Table of Contents - DropPDF1.droppdf.com/files/puDJh/into-the-storm-tom-clancy.pdf956.7044'2--dc21...
Transcript of Table of Contents - DropPDF1.droppdf.com/files/puDJh/into-the-storm-tom-clancy.pdf956.7044'2--dc21...
-
TableofContentsTitlePageCopyrightPageDedicationIntroduction
CHAPTERONE-TheDayBeforeCHAPTERTWO-DutyCHAPTERTHREE-Cambodia
-
CHAPTERFOUR-ValleyForgeCHAPTERFIVE-TheRebirthoftheArmyCHAPTERSIX-ManeuverWarfareCHAPTERSEVEN-MarchtotheSoundoftheGunsCHAPTEREIGHT-PreparingforWarCHAPTERNINE-CoiledSpringCHAPTERTEN-TurnEastCHAPTERELEVEN-
-
AttackEastCHAPTERTWELVE-NightCombatCHAPTERTHIRTEEN-KnockoutCHAPTERFOURTEEN-Cease-FireCHAPTERFIFTEEN-DutyinIraqCHAPTERSIXTEEN-TRADOCandtheFutureofLandWarfareCHAPTERSEVENTEEN-"OnceMore..."
-
CHAPTEREIGHTEEN-Reflections
AcknowledgementsBibliographyandReferencesIndex
-
PRAISEFOR
IntotheStorm
"Therewillbesome--inthefuturewhenourarmyagaingoestowar--whowilltakethisworktothebattlefieldasareminderofhowgreatcommandersaccomplishedthemission."--Armor
-
"Twoareasofthisbookmeritspecialattentionandshouldbemandatoryreadingforallmilitaryofficers.Clancy'snarrativeofthearmyintransitionandhischapteronmaneuverwarfarearesuperb....Whatthereadergainsfrom[Franks's]candidadmissionsisadeepappreciationofthemindofacommanderchargedwithemploying146,000soldiersand50,000vehiclesacross
-
120milesofenemyterritoryinthefaceofdeterminedresistance."--ArmyMagazine
"Franksmanagestotellagoodstory,offerinsightsintoleadershipandsettherecordstraight."--ScrippsHowardNewsServices
-
NOVELSBYTOMCLANCY
TheHuntforRedOctoberRedStormRisingPatriotGames
TheCardinaloftheKremlinClearandPresentDangerTheSumofAllFearsWithoutRemorseDebtofHonorExecutiveOrders
-
RainbowSixTheBearandtheDragon
RedRabbitTheTeethoftheTiger
SSN:StrategiesofSubmarineWarfare
NONFICTION
-
Submarine:AGuidedTourInsideaNuclearWarship
ArmoredCav:AGuidedTourofanArmoredCavalry
RegimentFighterWing:AGuidedTourofanAirForceCombatWingMarine:AGuidedTourofaMarineExpeditionaryUnitAirborne:AGuidedTourofanAirborneTaskForce
Carrier:AGuidedTourofanAircraftCarrier
SpecialForces:AGuided
-
TourofU.S.ArmySpecialForces
IntotheStorm:AStudyinCommand
(writtenwithGeneralFredFranks,Jr.,Ret.,andTony
Koltz)EveryManaTiger
(writtenwithGeneralCharlesHorner,Ret.,andTonyKoltz)ShadowWarriors:Insidethe
SpecialForces
-
(writtenwithGeneralCarlStiner,Ret.,andTonyKoltz)
BattleReady(writtenwithGeneralTonyZinni,Ret.,andTonyKoltz)
CREATEDBYTOMCLANCY
TomClancy'sSplinterCellTomClancy'sSplinterCell:
-
OperationBarracudaTomClancy'sSplinterCell:
Checkmate
CREATEDBYTOMCLANCYANDSTEVE
PIECZENIK
TomClancy'sOp-CenterTomClancy'sOp-Center:
MirrorImage
-
TomClancy'sOp-Center:GamesofState
TomClancy'sOp-Center:ActsofWar
TomClancy'sOp-Center:BalanceofPower
TomClancy'sOp-Center:StateofSiege
TomClancy'sOp-Center:DivideandConquer
TomClancy'sOp-Center:LineofControl
TomClancy'sOp-Center:MissionofHonor
-
TomClancy'sOp-Center:SeaofFire
TomClancy'sOp-Center:CalltoTreason
TomClancy'sOp-Center:WarofEagles
TomClancy'sNetForceTomClancy'sNetForce:
HiddenAgendasTomClancy'sNetForce:
NightMovesTomClancy'sNetForce:
-
BreakingPointTomClancy'sNetForce:
PointofImpactTomClancy'sNetForce:
CyberNationTomClancy'sNetForce:
StateofWarTomClancy'sNetForce:ChangingoftheGuardTomClancy'sNetForce:
SpringboardTomClancy'sNetForce:The
ArchimedesEffect
-
CREATEDBYTOMCLANCYANDMARTIN
GREENBERG
TomClancy'sPowerPlays:Politika
TomClancy'sPowerPlays:ruthless.com
TomClancy'sPowerPlays:ShadowWatch
TomClancy'sPowerPlays:
http://ruthless.com
-
Bio-StrikeTomClancy'sPowerPlays:
ColdWarTomClancy'sPowerPlays:
CuttingEdgeTomClancy'sPowerPlays:
ZeroHourTomClancy'sPowerPlays:
WildCard
-
THEBERKLEYPUBLISHINGGROUP
PublishedbythePenguinGroupPenguinGroup(USA)Inc.
375HudsonStreet,NewYork,NewYork10014,USA
PenguinGroup(Canada),90EglintonAvenueEast,Suite700,Toronto,
OntarioM4P2Y3,Canada(adivisionofPearsonPenguinCanada
Inc.)PenguinBooksLtd.,80Strand,London
WC2R0RL,EnglandPenguinGroupIreland,25St.Stephen'sGreen,Dublin2,Ireland(adivisionof
PenguinBooksLtd.)PenguinGroup(Australia),250CamberwellRoad,Camberwell,
Victoria3124,Australia
-
(adivisionofPearsonAustraliaGroupPty.Ltd.)
PenguinBooksIndiaPvt.Ltd.,11CommunityCentre,PanchsheelPark,
NewDelhi--110017,IndiaPenguinGroup(NZ),67ApolloDrive,MairangiBay,Auckland1311,New
Zealand(adivisionofPearsonNewZealand
Ltd.)PenguinBooks(SouthAfrica)(Pty.)Ltd.,24SturdeeAvenue,Rosebank,
Johannesburg2196,SouthAfrica
PenguinBooksLtd.,RegisteredOffices:80Strand,LondonWC2R
0RL,England
-
Copyright(c)1997,2004byC.P.Commanders,Inc.
AllmapscourtesyofC.P.Commanders,Inc.,byLauraAlpher.
Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybe
reproduced,scanned,ordistributedinanyprintedorelectronicformwithoutpermission.Pleasedonotparticipateinorencouragepiracyofcopyrightedmaterialsinviolationoftheauthor'srights.Purchaseonlyauthorized
editions.BERKLEYisaregisteredtrademarkof
PenguinGroup(USA)Inc.The"B"designisatrademark
-
belongingtoPenguinGroup(USA)Inc.
eISBN:978-1-429-58336-7
Clancy,Tom,date.Intothestorm:astudyincommand/TomClancy,withFredFranks,Jr.
p.cm.eISBN:978-1-429-58336-7
1.Franks,Fred.2.PersianGulfWar,1991--UnitedStates.3.PersianGulf
War,1991--Biography.I.Franks,Fred.II.
Title.DS79.724.U6F-38068CIP
-
956.7044'2--dc21
MostBerkleyBooksareavailableatspecialdiscountsforbulkpurchasesforsalespromotions,premiums,fund-raising,oreducationaluse.Specialbooks,orbookexcerpts,canalsobe
createdtofitspecificneeds.
Fordetails,write:SpecialMarkets,TheBerkleyPublishingGroup,375HudsonStreet,NewYork,NewYork10014.
http://us.penguingroup.com
http://us.penguingroup.com
-
Thisbookisdedicatedto:
THEVETERANSOFTHEDESERTSTORMVIICORPSJAYHAWKS
ANDTHEIRFAMILIES.
THEBLACKHORSETROOPERS
OFTHEIITHACR.
-
THEMENANDWOMENOFAMERICA'SARMY,WHODOTHEIRDUTY
EVERYDAY,WHOBEARTHE
WOUNDSOFWARSPAST,ANDWHODIEDINSERVICETOOUR
COUNTRY.
-
INTRODUCTIONTheQuietLion
HEROESrarelylookthepart.ThefirstholderoftheMedalofHonorImetlookedmorelikearetiredaccountantthanJohnWayne,andwhenIintroducedGeneralFredFrankstoaphysicianfriend,thelatterremarkedthathewasadeadringerforthe
-
professorofpediatricsatCornellUniversityMedicalSchool.Andthat'sreallythebasisonwhichwefirstmet.In1991,IknewayoungladnamedKylewhowasafflictedwitharareanddeadlyformofcancer.Afriendofmine,MajorGeneralBillStofft,washeadingovertothePersianGulfaftertheconclusionofhostilities.Therewasaseniorofficeroverthere,I'dheard,who'd
-
lostaleginVietnam.Mylittlebuddyhadjustenduredthesurgicalremovalofhisleg,andIaskedBillifhemightapproachthisofficerandaskhimtowriteabriefletterofencouragementtoKyle,thenatMemorialSloan-KetteringCancerCenterinNewYork.Theofficer,IlearnedfromGeneralStofft,wasFredFranks,thenalieutenantgeneral,andcommanderof
-
VIICorps.Billdeliveredtherequest,andLieutenantGeneralFranksrespondedatonce,callingitaprivilege.Hewroteawarmlettertomyfriend,andcopiedittomewithacovernotethankingmeformakinghimawareofmyfriendandhisaffliction.That,really,isthebondbetweenus.
Soonthereafter,Fredreceivedanotherstaranda
-
newpostascommandinggeneraloftheU.S.Army'sTrainingandDoctrineCommand(TRADOC)atFortMonroeintheVirginiaTidewater,aplumjobwhosemissionitistolookintothefutureandprepareforit,anditwastherethatwemetforthefirsttime.Thefirstorderofbusinesswastothankhimforhisgracioussolicitudetomylittlefriend.Hewaveditoff,thankingmeagainforthe
-
opportunitytolookafterachild,andreallythat'smostofwhatIneededtolearnaboutthisgentleman.
Fredisamanofmodestsizeandwords--ontherareoccasionswhenheswears,eventhatisquiet.There'sanengagingshynesstothisgeneralofficer.Don'tbefooled.He'soneoftheundramaticpeoplewhogetsthejobdoneandmoveson
-
withoutfanfaretothenextmission,leavingaccomplishmentinhiswake.
Soldiersarenotwhatwemostoftenseeportrayedonthescreen.Thebestofthem,theoneswhoascendtogenerals'stars,arethoughtfulstudentsoftheirprofession,scholarlycommentatorsonhistory,andgiftedobserversofhumanpsychology.Theprofessionofarmsisevery
-
bitasbroadanddeepasmedicineorlaw.Likephysicians,officersmustknowtheirsubjectineverydetail,fortheydealinthecurrencyoflifeanddeath,andsomemistakescanneverbecorrected.Likeattorneys,theymustplaneverythinginexquisitedetail,becauseinsomearenasyouhavebutonechancetogetitright.
Thesheerintellectual
-
complexityofcommandissomethingfewhavediscussedwithanythingapproachingaccuracy.InpreparingtomovehisVIICorpsacrossthedesert,Fredfirstofallhadtoconsiderthemajorpieces:U.S.1stand3rdArmoredDivisions,therenowned1stInfantryDivision(Mechanized),the1stCavalryDivision,U.K.1stArmoredDivision,U.S.2ndArmoredCavalry
-
Regiment,andthreeseparateartillerybrigades.Thoseunitsaloneaccountfornearly100,000soldiers,eachofwhomwasassignedtoavehicle.Tossinthe"loggies,"thelogisticaltroopswhoseunsungbutvitaljobwastokeepthe"shooters"equippedwitheverythingfromdieselfueltocomputerchips.
Okay,nowimaginethatyouhavetoplantherush
-
hourforacityof,oh,say,1million,decidinghoweachworkergetshome;thatyouhavetoaccountforeverysingleoneofthem,frompointoforigintodestination,andthateveryonehastoarrivehomeatexactlytherighttime.
Oh,that'snotall:Fredhadtoplansevendifferentoptionsforhismove.Soyoualsomustallowforseven
-
differentcombinationsofclosedstreets,roadwork,andbrokenbridges,whilestillallowingeverycommutertomakeithomeatthepropertime.
Bytheway,ifyoumessthislittlejobup,humanliveswillbelost.
Soundseasy?Wehaven'tevengottentothereallyhardpartyet.Peoplewillbetrying
-
tokillthecommuters--organized,trainedpeople,withweapons--andyoualsomustminimizethatlittlehazard.
Andyet,inaway,thiswastheeasypart.JusttogettothatpointFredFranksandhiscolleagues--menlikeCreightonAbrams,EdBurba,BillDePuy,ColinPowell,ButchSaint,NormSchwarzkopf,PeteTaylor,
-
CarlVuono,andsomanyothers--hadtofixanArmythatintheiryoungerdaysaslieutenantsandcaptainshadbeenbrokenbypoorpoliticalleadershipandpublicantipathy.FredlostpartofaleginVietnam.Hiscolleagueswereallhurtinonewayoranother,andtheArmynearlylostitssoul,whileAmericalostherconfidenceasanation.Asamajorwith1.5legs,lyingina
-
bedinValleyForge,hehadtoconquerpainandheartache,towonderifhehadacareerbeforehimatall,andtowonderalsoifhiscountrygaveadamnabouthimandhisfellowamputees.
Rememberjusthowdarkthosedayswere?TheArmywasonitsback,itsNCOcorpsblednearlytodeathinVietnam,drugswererampantthroughouttheinstitution,
-
andmoralewassolowthatonmorethanonepost,officersenteredbarracksonlywithanarmedescort.
Fredwasoneofthemenwhohadtomakegoodallthatothershadconspiredtodestroy.LiketheArmyofthe1970s,hehadtolearntowalkalloveragain.Ashehadtorepairthewoundsinhisheart,sotheArmyhadtorestoreitsconfidence.All
-
thesethingsdidhappen,however,becauseFredandmenlikehimneverlostfaithintheircountryortheirownideals.
Howgreatwastheirtask?Lookingbackfromtoday'sperspective,itismorefrightening,perhaps,thanitwasatthetime,butthemagnitudeoftheaccomplishmentcanbemeasuredsimply:America
-
wontheColdWarbecausesheandheralliesweretoostrongtolose.ThathappenedonlybecauseFredFranksandhiswoundedbutproudbandofbrothersmadeherso,andthatonlyafterhealingthemselves.Istartedmeetingthesemenin1988,andthat'swhentheideaforthisbookreallybegan.ThepublicimageoftheArmyismostoftenthatofthecinema,andthatisgenerallyaninfantry
-
squad,becauseamoviecanshowonlysomuch.Bythesametoken,theheaviestfirepowertheArmyhas--tanksandartillery,whichdomostofthekillingonthemodernbattlefield--hasbeenlargelyignored.Andsotheimagewehaveofthemilitaryisnotsomuchfalseaslimited.That'salessonIlearnedatFortIrwin,California,onacoldJanuarymorning.Havinghadthe
-
taste,Ihadtolearnmore,andIwasfortunateinfindingasuperbcollectionofteachers.
Anyarmyisavastcommunityofpeoplemorethanacollectionoftheirawesometools.Itmayseemgrotesquetocallwar-fightinganart,butwarfightingismorethananythingelsetheleadershipofpeople,andhandlingpeopleisthemostdemandingofhumanarts,all
-
themoresowhenthecurrencyislifeanddeath.Morethanthat,inanation'smilitary,youfindthenationitself,allofitsqualities,whethergoodorbad,distilledtoanoddsortofpurity.OurArmyhastraveledinasinglelifetimedownastrangeandcrookedroad,fromthetriumphofWorldWarIIthroughtheembarrassmentofKorea,throughpeacekeepingandholdingthelinein
-
Europe,throughtragedyandwasteinVietnam,throughneartotalcollapsethereafter,throughalongandwrenchingprocessofreconstitution,thenagaintodominanceonthesandsofIraqandKuwait.
It'sastoryIcouldhardlytellbymyself,andit'sastoryformorethanonebook.FromFredFranksIlearnedthestoryoftheUnitedStatesArmy,sogrievously
-
woundedinVietnam.Thoughtheviewpointsandperspectivesaremine,muchofthestoryishis,andincertainchaptersIhavefeltitonlyfittingthathetellitinhisownwords.OtheraspectsofAmerica'srecoveryanddominancewillcomefromothersinfuturebooks,andIhopethereaderwillcometograspjusthowmuchwasdone,andhowmuchisowed.Therewereplentyofinfantry
-
squads,andtankcrews,andcannoneers,andloggies,allwearingtheirnation'scolors.Allofthemweretrained,supported,andledbytheprofessionalswhokeptthefaith.
Andsothemanandthearmythatadvancedacrosssandandrockwerereadyfortheirtask,theirmemoriesofVietnamneverfarfromtheirminds,andthelessonsofthat
-
experienceintheirhands.ThearmyAmericadeployedtothePersianGulfmightwellhavebeenthefinestinallofhistory,equippedwiththebestweapons,trainedinthemostrealisticfashion,andledbymenwho'dlearnedthehardwaywhyyouhavetogetitdonerightthefirsttime.WeallsawtheresultsonTV.
It'sbeenmyhonortogettoknowthisman.Amanofiron
-
andletters--he'staughtpoetryattheuniversitylevel--FredFrankssymbolizesourarmyaswellasanymancould.
--TOMCLANCY
-
CHAPTERONE
TheDayBefore
-
23FEBRUARY19912100
VIICORPSMAINCOMMANDPOST
AFTERtheeveningbriefingandabrieftalktohisstaffandtheliaisonofficersfromsubordinateunits,Fred
-
Frankswentbacktohissleepingshelter.
Inhistalk,Frankswasemotionalaboutthesoldiersandhard-nosedaboutthetaskahead.Thestaffwasquietandserious.Mostlistenedquietly,andtherewasalotofeyecontact.Whenhefinished,theyallholleredabig"JAYHAWK"--VIICorps'snickname--andthatwasit.Heleftthetent.
-
Thenhewasalonewithhisthoughts.Beforehegotsomeresthewantedtogooversomethingsabouttheoperationaheadandreflectontheeventsofthisday.
Therewasonethoughtthatwouldnotleavehim."Don'tworry,General,wetrustyou."Asoldierin3rdArmoredDivisionhadsaidthattohimon15Februaryduringoneofhismanyvisits
-
toVIICorpsunits.Now,howamIgoingtofulfillthattrust?heaskedhimself.Itwaswhatthesoldierswerethinking--heknewthat--andhewantedtobeworthy.
DuringVietnam,thatbondbetweenthesoldiersandthecountry'sleadersinWashingtonhadbeenshattered.Itwasanopenwound.FredFrankswantedtobeoneofthecommanders
-
whocouldhealthatwound,whocouldrebuildthattrust.Itwasapowerful,consumingthoughtonthiseveofbattle,onethatneverlefthim,ever.
THEnextdaywasG-Day,thebeginningofthegroundattacktoliberateKuwaitofIraqiforces.TheCoalitionplanwasfortheU.S.MarinesandtheSaudistoattackat
-
0400,200kilometerstotheeastofVIICorps,whilethelightforcesofU.S.XVIIICorps--the82ndAirborneDivisionandthe101stAirborne(AirAssault)Division--andtheFrenchwouldattack100kilometerstothewest.Andthentheheavyforces--VIICorps,thearmoredunitsofXVIIICorps,andtheJFCN(theArabJointForcesCommandNorth,anEgyptianCorpsand
-
aSyriandivision)--wouldattackonG+1,thedayafterthenext,atBMNT(thebeginningofmorningnauticaltwilight,orfirstlight),or0538GPSlocaltime(theyusedglobalpositioningsystemstogiveexacttime).
WhatFranksdidn'tknowthenwasthatthisnightwasgoingtoturnouttobetheeveofhisownVIICorpsattack.Whenhelearnedofthis
-
changeofplansthenextday,itwastobeforhimoneofthetwogreatestsurprisesofthewar.
Asfarasheknew,theplanandtheattacktimeswereset,andhewasconsideringnothingdifferent.Nobodyhadmentionedthepossibilityofgoingearly,notThirdArmy,CENTCOM,1JohnYeosock(theThirdArmycommander,andFranks's
-
immediatesuperior),orNormSchwarzkopf.Theyhadhashedoutthetimingtimeandagain.Asfarasheknew,theyhadsettledit.TheMarinesandtheSaudiswouldgointoKuwaitandfixIraqiforcesthere,andthentheheavyforceswouldgoaftertheRGFC--theRepublicanGuardsForcesCommand.VIICorps,theEgyptianCorps,andtheheavypartofXVIIICorps
-
werescheduledtoattackonG+1atBMNT.
Ashesatthereinthesilenceofhissleepingshelter--anexpandovanonthebackofafive-tontruck--hecheckedhiscigarsupply.Itwasstillholdingup.Thenhelitoneashebegantogooverinhismindtheposturefortheattackthedayaftertomorrow.Hehadnomap,butbynowtheyhadbeen
-
overtheplansomanytimeshehaditalmostcommittedtomemory.Aswashispractice,heusedtheArmy'sbasicproblem-solvingmethodandonehehimselfhadtaughtmanytimes,whichwentbytheacronymMETT-T(Mission,Enemy,Terrain,Troopsavailabletoyou,andTime).
-
MISSION
Themissionwassimple:todestroytheRGFCintheVIICorpszone(thecorpsareaofoperations)andbepreparedtodefendnorthernKuwait.
-
ENEMY
Thesituationwasthesameasithadbeenforthepastseveralweeks.TheIraqishadessentiallystayedinplace,whichwasnotsurprising,consideringthepunishmenttheywouldtakefromtheairiftheytriedanymajorforce
-
repositioning.AsfarasFredFrankswasconcerned,thatwasjustfine.Thecoalitionhadthemwheretheywantedthem.
DirectlyinfrontofVIICorpsacrosstheborderwastheIraqiVIICorps.Theirdefenseconsistedoffiveinfantrydivisions,sidebyside,easttowest,andonemechanizeddivisionbehindthemindepth.Thatdefensive
-
linestartedabouttwentykilometersnorthoftheborder,withacomplexobstaclesystemofmines,trenches,anddefensivebunkers,thickerintheeastandlesssointhewest.Inthewest,theyhadleftanopeningofaboutfortykilometers,wheretheirdefenselinecurvedtothenorthandwest,inordertopreventanenvelopment.Inmilitaryterms,thisiscalled"refusing
-
theflank."Thewidthoftheirdefendinginfantrydivisionswasabouttwenty-fivekilometerseach,withatotaldepthoftwentytothirtykilometers.
TheVIICorpsplanwasforthe1stInfantryDivisiontopenetrateoneofthesedivisionsinabreachmission,whileanenvelopingforce,consistingofthe2ndArmoredCavalryRegiment,
-
the1stArmoredDivision,andthe3rdArmoredDivision,wouldsimultaneouslysweeparoundtheIraqiflankandattacktowardtheRGFC.TheBritish1stArmoredDivisionwouldmeanwhilepassthroughthe1stINF(infantry)breach,oncethatwassecured,andattacktowardtheeasttopreventIraqiforcesfromthreateningtheVIICorpsflank.
-
AbigdisagreementaheadoftimehadconcernedtheestimatedwidthanddepthofIraqifrontlinedivisionsectors.U.S.intelligencethoughtthesectorsweretwenty-fivekilometerswideandnotsodeep;theBritishthoughttheIraqidivisionsectorswereamorenarrowfifteenkilometersanddeeper.TheBritishwerecorrect,asitturnedout,exceptthatthedivisionsectorsgotwiderthe
-
fartherwestyouwent.Thatwasofsignificantconsequencelater,astheBritishattackhitthecommandpostsoftheIraqifrontlinedivisionsratherthanpassingtotheirrear.
BehindtheIraqiVIICorps,theRepublicanGuards,Iraq'sbest,hadnotmoved,either.ThereweresixRGFCdivisions,threearmored/mechanizedand
-
threeinfantry(eachGuardsdivisionhadthreebrigades),withtheclosestoftheseabout150kilometersfromtheVIICorps'slineofdeparture.Thoughatthispoint,allsixwereintheVIICorpszoneofattack,fromthestartFranks'sintentwastoaimVIICorpsatthethreeGuardsarmored/mechanizeddivisions(Tawalkana,Medina,andHammurabi).Theyknewaboutwherethese
-
heavydivisionswere,aswellasthelocationsofthethreeRGFCinfantrydivisions.
BecauseairhadbeenabletofixtheRGFCstrategically(theIraqisknewthatiftheytriedanymajormoves,they'dgethithard),therehadnotbeenanyapparentmajorforcerepositioningsincetheaircampaignhadstartedon17January.Butairhadnotcompletelyimmobilizedthe
-
RGFC.TheGuardswereabletomoveuptobrigade-sizedunitslocallyintacticalrepositioning,andtheyhaddonesofrequently.SinceimmediateintelligenceaboutthesechangesinpositionwasnotavailabletoVIICorps,theywouldknowonlyapproximatelywheretheRGFCbrigadeswerelocatedatanygiventime.
Inotherwords,thatmeant
-
thattheIraqiarmoredforcesretainedtacticalfreedomofmovementandcouldmovefromtwenty-fivetofiftykilometerstoadjusttheirpositions.Thus,attackingunitswouldnotknowforsurewhatwasjustbeyondvisualrange.Itwouldthereforebeuptoattackingtroopstofixtheenemytactically,andthentodestroythem.ThatdistinctionwoulddictateFranks'stacticsandthoseof
-
hissubordinateunitcommandersastheyapproachedRGFClocations.Itwaslikelythatattackingunitswouldbeinvolvedinagreatmany"meetingengagements."2
AshepicturedinhismindthelayoutofIraqiforces,FranksturnedhisattentiontosomeofthenumberdesignationsofIraqibrigadesanddivisions.Theyhadbeen
-
thesubjectofmanydiscussionsamongintelligencestaffs--wasitthe12thDivisionoverhere,andthe52ndDivisionoverthere,ortheotherwayaround?Thesewereinterestingdiscussions,andimportanthistoricallytogettherecordstraight,yetforthepurposesoftheupcomingattack,hedidnotthinksuchmattershadanypracticalconsequence.Gettingunitdesignations
-
rightisvaluableforhistorybooks,butwhathereallyneededtoknowwashowmanydivisionsandbrigadestherewere,andwheretheywerelocated.Andhehadaverygoodideaofthat.
TurninghisthoughtsbacktotheIraqiVIICorps,Frankspicturedtheirfiveinfantrydivisionsforwardonline,behindabarriersystemthatwaslesscomplexmoving
-
westfromtheWadialBatin.(TheWadiisanancient,dryrivervalley,anglingsouthandwestoutofIraqintoSaudiArabia.Alongtheway,theWadidefinesthewesternboundarybetweenKuwaitandIraq.)Thedivisionnumbersfromeasttowestwerethe27th;25th;31st;48th;and26th.Thetacticalreserve,locatedbehindthe25thand31stdivisionsatadepthoffiftytoseventy-five
-
kilometers,wasthe12thArmored--actuallythe52nd(itwasoneoftheunitdesignationsthey'dgottenwrong).Again,itdidn'treallymattertoFrankswhetheritwasnumberedthe52ndorthe152nd.ItdidmatterthattherewasanIraqimechanizeddivisionthatcouldmove;ifitcouldmove,itcouldinterdicthislogisticsorotherwisegetinthewayofhisattackingforce.Inordertomakesure
-
thatdidn'thappen,hehadassignedtotheBritishthemissionofdefeatingthatdivision.
TheIraqiVIICorps'swesternmostdivision,the26th,hadtwobrigadesforwardinthedefensiveline.Inordertorefusethatwesternflank,theyhadaninfantrybrigadeindepth,stretchingperhapsfiftykilometerstotherearofthedefensiveline.It
-
wasthis26thDivisionthatthe1stInfantryDivision,theBigRedOne,wouldpenetrateintheirbreachmissionandthattheenvelopingforcewouldoverrun.
TheIraqiVIICorpshadassignedtheirartillerytofrontlinedivisionsandtotheirsubordinatebrigadeslocatedwiththoseunits.Otherartilleryretainedunder
-
theircorpscontrolwaspositionedtosupportthefrontlinedivisions.TotalguncountalongthatinitialIraqiVIICorpsdefensebeforetheairattacksbeganwasapproximately400to500,withoverhalfthatinrangeofthe1stINFbreach.
ThoughFrankswasrelativelysureaboutwhattheywerefacinginIraqiVIICorps,hewaslesssureofthe
-
organizationoftheirdeepforcesandhowtheywouldfight.HeknewtheGuardsweretheirbestandmostloyalforces.Theyalsowerethebestequipped,mostlywithRussian-madeT-72s,BMPs,andself-propelledartillery.IntheIran-IraqWar,theyhaddonewell.IntheinvasionofKuwait,theyhadmovedandfoughtefficiently.Eventhoughairhadhitthemhard,therewasn'tmuchdoubtthat
-
theRGFCwouldfight.
Franks'skeyquestion,then,waswhattheRepublicanGuardswouldattempttodowhenoriftheydiscoveredtheattack.Defend?ManeuvertowardVIICorpsunitstomeettheirattack?AttempttoescapeupHighway8toBaghdad?(Highway8wasthemainrouteonthesouthsideoftheEuphratesbetweenBasraandBaghdad.)Retreat
-
towardBasra?Franks'saimwastofixthemwheretheywere,ortosurprisethembeforetheycouldmove.
TherewereotherIraqiheavydivisionsinthecorps'szoneaswell,the10thand12thArmoreddivisions,formedintowhathediscoveredlaterwasthe"JihadCorps."Whatwouldtheseintermediateforcesdo?Inaddition,anotherheavy
-
division,the17th,waslocatedneartheRGFC,butwasnotintheVIICorpszone.ThepresenceoftheseformationsandtheirsubordinationtotheGuardswouldmakeadifferenceinhowtheIraqihighcommandchosetofightVIICorps.NotcountingthethreeRGFCinfantrydivisions,thatgavetheIraqisasix-divisiontheaterreserve,threeRGFCheavydivisionsandthree
-
otherarmoreddivisions.
TheforcesarrayedbytheCoalitionspreadfromthePersianGulftoapproximately600kilometersinland.VIICorps'smissionwastodestroytheRepublicanGuardintheirsectorofattack.
-
TheIraqidefenseswerearrayedinthreebelts.Thefrontlineconsistedprimarilyofinfantryunitsdefendingbehindamassiveobstaclebeltofminefields,trenches,andwire.Thetacticalreservewaspoisedtoreinforcewhereverthefrontlineswerebreached.Theoperationalreserve--theRepublicanGuardsandotherunits--defendedthesouthernapproachesinto
-
IraqandwerecapableofcounterattackingtheCoalitionforce.
-
Asheplayedallthisinhismind'seye,healsoconsideredsomethingelse:thelocationoftheIraqiarmywasonlyonepieceoftheintelligencepicture.Theotherpiecewashowstrongwerethey?Whatwastheirabilitytofight?Evenatthispoint,hewasnotveryconfidentthatheknewtheanswerstothat.
Inhiszoneofattackweretwoverydifferent-type
-
forces.Exceptfortheirmechanizedinfantryreserve,theIraqiVIICorpsconsistedoffivefrontlineconscriptinfantrydivisions,fixedinaWorldWarI-typedefensivearrangement.VIICorpshadhadsomecombatagainsttheseunitsovertheprevioustwoweeks,andprisonersanddesertershadbeentaken.AftertheseIraqisoldiershadbeenquestionedabouttheirdispositions,strength,unit
-
identification,andmorale,FranksandhiscommandershadgottenaprettyclearpictureoftheIraqiVIICorps.Theinfantrydivisionswerebrittleandwouldeasilycrackatthefirsthard,sustainedgroundattack.They'dbeenhurtbadlybyU.S.air,Apache,andartilleryattacks,andbythedesertionofsomeoftheirownleadership.Theconclusionwasthattheywerebetween50and75percent
-
strength.Theydidnothavemuchfightleftinthem.
ButFrankshadnosuchclearpictureoftheRGFC,oroftheotherIraqiarmored/mechanizedformations.PrewaraircampaignobjectiveshadcalledforthereductionofRGFCstrengthby50percentbythetimethegroundwarstarted.Theaterhadselectedthatnumberbasedonan
-
analysisoffriendlyandenemyforceratios.Ifthatfigurewasachieved,they'dthought,VIICorpswouldhaveenoughcombatpoweravailabletofinishthedestructionindirectgroundcombat.
Asithappened,noneofthegroundcommandershadparticipatedinsettingthisobjective.Andwhentheyhadlearnedofit,mosthad
-
thoughtitwouldnotbeachievableunlesstheattackswentonalongtime.
Therealproblemwasnotthespecificobjective(whether50percentorwhatever).Theproblemwasthattherewasnoreliablemethodfordeterminingiftheobjectivehadactuallybeenachieved.Therewasnowayofknowing,infact,iftheywereevenclose.Precise
-
bomb-damageassessment(BDA)wasdifficult.Itwasrelativelyeasytofiguredamagedonetoafixedtargetsuchasabridgeoranaircraftshelterbyaprecision-guidedweapon,butdamageagainstmobilearmoredunitsbydumbbombsor30-mmcannonsfrom10,000feetandhigher--now,thatwasharder.
SoVIICorpsestimatesofIraqiRGFCstrength
-
remainedquiteconservative.Thoughintheplanstheyhadbriefedtheyhadassumedthestatedobjectiveof50percent,theyalwayshedgedtheirbets.TheirownestimatewasthatGuardsandotherIraqiarmored/mechanizedunitswouldbecloserto75percentwhenVIICorpshitthem.Corpsalsothoughtthat,unlikethefrontlineinfantrydivisions,theGuardswouldfight,andnotrunawayor
-
desert.
AsFranksweighedthesenumbers,hebecameawarethattherealartwastoassessenemyfightingcapabilities,competence,andwillingnesstofight.Locatingthemanddeterminingnumberswastheeasypart.Itwasalmostscientific.Itwasthisotherpartthatwastheart.Youwantedneithertooverestimatenor
-
underestimatetheenemy.
FredFranks'sexperienceinVietnamhadinfluencedhimonthismatter.Ifheerred,hewantedtoerronthesideofoverestimatingtheenemy.Hewantedtobesurethat,thistime,theresultswouldbedifferent.
INthefinalanalysis,Franks
-
knewthathehadadecentintelligencepictureforIraqiunitlocationsbutapoorpictureofRGFCstrength,fightingcapability,andcompetence.
Hewasawareagainthathehadtocometoaconclusion.Hewouldalsoneedtopredictandinfluencetheirtacticalmaneuver.WouldVIICorpsbeabletokeepthemfixedwheretheywereandsurprise
-
theminthesizeanddirectionoftheattack?Wouldtheycometowardhisadvancingunits?WouldtheyattempttogoupHighway8?Wouldtheyattempttoescapeoutofthetheater?Andhealsoknewhewouldhavetodecideallthatabouttwenty-fourhoursaftertheVIICorpsattackatfirstlighton25February.
-
TERRAIN
Fromhisperspectiveascorpscommander,Frankshadnotspentalotoftimeexaminingterrain.InEuropeithadbeenvitaltodeterminekeyterrain--thepiecesofgroundthatdominateanarea--andtolookverycloselyat
-
avenuesofapproach--theareasthatallowedrapidmovementbylargeformationsinthedirectioninwhichyouortheenemywantedtogo.Theyhadexaminedthecross-countrytrafficability--thecapabilityoftheterraintoallowheavyarmoredmovement--andlookedatroads,bridges,airfields,towns,andcities,andathowtheymightinfluenceoperationsand
-
logistics.
Notmuchofthatmatteredhere.Thiswasdesert.Fightingherewaslikenavalsurfacewarfareontheopenocean.Heretheycouldessentiallytaketheirfleetanywhere,andinalmostanyformationtheywanted.Nowsmallerunitsinthecorpshadtobeconcernedwiththenormalrisesanddropsinthedesertastheyattacked.They
-
alsohadtobeawarethatinsomeplaces--especiallyin1stADsector--thesandwassofterthaninothers(andthuslesstrafficableforheavyarmor),andthatinsomeplacestherewerenarrowdefiles.
Sothattheycouldhavethebestavailableintelaboutsuchareas,aSpecialForcesnightflighthadbeensentforwardintotheVIICorpszoneto
-
lookovertheterrain.WhentheflighthaddeterminedthattheterrainwouldholdanythingFrankswanteditto,he'dfiguredhecouldmaneuverhisfleetanywhere.SocouldtheIraqis,herealized.Butasitturnedout,theyanchoredtheirfleetwithshortchains.Sincetheyhadnoconfidenceincross-desertmaneuver(andtheydidnothaveaccesstoGPSreceivers),theIraqismainly
-
stucktotheirroads.
Infact,weatherturnedouttobeabiggerfactor.Severelocalsandstorms,calledshamals,hidVIICorpsattacksfromIraqis,butalsolimitedsomeuseofApaches,andtroopshadtofightthroughcoldnighttemperaturesandtorrentialrains.
-
TROOPS
TheVIICorpssituationwasexcellent.Theplanwassoundandwellunderstoodbyallunits;theyhadrehearsedandwar-gamedit.TheCorpswasatfullstrength,andtheequipmentavailabilityofmajorcombatassetssuchas
-
tanksandBradleyswasat97percent.ThatwasbetterthanintheCorps'sbestColdWardaysinGermanyaspartofNATO.
Thecommanderswereready,andtheteamworkamongthemwastight.Itwasatalentedteam.Franks'smajormaneuvercommanderswereMajorGeneralTomRhame,1stInfantryDivision;MajorGeneralRonGriffith,
-
1stArmoredDivision;MajorGeneralPaul"Butch"Funk,3rdArmoredDivision;MajorGeneralRupertSmith,1st(U.K.)ArmoredDivision;ColonelDonHolder,2ndArmoredCavalryRegiment;andColonelJohnnieHitt,11thAviationBrigade.BrigadierGeneralJohnTilellicommandedthe1stCavalryDivision,whichwastobereleasedtoCENTCOMastheaterreservethenextday.
-
ThecorpsartillerycommanderwasBrigadierGeneralCreightonAbrams;andBrigadierGeneralBobMcFarlinwasthecommanderoftheCorps'salmost27,000-soldierSupportCommand.
Thetroopswerementallyready,andtheyweretrainedtoarazor'sedge.Duringtheweeksbeforecombat,theyhadtrainedhardtoadapttheirtacticstothedesertandto
-
practicetheirtasks.TheyalsohadbeenincombatagainstIraqis.Duringthetwoweekspriortotheattack,Frankshadwantedsomeactualfightinginordertogethisforcesmentallyreadytofight,aswellastoconductfeintstodeceivetheIraqisastotheactualpointofattack,andtodestroyartilleryinrangeofthebreachsite.Asaresult,theartilleryandaviationofeverymajormaneuverunitin
-
VIICorpshadbynowparticipatedinacombatactionagainstIraqifrontlineunits.
-
TIME
Thetimingoftheattackwasclear.TheywouldattackthedayaftertomorrowatG+1atBMNT.
Franks'sbestcommander'sestimatewasthatthewholeoperationwouldtakeabout
-
eightdays:twodaystogetthroughnon-GuardsIraqiforcesandthe150to200kilometerstotheGuardsthemselves,fourdaystodestroytheGuards,andtwodaysforconsolidation.TheThirdArmyestimatehadbeentwoweeksforthegroundoffensiveandanotherfourforconsolidation.
-
THATwastheMETT-TsituationfacingFredFranksashesatinhissleepingshelter,gazingouttheopeningtothenow-quietlifeofthemaincommandpost.
Itwasaveryfamiliarscene.ItwastheArmy'spracticetousethreecommandposts,calledthe"tactical,""main,"and"rear"posts,dependingontheirclosenesstotheenemy.The
-
close--orimmediate--battlewasledusingthetacticalcommandpostasabaseofoperations;therearpostdirectedallthelogisticsorcombatservicesupportoftheunit;andthemaincommandpostkepttrackoftheimmediatefightandthedeeperfightbeyondthatone,andplannedthebattlestobefoughtinthefuture.Atthemaincommandpost,allthreecommandactivitieswere
-
normallyfullycoordinated,aswasairsupport.Themaincommandpostwasalsothelinktohigherheadquarters,bothforoperationalmattersaswellasforintelligence--alldownlinkterminalswerelocatedthere,whichbroughtdirecttheaterornationalintelligencesystem"feed"totheunit.
FrankspicturedthemainCPinfrontofhim--
-
essentially,alargecamp-sitewithtentsandtruckvans.TheareaoftheCPcoveredabout500metersindiameterandperhapsakilometerincircumference.Theentireareawasbehindacircular,ten-foot-highbermofsandshovedupbyCorpsengineers.Abouttenfeetoutsidethebermwastriple-strandconcertinabarbedwirearrangedtriple-thickandpiledintightlytangledcoils.
-
Atregularintervalsaroundthisbermweresix-by-six-footbunkers,withuptotwofeetofoverheadcover.TheseweremannedbyarmedsoldierswithcommunicationtoacentralpostcommandedbytheHQbattalioncommander.
Therewasonlyoneentrancetothecommandpostarea.Togetin,youhadtoidentifyyourselftomilitary
-
police,whowouldpullthetemporaryslidingwirebarrieroutoftheway,andthenyouhadtodrivedownaserpentinecoursepasthighmoundsofsand.Onlyafewvehicleswerepermittedinside,andtheseweredirectedtoaparkingareajustinsidetheentrance.Thereallpersonnelwoulddismountandwalktowherevertheyneededtogo.ToallowmuchvehicletrafficinsidetheCP
-
wastostirupsomuchsandthatitwasharmfultotheequipment,plusitwasn'tsafeatnightwithnolights,anditmadelifeunbearableforthetroops.Mostvehiclesparkedoutside,andtheiroccupantswalkedtotheirdestination.Troopsmanningtheentrancecouldspotvehiclesapproachingfromalongdistance.
Insidetheperimeter,the
-
truckvanswerearrangedaccordingtotheirindividualfunction:Staffelementswerelocatedclosetootherstaffelementswithwhomtheyneededtocoordinate.Forexample,intelligenceandoperationswerealwaysnexttoeachother,andAirForceair,corpsartillery,andArmyaviationstayedclosetogether.
Thesetruckvanswere
-
whattheU.S.Armycalled"expandovans,"likeFranks'sownsleepingshelter.Theywerefive-tontruckswithasteelenclosureontheback.Whenthevehiclewasstationary,thiscouldbe"expanded"byabouttwofeetoneachside,thusincreasingtheworkarea.Theinsideofthesevanstookonvariousphysicalconfigurationsdependingontheirfunction.Insidedimensionswereabout
-
twentybyfifteenfeet,andtheywereprewired,sothatwhenyoustoppedyoucouldplugincablesandhavelights.Inotherwords,theywereessentiallyportableoffices.
AtthemainCPwereaboutathousandsoldiersandperhapstwohundredvehicles.Becauseofthetimeneededtoinstalllong-haulcommunicationsforboth
-
intelligenceandcommand,andbecauseofthenetworkofcablesandwiresthathadtobehookeduptoprovideelectronicnetworkingcapabilitybetweenthesevans,itwasnotveryphysicallyagile.
Thepictureofahigh-techCPFranks'sunitwasnot.PattonorBradleywouldhavebeenrightathomehere.Theyusedpapermapswithhand-
-
drawnsymbolsonacetatecoveringstodepictboundaries,phaselines,andobjectives,theusualcontrolmeasuresforacorps.Theyusedline-of-sightradiosandlonger-haulcommsthatweretheequivalentofradiotelephonestoreachRiyadhortheUnitedStates.Theyusedcommercialfaxmachinestotransmithardcopiesofsmallpapers.Forlargeracetateoverlays,theydrewthemone
-
atatimeandsentthemvialandoraircouriertosubordinateunits.Theyhadcomputersforanalysis,wordprocessing,andespeciallyintelligence.Butintheend,thecentralfocusofallthefriendlyandenemyinformationwasapapermappostedbyhand,notalarge-screencomputermonitor.Itwasaroundthatmapthattheyheldtheirdiscussions,andwhereFranksmadewhatever
-
decisionshemadeintheCPandwherehegaveguidance.
Duringthewar,FrankswouldnotstayinthemainCP,butinthesmaller,moremobileTACCPclosertothefight.Hewantedtobeupfront,wherehe'dhaveamoreprecisefeelforthebattle.
InRiyadhaswell,thebattlewastrackedonpapermaps.Inorderfor
-
informationaboutfriendlyandenemyunitstobeaccuratelyandtimelypostedonthosemaps,thestaffhadtorelyonvoicephonecallsandwrittensituationreportsthatwerehoursold.Insuchasetup,wheretherewasnoautomaticandsimultaneouselectronicupdatingofthesecommonsituationaldisplays,youhadabuilt-inprescriptionformisunderstanding.
-
EARLIERTHATDAY
Frankslethisattentionstraybackovertheeventsoftheday,andespeciallyhisvisitstotheunits.
Hehadgoneallaroundthecorpstalkingtocommanders,
-
lookingsoldiersintheeye,shakingtheirhands,bangingthemontheback,handingoutVIICorpscoins,sayingafewwords,suchas"goodtogo,""goodluck,""trustyourleaders,we'vegotagreatschemeofmaneuverhere,""theIraqiswillneverknowwhathitthem."Andhehadcalledouta"JAYHAWK"ortwo.
Hewantedtoshow
-
confidenceandtogetasenseoftheelectricitygoingthroughtheunits.AndhefoundtobetruewhathehadreportedtoSecretaryCheneyandGeneralPowellon9FebruaryinthefinalbriefinginRiyadh:"VIICorpsisreadytofight."Soldierswereallpumpedup.Therewassomeoftheusual"kicktheirass"typeofthing,"theIraqisaremessingwiththewrongguys."Soldier-to-soldier
-
chatter.
Forthemostpart,thetroopsandleadersweregoingabouttheirworkwithanairofquietprofessionalism.Theyweredoingsmallthingsthatcount,suchascleaningweapons,checkingfuel,checkingoilintheirvehicles,anddoingalittlemaintenanceontheirvehicles.
Duringhisvisitswith
-
commandersthatday,Frankshadtalkedaboutsomeofthepiecesoftheattackmaneuver.Thoughbythistimetheyhadbeenoverthebasicmaneuvermanytimes,hewantedtoreviewsomeofthedetailsagain.Forexample,hewantedtolookoverthecoordinationbetweenthe1stArmoredDivisioncomingupontheleftofthe2ndCavalry.Thatis,hewantedtoreviewhow
-
the2ndCavalry,whichwasinitiallycovering--infrontof--boththe1stADand3rdAD,woulduncoverthe1stAD--getoutfrominfrontofthem--sothat1stADcoulddashforwardtoal-Busayyah,whichwastheirinitialobjective(calledObjectivePurple),about140kilometersfromtheattackstartpoint.
HehadalsotalkedtoMajorGeneralGeneDaniel,
-
hisdeputy,aboutthetaskforceheadquartersthatDanielwouldheadupatthebreach.Sincethe1stInfantryDivision,theBritish,theCorpslogisticselements,twoCorpsartillerybrigades,andperhapsthe1stCavalryDivisionhadtopassthroughthebreach,heneededacommandertherewhocouldmakesurethatprocesswentwithoutletup,andwhocouldmakethenecessary
-
adjustmentsonthespot.(The1stCavalryDivisionwasthetheaterreserve;itwasexpected--butnotcertain--thatthisdivisionwouldbeaddedtotheVIICorpsattack.)
Andhewenttovisitthe1stCAVagain.Hisintentionhadbeentoattendthememorialservicefortwosoldierskilledon20FebruaryduringdivisionactionsintheRuqi
-
Pocket,3butbecauseofGPSnavigationproblems(notthatunusualinahelicopter),hehadn'tarrivedatthedivisionuntiltheservicewasover.However,hewasstillabletostayaroundandtalktothetroopsandcommanders.Ithadbeenanemotionalmoment,visitingsoldierswhohadjustlostfriendsincombat.Heknewwellthatdeathincombatissuddenand
-
usuallyunexpected,eventhoughyouknowitwillhappen.Andhewasremindedagainoftheinnersteelrequiredofsoldiersandleaders.Soldierswerespeakinginsofttonesabouttheaction.Whiletheywereclearlytouchedbythelossoftheirbuddies,theywerenotabouttobackoff.Theywerereadytogoagain.
Hedrewtwolessonsfrom
-
thefirsthandaccountsheheardoftheactionthatmorning:First,the1stCAVwasabletostrikebackhardwithacombinationofgroundmaneuver,artillery,andairandseverelypunishtheIraqis.Second,theIraqiscoulddeliverheavyandaccuratefiresifyouhappenedtodriveintotheirpredetermineddefensivearea.
Atthe1stInfantry
-
Division,hevisitedColonelBertMaggart'sfirstbrigade.Maggart,hiscommanders,andhisbrigadestaffgavehimathoroughbriefingontheirattackplansintheirTACcommandpost(threeM577sparkedsidebysidewithcanvasextensionsoffthebacktoformasmalltwenty-five-by-thirty-footworkarea).Theyneedednonotesorreferences.Theyhadbeenoveritmanytimesbefore.
-
Theirsoldierswerekeyedup,readytogo;plansfortheattackweresetandrehearsed;soldiershadconfidenceintheirleadersandtheirabilitytoaccomplishthemission.Youcouldseeitintheireyes.Youcouldhearitintheirvoices.Becausetherehadbeenlotsofpredictionsaboutthetimingoftheattack,thetroopsweregettingalittleimpatientwithallthefitsandstarts.Bynowtheywantedto
-
getintoitandfinishitandgohome.
Hefoundthesameattitudeinboththe3rdandthe1stArmoredDivisions."We'retrained,weknowwhattodo,"trooperstoldhimagainandagain.Andhe,too,wassayingthesamethingagainandagain:"We'reready,we'retough,we'retrained.Justlookoutforeachother,followyourleaders,and
-
knowwhatthehellyou'redoing."Hegotquickstatusreportsfrombothdivisioncommanders.
Atthe1stArmoredDivision,thespiritofoneunitespeciallytouchedhim,andhespentthebetterpartofanhourwiththem.TheywereaBradleyplatoon,the1stPlatoon,CompanyC,1stBattalion,7thInfantry,3rdBrigade,3rdInfantry
-
Division.Theycalledthemselves"Raiders"andtheirmottowas"Getsome."TheplatoonleaderwasFirstLieutenantDougMorse,andtheplatoonsergeantwasStaffSergeantJamieNarramore.Theywerereadyandtoughandnotwithoutasenseofhumor.Theyhadcomposedasongandsangitforhim,aprofanedescriptionofhowtoughtheywereandwhattheywereabouttodotothe
-
Iraqis.Hewasn'tsurehowtheyhaddoneit,buttheyhadputeverycusswordheknewinthere."Thanksfornotcourt-martialingus,"SergeantNarramoretoldhimafterward.TheyhadevengottenhimtosignhisnameonaBradleyforgoodluck,andFranksandthetwenty-eightplatoonmembershadposedforateampicture.Afterthewar,justbeforetheygotontheplanetogohome,
-
FranksandtheRaidershadamini-reunion;theytoldhimsomewarstories.Theyhadnothadanyonewoundedorkilledintheaction.HestillhastheRaiderspictureonhiswallathome.
Someoftheleadersweregoingthroughlast-minuterockdrillswhenhevisited.Ina"rockdrill,"leadersgooutinthesandandmarkoutapieceofgroundwithwhite
-
engineertapetomakeascaledreplicaoftheiractualanticipatedbattlearea.Then,usingrocksasuniticons,theymovetherockstoshowhowtheyplantomovetheirunitsinrelationshiptooneanother,theterrain,andtheenemy.
Basedonwhathe'dseeninVietnam,thetroopswereinabouttherightframeofmindandkeyedupproperly.InVietnam,anothergeneration
-
ofAmericansoldiershadgoneacrosshalftheworldtodowhattheircountryhadasked;andtacticallythey'ddoneitaswellasanyothergenerationofAmericancombatsoldierscould.Butthistimeitwasgoingtoenddifferently.Theyallwouldseetothat.
-
REFLECTIONS
FrankswasproudofhisVIICorpsteam.Afterlookingbackovertheday'svisits,hethoughtagainabouttrust--andmadeaquickinventoryofwhatheneededtodotofulfillthattrust.
-
Hehadgoneoverhis"commander'sintent"withhiscommandersanumberoftimes.Thisistheconciseexpressionofhowyouvisualizetheoperation,anditisalwayswrittenbythecommanderpersonally.Intheabsenceofspecificorders,itcouldbeusedasoperatingguidelines.Bynowhethoughtitwasclearandwellunderstood.Itread,
-
IintendtoconductaswiftseriesofattackstodestroyRGFCandminimizeourowncasualties.Speed,tempo,andacoordinatedair/landcampaignarekey.IwantIraqiforcestomovesothatwecanattackthemthroughoutthe
-
depthoftheirformationsbyfire,maneuver,andair.Thefirstphasesofouroperationwillbedeliberateandrehearsed,thelatterwillbemoreMETT-Tdependent.Wewillconductadeliberatebreachwithprecisionandsynchronization,resultingfrom
-
precisetargetingandcontinuousrehearsals.Oncethroughthebreach,Iintendtodefeatforcestotheeastrapidly,withonedivisionaseconomyofforce,andtopassthreedivisionsandACRaspointofmainefforttothewestofthataction,to
-
destroyRGFCinafast-movingbattlewithzonesofactionandagileforcesattackingbyfire,maneuver,andair.CSSmustkeepup,becauseIintendnopauses.Wemuststrikehardandcontinuallyandfinishrapidly.
-
Franksthenturnedhisattentiontoaspecificskill:theabilitytopictureoperationsinhishead,andtojudgetime/distancefactorstogettherightunitsintherightcombinationattherightplaceattherighttime.Frankscalledthis"orchestrating"thebattle.Howwouldwedo?Howwouldhiscommanders?
TheArmyhadgivenFrankslotsofopportunitiesto
-
practiceanddevelopthisskill,fromplatoonleadertocorpscommander.Thattrainingandsomeexcellentmentorshadalottodowiththehoningofhisability,ashadthecrucibleofVietnam.Butitwasnotonlyamatterofpracticeandexperience;italsohadtodowiththewaythebrainworked--withimagination.
Allheknewwasthat
-
somehowhecouldseeabattleclearlyinhishead,relatethephysicalandsoldierpiecestogether,andfigurehowlongitwouldtakeadivision,forexample,toturnthreebrigadesninetydegrees,ortomarktwenty-fourlanesofaminefieldbreach,ortocloseanartillerybrigadeonamovingdivision,ortoclosethreedivisionsonacommonobjective.
-
Somecommanderswerebetterthanothersatorchestratingabattle.Forsomeitwasalearnedskill;forothersitcamemoreeasily.Fortheconductofbattletheywereabouttowage,itwasindispensable.ButFranksfeltallhiscommandershadit.Hehadhadtheopportunitytomakehisownjudgmentsaboutallofthemduringtheirtimetogetherthesepastfew
-
months.
AtThirdArmyhetrustedJohnYeosock.Eventhoughhehadnotcommandedacorps,Yeosockunderstoodallthis,asdidhisG-3,BrigadierGeneralSteveArnold.Seniortothem,Frankswasnotquitesure.Hewasneversure,especiallyatCENTCOMinthebasementoftheMODbuildinginRiyadh,howVIICorps
-
maneuverswouldbeinterpreted.Asithappened,theperceptionthereofwhatitwouldtaketomaneuverthislarge,multidivision,146,000-soldierarmoredcorpsinacoordinatedattackofover200kilometerswasverydifferentfromhowitwasonthesceneinIraqandKuwait.Thisdifferenceinperceptionwouldleadtocontroversieslater.
-
Alliedtothislastissuewasacommunicationsmatterthatdidnotconcernhimthen--CENTCOMHQ'spictureofboththeenemyandfriendlysituation.Inlightoflaterevents,herealizeditshouldhave.
Wouldtheirpicturebethesameashisown?Wouldhismaincommandpost(itselfmanykilometersfromhislocationandthebattle)be
-
abletotrackthebattlecloseenoughtokeepThirdArmyinformedandtoaccuratelywritetherequireddailycommander'ssituationreports?AndthenwouldthisinformationgetpassedaccuratelytoCENTCOM?WouldJ-3(CENTCOMoperations)evenpayattentiontowhatasinglecorpswasdoing?Orwouldthatgetrolledupinabigpicture?WouldCENTCOMbeaware
-
ofthenormaltime-infolagofgroundoperationsreportsandsituationaldisplays?Andthenwouldtheyaskforanupdatebeforemakingdecisionscriticaltogroundops?WherewouldFranks'shighercommanderschoosetolocatethemselvesduringtheconductofthegroundwar?WouldtheycomeforwardintoIraq,wherehewouldbeinordertogetafirsthandfeelforthefight?And,finally,
-
shouldhetalktoSchwarzkopfduringthewar?Orshouldhecommunicateprimarilywithhisimmediatecommander,JohnYeosock?
HewasconfidentthathissubordinatesatVIICorps'smaincommandpostwouldgetthecommunicationjobdone.Theywereasmart,talented,skilledgroup.TheywouldcertainlyreportthecorrectpictureofVIICorps's
-
actionstoThirdArmy.
POSSIBLEuseofchemicalandbiologicalweaponswasabigconcern,however.HadtheygottentoalltheIraqiartillerycapableofreachingthe1stInfantryDivisioninthebreachorthefollow-onunitspassingthroughthebreach?Theyhadnowayofcompletelyknowing.No
-
otherissuemadeFranksfeelsomuchangerattheIraqileadershipastheirpossibleuseofchemicalorbiologicalwarfare.
VIICorpswasface-to-facewiththepossibilitythattheIraqiswoulduseoneorboth.Theyhadthem.TheyhadusedthemontheirownpeopleandagainstIran.Therewasnothingintheirbehaviororbattletendencies
-
thatindicatedtheywoulddoanythingdifferentthistime.Frankstrulyexpectedit.
TheVIICorpscommandersandsoldierswerenotintimidatedbyanyofthis,however.Foralongtime,theyhadtrainedinchemicalprotectivegearinNATOandU.S.trainingexercises,fullyexpectingtheWarsawPacttousechemicals.Ithadallseemed
-
soabstractthen,though.Theywouldenduretheseperiodsoftimeinmasksandchemicalsuits,shoutinginsqueakyvoicesthroughtheirmaskstobeheardontheradio,sweatingeveninthewinterinsidethecharcoalsuits,fumblingastheytriedtolaceupthedamnedrubberbootiessomeonehaddesignedtogoovertheirregularboots,wearingthemonsterrubbergloves,andlaboringtolook
-
throughgunsightswithaprotectivemaskon.Theyhadmadeitworkthroughdisciplinedtraining.Theyhaddoneitsomuchithadbecomeroutineandasourceofconfidence,aslongastheyhadtherightgear.Theyhadgottenthattakencareofafewdaysbefore.Theyhadprotectivemeasures.Theyalsohadantidotes.Theywereready.
-
Biologicalwarfarewasadifferentmatter.Frankswasnotsosureaboutthis.TheyhadhadverylittletrainingagainstbiologicalagentsinGermanyandweremostlyunfamiliarwiththeagents,eventhoughsomeofthem,suchasanthrax,botulism,andsalmonella,werecommonlyknownsicknesses.Theproblemwithbiologicalwarfareisthatthebiologicalagentshaveadelayedeffect,
-
whichmakesdetectionofthesourcedifficult.It'shardtofindevidenceofwhodidit--andthusretaliationisdifficult.TheyhadalltakenacrashcourseonIraqideliverymeans,though.TheVIICorpsNBCofficer,ColonelBobThornton,andG-2(Intelligence)ColonelJohnDavidsonwerehelpfulingettingwhateverinformationwasavailable.Frankswantedtostopalotofrumorsand
-
badinformationgoingaround.HedidnotwantthetroopsintimidatedbyIraqibiologicalwarfarecapability.OfallthecapabilitiespossessedbytheIraqis,itwastheonethatconcernedhimthemost,rightuptotheendofthewar.
HEalsowasawareofsomeotherthingsthatnight--larger
-
issuesbeyondtheactualconductoftheirmission.
ToFredFranks,andtomostofhissoldiersandleaders,whattheywereabouttodowastheirduty,pureandsimple.Theywereprofessionalssenttoskillfullyuseforceasaninstrumentoftheirgovernment(andoftheUN),tocompelaforeignbelligerenttodowhataUNresolutionhadorderedthem
-
todo.Theyknewhowtodothat.Butthiswasnotajihadforthem.Thiswasneithertotalwar,norawartosavecivilization,norawartostopmadmenfromtryingtoenslavethegreaterpartoftheworld.Themissionwasclear:toliberateanationanddriveaninvaderoutinanareaofvitalinterests.Itwasuseofforcetogainspecificstrategicobjectivesattheleastcosttotheirownside--thengohome.
-
ThiswouldaffectFranks'sselectionoftactics;hethoughtitwouldbeirresponsibleofhimandofVIICorpstopayanunlimitedpriceinthelivesoftheirsoldiersforalimitedobjective.Vietnamhadtaughtthemallthat.
PerhapsSFCEdFelderofCompanyD,1stBattalion,37thArmor,1stArmoredDivisionhadsaiditbest:
-
"Nobodywantstogotowar,butwetrainforiteveryday.That'swhatwegetpaidtodo.We'reprofessionals."AndPFCBruceHuggins,atankmechanicofthatbattalion'sheadquarterscompany,said,"Theyaskedforourhelpandwe'regoingtogivethemthathelpandwe'llfreethatcountry.We'lldoourjob,gohome,andcarryonwithlife."
Theendresultwasneverin
-
doubt.Theywouldwin.Forhimasamajorcommanderitwasamatterofselectionofmethodandonethatwouldcomeatleastcosttosoldiersforthemissionassigned.Therewouldbeindividualactsofheroism,astherealwayswere.Butforseniorcommanders,Frankssawnothingparticularlyheroicinwhattheywereabouttodo.Hehadsaidrightfromthestart,"We'llgodowhatwe
-
havetodoandtalkaboutitlater."ThiswasinthemodeofKorea,Vietnam,andPanama.Itwasnotacrusade.
ThatdistinctioncomeshardforAmericans.Inourownhistory,moreoftenthannot,wehavefought"crusades"orusedforcefornationalsurvival:theRevolution,theWarof1812,theCivilWar,WorldWarsIandII.Notonlydo
-
Americanshavelessexperiencewiththeotherkindofwar,buttheytendasamatterofnationalcharacternottobewarlike--eventhoughAmerica'ssonsanddaughtersmakethebestwarriorswhencalledupon.
TheotherfactorthatstayedwithFrankswasVietnam.InthehospitalatValleyForge,wherehehadhadhislegamputated,hehadmadea
-
pledgetohisfellowamputeesandtohisfellowVietnamveterans:"Neveragain."Neveragainwouldyoungmenandwomencomeawayfromabattlefieldonwhichtheywereaskedtorisktheirliveswithoutgainingtheirobjectives,withouthavingthoseobjectivesthoughttobeworththeeffort,withoutanagreementaheadoftimethatthetacticalmethodsneededtoachievestrategicobjectives
-
wereacceptableforthemilitarytouse,andwithoutawordofthankstothosewhowentwhenitwasallover.
FredFrankswasnotinchargeofallthat;buthewasinapositiontosatisfyhimselfasacommanderthatallthesemistakeswouldnotberepeated.Thatconvictionburnedhotinhim,likeablueflame.VietnamwasneverfarfromhimthroughoutDesert
-
ShieldandDesertStorm.Now,thatwasacrusade,atleastforFredFranks.
AnotherfactorhegotoutofVietnamwasarespectforwaranditscosts,andforwhatittakestowin.Whenyou'reonthebattlefield,yougetintofights,eitherdeliberatelyorinsurprisemeetingengagementswiththeenemy,andtheygotintoalotofthoseinVietnam.
-
Franksbelievedthatyouhadtomakeitanunfairfightasrapidlyasyoucould.Youwantedtogetalltheadvantagesonyourside,andtowinthetacticalengagementasrapidlyaspossibleandatleastcosttoyoursoldiers.Thatmeantalotoffirepower.Italsousuallymeantmovingintoapositionaladvantageandbringingbrutalamountsoffiretobearontheenemy,
-
untiltheycalleditquitsandranaway,oryoudestroyedtheircapabilitytocontinue,andcontrolledthearea.Andthatwastheendofit.
InVietnam,"IftheenemyfiredatuswithasingleAK-47round,wepoundedthemwithallwehad.Weputasmuchfirepowerbackonthemaswehad,somuchfirepowerthattheywishedtheyhadn'tstartedsomething."
-
ThatinfluencedhisthoughtsonIraq.Differentcommandersmightdothingsindifferentways,butFranks'swaywas,"Whenwecameintocontactintheareaofmainattack,thenitwasgoingtobewithabigfist.WeweregoingtohammertheIraqisrelentlesslywiththatfistuntilwefinishedthem.Weweregoingtosustainthemomentumofthatattackuntilwewerethroughwith
-
whatwecametheretodo."
Sotheideaof"fairfight"hadnomeaningforFranksinthiscontext.Itseemedtotallyinsanetogivetheenemysomesportingchancetowin.
"Ifyouhavetofight,"Frankslikedtosay,"then100tonothingisabouttherightscoreforthebattlefield.Twenty-fourtotwenty-onemaybeokayintheNFLon
-
Sundayafternoon,butnotonthebattlefield.
"Myinclinationintacticsistomaneuverourforcetobringsomuchcombatpowertobearontheotherforcethatwewillgetthembackpedaling.Iwanttogetthemontheropesandkeepthemthere.Then,whenwe'vegotthemdown,we'llfinishthem.We'regoingtofinishthem.
-
"Ifwehavetofight,thenweweregoingtogoforthejugular,notthecapillaries.
"Butoncewearewinningourbattles,we'vegottolinkthosesuccessfulbattlesinsomepatternordirection,sotheyadduptomeansomethingbigger.Theyhavetoendupaccomplishingyourstrategicaims.Thatiswhyyouarefightingthosebattles.Andthatiswhythetroops
-
whoareriskingitalltowinthosebattlestrustthatthegeneralsandSecretariesofDefenseandPresidentsknowwhattheyaredoing,andwillmakeallthatsweatandbloodcountforsomething."
FromwhatFranksandhiscommandershadseensofar,thecommandclimatewasfardifferentfromtheoneinVietnam.Theycouldfeelthesteelinthewill,fromthe
-
PresidentandtheSecretaryofDefensethroughGeneralPowell,tothetheater.Itwassolid.
FINALLYhewasatpeacewithhimself,asmuchasanycommandercouldbeontheeveofbattle.Histroopsandleaderswereready.Theyhadworkedlikehelltogettowheretheywere,andmost
-
unitshadhadtheminimumtwoweeks'traininghethoughtnecessary.Soldierswereconfidentinthemselves,theirequipment,oneanother,andtheirleaders.FrankshadknownthatwouldcomebecauseofthetraininginSaudiArabiaandtheteam-buildingtheyhadworkedonsincethestartofthemissiontodeployon8November.TheyhadbecometheVIICorpsteamsonecessaryfor
-
successincombat.
On21February,SamDonaldsonofABCNewscametovisitVIICorps.Franksescortedhimtothe2ndACRand1stAD.Whileat1stAD,DonaldsontalkedtomembersofanM1A1tankcompanycommandedbyCaptainDanaPittard.Frankswasnevermoreproudofhissoldiersthanhewaswhenheheardthemtalkofthe
-
missionandofoneanother.SpecialistShawnFreeney,amechanicinHeadquartersCompany,1stBattalion,37thArmor,said,"Itletsyouknowthat,whenitcomesdowntoit,you'rearoundfamily.Allofusherearefamily--righthereismyfamily."
Theyhadpreparedthewayyouwouldforabiggame.Theyhademphasizedskills
-
infundamentalsandteamwork.Theyhadgonethroughsituationdrillsagainstpossiblegamesituations.Theyhadgottentheir"battingpractice"underclose-to-gameconditionsandtheyhadhadsomescrimmages.
ButwhereFranksknewthesportsanalogystoppedwasgametime.Warisdifferent.Groundcombatisphysically
-
tough,uncompromising,andfinal.Theenemycanbeascloseasafewmetersorthousandsofmeters.Thereyoudealintheultimatereality--lifeanddeath.Thereisnohome-and-homescheduling.Thereisnonextyear.Whenit'sover,it'sover;thememoriesandresultsarefrozenintimeforalifetime.Forsomesoldiers,therewouldbenomorelifetimeafterthis.FredFranksknew
-
that,andsodidthey.
Franksthoughtagainofhissoldiersandleaders."HaveIpreparedthemwellenoughforthismission?Ithinkso.Didwehaveaworkableplan?Yes.Havewethoughtofeverything?Probablynot.Haveweignoredanythingmajor?Idon'tthinkso.Arethetroopsready?Yes.Theyknowwhattodo,they'remotivatedbytherightthings,
-
andtheywanttogetthisgoingandgetitfinishedsotheycangohome.Notacomplicatedsetofemotions.Soldiersandunitsgoattwospeeds,all-aheadfullorstop.Therecanbenohalf-stepping,especiallyforamountedattack.We'reready."
HerecalledthensomethingCaptainDanaPittardhadsaidtoSamDonaldson:"My
-
biggestfear,ofcourse,ismakingsureIdon'tdosomethingwrongthatwouldcostsomebody'slifeorsomethingelse.There'snofearonthepersonalside."Healsorecalledtheoldsayingthatgeneralscanlosebattlesandcampaigns,butonlythesoldierscanwin.Hebelievedthat.Healsobelievedthatifhegotthemandtheircommanderstotherightplaceattherighttimeinthe
-
rightcombination,inbattleafterbattle,theywouldtakeitfromthereandwin.
HISthoughtsturnedtoDenise,hiswifeofthirty-oneyears,andtotheirdaughter,Margie,andherfamily.Theywereallaclosefamily;they'dbeenthroughalottogether.DenisewasnowbusyathomeinGermanywith
-
familysupportwork.ForthefirsttimeinthehistoryoftheU.S.Army,theyhadtakenunitsalreadydeployedinonetheater(withfamilies),deployedtoanother,andlefttheirfamiliesoverseas.
SomeonehadaskedDeniseifshewas"goinghome"--thatis,leavingStuttgartandreturningtotheUnitedStates."Iamhome,"shereplied.Thoughtheycouldhave
-
returnedtotheStates,mostfamiliesstayedrightthere.Indoingthat,theywerebreakingnewground,adaptingtonewrealities.AndDenisewasprovidingleadershipandmoralstrengthinherownquietandforcefulway.Shewasshowingherownformofcourage...justaswerealltheotherfamilymembersinGermany.Theywereansweringthecall.Theirfavoritesongwas
-
"FromaDistance."
Franksrememberedallthathe,Denise,andMargiehadbeenthroughduringandafterVietnam.Andherememberedthehospitalrecoveryofalmosttwenty-onemonths.
Beforehe'dleftfortheGulf,hehadpromisedDenisehe'dcomeback"whole"fromthisoperation,butwitha
-
smile,she'dremindedhimthatthatwasnolongerpossible.Theyhadn'tbeenabletophoneeachotheroftenwhilehewasondutyintheGulf.Theonephonecallthey'dhadtothispointinJanuarywastenseandfulloffeeling.
InBadKissingen,Germany,Margie,alsonowanArmyspouse,hadherownfamilyoftwoboysandher
-
husband,Greg.GregwasacaptainintheBlackhorse.Atthatmoment,hewasS-3ofthe2ndSquadron,11thACR,or"Battle3,"thesamejobFrankshadhadinVietnam.NowMargie'sdadwasatwaragain.Denisehadsenthimataperecordingofthefamily,andhewouldlistentoittohearthesoundsoftheirvoices.Familywasrealclose,justlikehisVIICorpsfamily.Theybothinspiredhim.
-
Afterpullinghistankersuitpantlegoverthetopsohedidnothavetoremovetheboot,Franksunstrappedhisprostheticleg.Hesetitwherehecouldreachitinthedark,thenpulledthesleepingbagoverhim,saidaprayerforhistroopsandthathewouldhavethewisdomtodowhatwasright,andsleptsoundly.
-
CHAPTERTWO
Duty
MAJORFredFranksfoughtinVietnamwiththe11thArmoredCavalryRegiment,the"Blackhorse,"fromAugust1969,whenhearrived,toMay1970,whenhewasseverelywoundedduringtheCambodian
-
invasion.HehadpreviouslyservedwiththeBlackhorseinGermanyforalmostthreeandahalfyears,fromMarch1960toJuly1963,andhewasgladtobebackinhisoldoutfit.Hewasacavalryofficer;heknewcavalry;cavalrywashishome.AndtheBlackhorsewashisregiment.
LikesomanyAmericansbeforehim,Franksgotoffthe
-
planewithhisfellowsoldiersatLongBinh,Vietnam,readytodohisduty.HehadflownoverinastretchDC-8outofTravisAirForceBase,justnorthofSanFrancisco.Justthedaybefore,hehadsaidgood-byetoDeniseandMargieatthePhiladelphiaInternationalAirportandflowntoSanFrancisco.Hiskidbrother,Farrell,haddriventhemtotheairport,andhismotheranddadmet
-
themtheretosaygood-bye.Itwasaquickforty-eight-hourtransitionfromwhatsoldierscalled"theworld"toacombatzone.
Thefirstthingthathithimgettingofftheplanewastheunmistakablesmell.Itwasacombinationoftheheat,thesmokeintheairfromburningwood,andwhoknewwhatelse.Buthewouldneverforgetit.
-
Fighteraircraftwereparkedcloseby.Heheardsoundsofjetfighterstakingoffandflyingoverhead,aswellastheunmistakableVietnamsoundofUH-1"Huey"helicopterrotorbladesslappingintheair.Hewasintentontakinginasmuchashecould,rightaway,ashethoughtbackonhowhe'dgottenthere.
Aftergraduatingfrom
-
WestPointin1959,Frankshadaskedforandwascommissionedintoarmor.Hewasa"tanker,"andyethesawhimselfasmorethanthat.Thoughtanksarethecenterpieceofcavalry--theygiveititspunch--cavalrygoesbeyondtanks.Armoredcavalryisthefirstteam;ithasacommandfreedom,anesprit,anethos.Inthecavalry,smallunitsoperateacombinationofpotent
-
weaponssystems(intheArmy,thisiscalled"combinedarms")thatgivethemthecapabilitytomovefastandhithard.Onthebattlefield,theseunitsoperateunderdecentralizedleadershipinmissionsthatareoutinfrontofeveryoneelse.
First,though,Frankshadtogothroughsomefundamentals:abasicarmor
-
courseatFortKnox,thenRangerandairborneschoolsatFortBenning.ChestdeeponpatrolinthedarkwatersoftheFloridaswampsandtheninthenumbingcoldoftheDahlonega,intheGeorgiahills,Frankslearnedalotabouthimselfandcombat.ItwasthebestindividualpeacetimetrainingheevergotintheArmy.
Franksdidhisapprentice
-
workinarmoredcavalryalongtheIronCurtainbetweenCzechoslovakiaandWestGermanyduringatimethatincludedthe1961Berlincrisisandthe1962Cubanmissilecrisis.InthecrucibleofdailylifeasayoungtroopleaderintheBlackhorse,helearnedfromtheofficersandnoncommissionedofficersthetough,hardskillsofsmall-unittacticalleadership.CombatveteransofWorld
-
WarIIandKoreadrilledthemoncombatcavalryfundamentalsandtaughtthemtribalwisdomthroughwarstoriesduringthelongnightsatthebordercampsalongtheCzechborder.Likesomanyothers,hedevelopedhistacticalskillsbydoinghisjobdaytodayinthefield,bylistening,workinghard,andbymakingdamn-foolmistakes,andbeingallowedtogetbackupandlearnfrom
-
them.
ForhisfirstfifteenmonthsintheBlackhorse,Frankswasalieutenantleaderofthesmallestcombined-armsunitintheU.S.Army,anarmoredcavalryplatoonofscouts,tanks,mechanizedinfantry,andaself-propelledmortar.Fromtherehewasthesquadron'ssupportplatoonleader,responsibleforleadingtruckresupplyofthe
-
squadron.Forthenexteightmonths,hewasexecutiveofficer(secondincommand)ofacavalrytroop.ThenhecommandedTroopI.
WhenheheadedtoVietnam,itwastheBlackhorseheintendedtobelongto--buthealmostdidn'tmakeit.BythetimeFranksgottoVietnam,thebeginningsoftheU.S.drawdownhadscrewedup
-
theindividualreplacementsystemsobadlythatallorderswerecanceled,andnewreplacementsweresequestereduponarrivaltoawaitneworders.Hewasinstructednottocallanyone.Noway,Franksthought,I'vegottogettoaphone.HegotthroughtoasergeantattheBlackhorseunitatLongBinh."Waitrightthere,don'tgoanywhereelse,we'llbeovertogetyou.Weknewyou
-
werecoming."
Thenextmorning,truetothesergeant'sword,theBlackhorsesentavehicleoverandpickedhimup."MajorFranks?Comewithme,sir.Yourordersareallcutandwe'rereadytogo."WhenFrankssawthatrearingblackhorsepatchonthesoldier'sshoulder,hefeltasthoughhehadseenafamilymember.Actually,hehad.
-
In1969,theBlackhorsewasoneoffourcavalryregimentsonactivedutyintheArmy.Theothers,2nd,3rd,and14th,wereinGermany.TheBlackhorsehadbeenwithdrawnfromGermanyinthesummerof1964andstationedatFortMeade,Maryland.WhenthebigU.S.buildupinVietnambeganin1965,itsoonbecameapparentthatanarmoredcavalryregiment
-
wouldbeavaluableassetinthewar,andthe11thACRwasdeployedtoVietnam,arrivingin1966.Itimmediatelyestablisheditselfasatoughcombatregiment,successfullycompletingawidevarietyofmissionsonmanydifferentterrains.SoonithadinflictedheavypunishmentontheVietCongandtheNVA,theNorthVietnameseArmy.
-
TheArmyisacompetitiveorganization,butFrankswasacompetitiveman.Whenhejoinedthe11thACRinVietnam,hehadnotyetmetawallthatcouldstophim.Iftherewasahurdletoleap--physical,psychological,orintellectual--heleaptit.Ifhefailedthefirsttime,heworkedandtraineduntilhemadeitover.Hewasanathlete;hewasusedtointensetrainingandtohard
-
drills.Andhewasusedtothepayoffthathardtraininggavehim.Thoughatfive-eight,hecouldn'tbecalledphysicallyimpressive,hewasatalentedbaseballplayerwho'dreachedacareerbattingaverageofbetterthan.300ontheWestPointbaseballteam,andbeenteamcaptain.There'sagoodchancehewouldhavesucceededasaprofessionalballplayer.Hewastempted.In1961,thechoice
-
confrontedhim:tobeasoldierorabaseballplayer.Frankschosesoldier.
Therewasalsoinhimafinelytuned,well-developedmind,andin1964,theArmysenthimtoColumbiaUniversitytostudyforanM.A.inEnglish.Afterward,hewasscheduledtoteachatWestPoint.Itwasatwo-yearcourseatahigh-rankingschool,butcharacteristically,
-
hepushedit.Hefinishedthedegreeinayear,inthebeliefthathewouldbesenttoVietnamforthesecondyear,andthentoWestPointfollowingthat.Somehowabureaucraticfoul-upputastoptothat:"Ifwe'vesetyouupfortwoyearsofstudy,"hewastold,"youhavetoputyourselfthroughtwoyearsofstudy."Anditturnedouthecouldn'tgotoVietnamin1965afterall.Daunted,yet
-
stillpushinghard,hecontinuedatColumbiaandcompletedmostofthecourseworkforaPh.D.Thenhewenton,asplanned,toWestPoint,where,onateacher'sschedule,hehadtheopportunitytofinishuphisdaysatareasonablehourandperhapsspendrealtimewithDeniseandMargie(likemostyoungArmyofficers,he'dbeenawaymoreoftenthanhewashome).
-
Don'tcountonit.Hedidgettospendmoretimewiththem,buthealsohitthebooksandcompletedhisPh.D.orals,whilecarryingafullteachingloadandtakingonthejobofassistantvarsitybaseballcoachforthefallandspring.Ontopofthat,hetookacorrespondencecoursefromFortSilltokeephisnuclearweaponsproficiencycurrent,anecessaryskillforofficersinthe1960s.
-
SERIOUSAmericaninvolvementintheVietnamWarbeganin1962.Bythelate1960s,U.S.forceshadgrowntooverhalfamillion,andwiththatincreasecameanumberofplansandprogramsforvictory.Thoughnotallofthemwereillconceived,eventhebestneededtimeforsuccessful
-
completion,andsomecametoolate.TheUnitedStateswasoutoftime.Bythelatesummerof1969,strongantiwarfeelingsintheStates,broughtaboutprimarilybytheever-increasingAmericancasualties,hadcausedPresidentNixontobeginageneralwithdrawal.Atthesametime,hehopedtogivetheSouthVietnamesegovernmentsomechanceatsurvival.Theprogramwas
-
calledVietnamization.ItsaimwastoturnmoreandmoreofthegroundwarovertotheSouthVietnamese,whiletheUnitedStatessimultaneouslyprovidedairandlogisticsassistanceandbegantowithdrawitsowncombattroops.OperationswerelaunchedtoattempttobuytimefortheSouthVietnamese,suchasthecontinuationofthe"secret"bombingsofCambodia,then
-
theinvasionofCambodiainMay1970.Otherswouldfollow.
InAugust1969,theregimentalcommandpostoftheBlackhorsewasatthevillageofQuanLoi.QuanLoiwasjusteastofthemarkettownofAnLoc,fortykilometersfromtheCambodianborderandaboutaforty-five-minutehelicopterrideorafour-hourarmed
-
convoytripfromLongBinh.AC-130-capableairstripwasalsoatQuanLoi,andtheregiment'saircavalrytroopoperatedoutofthere.The11thCavalryrearbasewasatLongBinh,nearSaigon,thelargestU.S.ArmylogisticsfacilityinVietnam.
TheregimentwascommandedatthetimebyColonelJimmieLeach,anexperiencedandaggressive
-
cavalrycommander.AWorldWarIItanker,LeachhadcommandedatankcompanyinGeneralCreightonAbrams's37thTankBattalioninthe4thArmoredDivision.
Oneoftheregiment'smissionswastokeepopenthemajorroadfromLaiKhe,inthesouth,throughAnLoc,toLocNinhtothenorth.Todothisrequiredadailyminesweepoftheroad,plusactive
-
reconnaissanceoftheareatoeithersideofit.Allthreeoftheregiment'ssquadronsandtheaircavalrytroopwereengagedinthisoperation.TheBlackhorseatthetimewasundertheoperationalcontroloftheBigRedOne,the1stInfantryDivision,whoseheadquarterswereatLaiKhe.OthermissionsinvolveddirectattackonNVAunitswhentheywerefoundandfixed,andarea
-
reconnaissanceoftheentireareatokeeptheNVAout.Meanwhile,aspartoftheconsolidationthatwasoneofthefirstconsequencesofVietnamization,the1stInfantryhadbeengivenorderstobegintoredeploybacktotheUnitedStates.Aspartofthatredeployment,theywouldgiveupsomeoftheirrearbasecampsaroundLongBinhandDiAn,andtheBlackhorserearbasewas
-
movedfromXuanLoc,theirhomefromthetimetheycametoVietnam,toLongBinh.Someresidual2ndSquadronelementsweretomovetoDiAn.
WhenFranksreportedforduty,Leachassignedhimto2ndSquadron,butorderedhimbacksouthtoXuanLoctohelpclearupsomeproblemsandtoplantherearbasemovetoDiAn.Franks
-
knewhehadalottolearninashortperiodoftime.
Frankswaswhatthetroopscalleda"fanoogie,"abbreviatedasFNGandstandingfor"f'ingnewguy."Itwasawayforveteranstosetthemselvesapartfromthenewcomersandtotellthenewguysthattheyhadlotstolearnandsomeritesofpassagetogothrough.Therewasanofficialwaytodoit,
-
too--theArmysentallnewcomersthroughafive-daycoursein-countrytoindoctrinatetheminthewaysoftheunitandcombattechniquesandtheenemy.Unfortunately,thosecourseswereatLongBinhandFrankswasatXuanLoc,somedistanceaway.Heneededasubstitutecrashcoursefast.
Thecourseheneededwas
-
rightunderhisnoseatXuanLoc.Frankshadalwaysfeltnewleadersandcommandersshouldspendalotoftimelistening,andnotalotoftimesoundingoff:Whenyoujoinanewunit,youfindmostlysoldiersandleaderswhowanttobelongtoagreatoutfit.Theywantyoutosucceed.Theywantyoutobeabletoleadandcommandthemwell.Givethemachancetotellyouearlyonhowtheythink
-
theycanhelpyoudothat.IthadworkedforhimintheBlackhorsebefore.Gainthesoldiers'confidenceandrespectbytreatingthemthesamewayyouwanttobetreated.Earnyourwayontheteaminahurryandlearnwhileyouaredoingit.Thefirstfewweeksarewhenyoulearntheropesandyoualsomakeafirstimpression,and,likeitornot,assoonasyougetthere,youarebeingsized
-
upbythesoldiers,yourpeers,andyoursuperiors.Theywillputyouthroughbothformalandinformalritesofpassagetoseewhatyouaremadeof.Youjusthavetobereadytorisetothechallenge.
SoFrankswantedtospendasmuchtimeaspossiblewiththesoldiers,becauseitwasthebestwaytoreadhimselfintothisnewsituation.ManyoftheNCOstherein2nd
-
Squadronhadseenconsiderableactioninthepastmonths.Allhehadtodowasask.Frankswasabletodrawoutoftheminformationaboutthecountryandterrain,theenemy,andaboutsmall-unitfightingtechniquesandtactics.HealsohadtheopportunitytospendtimewithCaptainClaude"Keyes"Hudson,whohadbeencommandingthe2ndSquadronrearbase,had
-
recentlybeenacavalrytroopcommander,andwassoontogohome.Hudsonturnedouttobeawalkingrepositoryoflessonslearned,andFrankspumpedhimformoreinformation.Franksknewhowtofighttroopsandthesquadron.Whathedidnotknowweretheactualtacticalmethodsthatworkedhere,inthisterrain,againstthisenemy.KeyesandtheNCOsgavehimanintroductionto
-
VietnamandtotheBlackhorsehecouldnothavegottenanywhereelse.
Thatwaslucky,becausewhatFrankshadgottenbackintheStateshadn'tbeenanyhelp.Beforeheleft,hehadbeensenttoFortKnoxforastandard"refreshercourse,"whoseaimwastobringofficersuptospeedforserviceinVietnam.Frankscouldn'tbelievewhathe
-
found.TheywereteachingWorldWarIIinCentralEurope,andusinganoldseriesofradiosnolongerinserviceinVietnam.Afterafewdays,he'dstoppedgoingtoclassandsoughtoutVietnamveterans,especiallyBlackhorseveterans,forinformation.Itwasinvaluable,andafarsightbetter.
Thenhegotabreak.
-
LieutenantColonelJimAarstaatwantedhimtocomeforwardtoQuanLoitobecomethe2ndSquadronS-3(inchargeofplansandoperations)whenthecurrentsquadronS-3,MajorJohnGilbreath,wentonRandR.Thoughthejobwasofficiallytemporary,itlookedlikelytobecomepermanent.WhenGilbreathreturned,hewouldprobablybecomethesquadronXO(secondin
-
command)andFrankswouldremainS-3.
ToFranks,thiswasthebestjobyoucouldhaveasamajorintheBlackhorse.IntheU.S.Army,majorsdonotcommand;theclosesttheycouldgettotheactionwasasabattalionorsquadronS-3.Itwasthefirstteam.TobeamajorS-3inaneliteoutfitliketheBlackhorsewasarealhonor,andthetoughest,most
-
challengingcombatjobanarmymajorcouldfind.
Butitsurehappenedfast.JohnGilbreathwasabouttwentykilometerswestofQuanLoioperatingoutofasmallfirebase.FranksaskedGilbreathwhenhewasgoingonRandR.Hesaidtomorrow.Theyhadashorttransitionmeetingaboutthesquadronmissionandhowitwasconductingoperations,
-
thenGilbreathtookhimuponareconnaissanceflightoverthearea.Itwasfastandlow,andtheonlyplaceforhimtoridewasonthefloorinthebackoftheOH-6helicopterasGilbreathpointedouttheterrain,theenemyroutes,andrecentbattlesites.Andthatwasit.HewastheS-3ofthesquadron.He'dbeeninVietnamforalloftwoweeks.Yearslater,Frankswouldrememberthosetwoweeksas
-
hethoughtabouthowmuchtimeVIICorpsneededtoprepareforcombatinSaudiArabia.
Meanwhile,allthiswasnotunfamiliar.TheorganizationwasbasicallythesameasinGermany.Theenemywasdifferent,butitwasapparentthatthesquadronoperatedjustashewouldexpectitto.Thecavalrytroops,includingtheaircavalrytroop,would
-
findandfixtheenemy.Then,whileairandartilleryisolatedthemonthebattlefield,sealedofftheenemyretreat,andsimultaneouslypoundedtheenemywithfires,thebigfistofthetankcompanywouldmaneuveragainstthem,alongwiththecavalrytroops.ThejoboftheS-3--underthecommander--wastoorchestrateitallandbringalltheweaponsintothefightsimultaneously.
-
Asayoungofficerinacavalrytroop,youpickupanenormousamountofexperiencedoingthesethings.You'reinvolvedinoperationswherealargenumberofactionsaregoingonsimultaneously,almostallofthemoutofyoursight.Youneedacreativeimagination.Youhavetoknowwhat'sgoingonbylisteningtoreportsontheradio.Youseesomeofit.
-
Youhearmostofit.Youpictureitinyourmind.Oneactioninthewoods.Anotheroverbytheriver.Anothernearthetown.Maybesomeindirectfirebehindthewoods.Maybesomeattackhelicoptersbetweenthewoodsandthetown.Andmaybesomecloseairsupportcominginalongtheriver.Quickdecisionsarerequired,oftenwithoutseeingitallexceptinyourhead.You
-
havetofiguretime/distancefactors.Canaunitreinforceintime?Cantheybeattheenemytothepunch?Alloftheseactionsarehappeningsimultaneously,andallofthemhappening,muchofthetime,underconditionsofstressandfatigue,inallkindsofweather,andwithcasualties.Andsoasacavalryofficer,yougrowtobeproficientatjugglinghalfadozenorsothoughts
-
simultaneouslyinyourhead,picturingactionsinyourmind'seye,andconstantlymakingjudgmentsaboutwhentoactandwhentoremainsilentandletthingsgoon.
Becausehehadhadsomuchpracticeatthiskindof"battleorchestration"duringhistimeinGermanywiththeBlackhorse,Frankshadnodoubtthathecoulddowhat
-
hehadtoasS-3inVietnam.Itwasamatterofadaptingquicklytothetechniquestobeusedinthisterrainagainstthisenemy,andatthesquadronlevel,insteadofthesmallercavalrytroop.
Andheknewhebettergetitrightfromthestart,becausetherewerealotofsoldiersdependingonit.Theyhadeveryrighttoexpecthimtoknowwhathewasdoing,and
-
ifhedidnotmeasureup,theyhadeveryrighttogetsomeoneelse.
Whenhetookoveras2ndSquadronS-3,thisiswhatFredFrankshadtodealwith:
AnarmoredcavalrysquadroninVietnamnormallyconsistedofaheadquarters,withabout200troops;threeletteredcavalrytroops(2ndSquadrontroops
-
wereE,F,andG),eachwithbetterthan130men;atankcompanyofseventeenM48A3tanksandabout85troops;andahowitzerbatteryofsix155-mmartillerypieces,withabout125troops.Later,the2ndSquadronwouldgettwoeight-inchhowitzers,withaboutfortytroops,andaplatoonof40-mmantiaircraftpieces,whichwasanattachedunitthatwentwiththesquadron.Acombat
-
engineerplatoonfromtheregiment's919thEngineerCompanyalsowentwiththem.Atthattime,thecavalrytroopsdidnothavetanks,butinsteadvehiclesknownasACAVs,ArmoredCavalryAssaultVehicles(M113s),whichwerelightlyarmoredtrackedvehiclesarmedwithmachineguns.Thesquadronalsohadasectionoffourhelicopterstobeusedforcommandand
-
controlofsquadronoperations.ThereweretwoUH-1"Hueys"andtwoOH-6"Loaches."Normally,thesquadroncommanderusedtheUH-1s,andtheS-3usedtheOH-6s.Therewerecrewsforeachaircraftandtheyflewalternatedays,whilethecommanderandS-3fleweveryday.TheregimentalsohadanaviationtroopwithCobraattackhelicoptersandOH-6scouthelicopters.
-
Thesenormallyflewinsupportofdailysquadronoperationsorworkedindependentlyattheregimentalcommander'sdirections.TheCobraswerecalled"red"teams,andthescoutswere"white"teams(cavalrycolorsareredandwhite).Whentheyworkedinpairs(oneCobraandoneLoach),theywerecalled"pink"teams.
-
ThejoboftheS-3wastoplantheoperationsandrunthenervecenterofthesquadron.Underthecommander'sguidance,theS-3woulddeviseaplanthatwouldensurethattheelementsofthesquadroncombatpower--artillery,engineers,tanks,scouts,cavalrytroops,andair--werealltiedtogetherinsomecoherentwaytodowhatthecommanderwanteddoneto
-
defeattheenemyatleastcosttothesquadron.Attheforwardcommandpost,thecommanderandS-3wouldworkoutofthreeM577commandposttrackedvehicles.Theyeachalsohadtheirowncommandtrackedvehicle,M113ACAVs.
Thecommandpostofacavalrysquadronissmallandinformal.Itwas--andis--organizedlikethis:belowthe
-
executiveofficerwasastaff--S-1,S-2,S-3,andS-4(Sisfor"staff").The-1handledpersonnel;the-2handledintelligence;the-3handledplansandoperations;andthe-4handledlogistics.Normally,theS-3wastheseniorofthesefourandcoordinatedwiththem.The2ndSquadronofthe11thACRinVietnamwassetupsothatthepersonnelandlogisticselements,andthe
-
XO,normallystayedatthebasecamp(atQuanLoiatthattime),whiletheoperationalelement(S-2andS-3)wasoutrangingasfarasfiftykilometersfromthere.LieutenantColonelAarstaatwouldchoosewheretobetocommandifafightbrokeout.Therewasafightnearlyeveryday.
ByAugust1969,theenemywasnownolongerthe
-
VietCong,butNorthVietnameseregulars.TheTetOffensiveof1968,whichhasusuallybeenperceivedasadisasterforU.S.forces,wasactuallyacatastrophefortheVietCong.TetvirtuallydestroyedtheVietCongasanoperationalforce.Afterward,theNorthVietnameseArmytookovermilitaryoperationsinthesouth.ThefewVietCongthatwereleftmighthavelaidminesorinvolved
-
themselveswithotherminoractions,butanyseriousengagementsinvolving2ndSquadronwerealwayswiththeNorthVietnamese.Thiswasarmyinthefieldagainstarmyinthefield,atleastfortheBlackhorse.TheNVAwereexcellentlightinfantryandtheywerehardtofindandfix,buttheywerenotguerrillas.
WhenFredFrankstook
-
overasS-3,the2ndSquadronpartoftheregimentalmissionwastokeepopenthehighway--actually,atwo-lanedirtroad--fromAnLoctoLaiKhe,adistanceofaboutthirtykilometers.TheregimentusedtheroadforitsownsupplytoAnLocfromLongBinh,butciviliantrafficalsoneededit.ToestablishthattheSouthVietnamesegovernmentwasincontrolofthearea,thefreeflowof
-
normalciviliantraffichadtoberestored.Bythistime,theBlackhorseandthe1stInfantryDivision,alongwithsomeARVNunits,hadestablishedgoodcontroloverthearea.Thethreatofminesremained,buttheprobabilityofambushesbyNVAunitswaslow.SecondSquadron'smissionwastokeepitthatwaybyaggressivereconnaissancetothewestoftheroadouttodistancesof
-
twentytothirtykilometers.TheretheywouldinterceptanyNVAunitsmovinginthedirectionoftheroad.
InlateAugust,2ndSquadronoperatedoutofafirebaseapproximatelytwentykilometersfromAnLocandtenkilometerswestofthehighway.Theoperationalelementofthemaincommandpost(theS-2andS-3)wasthere,along
-
withthetankcompanyandartillerybattery.Atnight,andinthelocationwheretheyhadbeenoperating,thecavalrytroopssetupatightlaagerforself-protection.
Duringtheday,thesquadronaviationcouldflyovertheconvoysandbeavailableifafightbrokeout.Whenconvoyswerenotoperating(therewasnormallyoneperday),thesquadron
-
wasengagedinaggressivereconnaissanceintroop-sizedoperationalareastothewestoftheroad,wheretheylookedfortheenemyandfrequentlyfoundhim.Thethreatfromgroundattackatthetimewassolowthatthecavalrytroopswerenotinvolvedinprotectingtheconvoys.Butartillerylocationswerespacedinmutuallysupportingpositionsalongtheroad.Thesquadron
-
commanderorS-3wouldflyovertheconvoy,andcoulddealwiththeenemywithfiresavailablefromtheartilleryalongtheroute,orfromcloseairsupportorhelicopterattackaviation.
ItwasduringthistimethatFranksreceivedhisbaptismbyfire.Thisishowheremembersit:
"What'sthat?"I
-
askedmypilot,astherewasapop-popsoundandgreentracerszingedpasttheOH-6helicopter.
"We'retakingfire,"hesaid,turningtheLoachquicklyoutofthearea.
Isuspectedas
-
much.
Thatwasmyfirstexperienceofbeingdirectlyshotatincombat.Itwouldnotbethelast.Youalwayswonderhowyouwillreact.Itgotmyattention.Ifeltthenormalfearrisingtotakecontrol,andIwasinstantlymore
-
aware.Mysenseswereonsuper-alert.Inaninstant,though,yougetontopofthefear,putitaside,andtrytofocusonwhatyouknowyoumustdo.IfoundIcoulddothat.Thatdidnotmakemeunique,butitwasreassuringtopassthatfirsttest.Ialso
-
didnotfeelasthoughthefirewouldhitus.Somehow,asortofcalmcameoverme,andIfoundIwasabletothink,andotherwisedomydutyandhanginthere.Therewouldbemanymoreoftheseonthegroundandintheair.Myreactionwas
-
alwaysthesame,rightupuntilIwaswoundedthesecondtime.OnenightinGermany,IhadaskedCaptainHermWinans,oursquadronS-2andadecoratedKoreanWarveteran,"What'sitliketobeshotat?"Hetoldme,"Thefirsttimeistheworst,and
-
afterfivesecondsyouareallveterans.Don'tworryaboutit.Yourtrainingwillkickin."Abitofold-soldierwisdominanightlychatatourbordercampalongtheCzech-WestGermanborder.Hewasright.
-
Afewdayslater,anARVNinfantryunitwalkedbymistakeintoanareanearourfirebasewhereourengineershadputoutafieldofminesandboobytraps.Theywentoff.Wegotthemontheradioandhadthemfreezeinplace,thenwenttogetthem
-
outviathesafelanes.Isawmyfirstbattlecasualtyasalegwiththebootstillonit,separatedfromtheARVNsoldierwhohadbeenkilled.Younevergetusedtoseeingcasualties,eventhoughyouknowtheyarepartofcombat.Therewouldbemore.You
-
feeleveryone.
Duringthisperiodofalmostthreeweeks,the2ndSquadronhadanumberofengagementswiththeNVA,rangingfromasingleenemyrocketfiredintotheirfirebasetoanNVAcompany-sizeattackagainstoneofthecavalrytroops.Inthecourseoftheseoperations,FrankswoulddoallthethingsanS-3
-
ofacavalrysquadronwoulddoincombat:callinandadjustartilleryfire,callinairstrikes,maneuverforcesontheground,andinabattle,orchestrateallthefireandmovementsimultaneouslyoverasingleandtightlydisciplinedradiofrequency.NoU.S.soldierswerelosttoenemyaction.Althoughhewasnotyetaseasonedcombatveteran,hewasachangedsoldierfromtheone
-
ofthreeweeksbefore.
InearlySeptember,LieutenantColonelGrailBrookshirereplacedAarstaatassquadroncommander,andofficiallymadeFredFranksthe2ndSquadronS-3(andGilbreaththeXO).Forallhehadlearned,however,Franksknewhehadalongwaytogo.Healsowasawarethathehadtoexecutewhilehegrewincombatexperience.Hedid
-
notwanthisgrowthtobeattheexpenseofthesoldiers.Overthenextninemonthsofcombat,hewouldformsomeverydefinitivethoughtsabouthowtowinatleastcosttohissoldiers.Somewereconfirmationsofthingshe'ddevelopedfrompreviousexperienceintraining,education,andcommand.Somewereadirectresultofseeingwhatworkedincombat.Theywerebothparts
-
ofbeingasoldier--mattersofthemindandmattersoftheheart.Forsoldieringinvolvesmuchthinkingandintenseproblemsolving,butitisalsoanintenselypassionateprofession,becauseincommand,inordertodoyourduty,youputinharm'swaythatwhichyouhavecometolovesomuch--yoursoldiers(asMichaelShaarasaidsowellinhisCivilWarnovel,TheKillerAngels).
-
FredFranksknewwhatmadeunitsgreatinpeacetimetraining.Hewasnowtoseewhatmadeaunitgreatincombat.Andhewastolearnthattheywerethesame.
-
THEMINDOFA
COMMANDER4Manypartsmakeupa
commander--manyattitudes,skills,experiences,andconvictions.Someofthesearefundamentalandeternal--duty,honor,country,courage,
-
integrity,loyalty,patriotism.Othersaremoreparticularandpersonal;theygrowanddevelopovertime.Theparticularconstellationofattitudes,skills,experiences,andconvictionsthatFredFranksbroughtto2ndSquadron,andwhichgrewanddevelopedduringhismonthsinVietnam,latercharacterizedhisperformanceasacommander,uptoandincludinghiscommandof
-
VIICorpsinDesertStorm.Youdon'tunderstandFredFranksunlessyouunderstandthese.
Let'sstartwiththeblindinglyobvious.Whenyoufightincombat,youdon'tfighthalfway.Fightingisforkeeps.Whenyouplayball,youwalkawayfromthegame.Youlosetoday,youplayagaintomorrow.Butincombatthestakesarefinal.It
-
canbringaboutthedeathsofpeopleyou'veworkedwith,areresponsiblefor,andcareabout,oryourowndeath.Youdon'tgetsecondchances.Thismeans,asI'vealreadyindicatedFredFranksisfondofsaying,whenyouwin,youdon'twanttowinclose.Youdon'twantdrama.Youwanttowin100-0,not24-23.Inotherwords,there'snoroomforsloppiness.Andthere'snoroomforlapsesinalertness.
-
Itmeansthatwhenyou'reasoldier,youwantnotjustasmalledgeoveryourenemy,butaslargeanedgeasyoucanget.Thus,whereyoucan,youwanttoworkyourunitsintosituationswherethedifferencebetweenwinningandlosing,orbetweenlifeanddeath,doesnothangonactsofextremecourage--oronMedalofHonor-winningbravery.Itmaycometothatandthemissionmight
-
demandit,butyoutrytoworkitsothoseactionsaddtotheedge.Forasoldier,ordinarycourageshouldbemorethanenough(andordinarycourageisnotatalleasy!).Ordinarycouragemeansdoingwhatyou'resupposedtobedoingaswellasyoucan;anditmeansnotlettingdownthosewhodependonyou.Actsofordinarycouragesometimesrequireextraordinary
-
measures...butthat'sanotherstory.
Whatgivesthemtheedgetheyneed?Herearetheways,asFrankscametoknowthem:
-
Soldiers
Frankswastoconfirmwhathealreadyknew:Itallstartswiththesoldiersthemselves.Itistheirtrainingandcourage,andthequalityoftheirnoncommissionedofficerandofficersmall-unitleadership,thatwin.
-
Inthoseearlydaysofcombat,FranksquicklysawthattherealheroesofVietnamwerethesoldierswhobyandlargehadbeendraftedandwhohadcometoVietnamtodowhatourcountryhadaskedthemtodo.Inthe2ndSquadronFranksfoundatight-knitteamwhowerefiercelyproudoftheunitandwholookedoutforoneanother.Theylivedoutoftheirvehiclesformonths
-
onend,fightingfromthem,livinginthem.Dayafterdaytheywouldgoontheirmissions,lookingfortheenemyandonmostdaysfindinghim.BylateAugust1969,theyhadbeenatitconstantlyforalmostsixmonths.Frankswantedto