Sweeney2015 Roger Bacon and Albert the Great on Aristotle’s Notion of Science

8/19/2019 Sweeney2015 Roger Bacon and Albert the Great on Aristotle’s Notion of Science

1/10

«Quaestio», 15 (2015), 447-456 • 10.1484/J.QUAESTIO.5.108619

Roger Bacon and Albert the Great are two important early adopters of Aristot-

le’s Posterior Analytics, eager to put the resources of the new science to work.

However , their accounts of the sciences are different even though in important

ways inspired by some of the same sources. Their differences lay out many of

the basic questions about Aristotelian science that will continue to be discussed

throughout the 13th and 14th centuries.

Roger Bacon takes up Aristotelian demonstrative science, contrasting it with

the older and more traditional notion of knowledge. His goal is to replace the

traditional canon and methods of the liberal arts with science and push back

against the canon lawyers and theologians at Paris who instigated the bans on

Aristotle and scientific works, particularly Arabic astronomy/astrology. Bacon’s

enthusiasm for demonstrative argument brings him to advocate a complete re-

structuring of the curriculum, placing mathematics at the center as the most

certain, most accessible, and most important of the disciplines. For example,

Bacon claims that the disciplines of grammar and logic depend on mathematics

– through the mediation of music and its explanation of rhythm, meter, and ac-

cent – all required to achieve its end: persuasive arguments with the “maximum

amount of beauty”. Logic also needs mathematics for its “middle and heart”: the

art of demonstration, for only in mathematics is there “true and forceful demon-

stration”. Thus, the way to “arrive at certainty without doubt and truth without

error” is to ground all the other sciences in mathematics1.

Bacon ultimately puts mathematics at the center of physics by appealing to

the properties of light, studied in terms of the geometry of refraction and reflec-

tion. However, while Grosseteste (Bacon’s mentor) understood the role of math-

ematics and light in largely Neoplatonic metaphysical terms, Bacon thinks of

light and the use of mathematics in terms of physical causality. Light’s equivocal

action produces diverse effects: light causing heat, heat causing putrefaction and

1 ROGER BACON, Opus maius, IV, Dist. 1, c. 1, ed. Bridges, vol. 1, pp. 97-98.

Eileen C. Sweeney

Roger Bacon and Albert the Greaton Aristotle’s Notion of Science


2/10

448 Eileen C. Sweeney

putrefaction, death. We can know earthly/physical things only through mathe-

matics because celestial bodies are their causes, and these bodies are known via

mathematics, Bacon argues2.

In addition to demonstrative syllogistic form, science is characterized by“experimentum” for Bacon. Though it is not clear whether Bacon means empeiria

in Aristotle’s sense or something closer to the modern notion of controlled ex-

periment, its role in producing scientia is different for Bacon than for Aristotle3.

While Aristotle describes the path of the discovery of the principles of science

by induction from experience, Bacon notes that knowledge of conclusions as well

as principles requires experimentum4. Even for conclusions drawn via valid ar-

guments by reasoning, the removal of doubt requires confirmation of conclusions

by experiment5. Only thus can trickery and magic be distinguished from art and

nature, Bacon maintains6.Bacon also argues that there are crucial ties between mathematics and exper-

imentum. “Quantity is especially a matter of sense perception,” Bacon argues,

because it is a common sensible and “nothing is perceived without quantity”.

The act of understanding is only completed with reference to continuous quantity

and time7. Moreover, mathematical knowledge can be certain and without error

because it has examples perceived by the senses from which to proceed and to

which to make confirming reference. By contrast, the proper causes of natural

things are generated and corrupted. Nor it is possible in metaphysics, because

there is no demonstration of incorporeal things except indirectly through ef -fects8. In the Perspectiva Bacon also associates sense perception through vision

with experimentum and thus with mathematics through optics. Optics is a math-

ematically based science that grounds the sense evidence of vision, resulting not

in belief but experience9.

In the Opus maius Bacon’s criticism of the traditional teaching of the dis-

ciplines is a broadside against the path of reading and reliance on authority

that grounds the traditional study of liberal arts and scripture. Bacon lists four

causes of error: submission to faulty authority, the influence of custom, popular

prejudice, and the desire to conceal ignorance and appear wise. In order to avoid

2 ROGER BACON, Opus maius, IV, Dist. 1, c. 2, ed. Bridges, vol. 1, pp. 102-103.3 See HACKETT 1997, pp. 279-284.4 ARIST., Analytica Posteriora, II, 19, 100a1-14; BACON, Opus maius, VI, c. 2, ed. Bridges, vol. 2, pp.

172-173.5 On the need for experience, see BACON, Opus maius, VI, c. 1, ed. Bridges, vol. 2, p. 167. Cf. HACKETT

1997, p. 291; THORNDIKE 1929, p. 666, and MOLLAND 1993, pp. 140-160.6 BACON, Opus maius VI, cc. 2 & 12, ed. Bridges, vol. 2, pp. 172, 221.7 See ARIST., Analytica Posteriora, I, 18, 81a37-40 and De memoria, 1, 450a1-10. BACON, Opus maius,

IV, Dist. 1, c. 3, ed. Bridges, vol. 1, p. 107.8 BACON, Opus maius, IV, Dist. 1, c. 3, ed. Bridges, vol. 1, pp. 107-108.9 BACON, Perspectiva, I, 1, 1, ed. Lindberg, p. 4.


3/10

Roger Bacon and Albert the Great on Aristotle’s Notion of Science 449

these errors and find the true authorities, we must “freely hear what is contrary

to vulgar convention”10. In the spirit of experiment, one must oppose common

opinion, cultivating skepticism. Truth is usually on the side of what is unpopular,

Bacon warns, and a certain contrariness is the way to avoid error. It is hard notto hear in these criticisms of authority, tradition, and common sense the tones

of that other and much later Bacon, Francis, and his critique of the “idols of the

mind”11. Nonetheless, the 13th century Bacon is less opposed to tradition than he

seems, aligning his move to defend Aristotelian and Arabic science with initially

rejected but ultimately revered authorities, such as Jerome and even Moses and

Jesus; thus Bacon’s goal is the extension not the extinction of the tradition but

in a way that places mathematics and experimental science at the center of all

science, including theology12.

Albert the Great articulated a different way of reorganizing the disciplinesaround the model of Aristotelian science and highlighting experiment than Ba-

con. Albert’s rejection of the mathematical physics so favored by Bacon is one of

the most well known of his views. In his Commentary on the Metaphysics he argues

against Plato’s view that the principles of natural things are founded in mathe-

matics, and the principles of mathematics in metaphysics13. Mathematics and

natural science emerge co-equally from metaphysics, he argues. Further, Albert

argues that dimension is not a principle of body as body but rather a consequence

of being a body, while matter is subject of motion and time per se14. On these

grounds, Albert rejects any wholesale application of mathematical categories tonatural objects and phenomenon as the constitutive method of physics. This may

be partly because, as Molland argues, Albert is more conceptualist than realist on

mathematics15. Albert maintains that the abstraction of mathematics is the prod-

uct of the imagination, which “compos[es] figures and angles” rather than finds

those qualities inherent in the objects. Hence, Albert often focuses on the gap

between mathematics and the natural world, for example, pointing out that it is

only mathematical spheres not material ones that a line touches only at a point16.

Albert’s Commentary on the Physics begins with a distinction between the

path of knowing in physics versus the other sciences. Physics begins with thesenses and thus begins with the confused universal and works its way toward

more distinct knowledge, Albert comments. Moving from that which is more sim-

ple and indistinct to what is more distinct and composite is the via compositionis;

10 BACON, Opus maius, I, c. 8, ed. Bridges, vol. 1, p. 17.11 F. BACON, Novum Organon, Bk. I, aphorisms 38-68, ed. Rees / Wakely, pp. 79-108.12 BACON, Opus maius, I, c. 9, ed. Bridges, vol. 1, pp. 19-20.13 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Metaphysica, I, tr.1, c. 1, ed. Geyer, p. 2.14 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Metaphysica, I, tr.1, c. 1, ed. Geyer, p. 2.15 MOLLAND 1980, p. 467.16 MOLLAND 1980, pp. 468-470.


4/10


it is proper to natural science but not to the other sciences. In metaphysics and

mathematics, the opposite path of resolution is followed, from the particular to

the universal17. Thus Albert draws a sharp line between physics and its depend-

ence of sensation and the other sciences of metaphysics and mathematics.In a number of passages, Albert expresses a Platonic or Neoplatonic account

of the hierarchy of the sciences in terms of which some sciences are more certain:

a science’s conclusions are more necessary and certain to the degree to which its

subject is separated from matter. Albert does not, as those who want to see him

strictly as an Aristotelian claim, completely give up the idea that mathematics is

superior to physics because of its greater distance from the vagaries of material

things. He notes that things are closer to wisdom the more they recede from sen-

sation and he praises mathematics as separated from sense and the necessities

of life18. Albert defines wisdom as that which is difficult to know; things aredifficult to know either through their imperfection (physics) or their perfection

(metaphysics), but mathematics is accessible in ways the objects of physics and

metaphysics are not19. Mathematics is the most liberal of the sciences because

it is proportioned to our intellects and is not a subject to the variety of opinion,

but not physics (because of greater error and diverse opinions) nor divine science

(because it is beyond our intellects)20.

It might seem hard to square this skepticism about the ability to know ma-

terial things on their own terms with Albert’s well-known interest in empirical

data21. Albert’s commentaries on Aristotle’s works of natural philosophy includeinsertions of alphabetical lists of types of stones, herbs, and animals, along with

their descriptions, properties and possible uses or virtues. Beyond the perfect-

ly clear Aristotelian justification for including such particular data – that the

process of induction requires particulars from which we can abstract the uni-

versal, Albert adds that knowledge of things in matter and time is mixed with

opinion and not confirmed science22. Hence, he argues, we are more in need of

experience/experiments in regard to them than mathematical or metaphysical

objects23. We need to test/experience those things that are less certain more often

17 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Physica, I, tr. 1, c. 6, ed. Hossfeld, p. 12, ll. 53-66. Cf. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Metaphysica, I, tr. 1, c. 7, ed. Geyer, p. 10, ll. 35-51.

18 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Metaphysica, I, tr. 1, c. 11, ed. Geyer, p. 16, ll. 67-94.19 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Metaphysica, I, tr. 2, c. 1, ed. Geyer, p. 18, ll. 31-42.20 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Metaphysica, I, tr. 2, c. 7, ed. Geyer, p. 24, ll. 38-67. Cf. ASHLEY 1980, p. 95.

Ashley claims wrongly that Albert completely rejects the Platonist view that math is more a science thanphysics.

21 ASÚA 2001, pp. 389-400.22 ARIST., Ethica Nicomachea, VI, 8, 1142a11.23 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Metaphysica, I, tr. 1, c. 1, ed. Geyer, p. 1, ll. 24-27, 52-56. Cf. ASÚA 2001, p.

399. See also KÖHLER 1996, pp. 161-177.


5/10


and more diligently24. In this way Albert’s Neoplatonism fits seamlessly with his

experimentalism, and both fit into a picture which depicts the different sciences

as having diverse methods and degrees of certainty, depending on their subject

matter and relationship to human ways of knowing.Albert defines the subject of metaphysics as being qua being (rather than

God), but he adds that ens is esse simpliciter, being as not contracted to this or

that being but the “first effluxio of God,” the first created. This study, then, is

of the principles that “give to all other things the fullness of their being.” It is

called divine science because these principles are best and are “the perfection

of the divine intellect within us”25. Thus Albert situates an Aristotelian view of

the topic of metaphysics within a Neoplatonic frame. He adopts the Avicennian

account of metaphysics, though modified such that God does not fall under the

ens commune that is the subject of metaphysics; at the same time he links Ar-istotle’s Metaphysics with what he thinks is Aristotle’s theology in the Liber de

Causis. That which is first and highest is neither (strictly speaking) substance

nor being, yet is considered within the study of being qua being26. Albert thus

attempts to link as hierarchical steps and within the same discipline Aristotelian

metaphysics as ontology with Neoplatonic metaphysics as natural theology27.

The latter he construes as a kind of negative natural theology.

Albert’s little treatise De intellectu et intelligibili makes this point in a par-

ticularly clear fashion as it lays out the different lights by which the intellect is

progressively perfected. While clearly operating from within the realm of reason(not revelation), Albert speaks of the “holy intellect” and some kind of vision

of the divine. He describes the knowledge of metaphysics as knowledge only

available to those able to understand without reference to sensible examples28.

Its study of divine things repels and defeats our intellect by its light, while math

is proportioned to our intellect, and physics, because of the privation of matter

and motion, falls below intelligibility29. Thus, Albert not only thinks of sacred or

revealed theology as being informed by a different light than the other sciences

but holds that there are gradations and different lights and starting points for all

the different sciences30.This is also clear from the discussion of theology as a science in the Summa.

24 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Metaphysica, I, tr. 1, c. 8, ed. Geyer, pp. 11-12.25 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Metaphysica, I, tr. 1, c. 1, ed. Geyer, p. 3.26 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De causis et processu universitatis a causa prima, I, tr. 3, c. 6, ed. Kübel, p. 41,

ll. 38-43.27 Cf. NOONE 2005, pp. 691-704.28 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De intellectu et intelligibili, ed. Borgnet, 501b. The ones who can learn without

sensible reference, Albert notes, are described as having “intellectus sanctus sive mundus” by Avicenna,and “divine intellect” by Aristotle.

29 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De intellectu et intelligibili, ed. Borgnet, 500a.30 Cf. FÜHRER 2001, p. 151.


6/10


Albert distinguishes between theology and the other sciences in terms that are

much the same as those used to distinguish metaphysics from the other sciences.

He argues that the sciences concerned with creatures have unchanging rationes

which reside in changing creatures. Theology, by contrast, is founded in eternalreasons in eternal things, and in this sense is the only science in the strictest

sense31. Albert consistently defends the scientific character of theology by not-

ing the higher source/higher light from which its knowledge comes. Knowledge

of things through that which is prior, unchangeable, and known by inspiration

is more truly knowledge or science, and theology is most truly science, science

of the highest things, which are, as Aristotle said, the most difficult for human

beings to know32. Here Albert explicitly takes over Aristotle’s description of

metaphysics and applies it to revealed theology. As he replies to objections,

Albert notes, as he did in De intellectu, that the human intellect is perfected bydiverse lights; the light for metaphysics is distinct from the superior sources of

knowledge of the Trinity, Incarnation and resurrection33.

In Albert’s Summa, the opening six questions on the nature of the subject be-

ing explored, the discipline is named theologia, not sacra doctrina nor any other

name drawing attention to its different source in scripture. Albert thus chooses

to use the term theologia which can mean either the philosophical study of the

divine and highest immaterial beings or the study of God through scripture. So,

too, he describes theologia in terms of the higher intelligibility of its objects

and higher illumination needed to see those objects – the same terms used todescribe the theologia of the philosophers.

When he turns from whether theology is a science to its definition, he pivots

clearly to the different source and end of revealed theology, giving it a different

set of tasks and tactics. Through the whole discussion of the nature of theology,

Albert works hard to retain the traditional ways of describing the topic of theol-

ogy, including a series of questions on frui and uti, and discussion of tradition-

al definitions of theology as concerned with res et signa, Christus et ecclesia34.

Albert also defends the use of poetic language in theology forcefully, beginning

from the feature theology shares with metaphysics – that, as Aristotle says, oureyes confronted with the highest things are like those of bats looking toward

the sun35. Thus the use of persuasive and literary techniques for those things

that are beyond our intellect is not exclusive to theology. Albert notes that the

principles of metaphysics cannot be demonstrated or taught but that one must

31 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Summa theologiae, Prol., ed. Siedler et al., p. 2, l. 16 sqq.32 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Summa theologiae, I-I, tr. 1, q. 1, ed. Siedler, p. 6, ll. 52-56.33 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Summa theologiae, I-I, tr. 1, q. 1, ad 2, ed. Siedler, p. 7, ll. 34-42.34 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Summa theologiae, I-I, tr. 2, qq. 7-12 et tr. 1, q. 3, c. 2, ed. Siedler.35 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Summa theologiae, I-I, tr. 1, q. 5, c. 1, ed. Siedler, pp. 16-17.


7/10


be persuaded to their truth; thus, a broader use of language and tactics than pure

demonstration is required for basic principles36.

In defending the four modes of sacred scripture, Albert develops a long list

of different tasks for theology. It can operate either by force or instruction; if byforce (either disposing or compelling men to virtue), it can use admonition or

exhortation or command. If it operates by instruction, then it must either appeal

to the intellect or senses. It can address the intellect through hymns or prayer,

or prophecy or apocalyptic writings. If it is to appeal to the senses, then it can

operate by comparison to things or similitudes, e.g. parable, or by examples37.

Albert fits theology into his account of the different lights for the intellect

such that it is just the highest part of a strongly differentiated hierarchy; thus

he does not emphasize just the distinction between theology, operating on faith,

and the other disciplines, grounded in reason, as Aquinas does. The breadth ofAlbert’s notion of the definition of theology as a science and its multiple modes

is of a piece with his account of all the sciences as strongly differentiated from

each other in method and path because of their different topics.

Sometimes the differentiation and autonomy Albert grants the different

sciences are taken as a sign of his adherence to a kind of ‘double truth’. This is

urged because of Albert’s lack of reference to scripture in contexts where there

might seem to be a conflict between philosophy and theology and/or on the basis

of Albert’s retaining of the notion of metaphysics as a path to contemplation hav-

ing unity with the divine intellect as its goal38. As De Libera points out, Albert“recognized the rationality of theology without folding theology back into natural

reason, and the spirituality of philosophy, without involving philosophy in the

irrational”39. What this means, however, is not that for Albert a ‘double truth’ is

possible, a contradiction between the conclusions of philosophy (or science) and

theology, but rather that Albert sees philosophy in general and metaphysics in

particular as paths toward contemplation in their own right, not reducing them to

tools of theology. But even though metaphysics can be part of the ascent toward

the divine for Albert, it is still clear that for him, the ascent of the intellect is to

a single final and complete truth/good in God.There might also be in Albert’s hierarchy of the sciences a response to the

other common criticism of Albert: that he was just a compiler throwing together

inconsistent bits from different thinkers rather than constructing his own co-

herent vision. Behind Albert’s universal incorporation, there is a more broadly

36 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Metaphysica, I, tr. 2, c. 3, ed. Geyer, p. 20, ll. 40-49.37 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Summa theologiae, I-I, tr. 1, q. 5, c. 4, ad 13, ed. Siedler, p. 22, ll. 71-86.38 HONNEFELDER 2005, p. 272.39 DE LIBERA 2005, p. 60. Cf. HONNEFELDER 2005, p. 263, who notes that for Albert, theology is a

science based on things that are revealed but he retains the notion of theology as practical.


8/10


analogical sense of science that could range from encyclopedic lists of stones

and plants, to Neoplatonic metaphysics, to the new as well as traditional modes

of theology.

Both Albert and Bacon are struggling to integrate Aristotle with Christianityand traditional arts, as well as with the new impetus outward toward the world

manifested in Albert’s clear joy in the stuff of the world and Bacon’s barely con-

tained mania to get to work in the world. They illustrate different ways in which

the pleasures of knowledge are recognized and sought and reveal a rich diversity

of responses to Aristotelian science in this first wave of Aristotelianism in the

13th century.

Bibliography

Sources

ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De causis et processu universitatis a causa prima, ed. W. Kübel, Aschen-dorff, Münster 1993 (Albertus Magnus Opera Omnia, 17/2).

ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De intellectu et intelligibili, ed. A. Borgnet, Vivès, Paris 1890 (AlbertusMagnus Opera Omnia, 9), pp. 477-525.

ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Metaphysica, ed. B. Geyer, Aschendorff, Münster 1960 (Albertus Mag-nus Opera Omnia, 16/1).

ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Physica, ed. P. Hossfeld, Aschendorff, Münster 1987 (Albertus MagnusOpera Omnia, 4/1).

ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Summa theologiae, ed. D. Siedler, Aschendorff, Münster 1978 (Alber-tus Magnus Opera Omnia, 34/1).

FRANCIS BACON, Novum Organon, in G. REES / M. WAKELY (eds.), The Instauration magna Part II: Novum Organon and Associated Texts, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2004.

ROGER BACON, De multiplicatione specierum and De speculis comburentibus, ed. D.C. Lind-berg, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1983.

ROGER BACON, Opus maius, ed. John Henry Bridges, Oxford and Edinburgh. Vols. 1 & 2,Oxford 1897, Vol. 3 with corrections, Edinburgh 1900. Reprint, Minerva, Frankfurt

am Main 1964.

ROGER BACON, Perspectiva, ed. D.C. Lindberg, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996.

Studies

ASHLEY 1980 = B. ASHLEY, O.P., St. Albert and the Nature of Natural Science, in J.A.WEISHEIPL, O.P. (ed.), Albertus Magnus and the Sciences: Commemorative Essays 1980,PIMS, Toronto 1980, pp. 73-102.

DE ASÚA 2001 = M. DE ASÚA, Minerals, Plants and Animals from A to Z: The Inventory ofthe Natural World in Albert the Great’s philosophia naturalis, in W. SENNER / H. ANZU-LEWICZ ET AL. (Hrsg.), Albertus Magnus Zum Gedenken nach 800 Jahren: Neue Zügage,

Aspekte und Perspektiven, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 2001 (Quellen und Forschungenzur Geschichte des Dominikanerordens, N.F., 10), pp. 389-400.


9/10


FÜHRER 2001 = M.L. FÜHRER, Albertus Magnus’ Theory of Divine Illumination, in W. SEN-NER / H. ANZULEWICZ ET AL. (Hrsg.), Albertus Magnus Zum Gedenken nach 800 Jahren:

Neue Zugänge, Aspekte und Perspektiven, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 2001 (Quellen und

Forschungen zur Geschichte des Dominikanerordens, N.F., 10), pp. 141-155.

HACKETT 1997 = J. HACKETT, Roger Bacon on Scientia Experimentalis, in J. HACKETT (ed.), Roger Bacon and the Sciences: Commemorative Essays 1980, E.J. Brill, Leiden 1997,

pp. 277-316.

HACKETT 1980 = J. HACKETT, The Attitude of Roger Bacon to the Scientia of Albertus Mag-nus, in J.A. WEISHEIPL, O.P., Albertus Magnus and the Sciences: Commemorative Essays1980, PIMS, Toronto 1980, pp. 53-72.

HONNEFELDER 2005 = L. HONNEFELDER, Die philosophiegeschichliche Bedeutung Albertsdes Großen, in L. HONNENFELDER / R. WOOD ET AL. (Hrsg.), Albertus Magnus und die

Anfänge der Aristoteles-Rezeption im lateinischen Mittelalter. Von Richardus Rufus bis

zu Franciscus de Mayronis, Aschendorff, Münster 2005, pp. 249-280.

KÖHLER 1996 = T.W. KÖHLER, Wissenschaftliche Annäherung an das Individuelle im 13.Jahrhundert. Der Einfluss von De animalibus des Aristoteles, in J.A. AARTSEN / A. SPEER (Hrsg.), Individuum und Individualität im Mittelalter, W. de Gruyter, Berlin-New York

1996, pp. 161-177.

DE LIBERA 2005 = A. DE LIBERA, Métaphysique et noétique: Albert le Grand, Vrin, Paris2005.

LINDBERG 1987 = D.C. LINDBERG, Science as Handmaiden: Roger Bacon and the PatristicTradition, in Isis, 78/4 (1987), pp. 518-536.

MOLLAND 1980 = A.G. MOLLAND, Mathematics in the Thought of Albertus Magnus, in J.A.WEISHEIPL, O.P. (ed.), Albert and the Sciences: Commemorative Essays 1980, PIMS,

Toronto 1980, pp. 463-478.MOLLAND 1993 = A.G. MOLLAND, Roger Bacon and the Hermetic Tradition in Medieval

Science, in Vivarium, 31/1 (1993), pp. 140-160.NOONE 2005 = T. NOONE, Albert the Great’s Conception of Metaphysical Knowledge, in L.

HONNEFELDER / R. WOOD ET AL. (Hrsg.), Albertus Magnus und die Anfänge der Aris-toteles-Rezeption im lateinischen Mittelalter. Von Richardus Rufus bis zu Franciscus de

Mayronis, Aschendorff, Münster 2005, pp. 685-704.

THORNDIKE 1929 = L. THORNDIKE, A History of Magic and Experimental Science, vol. 2,MacMillan, New York 1929.


10/10


Abstract: The paper examines the different uses of and responses to Aristotle’s account

of science in the first wave of interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of science and works in

natural science and metaphysics in the early 13th century in Roger Bacon and Albert the

Great. The author argues that Bacon reduces all the disciplines to mathematics as the

most scientific discipline, even as he argues that experimentum is at the center of scientific

evidence and conclusions. Albert the Great, by contrast, gives a more strongly analogical

account of science, with broader differences between different disciplines as operating

according to different intellectual ‘lights’ and methods. Albert champions experimentum

in physics in a special way, rejecting a mathematical physics.

Key words: Roger Bacon; Albert the Great; Aristotle; Aristotelian Science; Demonstra-

tion; Mathematics; Experiment; Experience; Physics / Natural Philosophy; Metaphysics;

Theology.

Eileen SWEENEYDepartment of Philosophy

Boston College

MA - 02467, Chestnut Hill

[email protected]

Sweeney2015 Roger Bacon and Albert the Great on Aristotle’s Notion of Science

Documents

Transcript of Sweeney2015 Roger Bacon and Albert the Great on Aristotle’s Notion of Science