in forming their opinions (ROHRMANN & RENN 2000). However, the relative effectiveness of these criteria in opinion-forming and judgments about risk tolerance varies considerably between different social groups and cultures. While the above-mentioned qualitative characteristics are accepted (often subconsciously) as assessment values for perceived risk, their relative contribution to a person’s actual opinion or motivation to take action depends on individual lifestyles, threatening environmental factors and ingrained cultural values (SJÖBERG 1997). In assessing risk, people who favour alternative lifestyles tend more than others to consider both “reversibility of the consequences of risk” and “congruence between risk bearers and benefactors”, while those with strong material values assess risk more by way of personal control opportunities and trust in institutional risk control (BUSS & CRAIK 1983).

As OTWAY and THOMAS impressively showed in their studies on attitudes to nuclear energy, there is a high correlation between different value models and the relative importance that people attach to either the benefits or the risks of a specific technology (OTWAY & THOMAS 1982). The conclusion to be drawn from this is that value expectations and cultural background are significant determinants of subjective risk that do not add to the semantic and qualitative factors already described but, in effect, presuppose the existence of those factors in that they use them as heuristics to incorporate and process information on complex properties

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associated with the risk in question. Internalized value expectations and external circumstances can control the relative effectiveness of intuitive perception processes, but not their existence. This is not a matter of academic hair-splitting: it has direct relevance to communication and conflict management. If we assume that intuitive mechanisms of risk perception and assessment bear practically universal characteristics that can more or less be reshaped by socio-cultural influences, then they can provide a fundamental basis for communication of which one can avail oneself regardless of differences between the various standpoints. In addition to the pool of common symbols and rituals (shared meaning), whose importance to social integration is in constant decline in pluralistic societies, a new pool of common mechanisms of risk perception emerges that along with common sense signals the existence of supra-individual perception mechanisms.

3.4 Cultural approaches to risk perception

The psychological and qualitative approaches primarily address individual risk perception patterns based on individual or group responses to qualitative factors of risk. However, the process of risk perception in society has also been thoroughly analysed from a 'macro-sociological' perspective as well - see for example BECK 1986, 1992, DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY 1982, HEIMER 1988, LUHMANN 1990, 1993, RENN 1992, THOMPSON 1980, and WILDAVSKY 1988, 1993.

Sociologists have particularly stressed that the evaluative process of risk perception is determined by the norms, value systems and cultural idiosyncrasies of societies (see, e.g., BECK 1992, DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY 1982, SJÖBERG 1995, THOMPSON, ELLIS & WILDAVSKY 1990). According to the "cultural approach", risk is a "social and cultural construction" (JOHNSON & COVELLO 1987) - not an 'objective' entity to be measured independently of the context in which hazards occur. Consequently each society or social group may have its own specific set of risks believed to be of concern, based on its prevalent "worldview". Within this area, research has been more often qualitative than quantitative, including philosophical treatises on risk perception.

A group of distinguished anthropologists and cultural sociologists such as Aaron Wildavsky, Mary Douglas or Michael Thompson, have identified four or five patterns of value clusters that separate different groups in society from each other (DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY 1982; RAYNER 1990; THOMPSON et al. 1990; SCHWARZ & THOMPSON 1990; WILDAVSKY & DAKE 1990). These different groups have formed specific positions on risk topics and have developed corresponding attitudes and strategies. They differ in the degree of group cohesiveness (the extent to which someone finds identity in a social group), and the degree of grid (the extent to which someone accepts and respects a formal system of hierarchy and procedural rules).

These groups are: the entrepreneurs, the egalitarians, the bureaucrats, the stratified individuals, and –added in some publications - the group of the hermits. They can be localized within the group-grid space (see Figure 1). Organizations or social groups belonging to the entrepreneurial prototype perceive risk taking as an opportunity to succeed in a competitive market and to pursue their personal goals. They are characterized by a low degree of hierarchy and a low degree of cohesion. They are less concerned about equity issues and would like the government to refrain from extensive regulation or risk management efforts. This group contrasts most with organizations or groups belonging to the egalitarian prototype, which emphasizes cooperation and equality rather than competition and freedom.

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Egalitarians are also characterized by low hierarchy, but have developed a strong sense of group cohesiveness and solidarity. When facing risks they tend to focus on long-term effects of human activities and are more likely to abandon an activity (even if they perceive it as beneficial to them) than to take chances. They are particularly concerned about equity.

The third prototype, i.e. the bureaucrats, relies on rules and procedures to cope with uncertainty. Bureaucrats are both, hierarchical and cohesive in their group relations. As long as risks are managed by a capable institution and coping strategies have been provided for all eventualities, there is no need to worry about risks.

FIGURE 1: PATTERNS OF VALUE CLUSTERS (DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY 1982; RAYNER 1990; THOMPSON ET AL. 1990; SCHWARZ & THOMPSON 1990; WILDAVSKY & DAKE 1990)

Bureaucrats believe in the effectiveness of organizational skills and practices and regard a problem as solved when a procedure to deal with its institutional management is in place. The fourth prototype, the group of atomized or stratified individuals, principally believes in hierarchy, but they do not identify with the hierarchy to which they belong. These people trust only themselves, are often confused about risk issues, and are likely to take high risks for themselves, but oppose any risk that they feel is imposed on them. At the same time, however, they see life as a lottery and are often unable to link harm to a concrete cause. In addition to the four prototypes, there may be a hybrid group called the autonomous individuals or the hermit who can be grouped at in the center of the group-grid coordinates. Thompson describes autonomous individuals as self-centered hermits and short-term risk evaluators.

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They may be also referred to as potential mediators in risk conflicts, since they build multiple alliances to the four other groups and believe in hierarchy only if they can relate the authority to superior performance or knowledge

This theory has been criticized on several grounds (NELKIN 1982; SJÖBERG 1997). This is not the place to review the critical remarks and the counter-evidence provided by many scholars. The debate is still proceeding without a clear consensus in sight. Most risk communicators have assured us, however, that this classification has helped them tremendously in preparing communication programs for different audiences. There is sufficient anecdotal evidence that people with an entrepreneurial attitude react very differently to specific arguments compared to people with an egalitarian or bureaucratic attitude. For example, a reference to cost-benefit ratios makes perfect sense when presented to an audience of entrepreneurs but would trigger outrage when being referred to in a group of egalitarians.

How can one apply the insights of cultural theories to the perception of chemical risks? Although the empirical studies by Dake (DAKE 1991 and GRENDSTAD 2000) do not specify chemical risks per se, they suggest that entrepreneurs will probably welcome chemicals as they support their conviction that taking limited risks makes life exciting and provides strong benefits to the risk taker in the long run. The opposite is true for the egalitarians: They strongly believe that nothing can be beneficial in something that is artificially produced for special interests. Specifically they will argue that it is wise to avoid a risk if there is even a chance that it might be detrimental to one’s health. Egalitarians also tend to be very suspicious towards risk management agencies because they believe these agencies are influenced by powerful interest groups (in particular those who pursue the entrepreneurial ideas). Bureaucrats would see all chemical risks as a major challenge, since it makes management much more difficult. Yet if they were able to see a consistent and implementable path to incorporate best practice into the dominant regulatory regime, they might be less reluctant to avoid the issue (Bureaucrats hate to fight, they rather ignore issues when they don’t like them). The two remaining groups are of less relevance here: they see risk as a manifestation of fate and would probably be not attentive to any risk debate.

3.5 Reflexive modernization approach to risk perception

The reflexive modernization approach combines the macro and micro level and goes back to the seminal works of Ulrich Beck (BECK 1986, 1992) and Anthony Giddens (GIDDENS 1990, 1991). Beck claims that on the macro-level the societal production of wealth goes hand in hand with the societal production of risks, which are incalculable and irresolvable (BECK 1992). On the micro-level the theory describes how people cope with these reflexive modernisation trends and how that affects their risk perception (KNIGHT & WARLAND 2005).

Beck is convinced that modern risk has an equalizing effect on social stratus. According to him it would be difficult to target special groups or to distinguish victims from those who benefit from the risk taking activity. (BECK 1986, 1992). Risks transgress social, national and cultural boundaries. The release of radioactivity is a major nuclear disaster. For example, would affect the rich and the poor alike. Similar to Beck, Giddens (1991) understands risks as generated by modernity and its institutions. He examines a broader array of risks, including mundane as well as low-probability, high- consequence risks (KNIGHT & WARLAND 2005).

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The preoccupation of modern society with risks has made public institutions become more reflexive about their role and function in society. Reflexive means that actors need to find re-assurance of their objectives and strategies in continuous communication with the outside world. The result is that any attempt to monitor, decline or eliminate risks through industrial processes will only serve to hasten unplanned, unforeseen latent consequences (KNIGHT & WARLAND 2005). The development and implementation of pesticides resulted into a contamination of ground water and in accumulation of residues in food. Also the industrialisation of food production has increased the use of additives posing new and unfamiliar health risks to consumers and new risks to the environment.

As a consequence of the confusion about the merits and risks of modernization, widespread scepticism has evolved about the role and function of science and technology in producing social benefit, and the belief in progress, i.e. notion that secular understandings of the world would lead to a safer and more rewarding existence for humans (KNIGHT & WARLAND 2005). Science and technology are viewed as double-edged -‘‘creating new parameters of risk and danger as well as offering beneficent possibilities for human kind’’ (GIDDENS 1991:28).

3.6 Summary: Approaches for perceptions of chemical risks

The perception of chemical risks is without doubt a complex process. The characteristics of a risk source matter when people judge and assess risks. Criteria such as local/global, private/occupational, present/future impacts exert a major impact on the degree of perceived risks. In addition, acceptance of chemical risks will largely depend on benefit considerations and beliefs about the effectiveness of institutional control and regulation. Five different approaches for risk perception have been introduced in the chapter above, which facilitate our understanding of the underlying factors that govern risk perception in general and chemical in particular. The characteristics of these approaches are as follows:

Approach Level CharacterCognitive heuristics Anthropological

Common sense reasoning for making inferences about the world

Semantic images Social psychological

Reduces complexity by four powerful images that help to , affect information overload effectively and to cope with uncertainty

Psychometric Factors (Qualitative Characteristics)

Psychological characteristics of risks or the risk-taking situation that help individuals to estimate the degree of seriousness and to delineate a judgment about acceptability

Cultural approaches to risk perception

Macro sociological

Risk is defined as a social and cultural construct, every culture or subgroup pursues its own risk perception patterns five subcultures have been defined that can be distinguished by two variables: belief in hierarchy (grid) and intensity of group cohesion (group) distributing people into five classes due to their values and hierarchical attitude

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Reflexive modernization approach to risk perception

Combination of micro (individual) and macro (societal structures) level

Production of wealth goes hand in hand with production of risks, risks have an equalizing, effect on social structure risk actors need permanent reassurement of their goals and strategies with the outside world

It is hardly possible to describe all these influential factors by focusing on a single approach or one model. We cannot recommend a specific approach due to the complex processes that suggest a combination of all these forces being effective at the same time. It depends on the individual circumstances under which a chemical risk is socially embedded in order to determine which of the approaches might be more or less suitable to understand the risk perception patterns of the various actors.

The perception of chemical risk is often part of an attitude that a person holds about the cause of the risk, for example industrial activity, consumption of food, production method such as genetic engineering. Most people perceive risks as more serious and threatening to avoid cognitive dissonance, emotional stress caused by conflicting beliefs, if the other beliefs contain negative connotations and vice versa. Often risk perception is a product of these underlying beliefs rather than the cause for these beliefs (RENN & KASTENHOLZ 2000).

4. Central findings: What shapes risk perceptions?

The following sections describe empirical studies based on surveys, focus groups or experiments. The main objective of these studies has been to investigate the causal connections between the factors influencing the perceived seriousness of chemical risks and the judgement on acceptability. These factors can be regarded as the independent variables in the complex perception process. The focus will be on trust, social values, cultural and political structure, amplification processes and the media.

4.1 Comparative empirical studies about risk perception

There are a lot of empirical studies published over the last 15 years that describe differences of risk perception in various countries. ROHRMANN (1995) identified and documented 20 cross-cultural risk perception studies based on cross-national data collection; he also included 16 studies which looked at cultural differences within countries by comparing different societal groups.

A more in-depth analysis was conducted by RENN & ROHRMANN (2000) on cross-cultural risk perception patterns based on four empirical studies of the topic. These studies refer to investigations on):

Risk perception in the United States and France, P. Slovic, J. Flynn, C.K. Mertz, M. Poumadere and C. Mays (2000).

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Hazard perception and evaluation in Australia, Germany, and New Zealand and a second analysis on China and Australia, B. Rohrmann (2000).

Risk attitudes in Bulgaria and Romania (with Sweden as reference), L. Sjöberg, D. Kolarova, A.-A. Rucai, and M.-L. Bernström (2000).

The cognitive architecture of risk perception in the United States and Japan, Rosa, Matsuda and Kleinhesselink (2000).

Table 6 provides an overview of the four studies. The table lists the sampling methods, the countries involved in each study, and the primary independent and dependent variables.

TABLE 6: OVERVIEW OF THE DISCUSSED EMPIRICAL STUDIES

Paper Sampling Countries Independent variables

Dependent variables

Slovic et. Al

Random general population

USA, France Qualitative hazard characteristics, cultural prototypes, levels of emotion, demographics, country

Magnitude of risk, benefits (personal and social), acceptability

Rohrmann Special groups (ecological, technological, monetarian, feminist orientation

Students (three different disciplines), scientists

Germany, Australia, New Zealand

Australia, China

Cognitive beliefs, other attitudes, group composition, country

Risk appraisals including magnitude, health impacts, catastrophic potential, benefits, risk acceptance (personal and societal)

Sjöberg et al

Special Groups (nurses, students of economics & business, skilled workers, homeless people)

Bulgaria, Romania, Sweden (Brazil as contrast)

Demographic variables such as gender, respondent group, anxiety, credibility of risk information sources, country

Magnitude (personal; general); demand for personal and social mitigation, and others

Rosa et al. Several students samples

US and Japan Culture,Cognitive architecture for judgement decision

Risk appraisal including familiarity, knowledge, voluntary, controllability dread and catastrophic potential

a. Differences in cultural affiliations: Comparison of France and the US

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The study by SLOVIC et al. (2000) investigates people’s attitudes towards institutions and policy taken the example of nuclear power. It compares two countries – the US and France – uncovering many similarities, but also noticeable differences. Clear differences emerge between the US and France. The French see greater need for nuclear power, and expect greater economic benefit from it. In general, the French populations appear to embrace nuclear power, whereas the US population has serious doubts about its safety and acceptability. French citizens express greater trust in science, industry, and government officials, and believe that politicians and experts are capable and able to make the necessary decisions about nuclear power, rather than the people affected by these decisions. The US respondents show much greater distrust of experts, are more inclined to support direct citizen participation, and opt for more democratic control over the decision making process.

The differences between the French and US public are not the result of different risk perceptions but are founded in the evaluation of the citizens with respect to their political culture. The majority of French respondents have confidence in the centralised political decision-making bodies that rely on expert consultation and bureaucratic reasoning. Legitimisation in France involves the proof that the best experts have been consulted, and that some agency is willing to accept the responsibility and accountability for any decision that deviates from what the public actually wants or prefers.

This trust-based relationship between citizens and public institutions is alien to the US culture. People demand that their preferences are taken into account when decisions are being made. In addition, they do not trust agencies to be honest and independent brokers in managing public safety, health, and environmental affairs. Thus, US citizens expect public officials to reflect what citizens perceive as dangerous, and act according to the revealed preferences of their clients.

Important for decision makers and risk communicators is the question if risk perception can be influenced over the long run by educational or communication programs. The authors concluded that attitudes towards nuclear power are conditioned by the interplay between social, cultural and political factors. These cannot easily be changed by informational or educational campaigns.

b. Social variables and professional affiliations (Hazard perception and evaluation in Australia, Germany, New Zealand and China)The influence of cultural variables to risk perception is emphasized in the second study, which investigates risk perceptions and attitudes in Germany, Australia, New Zealand and China. Bernd Rohrmann studied risk perception with respect to more than 40 risks (like parachuting, living near a airport), classified them into “activities”, “residential conditions”, physical hazards” and “sources of financial/social risk”. He measured individual risk perceptions and conducted statistical analyses for different societal and professional groups (ROHRMANN 2000).

Although Rohrmann finds considerable cross-national variations in risk perception among the countries, he warns against using this data as implicit proof of the validity of the cultural prototypes that Slovic et al. (2000) explicitly tested in their study. In spite of some similarities between the samples, Rohrmann points out that the differences between groups can be better explained by referring to variations on occupational values (such as health care professionals

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or teachers) and worldviews (such as religious convictions) rather than cultural prototypes. It is indeed surprising that the differences between the countries are less pronounced with respect to most of the variables used in the first study than between the social and occupational groups within one country. The finding amplifies the observation that in the process of globalisation, national identities are partially exchanged for international group identities. That means that chemical risks are primarily perceived in relation to group characteristics such as sharing a common occupation rather than national identities or even countries. A chemical engineer from Spain will perceive similar chemical risks as a chemical engineer in Norway or France, whereas a Spanish banker will likely perceive a risk differently than a chemical engineer from Spain.

Rohrmann points out that among the many hazards that people might worry about, several are always perceived as more serious than others, regardless of country, social group or occupation. The list of top hazards includes nuclear power, asbestos, and smoking. There are also some noticeable differences in the ranking of hazards between countries. Most of the variance can be explained by differences in exposure or significance assigned to these hazards in each country. However, it would be misleading to assume that risk perception mirrors the measured level of risk revealed through risk assessments. Rohrmann demonstrates that many hazards are perceived as either more perilous or less severe than epidemiological data would suggest. This finding is prevalent in each of the countries included in his analysis.

c. Group attitudes in risk perception (Risk attitudes in Bulgaria and Romania)The tendency to rank risks similarly was illustrated by the third study. Sjöberg et al. (2000) compared six different groups in different national contexts. The main data was collected in Bulgaria and Romania, and compared to the results of studies conducted in Sweden and Brazil. The six professional groups are nurses, workers, economists, engineers, teachers, and slum dwellers. The authors chose 28 main risks for his analysis, like smoking, alcohol, unemployment, bad education, but also pollutants and food additives.

The ranking of risks, both personal and general, are rather similar the population in Bulgaria and Romania rank most of the risks similarly. Apart from a few exceptions, the same is true between the six subgroups of the study. Similarities in risk ranking were also detected in the two comparative samples from Brazil and Sweden. People seem to be concerned about identical threats all over the world, although the authors observe several notable exceptions. For example, the Rumanian population was specifically concerned about being attacked by dogs, a risk that was not even mentioned in any of the other studies. The explanation for this strange result is quite trivial. The late dictator Ceausescu had hundreds of dogs set free when he ordered to tear down large parts of the old quarter in Bucharest. In one disregards these idiosyncrasies, the similarities in risk perception prevail. This is particularly true for technological risks. Chemicals are usually grouped into the technological risk area, and raised medium concerns in both countries.

Sjöberg et al also rejected the thesis that the cultural prototypes are powerful predictors of risk perception. The results of his study suggest that the risk judgments made by the Bulgarian and Romanian samples are based on the perception of specific threats, attitudes towards nature and, indirectly, through media coverage. They reject the hypothesis of general, culturally contingent values and beliefs. Cultural orientations and biases are important variables that influence risk perception, but they may differ from those specific biases explicated by the

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theory of cultural prototypes. Furthermore, economic status and social aspirations may be more decisive in shaping people’s attitudes towards technological risks including chemicals than cultural biases.

d. The hypothesis of universalism (The cognitive architecture of risk perception in the United States and Japan)The common observation that risk perception rankings are rather similar among different nations and cultures, and that some of the factors influencing these rankings are almost identical, provided the inspiration for the study by Rosa et al (2000). Its intention was to test the hypothesis of universalism of psychometric variables in determining perceived risk. In total 70 risks were included in the cross cultural research. The main objective was not to find the best predictors for explaining variations in risk perception, but to identify hidden clusters of risk perception based on a variety of psychometric characteristics (by using factor analysis). The clusters were investigated within and between the different samples.

A particularly interesting result is that the main clusters characterizing risk perception in the US sample could also be found in the Japanese sample. Based on previous studies (SLOVIC et al. 1986) about the importance of psychometric variables the two items “perceived dread” and “perceived catastrophic potential” – were confirmed as valid predictors of overall risk perception scores in both countries. However, the cognitive routes that let respondents develop those images are fundamentally different. For the Japanese, the belief that the risk would lead to catastrophic results was highly correlated with lack of individual knowledge about risks, and the feeling of having little control over them. In turn, dread, i.e. the belief that any incident will inadvertently lead to severe damage s was linked to catastrophic potential, a lack of scientific knowledge, and the perceived involuntary nature of the phenomena. These relationships were almost reversed among US respondents. In particular, perceived catastrophic potential was highly correlated with perceived lack of scientific knowledge about risks and perceived lack of control over them.

If confirmed, these results may suggest different routes for risk communication. Americans need to be convinced that science is able to limit the maximum credible accident, whereas the Japanese need to be assured that people can rely on personal experience when dealing with such risks, and that personal knowledge is available to cope with the potential outcome of a hazardous event.

4.2 Institutional Trust and Confidence

The previous empirical studies were based on the assumption that risk judgements and evaluations are "universal" processes, independent of, e.g., social status, professional affiliation, ideologies, national heritage and other cultural contexts. The main insights were that in addition to cultural prototypes, the affiliation to a professional or social group exerted the strongest effect on risk perception and the evaluation of technological and chemical risks.

In addition to these cultural and group-related factors in shaping risk responses, social science research also investigated the role of social networks and reference group judgments which have been proven particularly influential in other fields of study. These orientations are also

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important since most information about risk is not learned through personal experience and senses but through "second-hand" learning. With the advent of ever more complex technologies and the progression of scientific methods to detect even smallest quantities of harmful substances, personal experience of risk has been more and more replaced by information about risks and individual control over risk by institutional risk management. As a consequence, people rely more than ever on the credibility and sincerity of those from whom they receive information about risk. Thus, trust in institutional performance has been a major key for risk responses. This is particularly important for risks that belong to the category of “early warning indicators”. Trust in control institutions are able to compensate for even a negative risk perception and distrust may lead people to oppose risks even when they are perceived as small. This function of trust as a mediator between negative risk perception and a positive judgment about acceptability was empirically proven by a study that compared attitudes towards nuclear power in France and the United States (MARRIS et al. 1999). This study showed that the French respondents had similar risk perceptions and shared the same concerns about safety as their American counterparts. However, the French sample demonstrated a high degree of trust and confidence in the technical elite of their country and in the effectiveness of regulatory bodies, both of which US respondents were much more sceptical.

Trust can be substructured in five components (BARBER 1983; LEE 1986; RENN and LEVINE 1991). These five components are listed and explained in Table 8. Trust relies on all five components, but a lack of compliance in one attribute can be compensated for by a surplus of goal attainment in another attribute. If objectivity or disinterestedness is impossible to accomplish, fairness of the message and faith in the good intention of the source may serve as substitutes. Competence may also be compensated by faith and vice versa. Consistency is not always essential in gaining trust, but persistent inconsistencies destroy the common expectations and role models for behavioural responses. Trust cannot evolve if people experience inconsistent responses from others in similar or even identical situations.

TABLE 7: COMPONENTS OF TRUST

Components Description

Perceived competence degree of technical expertise in meeting institutional mandate

Objectivity lack of biases in information and performance as perceived by others

Fairness acknowledgement and adequate representation of all relevant points of view

Consistency predictability of arguments and behaviour based on past experience and previous communication efforts

Sincerity honesty and openness Faith perception of "good will" in performance and communication

Trust on a personal level is a subjective exception that a person will refrain from behavioural options that may harm the trusting person. Trust necessarily entails risk-taking, but, in contrast to the scientific endeavour of predicting the probability of identified outcomes, trust

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implies that the selection of options is left to the entrusted person or institution. Due to the perceived competency and honesty of the entrusted entity, one does not need to bother with assessing the outcomes of actions and with controlling the decision making process of that entity (LUHMANN 1980, 1973). This saves time and effort.

On a more aggregate level, trust denotes a generalized medium of social differentiation and division of labour (PARSONS 1960). The performance of specialized institutions in economy and government relies on a prior investment of trust by those who are served by this institution or finance its functioning. Total control would imply that the control agencies would need the same expertise and the same time allocation as the performing institution. Such an arrangement would neutralize the desired effect of social differentiation and ultimately lead to a society of intimate clans performing all necessary social, economic, and political functions simultaneously. By shortcutting normal control mechanisms, trust can be a powerful agent for efficient and economical performance of social tasks. Durkheim's analysis of organic solidarity as a major structural variable of modern societies focused on trust as one of the predominant media that helped to shape the division of labour and to differentiate societal functions (DURKHEIM 1933; LUHMANN 1973).

The relative value of trust varies over time, as empirical surveys clearly indicate (LIPSET & SCHNEIDER 1983; more references). In some periods, people tend to invest a large amount of trust in institutions and it takes many disappointments before they withdraw this investment. In other periods, people tend to be extremely cautious with the investment of trust, placing more emphasis on functional equivalents, such as more organized control or increase of direct participation. Trust can partially be substituted by other generalized media, such as sharing power or control, but not totally replaced.

It is obvious that modern societies face difficulties in providing sufficient trust for reaching consensus on its complex and differentiated activities. All public institutions have lost trust and credibility over the last two decades except for the news media (LIPSET & SCHNEIDER 1983; Löftstedt 2005; RENN & LEVINE 1991). Trust and credibility losses are high for industry, the political system, and many government agencies. Science still has a high degree of credibility although much less than two decades ago. Most sociologists believe that the decline of confidence in public institutions is partially a function of better education and the increase of public aspirations with respect to their share of public resources and welfare (LIPSET & SCHEIDER 1983; KATZ et al. 1975). In addition, the complexity of social issues and the pluralization of values and lifestyles may have contributed to a growing dissatisfaction with the actual performance of institutions (WILDAVSKY & DAKE 1990). But at the same time, most people are confident in the governmental and economic system and do not support fundamental changes in the organizational structure of society. Therefore, the confidence crisis is less a systems than a performance or competence crisis.

Lack of trust does not indicate, however, a declining relevance of trust for governing modern societies and managing technological risks. The contrary is true. The reliance of the technological society on trustful relationships between and among its subsystems has never been stronger than today. However, such a need for trust makes people more and more sensitive towards situations in which their investment of trust has been factually or allegedly misguided or exploited. The more trust is needed for implementing cooperative efforts or for coping with external effects of social actions, the more cautious are people in assigning credibility to those whom they are supposed to trust.

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In risk debates issues of trust evolve around institutions and their representatives. People's responses to risk depend, among others, on their confidence that they have in risk initiating and controlling institutions. Since the notion of risk implies that random events may trigger accidents or losses, risk management institutions are always forced to legitimate their action or inaction when faced with an accident. On one hand they can cover up mismanagement by referring to the alleged randomness of the event (labelling it as unpredictable or an act of God), on the other hand they may be blamed for events for which they could not possibly provide protective actions in advance (LUHMANN 1986).

The stochastic nature of risk demands trustful relationships between risk managers and risk bearers, since single events do not prove nor disprove management failures; at the same time they provoke suspicion and doubt. The slightest mistake by a risk management agency can be sufficient to destroy the delicate balance of trust. The handling of risk by private corporations and governmental agencies has been crucial for explaining the mobilization rate of individuals for taking actions. The more individuals believe that risks are not properly handled (in addition to being perceived as serious threats) the higher is the likelihood that people will be politically active. It has been shown that in the nuclear case the disillusionment of the US-population with the nuclear option as well as the number of people becoming political advocates of antinuclear policies grew simultaneously with the growing distrust in the nuclear regulatory agency (RENN & LEVINE 1991). Negative attitudes are a necessary but by far not a sufficient reason for behavioural responses. Public confidence in institutional performance is another and even more important element in triggering behavioural responses.

It would be beyond the scope of this article to list all the relevant empirical results that investigated for the significance of trust and credibility, but some of the most interesting (and even counterintuitive) insights from these studies are worth mentioning (for a more detailed analysis see KATZ et al. 1975; LIPSET & SCHEIDER 1983; SIEGRIST et al. 2000; RENN & LEVINE 1991)

Researchers found a low correlation between the perception of institutional competence and the liking of the tasks and goals that the institutions were performing. The more sympathy an institution is able to generate the less competent it appears. The institutions people like most received low ratings on competence and vice versa (LIPSET & SCHNEIDER 1983).

Perceived competence of institutions was most likely associated with the perception of a successful task performance and the perceived cost-benefit ratio in meeting these tasks. In addition, the public image and the social prestige assigned to an institution serve as preliminary heuristic strategies to assign credibility (MATEJKO 1988).

Perceived fairness and openness is closely linked to the transparency of the decision making process, the opportunities for public scrutiny and institutional control (check and balances), and the degree of personal satisfaction with the rationale and procedures for decision making in the respective institution. Surprisingly, the amount of actual opportunities for public involvement and participation was hardly correlated to perceived openness (LIPSET & SCHNEIDER 1983; cf. theoretical concept LUHMANN 1980).

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Institutional case studies demonstrated that the erosion of credibility was often linked to: incompetence, poor performance, incomplete or dishonest information, withholding of information, obscure and hidden decision making processes, denial of obvious problems, and denial of vested interests (BERGESEN & WARR 1979; LIPSET & SCHNEIDER 1983; MATEJKO 1988; MIDDEN 1988).

Credibility can be enforced by good performance, fast responses to public requests, consonance with highly esteemed social values, availability for communication with outsiders, unequivocal and highly focussed information transfer, flexibility to respond to crisis situations or new public demands, and demonstration of public control over performance and money allocation (LIPSET & SCHNEIDER 1983; ROURKE et al. 1976).

The results of organizational studies on credibility emphasize the close relationship between perceived performance and credibility. Many risk management institutions face the problem, however, that their specific task is not well understood and that public expectations do not match the mandate or the scope of management options of the institution. This is certainly not unique for risk management agencies: LIPSET & SCHNEIDER (1983) found out that elites in America complain regularly about the ignorance and misperceptions of the public with respect to their mandate and performance. Regardless of whether this claim is true, there is a clear gap between the self-perception of most institutions and the public perception of these institutions. This is specifically prevalent in the risk arena because the issue at stake, health and environment, tops the concerns of the public in almost all countries and because the stochastic nature of risk impedes an unambiguous evaluation of management success or failure.

5. Perception of combined chemical risks

5.1 Survey in Baden-WürttembergIn what way do individual response patterns change when combined risk is used as a stimulus? Until recently there was hardly any empirical evidence available, only assumptions at best. In an attempt to address this deficit, the Center of Technology Assessment in Baden-Württemberg (Akademie für Technikfolgenabschätzung) conducted a representative survey on this subject among the population of the state of Baden-Württemberg.

The results of the survey are presented and discussed in sections 5.2. and 5.3. The sample included a representative cross-section of some 1,500 adults in Baden-Württemberg during the summer of 1998. Its main focus was society’s perception and assessment of technology (ZWICK & RENN 1998).

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5.2 Perception of combined risks: interaction between environment and lifestyle

Within the framework of the risk survey in Baden-Württemberg, combined environmental risks were addressed. At first, respondents were asked to assess the importance of environmental factors in health risks.

According to prevailing expert opinion, more than two-thirds of all cancers can be apportioned to smoking, alcohol consumption or poor eating habits, while only a fraction of cancers can be apportioned to the impact of noxious substances in the environment (HENSCHLER 1993). In the survey the participants were confronted with the following statement:

“The health risks from environmental pollution are considerably greater than the risks from personal lifestyles like obesity, smoking, alcohol consumption or leisure activities.”

Some 10.7% strongly agreed and a further 15.3% tended to agree. Practically every second respondent was undecided (48.1%) and about a quarter (25.9%) thought the risks from individual lifestyles were greater than the risks from environmental pollution. Adding the people who agreed and who were undecided, three quarters of the respondents appeared to be unaware of the statistical data that clearly show a dominance of habitual over environmental risks. The answers were similar across all groups; there is, for example, no difference as to whether a respondent preferred green policies or had more conservative values. The only exception was the level of education: the higher the level of education, the more often respondents were giving the correct answer. Only 20% of respondents with high school diplomas but almost 50% of university trained persons expressed the opinion that environmental risks are less of a threat to human health than the risks involved in personal lifestyles.

A significantly bigger gap is evident between the opinions of the majority of experts and the laypeople surveyed regarding their assessment of combined environmental risks. The respondents were again confronted with a statement:

“Just as combined consumption of tablets and alcohol can cause serious health problems, relatively harmless substances in the environment can also cause serious damage to one’s health when they interact.”

Although the super-additive relationship postulated in the statement cannot be ruled out from a toxicological standpoint, the majority of toxicological studies (cf. STREFFER et al. 2003) show that super-additive effects are more the exception than the rule. Although the statement used the soft version “can cause serious harm” for the environmental risks, the doubling of this phrase in the first part of the sentence (consumption of tablet and alcohol can cause serious harm) implies a symmetry between the two conditions mentioned. People who fully agree to the statement perceive a symmetrical situation between the combined effects of alcohol and drugs and the combined effects of environmental pollutants. Two-thirds of respondents were convinced that such super-additive effects could be expected from interactions between multiple pollutants. Just under a quarter (23.8%) were indifferent and only 9.6% rejected the statement. There were hardly any differences between the various social groups. Ages, gender, party preference, even formal education, were all variables that had no significant impact on how the respondents reacted to the statement.

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Because two-thirds of the population thinks, super-additive effects could occur through the combination of multiple pollutants, the acceptability of further contamination in soil, air and water is low. On the one hand, this clear response can stem from everyday experience with medium or high doses of drugs and stimulants. On the other hand, typical aversion to the risk of “early warning”, especially intolerance of continuous uncertainty, may play a significant role. The survey included a second item that related to combined effects:

“Even if we don’t know for sure what effect environmental pollution can have on human health, we should for economic reasons allow a certain amount of pollutants to be released into the environment.”2

Only 8.9% of respondents agreed with this statement, a third were undecided and a large majority of 58.7% rejected the statement altogether. There was no evidence of major differences according to gender, age, class or income in response to this particular statement, only supporters of the German Green Party (Die Grünen) appeared less willing to approve to the statement than did the average member of the population. In general a majority of almost 60% rejection indicates that most people associate super-additive effects from exposures to chemical substances in the low-dose range. In addition, it appears that most people will not make trade-offs between health impacts and economic benefits if these consequences are perceived as uncertain. Given the fact that chemicals are most likely to be found in the category of “slow agent”, the reliance on third party information combined with perceived uncertainty about risks and benefits reinforces the demand for zero risk.

5.3 Interpretation of results

Apart from the survey about combined environmental risks (ZWICK & RENN 1998), we know of no sociological or psychological study that explicitly attempts to explain in empirical form how synergetic risks are perceived. However, there are a variety of related studies that throw additional light on the subject. One is the empirical works of Kraus, Malmfors and Slovic (KRAUS, MALMFORS & SLOVIC 1992) on intuitive assessment of toxicological risk and the works of Jungermann, Schütz and Thüring on the question of risk perception involving the data sheets enclosed with drugs (JUNGERMANN, SCHÜTZ & THÜRING 1988).

Firstly, the information on large, unimaginable, invisible quantities of chemical substances in the environment leads us to conclude that not all effects are known and that the possibilities for combination have not been fully tested. There is thus an element of uncertainty in individual perceptions, and this cannot be erased by any amount of care or knowledge about individual noxious substances in the environment. If we look at the studies on qualitative risk characteristics, perceived uncertainty pertaining to possible impacts plays a significant part in engendering a more negative assessment of the risks (SIEGRIST & CVETKOVICH 2001). Most importantly, perceived uncertainty leads to a desire for more stringent regulation (SJÖRBERG 1994). It is hardly surprising that uncertainty surrounding combined effects tends to promote caution and demands for strict regulation and enforcement (ZWICK & RENN 1998).

2 The phrase “even if” is a translation of the German “auch wenn” which is much less rigid than the word “even” implies. Literally the phrase “auch wenn” translates into “Also when”

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Secondly, combined effects as early warning risks gives raise to the hypothesis that causal evidence, which plays an important role in intuitive risk assessment, is more readily brought to mind when assessing combined effects than when assessing individual substances. We all see ourselves affected by omnipresent chemical substances in some way. At the same time we can recall at least one example of an illness that is (apparently) caused by environmental impacts but are unable to name the actual cause-effect chain. Combined effects thus can be easily recalled and they are practically irrefutable forming an everyday hypothesis on which we base health risks from unspecified environmental impacts.

The fact that, on the one hand, we accept risk in one context, perhaps even seek it, while on the other we reject the same or an even lesser risk is not necessarily proof of irrational or inconsistent behaviour. Chemical risks are more acceptable and predictable for us, when the relationship between an event or substance and his cause is seen as obvious. We know the cause and find a way to handle or avoid it. For example we know the carcinogenic effects of the chemical substances of formaldehyde and benzopyrenes and try to avoid getting in contact with them. Combined exposure in many situations is less obvious for many scientists but refers to everyday experience of most people. They may find it strange that scientists find such cocktails difficult to test and to assess their synergistic effects.

These two heuristics – rapid recall of causal experience and concern based on the lack of understanding for toxicological or epidemiological testing methods – are reinforced by perceptions of disagreement among experts (NENNEN & GARBE 1996). As it is currently not possible to identify all combined effects and many theoretical possibilities for extrapolation of values are limited to the low-dose range due to a lack of significant cause-effect relationships, experts must also rely on plausible models, theories and assumptions (PETERS 1996: 63). In reality, the need for interpretation, especially where combined exposures are concerned, has contributed to a pluralization of expert opinions and assessments within the science system. There are consequences for the treatment of risk assessment both inside and outside the scientific community. Firstly, the case of scientific treatment often referred to as an expert’s dilemma of the first degree: experts conduct risk assessments in a variety of ways. Four categories can be identified in the plural sphere of expert opinion (Streffer et al. 2003: 263pp.):

Expert assessments that focus on the experimental results of risk studies and conventions drawn up by experts, and which deal with remaining uncertainties by simply ignoring rather than assessing them.

Expert assessments that focus on the empirical results of risk studies but which hover on the border of the range of conventions drawn up by experts and, in doing so, interpret uncertainties within the limits of those agreed conventions.

Expert assessments that focus on the empirical results of risk studies, but which reject conventions agreed to by experts or replace them with their own interpretation models.

Expert assessments that question both conventions and empirical results, and see their purpose in fundamental critique of the methods and interpretations of the relevant scientific community.

Without a doubt, the vast majority of experts are to be found in the first two categories, so that the conflicts that arise in reality are less strongly manifested than one would expect from looking at all four. At the same time, the various scientific communities use methods such as consensus conferences, meta-analyses or Delphi surveys in their attempts to resolve conflicts between the four types of expert opinions (NENNEN& GARBE 1996). The multi-layered nature of risk analysis for combined pollutants makes it difficult to find a clear-cut solution

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for conflicting expert assessments. In addition, we have a situation where statements on risk from combined effects are difficult or impossible to falsify. The lack of opportunity to falsify statements using empirical evidence (at least in the short-term) limits the effectiveness of knowledge as a tool to evaluate risk assessment studies. Different bodies of knowledge compete with each other and the competing demands for truth cannot be met to the exclusion of all possible doubt.

In addition, we need to consider the consequences of expert disagreements beyond the scientific communities: the existence of discretionary freedom in the assessment of combined effects, the need to implement conventions that cannot be justified by science alone, the constant uncertainty in effects analyses and the fact that numerous scientific controversies are debated in public all have a sustained effect on people’s perceptions and experience. In many ways, this involves the importance that outsiders ascribe to conflicts between experts: firstly, most people believe that, in principle, science can come up with clear and precise definitions of environmental pollution. Confronted with a large number of conflicting assessments by experts, people are thus forced to conclude that in the course of such conflict at least one or other of the parties involved is not revealing the truth, be it intentionally or unintentionally. It is not without reason that in the public eye, what experts put out is seen as a reflection of what their financial backers, their ideological preconceptions or their blinkered specialized world put in (COVELLO 1992; RENN 1995).

As most people are unable either to confirm or to reject the statements put out by experts by applying their own knowledge or experience, they must depend on external criteria if they want to assess the trustworthiness of those experts. Such external criteria range from assumed vested interest in the subject (an area in which industrial experts have particular difficulty) to the perceived likeableness or expertise of those involved (how they handle themselves on TV, how they dress, their debating style) (PETERS 1991). Laypeople often follow an intuitive better safe than sorry principle. The assumption that the most pessimistic expert embodies the epitomy of trustworthiness is reinforced by the fact that in the past environmental pollution has often been reported as less harmful than it actually turned out to be. Conversely, some experts often feel pressured by public expectations to place greater emphasis on negative outcomes in order to improve their public standing, while others financed by industrial interest groups may tend to underestimate risks. Most consumers are not taking studies seriously, which are financed by the industry.

6. The Influence of the Media

Most chemical risks that modern society faces are not experienced by human senses but learned through communication. The dangers of the risks of food additives or chemicals in drinking water, the threat a chemical explosion would probably never reach public attention unless society communicates about these adverse possibilities. Risk perception is less a product of experience or personal evidence than a result of social communication (LUHMANN 1986).

A vast amount of information about risks stems from intermediary sources. People develop attitudes and positions with respect to risky technologies and or activities on the basis of second-hand information. This information is transmitted by the media. Many beliefs about risks and risk sources are hence shaped or at least influenced by the information and

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evaluations that the media transmit to their consumers. The media perform a dual role in the communication process: first, they collect information from primary sources and process this information by applying professional and institutional rules that govern the selection of received messages and their interpretation. Second, they send information to the final receiver. The re-coding of messages involves conscious or unconscious changes of the original information material. Messages from several sources may be integrated into one new message or comments may be added.

The transformation process of messages during transmission has been a popular topic of communication research. From a theoretical point of view, many different concepts about the nature of this transformation have been suggested in the literature (PETERS 1990; PELTU 1985, pp. 129-130; 1989; SOOD et al. 1987, p. 30; LEE 1986, p. 175). The basic differences between these approaches may be confined to two major questions: First, are the media creating new messages or are they reflecting existing messages; second, how biased are journalists in their coverage vis-à-vis their own social convictions and external pressures? Both questions have not found a final answer yet (PELTU 1985, pp.140-141; MAZUR 1987, p. 86; LICHTENBERG & MACLEAN 1988, pp. 33-48).

With respect to the first question, the literature suggests a strong influence of the media on public opinion in the early years of communication research. Through extensive testing, however, this hypothesis was later substituted by the hypothesis that the media set the agenda, but do not change the attitudes or the values of the audience with respect to the issues on the agenda (PELTU 1985, p. 140; LICHTENBERG & MACLEAN 1988). Only in the long term have media a lasting effect on the attitude and value structure of their consumers.

With respect to the second question evidence has been gathered to support almost all possible viewpoints. Political and commercial pressures have been detected in media coverage as well as courageous news reports in conflict with all vested interests. Cultural biases within the journalistic community have been found, but also a variety of different political and social attitudes among journalists. Some journalists perceive their job as a mere translation of events into verbal or visual expressions while others believe they should play a more active role in shaping and explaining the issue (cf. the controversy about the studies of Kepplinger in the review by KÖCHER 1986; LICHTENBERG & MAC LEAN 1988, pp.37-45; PETERS 1990; 1991).

In short: the extremes that media are mere reflectors of reality or that they are docile instruments of social pressure groups may occasionally be true, but they are not the rule. In reality, the situation is more complex: Media coverage is neither dependent on external pressures nor an autonomous subsystem within society (LOWERY & DEFELEUR 1983). It reflects internalized individual values, organizational rules and external expectations. It depends on the issue itself, the institutional context and the political salience of the issue which of these three factors is likely to dominate the transformation process. A universal theory of how this transformation takes place is therefore not likely to evolve. Some of the common characteristics of media coverage deserve some attention, however:

Media construct reality as well as readers construct their understanding of the media report (DÚNWOODY 1992). These constructions are results of mental and professional frames that journalists use in selecting and recoding information. Construction does not imply that the coverage is independent of the real events. But there is ample evidence

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that the media amplify some elements and downplay others when processing information (WILKINS & PATTERSON 1987; SOOD et al. 1987). For example, the number of fatalities is a rather weak indicator for amount of coverage in risk issues, while the degree of social conflict arising from a risk debate correlates high with media coverage (ADAMS 1986).

Media direct their attention to events, not continuous developments. An accident-free performance of a technology over many years is not newsworthy, unless it is framed as an event (such as a public celebration). Likewise slow changes of the climate become hot news issues only if they can be linked to a conference, an exceptional hot summer (such as 1988 in the Unites States) or political statements (PELTU 1989).

Media have no internal mechanism to resolve conflicts among experts. Journalists have neither the time nor the qualification to find out who is right in a scientific debate. The most frequently used method to handle competing scientific evidence in the media is to give each side room to state or justify claims (PETERS 1991). Most journalists have lists of people who will provide counter-statements to any statement that they encounter when working on a story. Neither quality of evidence nor proportionality (with respect to number of dissidents or professional qualification) determines the amount of coverage that each side will receive. The amount is either equally distributed among camps or biased towards the preferences of the journalist or -more frequently- towards the editorial style of the respective medium. Media in a pluralistic society tend to reinforce diversity, dissent, and relativity of values (RUBIN 1987, p. 53).

Is there any evidence about specific media treatment of risk-related information? The media collect information from direct eyewitnesses of hazard events (anecdotal evidence) as well as systematic information from risk management institutions (RENN 1991). Displaying anecdotal experience (such as losing property or being injured) contrasts with the statistical evidence provided by risk experts. This contrast reinforces the constructive nature of media coverage and its reception (same event through two very different lenses), and often contributes to the erosion of trust in experts (see below). In addition, the nature and the magnitude of the original hazard are only of minor interest to most journalists. They prefer to focus on the way institutions handle risks and communicate about their activities. As Singer and Endremy have pointed out, the media emphasize hazards that are relatively serious and relatively rare; it is the combination that gives them their punch (SINGER & ENDREMY 1987, p.13). For example, the Chernobyl accident with 31 acute deaths cases received 129 minutes of CBS News coverage while the 1976 Tandshan earthquake leaving 800,000 people dead received less than 9 minutes on the average TV evening news (SOOD et al. 1987, p.37).

The literature contains endless lists of factors that are assumed to determine the attractiveness of risk-related messages for transmitters. Such factors include: technologically induced hazard (versus natural hazard), cultural distance from the place of occurrence (ADAMS 1986), human interest component, drama and conflict, exclusiveness of coverage (PELTU 1985, pp. 137-138), proximity to politically hot issues, prestige of information source, and degree of conflict among stakeholders (PETERS 1990).

Interaction among transmitters, plural input from different sources, the co-existence of personal, professional, and institutional selection and amplification criteria, and interaction among different target audiences create enough complexity and uncertainty that the final effect of the communication process can hardly be measured at all, let alone be effectively controlled. Reception studies of media coverage are therefore rare and often very restricted in

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the experimental design. It is clear, however, that people tend to form opinions and attitudes by a selection process in which parts of news-stories are taken out and rearranged in accordance with personal preferences, existing attitudes, and values (DUNWOODY 1992). Media consumers create puzzles constructed by many elements (cognitive and evaluative) from a variety of media reports. It is not so much the intention of the message that consumers take for granted, but their pre-existing viewpoint that make them select and interpret the messages.

Up to now, no research has been conducted on media reporting of combined effects. It is to be expected, however, that the same selection criteria are applied as with other environmental topics. Events receive a lot of attention especially when they can be presented in a way to stir public curiosity or outrage. At the same time, the media strive to obtain counter-arguments for every expert opinion and to publish them in parallel regardless of how representative they may be of the relevant scientific community. Thus there is a forced emphasis on plurality and on disagreements among experts.

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7. An integrative model of risk perception

Based on the literature about risk perception, a structured framework can be constructed to help risk assessors and managers understand and interpret their empirical findings related to risk perception. Figure 3 illustrates the influences on risk perception of four context levels:

cultural background,

socio-political institutions,

cognitive-affective factors, and

heuristics of information processing.

Each represents substructures of collective and individual influences. Each level is embedded in the next higher level to highlight the mutual contingencies among individual, social, and cultural variables.

Figure 3: Four Context Levels of Risk Perception

1. Level: Heuristics of Information ProcessingThe first level includes the collective and individual heuristics used when forming judgments about risks. Many researchers have been able to demonstrate that several common characteristics such as dread, catastrophic potential, perceived controllability and familiarity have a major influence on the perceived magnitude of risks, based on empirical data from the

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Collective Influences

Risk Perception

Heuristics of Information Processing

Collective Heuristics

Individual Common Sense

Cognitive-Affective Factors

Reference- knowledge Stigmata

Personal beliefs

Emotional affections

Social-Political Institutions

Social values and trust

Economic & politial structures Organiza- tional constraints

Personal values and interests

Socio-economic status Media influence

Cultural Background

Political, societal and economic culture

Cultural institutions

WorldviewsPersonal identity and sense of meaning

Personal Manifestations

Four Context Levels of Risk Perception


United States, Germany, France, Canada, Austria, Australia, Japan and elsewhere (Compare Overview Chapter 3 and in RENN 1990, ROHRMANN 1995; 1999).

2. Level: Cognitive and affective factorsThe second level refers to the cognitive and affective factors that influence the perception of specific properties of the risk in question and also indirectly through the assignment of special weights to the universal heuristics described above. Cognitions about a risk source – what people believe is true about a risk – governs the attribution of qualitative characteristics (psychometric variables) to specific risks (for example dread or personal control options) and determines the effectiveness of these qualitative risk characteristics on the perceived seriousness of risk and acceptability It is interesting to note that different cognitive processes can lead to the same result (in the case studied, the arousal of catastrophic images, in ROSA et al. 2000). While the Japanese respondents based their image of catastrophe on individual knowledge and familiarity, US respondents associated collective scientific experience and knowledge with catastrophic potential. This difference in cognitive routes also justifies the distinction between cognitive factors and heuristics (the first and second levels in Figure 3).

While cognitive factors have been explored extensively, emotions have been widely neglected in risk perception research. More recently, however, psychologists have discovered that affect and emotions play an important role in people’s decision processes (SLOVIC et al. 2002; LOEWENSTEIN et al. 2001). These factors are particularly relevant when individuals face a decision that involves a difficult trade-off between attributes or where there is interpretative ambiguity as to what constitutes a ‘right’ answer. In these cases, people often appear to resolve problems by focusing on those cues that send the strongest affective signals (HSEE & KUNREUTHER 2000). Both Rohrmann and Sjöberg demonstrated in their studies, that emotional affections about risk sources influence risk perception and co-determine the salience of psychometric variables such as dread and catastrophic potential. On the collective level, stigmata referring to risk sources or activities play a similar role in stimulating emotional responses (SLOVIC et al. 1992). Recent work on risk perceptions regarding technological hazards shows that emotional and cognitive factors are mutually related (ZWICK & RENN 1998). It is not yet clear whether cognitive beliefs trigger the respective emotional responses, or whether emotional impulses first ‘search’ for arguments supporting one’s emotional stance.

3. Level: Social and political institutionsThe third level refers to the social and political institutions that individuals and groups associate with handling risks. Most studies on this level focus on trust in institutions, personal and social value commitments, organisational constraints, social and political structures, and the socio-economic status. Another important variable in evaluating risk is the perception of fairness and justice in allocating benefits and risks to different individuals and social groups (LINNEROOTH-BAYER & FITZGERALD 1996). Other studies have shown the relevance of political and social organisations and their strategies to communicate with other organisations and society at large (CLARKE 1989).

The media, social groups, institutions, and organisational bonds also shape individual and societal risk experience. Several of the studies in this article were discussing the role of the media. Press coverage appears to contribute substantially to a person’s perception of risk,

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even when the extent of direct harm to people and property is taken out of the equation. In contrast to popular belief, however, there is no evidence that media create opinions about risks or even determine risk perceptions. Studies on media reception suggest instead that people select elements from media reports and use their own frame of reference to create understanding and meaning (cf. e.g. LICHTENBERG & MAC LEAN 1988). This creation is certainly influenced by the cognitive content and the evaluative statements of the reports, but the influence is more indirect and ambiguous than expected. Most people reconfirm existing attitudes when reading or viewing media reports (PETERS 1994).

4. Level: Cultural backgroundThe last level refers to cultural factors that govern or co-determine many of the lower levels of influence, including the selection of universal heuristics. Opinions on the validity of the cultural theory of risk differ widely. SLOVIC et al. (2000) regard this approach as useful in explaining some of the differences in risk perception; SJÖBERG et al. (2000) found the variance explained by cultural prototypes to be so low that they rejected the whole concept. ROHRMANN (2000) expressed a sceptical view, mainly because of measurement deficiencies. All the authors agree, however, that specific, culture-based preferences and biases are indeed important factors in risk perception. The disagreement is about the relevance of the postulated four prototypes within the realm of cultural factors.

All four levels of influencing factors are relevant to a better understanding of chemical risk perception. The comparative studies show that universal yardsticks to evaluate chemical risks do exist, at least to a certain degree, but that their relevance and their selective use in assigning these characteristics to specific risk situations are contingent on cognitive and affective patterns as well as on the social, political and cultural environments.

In spite of many open questions and ambiguities in risk perception research, one conclusion is beyond any doubt: abstracting the risk concept to a rigid formula and reducing it to probability and consequences does not match people’s intuitive feeling of what is important when making judgments about the acceptability of risks. Rather than evaluating risk with a single formula, most people use a set of multiple attributes.

8. Conclusion

This list of individual and social factors that shape risk perception demonstrates that the intuitive understanding of risk is a multidimensional concept and cannot be reduced to the product of probabilities and consequences alone (ALLEN 1987). Although risk perceptions differ considerably among social and cultural groups, the multi-dimensionality of risk and the integration of beliefs related to risk, the cause of risk, and its circumstances into a consistent belief system appear to be common characteristics of public risk perception in almost all countries in which such studies have been performed. This is not to say that quantitative assessment results do not matter for people’s perception but they are only one element among many others that shape the formation of attitudes towards risks and judgements about their acceptability (BOHOLM 1998).

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Risk perception studies have revealed the various elements that shape the individual and social experience of risk. First, individual and social risk experience appears to be stronger related to exposure than to actual casualties on which most risk assessment is based (RENN, BURNS, KASPERSON, KASPERSON & SLOVIC 1992). An exposure of few people resulting in several casualties is likely to be less influential for risk perception and public response than an exposure of many people resulting in minor injuries or only few casualties. Second, the processing of risk by the media, social groups, institutions, and individuals shapes the societal experience with risk and plays a crucial role in determining the overall intensity and scope of societal impacts. Press media coverage, perception of dread, and the individual intention to take action contribute substantially to an event’s socio-economic impacts even when controlling for the extent of direct harm to people and property. This finding supports the theoretical claim in the beginning of this article that risk reflects both, real harm and social constructions.

Third, individual perception is highly influenced by qualitative risk characteristics and semantic images. These images constitute tools of reducing complexity by providing easily identifiable cues for ordering new risks into one of four images: pending danger, slow agents, cost-benefit ratio, and avocational thrill. These images are internalized through cultural and social learning. They cluster around qualitative variables that specify the context and the situation in which the risk manifests itself within each image. Although these variables allow a certain degree of abstraction with respect to perceiving and evaluating risks across different risk sources, they provide sufficient contextual specification for making the necessary semantic distinctions between negligible, serious, and unacceptable risks. Rather than evaluating risk with a single formula, most people use a set of multiple attributes, many of which make normative sense. The application of qualitative characteristics seems to be a universal mechanism of risk perception which has been discovered in many countries, their specific content and relative importance depend, however, on the cultural context in which the individual is raised.

Fourth, among the perception variables, dread, personal control, familiarity, and blame, are good predictors for risk perception in most countries. This has been confirmed by empirical investigations in the United States, Germany, France, Canada, Austria, Australia, Japan and many others (ROHRMANN & RENN 2000). The degrees to which these qualitative characteristics are assigned to specific risk sources depend on cultural context, but also on the media coverage. In contrast to popular belief, there is no evidence that media create opinions about risks or even determine risk perceptions. The studies on media perception suggest instead that people select elements from media reports and use their own frame of reference to create understanding and meaning. This creation is certainly influenced by the cognitive content and the evaluative statements of the reports, but the influence is more indirect and ambiguous than many people think. Most people reconfirm existing attitudes when reading or viewing media reports.

Fifth, in a social environment in which personal experience is largely constructed by second-hand information, trust is an essential prerequisite for communication and social coordination. In risk arenas, trust can easily be destroyed by non-predictable or non-avoidable disasters; at the same time it can easily be exploited by referring to random events as explanations or excuses for risk management errors or hubris (LÖFTSEDT 2005). As both processes occur simultaneously, trust is constantly at stake in institutional responses to risk. One way to cope with this problem is to develop an organizational style that either leads to high-reliability

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performance or to immunization against public scrutiny. In addition, the ambiguity in assigning causality or blame to various actors (including nature or God) makes risk an ideal issue for political arenas. Struggling for social resources, actors in risk arenas can mobilize public support by placing blame and responsibility to other actors. They know that the probabilistic nature of risk prevents any of the actors to come up with compelling evidence that they are correct in their assessments or can justify their claims. This ambiguity has two consequences: resources other than evidence become major chips in the game for more social influence in risk debates and the position of rule enforcement agency tends to be weak as they struggle for the best evidence available.

What benefits can scientists and policymakers gain from the study of risk perception? What guidance can be derived from studies on intuitive risk perception for risk and technology policymaking? Even if there are no recipes to be derived from the current situation, analysis of risk perception still provides a number of lessons for policymakers, especially if one accepts pragmatic technology and risk policy as normative objectives.

Science-based risk assessment is a beneficial and necessary instrument of pragmatic technology and risk policy. It is the only means by which relative risks can be compared and options with the lowest statistical expectations selected. However, it cannot and should not be used as an exclusive guide for public action. The price for its universality is abstraction from context and the overshadowing of other rational and meaningful perception characteristics. Without taking context and situation-specific supporting circumstances into account, decisions will not, in a given situation, meet the requirement of achieving collective objectives in a rational, purposeful and value-optimising manner.

Context and supporting circumstances are significant characteristics of risk perception. These perception patterns are not just individual perceptions cobbled together: they stem from cultural evolution, are tried and trusted concepts in everyday life and, in many cases, control our actions in much the same way as a universal reaction to the perception of danger. Their universal nature across all cultures allows collective focus on risk and provides a basis for communication (ROHRMANN 1995).

From a rational standpoint, it would appear useful to systematically identify the various dimensions of intuitive risk perception (concerns assessment) and to measure those dimensions against prevailing, empirically derived characteristics. Many psychometric variables that matter to people are open to scientific study and scrutiny. In principle, the extent to which different technical options distribute risk across the various groups of society, the extent to which institutional control options exist and to what extent risk can be accepted by way of voluntary agreement can all be measured using appropriate research tools. Risk perception supplies lessons in the need to incorporate these factors into policymaking. This is based on the view that the dimensions (concerns) of intuitive risk perception are legitimate elements of rational policy, but assessment of the various risk sources must follow rational, scientific procedures on every dimension.

Risk perception is no substitute for rational policy. Just as technical risk assessment should not be made the sole basis for decision-making, factual assessment of risk should not be made the political measure of its acceptability. If we know that certain risks, like passive smoking, can lead to serious illness, then policies to reduce risk can certainly be normatively justified even if there is a lack of awareness of the problem among the general public. Many risks are ignored because no-one wants to deal with them. This applies especially to risks that are triggered by natural forces. To allow oneself to be guided by ignorance or obviously false perceptions hardly meets the prescription of pragmatic risk and technology policy. Knowledge of these perception patterns can, however, be used to

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structure and implement informational and educational measures in a beneficial manner. The inability of many people to understand probabilistic statements or to recognize the long-term risk from familiar risk sources is surely one problem area in which targeted education and information can be of benefit (RENN & LEVINE 1988). What is really needed is mutual enhancement between technical risk assessment and intuitive risk perception.

Little is known about how society perceives combined effects. Preliminary empirical study indicates that the majority of respondents perceive the combined effects of noxious substances in the environment as being super-additive. The explanations and interpretations contained in this chapter assume that exposure to combined noxious substances triggers a particularly high degree of concern and that scientists’ ability to allay that concern is limited. Such concern leads to a cautious approach which sends out an important signal for the need to protect ourselves against nasty “surprises”. It also acts as a vent for expression of the anxiety caused by the automation and chemicalization of everyday life. But while such anxiety can be alleviated to an extent, no amount of information or education can dispel it altogether. Once relationships have been recognized, it is up to policymakers to combine scientific expertise on the possible outcomes and remaining uncertainties with the assessments and desires for change of those affected by the risks in question, and to integrate them into a holistic policy that is both knowledge and values based. Risk policy should neither be purely science-based nor purely value-based.

Option trade-offs require policy weighting between the various target dimensions. Such trade-offs are dependent both on context and on the choice of dimension. Perception research offers important pointers concerning the selection of dimensions for focus. The aspect of fairness that rates high among people as an evaluation tool for the acceptability of risks plays a significant role in such trade-offs and in weighting the various dimensions. In their roles as scientists, experts have no authority to take such things into account. This is where risk comparison reaches its limits. Even if we remain within the semantic context accepted by most people – a pool of comparable risks – multidimensionality in the intuitive risk model and variable targets in risk management prevent risk policy from focusing one-sidedly on minimization of expected impacts. A breach of the minimization requirement, however, implies acceptance of greater damage than is absolutely necessary (although this can be justified in individual cases depending on the risk situation).

The inclusion of risk perception studies for normative use in policy making faces two major drawbacks. First, the advice of social scientists will vary considerably depending on the perspective that the scientists prefer. Second, unlike the technical or economic understanding of risk, the social science concepts offer no common denominator for measuring cultural or social acceptability (DOUGLAS 1985). What constitutes a major risk for one group may be perfectly in line with the perceptions of another group. Who is going to decide which risk perception has more validity than another perception?

There is also no impartial referee available to judge the appropriateness of risk perceptions. Science may help to determine the magnitude of the risk but this information alone is not sufficient to make decisions about the acceptability of risks. The only viable resolution of these conflicts in democratic societies is by initiating a discourse among the major parties involved in the decision making process or affected by the decision outcomes (HABERMAS 1971). Such a dialogue can be organized in form of advisory committees, citizen panels, formal hearings, and others (FIORINO 1989; WEBLER & RENN 1991). Risk communication and participation are integrative parts of risk pre-assessment, risk appraisal,

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risk judgement and management. Discursive elements need to be inserted in risk assessment as well as in risk management although the formats and the type of input from stakeholders and the public at large may differ in both steps (IRGC 2005).

Risk communication can be organized as providing information to the public, as a mutual learning process, or as an attempt to reconciling conflicts about risks. The empirical study of risk communication has demonstrated the need for trust and credibility between the communicators and their audience, but they also revealed the continuous trend towards distrust and suspicion on the side of those who are supposed to bear the risks. What can be learned from the evidence collected so far is that credibility of a communication source is closely linked to the perceived past performance record and its openness for public demands. The more institutions comply with the expectations of the public, the more confidence people will have in these institutions and the more trust they will assign to their messages. Communication efforts alone may be successful to change excessive aspirations or to correct misperceptions of the actual performance record, but it is more than unlikely that communication can compensate poor performance.

Risk communication is a necessary step towards bridging the gap between risk assessment, management and perception. The goal of risk communication should not be to persuade people to accept whatever the communicator thinks is best for them. The ideal communication program envisions a receiver who processes all the available information to form a well-balanced judgment in accordance with the factual evidence, the arguments of all sides, and his/her own interests and preferences. Risk communication is therefore a crucial element of any risk assessment and management strategy. It is aimed at informing appropriating, and supporting public formation of judgments and evaluations. The ultimate goal is to reconcile expertise, interests, and public preferences.

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