Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity Brett Edwards Biochemical Security 2030 Project University of Bath...
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Transcript of Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity Brett Edwards Biochemical Security 2030 Project University of Bath...
Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity
Brett EdwardsBiochemical Security 2030 Project
University of BathSfAM Winter Meeting 15/0/14
OverviewThis talk will provide an introduction to:
• The idea of ‘innovation biosecurity’• Biological weapons• The control of biological weapons
• The field of Synthetic Biology • As a techno-scientific field• Implications for biosecurity
• Some key trends and challenges
What is innovation biosecurity?
• Increasingly the term ‘biosecurity’ refers to biological weapon threats• Innovation biosecurity relates to the promises and challenges raised
for security specifically by advances in S&T• New applications• New foundational technologies• Changes in the practice of innovation
What is a Biological Weapon ? (1)• Definition:
Systems designed to deliver toxins and microorganisms, such as viruses and bacteria, in order to cause disease among people,
animals, and agriculture- Usually understood to include means of delivery,
and agent payload.- Can serve a range of purposes
(i.e terrorism, tactical/strategic, political objectives)- Can be low-tech or high-tech
What is a Biological Weapon ? (2)• Biological weapons are ‘taboo’- why?
• Taboo- norms and laws
• Moral explanations• The ‘yuck’ factor • Non-discriminatory weapons
• State centred strategic explanation• Absence of Military Utility• Fear or retaliatory use and escalation• Concerns about terrorists
What is a Biological Weapon ? (3)History of use and DevelopmentBefore Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) - 1975• Evidence of Ancient use• Large Bioweapons programmes established globally
from 1930’s onwards• Japanese Cholera Attack 1941- Kills 12,000Since establishment of BWC• Continued covert secret programmes in some states
up until 1990’s• Anthrax accident at Sverdlovsk, Russia- minimum 66
killed • Russia officially closes programme in 1990
• Developed a range of weapon strains• Increase in bioterror threat perceptions• Massive US investment into biodefense
How are biological weapons governed?
International Agreements
National Level Policy
Scientific and Industry
Initiatives
International level (1)• Primary regime is the Biological
and Toxins Weapon Convention• Chemical Weapons Convention is
also increasingly relevant because of scientific convergence
• States are banned from:developing, stockpiling, developing and using chemical and biological weapons, or allowing any of these things within national jurisdictions.
Classical
chemical
weapons
Industrial
pharmaceutical
chemicals
Bioregulators
Peptides
Toxins Genetically
modified
biological
weapons
Traditional
biological
weapons
Cyanide
Phosgene
Mustard
Nerve
Agents
Fentanyl
Carfentanil
Remifentanil
Etorphine
Dexmedetomidine
Midazolam
Substance P
Neurokinin A
Staphylococcal
enterotoxin B
(SEB)
Modified
bacteria and
viruses
Bacteria
Viruses
Rickettsia
Anthrax
Plague
Tularemia
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
Poison Infect
Table: Michael Crowley, presentation, BCS2030 project meeting, Bath (0ctober 2013) adapted from Pearson (2002)
International level (2)• There are two key facets of the BWC and CWC regimes:
• International reassurance: I.e states demonstrating compliance to other states.
• National implementation: i.e to support states in the development of national level policies
National level • Laboratory biosecurity and laboratory biosafety• Criminalisation of the possession of controlled biological agents without just
cause.• Import and export controls• Dual-use governance of advancing S&T• Also emphasis on mitigation, response and attribution.
So what is the field of Synthetic Biology? (1)
‘Synthetic biology is the design and engineering of biologically based parts, novel devices and systems as well as the redesign of existing, natural biological systems’
Synthetic Biology RoadmapCo-ordination group (2012)
• GM + ?• Convergent Technology?• Brand name?
So what is the field of Synthetic Biology? (2)
- Emerged as a concept in US and EU around 2004
- UK Research councils have invested £62+ million to date
- US around $1 bn- Public and Private investment,
Primarily biofuels
So what is the field of Synthetic Biology? (3)
Six subfields (Lam et al 2009)DNA circuits
standard biological partsSynthetic metabolic pathways
biological synthesis of chemicalsProto-cell creation
model of a cellUnnatural components
New proteins, with functionsSynthetic Microbial Consortia
Cells, working together
Key concerns and responses (1)
Concern• Misuse of mail order
Polynucleotides (2005)• Industry emergence• Concern about circumvention of
select-agent controls by terrorists
Response• Tightening up of select-agent
and GMO regulation so explicitly cover all means of production where neccisary
• Emergence of industry screening practices
• Two competing standards• US government also generated
guidance
Key concerns and responses (1)
Concern• Misuse of research findings, and
laboratory biosecurity and biosafety
Response• Web of measures
• Education and outreach initiatives• SB Community • Law enforcement • Scientific Institutions
• Forward looking policy discussions• US- NSABB, SYNBERC• EU -SYNBIOSAFE• International- UNICRI, National
academies. • Engineering safety into biology.
• Intrinsic Bio containment, Berkley.
Key concerns and responses (1)
Concern• Militarization
Throughout history rapid periods of scientific advance have been associated with militarization.
Response• Minimal discussion of policy
responses
Key Potential challenges for the field in the future
• The advances Synthetic Biology represent fresh challenges for an already overworked international regime
• Need to think beyond existing laboratory and biosecurity when considering potential future challenges
• I.e broader trends such as industrialisation and diffusion, convergence• Need to ensure that policies and capacities are in place before
next public outcry to ensure measured and scientifically informed response.
• I.e to avoid case by case review, as seen with recent H5N1 dual-use debates
Thanks!• Biochemical Security 2030
Project • (PI Professor David Galbreath)
• Contact
Twitter: @biochemsec2030
Website: Biochemsec2030.org
Email: [email protected]