Sustainable Alternatives Development for Narcotics Control in Afghanistan

GERALD R. FORD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN-ANN ARBOR, MI,USA

Sustainable Alternative Developments for Narcotics Control in Afghanistan

Dr. Ahmad Javid Ahmadi

7/5/2012

Sust. AL. Dev. For Narcotics Control in Afghanistan Dr. Ahmad Javid Ahmadi

Page 1 of 20 [email protected]

Executive Summary The ever-increasing nexus between drugs and terrorism is pretty well documented.

Afghanistan is one of the world’s largest producers of opium. The Afghan Drugs

Industry is steadily fueling insurgency and financing domestic and global terrorism.

While the Government of Afghanistan (GoIRA) is struggling to stem the unabated flow

of opium, the Taliban is going all out to maintain its cultivation. It facilitates drug

trafficking as it derives income by levying taxes on cultivation as well as its trade across

the border. The warlord and the Taliban use revenues from this cultivation and trade to

gain access to sophisticated weapons and communication systems and thereby thwart

any attempts to usher in peace and stability by the Afghani Government and the

NATO. Moreover, Afghanistan is a land locked country with a mix of stable and

volatile neighbors. Opium easily permeates through its porous borders and funds

global terror networks as well.

The Karzai’s Government has taken some concrete measures to contain this menace. It

has established a specialized Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN), formulated policies

and laws for counter narcotics. It has adopted several strategic and tactical measures

that have led to several provinces achieving the “Poppy Free” statuses. It has also

effectively utilized Public Awareness, Demand Reduction, Enforcement, and Alternate

Livelihood steps to alleviate the burden of narcotics on Afghanistan. This paper

attempts to critically evaluate the drugs trade of Afghanistan and provides

recommendations to improve counter efforts.



Table of Contents Executive Summary ..................................................................................................................1

Abbreviations and Acronyms ..................................................................................................3

Situational analysis ....................................................................................................................4

Historical Background ...........................................................................................................4

Afghanistan drug profile (demographics) .......................................................................4

History of narcotics in Afghanistan ...................................................................................8

Involvement of neighboring countries in Afghan drugs ...............................................10

Current efforts by the Karzai’s government ......................................................................11

Strategic ...........................................................................................................................11

Tactical .............................................................................................................................11

Achievements .....................................................................................................................14

Recommendations – Sustainable Alternative Development..............................................16

Government .....................................................................................................................16

Farmers .............................................................................................................................17

Consumers........................................................................................................................18

References ...........................................................................................................................20

Table of figures Figure 1 Factsheet – Afghanistan Opium 2011 ...........................................................................5 Figure 2 Major Poppy Cultivating Provinces of Afghanistan ......................................................6 Figure 3: Opium poppy cultivation map of Afghanistan..............................................................7 Figure 4: Trafficking routes .........................................................................................................8 Figure 5: Ministries and Agencies Segregation ......................................................................... 13



Abbreviations and Acronyms

AEF Afghan Eradication Force AL Alternative Livelihood ANDS Afghanistan’s National Development Strategy ANP Afghan National Police AREU Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit CJTF Criminal Justice Task Force CN Counter Narcotics CN-IMC Counter Narcotics Inter Ministerial Committee CNPA Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan GDP Gross Domestic Product Go-IRA Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan IDLG Independent Directorate of Local Governance ILM Implementing Line Ministry MAIL Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livelihood MCN Ministry of Counter Narcotics MoD Ministry of Defense MoEd Ministry of Education MoEW Ministry of Energy and Water MoF Ministry of Finance MoFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MoH&RA Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs MoHE Ministry of Higher Education MoI Ministry of Interior MoIC&T Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism MoJ Ministry of Justice MoPW Ministry of Public Works MoWA Ministry of Women Affairs MRRD Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDS National Department of Security UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics



Situational analysis

Historical Background

Afghanistan drug profile (demographics)

Afghanistan is the opium capital of the world. It produces over ninety percent (90%) of

the world’s opium, powering the global heroin trade and funding both the insurgents

and government-linked warlords. Afghan opium trade generates billions of dollars of

revenue per year into the country’s informal, illegal economy.

Afghanistan in total has 37,910,000 hectare of Agricultural land. Currently, 131,000

hectare of agricultural land is cultivated for opium poppy. The number of households /

individuals involved in opium poppy cultivation reached 191,500 / 1,490,000 or five

percent (5%) of the Afghanistan population in 2011. According to the United Nations

Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimate, the monetary value of the drug

industry is around $1.4 billion [or nine percent (9%) of GDP].



Figure 1 Factsheet – Afghanistan Opium 2011

Component 2010 Changes 2011

Net opium poppy cultivation (after eradication) 123,000 ha

(104,000-145,000)

+7% 131,000 ha

(109,000-155,000)

Number of poppy free provinces 20 -3 17

Number of provinces affected by poppy cultivation 14 +3 17

Eradication (Governor led) 2316 ha +65% 3810 ha

Weighted average opium yield 29.2 kg/ha +52% 44.5 kg/ha

Potential production of opium

3,600 mt

(3,000-4,200)

+61%

5,800 mt

(4,800-6,800)

Number of household involved in opium

ccultivation.

In % of total population

248,700

6%

-23% 191,500

5%

Average farm-gate price (weighted by production)

of fresh opium at harvest time

Average farm-gate price (weighted by production)

of dry opium at harvest time

US$ 128/kg

US$ 169/kg

+41%

+43%

US$ 180/kg

US$ 241/kg

Current GDP US$ 12.7 billion US$ 16.34 billion

Total farm-gate value of opium production

In % of GDP

US$ 605 million

5%

+133% US$ 1,407 million

9%

Gross income from opium per ha US$ 4,900 +118% US 10,700

Contribution of global narcotics trade

According to UNODC 2011 report, Afghanistan produces 90% of the world opium.

Only an insignificant quantity of this opium is consumed in Afghanistan, while the rest

is smuggled out of the country. Afghan heroin is channeled through Islamic Republic of

Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia, to other continents. In 2009 UNODC estimated that 150

tons of Afghan Heroin reaches Europe, 120 tons Asia and 45 tons Africa.



Geographical locations of poppy fields, opium labs and trafficking routes

i. Poppy cultivation & opium production

Ninety five per cent (95%) of poppy cultivation takes place in Southern and Western

regions of Afghanistan. Statistics indicate that in 2011 Southern region produced 2701

ton (78%), Western 529 ton (17%), North-Eastern 367 ton (9.6%), Eastern 89 ton (2.3%),

Central 80 ton (2%) and Northern 34 ton (.89%) of opium.

The production of opium is widely spread across the country. As outlined below, there

are six major opium-producing provinces that produce 3422 tons of opium annually:

Figure 2 Major Poppy Cultivating Provinces of Afghanistan

Region Province Opium Production (tons)

Southern Helmand 1940

Northern Badakhshan 367

Southern Kandahar 287

Southern Daikundi 235

Western Hirat 227

Western Farah 212

Southern Uruzgan 154

Total 3422

ii. Processing Laboratories

Afghanistan has approximately 300-500 laboratories in operation with an output of

approximately 380 tons of heroin per year. The Southern region of the country accounts

for 50 per cent of national Heroin manufacturing in the last few years.



iii. Trafficking

Almost all opiates trafficked from Afghanistan enter Pakistan, Iran and Central Asia.

According to UNODC report, 365 tons of heroin was trafficked out of Afghanistan in

2009: 160 tons to Pakistan, 115 tons to Iran, and 90 tons to Central Asia (Tajikistan,

Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). In addition, Afghan opium export was accounted for

1200 – 1400 tons, almost 80% of which was trafficked to Iran. Only a small percentage of

Afghan opiate is consumed in these neighboring countries, but the rest reaches

international markets in Europe, Africa and other Asian countries. In 2009, UNODC

estimated that 150 tons of Afghan Heroin reaches Europe, 120 tons Asian and 45 tons

African markets. All chemical precursors are smuggled in to Afghanistan from

Pakistan, Iran and relatively smaller quantities from Russia and China.

Figure 3: Opium poppy cultivation map of Afghanistan



Figure 4: Trafficking routes

History of narcotics in Afghanistan

Initiation Afghanistan has a long history of producing narcotics. The opium poppies cultivation

began, when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) invaded Afghanistan in

year 1979. This struggle consequently resulted in less or no control of Afghan

government of the time over its provinces. The invasion and lack of government control

over provinces resulted in growing strength of warlords. These warlords needed money

to fund their resistance operations against the Soviet-funded Afghan government. The

insurgents primarily used drugs industry to finance their operations, and then received

more financial support from the United States and a number of other western countries.



Following to collapse of the Soviet Union and withdrawal of their troops from

Afghanistan in 1989, the western support discontinued. This discontinuation resulted in

a significant increase in poppy cultivation, because the insurgents were using drugs as

the only financial means for their operations. Thus the opium production continued to

increase markedly in 1990’s. In year 2000 Taliban leader, Mulla Mohammad Omar

issued a decree that announced poppy production against Islamic practices. This decree

resulted in 90% reduction in poppy cultivation in year 2001.

Linkage to terrorism – opium ecosystem Poppy cultivation takes place in areas under control of insurgents (insecure

provinces)

Insurgents / drug traffickers provide security to farmers who grow opium

poppy

Insurgents / drug traffickers lend (provide informal loans) to farmers before

cultivation season for their poppy harvest

Insurgents tax the opium production at the farm gate (10% of production)

Insurgents work in poppy fields during harvest to augment their pay

Insurgents collect tax from local/ small drug traders who collect opium from

farms

Insurgents facilitate trafficking of narcotics by securing trafficking routes and

collect transit tariff per kilo of opium / heroin

Insurgents receive payment for providing security to narcotics processing

laboratories



Insurgents also receive regular payment from drug traffickers that makes the

largest proportion of their income

UNODC has estimated that insurgents collect an annual income of $ 125 million from

taxes and protection payments from the drug trade. All of this money is used to finance

insurgents operations in the country.

Involvement of neighboring countries in Afghan drugs Afghanistan’s neighboring countries play an important role in the growing Afghan

narcotics / drugs industry. The neighboring countries such as Pakistan, Iran and

Central Asian Countries (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) supply chemical

precursors used in Heroin processing labs, and provide primary market for Afghan

opiates. As illustrated in the trafficking map, these countries service as a hub between

Afghan opiates and drug markets in Asia, Europe and Africa.

CULTIVATION • Traffickers provide loans to farmers • Insurgents provide security against fee to

poppy fields and growers • Collects 10% tax on harvest

PRODUCTON • Insurgents tax production (double tax)

• Provide security to processing labs against fee

TRAFFICKING • Secure trafficking routes • Collect tariff on each killo of drugs shipped

FINANCING INSURGENCY • Access to sohphisticated weapons and

communication equipment via • revenue collected from tax and tariff • direct regular payments by traffickers



Current efforts by the Karzai’s government Go-IRA appreciated the implications of Afghanistan’s opium trade and adopted eight

pillars under the Afghanistan’s National Development Strategy (ANDS). The Ministry

of Counter Narcotics (MCN) was established post this to make these pillars more

comprehensible and achievable. The purpose of each pillar is briefly outlined below:

Strategic Institution Building

Build CN institutions that provide for effective governance at the center and in the

provinces

International & Regional Cooperation

Improve International and Regional Cooperation to disrupt the flow of illicit drugs and

precursor materials across borders.

Criminal Justice

Establish an effective criminal justice system that can support drug law enforcement.

Tactical Public Awareness

Inform, educate, deter and dissuade the population from involvement in the illicit

drugs trade, cultivation of opium and abuse of opiates.

Demand Reduction

Reduce Afghan demand for drugs and offer treatment to addicts.



Law enforcement

Establish Institutional capacity to increase drug trafficking risk through law

enforcement.

Eradication

Build the capacity to conduct targeted and verified ground-based eradication of opium

poppy farms.

Alternative livelihood

Strengthen and diversify ‘Alternative Livelihoods’ (AL) that free farmers and other

rural workers from dependence on opium cultivation and encourages growth of the licit

economy.

Since CN is a crosscutting function that requires multi-agency efforts, the government

mainstreamed CN objectives in all Implementing Line Ministries (ILMs) and relevant

agencies’ programs. It also established Counter Narcotics Inter-ministerial Committee

(CN-IMC), consisted of deputy ministers and/ or director generals of line ministries

and agencies. This high level CN-IMC coordinates CN efforts across the government.

The following table illustrates the formation of CN working groups under each pillar:



Figure 5: Ministries and Agencies Segregation

Objective Pillar Ministries and Agencies

Law Enforcement Ministry of Interior (MoI), Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan

(CNPA), MCN, Border Police, Afghan National Police (ANP),

Criminal Justice Ministry of Justice (MoJ), Attorney-General’s Office, Criminal Justice

Task Force (CJTF), MCN

International &

Regional

Cooperation

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), Ministry of Defense (MoD),

National Directorate for Security (NDS), Office of National Security

Adviser, MCN

Institution-Building All line ministries and provincial administration

Public Awareness MCN, Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE), Ministry of Public Health

(MoPH), Ministry of Information, Culture & Tourism (MoIC&T),

Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs (MoH&RA), Ministry of Women’s

Affairs (MoWA), Ministry of Education (MoEd), Independent

Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG)

Demand Reduction MCN, MoHE, MoPH, MoIC&T, MoH&RA, MoWA, MoEd

Eradication MCN, MoI, Afghan Eradication Force (AEF), IDLG (Provincial

Administration)

Alternative

Livelihoods

Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), Ministry of

Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL), MCN, Ministry of Energy

and Water (MoEW), Ministry of Finance (MoF), Ministry of Public

Works (MoPW), Provincial Administration (IDLG)



Achievements MCN has been instrumental in adopting both demand reduction and supply

constriction strategies. This two-pronged approach has had some teething troubles but

has been effective nonetheless. As demonstrated in Figure 1 – ‘Factsheet – Afghanistan

Opium 2011,’ while MCN has successfully managed to reduce the number of

households involved in opium cultivation, it has lost ground on achieving ‘poppy free’

provinces.

National database

One of the biggest accomplishments of MCN was the compilation and creation of a

national database of narcotics. This is turning out of immense value to the Afghani

government, UNODC, international agencies because previously there was absolutely

no account of the opium economy including opium production, opium exports,

families/ individuals involved, number of addicts, percentage of the GDP, percentage

contributing to warlords, etc.

Drug Demand Reduction

MCN along with MoI raised their law enforcement and eradication drives. This led to

increased seizures and arrest, more ‘Poppy Free’ provinces. Apart from this, MCN,

UNODC and MoPH launched an ‘Addicts Survey’ in 2005 that kept track of local

addiction numbers and created 50 ‘Treatment Centers’ that have been providing

deaddiction and counseling to addicts.



Alternate livelihood

MCN in accordance with MAIL and MRRD created alternative livelihood programs

that incentivized farmers to quit opium cultivation and seek alternate cyclical cash

crops. This resulted in the Helmand province achieving the status of a “Poppy free

Green Zone.” MCN also ensured that the farmers who had quit opium cultivation were

provided adequate protection from the warlords.

Public Awareness

MCN sought cooperation from the MoHE, MoPH, MoIC&T and MoEd in raising the

public awareness levels by running a media program on national television and radio,

creating a helpline for answering queries on alternative livelihood and deaddiction and

most importantly utilized the religious leaders and priests as the mouthpiece of the CN

initiative.



Recommendations – Sustainable Alternative Development The GoIRA has been persistently adhering to its CN pillars. However, most of the CN

initiatives have been rolled out in isolation and are successful in disparate areas. What I

would like to suggest here is that that the GoIRA should pursue a nationwide CN

initiative that targets all stakeholders. I have tried to encompass recommendations for

Government, Farmers and Consumer below:

Government Autonomy to MCN

MCN is the specialty ministry created solely for counter narcotics. Therefore, it ought to

be allowed autonomously to not just create policy but also to implement it. It should not

be subjected to pressures from international advisors. The transient international

advisors should neither formulate policy based on their limited knowledge nor should

they interfere in the policy formulation. They should just guide MCN in policy

formulation.

Centralize CN

Unless MCN is given pan-Afghanistan powers and prerogatives, it will continue to be

affected by IDLGs. Because narcotics are a menace affecting the entire country, it is

imperative that it is targeted by a central structure. Eliminating IDLGs or taking CN

control away from them is the only way MCN will retain control over the entire

country.



Human resource investment

Unless the MCN invests in training, hiring and retaining home grown expertise, it will

have to continue relying on international experts. In order to be self-reliant and

autonomous, it has to get local people on board who are in turn willing to invest their

time and careers in MCN.

Commitment

Often times because of lack of resources and manpower, MCN withdraws support once

the province achieves “Poppy Free” status. This has resulted in provinces not staying

“Poppy Free” permanently. Liaising, funding and implementation in a particular

province is a resource and time intensive process. The MCN ought to commit itself to a

province and not abandon it once the status is achieved.

Farmers Incentivize legal crops

MCN needs to figure out how to motivate farmers to dissociate themselves from the

opium ecosystem and opt legal crops? The MCN obviously has to incentivize this by

providing better value proposition to the farmers.

Security

In the current ecosystem, the warlords and extremists provide protection to the farmers

and their families in exchange for cultivating opium. This extortion ensures the

wellbeing of the farmers’ families. Unless the farmers feel secure about pursuing legal

crops, no amount of incentivizing can persuade them to switch to legal crops. The



GoIRA ought to provide security to the farmers, their families and on access routes to

markets.

Quality inputs

Afghanistan has a genuine dearth of farm inputs. The opium that the farmers currently

grow is also at the mercy of natural forces. In order to convert farmers to legal crops,

GoIRA will have to provide quality seeds, fertilizers and most importantly irrigation.

Improved access to markets

Currently, the warlords and extremists are buying opium from the farmers directly at a

high price. It is as if the markets come to the farmers’ doorsteps. Now, unless the GoIRA

creates markets that value the farmers’ legal crops at a fair price and provides them

their dues on time, farmers will not get motivated to switch to legal crops.

Better infrastructure (roads, transport, storage and processing facilities)

There is no semblance of any modern day infrastructure in Afghanistan. Unless the

government creates good quality storage and processing facilities for the farmers, their

harvest is bound to rot and get destroyed before it reaches the markets. The GoIRA

needs to create quality and secure roads and transport so that farmers can make their

legal crops available at markets to receive fair prices.

Consumers GoIRA and its ministries have scaled some impressive ground in addressing the

demand of opium and its derivatives. However, as mentioned above, they need to

continue



Raising the decibel on public awareness using national television, radio,

publications

Utilizing religious figureheads as spokespersons for counter narcotics

Identifying addicts using national database and by conducting periodic surveys

Providing deaddiction treatment and counseling

Providing vocational training and employment opportunities

Following up on their progress



References 1. Afghanistan’s National Development Strategy (ANDS) _ 2008-2013

2. Afghanistan’s National Drugs Control Strategy (NDCS) _ 2006

3. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) _

Global_Afghan_Opium_Trade_2011-web

4. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) _ Opium Rapid

Assessment Survey_Report_2011_phase_II_20110415

5. Adam Smith International (ASI) Need Assessment Survey _ 2008

6. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)_Counter Narcotics in

Afghanistan_ the failure of success _ Dec 2008

7. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/afghanistan-pakistan/opium-

brides/afghanistans-opium-profits-soared-in-2011/ accessed June 22, 2012

8. http://www.tradingeconomics.com/afghanistan/agricultural-irrigated-land-

percent-of-total-agricultural-land-wb-data.html, Agricultural irrigated land in

Afghanistan, by Trading Economics _ accessed on July 5th 2012

9. http://www.fas.usda.gov/country/afghanistan/us-afghanistan.asp,

Agriculture in Afghanistan, United States Department of Agriculture _ accessed

on July 5th, 2012

Sustainable Alternatives Development for Narcotics Control in Afghanistan

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