Swank, D. (2014). the Political Sources of Labor Market Dualism in Post-Industrial Democracies,...

8/17/2019 Swank, D. (2014). the Political Sources of Labor Market Dualism in Post-Industrial Democracies, 1975-2011. Revie…

1/24

The political sources of labor market

dualism in post-industrial democracies,1975–2011

Duane Swank*Department of Political Science, Marquette University, Milwaukee, USA

Increases in wage inequality and atypical employment have occurred across post-industrial

economies in recent decades. Technological change, globalization, the employment shift to services, and the decentralization of collective bargaining are commonly cited as causes.

I argue that where social democratic parties govern, and where employers and labor

remain highly organized, labor market dualism is mitigated. This should hold because

the organizational scope, centralization, and policymaking integration of labor and capital

facilitates the creation of post-industrial political coalitions necessary for egalitarian

policymaking and implementation by progressive governments, and organizationally blunts

insider politics by sectorally fragmented actors and excessive rent-seeking by narrow

interest groups. I draw on 1975 to 2011 annual data from 18 post-industrial democracies

and estimate models of labor market policy and performance. Findings support the

core argument: social democratic government has significant egalitarian impacts on

policies and performance at high levels of labor and employer organization. Some conven-tional explanations of dualism also receive support: technological change, trade pene-

tration by developing countries, and deindustrialization are associated with inegalitarian

outcomes.

Keywords: wage dispersion, labor market policy, labor and business organization,

partisan politics, social democracy

JEL codes: D31, D63, E24, I38, J24, J31, J51

1 INTRODUCTION

The growth of income inequality is a near-universal phenomenon among post-industrialdemocracies. Greater wage dispersion among full-time workers and rises in low-wageirregular employment play a substantial role in this story (OECD 2008; 2011).

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2013 Annual Meetings of the AmericanPolitical Science Association, August 29 to September 1, Chicago, IL, USA. I am grateful toMarquette University’s Committee on Research as well as the American Political ScienceAssociation Small Research Grant Program for financial support of this project. I also thank Molly Giese, Mujtaba Isani, and Darren Nah for exceptional research assistance and the journal’s

referees for very helpful comments. Finally, I acknowledge the debt this paper owes to mycollaborative work with Cathie Jo Martin on some of the issues addressed here.

Review of Keynesian Economics, Vol. 2 No. 2, Summer 2014, pp. 234 –257

© 2014 The Author Journal compilation © 2014 Edward Elgar Publishing LtdThe Lypiatts, 15 Lansdown Road, Cheltenham, Glos GL50 2JA, UK

and The William Pratt House, 9 Dewey Court, Northampton MA 01060-3815, USADownloaded from Elgar Online at 03/02/2015 06:23:53PM

via Columbia University Library

http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-


2/24

Conventional social science theory places the blame at the door of post-industrialization.Technological change, globalization, the employment shift to services, trends in familystructure, and the decline of centralized collective bargaining are commonly cited as the

causes. Yet, as Emmenegger et al. (2012) note, the processes through which structuralpressures are translated into policies and outcomes are political. Indeed, my argument is that where social democratic parties govern, and where employers and labor areencompassing, centralized, and rout inely participate in national policymaking forums,labor market dualism is mitigated.1

While contested, the most persuasive theory suggests that the interests of low-wageregular and atypical workers are more likely protected where traditionally egalitariansocial democratic parties rule. Yet the changing realities surrounding feasible politicalcoalitions in post-industrial societies suggest that the organization of labor and capitalis crucial. Not only should high levels of labor and employer organization have direct positive effects on outsiders’ interests (see below on this unconventional view), organ-

ization should facilitate the creation of post-industrial political coalitions necessaryfor egalitarian policymaking and implementation by progressive governments. Theorganizational scope, centralization, and policymaking integration of labor and capitalalso blunts insider politics by sectorally fragmented actors and excessive rent seekingby narrow interest groups common to pluralist political economies.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I offer an overview of trends inlabor market inequalities and the conventional theories that purport to explain thetrends. In Section 3, I elaborate my argument on the foundational role played by pol-itics in shaping policies and outcomes. In Section 4, I draw on 1975–2011 annual data from 18 nations to provide empirical analyses of the impacts of partisan government,the organization of labor and capital, and their interaction on wage inequality, atypicalemployment, and two dimensions of policy that should mitigate dualism, namely

active labor market programs (hereafter ALMP) and the social wage offered to out-siders. I conclude in Section 5 by assessing the relative power of the theories and futurelabor market trajectories.

2 AN OVERVIEW OF LABOR MARKET DUALISM AND ITS CAUSES

I display two familiar labor market outcomes by nation type in Table 1.2 These are theearnings ratio of workers at the 90th and 10th percentiles of the wage distribution andthe percentage of total employment accounted for by involuntary part-time jobs. As theOECD (2011) has noted, both high-wage and low-wage workers have been moving

away from the median earner in the majority of advanced economies and, thus, the90/10 ratio offers a convenient summary indicator of trends. The employment shareof involuntary part-time jobs generally reflects moves toward more temporary andpart-time work and, by isolating involuntary workers, taps the extent of undesirableirregular employment.

1. I follow Rueda (2007) and label workers in the lowest wage tiers of regular employment and irregular jobs (disproportionately the low skilled, women, younger workers, and immi-grants) ‘outsiders’; workers in middle and higher wage regular employment are called ‘insiders.’I conventionally label this bifurcation of the labor market, ‘dualism.’

2. See Hall and Soskice (2001) and Martin and Swank (2012) on the ‘varieties of capitalism ’framework.

The political sources of labor market dualism in post-industrial democracies 235

© 2014 The Author Journal compilation © 2014 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd

Downloaded from Elgar Online at 03/02/2015 06:23:53PM


http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-


3/24

Table 1 underscores a familiar theme: earnings of full-time workers have grownmore unequal in the large majority of post-industrial economies. Yet wage dispersionhas grown noticeably more unequal in both the relatively egalitarian Nordic countriesand the relatively unequal Anglo-liberal economies; earnings inequality among regular workers has increased less in continental coordinated economies and Japan. Withregard to atypical employment, King and Rueda (2008) point out that low-paid irregu-lar jobs have increased significantly in coordinated market economies (hereafter CMEs) where low-wage full-time work is still limited; the magnitude of increase inlow-quality atypical employment does, in fact, seem particularly pronounced in con-tinental Europe and Japan (Palier 2012; Thelen 2012). Overall, the Nordic labor mar-kets remain the least dualistic, the continental European CMEs and Japan are beset by

the rise of low-quality atypical jobs, and Anglo-liberal labor markets have becomeeven more unequal than in the past.

Table 1 The rise of labor market dualism in post-industrial capitalist democraciesa

Wage inequality (90/10 ratio) Involuntary part-time jobsb

1984–

86 2005–

08 Annual %Δ 1984–

86 2005–

08 Annual %Δ

Nordic politcal economies

Denmark 2.19 2.69 0.96 2.3 1.8 0.6Finland 2.49 2.53 0.12 – – –Norway 1.95c 2.22 0.93 1.9 1.2 –1.0Sweden 2.05 2.31 0.65 3.0 2.7 1.5Mean 2.17 2.44 0.66 2.4 1.9 0.4Continental Europe

and JapanAustria – – – 0.1c 1.7 13.1Belgium 2.43 2.34 –0.26 0.5 2.8 3.4

France 3.12 2.91 –0.29 2.6c 3.8 3.7Germany 2.89 3.27 0.48 0.7 4.2 9.8Italy 2.22 2.31 0.15 0.8 4.0 8.1Japan 3.14 3.02 –0.12 1.2 4.6 11.6Netherlands 2.49 2.91 0.89 2.3c 1.3 –2.4Switzerland 2.41c 2.67 0.69 0.2c 1.5 16.4Mean 2.67 2.77 0.22 1.0 3.0 7.9

Anglo-liberal market economies

Australia 2.83 3.29 0.58 – – –Canada 4.36 3.74 –0.41 4.2 4.3 0.3Ireland 4.06 3.81 –0.31 0.2 1.2 2.6

New Zealand 2.15 2.89 1.29 2.1 3.8 4.2United Kingdom 3.20 3.61 0.62 1.7 2.3 3.0United States 4.16 4.88 0.80 – – –Mean 3.46 3.70 0.43 2.0 2.9 3.4

Notes:a

Table 1 reports 1984–1986 to 2005–2008 means and 1984 to 2008 average annual percentage changes.b

Involuntary part-time employment as a percentage of total employment.c

Mean for 1991–1993.

236 Review of Keynesian Economics, Vol. 2 No. 2




http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-


4/24

2.1 Conventional explanations of dualism

A substantial literature has emerged to explain the rise of labor market inequalities.Globalization has been central to most inquiries. As Wood (1994) famously argued,Heckscher –Ohlin/Stolper –Samuelson models with factor price convergence suggest that trade penetration of advanced economies by developing nations will depress theearnings of semi- and unskilled workers in rich countries. Relatedly, Alderson andNielson (2002) and others have argued that the dramatic rise of capital mobility –especially the prospect of foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows – has adverseemployment and wage-bargaining impacts on labor. Yet most research has ques-tioned these inegalitarian effects of globalization (for example, IMF 2007; OECD2008; 2011). Instead, much of the recent literature has stressed that skill-biased tech-nological change has been at the heart of rises of wage inequality; technologicalchanges reward the highest skill and educational levels in the workforce and displacemiddle and lower income employees engaged in routine tasks (see Kierzenkowski

and Koske 2012).In addition, in the well-known argument by Harrison and Bluestone (1988), deind-

ustrialization, or the employment shift from relatively equal and high-paying manu-facturing jobs to unequal and excessively low-paying service sector employment,fosters wage dispersion and irregular employment. Concomitant with globalizationand deindustrialization, the decline in the centralization and coverage of bargainingmay have weakened the institutional pressure for wage compression (Wallerstein1999; Beramendi and Cusack 2008; OECD 2011).

Finally, scholars have acknowledged the importance of policy reforms in shapinglabor m a rket dualism; this set of factors is central to the argument made here about politics.3 First, most recent studies have stressed the role of human capital-promoting

policies (ALMP and education) in mitigating dualism; where human capital programsreceive resources and careful design, earnings inequality declines (Kierzenkowski andKoske 2012; OECD 2011). In addition, an egalitarian social wage mitigates dualism.This is so because a higher social wage raises the wage floor in labor markets ( OECD2008; 2011) and it alleviates the ‘scarring’ effect of unemployment on workers’ skills(Nelson and Stephens 2013). The way labor market reforms such as deregulation of

job security provisions and expansions of temporary and part-time contracts are struc-tured also plays a crucial role in dualism; where these reforms are coupled with exten-sions of collective bargaining and social insurance coverage, for instance, evidenceindicates that outsider s receive higher pay and face a diminished risk of unemployment (Koske et al. 2012).4

In sum, extant theory and evidence suggest a number of factors in all likelihoodplayed a role in the general rise of labor market dualism in post-industrial economies.But what about politics?

3. Beyond globalization, technology, deindustrialization, institutional and policy changes,scholars have suggested that socio-demographic forces such as trends in family structure, femalelabor market participation, and immigration may play a role. I address some of these argumentsbelow.4. The literature has also emphasized other policy factors such as public employment, pro-

grams which provide accommodations of work-care tradeoffs, and sufficient aggregate demand(for example, Carlin and Soskice 2009; OECD 2011).





http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-


5/24

3 THE POLITICAL SOURCES OF LABOR MARKET INEQUALITIES:THEORY

3.1 Partisan government and labor market dualism in post-industrialeconomies

In the 1970s and 1980s, scholars stressed – contra the ‘end of ideology’ thesis – that labor market interventions in advanced political economies were notably shaped bygovernment control by class-based parties (see Swank 2013 for a review of the major works). Both social and Christian democratic parties fostered the development of generous social insurance systems, while social democracy also promoted publicservice provision and government employment (Huber and Stephens 2001). Thus,traditional partisan theory predicts social democratic governments should be most likely to promote human capital formation, an ample social wage, and an equitablestructure of labor market reforms. Yet in the wake of 1970s and 1980s economic

crises and post-industrialization, a new body of scholarship led by Paul Pierson(1994; 1996) questioned partisan effects on social policies. In the view of Piersonand similar thinkers, the new politics of social policy under post-industrialpressures for austerity and efficiency entailed the politically challenging task of reducing concentrated benefits to well-defined, mobilized constituencies in returnfor future, diffuse benefits. Given continued political support for social transfersand services, incumbent governments had to engage in the politics of blame avoid-ance where the success of reform depends on the character of program constituen-cies, the depth of lock-in effects of social programs, and related programmaticfactors (for instance, the degree to which constituency groups can be politicallydivided).

Complementing the ‘new politics’

framework, Iversen and Wren (1998) arguethat social democratic parties face a ‘trilemma ’ where government may foster earn-ings equality and employment levels in the face of post-industrialization but not simultaneously maintain fiscal restraint (as pursuit of the first two goals adds to fiscalimbalances). The social democratic policy regime is also challenged by internationalcapital mobility as capital market integration may result in a loss of economic policycontrol and, hence, of state capacity to maintain the low unemployment essential to a generous welfare state (Huber and Stephens 2001). Finally, David Rueda (2007) hasargued that the division between insiders and outsiders in post-industrial labor mar-kets politically undercuts social democracy: insiders have an interest in the continu-ation of employment protection and the moderation of tax burdens on labor income,

while outsiders favor both income transfers for short-term security and active labor market programs for reintegration into regular employment. Rueda argues that in theabsence of rises in risks to insiders, social democratic parties will maintain job pro-tection and tax moderation but not enhanced income supports and ALMP that benefit outsiders.

In response, Korpi and Palme (2003) argue that alternation in power of class-based parties is still highly relevant to post-industrial politics of economic and socialpolicy. The differential distribution of physical and human capital still influencessocial policy preferences across business and labor and between strata of workers;the post-industrial welfare state still fundamentally affects the distribution of incomes and security. Parties still represent class-based constituencies andreflect class-based conflicts. In fact, recent studies highlight the significanceof incomes and exposure to risks for individual preferences for social insurance





http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-


6/24

and redistribution (Rehm 2011). In turn, preferences for transfers and taxesnotably influence citizens’ partisan identification in post-industrial societies(Cusack et al. 2006).5

Yet the aforementioned work of Rueda (2007) highlights the increasingly divisivesocial policy conflicts between insiders and outsiders and the political problems thesedivisions create for social democracy. Similarly, Iversen and Soskice (2009) make theimportant point that in the post-industrial production process, skilled and unskilledworkers – heretofore closely linked within industrial enterprises and politically con-nected in a progressive coalition – are increasingly dispersed across firms and sectors.I argue, however, that where labor and capital remain relatively highly organized, pro-gressive parties can nonetheless blunt dualism.

3.2 The political economic organization of capital and labor

The organization of labor unions and employers’ associations – beyond coverage andcentralization of collective bargaining – is likely to have direct political effects onlabor market inequalities; it should also play a central mediating role by facilitatingsocial democratic parties’ pursuit of enhanced human capital policies, of an egalitariansocial wage, and of an equitable structure of labor market deregulations.6 For bothlabor and employers, organization is defined as the density of organization of potentialmembers, centralization of power in national peak associations (for instance, power over constituent unions or employers’ strategies), and regularized integration of labor and capital into public policymaking forums.

3.2.1 Employers’

organization and labor market dualism

A higher level of employer organization is likely to be directly related to greater employer support for an array of policies that foster general human capital endow-ments of the workforce, and, in turn, mitigate inequality in labor markets (Martinand Swank 2012). Strong employer organization is also likely to politically and insti-tutionally facilitate social democratic party governments’ efforts to make and imple-ment social and labor market policies that address the needs of outsiders. Theseeffects should hold for several reasons.

As Cathie Jo Martin and I have argued (Swank and Martin 2001; Martin and Swank 2012), high levels of employer organization promote among member firms a collectiveorientation to the long-run interests of firms (for example, human capital) and, through

repeated exchanges with labor and the state that occur in macro-corporatist institutions,high employer organization is associated with trust, reciprocity, and a commitment to

5. Huo et al. (2008), Iversen and Soskice (2009), and others provide additional theory andevidence on social democratic government impacts on outsider-related policy and performance(also see Swank 2013). While scholars recognize the movement to the center of social demo-cratic parties in the face of post-industrial pressures (Inglehart 1990), substantial research indi-cates continued, systematic economic and social policy differences across left and right parties(Adams et al. 2009; Schmidt 2010; Burgoon 2012).6. I advance a general version of the notion that social democratic governments’ impacts on

social welfare are increasingly dependent on the institutions of coordinated economies in Swank (2013); I build on that argument here.





http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-


7/24

the public interest. Indeed, in our analyses of the policy preferences of employers inhighly organized Denmark and pluralist Britain, we found Danish employers muchmore likely to assume responsibility for labor market outsiders and to participate in

the implementation of programs for training than British firms (Martin and Swank 2012, ch. 8). A comparative analysis of German employers also reveals that sectorallyorganized business in Germany notably fell behind Danish firms in responsibility andALMP participation (Nelson unpublished).7

In addition, post-industrialization increasingly fragments employers between thosewho produce for internationally competitive versus sheltered markets and betweenthose who employ high-, medium-, or low-skilled workers. In this context, strongemployer organization contributes to the likelihood that progressive governmentscan construct a coalition of business (for instance, public sector, core manufacturing,and low-skill service sector employers) that supports relatively equitable reforms of social insurance and expansions of programs that enhance human capital. Moreover,

high employer organization provides social democratic governments with an institu-tional mechanism by which business can be mobilized in support of progressivereforms.

As business organization declines, however, the benefits of encompassing and cen-tralized organization are progressively lost. Thus, as Martin and I suggest, the sectoralorganization of employers tends to result in insider –outsider policies and outcomes.That is, even where employers are well organized within industrial sectors such as chem-icals, metal working, and so forth, they have little incentive to cooperate in nationalcoalitions to fight dualism, but only to work to protect the benefits of their own work-ers (Martin and Swank 2012, esp. ch. 11). Where pluralism reigns (for example, in theUnited States), one is likely to see extensive rent-seeking behavior as narrow businessinterest groups, and shifting coalitions of them, seek to enhance their economic posi-

tions and incomes through the political process; in the post-industrial context of market shifts of income to high-income earners and mobile business and of the decline of unions, the result is a pronounced increase in inegalitarian policies and outcomes(Hacker and Pierson 2010; Stiglitz 2012).

3.2.2 Labor organization and post-industrial labor market inequalities

National trade union movements have played a seminal role in the twentieth centurywelfare state development and reduction of income inequalities in industrial capitalism (for example, Stephens 1979; Korpi 1983; Hicks 1999); some scholars also stress that

union organization continues to bolster national systems of social protection,

7. One might argue that under pressures of post-industrialization (for example, greater globalcompetition), firms pursue their immediate interests in lower unit labor costs by pushing for labor market liberalization, tax cuts, and welfare retrenchments. Acquiescence to ALMP, itself,simply reflects the fact that firms rationally decide to take advantage of state subsidies for wagesand training costs. The argument made in this paper recognizes that firms are likely to behave inthis manner at low levels of employer organization. At high levels of organization, however,enterprises tend to pursue a long-term, human-capital-based strategy for greater worker produc-tivity, recognize business’ responsibility to assist in programs for outsiders, and participate inprograms that require enterprises to commit significant time and resources to training the

unskilled and long-term unemployed. See Martin and Swank (2012) for extensive firm-level sur-vey research and case studies on these points.





http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-


8/24

employment security, and redistribution in the face of globalization and deindustrial-ization (for example, Garrett 1998; Swank 2002; Kwon and Pontusson 2010).

On the other hand, post-industrialization threatens the densit y, centralization, and

participation in policy concertation of both labor and capital.8

Some scholars haveargued that even where unions remain relatively strong, they tend to be dominatedby the interests of labor market insiders. For instance, Palier (2012), Thelen (2012),and others note that this is the very pattern we observe in post-1970s reform politicsthroughout much of continental Europe. With regard to Japan, Song (2012) points out that a coalition of core sector unions, large firms, and conservative policymakers pro-duced largely insider-oriented social and labor market reforms in recent decades. At the same time, Bonoli (2006), Ebbinghaus (2006), and others point out that whereunions remain relatively encompassing (Nordic countries and Belgium), public sector and low-wage service sector unions (and hence women, younger, and low-skilledworkers) are represented alongside industrial and white collar unions within the

union movement. All things considered, I hypothesize that union organization shouldhave a dir ect, positive impact on policies addressing new social risks and the needs of outsiders.9

The level of union organization should also enhance social democratic parties ’impacts on policies that promote human capital development, social protection for out-siders, and equitable labor market reforms. This is so for two reasons. The first mechanism is relatively well understood: labor organization facilitates wage restraint and related adaptive behavior by unions which, in turn, mitigates inflation and ineffi-ciencies that are possible with social democratic spending initiatives for social protec-tion and human and physical capital (Garrett 1998; Beramendi and Cusack 2008;Kwon and Pontusson 2010). In addition, from the perspective of post-industrial poli-tics, high union organization increases the likelihood that social democratic govern-

ments can build an egalitarian coalition of public and private sector unions and of unions with relatively high- and low-skilled workers. Again, highly organized unionsare likely to represent outsiders as well as insiders in corporatist policymaking forumsand to mobilize electorally insiders and outsiders in support of more egalitarian policychange. As such, left-wing governments have the political base to more equitablyreform social insurance and labor m ar ket regulation as well as to expand social ser-vices to blunt labor market dualism.10

In sum, politics and institutions should matter. Net of post-industrial pressures andformal labor market institutions, social democratic governments should mitigate labor market dualism relative to center-right incumbents and high levels of employer andlabor organization should directly promote policies that mitigate wage inequality

8. See Martin and Swank (2012, ch. 7) for a survey of the large literature on the organiza-tional decline of labor and employers.9. Case study evidence suggests that union organization does promote inclusiveness; yet ten-sions remain. For instance, Davidsson and Emmenegger (2012)note that in the face of 1990s and2000s employer and government efforts to liberalize Swedish labor markets, the LO (Landsor-ganisationen) initially fought to defend both insider and outsider interests. The LO, however,ultimately acquiesced to liberalization of temporary employment in return for continuation of pro-insider ‘last in, first out ’ firing provisions.10. As Kitschelt and Rehm (2006) have noted, construction of a durable electoral coalition of insiders and outsiders can be difficult; for instance, social democratic parties may face signifi-

cant tensions between (disproportionately male) low-skilled blue collar workers and women oncultural issues.





http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-


9/24

and low quality atypical employment. Most important, high levels of organization of capital and labor should politically and organizationally facilitate the construction of political coalitions that undergird the making and implementation of pro-outsider poli-cies by social democratic governments. The core theoretical relationships are displayedin Figure 1.

4 THE POLITICAL SOURCES OF LABOR MARKET INEQUALITIES:EMPIRICS

In empirical models, I focus, as foreshadowed above, on explaining variations in the90/10 ratio of earnings and the employment share of involuntary part-time jobs. I alsofocus on two measures of policy highlighted in the literature on labor market inequal-ities: ALMP and the social wage.11 ALMP is measured as total ALMP spending as a percentage of GDP; the social wage for outsiders is measured by an indicator devel-oped by K. Nelson (2007): minimum income protection for citizens, or the sum of means-tested cash assistance plus family a nd housing allowances as a percentage of the average production worker ’s wage.12 (See the Appendix for details and data sources for all variables.)

I estimate empirical models of annual variations of labor market policiesand outcomes across space and tim e for 18 developed capitalist democracies

(see Table 1) for the years 1975–

2011.13

The general model of labor market policiesand outcomes is:

Figure 1 The political sources of labor market dualism

11. There is evidence, as noted, that ALMP and the social wage mitigate labor market inequal-ities. Substitution of these two policy indicators for political variables in labor market outcomemodels developed below confirms this.12. This measure taps the likely social wage available to younger and irregularly employedworkers who do not meet eligibility requirements for normal unemployment compensation. Sub-stitution of the unemployment compensation income replacement rate of the average productionworker produced results nearly identical to those for the ‘minimum income’ social wage.13. Data series begin between 1975 and the early 1980s; Nelson’s data are available for 1990to 2009 only. For involuntary unemployment, basic models are estimated for the 11 CMEs as

suggested earlier (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, TheNetherlands, Norway, and Sweden).



Social democratic

government

Employer

organization

Union

organization

Human capital

investment (training,

education)

Generosity of social wage for outsiders

Degree of equity in

labour market reform

(coverage, legal rights

for irregular jobs)

Other policies (work-

care accommodation,

aggregate demand)

Wage

inequality

Atypical

employment



http://-/?-http://-/?-


10/24

Labor Market Policy=Outcomei;t ¼ α þ β1ðTrade Penetration Developing Cos:Þi;t –1þ β2ðFDI OutflowsÞi; t –1þ β3ðTechnological ChangeÞi; t –1

þ β4ðDe-industrializationÞi; t –1þ β5ðUnemployment Þi; t −1þ β6ðReal per capita GDPÞi;t –1þ β7ðSocial Democratic Govt Þi;cumt –10 to t –1þ β8ðChristian Democratic Govt Þi;cum t –10 to t –1þ β9ðLabor OrganizationÞi;t –1þ β10ðEmployer OrganizationÞi;t –1 þ εi;t :

(1)

For policy variables, I add the ideological position of the median voter (where ideo-logical position is constructed as a 0.0 to 100 scale with higher values indicating morecollectivist orientations); technological change is not included in the social wage equ-ation. For wage inequality, I add collective bargaining coordination (a 0.0 to 5.0 scale of coordination among employers and labor) and bargaining coverage and delete unem-ployment. I do not include ba rgaining and technological change variables in the mod-els of atypical employment.14

For party government, I use mean cabinet shares of social and Christian democraticparties over the last 10 years; I also assess partisan impacts in the short term (averagecabinet portfolio shares over the last 3 years). Long-term power in office is used as theprimary indicator because policy changes are often phased-in over several years; oftentake the form of discrete, limited reforms that accumulate over time; produce changesin policy agendas, programmatic priorities, and bureaucratic ideological dispositionsthat shape policy over the long term; and establish policy constraints on newly electedopposition parties.

The organization of labor is measured as a standard score index of union density, a 0.0 to 4.0 scale of centralization of powers in the largest national peak association(control of affiliate appointments, over strikes, of bargaining strategy, and of conflict funds), and a 0.0 to 1.0 scale of integration of unions into public policymaking forums.For employers, I develop a standard score index of the presence of a national employ-ers ’ peak association, 0.0 to 4.0 scale of powers of the peak (control of affiliateappointments, over lockouts, of bargaining strategy, and of conflict funds), and a 0.0 to 1.0 scale of policymaking integration of employers.

As to globalization, I control for imports and exports with (non-oil-exporting)developing economies as a percentage of the post-industrial country’s GDP and FDIoutflows as a percentage of GDP. Technological change is measured as patents per one million population (OECD 2011). As to structural economic change, I followIversen and Cusack (2000) and measure deindustrialization as 100 minus industrialand agricultural employment as a percentage share of the working age population.Unemployment is measured conventionally as the percentage of the civilian workforceunemployed (standardized across countries). As a control for economic conditions,I examine real per-capita GDP (in international prices) and growth rates in real

14. These model specification decisions are based on theory, and justified by estimations that,for instance, include excluded variables.







11/24

per-capita GDP, and report levels or growth rates based on their significance in prelim-inary tests. All these variables are lagged 1 year.

To assess the institutionally contingent effects of partisan government, I estimate

Equation (1) with a series of interaction terms; the equation for each labor market pol-icy or outcome for the impact of Social Democratic Government as mediated by Labor Organization is as follows:

Labor Market Policy=Outcomei ;t ¼ α þ β1ðTrade Penetration Developing Cos:Þi;t –1þ ……………… þ β10ðEmployer OrganizationÞi;t –1þ β11ðSocial Democratic Govt ×Labor OrganizationÞi ; t –1þ εi;t :

Similar equations are estimated for Social Democratic Government and Employer Organization.

For estimation of all models, I use Prais–Winsten regression with first-order serial

correlation and panel correct standard errors (Beck and Katz 1996). In addition, as thetime series occasionally begin after 1975 or end before 2011, I use a standard tech-nique for unbalanced panels where elements of the variance–covariance matrix are com-puted with all available pairs of panels. Finally, F-tests suggest unit (country) fixedeffects might be included, and I include them for three or the four explananda. I donot use a fixed effects estimator for the social wage, as variation in this indicator isheavily cross-national. A model without unit effects explains nearly 80 percent inthe variation in the social wage for outsiders and, thus, omitted-variable bias due toexclusion of unit effects should be minimal.

4.1 Findings

The results of estimation of models of labor market policy are displayed in Table 2.With respect to control variables, deindustrialization facilitates activation in labor mar-ket policy: the decline of employment in traditional sectors is associated with greater resource commitments to ALMP and a decrease in passive income assistance. Econ-omic downturn bolsters spending for labor market policies: a fall in per-capita GDP generates ALMP spending while rises in unemployment buoy the generosityof the social wage. Finally, there exists limited evidence that a rightward shift in theideological orientation of the median voter is associated with activation, or moreALMP spending and lower income replacement rates for unemployment compensation(my unreported alternative measure of the social wage).

The bottom half of Table 2 reports core findings for the labor market policy impactsof party government, the organization of capital and labor, and their interaction. I alsoreport derived marginal impacts of social democratic government at low and highlevels of labor and employer organization.15 With respect to ALMP spending, vari-ations in social democratic government and employer organization have significant

15. Based on significance, substantive magnitude, and robustness of partisan policy impacts,I report effects of short-term party government on ALMP spending and long-term partisan gov-ernment on the social wage. For derivation of marginal effects of partisan government, I use thelevel of labor and employer organization in 1990s Denmark and Sweden for ‘high levels’ of

organization, and levels in 1990s Britain and New Zealand for ‘low levels’ of organization.See Kam and Franzese (2007) for an excellent synopsis of interactions.







12/24

positive impacts on policy (although union organization does not have a direct impact).As hypothesized, the impact of social democracy is mediated by the presence of rela-tively highly organized capital and labor. The effect on ALMP spending (as a percen-

tage of GDP) of a shift from a 0.0 to 100 percent share of cabinet portfolios by soci aldemocratic parties is roughly 0.15 at high levels of union or employer organization.16

Given that the mean of ALMP spending over the sample country years is 0.8, the sub-stantive magnitude of this impact is not trivial.

Turning to the social wage for outsiders, Table 2 illustrates that social democraticgovernment a nd the organization of employers have direct positive impacts on thesocial wage.17 Similar to ALMP, social democratic government is better able to bolster pro-outsider policy at relatively high levels of union organization. On the other hand,there is no mediation of social democratic government effects by employer organiz-ation. Given theory, this is not surprising: high employer organization is important tothe making and implementation of human capital policies while it is less crucial

than union organization to social democracy for promotion of income maintenancefor outsiders.Table 3 reports the results for wage inequality and atypical employment. In column I,

I report the basic model which estimates direct partisan and labor and capital organiz-ation effects. The second and third columns present estimates of the institutionallymediated impacts of partisan government on wage inequality. For wage inequality,trade penetration by developing countries and technological change increase wage dis-persion while bargaining coverage significantly lessens it. Bargaining coordination (or level) is not, however, related to wage inequality. With regard to direct impacts of political forces, the column I model suggests that union organization is the only factor that clearly matters. When we turn to institutionally mediated impacts of social demo-cratic government, however, there is a significant interaction between social democratic

government and union organization. The wage impacts of social democratic government are trivial at low levels of union organization but they are marginally significant whenunion organization is moderately high. With regard to capital, social democratic govern-ments significantly reduce wage inequality where employers are relatively well orga-nized. This result, coupled with findings on employers and ALMP, suggests that thecapacity of social democratic parties to make and implement training and related policiesto benefit outsiders’ employment and earnings capabilities is, indeed, contingent on wellorganized employers that cooperate with public human capital initiatives. Martin andSwank ’s (2012) country studies and surveys of business firms add clear corroboratingevidence on this point.

Results for involuntary part-time employment are displayed in the second set of col-

umns. Findings indicate that increases in low quality irregular employment are, in part,driven by deindustrialization, slow economic growth, and, with less certainty, tradepenetration by developing countries. On the other hand, FDI outflows depress therise of involuntary part-time workers. This somewhat unexpected finding is possiblythe result of the positive employment impact of inflows of FDI – which outflows clo-sely proxy (IMF 2007; OECD 2011). As to politics, both social and Christian demo-cratic parties decrease involuntary part-time jobs. On the other hand, union

16. There are no significant interactions between union or capital organization and Christiandemocratic governments in any of the models.17. Estimation of the model for the income replacement rate for unemployment compensation

replicates these findings and produces a direct, positive, and significant impact of union organ-ization on the social wage.





http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-


13/24

T a b

l e 2

T h e p o l i t i c a l s o u r c e s o f A L M P a n d t h e s o c i a l w a g e i n

1 8 p o s t - i n d u s t r i a l d e m o c r a c i e s ,

1 9 8 0 –

2 0 1 0

A c t i v e l a b o r m a r k e t p o l i c y

S o c i a l w a g e f o r o u t s i d e r s

I

I I

I I I

I

I I

I I I

T r a d

e p e n e t r a t i o n b y d e v e l o p i n g

n a t i o n s t

– 1

0 . 9 5 7 3

( 0 . 8

0 8 1 )

0 . 9 9 1 4

( 0 . 8

0 2 2 )

1 . 0 0 0 3

( 0 . 8

0 8 9 )

– 1 6 . 4 5

7 6

( 1 3 . 3 5 5 6 )

– 1 3 . 6

3 5 4

( 1 3 . 3 9 2 4 )

– 1 8 . 8

5 9 2 *

( 1 3 . 5

1 0 9 )

F o r e i g n d i r e c t i n v e s t m e n t

O u t f l o w s m e a n t − 1 t o t – 3

– 0 . 0 0 1 1

( 0 . 0

0 1 6 )

– 0 . 0 0 1 1

( 0 . 0

0 1 6 )

– 0 . 0 0 1 4

( 0 . 0

0 1 6 )

0 . 0 1 2 8

( 0 . 0 3

0 9 )

0 . 0 1 5 5

( 0 . 0

3 1 1 )

0 . 0

1 2 0

( 0 . 0

3 1 1 )

T e c h

n o l o g i c a l c h a n g e

( P a t e n t s p e r 1 m i l l i o n ) t

– 1

– 0 . 0 0 0 1

( 0 . 0

0 0 3 )

– 0 . 0 0 0 1

( 0 . 0

0 0 3 )

– 0 . 0 0 0 1

( 0 . 0

0 0 3 )

–

–

–

D e i n

d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n

t – 1

0 . 0 3 1 1 * *

( 0 . 0

1 0 3 )

0 . 0 3 2 0 * *

( 0 . 0

1 0 1 )

0 . 0 3 5 7 * *

( 0 . 0

1 0 3 )

– 0 . 9 7 4 0 * *

( 0 . 1 9

3 7 )

– 0 . 9 6 9 9 * *

( 0 . 1

9 3 9 )

– 0 . 9

8 1 4 * *

( 0 . 1

9 1 9 )

U n e m p l o y m e n t r a t e

t – 1

0 . 0 0 8 6

( 0 . 0

1 0 4 )

0 . 0 0 8 4

( 0 . 0

1 0 3 )

0 . 0 0 8 1

( 0 . 0

1 0 4 )

0 . 4 8 7 4 * *

( 0 . 1 8

5 8 )

0 . 5 1 2 6 * *

( 0 . 1

8 5 6 )

0 . 4

7 4 1 * *

( 0 . 1

8 6 3 )

R e a l

p e r c a p i t a G D P

t – 1

– 0 . 0 1 5 8 * *

( 0 . 0

0 6 6 )

– 0 . 0 1 5 5 * *

( 0 . 0

0 6 4 )

– 0 . 0 1 6 2 * *

( 0 . 0

0 6 5 )

0 . 0 0 0 2 * *

( 0 . 0 0

0 1 )

0 . 0 0 0 2 *

( 0 . 0

0 0 1 )

0 . 0

0 0 2 *

( 0 . 0

0 0 1 )

I d e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n o f

m e d i a n v o t e r t

– 1

– 0 . 0 0 2 2 * *

( 0 . 0

0 1 7 )

– 0 . 0 0 3 3 * *

( 0 . 0

0 1 7 )

– 0 . 0 0 3 1

( 0 . 0

0 6 7 )

0 . 0 1 4 8

( 0 . 0 3

6 7 )

0 . 0 1 4 6

( 0 . 0

3 6 6 )

0 . 0

1 5 8

( 0 . 0

3 6 8 )

P a r t i s a n G o v t a n d t h e

O r

g a n . o f L a b o r / C a p i t a l

S o c i a l d e m o c r a t i c

g o

v e r n m e n t

0 . 0 0 0 7 *

( 0 . 0

0 0 5 )

0 . 0 0 0 6

( 0 . 0

0 0 5 )

0 . 0 0 0 4

( 0 . 0

0 0 5 )

0 . 0 2 4 2 *

( 0 . 0 1

9 4 )

0 . 0 2 6 8 *

( 0 . 0

1 9 6 )

0 . 0

2 4 4 *

( 0 . 0

1 9 3 )

C h r i s t i a n d e m o c r a t i c

g o

v e r n m e n t

– 0 . 0 0 0 7

( 0 . 0

0 1 3 )

– 0 . 0 0 0 3

( 0 . 0

0 1 4 )

– 0 . 0 0 0 5

( 0 . 0

0 1 4 )

– 0 . 0 2 9 2

( 0 . 0 2

7 8

– 0 . 0 2 1 8

( 0 . 0

2 7 7 )

– 0 . 0

3 6 8 *

( 0 . 0

2 8 0 )






14/24

U n i o

n o r g a n i z a t i o n

t – 1

– 0 . 0 3 2 7

( 0 . 0

5 2 6 )

– 0 . 0 6 1 2

( 0 . 0

5 6 0 )

– 0 . 0 2 5 8

( 0 . 0

5 2 8 )

0 . 6 5 5 8

( 0 . 9 6

3 4 )

– 0 . 6 4 1 1

( 1 . 2

0 0 6 )

0 . 6

1 4 8

( 0 . 9

5 1 9 )

E m p l o y e r o r g a n i z a t i o n

t – 1

0 . 4 4 1 6 * *

( 0 . 4

4 1 6 )

0 . 4 4 7 1 *

*

( 0 . 1

4 6 5 )

0 . 4 2 4 6 * *

( 0 . 1

5 1 1 )

4 . 0 2 3 7 * *

( 1 . 2 4

0 0 )

4 . 2 8 7 6 * *

( 1 . 1

2 1 2 )

4 . 9

0 9 1 * *

( 1 . 3

3 1 2 )

S o c i a l d e m o c r a t i c G o v t ×

U n

i o n o r g a n i z a t i o n

t – 1

–

0 . 0 0 1 1 *

*

( 0 . 0

0 0 5 )

–

–

0 . 0 3 2 4 * *

( 0 . 0

1 8 5 )

–

S o c i a l d e m o c r a t i c G o v t × E m p l o y e r

o r g a n i z a t i o n

t – 1

–

–

0 . 0 0 1 0 a

( 0 . 0

0 0 8 )

–

–

– 0 . 0

2 6 7

( 0 . 0

2 4 8 )

M a r g

i n a l e f f e c t : s o c i a l D e m

G o

v t –

L o w l a b o r o r g a n

–

n s

–

–

n s

–

M a r g


G o

v t –

H i g h l a b o r o r g a n

–

0 . 0 0 1 6 *

*

( 0 . 0

0 0 9 )

–

–

0 . 0 6 2 4 * *

( 0 . 0

3 1 8 )

–

M a r g


G o

v t –

L o w e m p l o y e r s o r g a n

–

–

n s

–

–

–

M a r g


G o

v t –

H i g h e m p l o y e r s o r g a n

–

–

0 . 0 0 1 5 * *

( 0 . 0

0 0 9 )

–

–

–

C o n s t a n t

– 1 . 0 2 0 7

– 1 . 1 0 9 3

– 1 . 1 8 9 1

1 1 5 . 5 7 2 8

1 1 4 . 6 1 2 6

1 1 6 . 4

4 9 7

O b s e

r v a t i o n s

4 6 7

4 6 7

4 6 7

3 5 7

3 5 7

3 5 7

R 2

0 . 4 7 1 2

0 . 4 8 5 1

0 . 4 8 3 1

0 . 7 6 5 0

0 . 7 6 7 5

0 . 7

6 7 1

N o t e s

: M o d e l s a r e e s t i m a t e d w i t h a n n u a l 1

9 8 0 – 2 0 1 0 ( 1 9 9 0 – 2 0 0 9 f o r m i n i m u m s o c i a l w a g e ) d a t a f o r 1 8 a d v a n c e d d e m o c r a c i e s b y P r a i s – W i n s t e n r e g r e s s i o n .

T h e t a b l e

r e p o r t s u n s t a n d a r d i z e d r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s a n d p a n e l - c o r r e c t s t a n d a r d e r r o r s . F i x e d e f f e c t s , u t i l i z e d f o r A L M P e s t i m

a t i o n , a r e n o t r e p o r t e d . * s i g n i f i c a n c e

a t t h e 0 . 1 0

l e v e l ; * * s i g n i f i c a n c e a t t h e 0 . 0 5 l e v e l o r b e l o w .

a s i g n . = 0 . 1

1 .






15/24

T a b

l e 3

T h e p o l i t i c a l s o u r c e s o f

w a g e i n e q u a l i t y a n d a t y p i c a l

e m p l o y m e n t i n 1 8 p o s t - i n d u s t r

i a l d e m o c r a c i e s ,

1 9 7 5 –

2 0 1 1

W a g e i n e q u a l i t y

I n v o l u n t a r y p a r t - t i m e j o b s

I

I I

I I I

I

I I

I I I

T r a d e p e n e t r a t i o n b y d e v e l o p i n g

n a t i o n s t

– 1

0 . 7 2 6 3 * *

( 0 . 4

1 2 1 )

0 . 7 2 3 2 * *

( 0 . 4

1 1 3 )

0 . 6 9 2 1 * *

( 0 . 4

1 1 9 )

3 . 9 4 6 3 *

( 3 . 1

3 7 0 )

3 . 3 4 3 6

( 3 . 1

5 1 5 )

4 . 0 0 1 0 *

( 3 . 0 5 8 2 )

F o r e i g n d i r e c t i n v e s t m e n t

O u

t f l o w s m e a n t – 1 t o t – 3

– 0 . 0 0 0 5

( 0 . 0

0 0 6 )

– 0 . 0 0 0 5

( 0 . 0

0 0 6 )

– 0 . 0 0 0 5

( 0 . 0

0 0 6 )

– 0 . 0 2 1 2 *

*

( 0 . 0

0 7 0 )

– 0 . 0 2 0 6 * *

( 0 . 0

0 7 1 )

– 0 . 0 2 0 8 * *

( 0 . 0 0 6 7 )

T e c h

n o l o g i c a l c h a n g e

( P a t e n t s p e r 1 m i l l i o n ) t

– 1

0 . 0 0 0 3 * *

( 0 . 0

0 0 1 )

0 . 0 0 0 3 * *

( 0 . 0

0 0 1 )

0 . 0 0 0 3 * *

( 0 . 0

0 0 1 )

D e i n

d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n

t – 1

0 . 0 0 2 5

( 0 . 0

0 7 2 )

0 . 0 0 2 1

( 0 . 0

0 3 2 )

0 . 0 0 1 6

( 0 . 0

0 3 3 )

0 . 1 7 7 6 *

*

( 0 . 0

3 6 3 )

0 . 1 8 8 2 * *

( 0 . 0

3 4 3 )

0 . 1 9 0 6 * *

( 0 . 0 3 6 2 )

G r o w

t h i n r e a l p e r c a p i t a

G D

P t – 1

– 0 . 0 0 1 5

( 0 . 0

0 1 9 )

– 0 . 0 0 1 4

( 0 . 0

0 1 9 )

– 0 . 0 0 1 5

( 0 . 0

0 1 9 )

– 0 . 0 1 9 7 *

*

( 0 . 0

1 1 9 )

– 0 . 0 1 7 7 *

( 0 . 0

1 2 2 )

– 0 . 0 2 1 7 * *

( 0 . 0 1 1 8 )

B a r g

a i n i n g c o o r d i n a t i o n

t – 1

0 . 0 0 2 0

( 0 . 0

0 6 2 )

0 . 0 0 1 9

( 0 . 0

0 6 1 )

0 . 0 0 2 5

( 0 . 0

0 6 1 )

–

–

–

B a r g

a i n i n g c o v e r a g e

t – 1

– 0 . 0 0 7 5 * *

( 0 . 0

0 1 5 )

– 0 . 0 0 7 5 * *

( 0 . 0

0 1 5 )

– 0 . 0 0 7 4 * *

( 0 . 0

0 1 5 )

–

–

–

P a r t i s a n g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e

o r g a n i z a t i o n o f L a b o r / C a p i t a l

S o c i a l d e m o c r a t i c

g o v e r n m e n t m e a n t – 1 t o t – 1 0

– 0 . 0 0 0 1

( 0 . 0

0 0 4 )

– 0 . 0 0 0 1

( 0 . 0

0 0 5 )

0 . 0 0 0 2

( 0 . 0

0 0 5 )

– 0 . 0 0 7 2 *

( 0 . 0

0 5 6 )

0 . 0 0 0 7

( 0 . 0

0 5 9 )

0 . 0 0 5 0

( 0 . 0 0 8 9 )

C h r i s t i a n d e m o c r a t i c

g o v e r n m e n t m e a n t – 1 t o t – 1 0

– 0 . 0 0 0 3

( 0 . 0

0 1 0 )

– 0 . 0 0 0 2

( 0 . 0

0 1 0 )

– 0 . 0 0 0 2

( 0 . 0

0 1 1 )

– 0 . 0 1 4 1 *

*

( 0 . 0

0 8 3 )

– 0 . 0 1 1 1 *

( 0 . 0

0 8 2 )

– 0 . 0 0 7 3

( 0 . 0 0 9 5 )

U n i o

n o r g a n i z a t i o n

t – 1

– 0 . 0 7 3 1 * *

( 0 . 0

3 9 2 )

– 0 . 0 5 1 7

( 0 . 0

4 1 1 )

– 0 . 0 7 5 9 * *

( 0 . 0

3 9 3 )

0 . 2 0 5 9

( 0 . 2

9 1 5 )

0 . 3 0 5 6

( 0 . 3

0 1 8 )

0 . 1 3 7 1

( 0 . 2 9 6 1 )

E m p l o y e r o r g a n i z a t i o n

t – 1

0 . 0 3 2 0

( 0 . 0

2 6 2 )

0 . 0 3 3 3

( 0 . 0

2 6 7 )

0 . 0 7 7 8 * *

( 0 . 0

3 7 3 )

0 . 7 7 7 2 *

( 0 . 4

3 2 7 )

0 . 7 4 5 4 *

( 0 . 3

9 4 7 )

1 . 9 1 4 2 * *

( 0 . 7 4 9 1 )

T r i p a r t i s m

t – 1

–

–

–

–

0 . 6 4 1 6

( 0 . 4

0 7 9 )

–






16/24

S o c i a l d e m o c r a t i c G o v t ×

U n

i o n o r g a n i z a t i o n

t – 1

–

– 0 . 0 0 0 6 *

( 0 . 0

0 0 4 )

–

–

–

–

S o c i a l D e m o c r a t i c G o v t ×

T r i p a r t i s m

t – 1

–

–

–

–

– 0 . 0 1 4 8 * *

( 0 . 0

0 5 2 )

–

S o c i a l D e m o c r a t i c G o v t ×

E m

p l o y e r O r g a n i z a t i o n

t – 1

–

–

– 0 . 0 0 1 1 * *

( 0 . 0

0 0 6 )

–

–

– 0 . 0 1 7 1 * *

( 0 . 0 0 8 6 )

M a r g i n a l E f f e c t o f S o c i a l

D e

m G o v t –

L o w L a b o r O r g a n

–

n s

–

–

–

–


D e

m G o v t –

H i g h L a b o r O r g a n

–

– 0 . 0 0 0 8 a

( 0 . 0

0 0 7 )

–

–

–

–


D e

m G o v t –

L o w T r i p a r t i s m

–

–

–

–

n s

–


D e

m G o v t –

H i g h T r i p a r t i s m

–

–

–

–

– 0 . 0 1 9 2 * *

( 0 . 0

0 6 9 )

–


D e

m G o v t –

L o w E m p l o y e r s

O r

g a n

–

–

n s

–

–

n s


D e

m G o v t –

H i g h E m p l o y e r s

O r

g a n

–

–

– 0 . 0 0 1 1 *

( 0 . 0

0 0 7 )

Swank, D. (2014). the Political Sources of Labor Market Dualism in Post-Industrial Democracies,...

Documents

Transcript of Swank, D. (2014). the Political Sources of Labor Market Dualism in Post-Industrial Democracies,...