SUMMER 2001 - Volume 48, Number 2 · Airlift in the Korean War, 1950 Daniel L. Haulman 4 16 40...

Salvation from the Sky:Airlift in the Korean War, 1950Daniel L. Haulman

4

16

40

COVER: The B–2 Spirit, the USAF’s stealth bomber, sits ready for take-off.

Departments:From the EditorHistory MysteryBook ReviewsBooks ReceivedComing UpLetters, News, Notices, and ReunionsUpcoming Symposium

3454656586064

SUMMER 2001 - Volume 48, Number 2

Context and Theory:Lessons from Operation Allied ForceEllwood P. “Skip” Hinman 26

Slanguage: Part III, Letters E-LBrian S. Gunderson

Any Place, Any Time, Anywhere:The 1st Air Commando Group in World War IIWilliam T. Y’Blood

The Final Scene: Howard AFB, Republic of PanamaCurtis L. Brownhill 34

“Keep ‘em Flying”Harry F. Dill

Air Force Historian Wins Silver StarGeorge M. Watson, Jr. 38

36


The logo on this page is sized for the frontcover8 pt for table of contents, 9 pt for cover

2 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2001

Contributing Members

The individuals and companies listed are contributingmembers of the Air Force Historical Foundation. TheFoundation Trustees and members are grateful for theirsupport and contributions to preserving, perpetuating,and publishing the history and traditions of Americanaviation.

BenefactorMrs. Ruth A. (Ira C.) Eaker Estate

PatronMaj. Gen. Ramsay Potts

SponsorsMaj. Gen. William LyonMaj. Gen. John S. PattonGeneral Rawlings Chapter, AFABrig.Gen. Edward W. Rosenbaum, USAF (Ret)Gen. William Y. SmithTomlinson Family Foundation Inc.

DonorsMr. John F. DonahueEmerson ElectricRockwell InternationalQuesada FoundationGen. Bernard A. Schriever

SupportersThe Aerospace CorporationAllied-Signal Aerospace CorporationArthur Metcalf FoundationCSX CorporationBrig. Gen. Brian S. GundersonMaj. Gen. John P. HenebryGen. & Mrs. Robert T. HerresMaj. Gen. Harold E. HumfeldMcDonnell Douglas FoundationMaj. Gen. Kenneth P. MilesNorthrop-Grumman CorporationMr. William O’RourkeMr. James PartonMr. George PendeltonPratt & WhitneyGen. D. C. StrotherUnited TechnologiesCapt. William C. WardMaj. Gen. Richard A. Yudkin

Annual Contributing MembersANSERARX, Inc.ASTECH/MCI Manufacturing, Inc.Beech Aircraft CorporationBoeing Defense & Space GroupGeneral Electric CompanyInstrument Systems Corp.Litton IndustriesLockheed Martin Corp.The Mitre CorporationNorthrop CorporationVinell Corporation

Officers

PresidentGen. William Y. Smith, USAF (Ret)Vice-PresidentGen. John A. Shaud, USAF (Ret)Secretary-TreasurerMaj. Gen. John S. Patton, USAF (Ret)Executive Director Col. Joseph A. Marston, USAF (Ret)

Advisors

Gen. Michael E. Ryan, USAFLt. Gen. Tad J. Oelstrom, USAFLt. Gen. Lance W. Lord, USAFBrig. Gen. Ronald T. Rand, USAFDr. Richard P. HallionCMSAF Frederick J. Finch, USAFSMSgt. Walt Grudzinskas, USAF

Trustees

Col. Kenneth J. Alnwick, USAF (Ret)Mr. F. Clifton Berry, Jr.Lt. Col. Maynard Y. Binge, USAF (Ret)Gen. Mark E. Bradley, USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. Devol Brett, USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. William E. Brown, USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. Charles G. Cleveland, USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. John Conaway, USAF (Ret)Gen. Bennie L. Davis, USAF (Ret)Brig.Gen. Michael DeArmond, USAF (Ret)Gen. Robert J. Dixon, USAF (Ret)Gen. Michael J. Dugan, USAF (Ret)Gen. Howell M. Estes, Jr., USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. Abbott C. Greenleaf, USAF (Ret)Mr. John E. GreenwoodBrig.Gen. Brian S. Gunderson, USAF (Ret)Maj.Gen. John P. Henebry, USAF (Ret)Col. George A. Henry, Jr., USAF (Ret)Gen. Robert T. Herres, USAF (Ret)Dr. I. B. Holley, Jr.Maj.Gen. Jeanne M. Holm, USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF (Ret)Dr. R. Gordon HoxieBrig.Gen. Alfred F. Hurley, USAF (Ret)Brig.Gen. James A. Jaeger, USAF (Ret)Gen. David C. Jones, USAF (Ret)Maj. John Kreis, USAF (Ret)Lt.Col. Kathy La Sauce, USAF (Ret)Maj.Gen. Charles D. Link, USAF (Ret)Lt.Col. Donald S. Lopez, USAF (Ret)Hon. Hans MarkCMSgt Norman A. Marous, USAF Hon. John L. McLucasCol. Kenneth Moll, USAF (Ret)Gen. Thomas S. Moorman, Jr., USAF(Ret)Col. Helen E. O’Day, USAF (Ret)Hon. Verne OrrCMSgtAF Sam E. Parish, USAF (Ret)Maj.Gen. John S. Patton, USAF (Ret)Maj.Gen. Ramsay D. Potts, USAF (Ret)Brig.Gen. Edward W. Rosenbaum, USAF (Ret)Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, USAF (Ret)Gen. John A. Shaud, USAF (Ret)Gen. Jacob E. Smart, USAF (Ret)Gen. William Y. Smith, USAF (Ret)Dr. George K. TanhamCol. Robert E. Vickers, Jr., USAF (Ret)MSgt. Charles J. Warth, USAF (Ret)Col. George R. Weinbrenner, USAF (Ret)Col. Sherman W. Wilkins, USAF (Ret)Maj.Gen. Richard A. Yudkin, USAF (Ret)

The Journal of Air and Space History(formerly Aerospace Historian)

Summer 2001 Volume 48 Number 2

PublisherBrian S. Gunderson

EditorJacob Neufeld

Technical EditorRobert F. Dorr

Book Review EditorMichael L. Grumelli

Layout and TypesettingRichard I. Wolf

AdvertisingMark D. Mandeles

CirculationRichard I. Wolf

Air Power History (ISSN 1044-016X) is produced in March, June, September,and December by the Air Force HistoricalFoundation.

Prospective contributors should consult theGUIDELINES FOR CONTRIBUTORS atthe back of this journal. Unsolicited manu-scripts will be returned only on specificrequest. The Editor cannot accept responsi-bility for any damage to or loss of the man-uscript. The Editor reserves the right toedit manuscripts and letters.

Address Letters to the Editor to:

Air Power HistoryP.O. Box 10328Rockville, MD 20849-0328e-mail: [email protected]

Correspondence regarding missed issuesor changes of address should be addressedto the Circulation Office:

Air Power HistoryP.O. Box 151150Alexandria, Virginia 22315Telephone: (703) 923-0848Fax: (703) 923-0848e-mail: [email protected]

Advertising

Mark Mandeles8910 Autumn Leaf Ct.Fairfax, VA 22301(703) 426-5147; fax 426-5149e-mail: [email protected]

Copyright © 2001 by the Air ForceHistorical Foundation. All rights reserved.Periodicals postage paid at Lexington, VA24450 and additional mailing offices.

Postmaster: Please send change ofaddress to the Circulation Office.

The Air Force Historical Foundation

FOUNDATION WEB HOMEPAGE: http://home.earthlink.net/~afhfE-Mail: [email protected]

Air Force Historical Foundation1535 Command Drive – Suite A122Andrews AFB, MD 20762-7002

(301) 981-2139(301) 981-3574 Fax

In this issue’s lead article, William “Tom” Y’Blood tells the exciting story of the 1st AirCommandos in Burma during World War II. “Any Place, Any Time, Anywhere” details theroles of Orde Wingate, commander of the Chindits, and Phil Cochran and John Alison, theAmericans “Hap” Arnold selected to lead the air commandos. In “Salvation from the Sky,”Daniel Haulman writes of the critical contributions made by Air Force airlifters in the firstyear of the Korean War. Dependable and indispensable, the airlifters braved the elementsand enemy fire as they carried men and supplies both into and out of the war zone. In“Context and Theory,” Major “Skip” Hinman analyzes the “Lessons from Operation AlliedForce.” He examines the traditional air power theories of Douhet, Mitchell, and Trenchardwithin the context of NATO’s air war over Yugoslavia. He concludes that the conflictbetween theory and context determined the outcome of the war. However, while Allied Forcevalidated the air power theorists, it “demonstrated the superiority of context over theory.”

On October 31, 1999, CMSgt. Curtis Brownhill furled the colors of the 24th Wing as theUnited States prepared to transfer Howard Air Force Base to the Republic of Panama.Readers will feel the emotions Brownhill felt as he participated in this historic ceremony.MSgt. Harry Dill, USAF (Ret.) informs Air Power History readers when, how, and why theslogan “Keep ‘em Flying” originated. Even today, sixty years later, it remains an effectivemotto. “Bob” Phillips is a former Air Force historian and a combat veteran of World War IIand the Korean War. While he wrote official historical accounts, Phillips’s own heroism wentunrecognized for fifty years. But no more. His friend and colleague, George Watson, reportsthat justice was done on February 13, 2001, when Phillips finally received the Silver Star.Brig. Gen. Brian Gunderson’s series on World War II Royal Air Force slang terms continueswith the letters E through L.

A dozen books are reviewed, ranging in subject matter from scholarly and analytical tofiction and entertainment. Twenty-five new books arrived—see pages 56 and 57. Prospectivereviewers are invited to contact Michael Grumelli, our book review editor. The usual depart-ments include upcoming events, the History Mystery, letters, notices, news, and reunions.Readers should note especially the “Upcoming Symposium” notice and registration form onpage 64. Save the dates October 17th and 18th, 2001, at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland,for “Coalition Air Warfare in the Korean War.” Sign up now.

As this issue went to press, James Parton, 88, a Supporter of the Air Force HistoricalFoundation, and author of “Air Force Spoken Here,” a biography of Gen. Ira C. Eaker, died ofa heart attack on April 20, 2001, in White River Junction, Vermont. A more complete obitu-ary will be included in the Fall 2001 issue of this magazine.

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2001 3

From the Editor

Air Power History and the Air Force Historical Foundation disclaim responsibility for statements,either of fact or of opinion, made by contributors. The submission of an article, book review, or othercommunication with the intention that it be published in this journal shall be construed as prima facieevidence that the contributor willingly transfers the copyright to Air Power History and the Air ForceHistorical Foundation, which will, however, freely grant authors the right to reprint their own works,if published in the authors’ own works. In the case of articles, upon acceptance, the author will be sentan agreement and an assignment of copyright.


��


William T. Y’Blood

��

�robably the most innovative, most colorfulArmy Air Forces (AAF) units of World WarII were the Air Commando groups, particu-

larly the 1st Air Commandos. Denigrated by themore traditionally-minded air leaders of the time,the 1st Air Commandos, nevertheless, performedoutstandingly, and their heritage lives on in theAir Force of today.

The Air Commandos would not have existedhad it not been for two individuals—the brilliant,but eccentric, Orde Wingate and the visionaryHenry H. “Hap” Arnold. Wingate, commander ofthe famed Chindits, first led them in OperationLongcloth, a long-range penetration of Japaneselines in Burma, during the Spring of 1943. Despitesevere losses, and having to leave behind thewounded because there was no way to evacuatethem, Longcloth was a major psychological victoryfor the British. Wingate showed that with propertraining and strong leadership, Allied forces couldtake the war to the Japanese in the jungle.

Though deeply troubled by unreliable resup-ply of his troops and the inability to safely evacu-ate his wounded during Longcloth, Wingate deter-mined to try again. The August 1943 QuadrantConference, held in Quebec between PresidentFranklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Win-ston Churchill, gave Wingate the opportunity. En-couraged by the rise in morale of the British pub-lic following the news of Wingate’s exploits inBurma, Churchill invited the Chindit leader to

Quebec to report on his concepts of long-range pen-etration.

Quadrant was held mainly to discuss threestrategic issues: future operations in the Pacific,long-term strategy for the defeat of Japan, andproblems in the China-Burma-India (CBI) Thea-ter. Keeping China in the war was deemed a toppriority and, thus, continuing to transport suppliesover the Hump (Himalayas) was considered essen-tial. But Wingate’s plan for a new offensive innorthern Burma also received the go-ahead fromthe Combined Chiefs of Staff. For this new opera-tion, Wingate wanted more air support than hehad received during Longcloth. He requested a rel-atively modest 12 to 20 C–47s to drop supplies, buthe also wanted bombers, asking for one squadronfor each of the eight long-range penetration groupshe planned to form for the new operation. He alsoexpressed interest in a recent aviation develop-ment, the helicopter.

Although Roosevelt was not impressed withthe dour Briton, he arranged for Wingate to meetGen. George C. Marshall, the head of the JointChiefs of Staff, and Gen. Hap Arnold, the AAFleader. Both men found Wingate’s arguments per-suasive and promised him help. Marshall sent aregimental-sized infantry unit to Burma to beused in long-range penetration operations.Initially assigned to Wingate, the unit was takenaway by Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, the U.S. the-ater commander, to operate under his command.Intensely Anglophobic, Stilwell could not bear tosee an American unit operating under a Britishcommander. This unit later became famous as“Merrill’s Marauders.”

Arnold proved even more generous. For almosta year he had been thinking about what had beentermed an “Air Blitz Unit;” a self-contained orga-nization comprised of a fighter squadron, a bombersquadron, two transport squadrons, and miscella-neous support units. The timing for such an orga-nization had been premature, however. At QuebecArnold pressed Wingate about his needs. Initially,Wingate had mentioned light planes, but now herequested additional aircraft to fly out hiswounded. Arnold’s reply stunned Wingate.”Twohundred? Three hundred?” The numbers flowedfrom Arnold. Unaccustomed to such largesse in theBritish Army, Wingate was wary, but Arnoldassured him that he was serious. Surprised butrelieved, Wingate left Quebec with renewed hopefor the success of his operations in Burma.

Upon his return from Quebec, Arnold quicklyset about to establish an organization to support


William T. Y’Blood has been with the Office of Air Force History (now the Air Force History SupportOffice) since 1986. From 1960 to 1966 he flew B–47s in the United States Air Force and then was anairline pilot for twenty years. He has accumulated more than 11,000 hours of flying time. He haswritten several official histories, including two volumes on USAF operations during the Gulf War;the concluding chapters of Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force;The Three Wars of Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer: His Korean War Diary; and MiG Alley: TheFight for Air Superiority. Mr. Y’Blood is the author or co–author also of six commercially-publishedbooks and is working on a seventh book, a study of the World War II Air Commando groups.

(Overleaf) Colonel PhilCochran’s P-51A in flightover Burma.

Wingate and Cochran chatbefore the start of aChindit-Air Commandoexercise. Wingate holdsthe works of Plato andAristotle.

THE AIRCOMMANDOSWOULD NOTHAVEEXISTED HADIT NOT BEENFOR TWOINDIVIDUALS…ORDEWINGATEAND…“HAP”ARNOLD

Wingate and to find someone to lead this organi-zation. The choice swiftly was pared to two lieu-tenant colonels—Phil Cochran and John Alison.Both men had known each other for years andwere seasoned fighter pilots, Cochran in NorthAfrica and Alison in China. Effervescent and gre-garious, Cochran exuded an air of pugnacious con-fidence. He was also the inspiration for one ofMilton Caniff ’s most endearing characters, FlipCorkin, in his comic strip “Terry and the Pirates.”Alison was almost the complete opposite of hisfriend. Quiet and self-effacing, his demeanorearned him the nickname, “Father Alison.”Although not a voluble man, especially comparedto the irrepressible Cochran, when Alison spoke,everyone listened. He knew what he was talkingabout and he usually had the solution to any prob-lem already mapped out in his mind.

The two men were called to Washington tomeet Arnold about a mystery project. When Arnoldtold them that he had a big job for them usingsmall liaison aircraft, both Cochran and Alisonwere stunned and told the general that they werefighter pilots and did not want a job involving lit-tle planes. As might be expected, telling a generalone does not want the job he is offering is usuallya sure way to get that job. Moreover, Arnold was agood salesman and he made his sales pitch onwhat he really wanted them to do.

The light planes were only a starting point.Arnold wanted not merely to support Wingate, butto spearhead the operation. “I want to stage an aer-ial invasion of Burma,” was how he put it.1 Althoughhe never actually said it, both Cochran and Alisonbelieved the general meant, “Go over and steal theshow.” By now, the two men were showing interestand Arnold threw in the clincher. They would begiven carte blanche and top priority to obtain any-thing they needed to organize a force. With that,they said almost in unison, “Can we both go?”

Believing him to be the ranking officer, Arnoldnamed Alison to command the force. When toldthat Cochran was actually senior by a few months,Arnold said, “Oh well, make it a co- command.”2

Naturally, this did not work out and Cochranbecame the commander, with Alison his deputy.Still, the two thought alike and respected eachother so much that at times they did operate, unof-ficially, as co-commanders, each making decisionsas needed.

Arnold told them that their project, desig-nated Project 9, was top secret and that they couldnot tell anyone what was going on. They were onan extremely tight schedule for within just a cou-ple of months they were expected to train andequip an entirely new kind of organization, move itto India, establish bases, and lead it into combat.Their mission would be fourfold: (1) facilitate theforward movement of Wingate’s columns; (2) facil-itate the supply and evacuation of the columns; (3)provide a small air cover and strike force; and (4)acquire operational air experience under the antic-ipated conditions. They were not expected to be incombat for more than ninety days. The generalclosed the meeting with an airy, “To hell with thepaperwork. Go out and fight.”3

Hitting the ground running, the pair beganfleshing out their plans. While Alison stayed inWashington to contact people and obtain equip-ment, Cochran flew to London to meet Wingate.His trip began on an almost farcical note. Upon hisarrival at the headquarters of Lord LouisMountbatten, the new South East Asia Command(SEAC) leader, Cochran was ushered into a confer-ence involving several British naval officers,including Mountbatten. Cochran was introducedand the meeting began. Every now and then one ofthe conferees would look at him. He would smile ornod, and they would smile or nod back and resumetheir discussions. The session was almost over


(Below left) Cochran (L),John Alison (C), and ArvidOlson, the group’s opera-tions officer, discuss thegroup’s activities in frontof Cochran’s aircraft.

(Below right) Judging fromthe expressions onMontbatten’s andCochran’s faces, TadpoleSmith has just done his“buzz job” on the admiral.

ALTHOUGHHE NEVERACTUALLYSAID IT, BOTHCOCHRANAND ALISONBELIEVEDTHEGENERALMEANT, “GOOVER ANDSTEAL THESHOW.”

before Cochran and Mountbatten realized that theAmerican was in the wrong meeting. This one hadconcerned SEAC shipping matters.

An amused Mountbatten invited Cochranhome for lunch and thus began a warm friendshipbetween the two. After lunch, Cochran finally sawWingate. This first meeting did not go as well asthat with Mountbatten. Wingate, as was his usualstyle, launched into a long monologue on thingshaving nothing to do with long-range penetration,such as, the effect of rainfall on Burmese monas-teries. Wingate’s mumbling speech and raspy voiceleft Cochran confused about what Wingate wantedand Wingate apparently thought the Americanwas full of “hot air.” A meeting the following day,however, did much to clear the air. Now familiarwith Wingate’s speech, Cochran suddenly under-stood what he wanted. He told the Chindit leaderwhat he could offer and both men realized theycould work together. It was the beginning of astrong relationship.

Upon their return to Washington, Cochranand Alison sat down to discuss building their force.They had concluded that the force had to be muchbigger than originally envisioned. In the back ofCochran’s mind was the half-serious thought thatif they kept enlarging the force, Arnold mightbecome disgusted and not sent the force to Burma.Their first consideration for aircraft was, natu-rally, light planes for the evacuation of wounded.They settled on two types, the L–1 Vigilant and theslightly smaller L–5 Sentinel. Both proved superbworkhorses in the Burmese jungles. There was nodoubt that ubiquitous C–47 was the choice totransport heavy equipment. To bridge the gapbetween the L–planes and the C–47, they chosethe UC–64, a muscular plane used for years byCanadian bush pilots.

Cochran had promised Wingate fighter sup-port, so the P–38 was initially chosen. This requestwas denied and the P–47 was substituted. Deniedagain, the P–51A Mustang became their finalchoice and it turned out to be a very good one. BothCochran and Alison had realized independentlythat gliders would be extremely useful in Burma.The Waco CG–4A troop-carrying glider proved

very valuable in the upcoming operation. Finally,they decided that the unique capabilities of heli-copters would be useful in the jungle. Althoughhardly more than prototypes and also underpow-ered and short ranged, the six machines theyobtained demonstrated their worth.

On September 13, 1943, they presented theirshopping list to General Arnold. It listed 13 C–47s,12 UC–64s, 100 CG–4s, 100 L–planes, 6 heli-copters, and 30 P–51s. Bombers were not men-tioned because the RAF had indicated they wouldsupply those aircraft. Additionally, 87 officers and436 enlisted men were requested to man the unit.Arnold and his staff examined the request,approved it, and Project 9 was in business. Afterthe Air Commandos arrived in India, more menwere added. Although the group numbered fewerthan 1,000 men, they would do the work normallyassigned to 5,000 men.

The 1,000 consisted entirely of volunteers andthey all came highly recommended. There were nocastoffs from other units, no “trouble makers.”Among the more notable personalities were formerFlying Tigers, Arvid Olson (who would later com-mand the 3d Air Commando Group) and R. T.“Tadpole” Smith; Grant Mahony, an ace from thedark days of the Philippines; Bob Petit, a SilverStar holder from Guadalcanal, who would retirefrom the Air Force as a four-star general; BillCherry, who piloted Eddie Rickenbacker’s planewhen it ditched in the Pacific; and formerWashington Senators all-star third basemanBuddy Lewis. But the best-known face in the unitwas Flight Officer John L. “Jackie” Coogan. Theformer child actor and ex-husband of Betty Grable,Coogan was a glider pilot, the assistant operationsofficer for glider ground operations, and in chargeof tow rope inspections.

The men had hardly arrived at Seymour-Johnson Army Air Field outside Goldsboro, NorthCarolina, to begin training when they wereinformed that their overseas shipment date hadbeen moved up from December 15 to November 1.Thus, much of their training had to be accom-plished after arrival in India. Nevertheless, moralewas high—perhaps too high. One of the first groupof light plane pilots to begin the movement over-seas were issued, in addition to the rest of theirequipment, loaded side arms. While waiting in theGoldsboro train station for the train to take themto Miami, a few pilots decided to test their smallarms prowess on various fixtures in the station.Later groups were not issued ammunition.

By mid-December, most of the Air Commandoshad arrived in India, and Lalaghat andHailakandi, in Assam, had been chosen as theirforward airfields. The Air Commandos arrival inIndia was not universally popular. There wasresentment toward them at all levels—though notfrom Mountbatten, who had the final say. Much ofthis animosity was directed at Wingate, whommany British officers detested for his arroganceand his strong Zionist leanings. The airmen weresimply caught in the cross fire. But Cochran’s force


As part of his job as towrope inspector, JackieCoogan had to examine alltow rope fittings.

COCHRANTOLD THECHINDITLEADERWHAT HECOULDOFFER ANDBOTH MENREALIZEDTHEY COULDWORKTOGETHER.IT WAS THEBEGINNINGOF A STRONGRELATION-SHIP.

AFTER THEAIRCOMMANDOSARRIVED ININDIA, MOREMEN WEREADDED.ALTHOUGHTHE GROUPNUMBEREDFEWER THAN1,000 MEN,THEY WOULDDO THEWORKNORMALLYASSIGNED TO5,000 MEN.

was also envied because it had up-to-date equip-ment still in short supply to many AAF organiza-tions in the CBI. There was also the uncertainty ofmany senior officers about the unknown, theuntested, the unusual. The secrecy surrounding itsfuture operations contributed to a lack of under-standing about what it was capable of and meantto do. Moreover, the Air Commandos were just notthe typical AAF organization to which most wereaccustomed. Finally, there was a perception thatthe Air Commandos were Wingate’s private airforce. Many senior officials in the CBI, includingMaj. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, the commandinggeneral of USAAF forces in the India-BurmaSector of the CBI, urged Arnold to abandon thisexperiment even before the unit had settled intothe theater.

The Air Commandos were activated as the5318th Provisional Air Unit on November 29,1943. Full training with Wingate’s troops began inearly January. Although the first exercises wereflown in rain and low clouds, they impressedWingate considerably with the precision of theglider landings. The Chindit leader was so takenwith the success of the landings that he decided toparticipate in a snatch of the gliders for theirreturn to base. On the ensuing snatch the Chinditscame close to losing their leader. The C–47 wasapproaching to make the snatch when the gliderpilot glanced back to see if everybody was ready. Tohis horror, Wingate had unbuckled his seat beltand was leaning out the glider’s open door. “Tellthe RAF,” he yelled to one of his officers, “that I notonly have seen it, I have done it.”4 At the lastminute, he was steered back to his seat. Obliviousto all the commotion, Wingate pulled a book fromhis pack and began reading. The glider pilot, furi-ous over Wingate’s lack of common sense, had to berestrained from showing Wingate a few of themore unusual aerial maneuvers a glider could do.

A few days later, another exercise was heldwith Mountbatten in attendance. That afternoon,before the men boarded the gliders for the nightexercise, Mountbatten climbed atop a jeep todeliver a short speech (see photo page 7). Cochranhad taken every precaution to ensure that

Mountbatten’s talk was successful. There would beno engine run ups and everyone available wasordered to attend. He forgot, however, that TadpoleSmith was up in a P–51 logging some flying time.When Smith arrived back over the field, hethought the man standing on the jeep wasCochran and decided to have a little fun. Midwaythrough Mountbatten’s talk, there was a tremen-dous roar as Smith’s fighter flashed by just feetover the admiral’s head, almost blowing off his hat.The unflappable Mountbatten stood by waiting forthe racket to die down, then resumed his speech asif nothing had happened. A mortified Cochranapologized to the SEAC commander, who shruggedoff the incident with the remark that he should nothave been speaking on the airstrip anyway. Smithwas lucky to escape with little more than a tongue-lashing from Cochran.

That evening, Mountbatten and Wingatedrove to the exercise area, while Cochran flewthere in an L–5. It was a very dark night but thelandings again came off almost perfectly. Ecstaticover the success of the exercise, Wingate gushed,“This is what I’ve prayed for.” Mountbattenbounced up and down, shaking hands with anyonein reach. He was evidently a very religious man foras he watched the gliders swoop out of the dark-ness to land and later be snatched back into the airby the C–47s, he could be heard repeating over andover, “Jesus Christ.”5

The next morning, Mountbatten returned toDelhi. Noticing that Cochran had brought in anL–5 and, being a light plane pilot himself once,Mountbatten asked the American if he could flythe little plane back to his headquarters. Everaccommodating, Cochran agreed and the pairhopped in, Mountbatten at the controls in frontand Cochran seated behind. Cochran soon realizedhe had made a serious mistake in allowing theadmiral to fly. Mountbatten lost control on his firsttakeoff attempt and ground looped the plane, for-tunately with only minor damage to a wingtip.Crouched over the front seat, Cochran guidedMountbatten through the next successful, thoughwobbly, takeoff. On the flight to Delhi, every nowand then, Mountbatten would look back at


(Above left) Cochranexplains to Mountbattenand Wingate what theJanuary 10, 1944, nightexercise will entail.

(Above right) Cochranbriefs the SEAC comman-der on the L-5’s controlsprior to their eventful flight.

THERE WAS APERCEPTIONTHAT THE AIRCOMMANDOSWEREWINGATE’SPRIVATE AIRFORCE.

Cochran to nod and grin. Cochran would smileback but at the same time wondered what thelanding would be like. The landing, on two wheelsand nose down was nearly a disaster. For amoment Cochran thought they were going to flipover, but the plane’s tail came down and theyrolled to a safe stop. Mountbatten apologized pro-fusely for his poor showing, revealing that he hadnot flown in seven years. A few days later,Mountbatten wrote Cochran to congratulate theAir Commandos on the success of the exercises. Healso wrote, “I am sorry I nearly wrecked your L–5by manipulating the brakes so badly and hope Idid not frighten you too much!”6

Training now intensified because the start ofthe offensive—codenamed Operation Thursday—was set to go in less than two months. Attached toCochran’s outfit at this time were B–25s. Althoughthe RAF had promised to provide bombers, now,

because of commitments elsewhere, they could notsupply them. Appealing for help to GeneralStratemeyer, the Air Commandos were able to geta dozen B–25Hs. Flying arsenals, these planes car-ried a 75-mm cannon and twelve .50-calibermachine guns. They would be extremely importantduring the upcoming operation.

Meanwhile, the movement of supplies to thetwo forward airfields proved time-consuming.Bureaucratic inertia and the inefficiency of theatersupply organizations sometimes forced the AirCommandos to resort to the “midnight requisition-ing” of boxcars in Calcutta. But other Allied unitsand the Indians also proved adept at midnight req-uisitioning, so guards had to be posted on the sup-plies. The lack of a standard rail gauge in Indiacreated problems of its own, as supplies had to beunloaded from one train and loaded onto anotherseveral times before they reached the fields. Both


Wingate talks to the AirCommandos about the cur-rent situation in Burma.

(Above left) Using a pieceof packing crate for achalkboard, Cochrandescribes procedures to beused during the January 10night exercise.

(Above right) The all-impor-tant photos of Piccadillyare rushed to Wingate andCochran.

INERTIA ANDINEFFICIENCYFORCEDTHE[M]…TORESORT TO “MIDNIGHTREQUISI-TIONING”

the Lalaghat and Hailakandi airfields neededmuch work to get them in shape for combat opera-tions. Although the 900th Airborne EngineerAviation Company was attached to the AirCommandos to help prepare the airfields, much ofthe work had to be done by Cochran’s men. It wasdemanding and dirty, and a man’s appearance was

less important than what he had accomplishedeach day. One senior officer visiting the AirCommandos complained that Cochran’s men were“nothing less than a mob” and that no two menwore the same uniform, while almost all weregrowing beards.7

In response to this officer’s complaints,


The brass gather atLalaghat to watch thelaunch of OperationThursday. Maj. Gen.George E. Stratemeyer isthe officer in the centertalking to Air Marshal SirJohn Baldwin, commanderof the 3d Tactical AirForce.

Ground crews lay out 350-foot-long tow ropes prior totheir attachment to the C-47 tugs.

Cochran wrote one of the more memorable direc-tives of the war:

Look, Sports, the beards and attempts at beards arenot appreciated by visitors. Since we can’t explainto all strangers that the fuzz is a gag or “somethingI always wanted to do” affair, we must avoid theirreporting that we are unshaven (regulations sayyou must shave) by appearing like Saturday nightin Jersey whenever possible. Work comes beforeshaving. You will never be criticized for beingunkempt if you are so damn busy you can’t taketime to doll up. But be clean while you can. Ain’t itawful?8

Even as training for Operation Thursday wasunderway, the Air Commando fighters andbombers entered combat. Beginning February 3,1944, raids were carried out almost daily againstbridges, railway yards, and railroad tracks.Cochran was almost lost while leading one of thesemissions. His planes were jumped by ten Zekesand two Air Commandos were shot down. It wasthought that Cochran had been killed, also, but heshook off the attackers. Nevertheless, Wingate wasnot happy about this incident and restrictedCochran, Alison, and Olson from flying any moremissions over Burma. The trio knew too muchabout the impending operation to risk their cap-ture.

Also seeing early action were several lightplanes sent to Ramu in the Arakan during thefight known as the “Battle of the Box.” Though theJapanese enjoyed superior numbers, they did notprevail because this time the Commonwealthforces, supplied by AAF and RAF transports, didnot run but stayed to slug it out with the enemy.The Air Commando light planes provided out-standing support during the battle by evacuatingmore than 700 sick and wounded soldiers from theBox.

Meanwhile, in addition to hauling suppliesand erecting gliders, the transport and glider force

underwent intensive night training, includingnight snatches and night double tows. While per-forming the latter, two gliders collided, with onecrashing and killing the three Air Commandos andfour Chindits aboard. This tragedy might havedestroyed morale had it not been for Lt. Col. D. C.Herring, the commander of the soldiers killed inthe accident. Upon learning that the Chinditsmight have reservations about riding in gliders,Herring talked to his men, then wrote Cochran.“Please be assured,” he told him, “that we will gowith your boys any place, any time, anywhere.”9

The 1st Air Commando Group adopted the phraseas its motto and it has been a part of Air Force spe-cial operations lore ever since.

Operation Thursday, the airborne assault ofBurma, actually began on February 5, when aChindit brigade marched south from Ledo to theplanned landing zones near Indaw, Burma.Throughout their march, they were supplied byAir Commando gliders and light planes. AtLalaghat and Hailakandi (plus a couple of otherbases that would be used by the RAF) work wasproceeding at a frenzied pace to ready the fields forD-day, March 5. There was some concern by TroopCarrier Command, which would provide some ofthe C–47s and many of the crews, about Cochran’sproposal for a double tow of gliders over the impos-ing bulk of the Chin Hills. It was felt that it wouldplace too great a strain on both the gliders and theC–47 tugs. Cochran decided to go ahead with thedouble tow anyway.

Cochran, however, worried about the lack ofvisual intelligence of the planned landing grounds,the primary ones being Broadway and Piccadilly,with Chowringhee and Aberdeen as alternatesites. Over the protests of the Air Commandos andeven some of his own officers, Wingate had forbid-den any reconnaissance flights over the two land-ing zones. Despite serious misgivings, Cochran fol-lowed orders but felt uneasy about the decision.Finally, on March 5, the day Operation Thursdaywas to begin, he could no longer restrain himself


Air Commando UC-64s taxifor flight tests followingtheir assembly in theKarachi dirigible hangar inthe rear.

BEGINNINGFEBRUARY 3,1944, RAIDSWERECARRIED OUTALMOSTDAILYAGAINSTBRIDGES,RAILWAYYARDS, ANDRAILROADTRACKS.

THOUGH THEJAPANESEENJOYEDSUPERIORNUMBERS,THEY DIDNOT PREVAIL

and ordered a photo reconnaissance made of thelanding grounds. Tadpole Smith flew a B–25, whilethe unit photographer, Rush Russhon, took the pic-tures. Broadway looked fine but when they flewover Piccadilly they saw something very wrong.Hundreds of teak logs covered the clearing. Itwould be a disaster if the gliders tried to landthere. Russhon snapped his pictures and Smithfirewalled his plane all the way back toHailakandi, 12 miles from Lalaghat. They couldnot land the bomber at the latter field because itwas so crowded, and they were operating underradio silence.

The B–25’s propellers had not stopped turningbefore Russhon was out of the plane running forhis photo lab. Unable to reach either Cochran orAlison by phone, Russhon despaired that he wouldnot contact them in time. He was about to com-mandeer a jeep when fortune smiled on him. Afighter pilot, en route to Lalaghat, became lost andlanded at Hailakandi for directions. Russhonasked him to deliver the precious photos, to whichthe pilot consented. A second bit of luck came hisway minutes later. An Air Commando L–5 pilotlanded and Russhon hitched a ride to Lalaghat.When he arrived there, Russhon found everyonepuzzling over the photos. Russhon told his storyand Wingate became irate, threatening to courtmartial him for disobeying orders. Cochran dis-armed Wingate by saying that he had felt a hunch.

This seemed to mollify Wingate for he quicklycalmed down and even managed a smile.

Wingate, Gen. William Slim (the Britishground commander), Stratemeyer, the AirCommando leaders, and Wingate’s brigade com-manders gathered to discuss what to do. TheChindits and Air Commandos were at their peak ofreadiness following weeks of training. Any delaywould push the operation one month closer to thestart of the monsoon season—not a pleasantthought. Finally, the decision was made to puteverything into Broadway. With the matterresolved, “controlled chaos” prevailed as flightplans were reworked and loading manifestsadjusted to account for the elimination of thetwenty gliders scheduled for Piccadilly. Climbingatop a jeep’s hood, Cochran told his men, “Say,fellers, we’ve got a better place to go!”10 Moresomberly, he said, “Nothing you’ve ever done, noth-ing you’re ever going to do, counts now. Only thenext few hours. Tonight you are going to find yoursouls.”11

At 1812, just 72 minutes late, Bill Cherrypulled the first two gliders into the air. Piloting oneof the gliders was John Alison. It was his secondride in a glider. The rest of the Broadway force fol-lowed at two minute intervals. It was a laboriousclimb over the Chin Hills and the two-ship townearly ended in disaster. Only later was it learnedthat the gliders had been overloaded. Like soldierseverywhere, Wingate’s men did not trust thepromise that supplies would reach them soon andso they had loaded the gliders with more ammuni-tion, food, and other supplies than had beenplanned. Because of the extra weight, fraying towropes, and turbulent air, several gliders broke loosefrom their tow ships. Most of the men who wentdown in these gliders eventually made it back tofriendly lines, but some did not and were killed orcaptured.

The landings at Broadway in the blackness ofthe Burmese night were wild, the clearing lit onlyby a pale moon. The tall grass hid deep ruts andtree stumps left by loggers. Some gliders had theirlanding gear ripped off as they hit these obstacles.Some gliders hit gliders, while others slammedinto trees. One glider went through a clump oftrees, ripping off its wings. The fuselage continuedon until it came to an abrupt stop. The bulldozer itcarried slammed forward, unhinging the cockpitsection. The two pilots suddenly found themselvesstaring straight up in the air as the bulldozer con-tinued its mad rush into the jungle. When the bull-dozer had cleared the remnants of the glider, thenose section flipped back down, the pilots stillstrapped to their seats. Of the thirty-seven glidersthat made it to Broadway, only three were still fly-able the following day. Yet, amazingly, casualtieswere low-24 killed in jungle crashes and four morelost on Broadway itself.

The commander of the engineers charged withpreparing the landing ground to take the C–47swas killed in one of the crashes and it was left upto a second lieutenant to take over the job. When


A C-47 tows a CG-4A overthe Chin Hills. The ques-tion mark emblem was theinsignia for the group’s C-47 section.

“NOTHINGYOU’VE EVERDONE, NOTH-ING YOU’REEVER GOINGTO DO,COUNTSNOW. ONLYTHE NEXTFEW HOURS.TONIGHT YOUARE GOINGTO FINDYOURSOULS.”

Alison asked him how long it was going to take, theyoung man answered, “Is this afternoon too late?”And his engineers did the job. It was not perfect,not yet, but it was usable.12

Back at Lalaghat, Wingate and the otherswaited to hear if the operation had succeeded.Soon the code word “Soyalink” came over the radio.This was disheartening because it indicated thatthings were not going right and to stop furtherflights into Broadway.13 But within a short timethe more agreeable code words “Pork Sausage”were received, revealing that the operation was asuccess. C–47s carrying reinforcements and sup-plies began landing at Broadway on the evening ofMarch 6. Remarkably, the Japanese had no ideathat the Allies had landed behind their lines andsome time passed before they finally were aware ofBroadway.

As Broadway was building up, Cochran senthis men out to keep the enemy away from therapidly expanding base. On March 8, Air Com-

mando fighters and bombers executed one of thegreatest raids of the war in the CBI when they hitthe enemy airfield at Anisakan in central Burma.When aerial reconnaissance showed the Japanesegathering aircraft at that airfield, Cochran decidedto break up that assembly. Twenty-one Mustangs,each carrying a 500-lb. bomb, found about 60Japanese planes on the ground. The enemy neverhad a chance. Before it was over, the AirCommandos destroyed 38 aircraft. With still moretargets available, the bomber section was sent toAnisakan, as well. The B–25s destroyed another12 aircraft and left most of the airfield facilitiesablaze. In these two attacks the Air Commandosaccounted for more than 40 percent of theJapanese aircraft destroyed in the CBI in March1944.

Operation Thursday officially ended on March11. In less than one week, two British long- rangepenetration units had been inserted deep behindenemy lines without enemy knowledge or interfer-ence. The Japanese did not attack Broadway untilthe 13th, far too late to affect the operation. It wasa remarkable accomplishment thanks in largepart to the efforts of the Air Commandos.Tragically, the architect of the long-range penetra-tion concept would not survive to savor the victory.On March 25, while flying to his rear headquartersin an Air Commando B–25, Wingate was killedwhen his plane plowed into a mountain. TheChindits fought on, but they were never quite thesame without their fiery leader.

On March 29, Cochran’s force was formallydesignated the 1st Air Commando Group, shed-ding their “provisional” label and enabling them,at last, to get proper logistics support. The AirCommandos continued to support the Chindits


A glider shows the resultsof tangling with obstruc-tions and other gliders atBroadway.

Members of the light planesection prepare parapackscontaining food, ammo,and other supplies for aer-ial delivery. The L-5 in thebackground is loadedalready with parapacks.

REMARK-ABLY, THEJAPANESEHAD NO IDEATHAT THEALLIES HADLANDEDBEHINDTHEIR LINES

ON MARCH29,COCHRAN’SFORCE WASFORMALLYDESIGNATEDTHE 1ST AIRCOMMANDOGROUP

until late May when they were finally pulled out ofaction to reorganize. But before then they had per-formed an historic event–—the first helicoptercombat rescue mission. It had not been easy. AnL–1 carrying three wounded men had been forceddown in enemy territory. Although the Japanesespotted the plane, they could not locate the crew,who were on the move. Radio contact with friendlyforces was made on April 24, and Lt. CarterHarman and his YR–4 helicopter were sent to pullthem out. Because of the chopper’s limited liftcapability and underpowered engine, Harman hadto fly out the crewmen one at a time, taking themto a sand bar in a nearby river, where an L–1waited to fly them to the rear. These were the firstof 23 combat sorties in which the helicopters res-cued 18 men, proving the value of the aircraft.

Hap Arnold had intended to form four moreAir Commando groups, but as the war accelerated,the concept of long-range penetration supported byAir Commando units was no longer considered apriority. Two more groups were formed—the 2d,which joined the 1st in Burma in late 1944, andthe 3d, which operated in the Philippines begin-ning in January 1945. But that was all. When thewar ended, the three groups were swiftly inacti-vated, to the delight of some skeptics who hadnever conceived the enormous possibilities ofunconventional warfare afforded by these units. Asthe noted military theorist Liddell Hart wrote,“The only thing harder than getting a new ideainto the military mind, is to get an old one out.”14

Yet, the new idea of unconventional unitsorganized to carry out special operations that waslit by the World War II Air Commandos did not die.Its flames flickered and ebbed over the years, butthey kept burning. Others took up the idea and

sustained it. Today the Air Force Special Opera-tions Command carries on the proud tradition ofthe Air Commandos—Any Place, Any Time,Anywhere. �


This article is based on a talk the author gave on October5, 2000, to the American Branch of the Burma StarAssociation. The talk was based on the author’s researchin the Air Force Historical Research Agency archives fora book on the three Air Commando groups to be pub-lished by the Smithsonian Institution Press.

1. Intv, Maj. Gen. John R. Alison, by Maj. Scottie S.Thompson, Apr. 22-28, 1979, p. 347. USAF Oral HistoryCollection, AFHRA No. K239.0512-112J.2. Ibid.3. Gen. H. H. Arnold, “The Aerial Invasion of Burma.”National Geographic Magazine 86:No.2 (Aug.1944),p.130.4. Lowell Thomas. Back to Mandalay. (New York: TheGreystone Press, 1951), p. 134.5. Memo, John Alison to Gen. H. H. Arnold, subj:History, Status and Immediate Requirements for firstAir Commando Force, Jan. 21, 1944. AFHRA No. 145.81-170, Microfilm Reel No. A1378, fr 605.6. Ltr, Adm. Louis Mountbatten to Col. P. Cochran,Jan. 18, 1944. AFHRA No. GP-A-CMDO-1-SU- CO, Jan44-Aug 45, Reel No. B0681, fr 581.7. Brig. Gen.William D. Old, “Command Diary,” Mar. 6,1944 entry. AFHRA No. 833.13-1, Reel No. A8263, fr 116.8. Thomas, p. 149.9. Ibid., p. 155.10. Field Marshal the Viscount [William] Slim. Defeatinto Victory. (New York: Davis McKay Co., 1961), p. 228.11. Thomas, p. 197.12. Alison interview, p. 405.13. Soyalink was an artificial food product detested bythe British troops.14. James Charlton, ed. The Military Quotation Book,(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), p. 63.

NOTES

Even Wingate can smile abit over the success of theoperation. Sharing in hissatisfaction are Alison(second from left) and Brig.Michael “Mad Mike” Calvert(third from left), comman-der of the 77th Brigade, theBroadway assault unit.

THEY HADPERFORMEDAN HISTORICEVENT–—THEFIRSTHELICOPTERCOMBATRESCUEMISSION

AS THE WARACCELER-ATED, THECONCEPT OFLONG-RANGEPENETRA-TION SUP-PORTED BYAIRCOMMANDOUNITS WASNO LONGERCONSIDEREDA PRIORITY


��


Daniel L. Haulman

��

�efore dawn on June 25, 1950, Soviet-built T-34 tanks spearheading North Koreaninfantry columns invaded South Korea,

plunging the three-year-old U.S. Air Force into itsfirst war. The Korean War demanded all of thekinds of missions that air power could offer, includ-ing counterair, strategic bombardment, interdic-tion, close air support, reconnaissance, and airlift.Of these, airlift played a pivotal role, especially inthe war’s crucial first year, when ground forcesmoved spectacularly down and up the peninsula.Sometimes the airlift role is overshadowed by theflashier fighter and bomber missions. Yet the abil-ity of transport and troop carrier aircraft to movemen, equipment, and supplies rapidly from placeto place contributed as much to the successfuldefense of South Korea as bombing, strafing, orshooting down enemy aircraft.

The demand for airlift erupted on the first dayof the invasion. John J. Muccio, U.S. Ambassador toSouth Korea, requested a sea and air evacuation ofAmerican civilians from Korea. Most of the evac-uees were in the Seoul area, and had to leavethrough the port of Inchon or nearby Kimpo andSuwon airfields. The Far East Air Forces (FEAF)and its 374th Troop Carrier Group mustered 7four- engine C–54s, and 14 two-engine C–47s andC–46s at Itazuke and Ashiya Air Bases in Japanfor the airlift. Between June 27 and 29, the AirForce evacuated about 850 civilians from Korea toJapan. Fifth Air Force F–80 jets and F–82 TwinMustang fighters covered the evacuation and shotdown seven enemy aircraft. At the same time 905evacuees departed by sea.1

On June 28, the same day the North Koreanstook Seoul and Kimpo, the Air Force began airlift-ing ammunition to Suwon for the South Koreandefenders. FEAF delivered 150 tons from Tachika-wa Air Base (AB) in Japan that day. Despite FifthAir Force fighter cover, enemy strafers caught oneC–54 on the ground and left it a burning wreck. OnJuly 1, Suwon also fell to the enemy, depriving theUnited States of the last large airfield in the Seoularea.2

President Harry S. Truman was not contentmerely to evacuate U.S. civilians from the SouthKorean capital or to haul ammunition to the SouthKorean defenders. He was determined to send U.S.troops from Japan to Korea as quickly as possibleto help stem the invasion in the name of theUnited Nations. For this he turned again to the AirForce. On July 1, seven C–54s airlifted the firstU.S. troops from Japan to South Korea. BetweenJuly 1 and 4, the 374th Troop Carrier Group (TCG)airlifted 24th Infantry Division troops and their

equipment and supplies from Itazuke AB, Japan,to Pusan, at the southeastern tip of the Korea.Proceeding quickly by land northwestward, theairlifted troops first engaged the North Koreans incombat near Osan on July 5.3

The heavy four-engine C–54s that landed atPusan had threatened to damage the fragile run-ways there, forcing the use of smaller two-enginetransports. The ability of C–47s to land more eas-ily on small and poorly surfaced airstrips in Koreapersuaded the Air Force to expand the number ofSkytrains in the theater. Eventually, the numberof C–47s available to the 21st Troop CarrierSquadron at Ashiya rose to forty, and Greece senta detachment of the Skytrains to augment thesquadron.

The entrance of U.S. troops into the war failedto turn the tide, and the North Koreans, armedwith tanks, continued to advance rapidly andrelentlessly into South Korea. To help destroy thetanks, the Military Air Transport Service (MATS)moved rocket launchers, popularly known as


Dr. Daniel L. Haulman has been a historian at the Air Force Historical Research Agency at MaxwellAir Force Base, Alabama, since 1984. He earned a Ph.D in history from Auburn University in 1983,and has taught as an adjunct professor at Huntingdon College and at Auburn University inMontgomery. He has authored two books, The United States Air Force and Humanitarian AirliftOperations, 1947-1994 and Air Force Aerial Victory Credits: World War I, World War II, Korea, andVietnam. Additionally, Dr. Haulman has written several official U.S. Air Force historical pamphlets,and published several journal articles.

(Overleaf) Air-drop resup-ply.

AIRLIFTPLAYED APIVOTALROLE,ESPECIALLYIN THE WAR’SCRUCIALFIRST YEAR

THE ABILITYOF C–47S TOLAND MOREEASILY ONSMALL ANDPOORLYSURFACEDAIRSTRIPS INKOREAPERSUADEDTHE AIRFORCE TOEXPAND THENUMBER OFSKYTRAINS INTHE THEATER

bazookas, and shaped charges from the UnitedStates to Japan in July. FEAF moved the bazookasfrom Japan to Korea, but some of the shapedcharges went to the Navy’s Task Force 77.4

Despite domination of the air by Fifth Air Forceand U.S. Navy carriers, the North Koreans contin-ued to advance, and more and more South Koreancities fell. The territory available for U.S. airfieldsin South Korea decreased almost daily. Engineeraviation battalions built, repaired, or extendedairstrips still in friendly territory, such as the onesat Pusan, Pohang, and Taegu. Despite having tocompete with Fifth Air Force fighters for the use ofthese airfields, FEAF cargo deliveries to Koreaincreased in August. On August 2, the EighthArmy in Korea asked for an airlift of 300,000pounds of military cargo from Japan to Korea, andthe 374th TCG accomplished the mission in 24hours.5

That same month, the 314th TCG and its C–119Flying Boxcars began moving from the U.S. toJapan. MATS C–54 transports also helped move

two additional B–29 bombardment groups fromthe U.S. to the Far East. FEAF cargo sorties perday also rose significantly during August, goingfrom 42 on August 1, to 105 on August 14, to 130on August 25. Airlifted tonnage within the theateralso increased sharply, from 60 tons on August 1,to 203 on August 7, and 458 tons on August 27.6

At the end of the month, FEAF organized the1st Troop Carrier Task Force (Provisional), thenucleus of what on September 10 became the pro-visional Combat Cargo Command. It included the1st TCG (Provisional) and the 314th and 374thTCGs, that were equipped with C–46s, C–47s,C–119s, and C–54s. The new organization, head-quartered at Ashiya AB, Japan, was charged withairlifting men and materiel within Korea andbetween Korea and Japan. Its first commanderwas Maj. Gen. William H. Tunner, the famous air-lift veteran, who had masterminded the Hump air-lift over the Himalaya Mountains between Indiaand China during World War II, and the BerlinAirlift, which had concluded successfully the pre-vious year.7

UN demands for airlift increased duringSeptember, as the allied forces prepared to go onthe offensive. By then the North Koreans held allof South Korea except for a small perimeteraround Taegu and Pusan. When General DouglasMacArthur launched his dramatic invasion ofInchon near Seoul on September 15, Tunner’s

Combat Cargo Command prepared to airliftmateriel and men both to the Inchon invaders andto the Eighth Army, which was poised to break outfrom the Pusan perimeter. Tunner had availablean armada of C–54s, C–47s, and C–46s to landtroops and equipment and for air evacuation fromsoon-to-be-captured airfields, and C–119s for air-dropping supplies to advancing UN troops.

Tunner did not have to wait long for his oppor-tunity. On September 17, U.S. Marines capturedKimpo airfield near Seoul. Two days later thirty-two C–54s landed there with more troops, suppliesand night lighting equipment. Using this equip-ment, the next day Combat Cargo Commandtransformed the airlift into an around-the-clockoperation. With C–54s landing at all hours of theday and night, before long the command was deliv-ering more than 800 tons per day at Kimpo.Skymasters unloaded fuel and ammunition, muchof it for Marine Aircraft Group 33. On return tripsto Japan, the C–54s evacuated battle casualties.8

On September 21, still less than a week afterthe Inchon invasion, C–54s began airlifting rationsand ammunition to newly captured Suwon airfieldsouth of Seoul. As at Kimpo, the Skymastersreturned to Japan with wounded casualties. OnSeptember 24, eight C–54s transported 65 tons ofammunition and food from Japan to Suwon. Thenext day Tunner’s air transports began landingsoldiers of the 187th Airborne Regimental CombatTeam at Kimpo. That troop airlift lasted threedays.9

Ships could not deliver as much military cargoat Inchon as planners had hoped. Surface lines of


(Facing page top) C–46 atlow level.

(Facing page middle) C–47Skytrain.

(Facing page bottom) C–54Skymaster.

(Right) C–119 FlyingBoxcar.

(Far right) Maj. Gen.William H. Tunner.

ONSEPTEMBER15, TUNNER’SCOMBATCARGOCOMMANDPREPAREDTO AIRLIFTMATERIELAND MENBOTH TO THEINCHONINVADERSAND TO THEEIGHTHARMY, WHICHWAS POISEDTO BREAKOUT FROMTHE PUSANPERIMETER

transportation also failed to deliver enough warmateriel from Inchon to the front line troops. Tokeep the advancing Marines and Army troops sup-plied, Generals MacArthur and Edward Almond,who led X Corps, depended on airlift. It includednot only the landing of cargo at the Kimpo andSuwon airfields, but also the airdropping of foodand ammunition directly to the front, usually byCombat Cargo Command C–119s. Airlift helpedsupply both X Corps at Inchon and the EighthArmy advancing from the Pusan perimeter. Asthese forces approached each other to link up,North Korean troops fled northward to escapebeing cut off.10 Some of them dispersed into theSouth Korean mountains to live off the land.

In October, sixty-six Flying Boxcar sorties air-lifted components of a 600-ton treadway bridgefrom Ashiya AB in Japan to Kimpo to allow U.S.

ground troops spreading out from Inchon andSeoul to cross the Han River. This was the firsttime that airlift had delivered an entire bridge.Once it was assembled, General MacArthur him-self crossed it to lead the offensive northward. Histroops not only reached the 38th parallel, but, withthe approval of President Truman and the JointChiefs of Staff, moved into North Korea. What hadbeen an effort to defend South Korea now becamean attempt to liberate all of Korea from commu-nism.11

During October 1950, General Tunner’s airliftfrom Japan to Korea and within Korea broke itsprevious records. USAF transports dropped food to150 former POWs on October 7.12 Five days later,Combat Cargo Command began airlifting suppliesto Wonsan, that Republic of Korea (ROK) forceshad just captured in eastern North Korea.Tunner’s airplanes also transported an entire baseunit to Wonsan to operate the airfield there.13

After Eighth Army troops captured Sinmak air-field, between Seoul and Pyongyang, CombatCargo Command began airlifting fuel and foodthere for the UN troops advancing toward theNorth Korean capital. On October 17, air trans-ports delivered 235 tons of gasoline and rations toSinmak and returned to Japan with aeromedicalevacuees.14

On October 20, General MacArthur launchedthe first airborne operation of the Korean War.Tunner’s transports, including more than seventyC–119s and forty C–47s, dropped over 2,300 para-troopers of the 187th Airborne Regimental CombatTeam and 300 tons of their equipment behindenemy lines at Sukchon and Sunchon, about 30miles north of Pyongyang. H-5 helicopters evacu-ated injured paratroops from the drop zone. Thatsame day, Pyongyang fell to UN forces, andCombat Cargo Command began airlifting suppliesto the airfields there. Forty C–119s dropped about


(Above) The 187thRegimental Combat Team.

(Right) The bridge over theHan River.

MACARTHURAND ALMOND… DEPENDEDON AIRLIFT

SEVENTYC–119S ANDFORTY C–47S,DROPPEDOVER 2,300PARATROOP-ERS OF THE187THAIRBORNEREGIMENTALCOMBATTEAM

1,000 additional paratroops in the Sukchon andSunchon areas on October 21 to reinforce the air-borne troops dropped the day before. BetweenOctober 20 and 22, the Flying Boxcars and C–47shad dropped well over 3,000 troops behind enemylines north of Pyongyang. To resupply the para-troopers until surface supply routes from thePyongyang area could reach them, Tunner’s C–119sair-dropped 290 tons, including jeeps, trucks, andhowitzers.15

Within a day of the airborne operation, UNforces from Pyongyang linked up with the para-troopers.16 On October 24, Combat Cargo Com-mand delivered 1,182 tons of freight to Pyong-yang, the largest one-day airlift into any airfieldthus far in the Korean War. The next day thecommand broke its record again.17 At the same

time, C–119 airdrops continued. To relieve a groupof friendly ground troops cut off temporarily atUnsan, nine Flying Boxcars dropped 28.5 tons ofammunition, fuel, and oil on October 26.18 DuringOctober, FEAF airlifted 2,840 patients withinKorea and 3,025 patients from Korea to Japan. Byearly November, C–47s were flying cargo in andcasualties out of newly captured airfields atSinanju and Anju, deep in North Korea, wellnorth of Pyongyang.19 By then, the number oftransport sorties outnumbered sorties devoted tostrategic bombardment, interdiction, or close airsupport. With the help of airlift, the Eighth Armyadvanced from the Pusan perimeter all the way tothe vicinity of China in just a few weeks. Enemyguerillas continued to throw up roadblocks on sur-face supply lines, but UN supplies could bypassthem. C–47s and C–46s landed freight at forwardairfields, and C–119s dropped cargo from over-head.20

By November, although UN troops had takenover most of North Korea and were approachingthe Yalu River border with China, the war was notyet over, and airlift would have an even moreimportant role to play. The Eighth Army, whichhad advanced beyond the ability of surface supplylines to sustain it, required additional airlifts offood and ammunition.21 On November 10, lessthan 36 hours after its arrival in Japan, the 437thTCG began airlifting cargo in C–46s from Japan toKorea.22 On November 12, FEAF commander,General Stratemeyer, requested additional C–46and C–54 air and ground crews.23 Combat CargoCommand dropped rations and gasoline at Kapsanon November 20 to resupply rear echelons of a UNunit that had just reached the Yalu River.24 Whenoverwhelming numbers of Communist Chinese


(Above left) Airborneassault troops.

(Above right) C–119 airdrop.

(Below) Unloading a C–46.

troops entered the conflict during the month, UNtroops began a retreat. Even with airlift to supple-ment stretched land and sea supply routes,MacArthur could not deliver enough cargo andreinforcements to allow his troops to hold theiradvanced positions.25

Eighth Army forces in western North Korea fellback to Pyongyang and then retreated to newmore defensible lines nearer the 38th parallel. XCorps and ROK troops in eastern North Koreawithdrew toward Wonsan and Hungnam on thecoast, from which they could be evacuated by seato South Korea. FEAF Combat Cargo Commandfacilitated the orderly retreats with a “reverse air-lift” that removed tons of supplies that advancingenemy troops might otherwise have captured. Forexample, during December 1950, Fifth Air Forcemoved three fighter groups from North to SouthKorea, using the airlift resources of Combat CargoCommand. On December 1, the command also air-lifted some 1,500 wounded personnel from thePyongyong area. Transport planes evacuated menand materiel that could not be removed expedi-tiously by land or sea.26

At the end of November, the Communist forcesin northeastern Korea surrounded troops of the1st Marine Division and the 7th U.S. InfantryDivision in the area of the frozen Chosin(Changjin) Reservoir. Threatened by terribly coldweather and hoping to escape total annihilation or

capture, the Americans fought their way to thetiny village of Hagaru, about four miles south ofthe reservoir, where they set up a defensiveperimeter protected in part by Marine Corps andNavy close air support missions.27

Almost immediately, Combat Cargo Commandbegan dropping supplies to the encircled U.S.troops. On November 28, 29 and 30, at least thirty-seven C–119 flights and twenty-two C–47 sortiesair- dropped 247 tons of ammunition, rations, gaso-line, and medical supplies to a relatively smalldrop zone within the Hagaru perimeter. Some ofthe initial C–119 loads landed beyond the perime-ter in enemy-held territory. U.S. Marine Corpsobservation airplanes and helicopters landed totake out wounded, but there were far too manycasualties to be evacuated that way. X Corps com-manders decided they needed to supplement theUSMC airlift from Hagaru with C–47s of CombatCargo Command.28

By December 1, the Marines had carved alarger airstrip in the frozen ground. Although notyet complete, it was ready enough for the firstcargo airplanes to land. On that day, seven USAFC–47s and four USMC R4Ds (virtually identical tothe C–47s) evacuated more than 1,000 woundedand sick soldiers from Hagaru to Yonpo, about 40miles to the south, within the X Corps defensiveperimeter around Hamhung and Hungnam. In thenext several days, the aircraft evacuated an aver-age of 34 men per flight. On December 5, thebiggest aeromedical airlift day for Hagaru, 1,580patients flew from Hagaru to Yonpo.29


(Above) C–119 supply mis-sion.

(Right & below) Aero-medical evacuation inC–47s.

ALMOSTIMMEDI-ATELY,COMBATCARGOCOMMANDBEGANDROPPINGSUPPLIES TOTHEENCIRCLEDU.S. TROOPS

The C–47s and R4D airplanes that carried outthe wounded and sick did not arrive at Hagaruempty. Many of them carried ammunition, rations,and gasoline, but these were only a small fractionof the supplies that C–119s continued to drop overthe besieged village. On December 1, for example,the Flying Boxcars dropped more than 66 tons ofsupplies, mostly ammunition, to UN forces atHagaru.30

Other U.S. Marines and Army troops from XCorps had been encircled by Communist Chineseforces at the village of Koto, about seven miles

south of Hagaru. On December 6, thirty-one FlyingBoxcars dropped 150 tons of ammunition andrations over Koto. American forces abandonedHagaru and fought their way to join the men atKoto on December 7. By then, Combat CargoCommand had flown 221 airdrop and airland mis-sions to Hagaru and had evacuated over 4,300casualties from there.31

The crisis was not yet over. Koto needed thesame kind of airlift that had supported Hagaru theprevious week. On December 7, Skytrains beganlanding at a newly constructed airstrip at Koto toevacuate the wounded, while Flying Boxcars con-tinued to airdrop supplies. By the end of December9, when the airdrops to Koto ceased, C–47s hadcarried 312 casualties from the village to safetybehind UN lines. The ground troops at Koto weredetermined to join the rest of X Corps at Hamhungand Hungnam to the south, but a 1,500-foot-deepgorge blocked their way. The Chinese haddestroyed the bridge over the chasm. Without abridge, the Marines would have to abandon theirtanks, other vehicles, and artillery. Airlift provideda solution. On December 7, each of eight C–119s ofthe 314th Troop Carrier Group dropped a span ofan M-2 treadway bridge from an altitude of 800feet. Each span descended with the help of a pairof huge G-5 parachutes. One span fell into enemy-held territory and another one was damaged, butthe other six were enough to span the gorge. OnDecember 8, troops of the 1st Marine Division fromKoto linked up with a 3d Infantry Division reliefcolumn north of Hamhung. With the help of thefirst air-dropped bridge in history, U.S. forces hadat last broken the encirclement.32

In the thirteen days since the original encir-clement at the end of November, Combat CargoCommand airplanes dropped 1,580 tons of equip-ment and supplies to the Marines and U.S. Armytroops at the Chosin Reservoir, Hagaru, and Koto.Since November 28, the airlift involved 313 C–119and 37 C–47 flights. Between December 1 and 9,USAF and USMC airplanes evacuated more than4,680 wounded and sick Americans from Hagaruand Koto. The Air Force subsequently awarded itsfirst Korean War Distinguished Unit Citations tothe 21st Troop Carrier Squadron, the 314th TroopCarrier Group, and the 801st Medical AirEvacuation Squadron, for their parts in the emer-gency airlift.33

X Corps itself was still not out of danger, despiteits recovery of major elements of the formerlyencircled 1st Marine and 7th U.S. InfantryDivisions. Chinese Communist pressure stillrequired the evacuation of the Hamhung/ Hung-nam perimeter on the northeastern Korean coastthat December. UN Task Force 90 accomplishedthe bulk of this evacuation by sea, but airliftplayed a major role again. Even while the sea evac-uation was under way, 61st Troop Carrier WingC–54s airlifted ammunition and other suppliesfrom Japan to the perimeter. On December 14, theair evacuation of Yonpo airfield began. It continuedfor four days, during which time FEAF Combat


(Above) C–119 FlyingBoxcar cruises overground troops manningantiaircraft artillery battery.

(Below) A C–47 on thebeach.

Cargo Command, in 393 flights, evacuated morethan 4,000 personnel and transported over 2,000tons of cargo. Most of the passengers were U.S.Marine and Army troops, many of whom werewounded.34

While airlift was helping to evacuate the XCorps from northeastern Korea, it was also airlift-ing Eighth Army and Fifth Air Force personnel,equipment, and supplies from northwesternKorea. Between December 1 and 4, Combat CargoCommand air-evacuated the combat echelons ofthe 8th and 18th Fighter-Bomber Wings fromPyongyang and Pyongyang East airfields to Seouland Suwon in South Korea. The provisional 1stand the 437th TCGs, using C–46s and C–47s, flewemergency air evacuations of UN forces fromSinanju and Pyongyang. During that terriblemonth of December, 1950, they transported thou-sands of wounded troops from Korea to Japan.35

As Chinese Communist troops approached theSouth Korean capital of Seoul, managers oforphanages there began gathering children for asealift to safety on Cheju Do, an island off theSouth Korean coast. Sealift could not immediatelytransport the children, some of whom died frommalnutrition or exposure while they waited. Airliftresponded again. On December 20, twelve C–54Skymasters from the 61st TCG air-evacuatedmore than 800 orphans from Kimpo Airfield toCheju Do. The operation was called “ChristmasKidlift”.36

As the year ended, UN forces were withdrawinginto northern South Korea, hoping to stop theChinese and North Korea Communists before theyreached the gates of Pusan again. Mobility contin-ued to characterize the Korean War for the firstthree months of 1951, with Seoul changing handstwo more times. Airlift continued to play a majorrole in the conflict, even after it became a war oflittle movement.

In the crucial months of 1950, airlift hadalready demonstrated its ability to influence theoutcome of battles and thereby shape the waritself. Without airlift, American civilians wouldhave been captured at Seoul in June 1950, andU.S. forces would not have been able to enter theconflict as early as July 5. Without airlift, UNforces could not have hoped to advance nearly asrapidly as they did from the Pusan perimeter andInchon into North Korea, and many more wouldhave died surrounded by Chinese Communistforces in North Korea. In 1950, airlift contributedgreatly to the successful defense of South Korea, tothe near liberation of North Korea, and to thedeliverance of U.S. forces from that country. Asmuch as strategic bombing, interdiction, close airsupport, counterair missions, and reconnaissance,airlift demonstrated the tremendous influence ofair power on the Korean War during its criticalfirst year. Military airlift grew up during WorldWar II and the Berlin airlift, but it matured inKorea. �


Airlifting orphans fromKorea as part of OperationChristmas Kidlift.

DURING THATTERRIBLEMONTH OFDECEMBER,1950, THEYTRANS-PORTEDTHOUSANDSOF WOUNDEDTROOPSFROM KOREATO JAPAN.

THE 61STTCG AIR-EVACUATEDMORE THAN800 ORPHANSFROM KIMPOAIRFIELD TOCHEJU DO …[IN] OPERA-TION …“CHRISTMASKIDLIFT”.

1. ATC Pamphlet 190-1 (History of the USAF),Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force ROTC, 1961, pp. 25-1, 25-2.374th TCG lineage and honors history at AFHRA, 11Nov 1974, p. 12. Bruce D. Callander, “The Evolution ofAir Mobility,” Air Force Magazine, vol. 81, no. 2 (Feb1998), p. 71. Maurer Maurer, Air Force Combat Units ofWorld War II (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air ForceHistory, 1983, p. 262. Robert Frank Futrell, The UnitedStates Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 (Washington, D.C.:Office of Air Force History, 1983, pp. 5-9, 11-12. A Day byDay History of Far East Air Forces Operations(K720.302A at AFHRA), vol. I, 25 Jun-31 Oct 1950, pp.17-19. History of Far East Air Forces (K720.01 atAFHRA), 25 Jun-31 Dec 1950, vol. I, pp. 29-31. Annis G.Thompson, The Greatest Airlift; The Story of CombatCargo. Tokyo, Japan: Dai-Nippon Printing, 1954. AnEvaluation of the Effectiveness of the United States AirForce in the Korean Campaign (K168.041-1 at AFHRA),25 Jun-Dec 1950, vol. I, pt. 2, pp. 3, 5. Daniel L. Haulmanand William C. Stancik, Air Force Aerial Victory Credits:World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam (GunterAFB, Ala.: 1988), p. 767.2. Futrell, pp. 25, 28. 374 TCG L&H, 11 Nov 1974, p.12. Lee Hyung Suk, editor, The History of the UnitedNations Forces in the Korean War (Seoul, Korea:Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 1972, p.707. Day by Day, 28 Jun 1950. Evaluation, p. 5. FEAFHistory, Jun-Dec 1950, vol. I, p. 34.3. Futrell, p. 77. 374 TCG L&H, 11 Nov 1974, p. 12.Day by Day, vol. I, pp. 29-30. FEAF History, p. 39. RussellA. Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea (Washington, D.C.:Office of the Chief of Military History, 1970), p. 4. FrancisH. Heller, The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective(Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977, p. xviii.Evaluation, Jul 5, 1950.4. Day by Day, vol. I, pp. 46-47. Futrell, p. 97. Roy E.Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History,1961), p. 260.5. Futrell, p. 110. Evaluation, 19 Jul 1950. Day by Day,vol. I, (2 Aug 1950). FEAF History, p. 48. Callander, p. 71.6. Day by Day, vol. I, (3 Aug, 14 Aug, 25 Aug, 1950).Futrell, p. 75. Appleman, p. 380. FEAF History (1 and 27Aug 1950). Maurer, p. 191. ATC Pamphlet 190-1, p. 25-5.7. Day by Day, vol. I (26 Aug 1950). Futrell, pp. 154-155, 773. FEAF History, pp. 18, 23, 24. 314th OperationsGroup lineage and honors history at AFHRA.8. Robert Jackson, Air War Korea (New York: Scribner,1973), pp. 38-39. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), p. 253. FEAF History,p. 62. Futrell, pp. 160-161. USAF Historical Study no. 71,USAF Operations in the Korean Conflict (Washington DC:Department of the Air Force, 1952), p. 66. Evaluation, p.173. FEAF Combat Cargo Command History (K714.01 atAFHRA), Sep 1950-Jan 1951, vol. I, p. 33.9. Jackson, p. 40. Futrell, p. 161. USAF HistoricalStudy no. 71, p. 66. ATC Pamphlet 190-1, p. 25-6.10. Futrell, pp. 160-161, 215. A. Timothy Warnock, AirForce Combat Medals, Streamers, and Campaigns (Wash-ington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1990), p. 195.11. USAF Historical Study 71, p. 101. Thompson, pp.18, 20. Evaluation, vol. I, p. 224. FEAF WeeklyIntelligence Roundup, 15-21 Oct 1950, p. 3.12. Day by Day, vol. I, p. 210.13. Futrell, p. 212.14. Ibid., p. 215. USAF Historical Study 71, pp. 103, 110.15. Futrell, pp. 209, 211, 215. Day by Day, vol. I, pp. 232,236. 314th Operation Group lineage and honors history,prepared 10 May 1995. ATC Pamphlet 190-1, p. 25-8.FEAF Weekly Intelligence Roundup, 15-21 Oct 1950, pp.6-8. Evaluation, vol. I, p. 240. USAF Historical Study 71,p. 77. FEAF History, Jun-Dec 1950, vol. I, pp. 72, 223.John L. Vandegrift, editor, A History of the Air RescueService, 1959 (K318.2 at AFHRA).

16. Futrell, p. 211. FEAF History, Jun-Dec 1950, vol. I,p. 72.17. FEAF Weekly Intelligence Roundup, 22-28 Oct1950, p. 6. FEAF Korean Operations 1950 (K720.3069Aat AFHRA), p. 15. USAF Historical Study 71, p. 103.18. Evaluation, vol. I, p. 246.19. USAF Historical Study 71, p. 110. FEAF WeeklyIntelligence Roundup, no. 10, 5-11 Nov 1950, p. 3; no. 11,12-18 Nov 1950, p. 2.20. FEAF Korean Operations, 1950 (K720.3069A atAFHRA). FEAF Weekly Intelligence Roundup, no. 10, 5-11 Nov 1950, p. 3 and no. 11, 12-18 Nov 1950, p. 2.Futrell, p. 215.21. FEAF History, Jun-Dec 1950, vol. I, p. 84.22. Futrell, p. 232.23. FEAF History, Jun-Dec 1950, vol. I, p. 84.24. FEAF Korean Operations, 1950 (K720.3069A atAFHRA), p. 25.25. Futrell, p. 230.26. FEAF Korean Operations, 1950 (K720.3069A atAFHRA). Futrell, pp. 232, 258, 268. Warnock, p. 200. Dayby Day, vol. II, pp. 96-97. FEAF History, Jun-Dec 1950,vol. I, pp. 91-94.27. Suk, p. 709. Ridgway, p. 254. Gugeler, pp. 58-59, 62.Benjamin F. Blackmon, “One Way Out,” Air ForceMagazine vol. 34, no. 1 (Jan 1951), p. 21. Futrell, p. 258.28. FEAF Korean Operations 1950 (K720.3069A atAFHRA), p. 35. Day by Day, vol. II, pp. 86-88, 90, 93, 100.Futrell, pp. 255-258. Gugeler, pp. 65, 68-78. FEAFHistory, Jun-Dec 1950, vol. I, pp. 91-93. Lynn Montrossand Capt Nicholas A. Canzona, US Marine Operations inKorea, 1950-1953. Vol. III The Chosin ReservoirCampaign (Washington DC: HQ, USMC, 1957), pp. 245-246. Historical Report, Far East Air Forces Combat Car-go Command (Provisional) (K714.01 at AFHRA), 10 Sep1950-24 Jan 1951, vol. I, p. 112.29. Montross and Canzona, p. 246. Historical Report,Far East Air Forces Combat Cargo Command, p. 112.Blackman, pp. 22-25.30. Historical Report, Far East Air Forces CombatCargo Command, vol. I, p. 112. Futrell, p. 258. Blackman,pp. 22-23.31. Historical Report, Far East Air Forces CombatCargo Command, vol. I, pp. 112-113. FEAF WeeklyIntelligence Roundup, no. 14, 3-9 Dec 1950, p. 6; no. 15,10-16 Dec 1950, pp. 3, 4. FEAF Korean Operations, 1950(K720.3069A at AFHRA, p. 34.32. Historical Report, Far East Air Forces CombatCargo Command, vol. I, p. 112. Blackman, p. 25. FEAFWeekly Intelligence Roundup, no. 14, 3-9 Dec 1950, p. 3.Warnock, p. 199. Futrell, p. 259. FEAF Korean Opera-tions, 1950, p. 35. Thompson, p. 73. FEAF History, Jun-Dec 1950, vol. I, pp. 96- 97. Day by Day, vol. II, p. 116.Suk, pp. 131, 709. Ridgway, p. 254.33. Historical Report, vol. I, pp. 113-114. Blackman, p.25. Warnock, p. 199. FEAF Korean Operations, 1950, p.34. Futrell, pp. 259-260.34. Futrell, p. 260. Frederick J. Shaw, Jr., and A.Timothy Warnock, The Cold War and Beyond,Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and MuseumsProgram and AU Press, 1997, p. 9. FEAF KoreanOperations, 1950, p. 41. ATC Pamphlet 190-1, p. 25-11.FEAF Weekly Intelligence Roundup no. 15, 10-16 Dec1950, p. 6; no. 16, 17-23 Dec 1950, pp. 2-3. 61st TCG lin-eage and honors notes in Endicott working papers forKorean War unit data at AFHRA.35. 437 TCG lineage and honors history; 61st TroopCarrier Group lineage and honors history, and 1st TroopCarrier Group (Provisional) lineage and honors history,in Endicott working papers on Korean War units atAFHRA. Futrell, p. 266.36. FEAF Korean Operations 1950, p. 41. Futrell, p.269. FEAF Weekly Intelligence Roundup, no. 16, 17-23Dec 1950, p. 3.



��


Ellwood P. “Skip” Hinman

�hen the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-tion (NATO) began Operation AlliedForce on March 24, 1999, it fought two

wars at the same time. One was the air war overSerbia, waged between NATO and the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia. The other was a conceptualstruggle between the tenets of traditional airpower theory and the unique situational context ofthis contemporary conflict. It was, in fact, thisunderlying conflict between theory and contextthat would ultimately determine the outcome ofthe other more visible war.

The Allied Force air campaign can be dividedinto two distinguishable phases. In the first phase,the overarching situational context of the conflictin the Balkans prevailed over NATO’s effort toexercise the theories of air power’s renownedfounders—Guilio Douhet, William “Billy” Mitchell,and Sir Hugh Trenchard. During the secondphase, a fundamental change in the context of thewar allowed Allied air strategists to successfullyapply this traditional air power thought. Accordingto historian John Keegan, there “have really beentwo air wars, the first lasting a month, the secondsix weeks.” The first was a measured failure andthe second—a success.1 The contextual impact onNATO’s efforts to blend traditional air power the-ory with enduring principles of war highlights thestark differences between these two phases andreveals some lasting lessons of the air campaign.

During the first month of Operation AlliedForce, situational limitations severely restrainedair strategists’ efforts to adhere to five principles ofwar basic to the teachings of Douhet, Mitchell, andTrenchard: (1) objective, (2) mass, (3) unity of com-mand, (4) offensive, and (5) economy of force. Whilethese theorists differed markedly on the margins,most of their work bore striking similarities in con-junction with these principles. First, these threeair power pioneers agreed that, aside from “com-mand of the air,” the sole objective of aerial bom-bardment was, as Mitchell explained, to “wreck anenemy nation’s vital centers and destroy theenemy’s capability and will to keep fighting.”2

Douhet argued that air power “should keep up vio-lent, uninterrupted action against surface objec-tives, to the end that it may crush the material andmoral resistance of the enemy.”3 Initially, however,this total war theory of aerial bombardment sim-ply did not fit well into the context of limited warin the Balkans. Every target required the approvalof every NATO country and reluctant participantsseverely restrained the numbers and types of tar-gets hit during the first weeks of the air campaign.In accordance with the teachings of the early airpower theorists, Lt. Gen. Michael Short, AlliedForce’s Combined Force Air Component Com-mander (CFACC), testified after the war that he“would have gone for the head of the snake on thefirst night. I’d have turned the lights out the first


Major Ellwood P. “Skip” Hinman, IV, is a student at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies atMaxwell AFB, Alabama, and a senior Air Force pilot with 2,600 flying hours in F–117A, A–10, T–38,and T–37 aircraft. He has flown A–10 and F–117 sorties in support of numerous contingency oper-ations, including Desert Storm, Provide Comfort, and Southern Watch. During Operation AlliedForce, Major Hinman flew several combat missions in the F–117. As mission commander, he plannedand led twenty-five-aircraft strike packages deep into the most heavily defended target areas inSerbia. Major Hinman’s decorations include the Distinguished Flying Cross, Meritorious ServiceMedal, and Air Medal. He has articles appearing in Strategic Review and Aerospace Power Journal.

(Overleaf) The B–2 StealthBomber.

An early advocate of air-power, Maj. Gen. William“Billy” Mitchell.

LT. GEN.MICHAELSHORT, …TESTIFIEDAFTER THEWAR THAT HE“WOULDHAVE GONEFOR THEHEAD OF THESNAKE ONTHE FIRSTNIGHT…”

night. I’d have dropped the bridges across theDanube. I’d [have] hit five or six political and mil-itary headquarters in downtown Belgrade. [Yugo-slav President Slobodan] Milosevic and his cronieswould have waked [sic] up the first morning ask-ing what the hell was going on.”4 The delicate con-sensus among NATO participants during the plan-ning and initial execution of Allied Force, however,did not allow General Short to achieve the objec-tive of his predecessors’ air power theories.

Nor did the contextual limitations of coalitionwarfare allow military planners to capitalize onthe air power pioneers’ related insistence on theprinciple of mass. While Douhet called for “a massof battleplanes...acting decisively and exclusivelyon the offensive,” Trenchard urged air war strate-gists to “hurl a mass of aviation at any one localityneeding attack.”5 And yet, NATO strike aircraftaveraged only 92 sorties per day for the first thirtydays compared to a “mass” of 1,300 strike sortiesflown every day during Operation Desert Storm.6“In terms of level of effort, it took NATO 30 days todo what Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf and theCoalition did in about three days of the Gulf War.”7

Replete in the writings of Douhet, Mitchell, andTrenchard is the underlying assumption that lit-erally thousands of aircraft would be available toprosecute the air war. By that yardstick, an aircampaign so restrained to start with a mere 120strike aircraft is not likely to accomplish the ambi-tious goals set by the interwar theorists. While theprecision guidance capability of modern weaponsystems admittedly increases each individual air-craft’s effect, such paltry numbers clearly fall shortof the intent of the air power pioneers. Lt. Gen.Buster Glosson, USAF (Ret.), a key planner andair boss for Desert Storm, submitted that, when“you fly [fewer] than 50 bombing sorties per dayfor seven days, you’re not serious about whatyou’re doing. At best, it’s sporadic bombing.”8

Arizona’s Senator John McCain was more suc-cinct: “Limited actions beget limited results.”9

Beyond their unanimous calls for objective andmass, the interwar theorists’ strong words aboutthe principle of unity of command fell on deaf earsduring the air war over Serbia. Mitchell said, “theone thing that has been definitely proved in all fly-ing services is that a man must be an airman tohandle air power. In every instance of which I haveknown or heard the result of placing other than airofficers in charge of air power had ended in fail-ure.”10 Such thought culminated years afterMitchell’s writings with the creation of the JointForce Air Component Commander (JFACC) con-cept, a single airman who would command joint airforces in combat. However, once again, context pre-vailed over theory; Allied Force was not com-manded by a single airman. Instead, political con-siderations required that Allied Force be controlledwell above the JFACC level, by senior civilian lead-ers of the nations comprising NATO and by WesleyClark, the Army general in charge of the cam-paign. Furthermore, the “most senior militaryleaders in the chain of command were all soldiers,

not airmen.”11 General Short, by his own admis-sion, was relegated to the level of “an executor,”largely unable to influence the employment ofNATO air forces supposedly under his command.12

“As an airman, I’d have done this a whole lot dif-ferently than I was allowed to do. We could havedone this differently. We should have done this dif-ferently.”13

Douhet, Mitchell, and Trenchard also agreedthat the principle of the offensive was inherent tothe concept of air power. In fact, the allure of theaircraft in the aftermath of the carnage and stale-mate of World War I was its overwhelmingly offen-sive answer to the puzzle of positional warfare.Yet, NATOs compromise of air power theory in theface of dominant contextual factors—its reluctanceto mass a concentration of force against theenemy’s vital centers—relegated the initiative tothe enemy. While context protected Serbia’s softunderbelly from attack, it left NATOs center ofgravity—a delicate alliance of reluctant partici-pants—exposed and vulnerable. The bombingcampaign favored the offense in a tactical sense,but the alliance was clearly on the strategic defen-sive during the first month of the operation. WhileNATO waged war in the skies over Yugoslavia,Serbia conducted an equally ferocious war over theairwaves throughout Europe and all over theworld. Whether NATO was winning the air warwas questionable; that it was losing the propa-ganda war was clear for a while. The appropriateapplication of traditional air power theory is toseize and maintain the offensive. Conversely, itsmisapplication may unwittingly pass the initiativeto the enemy, leaving the aggressor to defend themorality of its bombing campaign and the unfor-tunate instances when the bombs go astray.

While NATO was still learning this difficult les-son, President Milosevic was turning another prin-ciple of war against the alliance: economy of force.After sustaining two days of light bombing, andwith the initiative firmly in hand, the Serb presi-dent began a concerted effort to forcefully evict theethnic Albanians from Serbia’s Kosovo province. ToNATOs political leaders, the image of Kosovarrefugees fleeing their burning homes and floodingacross Kosovo’s borders demanded action.Milosevic’s brutal “ethnic cleansing” campaign hadpulled NATOs rudderless air armada in a direc-tion opposite from the teachings of the air powerpioneers. Douhet had warned that “no aerialresources should under any circumstances bediverted to secondary purposes, such as auxiliaryaviation.”14 For Douhet, such a use of combat air-craft to target fielded forces was, in fact, “worth-less, superfluous and harmful.”15 But “whenKosovar refugees began streaming into Macedoniaand Albania on 26 March, horrified NATO leaderspromptly ordered a shift of emphasis.”16 Milosevichad compelled NATO to dilute its already meagerforce to initiate a difficult and largely ineffectualeffort that would bring more embarrassment tothe alliance than success. Additionally, perhapsunwittingly, he had awakened in NATO military


THEDELICATECONSENSUSAMONG NATOPARTICI-PANTS … DIDNOT ALLOWGENERALSHORT TOACHIEVE THEOBJECTIVEOF HIS PRE-DECESSORS’AIR POWERTHEORIES

NATO STRIKEAIRCRAFTAVERAGEDONLY 92 SOR-TIES PER DAY… COM-PARED TO…1,300 STRIKESORTIESFLOWNEVERY DAYDURINGOPERATIONDESERTSTORM

leadership the age-old debate between the utilityof tactical aviation versus strategic bombardment.In so doing, the Serb president had driven the con-textual wedge even further into an already dividedalliance.

And it almost worked. In fact, had Milosevicmaintained the strategic offensive and continuedto divide both NATO forces and NATO opinion, hemay very well have driven off Allied Force. But thecontextual factors that proved so favorable to himduring the first month, and so detrimental to thetheoretical tenets of NATOs bombing campaign,began to change. In fact, Milosevic became his ownworst enemy and the victim of his own success.The same ethnic cleansing campaign that had ini-tially worked to his advantage became so unpalat-able to NATO leaders and their peoples, that theyturned against the Serb president. The Kosovarrefugees, not the Serb people, became the victims.The propaganda game that Milosevic had playedso well during the first month of Allied Force nolonger attracted a sympathetic audience.

When NATO planners emerged for “part two” ofOperation Allied Force, they found that the rules ofthe game had changed in their favor. Context nolonger prevailed over theory. A more permissive sit-uational atmosphere allowed for a more appropri-ate application of the theories of Douhet, Mitchelland Trenchard and turned the recalcitrant princi-

ples of war in NATOs favor. The alliance’s objectivebecame increasingly clear, achievable, and com-mensurate with traditional air power theory. Bythis point in the air campaign, NATO aircraft hadbattered enemy air defenses to the point wherethey could indeed claim to have achieved “com-mand of the air.” General Michael Ryan, the U.S.Air Force Chief of Staff, would declare that“Serbia’s air force is essentially useless and its airdefenses are dangerous but ineffective.”17 Relaxedcontextual restrictions unleashed the most modernembodiment of Douhet’s “battleplane,” the B-2Stealth bomber, with devastating results. Mitchell’svital centers were no longer shielded by politicalrestraints, exposing both the electrical grid andSerbia’s petroleum industry to continuous and suc-cessful attack. In accordance with Trenchard’s tar-geting strategy, “NATO aircraft also intensifiedattacks on key war industries, especially vehicleand weapons factories and repair shops.”18 Everybridge across the Danube was hit and more than 50percent were completely destroyed. Even Serb tele-vision, Milosevic’s primary propaganda warweapon, was bombed off the air.

By the end of April, favorable context allowedNATO to achieve the previously elusive principleof mass and concentrate its greatly increased num-bers on the enemy, conducting non-stop, 24-houroperations on multiple targets throughout Serbia.


Gen. H. NormanSchwarzkopf, Desert Stormcommander.

MILOSEVICBECAME HISOWN WORSTENEMY ANDTHE VICTIMOF HIS OWNSUCCESS

GENERALMICHAELRYAN,WOULDDECLARETHAT“SERBIA’SAIR FORCE ISESSENTIALLYUSELESSAND ITS AIRDEFENSESARE DANGER-OUS BUTINEFFEC-TIVE.”

The alliance reclaimed the strategic offensive andnever again relinquished the initiative. “NATObegan to ratchet up the pressure, doubling thetotal number of targets it struck between day 30and day 45. The gradual escalation would continueuntil it peaked on May 31, with 778 total sorties, ofwhich 319 were strike sorties.”19 But NATO didnot only optimize mass through increased num-bers of sorties flown and weapons delivered. Theprecision capability of modern U.S. weapons ledNATO to claim a 99.6 percent accuracy rate andmay have redefined the principle of mass in waysthat even Douhet had not foreseen.20 The contex-tual shift during Allied Force allowed for a mar-

riage between modern air power technology andtraditional air power theory that brought aboutdecisive results. When Milosevic capitulated toNATO demands on June 10, 1999, the dogmaticassertions of Douhet, Mitchell and Trenchard thatair power could alone be decisive was no longer anarticle of faith but—within the confined context ofthe 78-day air campaign—an irrefutable reality.

As air power strategists look to aerospace war-fare in the next millennium, NATOs experience inthe last air war of the twentieth century clearlycarries with it some important and enduringlessons. First, it appears increasingly difficult torefute the axiom that “Douhet was right!” While


Brig. Gen. Buster Glosson,(right) and Lt. Col. DavidDeptula (Left) architects ofthe Desert Storm air cam-paign.

THE PRECI-SION CAPA-BILITY OFMODERN U.S.WEAPONSLED NATO TOCLAIM A 99.6PERCENTACCURACYRATE

THEDOGMATICASSERTIONSOF DOUHET,MITCHELLANDTRENCHARDTHAT AIRPOWERCOULDALONE BEDECISIVEWAS NOLONGER ANARTICLE OFFAITHBUT—ANIRREFUTABLEREALITY

the early air power theorists may have been blindto the very real technological constraints thatwould hinder the application of their theories dur-ing World War II, modern technology has caught upto their progressive ideas about war. Aerospacepower was immensely effective in Desert Storm,but the short, ferocious ground war invalidated anyair power claim of “decisiveness.” Even DeliberateForce had its share of ground activity coincidentwith air operations. Allied Force, however, vali-dated the ideas of air power’s pioneer theorists.

Although the air pioneers won in terms ofAllied Force’s decisiveness, they would hardly

have rejoiced to see the debate over air power’sunity of command continue unresolved. Thus,while the requirement for a JFACC was writteninto law and technically exercised during the airwar over Serbia, the JFACC works directly for,and is clearly subordinate to, the regional com-batant commander-in-chief. Additionally, theCINCs report to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff, the President’s chief military advisor.Since the inception of Goldwater-Nichols Act in1986, these top military billets traditionally andalmost exclusively have been held by the topbrass of other services. Consequently, the JFACCis relegated to the executor of air power strategy,as he was in Allied Force. The vitally importantdecisions and advice on air power application aremade at higher levels by military leaders in uni-forms other than Air Force blue. “At a time whenaerospace power has become the force ofchoice...it is imperative that both at the level ofthe national command authority and the top lev-els of military commands there be a senior air-man in position to give advice on aerospace capa-bilities and employment options.”21

Beyond unity of command, Allied Force also leftlargely unresolved the principle of economy offorce. Rather than laying the dispute to rest, theKosovo conflict only exacerbated the on-goingdebate over targeting Mitchell’s vital centers. In amore general sense, Allied Force did no better thanDouhet to resolve the fundamental question of tar-geting. What brought Milosevic down? Was itMitchell’s “capability” or Trenchard’s “will,” indus-try or the morale of industrial workers, thebridges, the airfields, the oil, the electricity, or thefielded forces that convinced the Serb president tosue for peace?

Perhaps the most important lesson from theair war over Serbia was the overriding signifi-cance of contextual factors. Theories and ideas


The B–2 bomber repre-sented a revolutionarycapability.

The air campaign plannersreceive a visit from the AirComponent Commander,Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner(fourth from left) andSecretary of the Air ForceDonald Rice (third fromright).

are immensely important, but it was the contextof the Balkans conflict that initially held thoseideas in check. Only a vital shift in that contextallowed the traditional air power theories to pre-vail. Thus, while Operation Allied Force may havevalidated the theories of Douhet, Mitchell and

1. John Keegan, “Please, Mr. Blair, Never Take Such aRisk Again,” London Daily Telegraph, Jun 6, 1999, p. 1.2. Mark A. Clodfelter, “Molding Airpower Convictions:Development and Legacy of William Mitchell’s StrategicThought,” The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press,1997), p. 101.3. Guilio Douhet, The Command of the Air (New York,N.Y.: Coward-McCann, 1942), p. 129.4. Robert S. Dudney, “Verbatim,” Air Force Magazine,Dec. 1999, p. 58.5. Douhet, The Command of the Air, p. 129; Clodfelter,“Molding Air power Convictions,” in The Paths ofHeaven, p. 84.6. Stephen P. Aubin, “Operation Allied Force: War or‘Coercive Diplomacy’?,” Strategic Review, vol. 27, no. 3(Summer 1999): p. 6.7. Ibid.8. J. Hayward, “NATO’s War in the Balkans: APreliminary Assessment,” New Zealand Army Journal,Jul. 1999, 7.


Trenchard, it more accurately demonstrated thesuperiority of context over theory. Consequently,in looking ahead to the next air war, it will be aconsortium of ideas—and not any single theory—that will hold the key to aerospace power’s suc-cess. �

9. “Verbatim Special: The Balkan War,” Air ForceMagazine, Jun. 1999, p. 50.10. Clodfelter, “Molding Airpower Convictions,” in ThePaths of Heaven, p. 90.11. John T. Correll, “Airpower and Its Critics,” AirForce Magazine, Jul. 1999, p. 3.12. Aubin, “Operation Allied Force,” in StrategicReview, p. 11.13. “Verbatim Special: The Balkan War,” Air ForceMagazine, Jul. 1999, p. 43.14. Douhet, The Command of the Air, p. 128.15. Ibid., p. 94.16. Hayward, “NATO’s War in the Balkans,” in NewZealand Army Journal, p. 8.17. Correll, “Airpower and Its Critics,” p. 3.18. Hayward, “NATO’s War in the Balkans,” p. 13.19. Aubin, “Operation Allied Force,” p. 7.20. Col. Phillip S. Meilinger, “Gradual Escalation.”Armed Forces Journal International, Oct. 1999, p. 18.21. Aubin, “Operation Allied Force,” p. 11.

NOTES

Gen. Schwarzkopf briefsthe Secretary of DefenseRichard B. Cheney (center)and the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff Gen.Colin L. Powell. (secondfrom left).

Curtis L. BrownhillOn November 1, 1999, 1000 hours, Howard AFB,

Republic of Panama, was officially transferred tothe government of Panama in accordance with theCarter-Torrijos Panama Canal and NeutralityTreaties of 1977. This day officially marked the endof an era and culminated eighty-two years of con-tinuous, American air power presence on theIsthmus of Panama. It was a moment of interna-tional importance and a tribute to the region andtwo nations. What may not be as well known iswhat occurred less than twenty-four hours earlier.On October 31, 1999, at 1745 hours, a small for-mation of United States Air Force airmen musteredfor one final mission—to ceremoniously inactivatethe 24th Wing and to lower the American flag thathad flown proudly for fifty-nine years over the skiesof this strategically important installation. Withjust 24 hours remaining until the base wouldtransfer, a 100-member military and civilian care-taker force remained to conduct this ceremony.Only a few spectators, former Panamanian andAmerican employees, were on hand. This ceremonyprovided a brief moment to reflect on our profession

and service to the nation, and to honor the coura-geous men and women who struggled to carve airbases from the jungles and the marshes of Panamaand who faithfully served from those bases fornearly a century.

October 31, 1999, 1745 hours. Sunset. A warm,humid, and breezeless evening, eight degreesabove the equator, in a lush tropical environment.Howard Air Force Base, near the west bank of thePanama Canal, now little more than an emptyshell of its once proud existence. The sun is verylow, all but hidden by the mountains that loommajestically over the base, casting prominentshadows upon the headquarters building and theformation area. Darkness would set in by the con-clusion of the ceremony. Thunder can be heard inthe distance, as a massive storm is brewing butsurprisingly holding out, as if to allow this historicmoment to take place unabated.

The flags of the United States of America andthe Republic of Panama are both strikingly illumi-nated by powerful floodlights. The formation is inplace. The flag folding detail is ready. It is haunt-ingly quiet, except for the clanking of the halyardson the flagpoles and night creatures beginningtheir evening symphony. There is stillness. The for-mation comes to attention. The wing colors aremarched out to join the formation. The commandertakes over from the first sergeant. Reflective wordsare spoken. There is a prayer. The wing colorsparade forward and the wing is decorated. Theorders of the day are published. A proud and dis-tinguished unit is inactivated, its colors cased until


Chief Master Sergeant Curtis L. Brownhill is the 6th Logistics Group Superintendent atMacDill Air Force Base, Florida. From September 1997 to November 1999, he was the com-mand chief master sergeant of the 24th Wing at Howard Air Force Base, Republic of Panama.In that capacity, he was intimately involved with executing the final phases of the historic 1977Carter-Torrijos Panama Canal Transfer and Neutrality Treaties. His twenty-eight-year careerhas been primarily in the aircraft maintenance field, beginning in 1973 as a propeller repair-man. Over the years he has maintained a diverse list of fixed and rotary wing aircraft.

��

The mountains loom overHoward AFB.

such time as it may be recalled to duty. The skydarkens, the thunder intensifies.

The command is given to sound retreat. Theformation presents arms. The “Himno Nacional dePanama” is played and the Panamanian flag islowered respectfully and folded by the detail, aflag that would fly again atop this installation.There is quiet anticipation. The detail is prepared.This moment is not relished. At the command ofpresent arms, a rush of emotion is felt at the firstnote of “The Star Spangled Banner.” Then comesthe dutiful lowering of the flag of the UnitedStates of America. Its long journey from its placeof honor to the awaiting hands of the flag detail isslow and deliberate. The detail carefully collects

and tends to the flag. There is much upon which toreflect.

A crisp snap is heard as the flag is presented forall to see. The powerful music of “America theBeautiful” is played, as the detail slowly and cere-moniously continues to fold the world’s most rec-ognizable symbol of freedom; its duty here nowcomplete. The detail slowly marches the flags fromthe poles to the commander. Honors areexchanged. The order is given to retire the colors.The stirring tones of the Scottish pipes echo as thecolors are marched off the field. As the lights areextinguished, a prolonged silence follows. Thereare few dry eyes. Darkness has set in. It begins torain. �


(Right) Furling the 24thWing colors, Col. Roger T.Corbin, 24th WingCommander (left), CMSgt.Curtis L. Brownhill,Command Chief MasterSergeant (right).

(Right) Col. Roger T.Corbin receives the UnitedStates flag from SSgt.Francisco Hernandez.

Early in 1941, under pressure to speed expan-sion of the U.S. Army Air Corps, the WarDepartment directed its recruiting service to cre-ate a slogan that would serve as an inspirationalrallying cry. On May 17th, the Army’s chief recruit-ing officer, Lt. Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Harold N.Gilbert, coined the slogan, “Keep ‘em Flying!” Helater recalled: “We were trying to think of a picturecaption for a recruiting ad for the Aviation CadetProgram. The phrase just came out on the spur ofthe moment.”

A poster illustrating the slogan was designed inwhich the red capital letters formed a circle read-ing: “LET’S GO! U.S.A. KEEP ‘EM FLYING!”Inside the circle, on a white background and col-ored in blue, were three pursuit planes and the

caption: “Uncle Sam Needs Pilots. Be a U.S. ArmyFlying Cadet.” Later, variations of the originalinsignia included the addresses of the nine ArmyCorps areas.

Not until after the attack on Pearl Harbor wasthe slogan used in commercial advertising. It firstappeared in the June 18, 1941, edition of the NewYork Times in an ad by John David, a man’s cloth-ing emporium in New York City. Later, andthroughout the war years, many stores in citiesnationwide emphasized the slogan in their adver-tising and displayed the posters.

The War Department asked industries, tradeorganizations, and advertising agencies to promotethe slogan as a patriotic service. By December1941, more than 15,000 posters were distributed


Keep emFlying!

Lt. Col. Harold NapoleonGilbert. (Photo courtesy ofNational Archives TrustFund, Atlanta, Georgia.)

in New York State alone. The Army printed fornational distribution, 900,000 stickers for automo-biles, 100,000 small posters, and 50,000 large onesfor roadways and other areas. In addition, 50,000cards were prepared for display in subways, streetcars, buses, and trains. About a million stampswere printed for use by the Army and commercialconcerns to advertise the slogan through corre-spondence. Distribution of all materials, except thestamps, was without charge to users. Whether inadvertising, or as a public service by editors, theslogan appeared in newspapers across the UnitedStates.

The slogan also inspired writers and a songentitled “Keep ‘em Flying!” became popular duringWorld War II. A sample verse from one of these,written by Air Corps members Charles Belangerand John J. Broderick, reflected the slogan’s strongpatriotic appeal:

And as we go through each day,Be thankful that we still can say,We’ll preserve our American way,If we KEEP ‘EM FLYING in every way.

This song and several others were printed in theAir Corps News Letter for June and July 1941.

Universal Pictures caught the spirit with itsmovie, “Keep ‘em Flying.” Starring the popularcomedy team of Bud Abbott and Lou Costello, thepicture was released in November 1941. Marqueeand newspaper advertisements touted the film ashaving “a sky full of sunny songs,” including “Let’sKeep ‘em Flying.”

The Army recruiters’ goals were 120,000 new

applicants for flying commissions and 300,000applicants as flying crew members. Additionally,the Army hoped to recruit 30,000 trained pilots ayear, an increase of 18,000 over 1940’s quota of12,000 pilots. The aviation cadet program offeredyoung men between twenty and twenty-six yearsof age $75 on enlistment, plus a dollar per day formeals, all necessary uniforms and equipmentbeing supplied without cost. On completion of theseven months’ course, each cadet was commis-sioned as a second lieutenant in the Air CorpsReserves. Immediately after graduation, the newofficers went on active duty at $245 per month.

The effect the slogan and its advertising had onthe recruiting program cannot be measured. But itmust have been significant, considering that evenafter its advent sixty years ago, “Keep ‘em Flying!”remains an effective motto.

MSgt. Harry F. Dill, USAF (Ret.), Alexandria,Louisiana


Sources

Biographical data on Maj. Gen. Gilbert—Department of the Army Center of MilitaryHistory, Washington, D.C.

Articles on microfilm at Louisiana StateUniversity, Alexandria, Louisiana; New YorkTimes, May 11, 1941; May 18, 1941; June 17,1941; November 18, 1966 (obituary of Maj. Gen.Harold Napoleon Gilbert); and ShreveportTimes, June 1, 1941.

“Keep ‘em Flying” slogan.(Photo courtesy of NationalArchives Trust Fund,Atlanta, Georgia.)

After more than fifty years, former Air Forcehistorian Robert F. Phillips was recognized for hisheroic efforts in the Korean War with the awardof the Silver Star. He received the medal fromMaj. Gen. James T. Jackson, commanding generalof the Military District of Washington, at a cere-mony held on February 13, 2001, at Fort McNairin Washington, D.C.

Phillips, now seventy-six, was born in SouthDakota, where he attended local schools. Draftedimmediately after graduating from high school,he was sent to Europe as a combat medic with the110th Infantry Regiment of the 28th InfantryDivision. Phillips was seriously wounded in theBattle of the Siegfried Line in Germany inSeptember 1944. After recuperating in a hospitalin Oxford, England, he was released in November

and reprocessed into his former unit onDecember 15, 1944, on the eve of the Battle of theBulge. Tasked to hold the line, his regimentlasted only four days. Out of 3,100 soldiers, only750 made it back to Bastogne. The remnants ofhis division transferred to French administrativecontrol and fought in the Alsace campaign untilFebruary 1945. His unit returned to U.S. controland fought until V-E day, then remained inEurope as part of the occupation forces until July.Phillips returned to the U.S. and was waiting tobe shipped to the Pacific Theater when the warended. He processed out of the Army inNovember.

Phillips used the GI Bill to attend theUniversity of Oregon, earning a BA degree.Following graduation, he decided on a military


Air Force Historian Wins Silver Star

Maj. Gen. James T.Jackson (left) awards theSilver Star to Robert F.Phillips (right).

career, and enlisted in April 1950. When theKorean War started two months later, he wasamong the first general replacements sent toKorea. Phillips married his fiance MarjorieGriffeth from Eugene, Oregon, one week beforehis departure date.

When he arrived in Korea on August 1,Phillips was assigned to Company I, 21stInfantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division. Onthe dawn of September 8, in the vicinity of Kyong-ju, South Korea, his unit was attacked from therear by a company-sized enemy force. One enemy

platoon broke from the main attacking force tocapture a hill that was the dominant terrain fea-ture in the area. Phillips raced behind his platoonleader to the top of the hill, and the pairunleashed a barrage of hand grenades and riflefire, preventing the enemy’s occupation of thehill. After they depleted their supply of grenades,Phillips raced down the hill under a hail of fire,and heedless of his safety, replenished his stashof grenades. Rejoining his platoon leader, the duoheld off the enemy until the officer fell mortallywounded. Alone, Phillips backed a short waydown the hill on his stomach and determined tohold off any enemy who dared to crest the hill.Then, a Company I machine gun and tankfocused their fire to Phillips’s front and began torepel the enemy attack. Once the firing subsided,Phillips rushed over the hillside, killing fiveNorth Koreans with his rifle. A later examinationof Phillips’s field jacket revealed four bullet holes,and the top of his helmet was dented. The citationfor Phillips’s Silver Star recognized the “utter dis-regard for his own personal safety and his cooldisplay of marksmanship while exposed to con-centrated enemy fire.”

He was later evacuated to Japan because of asevere ear infection and in August 1951, sent toFt. Riley, Kansas, where he became theRegimental Supply Sergeant for the 10thInfantry Division. Two years after the KoreanWar, Phillips inquired about the status of hisSilver Star medal, but was told that it had beenlost and, moreover, that the time limit for resub-mitting the paperwork had expired. Time limitsfor rewards were not removed until the late1990s. Phillips then located his former companycommander, who resubmitted the documentationfor the medal.

Phillips mustered out of the Army in April1953, and returned to the University of Oregon,earning an MA in history in 1956. He then wentto Washington, D.C., where after a stint with theDepartment of Health, Education, and Welfare hebecame an historian in the Office of the Chief ofMilitary History. He remained there for severalyears before transferring to the Air Force HistoryProgram, becoming the chief historian at theOffice of Aerospace Research. In the meantime,he and Marge raised two children, Catherine andMark. In 1970, he became the chief historian ofthe Seventeenth Air Force in Germany. Hereturned stateside in 1976 and served as deputychief historian at Air Force Systems Command,Andrews AFB, Maryland. In May 1986, RobertPhillips retired from the Air Force history pro-gram, after a thirty-year civil service career,including twenty years with the Air Force. Inretirement, his book, To Save Bastogne, was pub-lished. Currently residing with Marge in Burke,Virginia, Phillips remains an active member ofseveral veterans’ organizations, including somein France.

Dr. George M. Watson, Jr., Chevy Chase, Maryland


A contemporary photo ofRobert Phillips. (Photocourtesy of RobertPhillips.)


��Brian S. Gunderson

Part III: Letters E-L

EAR BASHER A TALKER

ELEVENSES TEA, COFFEE AND BUNS TAKEN AT 11:00 AM FROM THE NAAFI FOOD WAGON BY AIRCRAFT GROUND/MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL WORKING ON AIRCRAFT

ELSAN A TOILET ABOARD BOMBER AIRCRAFT

ENSA TRAVELING ENTER-TAINMENT GROUPS SIMILAR TO U.S. USO GROUPS

ERKS USUALLY ANY LOW-RANKED ENLISTED GROUND CREW PER-SONNEL OR BEGIN-NERS ON A JOB

EVER SO VERY GOOD OR A LARGE QUANTITY OF SOMETHING

EYETIES ITALIAN POWs WORK-ING ON BRITISH FARMS

FAGS/FAGGIES CIGARETTES

FAG ENDS CIGARETTE BUTTS

FAN AN AIRCRAFT PROPELLER

FAT RASCAL A BUN STUFFED WITH RAISINS OR CURRANTS

FENDER A FIREPLACE

FIDDLE KEEP INCORRECT/FALSE RECORDS, "COOKTHE BOOKS," SWINDLE

FIDO FOG INTENSIVE OR INSTANT DISPERSAL OPERATION AT SELECTED RAF AIR-FIELDS, MANSTON,WOODBRIDGE, CARN-ABY

FINE NICK GOOD CONDITION

FIRE TENDER A FIRE ENGINE/TRUCK

FIRM, THE THE BRITISH ROYAL FAMILY

FISH HEADS BRITISH ROYAL NAVYPERSONNEL

FISHPOND RAF AIRBORNE RADAR WARNING ON BOMBERS

FITTER AN AIRCRAFT ENGINE MECHANIC

FLAKING OUT FEELING SICK

FLAMER A PLANE SHOT DOWN IN FLAMES

FLANNEL PULL THE WOOL OVER ONE'S EYES, FLATTER,SEEK FAVOR

FLAP A LARGE BOMBER RAID

FLAREPATH LIGHTS RUNWAY LIGHTS

FLASHERS TURN SIGNALS ON A CAR, VAN, TRUCK

FLAT AN APARTMENT

FLAT OUT ACCELERATE TO TOP SPEED OR COM-PLETELY EXHAUSTED

FLICKS MOVIES

FLIMSIES RICE PAPER CONTAIN-ING CLASSIFIED RADIO FREQUENCIES, GEE CODES, ETC. THAT WAS EDIBLE AND SWAL-LOWED BY CREW MEM-BERS BEFORE ABAN-DONING AN AIRCRAFT OVER ENEMY TERRI-TORY

FLIP A SHORT TRAINING OR CROSS-COUNTRY FLIGHT

FLIPPING POLITE USE OF TERM"BLOODY," E.G. HE LOST HIS FLIPPING MIND

ROYAL AIR U.S. ARMY AIR FORCESFORCE TERM EQUIVALENT/

DEFINITION


DEFINITION


FLOGGING THE PRACTICING AIRCRAFTCIRCUITS LANDINGS

FLOG IT WALK OR PLOD ON ALONE

FLORIN BRITISH SILVER COIN,TWO-SHILLING PIECE (50 CENTS)

FLOWER MISSION A PATROL OVER ENEMY NIGHT FIGHTER AIR-FIELDS

FLURRIED NERVOUS, FLUSTERED

FLUTTER A SMALL BET ORWAGER

FLYING OFFICER AN RAF OFFICER RANKEQUIVALENT TO A 1st LIEUTENANT

FLYING PENCIL RAF TERM FOR GER-MAN LUFTWAFFE DORNIER 17/215 AIR-CRAFT

FLYING PORCUPINE WWII RAF SHORTBROTHERS SUNDER-LAND FLYING BOAT

FLYING SUITCASE WWII RAF HANDLEYPAGE HAMPDEN TWIN-ENGINED BOMBER

FOGGING EFFECT SMOKE PATCHESABOVE BOMBED ENEMY TARGETS THAT PREVENTED DETAILED POST-OPERATIONAL PHOTO RECONNAIS-SANCE OF TARGET AREA

FRESHMAN FLIGHTS FIRST SIX OPERA-TIONAL MISSIONS BY RAF BOMBER CREWS;USUALLY PILOT AND NAVIGATOR FLEW THEIR FIRST MISSION WITH AN EXPERIENCED CREW

FROG BRITISH NICKNAME FOR A FRENCHMAN

FRYING PAN AN AIRCRAFT DISPER-SAL PAD

FULL BORE FLY AS FAST AS POSSI-BLE

FUNK PANIC, FEAR, COW-ARDLY ACTION

FUNK-HOLE A SLIT TRENCH ON AN RAF AIRFIELD USED BY RAF PERSONNEL WHEN UNDER ATTACK BY GERMAN BOMBERS

FUNNEL PATH FOLLOWED IN LINE WITH AND DESCENDING INTO A RUNWAY

GAFFE A MISTAKE

GAGGLE A LOOSE FORMATION OR GROUP OF AIR-CRAFT

GALOSHES RUBBER BOOTS

GARDENING MISSION LAYING AERIAL MINES IN GERMAN OR OCCU-PIED TERRITORY HAR-BORS

GASH A RIDE IN A BOMBER IN A NON-COMBAT SITUA-TION, USUALLY BY GROUND/MAINTE-NANCE PERSONNEL ON A TEST HOP OR FERRY FLIGHT

GASPER A CIGARETTE

GAUNTLETS LEATHER GLOVES WORN BY AIRCREW PERSONNEL

GEAR BOX THE TRANSMISSION IN A CAR

GEE MEDIUM RANGE RADIO AID TO NAVIGATION EMPLOYING GROUND TRANSMITTERS AND AN AIRBORNE RECEIVER IN A BOMBER AIR-CRAFT

GEN INFORMATION

GENTLEMAN'S DISCIPLINARY ACTIONJANKERS TAKEN AGAINST RAF

OR ALLIED AIR FORCE OFFICERS, USUALLY CONFINEMENT TO AIR-FIELD FOR A SET PERIOD

GEORGE AN AUTOPILOT IN AN AIRCRAFT

GET CRACKING GET GOING, GET A MOVE ON, WORK FASTER


DEFINITION


DEFINITION

GET THE CHOP KILLED IN ACTION, GET SHOT DOWN

GET THE GRIFF RECEIVE PRE-MISSION BRIEFING

GIPPO MILITARY SLANG FOR GRAVY

GIVE IT THE GUN ACCELERATE,INCREASE SPEED

GLASS HOUSE A PENAL DETENTION CENTER

GLYCOL AIRCRAFT ENGINE RADIATOR COOLANT

GOBSMACKED FLABBERGASTED,OVERWHELMED

GOING CLAPPERS AN AIRCRAFT FLYINGAT NOUGHT FEET AT MAX SPEED ON THE

DECK/GROUND LEVEL

GOLD FISH CLUB AIRCREW MEMBERS WHO SURVIVED A BAILOUT OVER WATER OR AIRCRAFT DITCH-ING

GONE FOR A BURTON MOST COMMON RAFEXPRESSION FOR A CREW MEMBER KILLED IN ACTION (KIA) OR MISSING IN ACTION (MIA) ON AN OPERATIONAL FLIGHT OR ON A TRAINING FLIGHT

GONE FOR SIX AIRCRAFT MISSING IN ACTION

GONG A MEDAL/MILITARY DECORATION

GOOD BLIND A DRINKING BINGE

GOOD SHOW WELL DONE, A SUC-CESSFUL MISSION

GOODS TRAIN A FREIGHT TRAIN

GOODS WAGON A FREIGHT TRAIN BOX-CAR

GOOSENECK A PARAFFIN RUNWAY LIGHTING FLARE

GOT THE CROWN WAS PROMOTED TO FLIGHT SERGEANT

GRAMAPHONE A RECORD PLAYER/PHONOGRAPH

GRAND SLAM BOMB A 22,000-LB BOMB

GRAUNCHING LANDING AN AIRCRAFT WITH GEAR UP

GRAVY PETROL, GASOLINE

GREASER A PERFECT THREE-POINT LANDING

GREAT COAT A FULL LENGTH MILI-TARY OVERCOAT

GREEN HOUSE A PLEXIGLASS COCKPIT COVER, AIRCRAFT CANOPY

GREMLIN A MYTHICAL, MISCHIE-VOUS AND INVISIBLE IMP THAT CAUSES AIR-CRAFT MALFUNCTIONS,PROBLEMS, ACCI-DENTS, AND CRASHES

GRIFF INFORMATION, NEWS,OPERATIONAL BRIEF-ING

GROUPIE, GROUPY RAF GROUP CAPTAIN,EQUIVALENT TO A COLONEL

GUINEA PIG CLUB MEMBERS WERE MILI-TARY FLIERS WHO SUFFERED SEVERE DISFIGUREMENT (BURNS, LOSS OF LIMBS, ETC.) INCRASHES OR IN-FLIGHT FIRES, MOST SEVERE CASES WERE TREATED AT QUEEN VICTORIA HOSPITAL IN EAST GRINSTEAD, ESSEX,SOUTH OF LONDON

HAD A GO AT ATTEMPTED, TRIED

HAIRY DO/ A RISKY, SCARY OR DIF-SHAKEY DO FICULT OPERATIONAL

MISSION

HALF CROWN A BRITISH SILVERCOIN, TWO SHILLINGSAND SIXPENCE (62 ½ CENTS)

HALF AND HALF A MIXED DRINK OF ALEAND STOUT OR A MILD AND BITTER

HALIBAG, HALLIE, NICKNAME FOR WWII HALLY RAF HANDLEY PAGE

FOUR-ENGINED HEAVY BOMBER

HANG UP A BOMB THAT FAILED TO RELEASE FROM A BOMB RACK



DEFINITION


DEFINITION

HAPPY VALLEY RAF "BLACK HUMOR" DESIGNATION GIVEN TO HEAVILY DEFENDED TARGETS IN GERMAN RUHR VALLEY

HARBOUR MASTER THE COMMANDINGOFFICER OF AN AIR-FIELD/STATION

HARD CHEESE TOUGH LUCK

HEADED FOR RETURNING TO AIR-THE BARN FIELD/BASE AFTER A

MISSION

HEDGEHOP FLYING AN AIRCRAFT AT VERY LOW ALTI-TUDE, ON THE DECK

HIGHBALL ONE OF TWO TYPES OF"BOUNCING BOMBS" DESIGNED BY SCIEN-TIST/ BOFFIN DR.BARNES WALLIS

HIGH TEA AN EARLY EVENING ORLATE AFTERNOON MEAL THAT INCLUDES A HOT DISH (EGGS,SAUSAGES AND/OR BAKED BEANS WITH TEA)

HIT THE DECK DIVE AN AIRCRAFT TOTREETOP HEIGHT FOR VARIOUS EMERGENCY REASONS

HIT THE TAPS ADVANCE THE THROT-TLE IN AN AIRCRAFT

HOIST A CRANE/ HAVE THE RESPONSI-HOLD THE CAN BILITY FOR SOME-

THING

HOOCHING PUB CRAWLING, VISIT-ING VARIOUS BARS

HOOD AN RAF FIGHTER AIR-CRAFT COCKPIT CANOPY

HORIZONTAL TAKE A REST, SLEEPREFRESHMENT

HOT UP PREPARE FOR A MAXI-MUM EFFORTBOMBER MISSION

HUFF DUFF HIGH FREQUENCYRADIO DIRECTION FINDING EQUIPMENT

HURRIES/HURRI'S/ NICKNAME FOR AN RAF HURRY BACKS WWII HAWKER HURRI-

CANE FIGHTER AIR-CRAFT

ICE CREAM CONE AN EASY MISSIONAGAINST AN ENEMY TARGET

IN A FLAT SPIN RATTLED/CONFUSED

IN DOCK IN SICK QUARTERS ORIN A HOSPITAL

INSTRUMENT BASHER AN AIRCRAFT INSTRU-MENT MECHANIC

IN THE BAG BECAME A PRISONEROF WAR

IN THE CART IN TROUBLE

IN THE DRINK DITCH AN AIRCRAFT INOR BAIL OUT OVER WATER/SEA/OCEAN

IRONMONGER A HARDWARE STORE

IRONS RAF ISSUED METAL EATING UTENSILS(KNIFE,FORK,SPOON,MUG)

IRVIN SHEEPSKIN A HEAVY DUTY JACKETJACKET WORN BY RAF AIR-

CREW SIMILAR TO USAF B-3 JACKET

JACKET POTATO A BAKED POTATO

JAKE EVERYTHING IS OK OR WELL

JANKERS DISCIPLINARY PUNISH-MENT METED OUT BY A ROYAL AIR FORCE PROVOST MARSHAL OR SENIOR RAF OFFI-CER/SENIOR NON-COM-MISSIONED OFFICER

JERRY A GERMAN MILITARYPERSON

JINKING WEAVING AND TWIST-ING AN AIRCRAFT ALONG COURSE TO AVOID AN ENEMY AIR-CRAFT ATTACKING FROM THE REAR OR TO AVOID ENEMY ANTIAIR-CRAFT FIRE BY VARY-ING AIRCRAFT'S ALTI-TUDE



DEFINITION


DEFINITION

JOE A SECRET AGENTDROPPED FROM AN ALLIED AIRCRAFT OVER ENEMY OCCU-PIED TERRITORY

JOE JOB PUNISHMENT FOR "SWINGING THE LEAD," MALINGERING—USU-ALLY CLEANING LATRINES, POLICING THE AREA

JOINT A ROAST OF BEEF, LEGOF LAMB, OR LOIN OF PORK

JUDDER A VIOLENT SHAKE ORLOUD NOISE IN AN AIR-CRAFT

JUG A GUARDROOM, A DETENTION ROOM

KERB THE CURB OR GUT-TER ON A STREET

KICKERS RAF AIRCREW INBOMBER AIRCRAFT THAT KICKED OUT BUNDLES OF FOOD,AMMUNITION, ETC.FROM AIRCRAFT IN SUPPORT OF PARTI-SANS FIGHTING GER-MAN TROOPS IN OCCUPIED COUNTRIES

KIP A SHORT NAP, SNOOZE

KIPPER KITE A BRITISH COASTAL COMMAND AIRCRAFT

KITE A COMMON TERM FOR ANY AIRCRAFT

KITE GUARD AN ARMED PERSONGUARDING AN AIR-CRAFT

KIWIS NICKNAME FOR NEW ZEALAND MILITARY PERSONNEL

KNACKERED FAILED, STOPPED—AS AN AIRCRAFT ENGINE DUE TO MECHANICAL FAILURE, ICING OR ENEMY ACTION

KNOWS HIS ONIONS COMPETENT, ABLE

KRAUT A NICKNAME FOR AGERMAN PERSON

KRIEGIE SHORT FOR KRIEGSGE-GANGER, AN ALLIED PRISONER OF WAR IN A GERMAN CAMP

LADDER IN A RUN IN A LADY’SONE’S HOSE STOCKING

LAID ON A FLIGHT SCHEDULED A MIS-SION/FLIGHT

LANC NICKNAME FOR AN RAF WWII AVRO LANCASTERFOUR –ENGINED HEAVY BOMBER

LANDING CIRCUIT THE AIR TRAFFIC PAT-TERN AROUND AN AIR-FIELD

LAST POST THE BUGLE CALL OFTAPS

LET, TO TO RENT AN APART-MENT, ROOMS OR HOUSE

LIE DOWN A NAP, A SNOOZE

LIE IN SLEEP IN LATE

LIFT AN ELEVATOR IN A BUILDING

LINE SHOOT BRAGGING, BOASTING,EXAGGERATING

LITTLE NEAR A BIT RACY, RISQUÉTHE KNUCKLE OR BAWDY

LMF LACK OF MORAL FIBER,COWARDICE IN THE FACE OF THE ENEMY

LOBBING IN AN EMERGENCY ORUNEXPECTED LAND-ING

LOLLEY MONEY, CASH

LOO A LAVATORY/TOILET

LOOKSEE AERIAL RECONNAIS-SANCE

LOOSEOFF TEST FIRE AIRCRAFT’ GUN

LORRY A TRUCK

LOSE YOUR WOOL LOSE YOUR COOL, BE UPSET

LOW WRACK LOW CLOUD



DEFINITION


DEFINITION


The readers of Air Power History know theirairplanes. Once again, readers correctly identi-fied last issue’s “What Is It?” flying machine.Thirty-three readers sent in postcards with theright answer. Only one reader flunked.

The photo in our last issue depicted the onlysurviving Douglas B-18B Bolo bomber, restoredat the Pima Air and Space Museum in Tucson,Arizona, in 1996. The B-18B was the radar-equipped anti-submarine version of the twin-engined bomber based on the DC-2 transport.The Pima aircraft (38-593) hunted German U-boats and later hauled cargo in 1942-44 with the4th Antisubmarine Squadron of the CaribbeanWing of Air Transport Command.

The Pima B-18B was built as a B-18A byDouglas in Santa Monica, Calif., in 1935 for $80,479.72. In 1942, 122 B-18As were modifiedwith SCR-5180A radar and MAD (magneticanomaly detection gear) for the sub-huntingrole.

On 7 July 1942, a B-18B from the 396th BombSquadron became the first Army Air Forces air-craft to sink a German submarine (U-701) in theAtlantic near Cherry Point, N. C. Two other B-18Bs were credited with sinking U-boats.

Our “History Mystery” winner is GeorgeBowman of Norwich, Connecticut. Thanks to allreaders who joined in our “name the plane” exer-cise.

Once again, we challenge our ever-astute readers.See if you can identify this month’s “mystery” air-craft. But remember please, postcards only.

The rules, once again:1. Submit your entry on a postcard. Mail the

postcard to Robert F. Dorr, 3411 Valewood Drive,Oakton VA 22124.

2. Correctly identify the aircraft shown here.Also include your address and telephone number,including area code. If you have access to e-mail,include your electronic screen name.

3. A winner will be chosen at random from thepostcards with the correct answer. The winner willreceive a recently-published aviation book as aprize.

This feature needs your help. In that attic orbasement, you have a photo of a rare or little-

known aircraft. Does anyone have color slides?Send your pictures or slides for possible use as“History Mystery” puzzlers. We will return them.

ThisIssue’sMysteryPlane

History Mystery by Robert F. Dorr


The Cold War and Beyond: Chronologyof the United States Air Force, 1947-1997. By Frederick J. Shaw, Jr., and TimothyWarnock. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air ForceHistory and Museums Program in associa-tion with the Air University Press, 1997.Photograps. Pp. 163. $19.00 PaperbackISBN: 0-16- 049145-2 Gov’t Doc Call No. D301.82/7:C 67

The USAF in Korea: A Chronology,1950-1953. By A. Timothy Warnock, Ed.Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air Force History andMuseums Program in association with theAir University Press, 2000. Photographs.Glossary. Pp. 105. $7.00 Paperback ISBN: 0-16-050410-4 Gov’t Doc Call No. D 301.82/7:K84/5

These paperback commemorative edi-tions were issued on the fiftieth anniver-saries of two important events in Americanmilitary history—that of the establishmentof the United States Air Force (the sameyear that the Cold War is generally acknowl-edged to have started), and the outbreak ofthe Korean War. Both reference tools werecompiled at the USAF Historical ResearchAgency (AFHRA), located at Maxwell AirForce Base (AFB), Alabama, (www.au.af.mil/au/afhra/). The coverage of the ColdWar chronology extends from the date theservice was established on September 18,1947, to the rollout of the new Lockheed-Martin-Boeing F-22 Raptor fighter jet, onApril 9, 1997. The book is first divided intoten-year chunks, then further subdivided byyear. The individual entries contain a lot ofdetails about combat, deployment, and test-ing operations, important people, organiza-tional changes, and equipment used. Muchmore was going on with the Air Force thanjust combat in Korea, Southeast Asia, andthe Persian Gulf, so there are many entrieson aircraft development and space opera-tions. There is no glossary, which would havebeen helpful for those trying to decipher offi-cial acronyms and abbreviations. This workcomplements Winged Shield,Winged Sword:A History of the USAF, ed. By Bernard C.Nalty (2 vols.; Washington, D.C.: U.S. AirForce History and Museums Program, 1997and Michael Robert Terry’s HistoricalDictionary of the United States Air Force andIts Antecedents (Historical Dictionary of War,Revolution, and Civil Unrest, no. 11)Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 1999. TheCold War chronology was reprinted in 1998by the DIANE Publishing Company andsells for $35.00!

Warnock’s book on the Korean Warmight be considered a subset of the titlereviewed above, but, as one would expect,with a lot more details. (The Cold Warchronology only allocates six pages to theKorean War.) The coverage in The USAF inKorea extends from June 25, 1950 (whenNorth Korea attacked) to July 27, 1953(when the armistice was signed). This

reviewer expected to find some entries forthe immediate pre- and post-war periods,such as USAF deployments, projections, andplans for Korea and Asia. Each monthbegins with an overview of operations forthat month. The entries that follow includeinformation about the number of sortiesflown, number and types of planes involved,losses and victories, important names, tar-gets, amount of bombs dropped, etc. Thosenot familiar with this air war may be sur-prised at the aerial battles that resulted inseemingly small losses for the large numberof planes involved from both sides. There is aglossary of important terms at the end of thebook. For an official history of the war onecan consult Robert Frank Futrell’s TheUnited States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air ForceHistory, 1981, reprinted 1991). The USAFKorean War web site can be found at:www.au.af.mil/au/afhra/wwwroot/kore-an_war/korean_war.html/.

This chronology can also be found onlineat: www.au.af.mil/au/afhra/wwwroot/korean_war/korean_war_chronology/kwc_contents.html/. A very specialized com-plement to these sources is Roger D. Launius’Significant Airlift Events of the KoreanConflict, 1950-1953: A Brief Chronology(Military Airlift Command Historical OfficeSpecial Study) Scott AFB, Ill.: Military AirliftCommand, Office of History, 1990. One canalso consult the Korean War Almanac, byHarry G. Summers, Jr. (N.Y.: Facts on File,1990).

Some maps, organizational charts,indexes, and bibliographies would haveimproved the usefulness of both books, espe-cially the chronology on the Korean War. Butthese are not critical points at all. The manyphotographs in both titles are interesting,and ones not usually seen in commercialproducts. Government documents call num-bers, also known as Superintendent ofDocuments (SuDocs) call numbers, wereincluded in the bibliographic citations at thebeginning of this review in case readerswant to find these items in the separate fed-eral depository documents collection thatare housed in many academic and large pub-lic libraries.The AFHRA has produced manytitles that are very useful for the study ofUSAF history. They are real bargains, espe-cially when one considers the prices of com-mercial publishers. These two governmentpublications are suitable for personal collec-tions as well as the reference or circulatingcollections of public, academic, and interest-ed special libraries.

Daniel K. Blewett, Reference Librarian, TheCollege of DuPage Library, Glen Ellyn,Illinois

Soldier and Warrior: French AttitudesToward the Army and War on the Eve of

the First World War. By H. L. Wesseling..trans. Arnold J. Pomerans (Westport, Ct:Greenwood Press, 2000).

At first glance, an unrevised Englishtranslation of a book originally published in1969 may seem out of step with current his-toriography. Fortunately, H. L. Wesseling’sSoldier and Warrior proves the exception tothis perception. Wesseling traces the evolu-tion of French attitudes toward war and theArmy from the early years of the ThirdRepublic through the tumultuous road tothe First World War.

This is not a conventional military histo-ry; for studies that contain a more martialflavor see Douglas Porch’s excellent TheMarch to the Marne: The French Army, 1871-1914 or David B. Ralston’s somewhat dated,but still relevant, The Army of the Republic:The Place of the Military in the PoliticalEvolution of France, 1871-1914. Wesselingwrites a cultural history that draws heavilyon popular and official sources. Throughoutthis edition, the translator provides originalFrench quotations, where appropriate, fol-lowed by parenthetical English transla-tions—a considerate aid to those who lackproficiency with the language. L’Echo deParis, the Revue Hebdomadaire, the worksof Maurras, Psichari, Péguy, Marshal Foch,and Marshal Lyautey provide raw materialsfrom which the author weaves a complexdescription of French attitudes that departsfrom interpretations that attribute thesource of the Great War to the French desireto avenge the defeat of 1870-1871.The resultis an analytical narrative that shows cyclesof animosity, ambivalence, and infatuationwith war and military culture. Unfor-tunately for Frenchmen, the last wave ofinfatuation occurred as political tensionsflared on the eve of the Great War.

Wesseling focuses on the relationshipbetween civil society and standing militaryforces. At times, the military represented asymbolic unifying force for the ThirdRepublic. When the Army served this func-tion, themes of patriotism, nationalism, andcivic duty characterized the national debate.When the general opinion of French societydid not favor the Army, Wesseling concludesthat “the love of the army was the monopolyof one political wing only, the Right, and onedistinct ideology, that of nationalism andmilitarism. From its position as a symbol ofnational unity the army became a bone ofpolitical party contention” (p. 2). Workingfrom this broad characterization of the Armyas a tool of the Right, Wesseling organizeshis work thematically around subjects asdiverse as intellectual trends, internationalcrises, military reform, and images of war.This thematic approach allows author andreader to flow with the changing currents ofsocio-cultural, political, and intellectual atti-tudes toward the cataclysm that engulfedEurope in 1914.

Wesseling identifies a shift in intellectu-

Book Reviews

��


al attitudes as the beginning of the marchtoward war. Boulanger’s bid for power com-bined with the Dreyfus Affair and a generalloss of respect for university learningpushed a generation of Frenchmen to aban-don rationality in favor of “the qualities ofservice, virility, and power” (p. 40). Accordingto Wesseling, young men sought to redeemthe nation through vigorous endeavors—sports and colonialism. This shift in intellec-tual values set the stage for the now famousdoctrines of élan vital and offensive à out-rance. It was not that Frenchmen soughtwar, but that the intellectual climate con-vinced them that war had become inevi-table.

The chain of international crises thatbegan with the Morocco crisis in 1905 rein-forced intellectual trends that emphasizedwar as an inevitable, if not desirable, methodof resolving international tensions whilesimultaneously restoring French greatness.From Morocco to Tangier to Agadir, Frenchforeign policy experts, intellectuals, and pri-vate citizens focused their attention on thegrowing competition with Germany. Wesse-ling draws upon Eugen Weber’s The Nation-alist Revival in France to help frame his dis-cussion of how a wide-ranging series ofevents reinforced belligerent attitudesamong metropolitan citizens. Wesselingobserves, “Even those who rejected warunreservedly seemed to have resigned them-selves to its inevitability. People bowed tothe inescapable and prepared for it as bestthey could” (p. 96).The transformation of for-eign policy objectives from pacifism andinternationalism toward nationalism fitwith the intellectual mood that emphasizedirrationality and valor. This combinationproduced a resurgence of admiration andsupport for the Army. Offensive doctrinesgained precedence over defensive strategies,rapid mobilization that supported preemp-tive strikes replaced political restraint, andthe expansion of the ranks with the additionof a three-year conscript law enhanced Armynumbers and prestige.

Between 1870 and 1914, the Army’s rep-utation traveled on waves of favor and disfa-vor. Wesseling points to a rather consistentideal, however, that portrayed the Army as aschool for refining patriotism and nationalvirtue. Lyautey’s writings on the role of theofficer captured the essence of this phenom-enon. “That the army had a subsidiary socialand educational task was an idea that hadessentially arisen because there were noimmediate prospects of military action. Butwhen the dangers became more imminent,the purely military tasks came into theirown” (p. 119). But the Army also became ahaven for those who harbored a certain ide-alistic vision of French nationalism. Here,Wesseling draws heavily upon ErnestPsichari’s life and works to make his argu-ment. Psichari’s Catholicism, his search forheroic fulfillment, his accounts of militaryadventure in the colonies, and his ultimate

fall in the Battle of the Frontiers seemed tocapture the essence and the imagination of ageneration that marched bravely, enthusias-tically to their deaths in 1914.

By the end of the first decade of thetwentieth century, the French socio-culturalclimate appeared poised for a headlongcharge into war. Wesseling argues that thetransformation of the images and expecta-tions of war formed the last element in theprocess that plunged the nation into theabyss of the trenches. He proposes that “Theimage of war had lost the impact of personalexperience or direct witness. It is in thislight, and this light alone, that we can beginto appreciate the optimism and enthusiasmwith which people could say of a future war,‘As a matter of fact, we look forward to it’” (p.154). Success and conspicuous heroism incolonial campaigns—typified by Psichari’sand Lyautey’s romantic descriptions of colo-nial military life—coupled with a lack ofexperience with war’s suffering and deathamong metropolitan citizens produced thisattitudinal shift.

Soldier and Warrior reveals the complexcurrents in French society that propelled thenation into World War I. The subtle evolu-tion of attitudes from anti-militarism/anti-war to a full embrace of war as a cleansing,rejuvenating experience should give cause topause and examine current attitudes towardthe relationship between war and society.Read this important book with a focus on thepast to expand understanding of French cul-ture, with a focus on the present to detectsimilar tendencies in contemporary society,and with a focus on the future to guardagainst losing an appreciation for the hor-rors of war.

Anthony C. Cain, Air Command and StaffCollege, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

Petals of Fire. By Herb Alf. Roseburg, Ore.:Millennium Memorial Trust, Inc. 2000. Pp.539. $45.00 ISBN: 0-967-81400-6.www.petalsoffire.com.

Herb Alf ’s Petals of Fire is an autobio-graphical novel of the combat and prisonerof war (POW) experiences of a B–17 crew ofthe Eighth Air Force’s 100th Bomb Group.The novel grew from scraps of a secret jour-nal, some written on both sides of toiletpaper, that Alf maintained as a POW. Whileserving as a twenty-three-year-old bomberpilot, he was shot down during his nine-teenth mission, on April 23, 1944, and spentthe next year in captivity. The work reflectsnot only this intense experience, but gainsinsight from the author’s maturation andpostwar experiences. After a brief stint inmilitary intelligence working with Germanrocket scientists, Alf earned a doctorate inpsychology, and then studied screenwritingat UCLA. He worked as a screenwriter and

cameraman in Hollywood. Along the way hehas also worked with creative children andcompleted a book on aging in America. Hedoes not intend to go quietly into the night.

Alf ’s battle descriptions vividly andwith first-hand accuracy convey the actionand terror of bomber crews in combat andduring their shoot down and capture. Like-wise, his depiction of survival in a GermanPOW camp, or Luftstalag, compares favor-ably to those of Donald Westheimer in Songof the Young Sentry and the classic Stalag17. Alf ’s POW characterizations approachthe dark spirit portrayed in James Clavell’sKing Rat. His airmen, hoard and bribe theircompatriots for favors. Senior POWs abusetheir positions. The mid-winter march inwhich the Germans evacuated their Alliedprisoners to the west ahead of the RedArmy’s offensive is a scene no reader willforget. The portions of the novel based onthe author’s personal experience are grip-ping and well done. The author hews to thefacts with no exaggeration.

The sections of the work based on sec-ond-hand knowledge, such as those dealingwith the American air force high commandand the Anglo-American policies concerningarea or city bombing do not measure up tothe rest of the novel. Alf ’s attempts to con-vey the Americans’ participation in the pur-poseful bombing of German cities, which heexperienced both as a perpetrator and vic-tim, reveals, I believe unintentionally, thedeeply conflicting emotions such strikesevoked in air crew and in the service atlarge. Unlike RAF Bomber Command, whohad an officially sanctioned governmentdirective authorizing area raids and a com-mander-in-chief, Bomber Harris, who rel-ished them, the American Army Air Forcesin Europe approached area bombing withqualms. Whenever the level of such raidsseemed to become too high, GeneralsArnold, Spaatz, Doolittle, or officers in theirheadquarters would protest.

An example of Petals of Fire’s uneven-ness is its treatment of one of its main char-acters, Colonel Dean Raymond, a friend ofBilly Mitchell and inspector general sentout by Arnold to England. In England, as hetalks to the generals, spouts the air forcecredo of precision bombing and indepen-dence, and comes across as a cardboardcharacter. Once he is shot down he is trans-formed from a prig to an officer who learnsand internalizes the need to look after hismen.

Fortunately, Alf spends most of thenovel following his airmen. In doing so hepresents a war story that rings true. I rec-ommend it to participants in, or students of,the bomber offensive. It may raise painfulimages, but those are the ones we shouldnot allow ourselves to forget.

Richard G. Davis, Air Force HistorySupport Office, Washington, D.C.

��

��


Air Power at the Battlefront: AlliedClose Air Support in Europe 1943-45. ByIan Gooderson. London and Portland, Ore.:Frank Cass Publishers, 1998. Pp. 282.$24.50 Paperback. ISBN: 0-714-64211-8.

Here is a much needed book that exam-ines an aspect of air power that is often over-looked: tactical air support in World War II.Rather than giving a chronological or cam-paign account, Gooderson analyzes the sys-tems, weapons, and techniques of tacticalaviation as well as comparing the close sup-port, armed reconnaissance, and artilleryroles. In many respects Gooderson’s bookbrings to light numerous important observa-tions, however, his conclusions do not followfrom the material he presents, and seem tohave been made a priori. His main con-tention is that close air support was not vitalto the war effort and essentially wastedeffort.

To support his thesis Gooderson reliesheavily upon Operational Research (OR),which he defines as “a scientific approach tothe problems of determining the likelyeffects of weapons and tactics and of decid-ing between varying courses of action.” TheOR material was gathered by OperationalResearch Sections (ORS), which accompa-

nied the 21st Army Group and 2d TacticalAir Force in Northwest Europe. The ORSstudied the effects of bomb and rocketattacks, distinguished between damage fromair strikes and ground weapons, and hadaccess to some battlefields like those atMortain, Falaise, and parts of the Ardennesalmost immediately after the conflict movedeastward. However, the ORS often actedwithout clear orders or procedures and didnot always have an early chance to scour thebattleground. Gooderson also points out thatthe Germans routinely carried their deadback for burial, but failed to consider thereclamation of damaged or destroyed vehi-cles. The OR material and Gooderson’sEnglish origin weight his study towards theBritish experience, and Northwest Europeover the Italian Campaign.

Air Power at the Battlefront raises sever-al good points on the limitations and capa-bilities of close air support. The OR materialcalls into question the claims made by pilotsengaged in ground attack. In most cases evi-dence of vehicles damaged or destroyed fromthe air fell well short of that claimed. Thisshould come as no surprise given the inflat-ed claims from air combat, but is well worthkeeping in mind. Gooderson also showedthat during World War II the accuracy of

aerial weapons, both rockets and bombs, wasvery limited. Statistics gleaned from the ORmaterial show that large numbers of sortieswere necessary to hit point targets even aslarge as a tank. The author concludes fromthis that the destructive effect of air attackswas much lower than previously thought,and that it was the morale effect that reallyprovided most of the impact on the enemy.This is something that American air theo-rists knew as early as World War I, and stat-ed repeatedly during the interwar period,but it is still a good point that many com-manders may have forgotten during WorldWar II. Finally, Gooderson devotes an entirechapter to the limitations on the use ofstrategic forces for close support. This sub-ject has been covered before and Goodersoncorrectly points out the dubious value ofusing heavy bombers in frontline support,but adds little new information.

Gooderson does reveal several advan-tages to close air support. It could engagetargets closer to armored units thanartillery, and in fact, his statistics show thatdespite the inaccuracy of air weapons, theywere still more accurate than artillery fire.Other air support advantages over artilleryinclude the ability to keep pace with rapidadvances; faster response time to requests if

��

�� !! ""��#��$� !��#��$� !

%%%

%%%��

��

&'��(�)&�''��'*�+�*��,��'�)

� "��')'��,��**�*��,��-,�.�'�//0�� 1��(,�*�*2

� �**�,��3*4 &�,5��'3*4��*��'3* +�)'��

��'��,�� 6'�)'��* �,��)�

�� !��"#��

7 � � � � ��,�'��, , ��**'��*

(��8-��,5%��5��5�'*��*��' ��*��)��*5��48'��**��,��-�

� 9��,'��'�'��)��:8�'��,��

� ��.��4��:�1��8'�)'��*�5��8��

!7"�,5�')��-��'*,5��

��

��$#

�� %

$&&$%'##$%


using the CABRANK system of keeping air-craft overhead; a heavier weight of ordnancedelivered in a shorter period of time that ledto quicker and longer neutralization ofenemy targets; and finally the TIMOTHYtechnique involving aircraft striking aheadof advancing troops proved more responsivethan rolling barrages.

Given the advantages of air support onemay wonder how Gooderson reached hisconclusion that it was wasted effort. As men-tioned earlier, he goes to great lengths toshow that the morale effects of air supportwere much more pronounced than thedestructive effects. The ORS data indicatedthat the actual elimination of tanks, guns, orenemy strong points was very difficult due tothe lack of accuracy. In many cases it wasthe shock and disorientation from the airweapons’ concussive force, or fear of repeat-ed strafing, that led to neutralization of thetargets attacked. However, this effect woreoff after a period of time depending on thequality of the troops and the weight of theattack. If the ground forces did not follow upthe air attack with an assault of their own,or if they were somehow delayed, the neu-tralization effect would have been overcomeand the enemy ready to resist any advance.Therefore, in any instance that the ground

forces failed to take advantage of the airstrikes, the effort was mostly wasted.

Gooderson also critiques the value of theCABRANK technique. To be successful,CABRANK required aircraft to be constant-ly over the advancing armored column,ready to strike targets whenever called. Theproblem that he identified with this systemis that planes needed to report on stationevery hour in order for a flight to always beready to respond to requests. Unless largenumbers of fighter-bombers are available,this system deprives other sectors, or mis-sions, of badly needed aircraft. Becauseother missions maybe more profitable,CABRANK is either a waste of air assets ora luxury that couldn’t be sustained.

Gooderson’s last objection to close airsupport comes from comparison to other airforce missions which he regards as morevital. Obviously constant diversion of heavybombers from their strategic mission wouldlead to a lessening of their campaign, andwould be a misuse of air units. In the case offighter-bombers he believes that the armedreconnaissance mission was more vital andcould be compromised by too much air sup-port. The advantages of armed recce mis-sions included limiting enemy freedom ofmovement and ability to deploy reserves,

slowing down of enemy reinforcements tothe sector being attacked, and a generalinterdiction of supplies. He states that evensorties where planes did not encounter anyenemy targets were not wasted effortbecause their presence helped instill in theenemy mind the fear of omnipresent alliedaircraft, further restricting his movement.

Gooderson’s analysis contains severalflaws, contradicting some of the evidence hepresents. Although he acknowledges theutility of air support in unusual cases, likethe German counter-attack at Mortain, hegives several other examples where unitswith air support advanced faster and withfewer casualties than units without suchsupport. His analysis of friendly fire casual-ties showed that during offensive operationswhen the front was moving fighter-bomberson armed recce were more likely to bombfriendly ground forces than those on closesupport missions. Losses from anti-aircraftfire were much higher on armed recce mis-sions because the targets were easier toanticipate and could be protected by heavierconcentrations of flak. In contrast, the wide-ly dispersed frontline units could not put upa similar amount defensive fire, actuallymaking close air support a safer mission.Gooderson also fails to fully take into

AU Press


account the interconnectedness of the twoair efforts. Many times aircraft on CAB-RANK or other air support missions wouldbe diverted to armed recce, and vice versa.The diversion of aircraft from one mission tothe other enhanced the flexibility withwhich the fighter bombers were used andallowed for their employment at the mostvital point at any particular time. Thesefacts combined with the advantages of airsupport that Gooderson brings out seem torefute his charge that it was not vital and awasted effort.

On the whole, Air Power at the Battle-front is a worthwhile book containing a greatdeal of useful information along with someflawed conclusions. That rear area targetspresented more profitable targets is some-thing that most of the interwar manuals andtheorists had stated. However, to deny theutility of air support, especially given thesurplus of aircraft that existed during thecampaign in Northwest Europe, seems back-wards. Air power’s greatest asset is its flexi-bility; the ability to intervene at the mostcritical junction for the largest impact. Todeny that air support can be vital seems todeny the validity of combined arms theory.The combination of the various ground armsand tactical air missions create a favorablesituation for the offensive and air supportcan allow a sustained offensive by minimiz-ing casualties and maintaining the offensivemomentum, something Gooderson toucheson when looks at the British XXX Corps dur-ing Operation Market-Garden. Perhaps themost important point to Gooderson’s book isthe reaffirmation that any arm’s effort canbe wasted if its limitations are not under-stood and it is not coordinated with the restof the forces available.

Garner Johnson, is a Ph.D. student at theUniversity of Nebraska in Lincoln currentlyworking on his dissertation on World War IIclose air support in the Pacific.

Angels Zero: P–47 Close Air Support inEurope. By Robert V. Brulle. Washington,D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2000.Photographs. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp.164. $29.95 ISBN 1-56098-374-4

The two most dangerous missions of theArmy Air Forces during World War II in theEuropean theater were unescorted strategicbombing and close air support (CAS). Thisbook, details the personal experiences of aP–47 pilot, assigned to the 366th FighterGroup, who flew the “hairy and scary” CASmission over French and German battle-fields from D-Day to VE Day. During virtu-ally every mission flown by the author andhis fellow pilots, their aircraft routinelyreceived some damage and, all too often, thewounding or loss of a pilot. From June 1944

to April 1945, Brulle’s unit had 135 aircraftshot down and 95 pilots lost—24 becamePOWs and 71 were killed in action. Statis-tically, the group had an average monthlyloss of seven aircraft and five pilots for eachof the nineteen months it was in combat. Anadditional 26 pilots were wounded duringthis time. This casualty rate is grim testimo-ny of the ferocious combat environment ofthe pilots who flew—and fly—the CAS mis-sion. More than 45 years later, Coalitionpilots flying at low altitudes duringOperation Desert Storm found themselvesin a similar position vulnerable to enemyground fire (Iraqi radar-controlled antiair-craft artillery and shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles) that forced them to fly higher atmedium and high altitudes.

Air Force Document Doctrine (AFDD) 1,Air Force Basic Doctrine, defines close airsupport (CAS) as “air operations againstenemy targets in close proximity to friendlyforces.” It involves the application of airpower against enemy ground forces, menand vehicles, near or at the frontlines of bat-tle to protect friendly ground forces, assistthem in stopping enemy advances, and helppave the way for the advance of friendlyground forces. This formal definition, howev-er, does not capture the teeth-shatteringreality of antiaircraft artillery shells explod-ing near the cockpit, machine gun bulletsripping through the wings, shrapnel fromexploding munitions tearing into the under-belly of a low-flying aircraft, or watching abuddy’s aircraft spiral into the ground withtoo few precious seconds remaining to hopefor a parachute. As Brulle mentions, General“Jimmy” Doolittle, commander of the EighthAir Force in England, considered fighter-bombing to be so hazardous that he aban-doned the practice except in rare instances.Brulle translates this sterile definition fromthe doctrine document into the reality ofactual combat as he portrays his own dan-gerous world as one CAS pilot who dailywent “down to the deck” to help Americansoldiers advance against Hitler’s army onthe way to victory in Europe.

The author was a young twenty-year oldwhen he applied for flying training in 1943.He was accepted and ultimately received anassignment to fly a P–47 Thunderbolt fromright after D-Day to VE Day with the 366thFighter Group in Europe. In the first twochapters, Brulle provides the reader with agood look at the various stages of flighttraining during the war that ultimately wonhim his wings. In the remaining nine chap-ters, he covers his personal wartime experi-ences, going into combat right after D-Day inwestern France and later flying from vari-ous airfields in liberated France as the Armyadvanced and the frontlines moved evercloser to Germany. He then records his expe-riences flying CAS and interdiction missionsduring the difficult battles of the HuertgenForest and the Ardennes in late 1944. AsBrulle recounts his own personal experi-ences in these battles, based on a diary he

kept, he also provides complementary his-torical background that places these experi-ences into the “bigger picture.”

What further makes Brulle’s memoirsinteresting and personal is that he and hisparents had emigrated from Belgium to theUnited States in 1929 and he still had rela-tives in what was, in mid-1944, Germanoccupied territory. In addition to the routinedangers of flying CAS missions, he had toworry about being shot down and capturedby the retreating Germans. If he had been,the Germans might have retaliated againsthis hometown and relatives. He once askedhis commander what should he do, and hiscommander gave him the best advice hecould: “Don’t get shot down.” When hishometown was finally liberated, Brulle hadseveral opportunities to visit his relatives.On his first visit, they could not believe thatthe six-year old youngster who had gone tothe United States so many years before wasnow an American officer flying a modernfighter. Brulle also took several opportuni-ties to do “flyovers” of his hometown as hereturned to his home base from combat mis-sions in late 1944 and early 1945.

Brulle also provides an excellent accountof the P–47 as one of World War II’s mostfamous aircraft and one of the most pro-duced aircraft by the United States duringthe war. The P–47 Thunderbolt was affec-tionately called the “Jug” for juggernautbecause of its rugged build and the amountof damage it could take. It is often associat-ed with the fighter escort role that helped,along with the P–51 Mustang, to curtail thefrightful losses of bombers and crews onlong-range daylight bombing raids overGermany. The P–47 was also a mainstay ofthe CAS and interdiction missions in theEuropean theater. Brulle, as well as otherpilots who flew the “Jug,” were amazed andgrateful for the amount of damage the P–47could take and still bring them back theirbases in one piece. Rare was the mission inwhich Brulle’s aircraft did not suffer somedamage caused by German ground fire from“flak wagons,” special vehicles equippedwith quad-antiaircraft guns that oftenaccompanied German military convoys,German soldiers firing upward at theattacking P–47s, or shrapnel from explodingammunition trucks recently attacked by theP–47s. The author, who became an aeronau-tical engineer and went work for McDonnellAircraft Company after the war, also ablyprovides information about the flying char-acteristics of the P–47, especially in combat.

The only real criticism of Angels Zero isa comment that the author makes in thePreface and Acknowledgements. He statesthe P–47 “performed [as a high-altitudeescort fighter] admirably during the greatair battles over Germany in 1943. Americanpilots flying the P–47 challenged the best ofthe Luftwaffe fighter force...and forced themto withdraw.” In 1943 the P–47s could escortthe American bombers no further thanFrance and had to turn back for lack of

��


range. Furthermore, long-range fighterescorts of any type did not appear in sub-stantial numbers until late 1943, and, as aresult, the “great air battles” of which Brullewrites did not take place until early 1944,especially after “Big Week” in February1944. By early 1944, the P–47s wereequipped with drop tanks to escort thebombers to Germany and would achieve agood record against the Luftwaffe fighters.Even then, most of the fighter groups usedfor to escort the bombers on raids overGermany flew the P–51 Mustang. I wonderif the author made this statement to some-how inflate the image of the P–47 againstthat of the P–51, something that is unneces-sary. The pilots, like Brulle, flying the P–47in the CAS and interdiction roles deservetheir own special credit in the defeat ofGermany as the P–51 escorts and certainlyexperienced their share of danger and lossesin these, perhaps less glamorous, but cer-tainly equally important missions.

Dr. Robert B. Kane, a lieutenant colonel inthe USAF, is currently assigned to theNonresident Studies Directorate, Air WarCollege, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

Stars in Khaki: Movie Actors in theArmy and the Air Services. By James E.Wise, Jr. and Paul W. Wilderson III.Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000.Photographs. Appendices. Bibliography.Index. Pp. x, 241. $24.95 ISBN: 1-55750-958-1

Stars in Khaki is about the military ser-vice of celebrities, including some of thebiggest names in the movies, theater, andmusic world. Of course, one picks up thistype of book mainly out of curiosity, but Ifound it both enjoyable and informative todiscover that many of these celebrities wereregular people. The book tells about thestars’ roots, how they climbed their laddersof success, and their military achievements.This makes for an interesting trip downmemory lane.

I was most impressed to learn about anold time favorite, Art Carney. Although hewas very popular beginning in the 1950s, histalents were in bloom as early as the 1930s,when he was already a creative mimic andperforming one-man shows. Drafted into theU.S. Army in 1944, Carney soon was shippedto Normandy—where he arrived two weeksafter the invasion. Although there was stillmuch to do there, Carney initially went as areplacement with Pennsylvania’s KeystoneDivision, then he joined the 28th InfantryDivision at the Viere sector in France. InAugust 1944, his leg was severely wounded.After undergoing extensive surgery andmuch rehabilitation—which left him withone leg shorter than the other—Carneyhelped the other men at the rehabilitation

hospital. He was like their older brother orfather and would listen to their problems andtry to help them. He received a Purple Heartmedal and was discharged in April 1945. Thebook describes not only all of Art Carney’stravels during his stay in the Army, but alsomany of the campaigns involving his divisionand some of the men alongside whom hefought. It also provides some personal infor-mation regarding his marriage, family, andcareer moves up until the present.

Stars in Khaki mentions a great manyother interesting people, including CharltonHeston, Glenn Miller, Sammy Davis, Jr., ElvisPresley, Clark Gable, Tony Bennett, MarthaRaye, and James Garner, to mention just afew. An appendix contains an additional 100or so vignettes of celebrities who served; thereis also an appendix noting those “who couldnot serve.” There are many appropriate pho-tographs of the entertainers illustrating howthey boosted the troops’ morale.

The book is worth reading if only toappreciate how the authors created a combi-nation of nostalgia and a feeling of patriotism.We are able to see our idols as patriots whofought in a foxhole or aboard an airplane.

Shari Kerner Neufeld, Potomac, Maryland

Truman, MacArthur, and the KoreanWar. By Dennis D. Wainstock. Westport, Ct.:Greenwood Press, 1999. Notes. Photographs.Index. Pp. 186. $55.00. ISBN: 0-313-30837-3

As we commemorate the fiftiethanniversary of the beginning of the KoreanWar, we have been exposed to a variety ofnew works on every aspect of the conflict, beit diplomatic, strategic, tactical, the homefront or some other unique perspective.Wainstock describes his work as a generalhistory of the first year of the war, with aspecial focus on policymaking and the devel-oping conflicts between President Trumanand his theater commander, Gen. DouglasMacArthur.

It is appropriate to renew our interestand focus on this long forgotten war. Weshould honor the Allied combatants who sac-rificed so much in defeating an invasion bythe North Korean army and then by theChinese Communists a few months later. Itis ironic to remind ourselves that fifty yearslater, the United States still maintains aforce of over 37,000 troops in South Korea tofulfill its commitment. Recently, it has beenencouraging to read of the increased com-munications between both the North andSouth Koreans, with the hope of uniting thecountry peacefully in the years to come.

Wainstock, an associate professor of his-tory at Salem-Teikyo University in WestVirginia, has crafted a balanced, informativework that fulfills his purpose and is an easyread. He carefully discusses most of the

major issues from the early months of thewar, many of which are still relevant intoday’s world. For example, how should agreat power such as the United States con-front direct aggression in distant locales?Should it act unilaterally or in consonancewith a variety of international and regionalsecurity organizations? How should anAmerican president proceed to commitforces to combat overseas in a nuclear envi-ronment? What was the effect of nuclearweapons upon the policymakers inWashington? How should civilian authorityreact when its uniformed theater comman-der refuses to follow instructions or complywith directives? Should the war end whenthe initial objectives have been met or onlywith the total defeat of the adversary’sarmed forces? Wainstock discusses all ofthese issues and more, that force the readerto reflect on more contemporary events aswell.

The lingering debate about the closinghours of Desert Storm come to mind. We con-tinue to analyze the situation of whetherPresident George Bush acted too hastily toend the allied offensive in Iraq. In Korea,some of the same questions were raised, ofcourse in a very different context. After thebrilliant Inchon invasion of September 1950,the United Nations forces had to decidewhether to cross the 38th parallel and thenhow to proceed northward. Should the U.S.and all its allies have led the charge orshould only elements of the South Koreanarmy have proceeded to the Yalu River andeffected the unification of the country. In thecase of Korea, decisions were made in piecesthat eventually moved UN troops to the bor-der, resulting in the Chinese invasion andthe growing chasm between MacArthur andhis commander-in-chief. There were plenty ofmistakes and bad judgements to go around.Neither Truman nor MacArthur is spared.

Using English language sources, Wain-stock effectively weaves the growing policydifferences that eventually forced Truman torelieve MacArthur in April of 1951. Thegreat general often loomed larger than life,especially after the success of the Inchoninvasion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff seemedunable to handle this “Czar of the Pacific,”whose bottom line in military operationswas victory in the field and destruction ofthe enemy. The idea of limited goals, com-promise, and a negotiated peace was repug-nant to the proud warrior. Truman fearedwidening the war. He and his Europeanallies were anxious that the Chinese mightintervene and tie down the U.S. in an Asianconflict.

Only the maps in the book do not meetthe quality of the discourse. With the myriadof Korean locales and battle sites, the readeroften searches in vain on the scant mapsprovided. Regardless, this work is a solideffort that serves as an excellent review ofthe war and the two dominant personalitieswho shaped its outcome. It redefined the roleof the military commander vis a vis his civil-

��

��


ian authority in our democracy. It was a cost-ly lesson.

Peter Lane, University of North Texas

To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948-1949. By Roger G. Miller. (College Station:Texas A&M University Press, 2000. Maps.Illustrations. Notes. Index. Pp. x, 253.$34.95 ISBN: 0-890-96967-1

It has become almost trite to suggestthat the most unlikely of air power applica-tions—one that does not kill people andbreak things—proved decisive in defeatingthe Soviet Union in the first major contestof the Cold War, but it is true. The victoriousAllies divided Germany and Berlin into fourzones in 1945, one each for France, GreatBritain, the United States, and the SovietUnion. As Soviet-American relations deteri-orated during 1946 and 1947, the jointlyoccupied Berlin, located deep inside theSoviet zone, began to be the focus of con-frontation between the two ideologies. Whenthe Soviets blockaded the land routes toBerlin from the West the United States,Great Britain, and France responded with amassive airlift that both relieved a sur-rounded and starving city and avoideddirect conflict with the Red Army. It repre-sented a truly decisive use of what I like tocall “constructive air power.”

Roger G. Miller’s To Save a City seeks totell the story of this airlift, both its geopolit-ical and operational elements, in a sparevolume that represents an important up-top-date contribution to the subject. A civil-ian historian with the U.S. Air Force Historyand Museums Program, Miller draws onofficial Air Force files, recently declassifieddocuments from the National Archives,Soviet documents released since the end ofthe Cold War, and interviews with airliftveterans to reconstruct the story of thisimportant Cold War confrontation. Theresult is a compelling story well told. Whileother historians, including myself, have laidout the major parameters of this subjectbefore, this work is a worthy synthesis ofthose earlier studies and offers a depth ofstudy not previously offered.

Miller begins by discussing the politicalcrisis that led to the airlift. He quickly moveson to the hasty organization of the operationto resupply the city by a small number ofantiquated cargo airplanes. This soonevolved into an intricate bridge of moderntransports that flowed in and out of Berlinthrough narrow air corridors on a preciseschedule regardless of weather or other con-ditions. In the slang of the present, this24/7/365 operation delivered everything fromfood and medicine to coal and equipment to abesieged Berlin. It allowed airlift forces tohone to fine edge their doctrine and opera-tional procedures. It also brought to the

attention of postwar leaders the most signif-icant thinker the possibilities of airlift formilitary purposes, William H. Tunner, whocommanded the operation and eventuallywent on to lead the Military Air TransportService, now Air Mobility Command.

Miller observes that the Berlin Airliftserved to codify the flexibility of airlift as aninstrument of national will. If one believesthat the military exists as tools to help fur-ther the national defense and diplomaticobjectives of the nation they serve then themore flexible the tool the more useful itbecomes. Fighters and bombers are precisetools useful in only a limited number of cir-cumstances, essentially that involving com-bat. Military airlift can be used in every con-ceivable scenario across the spectrum ofconflict. Unlike virtually all other majortypes of Air Force aircraft, air transport hasan important mission in both the peacetimeand combat environments. In peace or war,military airlift sustains the American pres-ence abroad, projecting military resourcesin a crisis or assisting in humanitarian mis-sions. A unique national resource, theBerlin Airlift demonstrated its significance.

Roger Miller notes that American alliesaround the world regarded the airlift as atriumph of will, and it solidified the westernposition in the early Cold War era. The sizeand extent of the airlift, the requirement forclose coordination, and the resourcefulnessof allied leadership also impressed theSoviet Union. The airlift affected Air Forcedoctrine as well; demonstrating that virtu-ally any amount of cargo could be movedanywhere in the world with little concernfor geography or weather. It provided valu-able experience in operational techniques,air traffic control, and in aircraft mainte-nance and reconditioning. Finally, asalready stated, the Berlin Airlift proved forthe first time what has been confirmedmany times since: airlift is a more flexibletool for executing national policy thaneither fighter or bomber aircraft.

To Save a City is a useful resource for allwho seek to understand the development ofAir Force roles and missions, the impor-tance of strategic airlift in executing nation-al policy, and the significance of the technol-ogy of aviation in the Cold War. It is a bookthat should find its way onto the shelves ofmany historians of air power.

Dr. Roger D. Launius, NASA Chief Historian

Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein’sUnfinished War Against America. ByLaurie Mylroie. Washington, D.C.: The AEIPress, 2000. Photographs. Index. Pp. 321.$24.95 ISBN 0-84474127-2

Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein’sUnfinished War Against America is a “mustread” for the U.S. national security commu-

nity and especially for the new George W.Bush foreign policy and defense team. Overthe last eight years, Clinton Administrationnational security officials argued that loosenetworks of “non-state actors”—for exam-ple, extremists such as Islamic Jihad andOsama bin Laden—were responsible forviolent attacks on Americans. LaurieMylroie, an expert in Middle Eastern poli-tics, societies, and culture, and publisher ofthe on-line newsletter Iraq News, explodesthis argument. She argues that recent hor-rific acts of terrorism committed againstAmerican citizens and interests are morelikely to have been ordered by SaddamHussein and organized by Iraqi intelligenceofficials. Mylroie acknowledges that someMuslim extremists, particularly Osama binLaden, may cooperate with Iraq on particu-lar missions. However, the capabilities andresources of a state, which range from diplo-matic privileges to the organizational abili-ty to coordinate diverse activities, are muchgreater than those that may be built andcommanded by non-state actors.

Mylroie performs the type of analysis ofthe World Trade Center bombing and theattempted bombing of the New York CityUnited Nations building that one wouldhave hoped the U.S. government had done.She meticulously examines telephone, pass-port, and airline records to demonstratethat the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ)prosecution of the cases was flawed concep-tually. The DoJ prematurely decided—thatis, before evidence was gathered and ana-lyzed—that the World Trade Center bomb-ing was a criminal act of individuals. LittleDoJ effort was made to examine the evi-dence in the context of whether there was astate sponsor, nor did the DoJ seek to applythe resources of national security agenciesto determine who organized the attack.Hence, the way the prosecution conceivedand “bureaucratically compartmented” thecase prevented achieving an understandingof who masterminded the terrorist acts. It isironic that James Steinberg, deputy nation-al security adviser from December 1996 toAugust 2000, recently lamented the lack ofinteragency coordination for dealing withproblems such as terrorism (The Washing-ton Post, January 2, 2001, page A15). Heconcluded that, “Organization cannot re-place strategic thinking. But bad organiza-tion can make it difficult to respond imagi-natively and effectively to the needs oftoday.” Applied to the Clinton Administra-tion’s Iraq policy, Mylroie would agree: poli-cy has been plagued by an abundance of badstrategic thinking and bad organization.

This reviewer believes that Mylroie hascorrectly pinpointed Saddam Hussein asthe source of terrorist attacks on Americans,including the World Trade Center bombingand the attempted assassination of formerPresident George H. W. Bush. The ClintonAdministration, wittingly or unwittingly,has chosen the path of self-delusion: to notinvestigate the matter seriously. In this way,

��

��

Smithsonian Press


unpleasant policy options have not beenarticulated and discussed. Yet, the failure ofU.S. officials to address the question of statesponsorship of terrorism will have signifi-cant consequences. It encourages future ter-rorist attacks by eliminating the costs ofretribution from the calculations of leaderssuch as Saddam Hussein.

The decision by President George H. W.Bush and his aides, in February 1991, toallow Saddam Hussein to remain in officeand not to fully destroy Saddam’s militaryforces has bedeviled the foreign policy ofPresident Bill Clinton. Americans may havethought the war was over, but SaddamHussein does not agree: economic sanctionsremain and American and British aircraftattack selected sites. Indeed, Saddam con-tinues his programs to acquire and stockpilenuclear, chemical, and biological weapons(and the means to deliver them), just as hethreatens the U.S., its interests, and itsallies. A cursory examination of Saddam’sspeeches, as translated by the ForeignBroadcast Information Service, shows thatthe Iraqi dictator routinely threatens theU.S. Saddam is telling his listeners, clearlyand directly, his intentions.

In the book’s penultimate paragraphMylroie concludes: “Given how decisiveAmerica’s defeat of Iraq seemed in 1991,Saddam has accomplished a significant partof his program. He has secured the criticalgoal of ending UN weapons inspections, andhe is now free to rebuild an arsenal ofunconventional armaments. he has alsosucceeded in thoroughly confusing Americaas to the nature of the terrorist threat it hasfaced since the World Trade Center bomb-ing. He is free, it would appear, to carry outmore terrorist attacks—possibly evenunconventional terrorism, as long as he canmake it appear to be the work of a loose net-work of Muslim extremists.” Thus, LaurieMylroie predicts Saddam Hussein will con-tinue to attack American citizens and inter-ests. At a minimum, we should expectattempted bombings and other attacks inthe year 2001 and beyond. What is to bedone?

The dust jacket of Study of Revenge listswell-earned laudatory comments from for-mer Director of Central Intelligence R.James Woolsey, former Assistant Secretaryof Defense Richard N. Perle, former UnderSecretary of Defense for Policy PaulWolfowitz, former U.S. Ambassador to theUnited Nations Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, for-mer CIA chief of counterterrorism VincentCannistraro, and the former director of theNew York FBI Office James M. Fox. Study ofRevenge reads well and it sets a new highstandard for investigative literature; it isthe product of thorough and painstakingresearch, and its conclusions are sobering.

Dr. Mark D. Mandeles, The J. de BlochGroup, Fairfax, Virginia.

Air Commando Fighters of World WarII. By Edward Young. North Branch, Minn.:Specialty Press, 2000. Maps. Photographs.Notes. Index. Pp. 128. $29.95 ISBN: 1-58007-022-1.

Air Commando One: Heinie Aderholtand America’s Secret Air Wars. ByWarren A. Trest. Washington, D.C.: Smith-sonian Institution Press, 2000. Maps. Photo-graphs. Notes. Glossary. Bibliography. Index.Pp. xi, 322. $27.95 ISBN: 1-56098-807-X.

Publishers for many years tended toignore Air Force special operations activi-ties. Fortunately, this disregard has begunto fade recently as a number of books havebeen published on various aspects of theUSAF’s involvement in special operations.Two of the best of these came out in the year2000. Although very different in tone andsubject matter, both fill great gaps in thehistory of USAAF/USAF special operations.

In the fall of 1943, “Hap” Arnold autho-rized the organization of the 1st AirCommando Group (ACG) to support OrdeWingate’s Chindits in a long-range penetra-tion operation. The 1st Group consisted offighter, bomber, transport, glider, lightplane, and helicopter sections. All per-formed outstandingly in the glider assaultbehind enemy lines in Burma, known asOperation Thursday. Following this opera-tion the group was reorganized into a moretraditional USAAF unit, although still con-taining fighter, transport, and light planesquadrons, with gliders and bombersattached. With this reorganization, itbecame less involved in “special operations,”which were viewed differently then thanthey are today, and was used in a more con-ventional role. Arnold wanted to organizeseveral air commando groups, but only twomore were established. The war was nowturning in favor of the Allies and there wasless need for such specialized units. Too,senior airmen in the USAAF were not com-fortable with these kinds of units and wereeventually successful in quashing the for-mation of more than the three that becameoperational.

Edward Young has spent many yearsattending the reunions of the World War IIair commando groups, where he interviewedthe veterans, particularly those in the fight-er squadrons, and collected photographs. Hehas also studied the official records indetail. In the process, he has become anexpert on the air commandos. He has woventogether the interviews and official recordsdeftly to produce an outstanding history—both scholarly and very readable—on theair commando fighter squadrons. Young hasfleshed out the story by the judicious use ofcommercial and official publications, includ-ing Craven and Cate and British official his-tories. Correspondence with a Japaneseindividual on Japan’s air operations in theCBI provides an interesting “other side ofthe hill” viewpoint. Finally, the book is illus-

trated liberally with mostly never beforeseen photographs. This, in itself, is a raretreat.

The book begins with a short chapter onthe formation of the original air comman-dos, followed by chapters on the 1st ACG’sinitial fighter section, then its 5th and 6thFighter Squadrons, the 2d ACG’s 1st and 2dSquadrons and, finally, the 3d ACG’s 3d and4th Squadrons. An “album” of photos com-pletes the book. Numerous colorful individ-uals, including Arvid Olson, GrantMahoney, Levi Chase, and Bud Mahurin,appear in the book, giving it a very humandimension. While Young describes manyengrossing subjects throughout, perhapsthe best is his description of the 1st and 2dSquadrons attack on the Don Muang air-field near Bangkok in March 1945. This epicraid, over 1,500 miles round-trip, though lit-tle recalled today, was one of the longestfighter missions of the war and one of themost successful. Another, more amusing,incident recounted is one in which a 4thSquadron pilot got official credit for shoot-ing down an AAF C-47! Air CommandoFighters of World War II is highly recom-mended; an excellent book on units thathave received far less recognition than theyhave deserved.

Another time; another war. After a longdormancy, the air commandos resurfaced,albeit in a different guise in the VietnamWar. There are similarities, however,between the two periods— charismatic andenergetic special operators and senior air-men who did not understand special opera-tions and who wished to fit a square peginto a round hole just two examples. WarrenTrest’s Air Commando One is a fine work byan excellent historian on one of the AirForce’s more colorful individuals.

Aderholt’s candor did not always servehim well, often creating powerful enemies.One such was Gen. William W. Momyer, theSeventh Air Force commander in Vietnamand, later, commander of Tactical AirCommand. Momyer serves as Aderholt’spersonal bete noire in this book. The gener-al openly disliked Aderholt and took everyopportunity to rein in the special operatorsin Southeast Asia. Also, Momyer was wed-ded to the idea of an all-jet Air Force andwas unable, apparently, to fathom what thespecial operations people could accomplishwith their old, slow prop planes. Aderholt’sstrong views on the “proper” use of theseaircraft and of his people served to inflamethe tensions between these two strong-willed individuals. This was a fight Aderholtcould not win. Interestingly, it appears thatsome State Department officials, notablythe U.S. ambassador to Laos, had clearerviews than some senior Air Force leaders onthe value of special operations.

Forced into retirement in January 1973,Aderholt was back in uniform ten monthslater and sent back to Thailand. Eventuallypromoted, over the protests of Momyer andother senior Air Force officers, to brigadier��


general, Aderholt had his hands full closingout the United State’s military presence inThailand and at the same time retainingthe goodwill generated between the Thaiand U. S. governments during the precedingyears. Being able to do that was perhaps thegreatest of his many accomplishments overthe years. Aderholt retired for the final timeon August 1, 1976. Given his unquenchable

drive, he is still active in a variety ofendeavors, notably the Air CommandoAssociation.

If there is a caveat to this book it is thatit comes close to hagiography at times.Aderholt can do no wrong; almost everyonewho disagrees with him can do no right.Nonetheless, Aderholt is a remarkable indi-vidual who accomplished—by himself and

with his men—incredible things despiteobstructions thrown up by friends and ene-mies alike. Air Commando One deserves tobe on the bookshelf of anyone interested inthe United States Air Force.

William T. Y’Blood Air Force HistorySupport Office, Bolling AFB, D.C.

Availablefrom the

GovernmentPrinting

Office

Phone:(202) 512-1800

Fax:(202) 512-2250

Web:www.gpo.gov

RecentlyPublished

by

Day, Dwayne A. Lightning Rod: A History of the AirForce Chief Scientist’s Office. Washington, D.C.:Chief Scientist’s Office, 2000. Photographs. Notes.Appendices. Glossary. Index. Pp. xv, 310. Paperback

Franck, Harry A. with Charles O. Porter. WinterJourney through the Ninth: The Story of Tactical AirPower as Illustrated by the Exploits of the Ninth AirForce in Europe. Tucson, Ariz.: Prince of the RoadPress, 2001. Tables. Diagrams. Illustrations. Photo-graphs. Appendices. Glossary. Index. Pp. xii, 304.$21.95 Paperback ISBN: 0-975948-0-1 [www.har-ryafranck.com]

Hess, William N. A–20 Boston at War. Surrey, UK: IanAllan, 1979 [Reprinted, 2000]. Photographs. Pp. 128.$34.95 ISBN:0-7110-0965-1

The Korean War, Vol. 2. London and Lincoln:University of Nebraska Press, 2001. [Originally pub-lished, Seoul, South Korea: Korean Institute of Mili-tary History, 1998.] Maps. Tables. Diagrams. Illus-trations. Photographs. Notes. Appendices. Glossary.Bibliography. Pp. xiv, 807. $39.95. Paperback ISBN:0-8032-7795-4

Leary, William M., Ed. MacArthur and the AmericanCentury: A Reader. Lincoln and London: University ofNebraska Press, 2001. Maps. Photographs. Notes.Bibliography. Index. Pp. xxi, 522. $40.00 ISBN: 0-8032-2930-5

Macksey, Kenneth. Without Enigma: The Ultra andFellgiebel Riddles. Surrey, UK: Ian Allan, 2000.Photographs. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 160.$34.95 ISBN: 0-7110-2766-8

Maga, Tim. Judgment at Tokyo: The Japanese WarCrimes Trials. Lexington: The University Press ofKentucky, 2001. Photographs. Notes. Bibliography.Index. Pp. xiv, 181. $25.00 ISBN: 0-8131-2177-9

Marolda Edward J. and Robert J. Schneller, Jr.Shield and Sword: The United States Navy and thePersian Gulf War. Annapolis, Md.: Naval InstitutePress, 2001 [Original Ed. 1998]. Maps. Tables.Photographs. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography.Index. Pp. xxi, 517. $36.95 ISBN: 1-55750-485-7


Anderegg, C.R. The Ash Warriors [The Mount Pinatu-bo, Philippines, Eruption, 1991]. Hickam AFB, Ha-waii: Office of PACAF History, 2000. Photographs.Notes. Appendices. Glossary. Bibliography. Index. Pp.x, 146.

Benson, Charles D. and William B. Faherty. Gatewayto the Moon: Building the Kennedy Space CenterLaunch Complex. Gainesville: University Press ofFlorida, 2001. [selected portions of Moonport origi-nally published in 1978 by NASA] Tables. Diagrams.Illustrations. Photographs. Notes. Bibliography.Index. Pp. xcvii, 316. $24.95 ISBN: 0-8130-2091-3Paperback

Benson, Charles D. and William B. Faherty. MoonLaunch! The History of the Saturn-Apollo LaunchOperations. Gainesville: University Press of Florida,2001. [selected portions of Moonport originally pub-lished in 1978 by NASA] Tables. Diagrams.Illustrations. Photographs. Notes. Appendices. Biblio-graphy. Index. Pp. xcvii, 234. $24.95 Paperback ISBN:0-8130-2094-8

Cameron, Rebecca H. and Barbara Wittig, Eds. Gol-den Legacy, Boundless Future: Essays on the UnitedStates Air Force and the Rise of Aerospace Power.[Proceedings of the Aim High symposium, May 28-29,1997.] Washington, D.C.: Air Force History andMuseums Program, 2000. Photographs. Notes.Glossary. Index. Pp. vii, 358. Paperback.

Carty, Pat. Secret Squadrons of the Eighth. London,UK: Ian Allan, 1990 [Reprinted, 2000]. Maps. Illus-trations. Photographs. Appendices. Bibliography. Pp.111. $34.95 ISBN: 0-7110-1881-2

Chinnery, Phillip D. Korean Atrocity! Forgotten WarCrimes, 1950–1953. Annapolis, Md.: Naval InstitutePress, 2000. Maps. Illustrations. Photographs. Appen-dices. Bibliography. Index. Pp. ix, 286. $34.95 ISBN: 1-55750-473-3

Crookenden, Napier. Airborne at War. London, UK:Ian Allan, 1978 [Reprinted, 2000]. Maps. Diagrams.Illustrations. Photographs. Pp. 144. $34.95 ISBN: 0-7110-07710-3

PROSPECTIVE REVIEWERS

Anyone who believes he or she is qualified to substantively assess one of the new books listed above isinvited to apply for a gratis copy of the book. The prospective reviewer should contact:

Dr. Michael L. GrumelliACSC/DES225 Chennault CircleMaxwell AFB, AL 36112Tel. (334) 953-3060e-mail: [email protected]

Books Received


SPECIAL OFFER:AMERICAN ASTRONAUTICAL SOCIETY

(AAS) BOOKS ON THE HISTORY OFROCKETRY AND ASTRONAUTICS

AAS History Series (Write for a complete catalog):

Volume 1, Two Hundred Years of Flight in America: A BicentennialSurvey, E.M. Emme, ed., 326p., 3rd printing, hard cover $25 $17.50; softcover $25 $12.50.Volume 2, Twenty-Five Years of the American Astronautical Society:Historical Reflections and Projections, 1954-1979, E.M. Emme, ed.,248p., hard cover $25 $12.50; soft cover $15 $7.50. Volume 3, Between Sputnik and the Shuttle: New Perspectives onAmerican Astronautics, 1957-1980, F.C. Durant III, ed., 350p., hard cover$40 $20.00; soft cover $30 $15.00.Volume 4, The Endless Space Frontier: A History of the HouseCommittee on Science & Astronautics, 1959-1978, by K. Hechler,abridged and ed. by A.E. Eastman, 460p., hard cover $45 $22.50.Volume 5, Science Fiction and Space Futures, E.M. Emme, ed., 278p.,hard cover $35 $17.50; soft cover $25 $12.50.Volume 6, First Steps Toward Space (1st and 2nd IAA HistorySymposia), F.C. Durant III and G.S. James, eds., 318p., hard cover $45$22.50; soft cover $35 $17.50.Volume 7, Parts I & 11, History of Rocketry & Astronautics (3rd-6thIAA History Symposia), R.C. Hall, ed., Part I, 250p, Part II, 502p., soldas set, hard cover $100 $50.00; soft cover $80 $40.00. Volume 8, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (7th and 8th IAAHistory Symposia), K.R. Lattu, ed., 368p., hard cover $50 $25.00; softcover $35 $17.50.Volume 9, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (9th-11th IAA HistorySymposia), F.I. Ordway III, ed., 330p., hard cover $50 $25.00; soft cover$35 $17.50.Volume 10, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (12th-14th IAA HistorySymposia), A.I. Skoog, ed., 318p., hard cover $50 $25.00; soft cover $40$20.00.Volume 11, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (15th and 16th IAAHistory Symposia), R.D. Launius, ed., 236p., hard cover $60 $30.00; softcover $40 $20.00.Volume 12, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (17th IAA HistorySymposium), J.L. Sloop, ed., 252p., hard cover $60 $30.00; soft cover$40 $20.00.Volume 13, History of Liquid Rocket Engine Development in the UnitedStates 1955-1980, S.E. Doyle, ed., 176p., hard cover $50 25.00; softcover $35 $17.50.Volume 14, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (18th and 19th IAAHistory Symposia), T.D. Crouch and A.M. Spencer, eds., 222p., hardcover $50 $25.00; soft cover $35 $17.50.Volume 15, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (20th and 21st IAAHistory Symposia), L.H. Cornett, Jr., ed., 452p., hard cover $60 $30.00;soft cover $40 $20.00.Volume 16, Out from Behind the Eight-Ball: A History of Project Echo,by D.C. Elder, 176p., hard cover $50 $25.00; soft cover $30 $15.00.Volume 17, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (22nd and 23rd IAAHistory Symposia), J. Becklake, ed., 480p., hard cover $60 $30.00; softcover $40 $20.00.Volume 18, Organizing the Use of Space: Historical Perspectives on aPersistent Issue, R.D. Launius, ed., 232p., hard cover $60 $30.00; softcover $40 $20.00.Volume 19, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (24th IAA HistorySymposium), J.D. Hunley, ed., 318p., hard cover $60 $30.00; soft cover$40 $20.00.Volume 20, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (25th IAA HistorySymposium), J.D. Hunley, ed., 344p., hard cover $60 $30.00; soft cover$40 $20.00.Volume 21, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (26th IAA HistorySymposium), Philippe Jung, ed., 368p., hard cover $60 $30.00; soft cover$40 $20.00.Volume 22, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (27th IAA HistorySymposia), Philippe Jung, ed., 418p., hard cover $60 $30.00; soft cover$40 $20.00.Special Price for Complete Set (Volumes 1-22): Hard Cover $475.00plus $20.00 postage and handling (U.S.) Soft Cover $345.00 plus $20.00postage and handling (U.S.).

Postage and HandlingPlease add $5.00 for the first book ordered and $l.00 for each additionalbook ordered (U.S.), $8.00 for the first book ordered and $3.00 for eachadditional books ordered (non-U.S.).

Ordering Information:All orders from individuals must be prepaid by check or money order inU.S. funds. Visa and Mastercard accepted. California residents should addsales tax.

Order from Univelt, Inc., P.O. Box 28130,San Diego CA 92198

Phone: (760) 746-4005; Fax: (760) 746-3139

McKenzie, Kenneth F., Jr. The Revenge of the Melians:Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR. Washington,D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies (NDU),2000. [McNair Paper 62] Tables. Notes. Pp. xi, 104.$8.50 Paperback GPO Stock No. 008-020-01486-9

Moy, Timothy. War Machines: TransformingTechnologies in the U.S. Military, 1920–1940. CollegeStation: Texas A&M University Press, 2001. Photo-graphs. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xiv, 218.$39.95 ISBN: 1-58544-104-X

Neese, Harvey and John O’Donnell, Eds. Prelude toTragedy: Vietnam, 1960-1965. Annapolis, Md.: NavalInstitute Press, 2001. Photographs. Notes. Appen-dices. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xviii, 309. $32.95ISBN: 1-55750-491-1

Neufeld, Jacob, and William T. Y’Blood and Mary LeeJefferson, Eds. Pearl to V–J Day: World War II in thePacific [Proceedings of a symposium, July 20-21,1995.] Washington, D.C.: Air Force History andMuseums Program, 2000. Photographs. Notes.Bibliography. Pp. vii, 196. Paperback

Redmond, Kent C. and Thomas M. Smith. FromWhirlwind to MITRE: The R&D Story of the SAGEAir Defense Computer. Cambridge, Mass. andLondon: The MIT Press, 2000. Tables. Diagrams.Illustrations. Photographs. Notes. Bibliography.Index. Pp. vii, 535. $49.95 ISBN: 0-262-18201-7

Salecker, Gene Eric. Fortress Against the Sun: TheB–17 Flying Fortress in the Pacific. Conshohocken,Pa.: Combined Publishing, 2001. Maps. Photographs.Notes. Appendices. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 464.$34.95 ISBN: 1-58097-049-4

Tangredi, Sam J. All Possible Wars? Toward aConsensus View of the Future Security Environment,2001-2005. Washington, D.C.: Institute for NationalStrategic Studies (NDU), 2000. [McNair Paper 63]Appendices. Notes. Pp. xi, 212. $16.00 PaperbackGPO Stock No. 008-020-01487-7

Thompson, Wayne. To Hanoi and Back: The USAFand North Vietnam, 1966–1973. Washington, D.C.:Air Force History and Museums Program, 2000.Maps. Tables. Photographs. Notes. Glossary.Bibliography. Index. Pp. xiii, 416.

Topping, Dale. When Giants Roamed the Sky: KarlArnstein and the Rise of Airships from Zeppelin toGoodyear. Akron, Oh.: University of Akron Press,2001. Illustrations. Photographs. Notes. Appendices.Glossary. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xii, 276. $27.95paperback ISBN: 1-884836-70-4

Y’Blood, William T., and Jacob Neufeld and Mary LeeJefferson, Eds. Reflections and Remembrances:Veterans of the United States Army Air ForcesReminisce about World War II. Washington, D.C.: AirForce History and Museums Program, 2000.Photographs. Pp. xiv, 73. Paperback

SUMMER 2001 - Volume 48, Number 2 · Airlift in the Korean War, 1950 Daniel L. Haulman 4 16 40...

Documents

Transcript of SUMMER 2001 - Volume 48, Number 2 · Airlift in the Korean War, 1950 Daniel L. Haulman 4 16 40...