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Summer of DiscontentConsidering Conditions in Kashmir

AMITABH MATTOO & SOURESH ROYOn July 7, 2010, for the first time in over 17 years,

troops from the 15* corps of the Indian army were de-ployed in Srinagar, the summer capital of Jammu andKashmir, to assist civilian authorities in maintaining lawand order. Although the army's presence remained lowkey, it was a startiing recognition of the fact that the val-ley of Kashmir was moving toward crisis once again. Andyet, less than two years before, Jammu and Kashmir hadwitnessed the most inclusive elections in its history thatled to the formation of a coalition government headed bya young, modern, and well-educated chief minister, OmarAbdullah. Veteran Kashmir watchers may experience asense of déjà vu, and be reminded ofthe 1990s. Unlike thesituation two decades ago, however, the writ of the stateis not primarily being challenged by a popular insurgencyor Pakistan-sponsored militant organizations or even byseparatist cartels like the Hurriyat. Instead, it is the angerof a new generation of young men and women who havegrown up in these two decades of conflict, which hastranslated into a resilient wave of protests in many partsofthe BCashmir valley. They are not armed with guns, butofren only with stones, in what has become a resistance

AMITABH MATTOO is a leading scholar serv-ing as Professor of International Politics at theSchool of International Studies,Jawaharlal Neh-ru University, in New Delhi. SOURESH ROYserves as a Research Scholar at the school.

movement.The troubles in Kashmir have two dimensions: the

conflict between India and Pakistan over the province, andthe conflict between New Delhi and the people ofthe stateof Jammu and Kashmir. Here we focus primarily on thelatter, the "internal" dimensions of the problem.

The Present CrisesThe immediate catalyst for the street protests of the

summer has been the killing of innocent Kashmiris. OnJune 11,2010, a student, Tufail Mattoo, was killed by a teargas shell, which triggered a vicious cycle of protests, kill-ings, and more protests. More than a hundred Kashmirisdied between June 11 and the first week of November.

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Most of them were teenagers, either protesters or justinnocent bystanders caught in the turmoil.

Although this rebellious urge may have been sparkedby specific incidents of violence and killings, it is also abroader expression of anger, disillusionment, and frus-tration. While it is tempting to reduce the protests toindoctrination by extremist Islamic groups, Pakistan'smachinations, or the influence of other vested interests,this radicalizadon has been caused by multiple factors, andabove all by a sense of hopelessness. This is a generationthat has seen suffering, killings, and political uncertainty,and has had to remain sequestered in their homes forgreat lengths of time. This group has often witnessed dailytragedy, seen no light at the end of the tunnel, enduredharassment, and been distrusted by sections of the Indianestablishment—consequently, its members simmer withdeep discontent and angst. And yet this generation is notat an age where it can introspect and take a long-termview of matters.

This is also a generation that, somewhat paradoxically,has been empowered by technology. The internet is apowerful instrument of social communication, radicahza-tion, and political mobilization. One has to conduct only asample survey of the Kashmiri lists on Eacebook to witnessthe anger and the appeal of the "stone pelters" as well asthe collective expression of rebellion through the "QuitJammu and Kashmir" campaign. A Kashmiri version ofEverlast's song "Stone in My Hand" has been uploadedon Youtube with deeply suggestive lyrics: "I got no pistol,ain't got no sword; I got no army, ain't got no land, ain'tgot nothing but the stone that's in my hand... You say youwant a revolution, well get on board."

Ironically, there does not seem to be a leader or a groupof leaders who is inspiring or directing these protests.Some may be ideologically or logistically guiding theseprotests, but there is no mainstream or separatist leaderwho can legitimately be blamed for the street protests—orwho can claim credit. While the Hurriyat leader Ali ShahGeelani may still retain his credibility, others in the sepa-ratist camp have become marginal to the protests. Whenthe Pakistan-based chief of the militant group HizbulMujahideen, Syed Salahuddin, suggested that the protestswere impacting the daily life of the citizens, his effigieswere burned. While Geelani's radical protégé MasaratAlam—now imprisoned—is given credit for guiding theprotests through his weekly "protest calendar," even hewas merely riding a wave rather than genuinely leadingthe massive rage on the streets of Kashmir. The beliefwithin the intelligence community that former militantswho have surrendered or been captured but are not yetrehabilitated are the backbone of the protests is also notborne out by the reality on the ground.

Critically, this rage of the young is built on the largerand longer sense of Kashmiri victimhood, injustice, andinsecurity about their identity. This is, of course, rooted ina deep sense of discrimination, injustice, and a widespreadanti-India sentiment.

A Missed OpportunityElections in Jammu and Kashmir are much more than

a democratic ritual. In the popular Kashmiri imagination,they have been powerful symbols: of faith and betrayal; ofresistance and accommodation; of hope and disillusion-ment; of confidence and uncertainty. Through the 1950sand the 1960s, stage-managed elections were seen as abetrayal of die "trust" of 1947. The 1977 election, die

"The 2008 election

will also be recognized as

a marker for its

inclusiveness and credibility."

fairest the state had witnessed since independence, be-came a leitmotif of faith and accommodation. The 1987election, neither free nor fair, paved the way for militancyin the state. Confidence in the democratic process wasrestored considerably when, for the first time ever, in2002, the electorate was able to dislodge the ruling party.The 2008 election is also recognized as a marker for itsinclusiveness and credibility, despite considerable odds.While 43.69 percent of the electorate had voted in 2002,the 2008 figure was 61.49 percent, respectable by anynational or international standard. More significantly.

Above: Kashmiri Shi'a Muslims join a Muharramprocession in Srinagar on December 16, 2010.Opposite: Indian ponce personnel rest after ananti-India protest in Srinagar July 16, 2010.

Photos Courtesy Reuters Winter 2011 «HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW

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all the districts of the Kashmir valley (outside Srinagar)witnessed a healthy turnout of more than 45 percent, withthe Kupwara and Bandipora districts—once at the heartof separatist politics—registering 68.22 percent and 59.66percent respectively.

The real long-term importance of the 2008 elections,however, would have been judged by the manner in whichNew Delhi and the state government responded to theaspirations of the people and the multiple challengesthat existed within the state. This unique opportunitywas missed. That Kashmiris, having taken to the streetsonly a few months earlier in a mass intifada-like upris-ing during the Amarnath land controversy, turned outin even larger numbers to vote in the state election wasmistakenly seen as evidence of Kashmiri fickleness. It wasa mistake also to view the elections as signahng a returnto business-as-usual politics of the state and as obviating

Indian police run from Kashmiri protesters during a clash in Srinagar on July 30,2010. The year saw large anti-India demonstrations across Kashmir, resulting in themurder of civilians and destruction of public property throughout the region.

the need for a special and more imaginative approach.The triumph of democracy tragically became a momentof triumphalism for the New Delhi establishment. Had itacted in a statesmanlike fashion. New Delhi would havedemonstrated a willingness to reward participation in thedemocratic process and not be seen as capitulating to extra-constitutional pressure. Instead, there was total inertia. Eornearly six months, and admittedly also because of otherpriorities, including the general election, Kashmir was nolonger on the agenda, not even at the margins. What wasnot recognized was the nature of the new transformativepolitics in Kashmir: many Kashmiris were seizing everyopportunity to achieve peaceful change, from the politicsof the street to the politics of the ballot. And if the ballotdid not fulfill its promise, the people would return to thestreets—as they well did.

Taking advantage of the improved situation on theground, the government could have struck a better balancebetween the rights of the people and the need to deal withmilitancy. The release of political detainees should havebeen a top priority. A general amnesty would have been apowerful gesture symbolizing the new spirit of reconcili-ation. It was also time to seriously consider returning thearmed forces to their pre-1989 position, ensuring—inletter and spirit—a zero-tolerance policy for human rightsviolations and repealing many of the laws that had giventhe security forces a virtual carte blanche in the valley. Butthis remained only a wish list.

A Vision of Comprehensive SecurityEortunately, while the immediate opportunity of-

fered after the state election was missed, the window isfar from closed. Even while any meaningful dialogue with

Pakistan on Kashmir may haveto wait until Islamabad is lessfragile. New Delhi can and mustinternally implement a plan ofaction that can assuage the angerand fulfill, at least partially, theexpectations of the people. Andthere is no dearth of practicaland implementable ideas. PrimeMinister Manmohan Singh him-self said in his opening remarksat the Roundtable Conferenceon Jammu and Kashmir onFebruary 25, 2006: "Security isfreedom from fear and this iswhat we want to achieve. Wewant the people of Jammu andKashmir to be free from all fearsabout their future. It is only thissense of comprehensive security,within a framework of good gov-ernance that can really empowerthe people."

This vision of comprehen-sive security must surely guide all new initiatives forJammu and Kashmir. Eor New Delhi, the Working GroupReports offer a perfect starting point. Set up during thesecond Roundtable Conference of the Prime Minister inMay 2006, the five working groups had a specific agenda:support confidence building measures (CBMs) within statesociety, strengthen relations across the line of control inKashmir, further economic development, ensure goodgovernance, and improve center-state relations.

Apart from the working group on center-state rela-tions, all others submitted their reports in April 2007.The government has, in principle, accepted the rec-ommendations and virtually committed itself to theirimplementation. But in reality, little has been done. NewDelhi must signal its sincerity by first acting on the rec-ommendations of the working group dealing with CBMs

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across the state.Chaired by Hamid Ansari, the CBM group included

representadves from all mainstream polidcal parties andgroups. The group's agenda included the following: mea-sures to improve the condition of the people affected bymilitancy; schemes to rehabilitate all widows and orphansaffected by militancy; issues reladng to the relaxadon ofcondidons who have foresworn militancy; an effectiverehabilitadon policy, including employment, for KashmiriPandit migrants; an approach considering issues reladngto the return of Kashmiri youth from areas controlled byPakistan; and measures to protect and preserve the uniquecultural and rehgious heritage of the state. The group hadrecommended, inter alia, that the government: review andrevoke laws that impinge on the fundamental rights ofcommon cidzens, such as the Armed Eorces Special PowersAct; review cases of persons in jails and general amnestyfor those under trial for minor offences; take up measuresto strengthen the state Human Rights Commission; andset up a state commission for minorides.

New Delhi must also consider revamping the fifthworking group on center-state relations, which failed toarrive at a consensus. A new expert group can consult withall stakeholders to forge common ground on issues suchas autonomy, self-rule, regional balance, and sub-regionalaspirations. "Autonomy" and "self-rule" must not beviewed as dirty words, and an autonomous or self-ruledKashmir could become a model of cooperadve federalism.Autonomy is about empowering people, making peoplefeel that they belong, and increasing the accountabilityof public institudons and services. It is, in essence, syn-onymous with decentralization and devolution of power,phrases that have been on the charter of virtually everypolidcal party in India. In Jammu and Kashmir, autonomycarries tremendous resonance with the people becausepuppet leaders from the state colluded with the centralleadership and gradually eroded the autonomy promisedby the consdtudon. There is no contradicdon betweenwanting Kashmir to be part of the national mainstreamand the state's desire for autonomous self-governance.

Separadsm grows when people feel disconnected fromthe structures of power and the process of policy formula-tion; in contrast, devoludon ensures popular participationin the rurming of the polity. If this balance is struck, Jammuand Kashmir could become a model of co-operative fed-eralism, a special model that could be gradually appliedto other states in the union.

Many people genuinely feel that even if a packageof autonomy or self-rule is worked out, a future centralgovernment may, in collusion with the state's politicalleaders, renege on an agreement that is made today. Thisis based on the past experience of the state's reladonshipwith the center. It is essential, therefore, that specialconstitutional guarantees are introduced to ensure thatthe state's autonomy is not eroded. It may be necessary,for instance, to introduce a provision in the consdtudonwhich would provide for a referendum in the state before

any major amendment that would affect its des with theunion becomes a law.

New Delhi must also work to promote a greater re-gional balance, but rule out a division of the state. Thereare powerful forces demanding a trifurcation of the mainregions of the state—Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh—intoseparate administrative units. Posing as an imaginativesoludon, this demand, if conceded, could lead to violentsocial disruptions in the state and create a communalpolarizadon that would not just irretrievably destroy thecultural and social fabric of the state, but have perilousconsequences for communal relations in the rest of India.In addidon, trifurcadon would forever end the possibilidesof reviving the plural traditions of communal harmony inthe state that had once made it a symbol of the very ideaof India: unity in diversity.

The demand for a division of the state is not new perse. The UN mediator Sir Owen Dixon recommended apartition of the state in 1950, and elements within thePraja Parishad agitadon of the early 1950s had also soughtthat Ladakh and Jammu be detached from the valley if frillintegration of the state was not achieved quickly. But, inits new avatar, several factors have coalesced to producea potendally explosive situation. Most important is thewidespread feeling within Jammu and Leh of deprivation,as well as political and economic discriminadon by polid-cians from Kashmir.

While this feeling of deprivation may have somegrounds, it is being exploited by sectarian polidcal groupswho are demanding separate statehood for Jammu andunion territory status for Ladakh. They argue that not onlywill separadon from Kashmir ensure better governance,more economic opportunides, and a greater share of po-litical power, but Jammu and Ladakh will also be able todistance themselves from the militancy. In its most extremeform, ideologues of this demand suggest that it is in thenational interest to limit the "area of operations" of thesecurity forces to Kashmir, and that division will ensureonly one-sixth of the state will then remain troubled.

This logic is dangerous for at least four reasons.Eirst, trifurcation will destroy the composite identity ofthe state, which has existed as one unit since 1846, andsend a dangerous message to the whole nation. If Hin-dus, Muslims, and Buddhists cannot live together in onestate, can they do so in a larger endty? Second, it willmost probably lead to a transfer of Muslims from variousparts of Jammu, including parts of the city but also Doda,Rajouri, and Poonch, assuming that the entire provinceis made into a separate state. Finally, it will lead to suchdeep communal polarizadon that bloody communal riotswill inevitably follow.

Regional harmony, it should be clear from experience,cannot be ensured through partidons, but through a de-centralization and devolution of financial and economicpower that will treat the panchayat as the primary unit ofgovernance. Jammu and Kashmir is not Assam or UttarPradesh where the carving of smaller states will provide

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Ranging Rates

Growth Rate Per Capita Income in the Indian Himalayan Region1997-2001

Jammu & HimachalKashmir Pradesh

Sikkim Meghalaya Tripura

State

Manipur Arunchal All IndiaPradesh per capita

NNP

G.B. Pant Institute of Himalayan Environment and Development; 2002

for better governance; it is a recipe for disaster.The state government must also pay attention to the

recommendations of the working group on ensuring goodgovernance in the state, which include the appointment ofa Chief Information Commissioner for the effective imple-mentation of a more robust Right to Information Act,the introduction of e-governance—to make governmentat the district and tehsil level more efficient, accountableand transparent—and for extending the 73''' amendmentto truly empower the Panchayati Raj system.

However, for the state government, an importantpriority must be to devise and implement a comprehensivepolicy for the young men and women of the state. Thestate has witnessed consistentiy high levels of educated un-employment and low levels of vocationally skilled humanresources. With more than two million unemployed, andin many cases unemployable (outside of government work),the youth have formed the bedrock of the militant move-ment over the last two decades. The challenge now is touse this energy of the young Kashmiris to build peace.

Re-training hubs in all the district headquarters mustbe immediately established to ensure that a significantsection of the unemployed and educated youth becomesemployable within six months to a year. With extensive useof information and communication technology, it shouldbe possible to annually produce more than 20,000 skilledand employable workers from the 22 district re-trainingcenters. These centers could be established through apublic-private partnership or by creating a special purposevehicle (SPV). Public-private partnerships are also neededto enhance international connectivity by extending broad-

band access in the state,— with stronger incentives

provided through theexisting universal accessfunds for telecommu-nications. In the longterm, given the geogra-phy of the state and itsgrowing endowments ofskills, electronic exportsof services may play amore significant role inrevitalizing its economythan other traditionalsectors.

The youth of thestate can indeed be-come the state's greateststrength, its soft power.Investing in the righteducation, training andskill development musttherefore be part of thefundamentals of the newgovernment if it hasto take advantage ofthe huge demographic

dividend in the state. It is vital that the gross enrollmentratio in higher education is at least 15 percent in the nextten years. This calls for a massive expansion in education:more universities, more off-site campuses, more colleges,more ITIs, and more polytechnics extensively using revo-lutionary, new IT instruments for content delivery of worldclass courseware.

The Uniqueness of Jammu and KashmirKashmir is unique, and must be dealt with as such.

Jammu and Kashmir's uniqueness is obvious for a varietyof historical reasons recognized even by the SupremeCourt. In 1984, in Khazan Chand vs. The State of Jammuand Kashmir, the court unambiguously held that the stateholds "a special place in the constitutional setup of thecountry." The 1983 Srinagar Declaration adopted by theopposition conclave that included political stalwarts suchas Jyoti Basu, Inder Kumar Gujral, Chandra Shekhar, andPrakash Singh Badal stated that "the special constitutionalstatus of Jammu and Kashmir should be preserved andprotected in letter and spirit."

More important than such assertions is Kashmir'ssingular importance to the very idea of India, which isoften forgotten. A Muslim majority state that voluntarilyacceded to India in 1947 lent tremendous strength to theconstruction of India as a vibrant, secular and pluralisticstate. The battle, therefore, to win back the hearts andminds of the Kashmiri people is central not just for therecovery of ideals that inspired nationhood, but also to thewar against obscurantism and fundamentalism, ill

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