Open Society Institute

Central European University

Center for Policy Studies

International Policy Fellowships

BRIDGING RESEARCH AND POLICY: ROLE OF EXPERTISE IN THE POLICY PROCESS IN TRANSITION SOCIETY

(The case of pension reform in Kazakhstan)

Zhanna Nauryzbayeva

Almaty – Budapest, 2003

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments iii

List of Tables and Glossary of Abbreviations iv

Executive Summary v

I. Introduction 1

1.1 Purpose and Significance 1

1.2 Subjects in the Study 3

1.3 Hypothesis and Research Questions 5

II. Policy Dialogue and the Role of Research in Transition Societies: The case of pension reform in Kazakhstan 6

2.1 Background of the Reform 6

2.2 Main Actors and the Role of Expertise in the Policy Dialogue 9

2.2. Communicating vs. Dialogue 13

2.3 Current Status of the Reform 15

2.4 Key Lessons Learned from the Case Study 19

III. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 23

References 27

Endnotes 28

Appendices

Acknowledgements

ii

This work became possible with the support of International Policy Fellowships Program running by

Center for Policy Studies and Open Society Institute. I am very grateful to IPF team, trainers and

lectures who shared their knowledge and wisdom with us, international group of fellows from almost

all regions of Eurasia.

I am particularly grateful to my group mentors: Professor Julius Horvath and Andrew Cartwright, and

my local mentor Dr. Asylbeck Bisenbayev for their dedication and help in conduction of the research.

I would like to express my greatest honor and gratitude that I had an opportunity to work and enjoy

the mentorship of Professor Leslie C. Eliason, whose help and advice were both encouraging and

challenging, whose friendship and professional intuition have lead me to the insights changing my

approaches to the research work and professional self-realization.

Tables

iii

Table 1. Portion of average worker's old age benefit deriving from the second pillar

8-9

Table 2. Selected Reform Measures15-16

Glossary of Abbreviations

(S)AF – Accumulation Funds, State and Non-state

ADB – Asian Development Bank

CAR – Central Asian Region

CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States

CSO – civil society organization

DB – defined benefit

DC – defined contributions

FSU – Former Soviet Union (countries)

MLSP – Ministry of Labor and Social Protection

MOF – Ministry of Finance

NBK – National Bank of Kazakhstan

NGO – non-governmental organization

NSC – National Securities Commission

PAYG – pay-as-you-go

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

PRAL – Pension Reform Adjustment Loan

SAF – State Accumulation Fund

SPPC – State Pension Payment Center

TA – technical assistance

Executive Summary

iv

The role of research in policy processes has increased significantly in recent decades in almost every

country and in international organizations. In a milieu of increasing complexity, especially in the

socio-economic and political contexts, knowledge becomes a vital factor affecting the ability of policy

actors to influence the political agenda and the shape of policy outcomes. The degree of researchers`

and research institutes` participation is posited here as a significant factor that contributes to the

openness of the policy process and efficacy of policy itself. The objective of this study is to

investigate the role of research in policy decision-making processes in Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan as a part of one of the most remote areas of the Soviet Union, has suffered from a severe

scarcity of research-related resources during the years of transition. Despite the lack of local

experience with a market economy or democracy building, the Kazakhstani government pledged to

conduct reforms based on three pillars: creation of a market economy, democratization of the political

process and institutions, and integration into the global economy. In the absence of indigenous

knowledge the concepts and methods used in the reforms came from external sources. During the

transition period (since 1991) the World Bank, USAID, EU, and ADB supported Kazakhstani reforms

with a high volume of knowledge and expertise.

Today it appears that international and foreign organizations have to change their role as a source of

policy ideas, and the question of local ownership of reforms has emerged as a very real issue, as it

does in most other transition and developing countries. Using the case of pension reform this paper

address the questions speaking to the extent to which transitions are sustainable and supported by

indigenous policy-making expertise sufficient to provide the administrative capacity to support

democratic governance. Also, this research intends to shed more light on how, why and what kinds of

expertise policy actors have been using in policy-making during the years of reform. Finally, it this

study investigates how research affected, if at all, the policy dialogue and public debates.

v

I. Introduction

I.1 Purpose and Significance

This research project has been implemented within the framework of the International Policy

Fellowship Program, sponsored by the Open Society Institute. The objective of this study is to

investigate the role of research in policy decision-making processes in Kazakhstan. The degree

of researchers` and research institutes` participation is posited here as a significant factor that

contributes to the openness of the policy process and efficacy of policy itself. This project is

aimed at generating practical recommendations that may be applied in the policy process in

Kazakhstan, to improve outcomes while making the process more transparent, inclusive and

participatory.

The role of research in policy processes has increased significantly in recent decades in almost

every country and in international organizations. In the United States and countries of Western

Europe, research organizations play a vital role in the policy dialogue, providing all parties

(partisan and interest groups, governmental agencies and parliament) with ideas and policy

relevant analysis. A vast array of so-called think tanks i - from the very famous and influential

such as the Brookings Institution, RAND Corporation, American Enterprise Institute, the

Heritage Foundation (USA), Royal Institute for International Affairs (UK), Center for

Development Research (Denmark), Kiel Institute for World Economies (Germany), to small

NGOs working in particular areas of expertise – manifest the growing role of knowledge in

policy-making process in modern western democracies (Think Tanks & Civil Societies: catalysts

for ideas and action / editors McGann, J. & Weaver, K., 2000; Smith, J.,1993).

Since the 1970s, the number and diversity of research policy centers (institutes) in developing

and transition countries has also grown. Latin America, Africa and Asia have been witnessing

the brisk growth of new types of institutions that have introduced important knowledge and

know-how, assisting their governments in market and social reforms. In Eastern Europe and the

former Soviet Union, non-governmental research organizations close to the model of western

think tanks appeared in the late 1980s and early 1990s after the collapse of the socialist system.

Many of the institutes established by western-oriented intellectuals and technocrats have played

prominent roles in the transition to the market economies in these countries (Think Tanks &

Civil Societies: catalysts for ideas and action / editors McGann, J. & Weaver, K., 2000; Struyk,

R., 1999; Krastev, I., 2001).

1

In FSU countries, the situation varies from country to country and from region to region. The

extent of research activities within post-Soviet space appears to depend heavily on the prior

allocation of intellectual and knowledge resources. The vast majority of academic resources of

the Soviet Union were rooted and concentrated in the Center – in the main cities of Russian

Federationii and in the most developed European territories of the former Soviet Union – Ukraine

and Belarus (Think Tanks & Civil Societies: catalysts for ideas and action / editors McGann, J.

& Weaver, K., 2000). The concentration of knowledge and power in this region provided the

basis for a comparatively successful transformation of many governmental research

organizations into private ones or the establishment of new research institutes by prominent

experts and intellectuals in particular areas.

At the same time the other newly independent states faced a lack of local research capacity and

knowledge resources. The Central Asian region (CAR), one of the most remote areas of the

Soviet Union, has suffered from a severe scarcity of research-related resources during the years

of transition. Large numbers of scholars left the region to Western countries or Russia due to a

range of economic and political reasons. Education and the system of knowledge production

have undergone a painful transformation and retrenchment. The resources from state budgets

available for research shrank dramatically, while the market (or non-state actors) failed to

provide any significant demand for or supply of research.

Research is unlikely to receive funding in developing countries unless it can either demonstrate practical utility, or arrange for political protectionism (though clientelism for example). However, it is easier to obtain political protection than it is to demonstrate research utility (Stone, D., Maxwell, S., Keating, M., 2001, 26).

Following this pattern, the governments of the CAR pursuing economic and political reforms

faced a range of challenges. Despite the lack of local experience with a market economy or

democracy building, almost all of them pledged to conduct reforms based on three pillars:

creation of a market economy, democratization of the political process and institutions, and

integration into the global economy. Where did the concepts and methods used in the reforms

come from in the absence of indigenous knowledge? The answer is similar throughout the entire

developing world (Stone, D., Maxwell, S., Keating, M., 2001): international expertise, provided

by multilateral and foreign agencies such as the Word Bank, IMF, the Asian Development Bank,

the US Agency for International Development, various agencies of the European Union, etc.

During the transition years, Kazakhstan has come to be known as a model student in following

the recommendations of external experts regarding market reforms. Not surprisingly, these

experts note that the Kazakhstani government has demonstrated relatively good abilities in

transition management as evidenced by having achieved macroeconomic stability, establishing

2

one of the best financial systems in the CIS, and creating a favorable climate to attract foreign

investments.iii It is the first post-Soviet country to launch an ambitious and radical pension reform

program (Andrews, E., 2001; Orenstein, M., 2001).

The evidence shows that the Kazakhstani government has advanced its policy agenda primarily

in those spheres where it acquired significant foreign or international technical assistance, as in

the case of pension reform. The essential support provided by multilateral agencies was

expertise. The World Bank, USAID, EU, and ADB supported reforms with a high volume of

knowledge and expertise. Today it appears that international and foreign organizations have to

change their role as a source of policy ideas, and the question of local ownership of reforms has

emerged as a very real issue, as it does in most other transition and developing countries.

Leaving aside the issue of the relevance or success of the reforms for the moment, at the present

stage it might be useful to ask: Who will continue to push the reform agenda ahead? With the

ramping-down or phasing-out of international technical assistance and expertise, who will

produce the knowledge and ideas for policy-making in this country in the future? These are the

critical questions that speak to the extent to which transitions are sustainable and supported by

indigenous policy-making expertise sufficient to provide the administrative capacity to support

democratic governance.

This research intends to shed more light on how, why and what kinds of expertise policy actors

have been using in policy-making during the years of reform. Also, this study investigates how

research affected, if at all, the policy dialogue and public debates. This study is designed to help

in the development of recommendations for local researchers, policy-makers, and the

international donor community on how to:

build local capacity in research and its uptake into policy,

raise the role of research in policy dialogue and public debates,

enhance local ownership of development policies,

raise policy makers` awareness of the value of research for more efficient policy

development, and

strengthen links between local academic communities, decision-makers and the international

development community.

I.2 Subject of the Study

In order to investigate the role of expertise in policy-making in Kazakhstan, the case of pension

reform is considered. The problem of the reforming of the pension system has topped the

political agenda in many countries over the last two decades and is likely to continue to dominate

3

the political agenda in the years ahead due to the aging of populations and the growing fiscal

difficulties states face in funding existing pension schemes (Renaud E., 2000; Bonoli G., 2000).

International organizations including the IMF and OECD have urged governments to reform

their pension systems.

The term “pension reform” denotes an entire range of political, economical, and societal issues

concerning income distribution, generational equality, social policy-making, financial market

regulations, poverty alleviation and so forth. This mixture of various concerns arising within the

processes involved in generating and adopting pension reform engages a wide variety of political

actors and conflicting interests.

Launched under the technical support of the World Bank and other international agencies in

1997-98, pension reform became one of the main pillars of market reforms in Kazakhstan. Thus

pension reform is a prominent case that reveals the nature, logic and intrigue of the policy-

making and the role of expertise in Kazakhstan from the early stages of transition into the

present.

I.3 Hypothesis and Research Questions

Pension reform in Kazakhstan, called in some analyses “an ambitious” iv, and perhaps the most

radical program in the post-socialist space, was at the same time a comparatively bloodless

process. According to Orenstein’s comparison of the outcomes and progress of the reforms in

three post-communist countries (Kazakhstan, Hungary and Poland), Kazakhstani reformers met

less resistance or opposition than in the other countries he studied. Neither institutional veto

actors nor partisan ones, nor a variety of interest groups played a critical role in the reform. v He

argues that due to the weakness of veto actorsvi within the political institutions and civil society,

the reform process was smoother and less deliberative in Kazakhstan.

Within this milieu of weak veto actors, other parties involved in the process obtained more space

to maneuver. Orenstein suggests the concept of proposal actors to elaborate the process in

Kazakhstan.

Proposal actors often have a separate and independent influence on reform, acting as intellectual agenda-setters for reform. In complex policy areas, where veto actors do not have the relevant expertise to develop their own concrete policy positions, they may rely on proposal actors to determine policy preferences for them, or to set the general terms of debate and the range of policy options in a particular area. While veto actors have an institutional, partisan, or situational veto over reform, proposal actors play a critical role by introducing intellectual innovations, setting agendas, and defining the range of feasible policy outcomes (Orenstein, 2002, 13).

4

Some proposal actors can be veto actors in a move that strengthens their positions, but in the

Kazakhstani case, veto actors had less capacity to influence the reform because of a lack of

expertise required for the policy discourse (Orenstein, 13). In the case of Kazakhstani pension

reform, proposal actors added to the design of the reform program more than some veto actors

did. International organizations that wielded enormous influence on the pace and direction of

reform played the role of proposal actors. At the same time, domestic interest groups had little

impact on the policy dialogue because of their distance from veto and proposal actors and their

(interest groups`) inability “to mobilize constituencies to exert pressure at critical veto points,

and … to act as veto or proposal actors themselves” (Orenstein, 2002, 21).

Based on Orenstein`s concept, I hypothesize that in the case of Kazakhstani pension reform:

(i) The strength of veto actors` and interests groups` ability to execute their role in policy

dialogue depends on their ability to act as – or at least influence the position of – proposal

actors.

(ii) If local veto actors and interest groups do not serve as proposal actors, foreign or

international institutions replace the latter and become proposal actors themselves.

(iii) Acting as proposal actors, international organizations pay more attention to the content

development of policy and less to the attributes of the policy process, especially

transparency and inclusiveness.

(iv) Participating in the policy process as proposal actors, international organizations do not

stimulate the strengthening of local expert capacity.

Research Questions

What kind of expertise was involved at each stage of the pension reform? How did the

involvement of experts vary from one stage of the reform process to another? Has it been

evolving during the reform period?

Did the expertise that was provided meet the needs of veto actors and interests groups? Did

the latter have their own research capacity? How did they use it, if at all?

How was research-based evidence communicated within policy dialogue? What was the role

of expertise in the policy dialogue?

What impact does the use of external consultants have on the content and nature of the policy

process?

What are the decision-makers` attitudes towards external experts? Has their attitude evolved

since the start of reforms?

5

II. Policy Process and Role of Research in a Transition Society: The case of pension

reform in Kazakhstan

II.1 Background of the Reformvii

From 1995 to1997, like many other post-Communist countries, Kazakhstan experienced a severe

pension arrears crisis (about 5 months of pension payments in 1996). As in other parts of the

former Eastern Bloc, fewer workers were paying pension contributions to support growing

numbers of retirees. In Kazakhstan, the system dependency ratio was about 0.56, i.e., only 1.8

contributors paid for one pensioner (Andrews, 2001). By comparison, in France, the ratio is five

workers to one pensioner. In the early 1990s, almost all transition countries spent more for

pensions, in spite of the paltry payments pensioners received. According to the International

Monetary Fund, pension payouts in Poland amount to about 15 percent of GDP. In Latvia, the

number is about 11 percent. In Kazakhstan, in 1996 pension payments arrears were 2.5 percent

of GDP. Not surprisingly, those countries were among the pioneers in pension reform

(Wesolowsky, A.). [Remember to fill in the KZ value.]

In Kazakhstan, the failure of the Soviet PAYG system led to mass protests by pensioners calling

for extensive political and economical measures. In response to this pressure, the Kazakhstani

government agreed to urgent and radical pension reform, accompanied by an effort to pay off all

existing pension arrears (Orenstein, 2000, 23). The Pension Law, passed by Parliament in July

1997, entered into effect on 1 January 1998, providing the basis for the replacement of the

PAYG system with a new pension system based on individual investment accounts to be

maintained either with the newly established State Accumulation Fund (SAF) or with nonstate

(privately owned) pension funds (NSAF) (ADB, PPA: KAZ 31091, September 2003).

The Soviet PAYG system existing at the time had being designed for in the conditions of a

planned economy characterized by full employment, insignificant informal economic activity, a

flat wage distribution, and so on. Dramatic changes in the political and economic situation

necessitated the reformation of the pension system as well. Thus, the pension arrears crisis

served as a catalyst for policy change. However, the fundamental reasons for the reform did not

differ from those of other post-Communist countries:

Benefits were excessively generous; wage replacement rates were too high, particularly for

short-service workers; retirement ages were too low; and special privileges were awarded to

people working in hazardous environments and favored occupations.

6

Payroll tax rates were excessively burdensome, totaling 25.5% of the wage bill. This

discouraged job creation in the formal sector and created incentives for noncompliance with tax

obligations, reducing the number of active workers paying into the system.

The system was vulnerable to a rapidly declining revenue base, as a result of economic

contraction; the emergence of a large informal economy; and the widespread underreporting of

income within the formal economy also reduced the proportion of earned income that was part of

the PAYG system.

Adverse demographic pressure on economic growth in the coming decades would only

further exacerbate the problem; the demographic crisis has several dimensions:

- Declining life expectancy of dramatic proportions

- Rapidly declining fertility

- Shrinking population

- Impending retirement of the post-war “boom” generation

- Gradual aging of the population and growth in elderly dependency rates

- High rates of net emigration

- Declining incidence of marriage

An ineffective system of tax collection (collections only amounted to 45-52% of potential

revenues. As a result government needed to transfer money from the National Treasury to the

pension fund to cover pension arrears (1997).

Source: adapted from (Baimatayeva, 2002; Urzhumova, D. and Becker, Ch., 1999; ADB, PPA:

KAZ 31091, September 2003)

At present, two systems are valid in Kazakhstan. An old state-supported PAYG pension system

will remain in force for pensioners who contributed to the system until 1998, but newcomers

cannot enter it. Workers who had accrued benefits under the old system retained their

entitlements. Their pensions will be paid in part from the old system and in part from the new

system, until the old system has been fully phased out (ADB, PPA: KAZ 31091, September

2003). The new pension system will completely replace the old one by 2045-2050.

The basic scheme of the new Kazakhstani pension system is based on the concept introduced by

the World Bank in its volume, Averting the Old Age Crisis (1994), which recommends a

combination of pay-as-you-go and funded pension systems. According to WB, a multi-pillar

system should include following elements (Fox, L.):

Pillar 1 - a mandatory pay-as-you-go public pension system designed to provide an income

floor for all elderly persons;

7

Pillar 2 - a mandatory funded and privately managed pension system--one whose current

reserves are equal to or greater than the present value of all future pension payment

liabilities, based on personal accounts (the Latin American approach) or occupational plans

(the OECD approach);

Pillar 3 - a voluntary system (also funded and privately managed), with strong government

regulation, to provide for additional savings and insurance.

In the new Kazakhstani pension scheme, the Pillar 1 (a mandatory pay-as-you-go public pension

system) has been eliminated, although other post-Communist countries that reformed their

pension systems at the same time preferred more cautious approaches (Andrews, 2001). For

instance, in Hungary, Poland, and Latvia the state continues to sustain the publicly funded

system simultaneously with privately funded components. The newly adopted Kazakhstani

pension system – fully funded, defined contribution accounts, relies on the second Pillar. As it

seen in Table 1, among a sample of 19 OECD, SEE, and Latin American counties that adopted

new pension systems, Kazakhstan is one of only five that adopted a system that relies completely

onthe FF/DC component.

Table 1. Portion of average worker's old age benefit deriving from the second pillar

Country Percentage of average worker's old age benefit deriving from Pillar # 2

Chile

Colombia –DC option

El Salvador

Kazakhstan

Mexico

Peru - DC option

Bolivia

Australia

Denmark

Netherlands

UK

Argentina – DC option

Switzerland

Hungary

Uruguay

100

100

100

100

100

100

79

60

50

50

50

49

47

40

39

8

Croatia

Poland

Sweden

33

29

23

Source: adapted from James, E. & Brooks, S., 2001

The institutional structure of the system consists of three major components: pension funds,

pension asset management companies, and custodian banks. By January 1, 2003, 15 private

funds (NSAFs) and one state accumulation fund (SAF) were operating in Kazakhstan. Thirteen

of the NSAFs are open and two are corporate ones. NASFs attract contributors and engage

pension assets management companies and custodians. The market is represented by 9 pension

asset management companies (AMCs), which decide where assets should be invested. They also

carry out regular re-evaluation of assets. Each fund keeps the accumulated assets in one

authorized bank custodian that accounts for and reports on all investment transactions, portfolio

allocation and investments return (Andrews, 2001). Custodian banks accept deposits and make

pension payments. The basic three-tier structure was instituted to provide for a clear separation

of accounts and responsibilities so that a system of checks and balances would thwart any fraud

and abuse (Andrews, 2001, 17).viii A corresponding department of the National Bank controls

every component of the «triangle».ix Also, in order to calculate and pay PAYG pensions,

maintain contribution records, and route funds to the accounts of SAF and private pension funds,

the State Pension Payment Center (SPPC) was established in 1997 (ADB, PPA: KAZ 31091,

September 2003).

2.2 Background of the Reform Process: main actors and policy dialogue

2.2.1 Policy Actors and the Role of Expertise

What kind of expertise was involved at the first stage of the pension reform?

Did the expertise that was provided meet the needs of veto actors and interests groups? Did

the latter have their own research capacity? How did they use it, if at all?

What impact does the use of external consultants have on the content and nature of the policy

process?

Governmental Working Group

Officially the design of the pension reform program began in November 1996 when President

Nursultan Nazarbaev formed a governmental working group (WG) formally consisting of the

9

Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, the Chairman of the

National Bank, the Minister of Labor and Social Protection, the head of the National Securities

Commission, two representatives of the private sector, and two members of parliament. The

governmental working group was a major designer and executor of the reform and also served as

a main veto actor. It was the only proficient local proposal actor that enjoyed significant

technical support from the World Bank, ADB, and USAID “providing both policy ideas and

direct technical assistance” (Orenstein, 2000, 24).

(WB, ADB,) and USAID technical assistance gave the main proposal actor an unparalleled advantage. Given the lack of technical expertise in Kazakhstan and the lack of resources on the part of civil society groups, ‘no one else was technically in a position to develop a model’ for analyzing or developing different pension reform proposals (interview with Marchenko, July 1, 1998), and thus the working group easily dominated expert debate (Orenstein, 2000, 24).

Officially there was no noticeable opposition to the concept of pension reform within the

government, as it was clear that the political and economic situation necessitated urgent

measures. More to the point, President Nazarbayev insisted that responsible officials develop a

policy response to the devastating pension crisis. [How did he do this?] Some members of the

government initially contested the concept, but ultimately they signed a letter calling for reform,

published in the official newspaper Kazakhstanskaya Pravda (July, 1, 1997). This act was

necessary to symbolize the unity of the Governmental team and their readiness to bear

responsibility for a radical pension reform (interview with Mr. Oraz Zhandosov, former Head of

NBK and member of WG. Astana. November, 2003). Nonetheless, while the composition of the

working group represented both financial and social security sectors, the discourse was led by

the financial sub-group – the National Bank of RK, Ministry of Finance, and technocrats hired

by WB and USAID. [Do we know who these people were, i.e., thei training, backgound,

disciplinary training, consultants vs. permanent staff, etc.?] The Ministry of Finance was a key

partner for the aid agencies, yet the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection (MLSP) was

relegated to the position of “a background participant”. Even in 2000, two years after the

launching of the reform MLSP suffered from the shortage of research and analytical capacity.

(Interview with Alikhan Baimenov, former Minister of Labor and Social Protection. Almaty,

November, 2003). According to the interviews with executives from MSLP the situation remains

unchanced. (Interview with Gulnar Delimbetova, Head of the Department of Pension Provision,

MSLP, December, 2003)

10

Parliament

Formally Parliament is one of the most important institutional veto actors. Despite this, however,

it did not play a significant role in the development of the reform program’s conceptual design

and evolution. As the evidence shows, Parliament had neither proposal nor veto power and did

not participate effectively in the development of pension reform. At that point, Parliament

lacked the requisite technical and expert capacity to analyze the issue and suggest alternatives

(interview with Valentin Makalkin, the Member of Parliament. Astana. November, 2003). All the

Parliamentarians practically could and did do was to provide “an important deliberative forum”

(Orenstein, 2000, 27).

The political cost of any delay in the reform was extremely high during that period. The pensions

arrears crisis topped the domestic political agenda. Coverage of pension arrears was one of the

crucial political conditions of the reform. For this purpose the government received a USD 200

million loan from the WBx, and pushed hard to “to convince Parliament members to vote for the

governmental concept of the reform” (interview with Mr. Oraz Zhandosov, former Head of NBK

and a member of WG. Astana. November, 2003). No fundamentally different concepts were

proposed by Parliament to compete with the government`s proposal. The most sensitive and

awkward issue for the Parliament was the problem of raising the retirement age. As this element

of reform was not a matter for the distant future. The urgency of the pension arrears problem did

not “allow political actors to postpone the political costs and claim credit for policy outcomes

that will not occur until a future date” (Kay, Stephen, 2001).

Civil Society Groups

Although the Government submitted the reform program for debate, the nascent Kazakhstani

civil society was not capable of participating in the process in a meaningful way. Orenstein

argues that there were no real partisan or civil society vetoes or proposal actors, and the interests

groups that might have been drawn into the process in this particular case included the

Pensioners Movement and the trade unions (Orenstein, 2000). However, the Pensioners

Movement represents only the interests of current pensioners, and logically they held little

interest in participating in the design of a new pension scheme from which they hardly stood to

benefit. The main issues that topped their agenda were pension arrears, current benefit adequacy,

and raising of retirement age. The trade unions` representation capacity had narrowed

dramatically from 1993-1996 in the context of mass privatization, the fleeing of the labor force

11

into the informal sector, and mass unemployment caused by the bankruptcy of many large

enterprises that had been the hallmark of the planned economy. Consequently, trade unions (for

example, the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions) participated in the process to some

degree, but they could not serve as a meaningful player in the design of the reform program. The

evidence shows that there were no other groups capable of entering the policy dialogue as

proposal actors.xi

The key stakeholders in the new scheme – the contributors (customers) - were not represented in

the policy dialogue at all. “To some degree, pension politics is generational politics” (James,

Estelle & Brooks, Sarah, 2001, 15). Masses of well-organized current pensioners, pre-retirement

age workers, and people having professional privileges were logically against any change in the

retirement age, and this made the government more disposed to compromise on this issue. As it

transpired in other countries younger workers proved incapable of exercising political pressure

on veto actors. Generally they are more concerned about current income issues, and this makes

them less willing to participate in the dialogue.

International Organizations

The technical assistance provided by international multilateral agencies as such as WB, ADB,

IBRD, the Governments of Japan and the United States (through USAID) was an important

factor at all stages of the reform process, from design to monitoring and evaluation. The basic

framework for pension reform in Kazakhstan was derived from the World Bank’s policy ideas

even “without direct technical assistance from the Bank at the early stages” (Orenstein, 2000).

Government working group member Oraz Zhandosov (Former Head of NBK) points out that

while experts of the WB joined the working group when the design of the reform was already in

progress, both the expertise and technical support of international organizations (WB and

USAID) had already strengthened the Government`s capacity to design and implement the

reform (interview with Mr. Oraz Zhandosov, former Head of NBK and member of WG. Astana.

November, 2003). On the other hand, the tendency for the government to cooperate closely only

with international financial institutions like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank

led to the domination of a technocratic vision of the concept of the reform. This occurred despite

the fact that other organizations such as the International Labor Organization also possess

considerable experience and expertise in dealing with pension issues as an advocate of PAYG

(Appendix 1). This situation is not unique and can be considered a fragment of the global

tendency for international financial organizations to enlarge their role in the diffusion of policies

internationally, encouraging specific types of policy changes (privatization) through financial

and technical assistance (Kay, J. Stephen, 2001, 7).

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2.2.2 Communicating vs. Dialogue

As the available information shows there was no real policy dialogue at the first stage of

Kazakhstani pension reform. Dialogue requires at least three necessary conditions: i) interested

parties occupying distinct positions; ii) their willingness and ability to articulate and promote

their positions with a certain degree of proficiency (expert capacity); and iii) an institutional and

political framework for the dialogue. In the case of the pension reform, none of the

aforementioned circumstances was fully present.

In reality, at the initial stage of the reform process, only two actors fulfill their role on the

pension policy scene: the government (as a policy designer and decision-making center) and

international aid agencies (as a source of technical support and policy ideas for the decision-

making). Both meet the requirements to execute their role as actors in the policy dialogue

effectively – they possess the interest, ability, and proficiency in designing and promoting

reform proposals. Other actors – Parliament, political parties, trade unions, and civil society

groups – did not demonstrate sufficient proficiency to participate equally in the dialogue as in the

process of interactive multilateral communication.

Thus, in a situation where it was no a need to develop a multiparty dialogue, the latter was

replaced by the attempts to communicate the reform through public information/education

campaigns. The designers of the reform understood that the success of the program depended

“not only on the creation of its components – laws and regulations; administrative and regulatory

bodies; market actors, such as private pension funds and assets managers; administrative and

regulatory procedures; and infrastructure (computer networks, databases, and so forth) – but also

on ability of the Government to explain and justify the reform to a public that had lived most of

its life under a system of central economic planning” (ADB, PPA: KAZ 31091, September 2003,

v).

There is a range of assessments of how and what the Government has done in communicating the

pension reform project. Different sources provide dissimilar appraisals of the communication

component of the reform:

Andrews (WB): “The Government realized the need to inform the public about this substantial

change in the pension system and responded, in part, by a nationwide effort to put key reform

officials before the public, in person and through the media, to provide information about the

reform at the highest level” (Andrews, 2001: 3-4).

13

Orenstein (WB): “There is no evidence that the government concerned itself with rallying diffuse

support of the population, as only limited resources, mostly provided by USAID, were allocated

to public relations and public awareness campaigns”. (Orenstein, 2000, 24).

The fact is that with the assistance of ADB, WB, USAID, and IBRD, which together provided

about USD 2 million for public information and media campaign (according to the reports of

WB and ADB) the Government realized a program that included surveys, public information

trough TV and leaflets, seminars for the press, trade unions, employer organizations, and

government officials throughout the country. In addition some foreign non-governmental

organizations were involved in the campaign to a certain degree. For instance, in 2000-2001

CARANA Corporation (USA) received a grant from WB for the implementation of a pension

reform public education program with a focus on the promotion of private pension funds. The

CARANA`s program included a media information campaign, with special emphasis on the self-

employed and rural sectors. Its communications strategy was focused on increasing participation

by building public confidence, based on a better understanding of how the pension system works

and how individual contributors could best manage their own participation. CARANA also

trained journalists and local officials to ensure ongoing public education after project

completion.xii (CARANA`s report on this program is not available).

However, there is no information, which shows that the local civil society actors were somehow

involved in the design, implementation or monitoring of public education campaigns, conducted

by the government and foreign organizations. Also there is no any available data on the

assessment of the effectiveness of those public information campaigns, conducted either by

government or foreign organizations, except a short comment in the ADB`s report saying: As the

public’s awareness and understanding of the new pension system has grown, in response to

public information activities and direct marketing by the private pension funds, participation in

these funds has increased from less than 20% in 1998 to almost 75% in 2003. Two surveys, one

conducted at the beginning and one conducted at the conclusion of TA 3082-KAZ: Public

Information and Education in Support of Pension Reform, indicated that public awareness and

understanding of the pension system had increased. The degree to which this increase is

attributable to TA 3082-KAZ is hard to assess, but it clearly played a significant role . (ADB,

PPA: KAZ 31091, September 2003, 13).

2.3 Current Status of the Reform and the Policy Dialogue

Kazakhstan’s pension reform was, at the time, the largest and the most radical attempted in any

post-Communist country (ADB, WB). The reform was complex in design and challenging to

14

implement when juxtaposed against nascent capital markets, the weakness of institutional

infrastructure and lack of governance background. The scope of the reform conducted in

Kazakhstan is impressive. Its implementation necessitated the development of new laws and

promulgating regulations and entirely new institutions. The administration of the new system

required the issuance of social identification codes to millions people, as well as

computerization, and the development of a new administrative system (ADB, PPA: KAZ 31091,

September 2003, iv-v).

In Table 2, there is a list of some standard measures proposed in the literature on pension reform.

From this table we see that the range of measures, that to some degree were implemented in

Kazakhstan during seven years of the reform (marked bold), does not include such issues as

equity of pension levels, new role for the public pillar, rules (and markets) for annuities and

withdrawal of funds. Although these particular issues imply a social viability of a pension

reform. Alikhan Baimenov (Co-Chairman of the Democratic Party “Ak Zhol”, former Minister

of Labor and Social Protection) notes that the main focus of the reform was on the development

i As Smith, J. (The Idea Brokers-Think Tanks and Rise of Policy Elite, 1993) notes there are a lot of terms that mark various types of organizations that participate in the policy process, engineer policies or policy choices: brain banks, think factories, egg-head row, etc. The term “think tank” is “now-familiar” and wide-spread throughout the international policy community at present. ii For instance, the State Academy of Science working in different areas from social science to medicine and engineering, as many others Soviet organizations had its head- quarter in Moscow and divisions in every republic of the Union.

iii The external state debt is gradually decreasing. For the last three years (from July 1, 1999 through July 1, 2002) the average number of annual growth of GNP came to 11%. Mr. Marchenko, Head of National Bank, stated that Kazakhstan with its economic growth is one of the three most rapidly developing countries in the world.

iv “Government decided on an ambitious pension reform primarily as a result of serious arrears in pension payments in an environment that made amore moderate reform unlikely”. Andrews, Emily. “Kazakhstan: An Ambitious Pension Reform”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. 2001, 4.

v Orenstein, M. How Politics and Institutions Affect Pension Reform in Three Postcommunst Counties, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 2000

vi Veto actors according to Orenstein (or veto players according to Tsebelis: 1995), can be represented by three major groups: i) institutional actors who can “exercise veto power over legislation”; ii) partisan actors who can veto power as a majority in parliament or governing coalition; or iii) other veto actors as such as various interests groups “that are strong enough or mobilized enough to effectively veto policy in particular area”. (Orenstein, 2000,12)vii

? This chapter as well as the research in general does not tend to reveal all the aspects of the content of the pension reform. There is a range of studies on the topic made by international and local experts. Thus, here I provide only a portion of the basic information about the content of the policy, which might be useful in the consideration of the process of the policy deliberation and adoption.viii

? In 2004 the Government is planning to establish a unified financial sector regulating body with jurisdiction on the banking sector, capital markets, and pension an insurance industries (ADB, PPA:KAZ 31091, September 2003: 14).ix

? Source: The National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan

x The original Agreement was on 300 million loan, but the Government refused the 3-d 100 million disbursement xi

? Even some groups loosing their privileges and special retirement benefits (air controllers, pilots, and steelworkers) organized protests in July 1997. (Orenstein, 2000, 30)xii

? http://www.carana.com/services/pages/kaz_pension.htm

15

of capital markets, infrastructure, and institutions, rather than the enlargement of social

protection: “The reformers were focused on input aspects of the system, rather the output ones,

as nobody answered yet the questions - How and how much will contributors receive when they

retire, and what will happen with those people who are not enrolled to the funded system and

with those, who will not have a significant amount of pension assets?” (Interview, November,

2003. Almaty).

Table 2. Selected Reform Measures

I. Restructuring the Public PAYG System

1. Raise the retirement age

2. Eliminate preferential treatment for specific occupations

3. Tighten disability and early retirement requirement

5. Lower targeted replacement rate to more realistic levels

6. Reduce inequality of pension levels

7. Fight evasion

8. Improve administrative capacity

II. Establish A Fully Funded (FF) System

A. Establish a System of Individual Accounts

1. Establish the role for public pillar (flat-rate, means-tested, etc.?)

2. Create mandatory or voluntary accounts

3. Set contribution rates

4. Institute life and disability insurance

5. Establish rules (and markets) for annuities and withdrawal of funds

B. Establish a Regulatory Framework

1. Create or reorganize regulatory agencies (new or existing agency)

2. Establish competent supervision and regulation powers

3. Establish entry/exit requirements for pension funds

4. Solvency rules

5. Investment rules

6. Establish reporting and disclosure rules

7. Establish state guarantees (protection against insolvency)

C. Transition Plan and Actuarial Model to Estimate Costs

1. Compensation for vested pension rights (recognition bonds, other compensation)

16

2. Periodic review of regulations for insurance plans, pensions, training for staff

3. Train regulators, fund managers, actuaries, accountants, and auditors

4. Public relations campaign

Source: adapted from Kay, S., 2001

According to the official statistic data by January 2004, new pension scheme covered 6 million

people, representing approximately 80 percent of the economically active population. However,

according to other sources (A. Baimenov, former Minister of Labor and Social Protection; A.

Alibayev, Chairman of the NSAFs Association) less than 50 percent of contributors make

payments on a regular basis and in the full amount. The managers of NSAF report, that a large

number of contributors have more than one pension account (interview with Deputy Director of

SAF, February 2004). It means that the number of pension accounts announced in the official

reports does not reflect a real number of people enrolled in the new pension system. At the same

time, the other part of the population - self-employed workers in the informal sector or/and

unemployed people – are still in the socio-economic shadows. Theoretically, at least some of

them should benefit from the Pillar 3 - a voluntary system. But in practice, less than 0.5% of

personal pension accounts (27 000) were opened at pension funds on a voluntary basis by

January 2004 (Report of the National Bank of RK).

The World Bank`s preliminary actuarial calculations, made in 2003, show that in 40 years more

than 35 percent of the retirement age population is expected to have no significant benefit from

the funded system (Kazakhstan Pension Policy Note – Concept Note, 2003, 2). Furthermore,

there is still no a scheme promising to those segments of population who not covered by FPS a

possibility to have any benefits in their retirement period. Not surprisingly, 100 percent of high-

positioned managers of pension funds (according to the results of an expert poll conducted by

the Kazakhstani Association of Pension Funds Contributors in February 2004) assess the level

of population`s reliance to pension funds and to the new pension system as “close to low”. The

same 100 percent asses the level of population`s awareness on funded pension system as “the

population is not informed enough”.

A survey conducted in Almaty (the biggest city in Kazakhstan) in November 2003 of a randomly

drawn sample of the working populationxiii illustrates an astonishingly low level of workers`

awareness about the features of the new pension system. 92 percent of the sample do not know or

xiii

? The survey was conducted in November 2003 in Almaty. The sample is randomly formed. It includes male / female at age 20-45 respondents working in formal sector in private companies of different scale (resident and non-resident), non-profits and government agencies.

17

do not know enough to manage their pension assets. No one monitors the activity of his/her

(S/N)AF on regular basis, more then 40 percent do not know to which (S/N)AF they make their

transfers. 80 percent of the sample think that their pension assets will not allow them to have

adequate benefits in retirement period. 24 of 25 respondents do not know or have difficulties in

answering how much and in what way they will receive benefits from their pension accounts. 36

percent do not trust the new system, 56 percent have not made a decision yet whether to trust it

or not, although 56 percent say that they worry about their income in old age very often.

The arrears in transfers to pension accounts have become quite a sensitive problem both for

contributors as well as for (N)SAFs. An array of employers do not follow the compulsory regime

of transfers of employees` contributions to pension accounts. According to the Ministry of

Finance, by 1 October, 2003, the total employers` debt of mandatory pension transfers is about

USD 131 million (KZT 19.3 billionxiv). According to the poll conducted by COMCON agency

that covered 1000 respondents around the country (3/4 of the sample are (S)AF contributors) 68

per cent of the sample say that they did not choose their (S)AF - employers made the choice; 11

percent have difficulties answering this question, and only 21 per cent of the sample say that they

chose their (S)AF by themselvesxv, what in many cases implies a direct violation of the Pension

Law and other regulations.

Thus, today it becomes obvious that a range of inadequacies and adjustments to the pension

system would require a second phase of reform. The government stands against the need to

conduct assessment of the first stage of the reform and development a conceptual framework for

further strategies. However, even after seven years of the reform Kazakhstani government calls

for external experts to provide necessitate analyses. In 2003, expert groups of WB and ADB

launched the series of analyses which cover the entire range of problems in the new pension

system: governance of the system, benefit adequacy, coverage, and distributional concerns,

absorption capacity of the capital markets, etc. (ADB, PPA: KAZ 31091, September 2003; WB,

Kazakhstan Pension Policy Note – Concept Note, 2003).

In interviews, executives and local researchers mentioned that the assistance of multilateral

agencies was very helpful during the initial stages of the reform, but eventually it became clear

that outside expertise can be used just to a certain degree and cannot not replace domestic

capacity. Nevertheless, most of the recent reports on pension reform are still prepared by foreign

experts, even though they are based and put together from the data gathered by governmental

xiv This amount includes penalties

xv http://www.comcon-2.kz/publication/publ_000019.php

18

agencies (MSLP, NBK, and MOF). This fact clearly demonstrates that Kazakhstani government

yet does not have a sufficient in-house research and expert capacity to sustain the reform without

an outside support. Also, we see that the other domestic actors – civil society organizations,

political parties, stakeholders, and researchers - are not involved in this discourse even at the

second stage of the reform. Furthermore, as it seen their capacity to participate in the dialogue on

the perspectives of pension reform has not evolved during past seven years. There is still no a

research or civic group that could be capable to enter the policy dialogue with a significant

amount of proficiency.

2.4 Key Lessons Learned from the Case

I. Imbalance in the achievement of the reform`s goals.

The reform program has two strategic goals: (i) a sustained economic recovery, capital markets

development, increasing private savings, and (ii) assured acceptable old-age income security for

(current and) future pensioners. Taking into account the context in which the program was

designed and introduced (time pressure, nascent capital markets and infrastructure, inadequacy

of knowledge and cultural background) the accomplishment of the first goal is impressive. The

new system generated a significant volume of new institutions and regulations that did not exist

until the reform. Pension fund assets (7.5 % of GDP by the year 2003) were invested in an

increasingly diversified portfolio, and managed by a developing pension fund industry (WB,

Kazakhstan Pension Policy Note – Concept Note, 2003). However, preliminary analyses reveal

that currently pension scheme does not meet the second, critical goal – provision of sufficient

pension income for retirees. In 40 years, more than 35 percent of the retirement age population is

expected to have no significant benefit from the funded system (WB, Kazakhstan Pension Policy

Note – Concept Note, 2003, 2). Thus, it obvious, that a range of inadequacies in the pension

system points to the need for a second phase of reform. The new Kazakhstani pension system is

designed and implemented mostly from the side of input: regulations, infrastructure, training of

government agencies staff and market operators. Whereas, it is leaving aside the output (social)

functions - benefit adequacy, coverage, and equity – remain undeveloped. The keystone

questions for any pension system are not answered in Kazakhstan yet – i) How and how much

will contributors receive when they retire? ii) How the part of population that is not enrolled (and

probably will not be enrolled in the years ahead) in the funded scheme will be provided with

sufficient income upon reaching retirement age?

19

II. Imbalance in the shape of policy outcomes might be rooted in the characteristics of the policy

process.

The Government, as well as the expert groups associated with the international multilateral

agencies (the World Bank and Asian Development Bank), turn out to be more concerned with

the long-term economic – although not necessarily political -- sustainability of reforms. A series

of analyses and assessments have been launched in order to develop a conceptual framework for

the next stage of reform. Although the evidence shows that typically most analyses of pension

reforms conducted by local or international experts in any part of the world concentrate on the

technical aspects of the reform, leaving the decision-making aspects to others. The political and

decision-making aspects of the reform are nevertheless key factors affecting the implementation

of the reforms and the long-term viability of the reform agenda. From this perspective, the policy

is a “product” of the process by which it was designed and elaborated, and the policy output’s

characteristics are directly related to the nature of the process that produced them.

In the Kazakhstani case, some of the systematic shortcomings in the nature of the pension reform

are rooted in the qualities of the process of design and deliberation. Tracing this process stage by

stage and actor by actor, it can be noticed that the shape of the reform concept has been

influenced by i) the composition of policy actors participating in the process and their ability to

serve as proposal actors.

Domination of financial sub-groups in the design process against a backdrop of a shortage of

participation by proposal actors interested in advocating for social protection had coursed the

supremacy of macroeconomic priorities and inferiority of social protection targets of the reform

(App. 1, Figure 1.).

The governmental working group led by the finance sub-group was the only actor that was

able to execute an active role in the reform program’s development and implementation. The

other actors such as parliament, political parties, trade unions, interests groups, and SCOs did not

demonstrate enough proficiency to participate equally in the policy dialogue. (The term

proficiency includes the ability of potential policy actors i) to elaborate policy alternatives, and

ii) to exert sufficient volume of pressure to push their policy ideas onto political agenda).

In the case of Kazakhstani pension reform the evidence shows, that despite the rhetoric about

the importance of good governance principles, international multilateral agencies did not pay

enough attention to the openness and inclusiveness of the decision-making process. By providing

technical assistance just to the governmental working group, international agencies gave it

unparallelled advantage and aggravated existed imbalances in the capacity of policy actors to

participate in the policy dialogue.

20

III. In complex policy areas (such as the case of pension reform), expertise capacity of policy

actors is a key factor of their adequate participation in the policy process.

In the milieu of increasing complexity of socio-economical and political contexts, the role of

knowledge needed for the development and implementation of policies escalates dramatically.

Reasonably, knowledge becomes a vital factor affecting the ability of policy actors to influence

the political agenda and the shape of policy outcomes. The case of Kazakhstani pension reform

substantiates this. The lack of expert capacity (reliable knowledge) among partisan and

institutional veto actors and interests groups evidently diminished their ability to participate in

the policy dialogue.

At the same time, in a society suffering from a scarcity of knowledge (as in the Kazakhstani

case), multilateral agencies that possessed expert knowledge tend to dominate in the policy

dialogues. Furthermore, international organizations in this case act more like “the holders of the

keys to knowledge” rather than organizations interested in local ownership and long-term

sustainability of the reforms that they assist. Local ownership of reforms implies the ability of a

society with its own resources to sustain policies during the repeated cycles of policy

development, implementation, monitoring, and adjustment. However in the Kazakhstani case

the evidence shows that (i) the domestic policy actors are not able to sustain the reform without

using an external expertise, and (ii) international financial institutions do not foster local policy

actors to raise their ability to sustain the reform without external support.

IV. Reform is an ongoing project that requires enduring consultations with and participation of

all interested parties.

Like the reform experience in other parts of the world, the case of Kazakhstani pension reform

will require ongoing steering and refinement. Several aspects of the situation are noteworthy.

“…Social security reform is itself an ongoing project. Rather than being a one-time event,

the process of reform ... is a multi-staged, politically-driven process”. (Kay, Stephen, 2001, 4).

“Pension reform and other social sector reforms are more complicated politically than “first

generation” structural adjustment reforms. …Whereas structural adjustment reforms could be

designed by insulated technicians, implemented through executive decree, and rarely target

particular groups, social sector reforms directly affect the interests and eventually require the

active participation of consumers and producers as well as approval by elected legislation”

(James, E. & Brooks, S., 2001, 14).

21

The design of the Kazakhstani pension reform was based on the experience gained in other

parts of the world (particularly in Latin America). The radical change from PAYG to a fully

funded system means “loosening the social contract” of the citizen`s dependence on the state

system. It requires mature and well-informed citizens to make the switch to individual

responsibility to save for retirement rather than spend now. Thus, the education and informing of

current and potential contributors the system becomes a key social and economic concern.

(Presentation: Pension Fund Reform and Implications for the Market, SSB Citi Asset

Management Ltd, 2001).xvi Ricardo Zabala (Global Retirement Services, Citigroup), assessing the

experience of pension reforms in Latin America, notes: “These reforms are very appealing: high

asset accumulation, impact on the capital market, etc. However, the essence is invisible to the

eyes.

The real reform is a shift:

to the ownership of each individual account’s own assets

to a decentralized, competitive system

It moves “power to people”. The individuals choose:

Who manages their funds

When to pension themselves

What type of pension scheme.”xvii

However, the first phase of the reform was focused on the economic and technical parameters of

the pension system, whereas the social and political dimensions of the reform process were left

out of the discussion. An astonishingly low level of awareness and a high level of distrust in the

population make it evident that communicating the advantages of the reforms and endorsing

multiparty policy dialogue are essential to their long-term viability. This dialogue has to include

contributors and market operators in order to promote broader coverage, consumers`

participation, and the population`s trust in the new system.

xvi http://www.pensionline.ru/_data/SSBCiti/page_01.htm

xvii http://www.pensionline.ru/_data/citibank/page_15.htm

22

III. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

In a milieu of increasing complexity, especially in the socio-economic and political contexts,

knowledge becomes a vital factor affecting the ability of policy actors to influence the political

agenda and the shape of policy outcomes. Like in many other transition countries the

Kazakhstani pension reform was based on externally-imported knowledge which was supplied

by international financial institutions. Factually, international organizations like WB and ADB

served as a main resource of knowledge for the pension reform in Kazakshtan. They shared their

knowledge with the Kazakhstani government providing an extensive technical and financial

assistance. Thus, indigenous knowledge in this area was concentrated solely within the

government agencies during the years of reform. However, even after seven years of the reform,

government agencies are not able to further the reform without the use of external expertise.

23

At the same time, there were not built any democratic institutions or mechanisms, which could

include basic democratic features like citizen debate and political parties that propose a variety

of policy alternatives. Due to a severe scarcity of expert capacity (reliable knowledge) partisan

and institutional veto actors and civil society groups were limited in their ability to participate in

the policy dialogue in a meaningful and influential way. The situation remains the same today.

The government is launching the second phase of the reform, however there is no any partisan or

institutional veto actors that posses the level of expertise that allows them to be included in this

process effectively at the next stage of the reform.

The lack of involvement of domestic actors in the formulation of policy alternatives and the

prominent role of international actors means that the public may perceive the policy as an

external product imposed by outsiders.  Furthermore, without the active participation of those

most directly affected by the reform (i.e., pensioners and future pensioners), experts may fail to

incorporate critical contextual features that are important to the reform's success, both politically

and technically. 

Finally, the reform was not communicated by the government in a way and degree that could

raise populatiuon`s reliance to the reform and enrollment in the new pension system. Even today,

after seven years of reform, there is a lack of information on the new pension system available

for the population. Not surprisingly, the population responses to this vacuum of information with

turnover and an astonishingly low level of trust to the reform.

Policy Recommendations

Taking into consideration the lessons learned from the first stage of the pension reform the

following policy recommendations for the next phase of the reform are proposed:

(i) Develop and maintain credible technical data, meaning data that is both reliable and

accepted by the various actors, concerning the financial state of pension systems and prospects

for the future. These data are the basis for discussion and debate, and can lead to informed

political choices from among the available options. The formulas for sources and producers of

these data might vary, but the important point is that the data concerned are available and that

their credibility is beyond question. For instance, in the United Kingdom, an independent

institution within the government structure (the Government Actuary) collects and analyzes such

data. In the United States, the Social Security Administration (the governing body of which

includes representatives of the opposition party) is responsible for financial monitoring; in

24

Germany, the figures are produced by institutions whose reputation guarantees their validity

(Federation of Pension Insurance Institutions, Federal Office of statistics, Federal Bank).

(Adapted from ILO recommendations, Geneva, 2000).

(ii) Build domestic expert (research and analytical) capacity relating to pension policy through

the improvement of in-house research capacity of the responsible governmental agencies (MOF

and MLSP); support of research projects conducted by local research groups and research

institutes; expand the expert capacity of the Parliament and political parties;

(iii) In collaboration with CSOs, elaborate and conduct a complex communication/public

education strategy aimed to improve enrollment, awareness of the funded system and access of

the population to information relating to pensions on permanent basis (through media, ICT, and

public education campaigns).

(iv) Expand the participation of contributors in the reform development through the support of

CSOs working with workers and pension funds contributors.

(v) Establish advisory bodies or working groups to participate, permanently or on an ad hoc

basis, in the decision-making process relating to pensions. These advisory councils should be an

integral part of the process of monitoring and periodic review of the system. They might include

representatives of employers' organizations and trade unions, academics and qualified experts. In

a complex and highly technical area such as pensions, these councils are forums for examining

the system and propose compromises to assist decision-making by legislators. These bodies also

might underpin the formation of a consensus on a topic of potential conflict. (Adapted from ILO

recommendations, Geneva, 2000).

(vi) Develop the quality of expertise through the establishment of a forum for researchers and

experts in the area of pensions (workshops, conferences, web resources, publications, etc.), add

to the curricular courses on economic and societal implications of pension reforms, maintain

links between practitioners (executives of pension funds, National Bank, MOF, MSLP) and

universities and research centers.

25

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Wesolowsky, A. ____. World: Three Pillars Seen As Key To Eastern Pension Reform. It is available at: http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1999/09/F.RU.990909131930.html

Endnotes

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