T1 B19 Team 1 Workplan Fdr- Entire Contents- Draft Workplan Team 1 626

8/14/2019 T1 B19 Team 1 Workplan Fdr- Entire Contents- Draft Workplan Team 1 626

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7 What can we determine throu gh a comprehensive examinat ion of all' evidence now availablesynthesizing th e information available earlier withthat obtained post-9/11regarding th e planning, preparation, financin g, andexecution of the 9/11 attacks?a. What can we now understand regarding th e strategic objectives of the

attack?b How were th e targets and means of attack chosen? By whom? How wasintelligence collected and employed fo r this purpose?c What do we know of the origins and details of the operational planningfor th e attack e.g., the designation of operational command, th eselection of the hijacking teams, the establishment of logistic an dfinancial support? Wh en was the plan finalized? W as it fixed orflexible?d What were the key planning and decision variables? For example, isthere any evidence of an y variables that would h ave resulted in a

decision to abort the plan? Who had the final authority to carry out theplan or abort it ?

e . What t raining, exercises, and/or rehearsals were carried out?f W h a t s taging areas and suppor t ne t wo r ks we r e employed in car ry ing outthe plan? Did affi l iated entities play any role in staging or support ing the

attacks?3 . W h a t is now kn o w n of the present com pos i t ionofal Qaeda and its affi l iated

entities and wh a t threat do they now pose?a How has al Qaeda sought to adap t and c o m pensa t e for its losses? W h a t' changes have taken place since 9/11 in such areas as tact ics , doctr ine ,personnel , and financial practices?b. W h a t is the current status of al Qaeda's act ive membership and its access

to weapo ns and t ra ining?c. W h a t has happened to the ma ny t h o u s a n d s who passed through th et r a in ing and vet t ing c am ps in A fg h a n i s t a n?d. W h a t role has al Qaeda played in terrorist attacks mounted since 9/11,whether thwarted or actual ly carr ied ou t?e W h a t has been th e role, if a ny , of aff i l iated and col laborat ive e nt i t ies inthese attacks, and what is the status of the connect ions between al Qaeda

and other terrorist groups?f . I s there any evidence tha t al Qaedu is currently rece iv ing any support

f rom any state actor?g. What i s the s tatus of al Qaeda ' s effor ts to a cqu i r e W M D ?

...r.-hPI in 1


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Page 3 of 8, ,5SSMMS"he"OK"sacred sites"of Islam, to1991 binLaden moved msbase to Sudan. Some context:

this time frame several major terrorist operations took place in which bin Laden

s a plot that was broken up by law enforcement in June 1993, the1995Bo*r in Manila, which included plans to blow up 12 atrhners over the

those plans.The muhiole connections between these operations o f f e r insights into the evolving

role in rite/998 Embassy bombing Similarly, Ramzi Yousef, wf0" *.1.'

context:

I I I L / I I I X * * w*"***"' -y i ~- *u ended up in Manila, where he workedMohammed on the 1995 Bojinka Plot.

9/11 hijackers.


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involved in the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000, th e 9/11 attacks, and in theOctober 2002 Bali bombing.Similarly, a report released by the Singapore police reveals that the Southeast Asianterrorist organization Jema'ah Islamiyya planned to provide th e foot soldiers for theaborted suicide strikes planned for Manila and Jakarta in early 2002; al Qaeda leadersmade th e strategic planning decisions at meetings in Afghanistan and provided th efinancing and much of the target reconnaissance.

Research into Key Question/Line of Inquiry 2, dissecting and reconstructing the planning,preparation, financing and execution of the 9/11 attacks in rigorous detail from its origins to execution,will proceed in parallel, with part of the team merging newly developed intelligence (including findingsemerging from the research on al Qaeda's origins and development) with information from existingsources. Our specific objectives include the identification of al Qaeda's links with other entities,including possible links with state sponsors. These links could be a major part of the threat al Qaedaposes in the future. Some context:Evidence now available indicates that th e concept of using aircraft as weapons crashingthem into major sites wa s raised w ith top al Qaeda leaders as far back as the mid-1990's, at the same time the Manila-based Bojinka Plot wa s underway. Some have alsotheorized that the concept of employing hijackers with pilot training evolved from thefailed attempt of Algerian hijackers to force pilots to steer a hijacked aircraft into theE i f f e l Tower in 1995. Th e process of selecting individuals for piloting the aircraft,bringing tog ether the operational teams, moving the financial support for the trainingan d maintenance of th e teams, and, most notably, coordinating the actions of the diversecomponents of the attack entering the United States from both sides of the continent,an d coordinating th e implementation of th e plot with flights from three major airportsare prima facie indications of the linchpin role of the "central staff" of al Qaeda's innercircle.

The results of these research efforts wi l l provide a base for honing specific areas of focus an dident ifying sources fo r pursuing th e third l ine of inquiry: W h a t has happened to al Qaeda in the wake ofth e 9 / 1 1 attacks and the intensified worldwide coal i t ion in a war agains t terror ism, and , of even greaterimportance, what this reveals about al Qaeda's present composi t ion and its threat to the Uni ted States.T he research on al Qaeda's earlier developments will natural ly feed into th e understanding of al Qaeda'scurrent si tuation. H owever , we plan to step back at various intervals to e xa m i ne what specificcomp onent quest ions and branches of inqu i ry have emerged from our research into al Qaeda's evolut ionan d use these ques t ions to sharpen our focus on the current threat.

T E A M #1I tem 2: Suggested Readings

O n th e origins an d evolu t ion of the al Qaeda global terrorist consortium, we suggesteither Peter Bergen , Holy War. Inc., (Touch s tone , 2002) or R oh an Gunara tna , Inside Al-Qa'ida( C o l u m b i a Unive rs i ty Press, 2002). Al th o u g h both were publ i shed within a few months after the9 / 1 1 attacks, both au thors had begun t h e i r research in to al Qaeda years earlier and bothconducted extensive interviews with key actors in foreign sett ings. T he differences are main ly inpresentat ion. Bergen e m p l o y s a more journal is t ic narra t ive style, while Gunara tna is somewh atmore scholarly an d offers substantial deplh on key points.F or insight into the Washing ton perspect ive and what was known of the terrorist threat

presented by bin Laden and al Qaeda pr ior to 9 / 1 1 . we suugesi Daniel Benjamin and Stev eHouse. 2002f ',


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p l aye r s and col labora t ive t ies w ith other regiona l and t ransn a t iona l te rror is t enti t ies, which i spar t icu la r ly im portant in assess ing th e threa t a l Qaeda cu r ren t l y poses.M a nv key individua ls and mate r ia l s have been captured s ince the c onclus ion of the Jo intSryincluding, accord ing to media accounts , individua ls w h o p layed k ey roles in he alo2 taSnhipcircle , such as Khal id She ikh M o h a m m e d and Abu Zuba ida , as wel l as keynekIterators such as R a m z i Binalsh ib , U m a r Faruq and Mohammed Mansou r Jabarah TheSosSSesfor information on al Qaeda's global reach because of thei r central rolesin the collaboration of al Qaeda and Southeast Asian terrorist g roups in th e December 2000aVacks in Mani l a and Jakarta , th e p lanned mult ip le at tacks in S ingapore and Ma aysia tha tload authori t ies in December 2001, and the October 2002 Bal i b omb i n g .Other individua ls currendy in custody, such as Fathur R a h m a n al-Ghozi, served as regionalpoints of contact with al Qaeda in coordina t ing terrorist act ions, and tunne l ing money andmaterials to opera t ives .

; from fore ign i n t e l l i gence and l aw en f o rc em en t entities. This body of _on "combSUon with th e information f rom de ta inees provides th e Ingest a m o u n tof inforSon about a l Qaeda tha t has been obta ined s ince th e 9/1 1 a t tacks In addi t ion tow h a tSeenprov ided h r o u g h more t r ad i t iona l al l ies , i h e r i c p omn g Prided b ySingapo rean and M al ay s i an author i t ies is a rich lode , a s exem pl i f i ed by the J anua r y 7^003,Sinfapo re Mini s t r y of H o m e Affairs r epo r t to Pa r l i am en t de t a i l in g connec t .ons be tween a lQa eda a nd J e m a 'a h I s l a m iyya .

T E A M # 1I t e m 4: Interview Candidates

The" fo l lowing is a pre l imina ry l i s t of i n d i v i d u a l s and ca t egor i e s of ind iv idua ls who arewoKriWwMPrinze i n i t i a l i n t e r v i e w s based o n t h e i r po tcnua fo r p r o v i d i n ggncc and c lues to m i n i n g Jown andp o ten t i a l >a d d i t i o n a l i n t e r v i ews a s the r e s ea rch proce s s p roceeds , w i t h th e g u i d i n g p r inc ip l e tha t U K .cffcc vcncss a nd p r o d u c t i v i t y of f a c t u a l i n t e r v i ews is d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to the availably ofr e l e v a n t document and t he t i m e a n d e f f o r t g i v e n t0 p r ep a r a t o r y r e s e a r ch . I n o the r w o r d s , th emore i n f o rmed th e i n t e r v i ewe r , th e m o re e f f e c t i v e the i n t e r v i e w .

\ s I n t e l l i g e n c e Comm u n i t yGeorge Tene t (DC1)G e n . M i c h a e l H a y d e n (Di r e c to r . N S A ) __. . . ; / '9 /n closed b y StatuteP i rec tor .Cofe r Black ( f o rme r head . Coumcr t e r ro r i s t C e n t e r , C I A )

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Other C IA of f i cer s current ly u n d e r off icia l coverN ew York Cr imina l Cases and PENTTBOM Inves t iga t ionRober t S. Muel ler , IH (FBI Director)Lou i s Freeh (former FBI Director)

Dale Watson ( former Deputy Exec ut ive Assis tant D irec tor , FBI)Patrick Fitzgerald (former Assistant U.S. Attorn ey, S.D.N.Y.)

- John Mullaly (New York Pol ice Depar tment)Louis Napoli (New York Jo int Terrorism Task Force)

I |(FBI N ew York)J(FBI N ew York)| jFBINewY o r k )

K en Kuras (Assis tant U.S. . At torney , S .D.N .Y.)A n d r e w McCar thy (Ass i s t an t U.S . At t o rne y , S . D . N . Y . )Mary Ga l l i ga n (FBI Headqu a r t e r s , lead agen t o n P c n u b o m i n v e s t i g a t i o n )

j_ [(FBI Headqu a r t e r s ) ,M i c h a e l R o l i n c e (FBI Headqu a r t e r s ) ,Pasquale J . D ' A m u r o (Deputy Execut ive A s s i s t a n t Direc to r , FBI)

"[(FBI N e w Y o r k ) \san d Outs ide Expert sBruce H o f f m a n ( R A N D C o r p o ra ti o n) . \lB en j am in (CS1S)

Steven S i m o n ( R A N D ) , . ' - \ n G u n a r a t n a ( S a i n t A n d r e w s ) ' ' ' " - : - ' \ s R a m s l r

Z a c h a r v A bo u / . aB e r na r d L e w i s


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9/11 Closed by StatutePage 8 of!

,

.. ' U.S. D e f r a f r p " i - of State/NSC[(INR/NESA)

\)

Richard Clarke (former Chair, CSG, NSC)BarbaraBodine (former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen)Prudence Bushne l l (former U .S. Ambassador to Ken ya)Michael Shaheen (former Coordinator fo r Counterterrorism)

Foreign ServicesOff ic ia l s from various foreign services, potent ia l ly including officials from thef

"""9/11 LawEnforcement Sensitive|Foreign services-

F O R O F F I C I A L U S E O N L YC O M M I S SI O N S E N S I T I V E

F O R O F F I C I A L U SE O N L YC O M M I S SI O N S E N S I T I V E

T1 B19 Team 1 Workplan Fdr- Entire Contents- Draft Workplan Team 1 626

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