C E N T E R F O R S T R A T E G I C A N D B U D G E T A R Y A S S E S S M E N T S

Sustaining America’s Strategic Advantage in Long-Range Strike

Toward the next long-range strike family of systems

14 Sep 2010

• Why this issue matters now

• A framework for thinking about long-range strike (LRS)– Post-Cold War planning assumptions– A new framework

• Attributes for future LRS capabilities

• Sustaining America’s advantage: toward the next LRS family of systems

• Initiatives and implementation2

Overview

1993 BUR: Up to 184 B-52s, B-1s and B-2s

Today: Entering the 3rd decade of the post-Cold War era with the same bomber force (albeit older & somewhat smaller)

3

Bomber Variants

2010 Total Active

Inventory

Primary Mission Aircraft

Inventory

Average Age

in Years

B-2A 20 18 16

B-1B 66 50 23

B-52H 76 54 48

20 Years of LRS Studies little program action

1990 2000 2010

3/1999: USAF Bomber Roadmap, no new bomber until 2037

5/1995: DoD Heavy Bomber Force Study

10/2004: USAF announces new bomber plan with interim bomber (2018) and 2030 bomber

1/1992: Bush announces cut to 20 B-2s

6/1992: USAF Bomber Roadmap

6/1995: TASC Heavy Bomber Industrial Capabilities Study

7/1995: CORM Future Bomber Study

1996: Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study

12/97: National Defense Panel

6/97: Scowcroft Independent Bomber Force Review

3/1998: Welch Long-Range Air Power Panel Report

3/2005: USAF starts Bomber AoA

3/2007: USAF Bomber AoA completed

3/2006: QDR released, 2018 goal for initial new bomber capability

3/2004: USAF accelerates IOC to 2025

2004/5: Next Gen Bomber RFI

6-12/2008: DoD Bomber Requirements Review

4/2009: SECDEF cancels NGB

10/1993: DoD Bottom-Up Review

8/1991:Soviet Union Collapses

2/2010: QDR “Tiger Team” Analysis and NPR

Today: LRS Family of Systems Study

11/2001: USAF LRS Aircraft White Paper

12/2001: Nuclear Posture Review

• Standoff and penetrating platforms and munitions for long-range precision strike, plus supporting capabilities such as airborne electronic attack (AEA) and ISR

• Example of supporting relationships between systems– AEA aircraft help suppress enemy air defenses in support of penetrating

aircraft and cruise missiles

– Standoff strike platforms (e.g., Tomahawk-carrying Navy surface vessels and subs, non-penetrating USAF bombers armed with cruise missiles) launch attacks against an enemy’s critical air defense nodes to support penetrating platforms

– Penetrating aircraft (e.g., B-2A Spirits) attrite enemy long-range ISR and ballistic missiles to reduce attacks against US land bases and carriers

• Penetrating ISR/strike aircraft• Standoff strike aircraft• PGMs, including cruise missiles and CPGS

• Airborne electronic attack• Air breathing ISR• C2 network that ties the FoS together

/ ik i f Ai b l iDescribing a LRS Family of Systems

This study primarily focused on the strike elements of a LRS Family of Systems4

What is an LRS “Family of Systems?”

Without changes to the Defense Department’s program of record, the nation may lose its long-range strike strategic advantage

Why This Matters Now

• DoD is at a crossroads:– The operating environment and pending technical & operational obsolescence of current LRS

capabilities drive a need to begin building the next family of systems now– Continuing to invest in short-range strike at the expense of LRS is leading to an unbalanced force – The next budget may set DoD’s course toward new LRS systems that will exist for 30-plus years

• CSBA’s study proposes:1. A new framework for evaluating options for the next family of systems

2. Attributes for future LRS systems, including: • A new bomber (should it be manned, unmanned or optionally

manned; penetrating or standoff; nuclear or non-nuclear?) • A UAS to extend the range & persistence of carrier strike• New standoff attack weapons such as a joint cruise missile and

Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS)• A penetrating platform for airborne electronic attack (AEA)

3. A phased approach to develop new LRS capabilities over time

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• During the Cold War, the bomber force was sized & shaped primarily for nuclear deterrence

– End of Cold War: Advanced Cruise Missile terminated; B-2 buy capped; SAC deactivated

• DoD adopted a planning framework in the early 1990s that assumed military forces should be sized & shaped for two nearly-simultaneous conventional theater conflicts

– Planning scenarios were limited in scope; theaters were relatively small in size

– Few threats to theater bases, carriers operating off the coast, or to US C4ISR and logistics networks

– Fighters would deploy and provide mass needed to support US operations (e.g., to achieve a “rapid halt”)

– Bombers most valuable early in a conflict before fighters arrive in theater; most could then “swing” to a 2nd conflict

Where We’ve Beenpost-Cold War planning assumptions

Illustrative Distances

This vision of a relatively permissive operating environment continues to influence DoD’s investment decisions

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7

“Current US warfighting strategy hinges on the deployment of short-range fighters and ground forces to foreign bases. We need the power to fight effectively from beyond the theater, and that means shifting much of the burden to long-range air. The Gulf War gave me a glimpse into the future of warfare. I saw adversaries who attacked without warning. I saw adversaries armed with WMD and ballistic missiles.”

Gen “Chuck” Horner, 1996

“Pentagon preferences for short-range instead of long-range air power raise a puzzling contradiction. The long-range bomber fleet is an element of the force structure that appears ideally suited to the demands of the new security environment.”

Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft, 1997

Toward a New Framework for Thinking About LRS

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• While operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq reinforced DoD’s planning assumptions, our adversaries went to school on us

• In the process, they are well on the way to negating nearly all of DoD’s 1990s assumptions by:

Today’s Reality

– Restricting or denying US access to forward bases through political coercion / precise missile and air strikes

– Limiting freedom of maneuver for US Navy surface vessels

– Degrading US C4ISR networks with kinetic and non-kinetic weapons

– Hobbling US power projection by attacking “soft” logistics targets

– Limiting the effectiveness of US precision strikes by:• Fielding advanced integrated air defense systems (IADS);• Using strategic depth to move potential targets further inland;• Hardening and/or deeply burying potential targets; and• Increasing the mobility of key military systems, such as SAMs and

missile transporter erector launchers (TELs)

p y

8

Operating environments are becoming increasingly non-permissive in nature

Planning Scenarios

US power-projection forces must be prepared for a wide range of operations against state and non-state aggressors, including enemies equipped with A2/AD battle networks and WMD

Operating Ranges

Potential AORs and the lack of close-in regional bases will require systems that are capable of operating at much longer ranges

Threats to Forward

Bases

Maturation of the PGM regime will require US forces to operate from increasingly distant bases

Threats to Surface Vessels

Emerging A2/AD capabilities (ACSMs, ASBMs, smart mines, diesel attack submarines, etc.) will force carriers to initially operate 1,000 nm or more from enemy coastlines

C4ISR and Logistics

Networks

Networks will be attacked with kinetic and non-kinetic weapons; networks unlikely to provide uninterrupted support to LRS operations

Enemy Air Defenses

Advanced IADS with modern radars and double-digit SAMs will place aircraft and cruise missiles lacking advanced stealth at risk

Targets Targets that are increasingly mobile/relocatable, hardened or deeply buried will complicate US targeting

A New Framework for Assessing LRS Capabilities

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Desired Attributes for Future Long-Range Strike Systems

• Increased range and mission endurance to persist in target areas

• Advanced stealth to penetrate and survive in contested environments

• Independence of action to find, track and attack targets…reduced reliance on off-board supporting capabilities

RangeStealth

Manned or UnmannedPenetrating or Standoff

10

Attributes for a LRS Family of Systems in a Non-Permissive World

“Do we want a stand-off bomber? Do we want an attack bomber? Do we want amanned bomber or an unmanned bomber? Or do we want variations, where youcould have a platform that could serve both purposes?”

Secretary of Defense Gates, February 2010

Illustrative Range & Persistence for a Bomber with a 2,500 nm Combat Radius

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Assuming air refueling is available prior to penetration, a bomber with a 2,000-2,500 nm combat radius could cover all countries

Illustrative Range & Persistence for a Carrier Aircraft with a 1,500 nm Combat Radius

Illustrative range and persistence for a notional stealthy unmanned ISR/strike aircraft with last refueling approximately 250 nm from coastline 12

• “Stealth” aircraft are not invisible– Stealth = low radar cross sections, smart mission planning & tactics to avoid the most lethal

threat areas, and threat suppression

• There is a perpetual competition between “hiders” and “finders”– Some believe that advances in processing power have advantaged the defense by enabling

development of new systems such as low-band search radars and passive detection networks that use emitters of convenience (e.g., TV, cell phone, radio broadcasts)

• Sustaining the US military’s stealth advantage: – “Moore’s law” advances in processing power advantage both hiders and finders– The US is unmatched in its ability to turn new technology into operational capabilities– Using passive location systems to accurately locate stealth platforms in a “many against

many” real-world fight would be extremely difficult

13

Potential key attributes for future penetrating LRS systems:� “All-aspect” 360 degree low radar cross section

� “Broad-band” low observability characteristics across high and low frequency bands

� Sufficient on-board computing power to re-plan flight path to avoid pop-up air defense radars

� On-board electronic attack–capable systems (such as AESA radar)

� Weapons bay capacity to carry expendable decoys and, potentially, air-to-air missiles

Viability of Stealth

• UAS are particularly useful for “dull, dirty and dangerous” missions

• However, little study has been performed on the advantages & disadvantages of largeunmanned platforms the size of a new bomber

– Would an unmanned bomber be inherently more survivable than a manned variant?

– Would it be less expensive than a manned bomber?

– Would the lack of a cockpit increase a new bomber’s range and payload capacity?

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Manned or Unmanned?

• Survivability: ‒ Given equivalent planforms (shape and size), there should be little difference

between the low observability characteristics of manned & unmanned variants

Empty Weight Comparison

15

Assumptions:

• 2,000 nm or 5,000 nm unrefueled range

• 3,000 lbs for a single pilot ejection seat, life support, other required equipment

• 430 knots

• Many performance advantages of unmanned aircraft over equivalent manned aircraft tend to wash out as their size/empty weight increase

• 4-6% difference in empty weights translates to unit cost

Weapons Payload (lbs)

20%

10%

30%

1k 2k 4k 6k 10k 15k 20k 40k

2,000 nm range aircraft 5,000 nm range aircraft

Man Equip as % of

Empty Weight

4-6% of empty weight/cost

1 pilot cockpit (3,000 lbs)

2 pilot cockpit (6,000 lbs)

Comparing Manned, Unmanned, Optionally Manned Bomber Variants

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Manned Unmanned Optionally Manned

Aircrew at Risk Yes No Mission dependent

Mission Persistence Limited by human factors Limited by machine factors Mission dependent

Stealth Characteristics Negligible difference Negligible difference Negligible difference

Empty Weight 4-6% increase compared to unmanned

4-6% increase compared to unmanned

Unit Cost Negligible difference Negligible difference Negligible difference

Need for Secure C2, Adequate Bandwidth Desired Required for current UAS Mission dependent

Inflight Situational Awareness & Retasking Immediate and onboard Remote or by rule set Mission dependent

Weapons Release Consent Immediate and onboard Remote or by rule set Mission dependent

Probability for Loss of Aircraft Control

Very long sorties increase need for on-board systems redundancy

Very long unmanned sorties increase need for on-board systems redundancy

Nuclear Mission C2 No issues Not capable of meeting nuclear C2 requirements No issues when manned

• A future bomber capable of independent operations would have increased mission flexibility in communications-denied operating environments

• Absent true mission autonomy for unmanned aircraft, an “optionally manned” design may be a viable choice for the next penetrating bomber

Standoff or Penetrating?

1717

Assessed Against 1990s Framework (Optimized for Permissive Environments)

Assessed Against New Framework (Non-Permissive Environments)

Fixed Targets

�VERY CAPABLE• B-2s, B-1s, B-52s with direct attack and

standoff PGMs• Fighters and UAVs (with refueling)• Sea-based standoff strike

LIMITED CAPABILITY • 16 B-2s• Cruise missiles

Moving Targets

�VERY CAPABLE• B-1s, B-52s with direct attack PGMs• Strike fighters (with refueling) • UAVs with off-board cueing

LITTLE CAPABILITY

Hardened or Deeply Buried

Targets

�VERY CAPABLE• Bombers & fighters with penetrating PGMs • B-2 with future MOP for very

deep/hardened targets

LIMITED CAPABILITY• 16 B-2s with direct attack penetrating PGMs

• Standoff weapons are critical for striking targets in very heavily defended areas and for early strikes against IADS • Future air campaigns will likely require precision strikes on thousands of targets, including targets that are

increasingly mobile, hardened or deeply buried

– Long flight times for sub-sonic cruise missiles limit their effectiveness against deep inland targets that can relocate in minutes, especially if off-board terminal guidance is unavailable

– Standoff PGMs with 1,000-2,000 lb conventional warheads have limited effectiveness against very hard/deeply buried targets

• Moving to an all standoff force would present a one-dimensional challenge to future enemies– Would increase strain on US ISR– Would encourage increased investment in measures to counter standoff weapons

Comparing Standoff and Penetrating LRS Capabilities

Tota

l Cos

ts $

Mill

ion

(Pro

cure

men

t + O

pera

tions

& S

uppo

rt)

800

1200

600

1000

400

200

0

1400

Days of Conflict in 30 Year Period

Bomber CostCruise Missile Cost

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Total Cost of a New Penetrating Bomber Compared to Using New Cruise Missiles*

The next LRS Family of Systems should have a mix of standoff and penetrating capabilities

*From a RAND assessment

• Standoff weapons such as cruise missiles are “unmanned aircraft” that expend a vehicle, power plant and guidance system to deliver a warhead on target (and thus are costly)

– e.g., $1.5m for a Block IV TACTOM or $2m for a CALCM compared to a $22,000 JDAM

• Using only standoff PGMs in campaigns that require strikes against thousands of targets is likely cost prohibitive

– 1st Gulf War: average of 961 aimpoints/day

– First 30 days of Iraqi Freedom: total of 20,000 aimpoints

• A LRS family of systems with a mix of standoff and penetrating capabilities is a more balanced force

– Create multiple problems for adversaries– Cover all target categories– More affordable mix for air campaigns– Penetrators can perform multiple missions

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Toward the Next LRS Family of Systems

Next BomberAir Leg of the Nuclear Triad

Carrier StrikeStandoff Weapons

Airborne Electronic Attack

19

Program of Record Capabilities Assessed Against the New Planning Framework

20

Projected LRS family of systems capability shortfalls: • Penetrating strike (Air Force and Navy) • Standoff strike weapons • Airborne electronic attack to support long-range systems in contested environments• Air leg of the nuclear triad

Airborne Electronic

Attack

Penetrating Strike

Platforms

Standoff Strike Platforms

Standoff Strike Weapons

EA-6B,, EC-130,0, EF-18G

16 B-2s

B-52, B-1, B-2, sea-based

EC-130CALCM/ALCM, TLAM , JASSM-ER

Near-Term Future

= Potential Capability Shortfalls

Today’s Bomber Force

21

Strengths• Sufficient range, large payloads • Able to conduct independent operations using on-board sensors and systems• Viable standoff weapons carriers for 30-plus years (B-52 = 2044; B-1 = 2047; B-2 = 2058) • Can penetrate low-threat and medium-threat areas• Capable of attacking fixed and moving targets in low-threat and medium-threat areas

Shortfalls• With the exception of a small B-2 force,

unable to penetrate and persist in high-threat areas– Over time, B-2s are likely to lose their

ability to penetrate • Insufficient strike capacity to support air

campaigns with thousands of targets in high-threat areas

• Unable to locate, track, and strike moving targets in high-threat areas

Low- & Medium-Threat Areas

High-ThreatAreas

20

20

40

0

60

80

100

50 B-1B

54 B-52H

18 B-2A

Low-Threat Areas Only

Potential Characteristics of a New Penetrating Bomber

22

• Optionally manned or manned

• Unrefueled range of at least 4,000 nm between refuelings (2,000-plus nm radius)

• Broad-band, very low-observable with improved LO materials and computing power

• Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radar

• Conventional strike and potential to carry nuclear weapons

• Payload between 20,000 lb and 40,000 lb

• Affordable unit cost to permit procurement of a sizable fleet (e.g., up to 100 aircraft)

Weapons Bay

F135-PW-100 Engines (2)

AESARadar

Two Aircrew

Illustrative Off-The-Shelf

Systems & Components

to Reduce Unit Cost

– F-35 engines– F-35 mission computer– F-35 cockpit controls and displays– F-35 communication/navigation systems– F-35 armament control system– F-35 environmental control system– B-2 AESA radar– B-2 landing gear and weapons bay doors– B-2 secondary power system– B-2 crew escape– F-15E electrical system– F-15E fuel system– F-15E fire suppression– F/A-18E/F hydraulics– B737 derivative landing gear

Affordability is a Key Issue(size does matter)

23

• The next bomber fleet should be sized to support future air campaigns

• For example, compared to 50 new bombers, a fleet of 100 penetrating bombers would give commanders:

– Twice the area coverage to search for mobile targets – Significantly improved ability to swing to another theater

“We must avoid a situation in which the loss of even one aircraft –by accident or by combat – results in a loss of a significant portion of the fleet, a national disaster akin to the sinking of a capital ship.”

—Secretary of Defense Gates, September 2009

40,000 lb Payload 20,000 lb Payload

Empty Weight 126,000 lb 100,000 lbTotal EMD (assume 6 test vehicles) $19.7 billion $16.2 billion

Total Production

50 aircraft $24.1 billion $20 billion100 aircraft $36.2 billion $30 billion

Total EMD + Production

$44 billion for 50 acft$56 billion for 100 acft

$36 billion for 50 acft$46 billion for 100 acft

Total Program Average Unit Cost

$840 million for 50 acft $540 million for 100 acft

$680 million for 50 acft$440 million for 100 acft

• Aircraft empty weight and size of the buy translates directly to unit cost

– Sheer mass of payload per bomber is less important in the PGM era

• Develop new PGMs to fit a new bomber’s weapons bay, vice sizing the weapons bay for legacy weapons

s

g bombers would give commanders:

”

09

Sustaining the Air Leg of the Nuclear Triad

“The Air Force must have a plan for a land-based strategic deterrent replacement for sustainment of the air leg of the nuclear deterrent force.“

—General Chilton, Commander, US Strategic Command

• 2010 NPR determined the US should sustain the nuclear triad for decades

• However, without changes to DoD’s program of record, the triad is at peril of becoming a dyad by default

– ALCMs are aging out, B-2s will eventually lose their ability to penetrate

• DoD should design its next cruise missile to carry both conventional and nuclear warheads

• Design the next bomber to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons after a future block upgrade – New START permits mixed fleet of nuclear/non-nuclear bombers of same

type– No need to fully equip, test and certify for nuclear weapons until required

• A new bomber that may someday carry nuclear weapons must be designed accordingly—e.g., hardened against EMP & other nuclear weapons effects, wired appropriately, etc.

• Designing a new bomber to provide this hedge is worth the marginal cost of approximately 6-8% of EMD

24

The US Navy’s Notional Future Carrier Air Wing

44 strike fighters

F/A-18E/FF-35

UCLASSF/A-18E/F replacement

5 electronic attack aircraft EA-18GEA-18 replacement

5 airborne early warning aircraft E-2D

19 helicopters MH-60R/S or replacement

2 future carrier onboard delivery aircraft

nt

ment

• Precision strike technologies have increased the lethality of the Navy’s carrier air wings

• However, emerging area denial threats may force carriers to standoff at great distances, while emerging air defense threats pose unacceptable risks to aircraft without advanced LO

• Need a multi-mission ISR/strike capability with sufficient range and LO characteristics to operate in increasingly non-permissive areas

25

Toward the Future Carrier Air Wing

Manned or Unmanned?

“We must also rethink what and how we buy – to shift investments towards systems that provide the ability to see and strike deep along the full spectrum of conflict. This means, among other things…more resources devoted to long-range unmanned aircraft and ISR capabilities” Secretary of Defense Gates, May 2010

Unrefueled Range >2,500 nm

Internal Weapons >4,000 lbs

Refueled Endurance >24 hours Sensors / Comms

AESA, EO/IR, IRST, MADL, AEHF

Low Observables Broad-band / all-aspect

• UCLASS and F/A-18E/F replacement are opportunities to increase CVW ISR/strike range and persistence

• For example, build on the UCAS demonstrator to provide a low-observable multi-mission platform as part of the future LRS family of systems

• Missions could include strike, ISR, airborne electronic attack

26

Opportunity to Significantly Increase Range & Persistence of Carrier-Based Strike

Future UCAS is an opportunity to make a bold shift toward enabling effective strike operations against enemies with A2/AD battle networks

e

Airborne Electronic Attack

• Current generation AEA aircraft (EA-6B, EC-130H, EA-18G) are best suited for DoD’s 1990s planning paradigm

– IDA: “EA-18G is not designed to survive within defended airspace”

• A new AEA system should have performance characteristics suitable to complement next generation LRS capabilities

• May be possible to leverage other programs and systems to field a “75% solution” sooner and at less cost than a new design

27

Future?

Standoff Strike

28

• Due to their high cost & operational limitations, long-range standoff weapons are best used in small numbers against high-value fixed targets

• Consider a new cruise missile sized to be launched from a variety of AF & Navy platforms (e.g., one with 500-600 nm range)

– Would permit DoD to take advantage of economies of scale

• CPGS weapons would offer commanders another option for attacking very high value targets

• Supersonic/hypersonic speeds could help overcome the target location error challenge

• Such weapons would likely be very expensive–on the order of tens of millions of dollars per target

Sequencing and Initiatives

29

Sequencing LRS

Investments

LRS Initiatives

The Industrial Base

Sequencing LRS Investments

Option 1: Allows time to mature potential new technologies for a future bomber, but significantly extends LRS shortfalls into the 2030s or 2040s, at which time the entire bomber fleet will need replacing

Option 2: Fails to take advantage of the standoff attack service life of current bomber force ; extends the penetrating strike capability gap well into the future

Option 3: Addresses the most significant LRS shortfalls first; enables opportunity to take advantage of economies of scale by using the same aircraft planform for a penetrating bomber and follow-on standoff platform

Option 4: Likely the most expensive of the four options, would “overinvest” in stealth for standoff strike 30

Option 4: “One Bite at the Apple”

• Field a new penetratingaircraft to replace the entire bomber force

• New standoff cruise missile, limited CPGS

• New carrier UCAS

• New AEA platform

Option 3: Penetrating Strike +

• Field a new penetratingbomber first

• Defer a fielding new standoff bomber until the 2040s

• New standoff cruise missile, limited CPGS

• New carrier UCAS

• New AEA platform

Option 2: Standoff Strike +

• Field a new standoff bomber first

• Defer fielding a new penetrating bomber until the 2040s

• New standoff cruise missile, limited CPGS

• New carrier UCAS

• Defer a new AEA platform until 2040s

Option 1: Defer a New Bomber

• Continue to upgrade current bomber force

• Defer a new bomber decision until the mid-2020s

• New standoff cruise missile, limited CPGS

• New carrier UCAS

• Develop a smaller AEA platform

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Initiatives

Land-Based Penetrating ISR-Strike � Up to 100 optionally manned bombers with all-aspect, broad-band LO,

~20,000 lbs payload, 4,000-5,000 nm unrefueled range (field in mid-2020s)

� Design to have the potential to carry nuclear weapons, upgrade over time

Standoff Strike � Defer a new standoff attack platform until penetrating bomber production is

nearly completed

� Invest in a joint Navy/Air Force standoff cruise missile that can be launched from a variety of platforms

� Develop a small inventory (100 or fewer) CPGS weapons for limited strikes against very high-value targets

Carrier-Based Penetrating ISR-Strike � Develop an air-refuelable UCAS with all-aspect, broad-band LO and

~3,000 nm unrefueled range (field ASAP, beginning with UCLASS)

Airborne Electronic Attack� Develop an unmanned or manned platform to support penetrating LRS

platforms and weapons, leveraging other programs as much as possible

S

The Industrial Baseour LRS strategic advantage begins with the human element

0

10

20

30

40

50

Num

ber o

f New

Des

igns

F-117 T-45F-20 B-2X-29 V-22T-46 Condor

1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s

?

1950s

XP5Y-1 XFY-1 A2D F-8UXC-120 P6M-1F-4D U-2F-3H XY-3X-5 F-105B-60 X-13B-52 C-133A-3D F-107X-3 B-58S-2F F-106X-2 F-5DF-10F X-14F2Y-1 C-140F-100 T-2B-57 F-4F-102 A-5R3Y-1 T-39F-104 T-38A-4D AO-1B-66 X-15F-11F F-5AC-130 X-18F-101 T-37

1960s

A-6 XC-142E-2 F-111SR-71 A-7XV-4A OV-10X-21 X-22X-19 X-26BC-141 C-5AB-70 X-24

1970s1

F-14 B-1AS-3 YC-15YA-9 YC-14A-10 XV-15F-15 AV-8BF-16 F/A-18YF-17

1990s

YF-22 X-32YF-23 X-35X-31 X-36C-17 F-22Bird of Prey

2000s

F-35 N-UCASX-45 X-47MQ-1/9 RQ-4, BAMS

New Military Fixed-Wing Aircraft Designs• Between 7-13 aircraft under development over last 40 years…today,

there are none• At risk of “hollowing out” the military aircraft industrial base

• Loss of skills critical to designing advanced military aircraft• Declining experience levels contribute to development issues and

increase costs

• If the industrial base is allowed to atrophy, it will require a considerable amount of time and resources to regenerate

• Without work, it is doubtful that industry will continue to absorb the $80-100m annual cost of sustaining their engineering staffs

• Further delaying a new bomber will likely increase its development time and cost significantly

32

Questions?

“We are probably going to proceed with a long-range strike initiative coming out of the Quadrennial Defense Review and various other reviews going on…we’re looking at a family of capabilities, both manned and unmanned.”

Secretary of Defense GatesDecember 11, 2009

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5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

EMD

Cost

s (FY

200

7 $

Mill

ion)

Relationship Between Empty Weight, Number of EMD Aircraft, and Cost

34Plot developed using Breguet’s range equation and assumes a notional aircraft lift-to-drag ratio of 18, aircraft velocity of 430 knots (Mach 0.75) and SFC 0.68 pounds of fuel consumed per pound of thrust produced per hour, (lbs/hr/lbf) yielding representative comparisons

200

300

400

500

600

700 Num

ber of Production AircraftAv

erag

e U

nit P

rodu

ctio

n Co

st (F

Y 20

07 $

Mill

ion)

Relationship Between Empty Weight, Number of Production Aircraft, and Cost

Plot developed using Breguet’s range equation and assumes a notional aircraft lift-to-drag ratio of 18, aircraft velocity of 430 knots (Mach 0.75) and SFC 0.68 pounds of fuel consumed per pound of thrust produced per hour, (lbs/hr/lbf) yielding representative comparisons 35