Tactical Encyclopedia Volume 6 Active Shooter Response

Produced by Keith Suddes, LLCwww.k-series.net

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LAW ENFORCEMENT

SUBJECTS IN VEHICLES

An Illustrated Guide

Volume Six

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I L L U S T R A T E D T A C T I C A L M A N U A L

R E S E A R C H E D A N D P R O D U C E D B Y K E I T H S U D D E S , L L C

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This EncyclopediaThis Tactical Encyclopedia, in it’s entirety, provides initial guidance on the skills and techniques

approved for use by the Law Enforcement community in circumstances justifying the deployment of

Specialist Officers. It then builds upon the Conflict Management Model and basic firearms tactics,

providing further detail on the phases of an operation and the tactics which can be employed in

different environments. The contents are considered highly confidential as they are operationally

sensitive – if potential subjects of police operations involving lethal force options were aware of such

details, it might compromise the ability of Law Enforcement to perform its duty to protect life.

It provides further illustrations on tactics to be considered in different types of environments

(buildings, the open, vehicles and other structures).

This Encyclopedia offers guidelines, ‘Good Working Practices’ and standardized training

recommendations for commanding, managing, operating, and training law enforcement specialist

teams. It is a generic guide which should form the baseline of Critical Thinking in your response to

crisis situations where officer may use OR face lethal force.

The intent of these guidelines is to provide helpful guidance to law enforcement agencies in the

formation, oversight, operation, and training of effective patrol and tactical officers.

Contained within this Encyclopedia are recognized ‘Good Working Practices’ from across the USA

and Internationally. While these guidelines encourage some degree of standardization of tactics, it

is recognized that local conditions and needs vary considerably and therefore flexibility is the key.

These guidelines pay particular attention to the Tactical aspects that focus on effectiveness, safety

and prevention of problematic critical incidents.

A ‘Specialist’ team is any designated group of law enforcement officers who are selected, trained,

and equipped to work as a coordinated team to resolve critical incidents that are so hazardous,

complex, or unusual that first responders and local officers would be unable to safely resolve the

situation.

This Volume DOES NOT seek to replace an organizations SOP’s or authorizedworking practices; it merely offers guidance on accepted practices and it is to be

used as an aide and reference.

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Immediate ActionArguments for Individual Response

POST COLUMBINE

No one advocates waiting for SWAT

CURRENT PHILOSOPHY

3 or 4 officers, Rapid Deployment Search and Contact Team with coordinated movements.

SWAT Tactics are flawed for First Responders.

THE DILEMMA

If you are a patrol officer (or off duty) and are the first on the scene of an “active shooter” event, doyou…

� Make immediate entry and hunt the active shooter. OR� Wait for other early responders and assemble a Rapid Deployment Search and Contact

Team

CURRENT THINKING

Waiting for other responders:� Deadly waste of time� Slow and methodical = Tactical Loitering� Racing the Stop Watch of Death (15 second rule)� Average post Columbine event lasts just 8 minutes

The murderer’s timeline starts when he says it begins.

All others are “extras” to his starring role.Now law enforcement plays catch up.

We need to get less resources on site sooner.

Training officers to wait, even moments, shows Commanders have not done their homework.

BROKEN STRATEGY

We have proven time and again that we are very good at:� Arriving too late with too many and� Wasting time gathering pre-entry intel

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ACTIVE SHOOTER FACTS

� 98% Act alone� 80% Have long guns� 75% Have multiple weapons (average 3)� Less than 50% hit rate� They hunt defenseless innocents, typical AS not capable of “competing” on a level playing

field.� They have absolute control over life and death until they stop at their leisure or are stopped.� They do not take hostages or negotiate� Generally, they avoid police, they do not ambush armed adversaries.� Typically they fold upon armed confrontation.� 90% commit suicide on site. Many even before confronted by police.� Surrender or escape attempts rare.� Most police officers have already faced worse opponents from a personal safety standpoint.

THE NEW PHILOSOPHY

Many dangerous situations that begin with one officer taking action with back up en route.Solo responder is guaranteed an avalanche of resources coming fast on their heels (will not bealone for long).The typical Active Shooter is not a conventional criminal predator but a cowardly revenge seeker.

Officers need to learn valid and aggressive tactical principles.

ISRAELI MODEL

Tactics for the 1st of the first responders� Military Tactics� Speed, surprise, violence of action, etc…� Close in aggressively and finish the fight� Momentum of battle, keep them reacting� Swift application of DEADLY FORCE

CONCLUSION

A MORAL DILEMMADoes a responding officer risk going in alone…or are the potential victims left to the mercy of aheartless killer while the officer (armed and armored) stays safe.

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Active Shooter Response

LESSONS LEARNED� Active shooter incidents are spontaneous.� Suspects behavior is unpredictable.� Pre-incident signs exist in school incidents.� Incidents occur in a target rich environment.� First responders outgunned and/or didn’t have the training to respond to an active shooter situ-

ation.� A tactical intervention is always too late.� Multi-jurisdictional response issues were present.

ACTIVE SHOOTER RESPONSE - PRIORITIES

� Safety of the Innocent(those who encounter the active shooter).� Safety of third parties

(those who may encounter the active shooter).� Safety of Law Enforcement and Emergency Responders.� Safety of Suspects.

ACTIVE SHOOTER RESPONSE - GOAL

� Intervention to neutralize the threat to potential victims.� Officers must be trained and mentally prepared to neutralize the threat immediately!!!� Your task is simple . . . . . . STOP THE VIOLENCE.� Rescue injured persons and potential victims.

(This can ONLY be completed when the Active Shooter has been neutralized)

PRIORITIZATION

� Stop the Active Shooter(s).� Rescue innocents and victims.� Provide medical assistance.� Preserve the Crime Scene.

DEFINITIONS

Active Shooter

One or more subjects whom have used, is using or threatens to use a weapon to inflict deadlyforce on others, and/or continues to do so while having unrestricted access to additional victims.Prior actions demonstrate intent to continuously harm; objective appears to be mass injury ormurder. Suicide likely to be the end result . . . . . .

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Responder

YOU:� Off Duty (likely to be unarmed)� Plain Clothes� Patrol� Armed Patrol� Tactical Team

RESPONDER MINDSET

� Prepare for the fight of your life (YES . . . Its that important)� You are hunting for a killer� Pre-plan – wargame, train, exercise in your mind what you will do� Be prepared – right equipment / training� Know your limitations and push beyond them� Prepare to be on your OWN

LEVELS OF COMPETENCE

� Unconscious Incompetence – You’ve no idea what you are going to do� Conscious Incompetence – You know you are not prepared for this� Unconscious Competence – You will rely on your training� Conscious Competence – You are prepared and thinking rationally . . . You are ready

� You are likely to be on your own, or at best, with a partner.� Recognize 360 degree vulnerability; horizontally and vertically.� Do not clear ALL rooms; advance swiftly, pass injured persons/harmless distractions and

engage the Active Shooter(s).

INFORMATION

Indicators� What you see!

Indications� What you hear!

STANDARD TACTICAL APPROACHES

Contact Team Generally utilizes one of several tactical formations:� Diamond (four-five operators)� Large T (four-five operators)� Arrowhead (four-five operators)� Small T (three operators)� Broken Arrow (three operators)� Wedge or ‘Y’ (three operators)

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WHY ARE THESE TACTICS FLAWED FOR FIRST RESPONDER?

� The average response time of your Armed Officers is likely to be 5 mins – 20 mins.

� The average duration of Incident with Active Shooter is 3 – 4 mins.

� Since 1999 (USA) the number of active shooters STOPPED by dispatched duty personnel is ZERO.

�� The average time per Injury/Kill is 15 secs.

RESPONDERS

First Responders are inherently slower than a Tactical Team as they have generally received lesstraining, they are searching for downed victims, suspects and other responders - on their own.Responders should use tactics suitable to the situation. The more resources the safer the tactics.SWAT tactics may NOT be appropriate.Responders will also aid in escort of uninjured victims to a predetermined safe location when it issafe to do so.

IMMEDIATE ACTION DEPLOYMENT PLAN(IADP)

Immediate deployment of law enforcement personnel and resources to ongoing, life threateningsituations where delayed deployment could result in death or serious bodily injury to innocentpersons. (Not used as a barricaded suspect response or hostage rescue situations).

YOUR APPROACH

� Remember …. You may be on your own.� If it is an active shooter then only YOU can decide what is right – enter and hunt or stay and

control.� Be aware of other responders attending to assist you – identify yourself the best way you can.� Rely on your training, techniques and intuition.

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Characteristics of an Active Shooter

� Active Shooters (AS) usually focus on assaulting persons whom they come into contact with.� They are expressing hatred, rage or revenge, rather than the commission of traditional crime.� Likely to engage more than one target.� Intent may be to kill as many persons as quickly as possible.� Can be over in minutes.

Usually first indication of the event, for Police, is the initiation of the assault upon others.

However, numerous people are likely to know of this attack prior to it occurring . . . ?

Incidents occur at locations where potential victims are readily available.

Schools, malls, movie theatre, concerts, any large gathering.How often do you train in these locations?

� Many AS use sniper tactics or remain actively mobile.

� Active Shooters typically continue their violence despite the arrival of police.

� Tactics such as containment or negotiations may not be adequate or appropriate during activeshooter events.

� Active Shooters are often better armed than the initial first responders.

� Rifles, explosives, body armor, extra ammunition, booby traps, edged weapons or anythingelse planned and brought to the attack or available at the event (environmental).

� Be under NO illusion. THIS IS PLANNED.

� Active Shooters should be expected to be applying a planned attack and be prepared for a sustained confrontation with police.

� Escape from the event location is generally not a priority of the active shooter.

However …..!

� Active Shooters may employ some method of diversionary tactic.

� Distraction, slow down responding operators, create more casualties or destruction.

� Active Shooters can be indiscriminate in their violence or may seek out specific victims.�

� Active Shooters may be suicidal, and may have developed it into their operational plan – they will die either at the hand of others (YOU) or their own hand. 90% end this way

� Active Shooter’s usually have some degree of familiarity with the building or location theychoose to conduct their attack.

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Again, reinforces the “they have a plan” concept. Remember this in your operational responseplan development.

Active Shooter events are dynamic, and may change from “active” to “static” events; or “static” to“active” and back again.

Active situation may become a barricaded suspect call, with suspect no longer having access topotential victims or becomes a hostage situation.

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

� Assume Tactical Responsibility� Rapidly identify who is in charge (rank, expertise), and TAKE ACTION.� Your failure to act may get people killed!� However, no action should commence without planning and control mechanisms.� Inform communications of your activities.

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

The OIC must perform continuous situational analysis and be able to adapt, improvise andovercome the threat based upon available resources and intelligence.

The first responder NOT trying to engage the AS will begin Incident Command until relieved by anappropriate authority.

Begin to establish external Perimeter.

� Identify Staging area.� Make appropriate notifications, mutual aid.� Form additional Contact / Responders. Designate staging areas for victims, family members,

arriving law enforcement, the media, EMS, etc.� Crime Scene preservation.

FIRST RESPONDER TACTICAL INTERVENTION

� Know and act upon the intent of an Active Shooter response plan.� Contact/Responders,� Tactical Command,� Containment� Site Security� No location will be determined secure until cleared and reported secure by the responding

Tactical Team Commander.� Officers assigned to security functions will maintain those positions until properly relieved.

TACTICAL RESPONSE TEAMS

Once on scene and prepared to be deployed, initial responding officers may be relieved,reassigned or assisted as necessary.

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MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES

If a suspect is arrested or incapacitated, standard practices will be utilised relative to the treatmentof the suspect's, investigation of the incident and the crime scene to include evidence preservation.

Should the situation no longer be an active shooting incident, the Tactical Commander shouldrequest and deploy the Tactical Team with trained negotiators utilised to attempt to contact thesuspect(s) to negotiate a safe resolution.

Should any officer encounter a suspected explosive device, they will note/report its presence andbypass it. Do not use a radio in vicinity.

Scene will be handled appropriately in terms of suspected explosive devices.

Operators should make entry into the most suitable location. Remember the Breachingequipment!

Be mindful that main entranceway may be barricaded or booby trapped.Remember the Active Shooter may have a well thought out plan.Virginia Tech – Doors were chained and barricaded by AS

During an Active Shooter incident, close and engage with the suspect. If the suspect is engagedby you, they may not be able to hurt others during that contact.Additionally, if the suspect is actively injuring others, they are generally not prepared for yourattack. This is a good time to strike!

As a member of a Contact Team you will have to pass over injured victims.Recognize this and be prepared for this.

� Active Shooter responding officers should create a response bag containing:� Ballistic Protection - essential� Breaching Equipment� Extra ammunition - essential� Trauma bandages - essential� Additional Lighting� First Aid Resources - essential� and much more . . . . .

CONTACT TEAM MOVEMENT

� Stay in your area of responsibility.� Move only as swiftly as your slowest operator.� Move quickly over open or exposed areas.� Be prepared to utilize multiple shooting positions (working angles, slicing the pie, kneeling,

prone, etc.).� Be prepared to use cover (fire) and movement techniques. JUSTIFICATION?� Speed, surprise and assertive, aggressive action are basic elements of dynamic clearing.� Deploying multiple ‘Contact’ personnel at different entry points can expedite the process of

neutralizing threats – be aware of ‘Blue on Blue’ situations.

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All officers should remember and apply the basics they have been trained in.� Angle of approach

ü Stairsü Tactical formationsü Weapon manipulationü Equipment familiarity

� First Aid� Handcuffing� Verbal commands, etc.

WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

� Handguns� Patrol Rifles� Distractions� Explosives� Training of responding personnel?

When you believe contact is imminent:� Work your angles.� Stick to the basics.� Use good verbal or hand signals to communicate with your teammates prior to initiating action

when possible.� One person gives verbal commands to suspect (Contact/Cover concept)

WHAT YOU CAN EXPECT TO EXPERIENCE AS A FIRST RESPONDER!

� Recognize that you are going into a combat zone.� Acknowledge and prepare for this mentally, emotionally and physically.� It will be loud, confusing, smelly ?, gruesome and dynamic.� Victims hiding, confused and frightened – not responding to Law Enforcement directions.� Carnage.� Fire sprinklers activated� Floor could be hazardous (blood, water, glass, debris etc)

PLAIN CLOTHES / OFF DUTY

� Be alert to your surroundings.� You may be mistaken for a “bad guy” by other responding personnel� Where is your ID badge or Cap?� How will you identify yourself – from front and rear?� Comply with any commands given to you by other responders especially uniformed personnel.

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EFFECTS ON YOUR BODY

� This is NOT something you can realistically train for!� Expect to experience the following:

ü Hyperventilation.ü Accelerated heart rate.ü Adrenaline rush.ü Deterioration of the cognitive thought process - confusionü Diminished fine motor skills.ü Diminished hearing.ü Perceptual distortionü Tunnel vision.

� Lets face it you are going to be ‘!@#£%^&’ frightened!!!

POST INCIDENT

Be conscious of the stress factors present after a traumatic incident:� P.T.S.D.� Insomnia, Nightmares� Anger and frustration� Heavy consumption of alcohol� Drug use� Find someone to talk to….Its good to talk!

In our profession you are never alone, you just need the courage to ask for help!No shame in this …

SUMMARY

Schools and Police must work together to establish response plans and procedures for violentschool situations.Conduct realistic training for all involved – Police, Schools, Fire Departments, EMS etc.First responding patrol Officers must take action using appropriate weapons and tactics if it is nec-essary.

Some Facts based on over 100 Incidents (USA)� 98% of Offenders act alone� 90% commit suicide, usually on-site� 80% use a long gun (rifle, shotgun or carbine)� 75% bring multiple weapons sometimes with 100’s of rounds of ammunition� Offenders pre-occupied with a high body count before police arrive� Increasingly they wear body armor� They almost NEVER take hostages or negotiate� Dynamic and quick usually over in less than 8 mins� Only 6 incidents stopped by Law Enforcement (in 30 years). The majority of these initiated by

ONE officer

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FACTS ON GLOBAL AS INCIDENTS

� United States since 1966 = 188Columbine = 15Virginia Tech = 33

� Canada since 1975 = 24Ecole Poly, Montreal = 14

� Europe since 1964 = 476Beslan = 385

� Other = 84Israel = 38

REMEMBER

“Tactically, making entry is the last option.In an Active shooter situation however, we are asking minimally trained officers to use this lastoption as their first and do it with minimum numbers.”

Active Killer / Shooter Tactics can be viewed in Volume 7 Building Entryhttp://www.keithsuddes.com/tacman.html

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WARNING SIGNS OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE

TYPES OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE

� Gang/Profit Motivated Criminal Violence� International Political Violence� The Mission Oriented Shooter

ü Not Defensive or Profit Motivated Crime BUTü Premeditated Predatory Violence

THE MISSION ORIENTED SHOOTER

� Homicide of guardians in 26% of school killings� Multiple weapons employed� Suicide often attempted or completed at end� Threat at all educational levels� Mission oriented shooters are not exclusive to the school setting:

ü Work Place Related (“Going Postal”)ü Crime Relatedü Societal or Psychological “Issues”

ü McDonald’s Massacre, July 18, 1984 - San Ysidro, CAü Suspect, James Huberty, Killed 21, Wounded 11, Killed by Police Sniper

ü North Hollywood Bank Robbery, February 27, 1997 - North Hollywood, CAü Suspects, Larry Phillips and Emil Mosuranyo, Wounded 13ü One suspect commits suicide the other is killed by SWAT

ü Belgium 2009,ü Deranged man enters a day care center and stabs to death two infants and a worker.

ü Texas Tower Incident, August 1, 1966 - Austin TXü Suspect, Charles Whitman, Killed 15 people (including an unborn baby)ü Wounded 31 (as far away as two blocks)ü Resolved by two police officers

ü Columbine High School, April 20, 1999 - Littleton COü Suspects Harris and Klebold, Killed 13, Wounded dozensü Both suspects commited suicide

ü Yes . . . It happens in UKü Hungerford, Berkshire, 1987ü Suspect, Michael Ryan, 27, Killed 14, Including an unarmed policemanü Shot himself

ü Dunblane, Scotland 1996,ü Suspect, Thomas Watt Hamilton, 44, Killed 16 children and 1 teacher

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WHAT WE KNOW (AND DON’T KNOW) ABOUT SCHOOL VIOLENCE

How can you Tell if a Student fits the Profile of a School Shooter???

ProfilesThere is no Demographic Profile of School Shooters

But if there are no profiles … then a fair, rational standardized method of evaluating andresponding to threats is critically important.

BEHAVIOR IS THE TRUTH

Examine behavior, not profiles

Myth: Disgruntled students are the only threats to student safety

Reality: there are multiple threats -

� Students� Staff� Teachers� Parents� Outsiders (West Nichols Mines, PA)

Myth: The main cause of targeted school violence is bullying

Fact:Per U. S. Secret Service Study, 75% of all students have been bullied at least one time.

A small percentage of the population may be unable to cope with bullying, harassment or rejection,except by violence-

The “Brittle People” Phenomenon� Injustices� Feelings of persecution and alienation� Suicide by other means� Extreme sensitivity to slights and rejection - “Injustice Collectors”� Perception of self as an outsider� No Options

WHY DO THEY DO IT?

“Thanks to your arrogance, Stupidity and relentless torment that you have caused me for pushingme away and teasing me in elementary school…for making sure that every minute of school washell for me…”From a letter found on the computer of Jeremy Getman, attempted shooter at Southeast HighSchool, New York.

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Brittle PeopleViolent Action Imperative: “I had no other choice”

� Psychopath,� Narcissism,� Psychosis

DOES POPULAR CULTURE CREATE SCHOOL SHOOTERS?

� Popular Culture� Movies/Television� Music (Rap)

VIDEO GAMES

“APRIL IS THE CRUELEST MONTH” - T. S. ELLIOT

The following events took place during the month of April:

� Columbine� Oklahoma City� Virginia Tech� Waco

Fact: School Shooters are rarely under the influence of any drug during the assault.

Myth: The student … “Just Snapped”

Reality: Over 50% of the attackers planned the attack for at least two weeks.Dr. Kris Mohandie (2000)

PATHWAY TO VIOLENCE

1. Grievance2. Ideation3. Research and Planning4. Preparation5. Breach6. Attack

A MODEL THREAT PLAN

� Notification� Assessment� Management

All threats are not created equal…but all threats should be taken seriously.

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In 81% of acts: At least one other person knew.

In 59% of acts: Two or more people knew…

But the Information was not provided. Blocks to Reporting their fears:

� Fear of being targeted� Doesn’t know whom to tell� Doesn’t take threat seriously� Doesn’t want to be a “snitch”

A MODEL SCHOOL THREAT POLICY

Students, teachers, staff and parents MUST report on receiving info on a threat of violence:� Assume every threat is serious.� Immediately report to a supervisor.� Preserve evidence and remain available.� All efforts should be made to keep info confidential.� Collect Collateral Data Sources� Potential precipitating events� Warning signs and risk factors� Stabilizing factors

Risk Assessment is only as good as the data collection to support it.

ASSESSMENT

Identified person or an anonymous communicated threat.Are anonymous direct threats to attack valid?

16% of school shooters directly threatened their targets. 7 out of 42 incidents - Fein and Vossekuil,2002

EMOTIONAL LEAKAGE OF VIOLENT INTENT

Systematic Indications of Homicide and Suicide

Inadvertent Disclosure

� Emotional leakage through writings, drawings, artwork, projects and conversations� Goods News!!� Evidence of planning means there is an opportunity to discover and intervene.� Emotional Leakage is Long Term� Talk to former teachers.� Interview friends, associates and potential victims.� Ask about favorite movies, scenes, interests.

Review all computers to which subject has access.Review all social networking sites for subject and victims.

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Social Networking Sites:� My Space .com� Xanga.com� Facebook.com� Friendster.com� YouTube.com� Beebo.com

There are no demographic profiles, but in assessing Individuals, examine behavioral warningsigns ...

BEHAVIOR IS THE TRUTHDo not search for profiles…

Examine Behavior.� Behavioral Risk Factors� Prior behavior� Threatening and harassing behavior� Destruction of property� Lack of healthy social ties� Severe depression and suicidal statements� Bizarre thoughts� Obsession with other people� Physical/behavioral changes

BEHAVIORAL RISK FACTORS

� Hopeless statements: “I see no way out”� Possession of Extremist or Hate Group Materials� Obsession with IED’s� Access to weapons� Threats or bragging about bringing a weapon to school� “Any efforts to acquire, prepare, or use a weapon may represent progression from an idea to

carrying it out.” - Vossekuil, et al 2000

FAMILY RISK FACTORS

� Divorce� Neglect� Emotional, sexual or physical abuse� Frequent relocation� Failure to set boundaries� Individual Stability Factors

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FUTURE ORIENTED, OPTIONS, LIFE PLANS

� Healthy self esteem� Sense of humor� Age� Available social support: family, friends, healthy peer groups� Family Stability Factors� Access to resources� Guardians set and support limits� Guardians support the intervention

SCHOOL STABILITY FACTORS

� Healthy organizational structure� Control over access to school premises� Access to mental health services� Active SRO program

Goal of Assessment is to Answer This Question :

� “Is there evidence to suggest movement from thought to action?”

Or more simply: Does the student POSE a threat, not simply whether the student MADE athreat

� Does the subject have the ability (access, means, capacity, and opportunity) to becomeviolent?

� Is there evidence of intent (specificity of planning, action taken towards a plan)

� Are others concerned by observed behavior (subject discussed plan with others, others afraid)

� Does subject demonstrate non-compliance with risk reduction (lack of insight)

MANAGEMENT

Myth: Individuals are either dangerous, or not dangerous

Fact: Individuals fall along a continuum of violence potential.

Violence potential is the interaction of individual, situation, setting, and target… If you alter onemaybe you can alter the outcome.

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CREATE A THREAT ASSESSMENT TEAM (TAT):

� Administrator� SRO or other LEO� Mental Health Professional� School Legal Representative� Ad Hoc Members: Teachers, Spec Ed Teachers, etc…

Who should NOT be on the TAT?� Parents� Students subject of review� Union rep� Mental health pro treating subject� Anyone with potential conflict

Questions To Ask Students:

� If you knew of a threat would you tell?

� If so, who would you tell?

� If not, Why?

EXAMPLES OF MASS MURDER/ACTIVE SHOOTER’S IN EUROPE:

1987, Hungerford, Berkshire, Michael Ryan, 14 including a Police Officer1993, Male armed with shotgun, Dover Kent. Shot by Police. No innocents injured1996, Dunblane, Scotland, Thomas Hamilton, 16 children and 1 teacher, suicide2002 Erfurt Germany, 16 dead, suicide2008 Realschule, Winnenden, Germany 15 dead, suicide2007 Jokela H. S., Finland 8 dead2008 Kauhajoki, Finland, 10 dead, suicide

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How to Minimize Loss of Life as Crime and Terrorism Blend

ARE YOU READY FOR AN ACTIVE SHOOTER?

� A review of basic principles and issues� Policy and Procedure for Response to Active Shooters� Do we need a police response policy for “active shooter” situations?� Do we need procedures for “active shooter” situations?

How do “active shooter” situations differ from other police responses.

� Not a hostage situation� Not a stand off� Not a barricaded perpetrator� But can transition to one of these

IMMEDIATE/RAPID DEPLOYMENT

The swift and immediate deployment of law enforcement resources to on-going, life threateningsituations where delayed deployment could otherwise result in death or serious injury to innocentpersons.

DYNAMIC SITUATION

The situation is evolving very rapidly along with the suspect’s action.Example, shooting and moving.

STATIC SITUATION

The situation is not evolving or in motion, the suspect actions appear to be contained.Example, suspect is barricaded in a room.

POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR RESPONSE TO ACTIVE SHOOTERS

� If you agree that this type of incident is different:� How are you currently preparing for it?� What training have you in place?� What’s different about it?

ü Danger is immediateü Cannot wait for SWAT/No negotiationsü Must act now to save livesü A “come as you are” affair for responders

� Weapons, equipment, skills, mindset, physical condition� You have less than a minute to act� You’re it! This is what they pay you for!

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RESOLUTION OF AN “ACTIVE SHOOTER” SITUATION

� More likely by patrol as opposed to SWAT.� Non-traditional response.� Minimum number of officers.� Properly equipped?� Properly trained?� Able to transition to a barricade situation.

RAPID DEPLOYMENT RESPONSE

The Rapid Deployment (R/D) active shooter response came out of the Columbine tragedy� Pre Columbine, post SWAT: establish perimeter and call SWAT� Post Columbine: neutralize the threat

Theory originally out of LAPD/NTOAMany variations on the theme exist today!

ACTIVE SHOOTER RESPONSE CHANGE:

Normal LE priorities� Officer safety� Hostage/public safety� Perpetrator apprehension� Perpetrator safety

Active Shooter LE priorities� Neutralise Suspect� Hostage/public safety� Officer safety� Perpetrator safety

RAPID DEPLOYMENT CONCEPT

Imperative:Stop the violence NOW

Theory of operation:� Enter structure with minimally safe team� Move quickly to sounds/source of violence� Search only when source of violence unknown� Move past victims and threats (IEDs, etc.)� Engage and neutralize perpetrators� Responding to scene� Describe situation to dispatch or emergency operator (off duty/cell phone)� Position vehicle to take in information and communicate with facility authority- preplan who

that is� Activate ICS (Incident Command System)� Wait for more officers?

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TEXT BOOK SITUATION

� First On Duty officer on scene is initial commander� Has most information� Directs other responding units� Hands off command to supervisor� Entry team(s): 4 officers� Larger buildings have multiple teams enter different entrances (note comms issue)� Rescue team: 4 later-responding officers� Ad-hoc ICS-commander outside� Everyone can communicate with each other

REALITY

� It may be YOU and/or a colleague� You can’t wait for ICS or supervisor� Your radio talks to whomever it does� No rescue team� Chaos will reign� Your Job is to neutralize the suspect

MOVING TO STRUCTURE

� Do not be in tight formation� Spread out (military patrol-like)� Utilise cover and leapfrogging (cover and movement) Do you know how?� Maintain areas of control with muzzle� No hard rules� Form up at entry point

WHAT TO EXPECT UPON ENTRY . . .

� Noise, confusion, screaming, alarms etc.� Victims running, hiding, confused and frightened - not responding to law enforcement

directions.� Carnage.� Fire and sprinkler operations.

MOVEMENT FORMATIONS

Most rapid deployment instruction is based on officers moving through the structure in one ormore teams of 4 officersinstructors spend most of their time teaching officers to move effectively as a team, eithersearching as they go or moving to the sound of gunfireA lot of emotional energy is spent defending one movement formation vs. another.All techniques and formations have a place in your tool box.

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INDIVIDUAL TECHNIQUE

� On your own or with a partner� Fewer officers = more risk� You go with what you have� “Formation” is fluid and dependent on environment� All officers need to have basic searching/clearing/movement training…� Both alone and as part of a team� Principles, not specific tactics� Use normal building clearing techniques when searching - Only faster

STRUCTURE MOVEMENT PRINCIPLES

� Muzzle orientated to general area of danger� All areas of responsibility (AOR) covered� Scan areas as you pass them� ALWAYS with a high or low ready—muzzle not pointed at innocents!� ‘T’ intersections: wings pie both ways; lead pies in direction of travel� ‘X’ intersections: make a choice!� Stairs: normal clears for type� Emphasis on flow and speed

ROOM ENTRY PRINCIPLES

� Stack if door open� Wings enter or wing/point entry� Door closed: get one Officer to try door knob� Pie through door glass if you cross

ENTRY

� Structured: criss-cross vs. button hook� Unstructured: whatever the other officer doesn’t do - 1st officer is always right!� Maintain AOR� Drive to corners (often advisable)� Triangulate on suspect� Speed: AVOID FATAL FUNNEL

AS YOU MOVE INDICATIONS

� Students/workers will be running past you� Detain them and gather intel (Indications)� Where? How many? Race? Sex? Weapons? Clothing?� Pass by injured, dead and dying� Might be your friends, relatives, or even children� Pass by IEDs� Sprinklers will be spraying, noises will be loud, chaos will be everywhere� Focus on your goal� Communicate your progress

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CONTACT TEAM

� If bad guys are shooting, you know where they are – move to them quickly (Indicators)� Bypass other rooms and areas� If they are not shooting:

ü Use your intel (verbal, visual, radio) to move quickly to them, orü Slow down and do quick entries/searches as you move

� Challenge or engage when you encounter them� If life not in imminent danger, transition to SWAT mode

RESCUE TEAM (RESPONDERS)

� Follows Contact team� Removes victims (including officers)� Must be capable of becoming contact team if perpetrators encountered� Fire/EMS personnel rescue team issues� No tactical skills� No training� Not armed� Not likely to enter an un-secured area anyway� TEMS exceptions

TYPICAL MOVEMENT MISTAKES

� Not moving smoothly� Getting too tense� Moving too fast; moving too slow� Failing to communicate with each other� Every officer trying to command the team� Moving into each other’s line of fire� Not maintaining areas of responsibility� Breaking role� Training is the key!

MULTIPLE JURISDICTIONAL RESPONSE

� Issues to be sorted out AHEAD of time:� Notification mechanism� Command structure� Communication capability� Legal agreements/MOUs� Tactics commonality� Roles and responsibilities� Joint training exercises� And so on…

To ponder…“In SWAT, making entry is the last option. In R/D, we’re asking minimally trained officers to useSWAT’s last option as their first.”

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These skills are perishable.� Do you have a policy and schedule for regular training?� Do other responding agencies?� Rapid Deployment is largely untested� Rapid Deployment used a few times. Out of 80 active shooter events from 1966-2003, 44 had

detailed info*:ü Southfield, MI – Rapid Deployment positive outcomeü Williamsport, PA – moot outcomeü Bethel, AK – Rapid Deployment positive outcomeü LA, CA – negative outcome – friendly casualtiesü Spokane, WA – Rapid Deployment positive outcome (POSA source)

*Rapid Deployment as a Response to an Active Shooter Incident, Illinois SP Academy, Richard Fairburn, 2003, ISPstudy* conclusions

Most incidents over by the time first officers on scene.Immediate action by on-scene officers most likely to have positive effect.But School Resource Officers not usually chosen for their “warrior” qualities.

Israel had similar problems� They arm the population� They arm the teachers� Schools are no longer targets

Rapid Deployment success chances heightened by access to patrol rifle*Rapid Deployment as a Response to an Active Shooter Incident, Illinois SP Academy, Richard Fairburn, 2003

Since 2003 - multiple active shooter incidents, including Virginia Tech (VT).In most, all killing was done before the first officers got to the scene.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE DATA

Training in Rapid Deployment/Active Shooter tactics, while necessary, is unlikely to minimize lossof life.The most important thing you can do to save lives is pre-event work with facilities, so thatthey take action immediately to execute their plan

Prepared school staff is the key

The truth is educational staff can do more to mitigate the loss of life than the police, due to beingon scene when the shooting starts.The need for training the educational staff in every school in how to recognize, react to andprevent active shooter events is CRITICAL.Passing out a comprehensive school safety plan to school staffs is simply not enoughpreparation/training for an active shooter event!Training EVERY member of the school community is paramount!

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ACTIVE SHOOTER AS A TERRORIST EVENT

Where We are HeadingCrime to 4th generation warfare. (4G)Until now in the U.S., active shooter incidents have been crimes perpetrated by individuals fortheir own purposesBut future active shooter incidents will include persons perpetrating 4G and even 5G warfare

WHAT IS 4G WARFARE?

“The loss of the state's monopoly on war and on the first loyalty of its citizens, and the rise of non-state entities that command people’s primary loyalty and that wage war. These entities may begangs, religions, races and ethnic groups within races, localities, tribes, business enterprises, ide-ologies—the variety is almost limitless.”William S. Lind, Strategic Defense Initiative.

WARFARE GENERATIONS

There are several different schemes that divide history into generational periods of warfare, andthese schemes often differ in the characteristics of warfare that they use to define its generations.

What follows is one popular scheme, provided for context:

1G to 3G Warfare1st Generation Warfare - up to WWIArmies fought attrition-based battles at close range with individual and squad-level weapons (can-nons)2nd Generation Warfare-WWIArmies fought attrition-based battles at close range with large-scale weapons support (chemicals,bombs, etc.) and mechanized transport (e.g., railroads)3rd Generation Warfare-WWIILarge-scale maneuvers (e.g. the blitzkrieg)Long range weapons targeting enemy infrastructure

4th generation warfareCarried out by small cells that blend with the population—not by armiesFundamentally a political endeavorSeeks to destroy the will of the enemies decision makers—not to defeat its militaryExamples: Mao, al-Queda; I.R.A.; SandinistasTerrorism is a tactic of, not a synonym for, 4GWCo-opting the media is a crucial element of 4GW

5th generation warfareThere are many different definitions of 5th generation warfare, but they all agree that actionsundertaken by individuals of their own initiative will be a salient characteristic of it.

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That is the important attribute of 5GW for our purposes.

4/5GW and active shootersActive shooter tactics are essentially the same as terrorist tactics: kill a lot of innocent peopleIndiscriminately.But a 4/5GW terrorist incident will be better planned and resourced than a lone (or a couple of)active shooter(s).

Self-deployment (5G warfare) examples:� MD / VA snipers� LAX / El Al incident on 7-4-02� Richard Reed (the “Shoe Bomber”)� Vehicle attack at UNC-Chapel Hill, 3-3-06� Seattle shootings, 7-28-06� Vehicle attacks in SF-Fremont area, 8-29-06

WHAT TO EXPECT?

� Our enemies freely tell us what they are planning and want to accomplish!� We have merely to pay attention…� And come out of denial.� Most public officials have taken a “downplay, deny and deflect” position� Captured al-Queda tapes - Produced for internal use, not propaganda.� Included:

ü Live-fire room entryü Live-fire/role-player scenariosü Any resistance was met with being shotü Assassination scenariosü Kidnapping trainingü No presumed compliance from victimsü Explosives plantingü Prisoner handling: search, control and execution

SOME CONTENTS OF AL-QUEDA TAPES

� Commands given in English� Prisoners begging for their lives in English� Distraction devices preceding entry� Multiple breach points� Targeting LE officers in ambushes using “disabled” vehicle as ploy, then sounding horn to initi-

ate assault� Scenarios on 6-lane highways at clover-leafs (to facilitate infiltration)� There are few such highways in the Middle East� Security/overwatch elements to shoot responding LE� Residential and golf course assassinations� Use of storm drains and sewers for exfiltration� Much practice on assault of buildings with a large number of occupants, including inconspicu-

ous movement to entry points (weapons hidden)� Anyone giving any trouble at all is shot� Executing hostages in front of the media

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Often no exfiltration plans for buildings – they plan to kill everyone and die in place

TAKE-HOME LESSON

While terrorist plans for large-scale events including WMD are certainly in place…

They are preparing smaller-scale attacks by small groups with various small arms andplanted explosives in populated buildings, particularly schools.

WHY SCHOOLS?

� Our Values� The most sacred thing to us are our children� Killing hundreds of children will boost the terrorist’s morale and lower ours, leaving us stunned� Our Lack of Preparation� Police deal with crime, but school attacks are war acts� Police are generally not prepared� Society hasn’t come to grips with terrorism on U.S. soil� al-Qaeda has said they have the right to kill millions of American children� al-Qaeda terrorists have been video-taped practicing school takeovers and issuing commands

in English� Some Islamic religious literature condones killing children if it is done for the “general good”� Target scouting and infiltration efforts have already reportedly occurred

SCHOOL ASSAULT MODEL-BESLAN

A dress rehearsal has already taken place in 2004 in Beslan, Russia where 172 children werekilled.Large buildings with complicated floor plans are preferred—they are harder to counter assaultIn Beslan, over 1,000 people were held hostage by 100 terrorists for three days without food orwater.� Started with at least 4 vehicle, 36 person “active shooter” attack� Additional 40+ terrorists in crowd� One police officer, one security officer present, both armed only with handguns, both killed im-

mediately� Secured building in 15 minutes with over 1000 hostages� Terrorist snipers and RPGs were immediately positioned in strategic locations once the school

was taken� Terrorists’ weapons included AK-47s, sniper rifles, rocket propelled grenades and explosives� Hostages’ cell phones were taken� Adults and teachers were separated from children to keep complete control� Intel spotters were in crowd

Attempts at negotiation by responders were used by the terrorists to buy time to fortify the schoolAll entrances and many stairwells were booby trapped with explosives.Children were used as shields against snipers.The terrorists used amphetamines to stay awake

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� 11 hours of fighting, 8 hours of heavy fighting� Women and older children were repeatedly raped� Adult males and large boys were made to help fortify the school, then they were killed� Over 330 persons killed and over 660 persons injured

When troops stormed the school, troops and children were gunned down.� Explosions started many fires.� Trip wires connected to explosives slowed the assault� Terrorists broke into three groups� One group attempted to escape by dressing in hostage’s clothing� One group attempted to fight off the rescue teams� One group focused on killing the hostages by shooting them and detonating explosives

BESLAN LESSONS

� Terrorists were very well prepared� Reconnaissance started months in advance� Gained tactical superiority quickly� Excellent tactics were employed� Terrorists were well trained� Ruthless . . . . .� Terrorists had effective communication equipment� Terrorists were well funded; reports indicate al-Qaeda funding� Had learned from prior incidents� (Nord Ost Theater)� Had gas masks� Broke out windows to negate gas effects

SCHOOLS ARE REAL TARGETS

� bin Laden has promised that Beslan will happen to the U.S. many times over� First 6 months of 2006 alone: 204 schools attacked in Afghanistan� 1984-1994: more than 300 schools attacked in Turkey� Floor plans for schools in VA, TX and NJ have been recovered from terrorists in Iraq

WHAT’S LIKELY IN THE US?

Terrorists striking simultaneously at multiple schools, or a Beslan-type attack with fewer terroristsbut better IED’s.Middle schools without a police presence are preferred as the girls are big enough to rape; thestudents are not big enough to fight back; staffed largely by females.Preferred targets are locations that do not allow concealed carry of firearms, have no hunting cul-ture, and where the police do not carry rifles.

WHAT’S LIKELY HERE?

Rural areas are favored because of the delayed response time for police to arrive in force.Schools with external surveillance cameras are preferred so terrorists can observe the LEResponse.

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As they seize the school, the attackers will initially kill every teacher and many of the students theysee.They will rape, murder and toss the bodies outside, as was done in Beslan.They will plant bombs throughout the school, and on students.Emergency responders and fleeing children will be blown up by car bombs in the parking lot andmuster areas.� 100 to 300 children could be killed on the first strike.� Fully automatic weapons placed in over-watch positions� Faux “negotiations” to buy time for fortification and PR value (Beslan)� They expect to fight and die there, not negotiate their way out� They know that Law Enforcement will not assault if “negotiations” are going well� Logical SWAT entry points heavily fortified with bombs� Will force SWAT entry by starting to kill children

WRONG PRIORITIES IN CURRENT SITUATION

� U.S. schools extensively guard against fire� Fire drills� Sprinkler systems� Building codes, etc.

Yet not one child has died from fire in any U.S. school in over 25 years (excluding dorm fires)Well over 200 deaths have occurred by active shooters in the same period across the USA.But training and preparation for these events meets with stiff resistance and denial

OVERALL RESPONSE PLAN

Four elements:DeterDetectDelayDestroy

DETER

� An armed police presence in a school is a strong deterrence against attack.� The terrorists are willing to die, but they don’t want to die without completing their tactical

objective. They want a high body count� Unarmed security in a school is pointless

DETECT

� They have to live among us, plan the event and recon the facility. Alert police officers areessential.� Follow good patrol procedures on traffic stops:� Ask probing questions, be alert for contradictions, inconsistencies, unduly nervous behavior.

Be aware of the inside of the vehicle and the people in it� Watch for signs of surveillance on potential targets. Terrorists always conduct recon and may

use cameras and camcorders� Some terrorists are blue-eyed blondes who may not fit the usual profile

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� Have the school report any inquiries about security practices. It could be a recon event.� In order to avoid failure or embarrassment, they will plan extensively� Info gathering (libraries, public records, etc.), recon, dry runs

For example, in Miami, two Saudi “students” who spoke English well, climbed onto aschool bus and refused to get off. When the police arrived, they said they thought iswas a public transit bus. They were probably seeing how long it took police torespond.

� Report all suspicious activities to your fusion center� Beware of groups renting halls/schools, and people videotaping the interior during the event.� Most non-police incident intell will come in the form of gossip and stories� Make friends with mail carriers, landlords, store clerks, and so on to receive these intell nug-

gets

DELAY

One police officer firing from behind effective cover inside a school may hold off a group ofattackers for several minutes and save lives by buying time for help to arrive and to let studentsevacuate.At the first hint of trouble, the school should engage in a three step lock-down model (or shouldthey?)Lockdown is to violence what fire drills are to fire.Move away from the violence. Don’t be paralyzed by the event.Move to a pre-selected secure location(s) to wait for police.Move again when in danger. “Lock-down” does not mean hunker down and die.

DESTROY

Police officers must be fully prepared, mentally and physically, to aggressively use deadly force tostop the threat.Act immediately. Every minute the Russians waited, the target got harder.If you hesitate, people will die.

Infrastructure/personal issues:� Officers need to be trained to essentially go to war—many are not physically, mentally or

emotionally prepared� Your ICS capabilities incorporating other agencies will be critical—are you prepared?� Your comms capability is critical—is it capable?� Inter-agency plans and roles/responsibilities are crucial—are they in place?

WHERE TO START?

Concentrate on the ten most likely structures in your jurisdiction or precinct� Schools� Businesses� Municipal offices� Shopping districts, malls, theatres� Visitor attractions� Outdoor venues: fairs, sporting events, etc

Assign an officer to be responsible for each.

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� Initiate a relationship with the facilities manager and top business manager there.� Develop an active shooter and/or 4/5 Gen takeover plan with them.� There are many good active shooter plans out there.� IACP, ASIS, NEA, US Dept. of Education, NASRO, Etc.� Even Google will return many good plans.� Pick one for a starting point with each of your 10 facilities.� Develop a custom plan for each with the facilities personnel..� Stakeholders involved.

Involve in planning:� Primary LE agency� Assisting LE agencies� Fire/EMS� Facility management� Professional societies/organizations� EMS� Hospitals� Crisis resources: Red Cross, etc.� Media—don’t forget them!

FACILITY PLANNING ISSUES

Once you’ve selected a plan template from an appropriate source and identified representativesfrom each stakeholder group, you’ll need to develop a specific plan for each of your “top 10” facili-ties.

Distribute to appropriate personnel:� Floor plans� Keys (or facilities managers contact info)� Facility personnel lists and telephone numbers� Understand which suspects are there� People with records� Suspicious people you know� Probation involvement� Intel from regional intel task forces� Info shared by other agencies� Info sharing with facility personal department� Facility planning issues� People don’t just “snap”� The typical active shooter has longstanding histories of involvement with legal, mental health,

and/or substance abuse services� Most of these people will not be murderers or criminals, but they form a pre-event suspect pool� Facility personnel rules and regulations� Visitor sign-in and out procedure

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HOW WILL YOU KNOW WHO’S IN THE BUILDING AT ANY TIME?

� Physical security and monitoring� Suspicious activity reporting mechanism� Monitoring of suspended/fired persons� Employee screening: criminal, substance abuse, etc.� Counseling services involvement� Threat identifications and assessments

FACILITY PLANNING ISSUES

� Establish crisis team at each facility� Establish chain of command� Establish communication chains and mechanisms� Who has control over what? Keys, controls, entrances…� Involve maintenance staff: sprinklers, plumbing, electrical…� Determine evacuation or lockdown decision process and procedures (address disabled

persons, too)� Establish evacuation holding sites – use safe room?� Determine how to take student/employee/visitor inventory� Make up crisis kits: radios, floor plans, student/employee lists, etc� How will first observers communicate the threat? To who?� How will the threat be communicated to everyone in the facility? Code words?� Lockdown or Evacuate? When? How?� Consider a kit in each room including color-coded signs with room numbers on them to post

under hallway door and outside windows (e.g., red sign means help needed, green signmeans no one hurt)� Each room should have 2 exits, even if a window� How/when will the facility communicate to family members of people involved? When?� Should all doors have locks on them?� Have busses respond to evacuate students/building occupants to a

reunification/debriefing/counseling area� Plan to shut down streets for emergency vehicle access and containment (Moscow)

LOCKDOWN VS. ESCAPE

� Currently, a lockdown is often advocated in an active shooter situation. That is, secure thepotential victims in a locked room(s).� But if it was you or your child, wouldn’t you want (them) to break a window and get out of the

potential kill zone?� Consider evacuation and escape as alternatives to lockdown.� Cho (Virginia Tech) barricaded and chained doors.

LE RECOMMENDATIONS

� Obtain patrol rifles, ballistic shields, ballistic helmets and other tactical gear – breachingequipment, first aid� Get every officer comfortable with a rifle� Learn how to use AK-47 type weapons� Train to shoot while moving

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Train officers in:� Bomb awareness� Basic crowd management� Basic riot control� Ballistic shield tactics� Team firing drills, and other response skills needed for a mass school takedown� Make sure every officer is familiar with all of the likely target structure’s interiors in their

jurisdiction� If you are a police parent, consider changing your personal data at the school to something

more generic (city employee versus police officer) so that your child won’t be as valuable ahostage.

INDIVIDUAL OFFICER RESPONSE BAG

� Multiple spare rifle and pistol magazines� Floor plans for every structure in their AOR� Locations of utility shut-offs, HVAC vents, etc.� Facility contact numbers, including cell phones� Keys� Self-rescue medical supplies (Blow Out Kit)� Chemlites to mark IEDs� Glass punch (to breach building)� Door wedges� Breaching rounds if shotgun carried in cruiser (and training)� Extra ballistic protection (plates carriers: level IIIA to level IV)

Expand active shooter training to include large, complicated, multi-adversary scenarios andexercises with multiple responding agencies.Train for open-air encounters, not just within a structure. The incident may transition to or includethe outdoors. (Penn State University)Practice against a booby trapped environment.Practice counter-assault on school buses. Terrorists may hijack several buses and drive them to aschool.School Resource Officers will be specifically targeted by terrorists. They will probably be the firstcasualties. SROs need training in surveillance awareness and the real-life testing tactics ofterrorists.Incorporate suicide-bomber shooting drills into firearms training for every police officer.Teach effective CQB skills that integrate empty-hands techniques with the firearm.Make sure that who makes the “enter” decision and when has been addressed, simulated andtrained.

Get the name and phone number of every private helicopter in your area and coordinate withthem ahead of time to deploy in an emergency.News helicopters can be great allies when transporting troops into a siege site in exchange fornews footage. Practice landing personnel on flat roofs. (Room outline on roof of location)Practice frequent incident command training and exercises using multiple jurisdictions and multi-ple disciplines (EMS, Fire, Police, Public Works, etc)

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Integrate the fire service into your tactical training. A fire hose can be a “crew-served weapon” atthe scene of a terrorist attack. They not only put out fires but they can knock a combatant out of awindow 50 yards away.Have a policy for officer parents of hostage children/spouse/etc.Have a plan for a “parent siege” of an attacked school (Another Beslan lesson)Have a plan for handling the media.

DEVELOP BREACHING CAPABILITY

� Barricading/securing facility prior to starting to kill people is a trend with recent shootings� VT shooter chained doors shut� White lights for weapons are necessary; facility may be dark� Shotgun breaching rounds in each armde patrol vehicle� Frangible buckshot or slugs� Other breaching capability for specific structures� Develop sniper capability, and ability to get several on scene fast� Plan for a siege: ammo, water, first aid, etc.

Include immediate aftermath planning and training:� Treating injured� Consolidating victims� Managing the scene� Training facility personnel to maintain crime scene� Managing any prisoners� Protecting/moving all from additional IEDs and other threats� Notifying victim’s families

EMS ISSUES

� EMS won’t enter an area until it’s secure� After you neutralise the shooter, it will still take a long time to secure the facility� Designate a causality collection point to bring casualties out to (Medical Rally Point)� Use uninjured subjects (victims, bystanders, etc.) to hold pressure on bleeding victims

IF YOU ARE CAPTURED

� Aggressively escape if you can� You will be killed immediately if you don’t� You will be killed eventually anyway. You are dead . . . . You just don’t know it yet !� The intelligence you provide will be invaluable� Fight immediately, its your ONLY chance.

Final thought“If not me, then who?”

That’s the motto of the Russian Special Forces, but it applies to every police officer, and byextension to every public safety official and government executive.

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REQUIRED READING

Terror at Beslan, John Giduckwww.terroratbeslan.com

The Sling and The Stone, Col Thomas X. HammesOn Combat, Lt Col Dave Grossman

RESOURCES

Prevention and Response To Suicide Bombing Incidents, New Mexico Tech, Energetic MaterialsResearch and Testing Center, www.emrtc.nmt.edu/

Many incident critical event/active shooter simulation software packages availableRural Law Enforcement Technology Center—several training DVDs/discs, www.nlectc.org/ruletc/

Terrorist Screening Center—information on using the nationwide database of terrorist watch sub-jects—(866) 872-5678

School Violence Solutions, www.schoolviolencesolutions.com

National Terrorism Center, http://www.nctc.gov/site/index.html

For further information on Warning Signs of School Violence contact the following:Special Agent Tonya DeSa, FBI Newark DivisionEmail: [email protected]

SPECIAL THANKS TO THE FOLLOWING:

Experts: Chief Bert DuVernay, Sergeant Michael Conti, John Giduck, Colonel Thomas Hammes,Lt Col Dave Grossman, John Holschen, Captain Al Sharon, Chuck Remsberg, Chief Richard Fair-burn, Todd Rassa, Lt. Frank Borelli, Paul Howe, Nick Minzghor, Keith Jones, Sgt. Allan Garcia, Dr.Laurence Miller, Ron Borsch, South East Area Law Enforcement (SEALE) Training Center.

Organisations: PoliceOne.com, LAPD, AIS/Prism, NTOA, ILEETA, IL SP Academy, NC DOJ, FBI,iLEESE, Keith Suddes, LLC

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Produced by Keith Suddes, LLCwww.keithuddes.com

Call: +1 908 642 5327Email: [email protected]

Volume Six

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Tactical Encyclopedia Volume 6 Active Shooter Response

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Transcript of Tactical Encyclopedia Volume 6 Active Shooter Response