T8 B3 Boston Center Joe Cooper Fdr- 9-23-03 3 Versions MFR- 2 Sets Handwritten Notes 745

8/14/2019 T8 B3 Boston Center Joe Cooper Fdr- 9-23-03 3 Versions MFR- 2 Sets Handwritten Notes 745

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[Classification]MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview withJoeseph Cooper, Traffic Managem ent Unit Coordinator.Type of event: InterviewDate: Monday, September 22, 2003Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by: Geoffrey BrownTeam Number: 8Location: FAA Boston Air Route Center, Nashua, New Ham pshireParticipants - Non-Comm ission: John R. Donn elly, FAA Senior Attorney [(781) 2387045]Participants - Com mission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion ofth e interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

Joe Coo per has been with the FAA since 1991 at Area B, and has been w ith the T MUsince 1999. At TMU Cooper generally manages traffic flows an d considers TMU to bethe "hub" of traffic for Boston C enter. The ZBW TM U comm unicates with ZBW sectorsan d coordinates what is ongoing in ZBW airspace with the TMUs of other national aircenters. Cooper identified TMU positions as departure spacing, en route spacing, arrivalflow, military coordinator, and severe weather management. The en route spacingcoordinator is responsible for the "metering" of air craft - a t about 38 crossing into a newair space per hour. T he military coordinator is responsible fo r clearing airspace fo rmilitary training purposes. Al Trav is the term used when the military makes an "altitudereservation" - they receive these reserva tions wh en they plan on using an air "track" fo rmid-flight refueling. Reservations for this space can be done through Herndon CommandCenter. Herndon also handles any national severe weather coordination. Cooper neverdeals with the ROC or the W OC.On 9/11, Cooper first heard from Pete Pesqu ili in Area B that AA11 had lostcommunication capabilities and radar. T he next step was for one of the T MU personnelto contact compan y. Cooper reme mbers thinking it odd that an air carrier wo uld looseboth at once. T MU pulled th e call sign for AA11 to monitor th e flight. Controllers werealerted to move ai r craft away from th e possible route of AA11 since th e altitude was


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would return to base.The facility manager then ordered everyone evacuate ZBW except for one supervisor perarea, one controller pe r area, and two TM U personnel.Cooper is clear that any suspicion of another airborne threat the DEN line is the absolutefirst place to report to. It is open at all times. Cooper is not aware of how he would get themilitary involved excep t to use the DEN line.NOT E: Cooper provided Comm ission staff with a personnel account of the events of 9/11through his perspective.


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Commission SensitiveMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview withW illiam Dean, Traffic Management Unit SpecialistType of event: Recorded InterviewDate: Monday, S eptember 22 , 2003Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by: Geoffrey BrownTeam Num ber: 8Location: FAA Boston Air Route Center, Nashua, New HampshireParticipants - Non-Commission: John R. Donnelly, FAA Senior Attorney [(781) 23 87045]Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NOT E: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases th e response an d opinion ofthe interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

BackgroundDean joined FA A in 1985 at Albuquerque Center. He has been a TrafficManagement Unit (TMU) specialist for the past four years, has worked at BostonApproach Traffic Control and at Logan Tower. He also has experience as an Air TrafficController (AT C) in Area E at Boston Center. As a TM U specialist Dean is responsiblefor smoothing the flow of traffic to busy airports. He gets heavily involved in cooperatingwith other centers on the flow of air traffic.

Morning of 9/11On 9/11 Dean started in TM U, but then went to Area E, Kingston Sector, RA20,to perform his 8 hours per month of man datory controller duty. He was operating as JohnHartling's Radar Associate. This was at about 0800 EDT and Kingston Sector isrelatively busy at that time of day. Athens Sector RA38 [Shirley Kula] called with areport of an unusual situation involving a flight with no transponder and notcommun icating (NORDO ). Dean stated that NO RDO wasn't unusual prior to 9-11, butthat no transponder signal was. Kula informed Dean that the last known altitude forAA11 was FL 290 (29,000 ft). Dean doe s not recall if the flight was off course at thatpoint, but assumes that was the case.After the situation with AA 11 began to escalate, Dean unplugged from the RAposition and reported to the TM U. At the TM U w atch desk Dean remembers making


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several calls. TMU , Colin Scoggins, called the Northeast Air Defe nse Sector (NEA DS) tofind assistance, and thought there might have been air defense fighters in Rome, NewYork w here NEA DS w as located. Dean stated that the inform ation conduit to the militarywas "muddled", and that he wo uld have expected a better procedure for the FA A toreceive quick military assistance. He had never been involved in a situation in hisexperience in wh ich the FAA called for military fighters, but had been involved insituations in which the m ilitary requested FA A controllers to assist in locating targets.Dean said that there "was not a lot we can do." Other than contact the militarythey would have to get Herndon [Air Traffic Control System Command Center] to letother Centers know there was a problem. No one likes to work fast moving primarytargets. The Controllers responsibility is to notify the supervisor w ho will, in turn, notifythe watch desk. Concerning AA11, they had a data block, some primary returns an d weretrying to verify its altitude. They thought he was heading to Miam i or Havana. Theyworked with New York Center, learned of the suspicious communications an d turnedUAL 175 out of the wa y. UA L175 w as acting completely normal, but didn't sayanything about the suspicious transmissions it heard until it reached New Yo rk air space.They called New Yo rk Center, Sector 56, but did not talk to New Y orkTRAC ON. According to Dean, Boston Center left the aircraft at altitude [29,000 ft] inthe handoff but had noted that he seemed to be moving faster. Boston Center then wentback to what else was going on.

NORDO, Transponder and Course Deviation anomaliesPre 9-11 the standard procedure to handle a NORDO aircraft was common sense:check the frequency of the plane's previous sector; attempt to contact the plane throughcompany [American Airlines]; or attempt contact through Airlnc [a commercial meansof sending text m essages to cockpits from the ground. Dean stated that ap proximately80 % of airspace users subscribe to Airlnc.Lost transponders, though rare, are mainly associated with older m ilitary aircraft.He believes he has seen it happen with com mercial airlines five or six times in the courseof his career. He has never seen an aircraft with no transponder, N ORD O and with aserious deviation from course. Regarding transponder loss, Dean noted the ATC willrequest the crew recycle the transponder.Dean stated that a primary target is difficult to track, and that for a primary targetto enter another center's airspace it must have permission. When AA11 went into NewYork Center airspace, New York w anted to know w ho had given it permission. W hentagging a primary, Dean explained that the ATC mu st manually select the primary target,an d associate a data block with that target.

Hijack proceduresPre-9-11 Dean noted that the AT C is trained to respond to signals from thecockpit - either direct verbal confirm ation, the confirmation of squawking the 7500transponder code, or the use of code words - and then relay that information to thesupervisor.There was a military num ber for NEA DS, and there were hard lines. Deanestimated that Boston could contact NEA DS in less than 15 seconds, but noted that


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getting in touch with NEAD S and com mun icating the urgency of the situation, thengetting an actual response are two very different timetables. Since 9-11 procedural detailson receiving military aid are extensive, but may also be confusing in a real-timeemergency.The policy for a "traditional" hijacking, according to D ean, is detailed in the FAA

M anual 7610.4 section on Spec ial Operations and Proced ures. This section also coversthe procedure for military aircraft shadowing planes, but Dean had no knowledge of alocal document o n how to handle hijacks. He noted that there is proficiency training o n ayearly basis for ATC s, but that even though the exercises covered a variety of situations,the real time encountering of such situations can be difficult for a controller to handle.Dean views the current approach to air traffic security as "a bit of an overkill", bu t

believes it is positive that the FAA is taking security serious. He noted that one of theprocedures now is that a superviser can advise an AT C to tell a pilot to do a 360 degreeturn to verify that everything on board is fine. He noted that this can be difficult whenthere is a good amount of traffic, and that functional control by the ATC of airspace iscritical to perform ing these verifications.Staff learned from Dean that after 9/11 Patricia Garabonne (sp) at theNortheastern ROC conducted an informal review of the events of that day. Staff pursuedthat lead and received the record that after action review as part of the FAA response tothe subpoena action.


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Commission SensitiveM E M O R A N D U M F O R T H E R E CO R D

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview withJoseph Cooper, Traffic Managem ent Unit C oordinator.Type of event: InterviewDate: Monday, September 22 , 2003Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by: Geoffrey BrownTeam Number: 8Location: FAA Boston Air Route Center, Nashua, New HampshireParticipants - Non-Comm ission: John R. Donnelly, FAA Senior Attorney [(781) 2387045]Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey BrownNO T E: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion ofthe interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript fo r a com plete acc ount.

BackgroundJoe Cooper has been with the FAA since 1991, primarily working in Area B. He

has been with the Traffic Management U nit (TM U) since 1999. At TMU Coopergenerally manages traffic flows and considers T MU to be the "hub"of traffic for BostonCenter. T he Boston T M U communicates with Boston sectors an d coordinates w hat isongoing in Boston airspace with the TMUs of other national centers. Cooper identifiedT MU positions as departure spacing, en route spacing, arrival flow, military coordinator,an d severe weather management. The en route spacing coordinator is responsible for the"metering" of air craft - at a rate of about 38 aircraft entering into a new air space perhour.

T he military coordinator is responsible for clearing airspace fo r military trainingpurposes. "Al Trav" is the term used when the military makes an "altitude reservation" -they rece ive these reservations wh en they plan on using an air "track" for mid-flightrefueling. Reservations for this space can be done through H erndon C omm and Center.Herndon also handles any national severe weather coordination. Cooper never deals withthe Region Operations Center or the Washington Operations Center.Morning of 9-11

On 9-11, Cooper first heard from Pete Pasquali in Area B that AA11 had lostcom munication capabilities and radar. The next step was for one of the T MU personnelto contact company (American Airlines). Cooper remembers thinking it odd that an air


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carrier would loose both radio and transponder at once.TM U pulled the call sign for AA11 to monitor the flight. Controllers were alertedto move air craft away from the possible route of AA11 since the altitude was unknown;the last registered altitude was FL 290.At that point Area C told TM U that AA11 was apossible hijack. Terry Biggio told Bob Jones [Quality Assurance] to "pull the tapes" (the

record of communication between the pilots and the ATC).AA11 veered to the right. Th e primary target ha d been tagged, so the data blockof the last known information stayed with the primary. At first, with only three factors, noradio, no transponder, and serious course deviation Cooper thou ght AA11 hadexperienced serious electrical damage. But after the hard left turn and the confirmation ofa hijack through the cockpit communication, there was no doubt in Cooper 's mind.After Bob Jones confirmed the cockpit communications, Dan Bueno askedCooper to call for military assistance. H e asked Hu ntress to send F16s out of O tis AirForce Base. Cooper did not know the physical location of Huntress [Rom e, New York ].Cooper asked Bradley {Hartford CN International Airport] to stop departures headed

towards New Y ork when A A11 was roughly five miles south of Albany.When speaking with the military, Cooper believes he spoke with Sergeant Powell.Cooper was un aware of any specific military exercises that were taking p lace on 9/11.Cooper believes there was a lack of understanding on the m ilitary's part of the FAAdefinition of "primary target", but he was eventually able to give the military a roughlatitude and longitude location. C ooper thought they m ight vector an aircraft from theFalcon Axe area [over Griffiss AFB, Rom e NY] that is composed of airspace 7,000 ft to49,000 ft.Concerning the attempt to gain an altitude on AA 11, Cooper believes that C olinScoggins asked the m ilitary to use its height finding capability on AA 11. [Staff note: theJoint Surveillance System radars feed both FAA and NORAD sites. The NORADportion of that feed can determine altitude on a primary-only target, the FAA feedcannot.]Cooper stated that Terry Biggio, the Boston Operations M anage r in Charge, wason a conference call that included New York Tracon and New Y ork Center. He does notbelieve those calls were recorded, but the hotline on the New York side m ay have beenrecorded. They were still attempting to locate AA11 when Terry Bigg io told the TM Uthey lost radar contact with AA11, and shortly after that one of the facilities personneltold the TMU a plane hit the WT C. Coop er wen t to the TV at the facilities and Cooperimmediately knew it was AA11.Cooper was caught in "disbelief, but he then imm ediately thought of the strainon his controllers w ho were attempting to slow d own traffic. New York Center thencalled an d informed B oston C enter of a possible second hijacking and that New Yorkairspace was being shut down. Cooper stopped al l departures planned through New Yorkair space. He then heard of the second hit on the W TC.He imm ediately realized that control in order to keep the planes still in the skywas all he could do. He told Dan Bueno that m aybe they should call ATC Zero. Bu enosaid to do it, and they sent out the message for a Boston ATC Zero.


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They reviewed more of the audiotape and Biggio relayed the "we have someplanes" through the conference call. The Pentagon then got hit and Herndon called for aNational Ground Stop.

Cooper discovered that UAL 175 was also a Boeing 76 7 headed to Los Angeles.The TMU decided to check for planes in the air that were also flight planned from Loganto Los Angeles. They found that Delta Flight 1989 was a similar flight and imm ediatelyinformed Cleveland Center.NE AD S was called and the TMU asked what to do with military aircraft in the airbut not part of the response to the attacks. NEADS announced that all military aircraft no ton mission would return to base.The facility manager then ordered everyone evacuate Boston Center except forone supervisor per area, one controller per area, and two TM U personnel.Cooper is clear that any suspicion, today, of another airborne threat the DEN(Defense Event Network) line is the absolute first place to report to. It is open at alltimes. C ooper is not aware of how he wo uld get the military involved except to use theDEN line.

NOTE: Cooper provided Commission staff with a personnel accoun t of the events of 9-11 he made a few days after the event.


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T8 B3 Boston Center Joe Cooper Fdr- 9-23-03 3 Versions MFR- 2 Sets Handwritten Notes 745

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Transcript of T8 B3 Boston Center Joe Cooper Fdr- 9-23-03 3 Versions MFR- 2 Sets Handwritten Notes 745