SUMMARY REPORT

INTO THE

MURDER OF JOHN

BINGHAM The Case for Collusion

ULET Legacy Unit

© Copyright of Ulidia Legacy and Educational Trust Legacy Unit

Preface:

Statement on release of the report into John Bingham Murder.

The right to life is undoubtedly the most precious and fundamental Human Right we are

entitled to. It should surpass all other Human Rights regardless of their status. In the early

hours of 14th September 1986, John Bingham had this fundamental Human Right taken

from him when a PIRA murder gang invaded the sanctity of his home and riddled him with

bullets.

There are a number of factors surrounding the murder of John Bingham that need

investigation, factors that suggest serious failings in the police investigation at best and a

full-blown cover-up at worst. Ulidia Legacy and Educational Trust are determined to bring all

of the aspects of John Bingham’s murder to light. We are also determined to pursue the

hidden truths that have been concealed from the public – and in particular the loved ones of

victims – for years, thus adding to their suffering.

We are often reminded that we are living in a post-conflict era. It has been 23 years since

the CLMC ceasefire and 20 years since the PIRA ceasefire. We feel the truth has been hidden

for long enough and that a vacuum has been created that has been filled with rumour,

speculation and outright lies. The exposure of the Agent known as Stakeknife has raised the

issue of collusion again only this time it is the level of collusion between the security forces

and Republicans. ULET has prepared a comprehensive report into the murder of John

Bingham and we have been in contact with other families who share our opinion that there

is much to uncover and the truth cannot be suppressed any longer.

We would invite you to examine our work and we can assure everyone that will not be

distracted in our quest for the truth. There are legacy issues that need to be fully

investigated and the Unionist community cannot be excluded from this process. ULET has

been formed to give a voice to those from the Unionist community whose fears and struggle

for justice has been ignored.

We now present a summary of our finding in the John Bingham murder and hope it will

encourage others in their search for truth in legacy matters.

Gary Blair. BSc (Hons)

Head of Legacy Research (ULET)

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Forward

Every crime investigator knows the importance of speed and every prosecutor values

probative exhibits.

When the four men came to murder John Bingham, they drove a Renault car. The VRM of

this vehicle was in possession of the police within minutes of the shooting. It is likely that

the name and address of the registered keeper was known before 2 am.

Usually, getaway cars are burned but this one was not. It would have provided a treasure

trove of evidence, even if the four men had been forensically aware and especially if they

originally planned to burn it. Fibres, hair, a careless half palm print, a footprint, a cigarette

butt; all would have been possible items for examination. In the car was found a stolen

radio/receiver. It too could have yielded information.

The car belonged to Suspect Two, who lived in Ardoyne. Police did not search for the car for

about three hours nor did they visit the registered keeper until after uniform, CID and

Special Branch met at Tennent Street police station.

Police went to the home of the registered keeper of the car at He told them that his car

must have been stolen but he was unable to produce the keys. He was arrested. It is clear

that at this point police had a reasonable suspicion that he had given over the car to PIRA,

complete with keys and that he was assisting offenders.

When the ATO and the police examined the car, at about 5.14 am, they found that the keys

were in the ignition. This supports the suspicion of assistance given by Suspect Two. Later,

as is detailed below, the Renault was photographed by SOCO with no keys and with a

damaged ignition block.

It is not known what evidence, if any was obtained from the car or the radio. All that is

known is that no one was ever prosecuted for the murder and that Suspect Two was not

prosecuted. Only two explanations are available for these actions. The police were

incompetent on the night or that Suspect Two was an important State asset who had to be

handled only with the agreement of the Branch and via a ‘performance’ which would

protect his cover.

As for the radio, the axe, the mask and the bullets and casings, all these items too have been

the stuff of many successful prosecutions. But, alas, not in this case.

Peter Sefton LLB B.L.

Director of V&A Consultancy.

Contents:

Introduction 1

Tabloid Media Involvement 3

The Official Narrative 5

Problems With The Official Chronology 6

The Physical Evidence 8

The Murder Weapons 13

The Re-writing of History 16

The Steak Knife Connection 18

Conclusion 21

Endnotes 23

1 | P a g e .

Introduction:

The official narrative of the murder of John Bingham sets the murder in a matter of fact way

but whether this is the case will be scrutinised in this report. It will set in place the political

undertones that resulted in the murder and the tabloid press’ involvement of charter

assassination that facilitated the literal assassination of John Bingham. The report will show

serious flaws in the RUC investigation, inconsistencies in the evidence, and tampering with

evidence to cover-up the involvement of state agents. It will also consider allegations of

collusion and the allegation that Mr. Bingham was denied vital medical treatment, this

resulted in his death, which was caused by bleeding from an injury to his right knee, a total

survivable wound. It will also look at the withholding of inquest evidence, which might be

viewed as an attempt by the state to re-write history.

The murder of John Bingham was a direct result of unionist’s refusal to accept the Anglo-

Irish Agreement. As early as 1984, Ian Paisley was setting out that there might be

underhanded dealings taking place when in repose to changes being discussed in the

Assembly he had stated:

There is more to this than meets the eye…it is the beginning of what I believe

to be the final confrontation… we have to take a stand. The matter is kindling

a fire which is going to set this whole Province ablaze1.

For many unionists, this final confrontation would arrive with the Hillsborough Accord of

November 1985. Unionist leaders had briefed their followers that they should dismiss

“disinformation” about the Tory Government plans for Northern Ireland2. The utter sense

of betrayal felt by was summed up by A.T.Q Stewart when he wrote “all has changed utterly

on the 15th November 1985. A terrible, unwished-for duty was born.3” This feeling of a

changed world would first shock then anger Unionist. Enoch Powell would express the

common belief that the Tory government had been “bombed into submission.4” The

government response to Unionist opposition was “With the agreement signed, the logic was

then to confront any unionist resistance and exploit to the full the hesitations and

contradictions” that it contained. This, would have had a dramatic effect on the continued

but decreasing loyalist paramilitary activity. Professor Arthur Aughey would observe that

loyalists had only been “engaged intermittently in offensive military action5”. The focus

being a doomsday situation. The preservation for such became “an alternative to political

violence”. This is borne out in the figures. While republicans murdered 47 people in 1985,

the loyalist figure was 56. In 1986 this would increase to 177 and to 20 in 1987, by which

time republican figures had jumped to 748.

By March of 1986, unionists and loyalists had recovered from their initial shock at the

implantation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. They would now coalesce in opposition and

strategy. This hounding of NIO officials and heightening of street protest were beginning to

worry government agencies. This also included the Security Services who began to target

the opposition. Concerns were raised by the Northern Ireland Assembly Member for South

2 | P a g e .

Antrim, Frazer Agnew. Mr. Agnew, not known for sensationalism or extreme views would

relate to a journalist, Joe Oliver, “What’s been happening stinks.”9 The Assembly Member

would claim “We know our phones are tapped and our movements monitored in an attempt

to silence any opposition to the deal.10” He also expected to be arrested along with others

who were opposed to the Thatcher government’s policy. He would state that a secret

Whitehall dossier was in existence and those being targeted – him included – were so,

because “opposition to the Agreement has proved highly effective.11” The most sinister and

perturbing aspect of the allegations was that he had been targeted by the Secret

Intelligence Service. Mr. Oliver states:

Recently an MI6 agent visited Mr Agnew at his East Antrim business

headquarters. Shortly after that he received a threatening phone call

warning him if he did not stop leaking information he could ‘face the same

fate as Robert Bradford.12’

Here we have an elected representative being targeted by elements of the intelligence

community because of his opposition to policies favoured by the government. The reference

to an MP murdered by the Provisional IRA and that Mr. Agnew could end up like him raises

questions with regard to the assassination of John Bingham, as allegations have been made

that a terrorist group was also directed in his murder.

Journalist and author, Nicholas Davies, writing in 2004 relates the following about murder of

John Bingham:

What has not previously been revealed was that immediately prior to

his murder the RUC Special Branch had asked the TCG to order an

exclusion zone around the Ballysillan area to ensure that no RUC or

army patrols entered the area from midnight until 2 a.m. on 14

September. Hundreds of such requests were made throughout the

years of violence, particularly in and around Belfast, and it must be

stated that only very, very rarely did such request end with anyone

being shot or killed.13

He would then further observe “But on this occasion someone was killed.14” That person

was John Bingham. The author is quite specific about who the organisers of the John

Bingham’s assassination were and who would be tasked with the operation. Overall “the

decision was taken by MI5 that Bingham had to be stopped and the Special Branch were

given the task.15” The author is adamant in his assertion that the John Bingham murder was

the result of a trilateral agreement involving the Security Services, RUC Special Branch, and

the Provisional IRA. Once this judgment was made “the information and timing of

Bingham’s return home was handed to the Provos16.” This enabled them to act in haste.

3 | P a g e .

Tabloid Media Involvement:

We will now look at one of the major contributing factors in the assassination of John

Bingham was the targeted tabloid media campaign. This took place over a six-month period

in 1986, cumulating in his murder.

The circumstances surrounding the murder of John Bingham, can be attributed to, and were

a result of, a campaign carried out by the Dublin-based, Sunday World newspaper. The

paper purported to have a weekly circulation in the region of 87.00017. It would among,

other bizarre elements, portray unionist pollical figures in comic strip fashion, dressed as

Gestapo officers18, while on another occasion it ran headlines comparing unionist concerns

to “Nazi Propaganda All Over Again”. This was also added to by lurid predictions of mass

murder being planned by loyalist groupings. The whole publication has a surreal feel, with

semi-naked teenage girls juxtaposed next to killer gang stories.

As early as April 1986, the paper was reporting that the UVF in north Belfast had stockpiled

weaponry and were planning attacks across Northern Ireland and the Republic in what they

hope they would facilitate a civil war. The report said the UVF had a “four-point terror

plan”. Phases of which had already been carried out. It would go on to allege that the

“North Belfast command had an anti-tank weapon and grenade launcher.19” These would be

used against the security forces according to the paper. The paper would target, by stealth,

John Bingham, linking him to the preparation of future attacks on every conceivable target.

In May, this focus was to reach a new level. On 7th May 1986, a group of UDA members

carried out a sectarian attack on the Caulfield home in the Kilcoole area of north Belfast20.

Mrs. Caulfield died and her husband was injured. The following Sunday,11th , a story

appeared linking the UVF to the attack. It would also allude to the murder of a Catholic, John

O’Neill, who was beaten to death area adjacent to Tyndale. Both murders were carried out

by the rival UDA21 but the newspaper reporting deliberately pointed at John Bingham as the

perpetrator. It was the first time the paper used the term “Tyndale terror gang”22 which It

would use as a regular moniker for the UVF in the Ballysillan area and especially those

alleged to be under the direction of John Bingham. It also carried an article attributing a call

to the local MP, Cecil Walker, to name the UVF gang responsible for the killings.

By July, the paper was reporting that the INLA had three men from the UVF known as the

“Tyndale Terror Gang” in their sights. A group of outsiders not known to loyalists in Belfast

had been brought in to facilitate the assassinations. They had been given intel on them and

had even joined one in a loyalist bar. The story then began linking those given the moniker

to the Shankill Butchers and reaffirmed the falsehood that the north Belfast UVF murdered

Mrs. Caulfield. This was all the work of a mastermind, the paper further stated 23. The

article has all the attributes of fiction. The question must be asked, was this an attempt by

some to force the PIRA into action: due to the rivalry that existed between both groups?

4 | P a g e .

On the 3rd August, the paper carried a double-page spread. The content included the

headline “Teens Used As Killers By UVF Gang Says MP” and carries the subheading “Tyndale

leader - talking over “Butcher” Murphy’s role” and “Don’t Come Home Without Catholic

Scalp.” These were supplemented with pictures of Lenny Murphy and the murder victim Mrs

Caufield. The local MP, Cecil Walker was quoted and the article speculated that the leader

of the gang was about to take the UVF in a contrary direction than the current political one

focused on by its present leadership. The author states “For some time since Murphy’s

murder the UVF has mostly taken a stance on political and social issues…24” This had

changed due to the Anglo-Irish Agreement and a new strategy was emerging from

hardliners. This analysis points republicans to a perceived coming threat and how it should

be dealt with: John Bingham.

On the day of John Bingham’s murder, the Sunday World carried a headline and a picture of

George Seawright, claiming Dublin was now the target of loyalists. In just hours, John

Bingham would be murdered. The following Sunday the paper then ran a story titled; “Who

Fingered John Bingham?25” Speculation was again relayed that a pact of sorts had been put

in place to have him removed. Of course, the paper was unable to see its own capability in

events. It also states a high-ranking PIRA figure had been seen on a number of occasions

conducting surveillance and reconnaissance of the Bingham home. This was the last story

that could be unearthed relation to John Bingham in the Sunday World’s pages until after his

inquest. He does get a fleeting mention on its front page when journalist Barny Rowen

states that the UVF had to undergo a restructuring process due to his murder but this was at

the beginning of 198826.

In cannot be ascertained if the tabloid targeting of John Bingham was the result of personal

grudges by employees: or whether this was a sinister manipulation by security services who

leaked erroneous intelligence to a conduit; or even if this was the work of a rival

paramilitary faction. However, it added conceivably to the building of a public persona that

facilitated his assassination.

A flavour of erroneous targeted media attention directed against John Bingham, prior to his murder.

5 | P a g e .

The Official Narrative:

The Coroner’s Verdict was submitted to the Belfast Register on the 29th February 1988. It

had sat on two days: 15th January and after an adjournment 25th February – both 1988. The

findings of Mr J. H. S. Elliott, the Belfast Coroner were as follows:

1. Name and surname: John Dowey Bingham

2. Sex: Male

3. Date of death: 14 September 1986

4. Place of death: Redacted

5. Usual address:

6. Marital Status: Redacted

7. Date and place of birth: Redacted

8. Occupation: Redacted

9. Maiden name:

10. Cause of death: I. (a) Bullet Wounds of Trunk and Lower limbs

11. Findings:

The deceased was (redacted). On Saturday evening 13 September 1986 he was at his home

at (redacted) and (redacted). He went up to bed in the large front bedroom at about 11.30

p.m., leaving (redacted) downstairs watching television. Shortly after 1 a.m. a white Renault

Deauville drove up, backed up to the (redacted) and stopped. Two men got out and

smashed open his front door with a large axe. They were masked and went to the living

room and asked (redacted) where he was. (redacted) said that he was not there and they

ran to the stairs. There they fired three shots from a rifle up the stairs at the deceased who

had left his bedroom. He shut the door at the top of the stairs at which they fired three

revolver shots. He ran to the small front bedroom and they went up the stairs firing two

more rifle shots. Then they ran out to the Renault car which was waiting with two men in

the front and its engine running. They got into the back and drove off at a very high speed

towards (redacted). An ambulance was summoned and its attendants found the deceased

shocked, but still breathing. They dressed his wounds. Then he stopped breathing and

attempts to resuscitate him were unsuccessful. He had been struck by five bullets fired from

a rifle which had been used in three previous attempted homicides. The revolver had been

used in two previous homicides. The large axe was found lying on the road near the steps

outside the house. The Renault car was found at 4.45 a.m. in Jamaica Court in Ardoyne with

the keys in the ignition and a small radio transmitter/receiver on the back seat. It had been

stolen on 13 September from (redacted). No one had as yet been made amenable, but the

Provisional IRA have admitted responsibility.(end)

The above findings leave many unanswered questions and do not attempt to answer

disputed facts. These failings, it is hoped will be addressed, somewhat in this report.

6 | P a g e .

Problems With The Official Chronology:

The official “Police Report Concerning Death” received by the Coroner’s Office states that

the time of Mr Bingham’s death as being “at approximately 1.30 am” The are a number of

perplexing issues arising out of this time frame and led to disputed facts surrounding the

chronology put forward by the state. The official police chronology states that they have

received a call at 0128 and then call for assistance.

The Ambulance service state that they receive a call at 0129. A vehicle is dispatched with

immediate effect. The crew do not give details of the route taken but state they are on duty

at the Royal Victoria Hospital ambulance depot at Broadway. They state that they arrived at

the Bingham home at 0135, that is a journey time of just six minutes. Both paramedic one –

statement 29 – and paramedic two – statement 30 – corroborate each other’s statements

on the initial emergency instruction and the arrival time at the scene. The feasibility of

such journey being made in such a time-frame is highly questionable. Modern route

mapping, off-peak travel times, gives a time frame of thirteen to fourteen minutes (see

figure: map 3). The prospect of a paramedic team making this drive in under less than half

that would be more than extraordinary. Inspector James Ogilvie states that he overheard a

radio message at 0130 and travelled to the Bingham’s home. He further states that he

arrived at “approximately” 0135 and that the entered the house and that there was an

ambulance crew already there working with Mr Bingham. (statement 92a). Despite this, a

Route Plan of Emergency Paramedics. Map 1.

7 | P a g e .

sergeant stationed at Tennent Street (statement 54) says he arrived at “approximately 1.30

am” and established that Mr Bingham had been “shot dead”. The first police officer on the

scene, that same officer who expelled those offering the deceased first aid, said he

immediately called for an ambulance and that a “few monuments later” 27two paramedics

entered the room. This could not be factual as, even going by the undisputed time frame

there is a six-minute differential in the evidence. If the eyewitness are right: one saying he

ran to the house while the gunmen were still in the street and when he entered a family

member was already on the phone and one eyewitness said they rang 999 at the same time.

The response times and quick action of the public would have caused the police to

encounter the existing terrorist gang. (See map 2)

The complete breakdown of the official chorology is perplexing, how are so many

professionals giving times that clash with each other’s evidence? Was there an attempt to

hide what happened? One witness interviewed in 2016 states that police expelled those

giving first aid and that Mr. Bingham was allowed to “bleed out”. Tensions became that

strained as a result the “riot police were called”. The presence of the RUC’s DMSU

confirmed by police record but no reason of why they are on the scene is given.

Escape Route of Murder Gang. Map 2.

8 | P a g e .

The Physical Evidence:

Renault 18 Deauville:

The car used in the murder was a Renault 18 Deauville (see photograph 2). The Renault 18

came into production in February 1979 and continued onto July 1986. There were of two

million produced for the European market during this, with the UK sales reaching thirty

thousand at their height. The model: GTD was brought into production in 1980 and came

with a 2.1-liter engine, it was also fitted with a five-speed gearbox. In 1982, the engine

power was increased from 110 to 125Hp and a rear spoiler was fitted. By April 1984, the

Mark 1 would be replaced by the Mark 2 and by July 1985, the new Deauville model was put

on sale for the first time on the British market. By the time of the shooting, the manufacture

of the car had ceased so this car was only available for around 12 months. Despite

redactions in the police file and the coroner’s report, if the limited information is correct,

the evidence concludes that the car used in the murder could have been less than 16

months old. The condition of the car is not known but one witness describes the engine

sound as loud. Was this normal for the make/ model or was there a mechanical fault with

this individual car that made it stand out? There does not seem to have been any

mechanical checks made by the police. To do so, would have confirmed if the car’s timing

was off or if the noise was down to it being revved by the driver.

The car would be identified by two witness and details of its registration passed

to police immediately they arrived at the scene, some sixty seconds after the

initial emergency call: 0130. The police would not move to follow this

Photograph 1: The Renault 18 Deauville, recovered for Jamaica Court, Ardoyne.

9 | P a g e .

intelligence up, as is the normal fashion. It was not for three hours and only after

a meeting took place between RUC officers from Special Branch and CID in

Tennent Street, that officers were allowed to move on the information they had

received. The police were then tasked to search the owner of the cars h ouse. He

was later arrested.

At 0514, the RUC tasked an Ammunition Technician stationed at Girdwood Barracks to

examine the car used in the murder. The area surrounding the car had been cordoned off.

Once he carried out a controlled ordnance blast, on the boot lock and glove compartment, he

states that the “keys were in the ignition.28

” This is an important fact and is also confirmed

by other security force members. The coroner also concludes this. This finding calls into

question the statement for suspect two, the registered owner of the car, who states that the car

had been stolen from his home, without his knowledge. This could not be the case if the car

keys had been used.

Photograph 2: Police photograph showing damage to the steering column.

10 | P a g e .

There is a sinister aspect to the car that has not been answered and it relates to the tampering

of evidence. As witnessed, the car was found with its keys in the ignition, however, once

SOCO photographs the car, at the police forensic lab, the keys are gone and the steering

column casing has been damaged. The car’s ignition block has also been tampered with. This

gives the impression that the car has been stolen. Why would this be so and who had access

to the car while it was being held as evidence? Was this an attempt to cover the actions of an

agent?

Photograph 3: A close-up of the damage to the ignition block caused while in police evidence storage. Was this to make the car look as if it was hotwired?

Axe:

The axe used by the killers was found at the scene, it was an Oregon Felling Axe. It was left

at the foot of the concert steps, that lead to the terrace that ran along the front of the

dwellings. It seems to be of a new condition (see photograph 4). The SCO officer’s

examination for fingerprints is negative. There is, however, no further detail of any

investigatory processes that followed this. The Oregon Felling Axe has a hickory 28-inch

shaft and a 3lb head. They are still sold in the UK but are only available in a limited number

of outlets, with just two online sellers, at the time of publishing. The use of such a tool by a

gang in a forced entry situation is unusual. The use of an axe could cause it to lodge in the

door which would prolong entry. The would give those inside precious time to escape. Most

11 | P a g e .

forced entry situations that were engaged by terrorists during the Troubles, used

sledgehammers to gain entry. They usually come with heads of 10 – 14lb which offer a

considerable advantage over the 3lbs of an axe head. The question must be asked why was

this tool used? Was it bought in a hurry, could the murderers not get access to a

sledgehammer? Its limited availability would make for an exotic purchase in the Belfast of

the mid-80s and with only a handful of places where an Oregon Felling Axe could be

obtained, surely a trace of such an item was not beyond the realms.

Mask:

There are a number of issues surrounding a homemade mask worn by one of the gunmen:

its strange production i.e. how did it come into the possession of Inspector Armstrong and

the lack of any report of the forensic analysis of the item.

Two eyewitnesses observe something strange about the gunmen’s facial coverings. Witness

B5 states that one of the gunmen “was wearing a black mask which seemed to have a big

knot in the top of it”, he would further state that “the mask kept coming off.” Witness B6

states that the masks “may have been stockings because there was something hanging from

the top of their heads.” The eyewitness accounts suggest that the gunmen wore masked

that had been manufactured by themselves. What was the reason behind this? Balaclava

type masks were openly on sale at various locations around Belfast. Was this to try and

Photograph 4: The Oregon felling axe use in the forced entry of the Bingham home by the

murderers. There was no attempt by the police to trace the origin of the item.

12 | P a g e .

avoid detection or was this because of the haste of the murder action, which did not enable

the gang to source properly manufactured face masks?

Inspector Armstrong states that “as the result of information communicated” to him, he

travelled to an undisclosed area and searched the roadway close to the kurb. There he

found the “sleeve of a grey coloured pullover.” It had been modified to act as a mask. He

returned to Oldpark RUC Station and had the item recorded and packaged for forensic

analysis. This was 15th September 1986. The item was then passed to a CID DC on the same

day as it was logged. He then says he gave the mask to a DC stationed at Tennent Street RUC

Station.

There is on further details of the mask or what were the results of any investigation into it.

There is also the very perplexing issue of Inspector Armstrong’s involvement in its recovery:

why would a senior police officer go alone to search a roadway? It is also not revealed how

this information was commutated to him. Surely if this was just a member of the public who

had given this over the Confidential Telephone it would have tasked to a routine call out.

This leaves the prospect that the information came from an HMIT source and if this is the

case what further information was relayed in relation to John Bingham’s murder?

Radio Transmitter:

The Army Technical Officer reports that he found radio transmitter on the back seat of the

car, during his search of the vehicle. There are no records of the logging of this evidence and

there are no reports in the released police file or the coroner’s inquest file. The absence of

such leave a number of questions: Why is there no record of the forensic procedures that

were carried on this object? Why was this object, its make, model, and trace not covered by

the original inquest?

Despite a number of formal request to the PSNI which asked:

(a) What is the current state of any physical evidence relating to the case: axe found at

scene, radio transmitter believed to have used by attackers, clothing recovered, hair

samples, and car?

(b) Given the advances in DNA has there ever been an attempt to obtain suspects’

profile from the physical evidence?

Despite these requests, the PSNI have not released the current state of the physical

evidence or what tests have been carried out on them.

13 | P a g e .

The Murder Weapons:

The gang would have been armed with at least three weapons. The intruders were both

armed and it is most like that there was an armed man in the front passenger seat to cover

the street and secure the escape car. The two armed intruders carried a 223 rifle, a 38-

caliber revolver, and a large axe for the house entry. Both the rifle and the revolver were

fired. The revolver was fired twice into the landing wall, which resulted in no injuries. This

seems strange as its purpose was as a backup weapon in case of failure of the part of the

main murder weapon: the 223 rifle. It shows an inexperience and could have led to a green

on green causality in the confines of the small hall and stairs.

The rifle was fired twelve times; the victim being hit once in both legs while he was on the

landing at the top of the stairs. The victim was then perused into a bedroom where he was

hit a further three times. These wounds were all to the lower body. There does not seem to

have been an attempt to finish-off the victim with a coup de grâce, even after the victim was

incapacitated. Again, is this inexperience? The wound configuration does not include the

upper torso or the head, both of which would be the main target of an experienced killer.

Lack of ammunition would not have been a factor in this, the rifle would have had at least

ten more rounds and if a spare was carried, over thirty more would have been available.

The ballistic history of the weaponry has been traced, despite the obstacles, to three

attempted murders and three murders, they are also associated with a further two murders.

These are as follows and graphs 1 & 2 showing spatial analysis of these.

The first victim of the weapons used in the killings was would be a member of the security

forces; Dennis Taggart. That was quickly followed by that of PIRA member and agent Paddy

Murray. The following month it would be used in the Bingham murder. As of publication,

the PSNI have not released the full ballistic trace of the weaponry and the records have

been redacted. The information concerning the weaponry has been compiled by

researchers. It is important, as it gives a picture of function and geography of specific PIRA

units and the number people murdered by around fifteen people well known to the security

services, police, and the military. All of which, had operatives working within the ASUs or in

their direct command structure.

In the case of Dennis Taggart, a 9mm pistol was also used this has been traced to a further

two murders. So far the patterns show five murders that have a direct evidential connection

to those who murdered John Bingham.

14 | P a g e .

Murder of John

Bingham

• 14/9/1986:

• John Bingham murdered under circumstances that point to cullusion. It believed up to four agents played a role in his murder.

Murder of Denis

Taggart

• 4/8/86:

• Denis Taggart was murdered by two gun men at his home, Battenberg Street, Belfast. One gun man was armed with a 9mm sem- automatic pistol. This was connected to two further murders.

Murder of Patrick Murray

• 15/8/86:

• Mr Murray was from the Short Strand area but was abducted then murdered by the PIRA Internal Security, in west Belfast. This was directed by Steak Knife and under the PIRA Belfast Brigade Special Unit.

Murder of Eugen Wilson

• 24/6/87:

• Murdered by PIRA Internal Security under the Belfast Brigade PIRA Special Unit.

Murder of Joseph

McIlwain

• 12/6/87:

• UDR Man murdered by SB Police agent who would become Belfast commander PIRA Special Unit.

9mm semi-automatic

pistol

Ballistic History of 38 Calibre Handgun and Associated 9mmSemi-Automatic Pistol.

15 | P a g e .

Attempted Murder of

Police

• 17/4/85:

• Police attacked in Friendly Street area of Marketts. An RPG rocket was fired and automatic gun fire was aimed at the patrol. It was carried out by the Belfast Brigade Special Unit of PIRA.

Attempted Murder of

Police

• 25/4/85

• Police attacked in Glenties Drive, Lenadoon. A police vehicle is hit with automatic gun fire. No injuries. Murder attempt carried out by Belfast Brigade Special Unit of PIRA.

Sectarian Murder Attempt

• 12/6/86:

• Attack on a group of Protestants in Manor Street area. There had been a standoff. Brian Feeny claimed the PIRA had been moving its members in from Ardoyne area to stir up conflict in the district. No one was injured. The Murder

of John Bingham

• 14/9/86:

• The murder was carried out by a four-man unit, which was a Speical Unit of the Belfast Brigade of PIRA. Up to four state agents played a role.

Ballistic History of 223 Automatic Rifle 1

16 | P a g e .

The Re-writing of History:

The Coroner’s Report, made available to the authors by the PRONI, offers a narrative that

suggests John Bingham was murdered by the PRIA and that all that every attempt to save his

life was made by the police who arrived on the scene. This would be disputed by some,

whose evidences was given but not recorded. There would also be doubts cast on the police

investigation. There is no transcript of the proceedings, just a number of statements and

depositions that confirm the narrative put forward. The findings are in contrast to some

media reporting of the sitting.

The report into the Coroner’s Court tells of the how the sitting had to be adjourned with one

barrister stating the police were “irresponsible and negligent” in that they had “prevented

medical aid to Mr. Bingham as he lay dying.” He would also state that the murder

investigation had been “ridiculous in the extreme”. Mrs. Bingham told of how the gunmen

had entered the family home and shot her husband. She then went to the bedroom where her

husband was, she was with a friend. They were then joined by the friend’s husband who

started to administer first aid and stem the blood loss due to the injuries. The most sinister

aspect of the whole Bingham case is that those engaged in stopping John Bingham from

bleeding to death were prevented from helping the victim further and expelled from the room.

The police officer who expelled those administering first aid said “he did not attempt to stem

the flow of blood from Mr. Bingham’s leg wound” after he had stopped those carrying it out.

A neighbour, Mrs. Hotham, told the inquest that “her husband a former soldier had gone to

the house immediately after the shooting.” He relayed to her that “He told me he was

stemming the blood flow from a wound with a continental quilt” when the police arrived. He

was then told to leave. She would them cast a serious doubt on the police investigation when

she told the inquest that “The police never even came back to take a statement from my

husband”. She said this was surprising as “he was one of the first people on the scene,” Due

to this information the initial inquest is adjourned.

At the subsequent sitting, Mr. Hotham recounts how he had stemmed the bleeding to the

victim’s right knee using a quilt. He states he was expelled from the scene and prevented

from giving further first aid. Mr. Grant, acting for the victim’s family would state “that if

police did clear the room at that particular time, for whatever reason, it certainly was an

irresponsible, and indeed scandalous piece of work.” He would then go on to attack the police

operation following the shooting which said was “pathetic”. The coroner replied that this was

no place for speeches and with reference to Mr. Grant’s comment on the police follow-up

operation stated: “I do not see how it has anything whatsoever to do with this death.” Mr.

Grant reiterated “the follow-up operation is relevant to the RUC’s overall attitude to this

incident.” He ended “their record, overall, was pathetic.” Mr. Elliot, the corner ruled that he

“would not hear” the barrister “any further.”

None of the above evidence has made it into the current Coroner’s Inquest File held on

record. Why is this the case? Was this decided at the finalisation of the report or is this the

decision of archivists to remove evidence that counters the official narrative surrounding the

case? The fact that vital evidence has been withheld leads to the authors to the conclusion

17 | P a g e .

that a fresh inquest is needed to establish the truth. In the public record, a statement from Mr.

Hotham dated the day of the victim’s murder is included. This contradicts the evidence give

and was not alluded to. Where did this come from?

Newspaper Reports That Contradict The Official Record.

18 | P a g e .

The Steak Knife Connection:

The evidence in the Bingham assassination points to at least eight agents from various

agencies being involved. The most notorious of these being the agent given the moniker

Stakeknife. This is attested to by the gathered intelligence, the ballistics of the murder

weapons, and information in the public domain.

PIRA man, Gerry Bradley, would write his memoir with the help of, politician turned

journalist and author, Brian Feeney. The book catalogues his rise from a youth to being the

OC of the PIRA’s 3rd battalion. Bradley was involved with IRA attacks in Ardoyne, and right

across Belfast. He mentions a number to things that are relevant to the Bingham murder

inquiry. He states that while a guest of a Sinn Fein candidate, at Belfast City Hall, he had

watched John Bingham in the company of George Seawright. He and those with him were

“busily trying to together as much intelligence as they could about those around

Seawright”29.

He also gives a structured breakdown of the PIRA units. The battalion structure had been

replaced by ASUs30. The whole of north and west Belfast being covered by a just three

operating ASUs.

These contained a core of around four men but operations could need the support of

between ten and fifteen operatives. These would scout areas, secure safe houses, and take

weapons away. “The ASUs carried out all the IRA’s military activities” in Belfast31. He states

that the effect of Christopher Black on the PIRA in north Belfast was devastating to the

group. Black’s evidence “resulted in virtually every member of the IRA in Ardoyne” being

Belfast PIRA ASU Command Structure.

19 | P a g e .

arrested. The PIRA man give a geographical breakdown of attacks that fit the patterns of

the weapons used in the Bingham murder.

By the time of the Bingham assassination, he would state “There was nobody left in Ardoyne

by 1986. That’s why me and Marley were running the squad then” but that Marley was far

too high profile to be personally involved in operations32. He confesses to being involved in

sniping in the Markets and other areas this fits with the ballistic geography of the murder

weapons. He also gives a list of those in his ASU: Rudy Davidson, Booster, Paddy McD, and

Paddy Murray. He goes on to make the revelation, that every action had to be given the

sanctioned by the Belfast Brigade, OC, the PIRA Internal Security33, and the Northern

Command34. Bradley also relates that every time an IRA man was arrested he was met by

Freddie Scapaticci to be debriefed. These would take place in Jamaica Street in Ardoyne35.

Because of the complete infiltration of the PIRA in the Belfast area attack after attack was

being foiled. This led to a number of the PIRA’s ASU members being tortured by PIRA’s

Internal Security. One of those would be murdered as an informer just a few weeks prior to

John Bingham and significantly the same 38 calibre revolver was used in both murders. The

book reveals that Paddy Murray was not only a key figure in the Belfast ASU but was

responsible for constructing hides for the unit’s weaponry.

In August 1986, the PIRA were planning an attack on the RUC in the Short Strand area of

Belfast. The ASU was number one on the chart, it would engage most of the operations

across north, central and south-central Belfast. They would also venture into west Belfast

when needed to do so. The attack was on was abandoned at the last minute. There had

been suspicions about those in the ASU and the bombmaker had been abducted and taken

to a secret location in South Armagh to be questioned by the PIRA’s Internal Security Unit.

He was ruffed-up but was returned despite being an agent.

Paddy Murray was next; he was taken to a house in the Clonard area off the Springfield

Road. In a house, he and fellow agent Brendan Davidson were interrogated. Davidson,

although blindfolded and tied to a chair, survived when Murray is said to have confessed

almost immediately, causing panic in his interrogators by telling them he had told the RUC

SB that he was going to meet them - PIRA Internal Security. Patrick Murray was murdered in

an alley close by. The gun used was 38 calibre revolver, it had been used to murder a UDR

soldier just 11 days prior and would be used by the deceased man’s AUS to murder John

Bingham in the subsequent month. The ASU, Belfast Brigade ASU1, that murdered John

Bingham, had four active agents in the months preceding and succeeding the attack. The

unit’s direct line of command also compromised as an agent was working in the PIRA’s 3rd

battalion leadership. The Belfast Brigade and Internal Security structures also had agents,

both of which, had to give direct confirmation of the murders.

In all, at least eight agents would have had prior knowledge to the murder of John Bingham.

One also has immunity from prosecution, while another has received and OTR. With these

facts considered, it is inconceivable, that with all of these agents working for a number of

20 | P a g e .

diverse agencies, who had penetrated the PIRA, that the Bingham murder could not have

been prevented.

The Command Structure and Level Security Force Infiltration.

21 | P a g e .

Conclusion

Aristotle said, “At his best man is the noblest of all animals; separated from law and justice he is the

worst.” For thirty years’ justice and the rule of law have been denied in the case of John Bingham.

This report has shown that evidence was tampered with by the state to protect those guilty of

murder. It has produced evidence of collusion between the security services and the PIRA to murder

Mr. Bingham. The RUC had two units in place just two hundred meters away while the murder took

place. The PSNI state that all records concerning these units have been destroyed and that they hold

no details about their objective or make-up. The MOD state that they cannot release details of the

incident due to health and safety issues. The RUC also removed vital first aid from Mr. Bingham and

this has been expunged from the official reports. The RUC refused to investigate a suspect and

would not move to act on intelligence until a meeting took place between the CID and Special

Branch. ULET call for a full independent investigation as set out in Regina v. Secretary of State for the

Home Department which states:

70. For an investigation into alleged unlawful killing by State agents to be effective, it

may generally be regarded as necessary for the persons responsible for and carrying

out the investigation to be independent from those implicated in the events. This

means not only a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection but also a practical

independence.

As of date, the PSNI Chief Constable has refused to confirm the status of the investigation into Mr.

Bingham’s murder. This despite them having a legal duty to do so. This is laid out in the decision of

the European Court of Human Rights: Brecknell v The United Kingdom [2008] 46 EHRR 42. The

relevant judgment and principles are set out in paragraphs [65] and following:

[65] The obligation to carry out an effective investigation into unlawful or suspicious

deaths is well established in the Court's case law. 13 When considering the

requirements flowing from the obligation, it must be remembered that the essential

purpose of such investigation is to secure the effective implementation of the

domestic laws which protect the right to life and, in those cases involving state

agents or bodies, to ensure their accountability for deaths occurring under their

responsibility. Furthermore, even where there may be obstacles or difficulties which

prevent progress in an investigation in a particular situation, a prompt response by

the authorities is vital in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule

of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts.

[69] The Court would also comment that there is little ground to be overly

prescriptive as regards the possibility of an obligation to investigate unlawful killings

arising many years after the events since the public interest in obtaining the

prosecution and conviction of perpetrators is firmly recognised, particularly in the

context of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

If this had of been anyone else, the media and rights groups would be leading calls for truth and

investigations, but, they with the state are silent. If the state refuses to investigate, then we must

investigate the state. ULET would ask anyone who would have information concerning the murder of

22 | P a g e .

John Bingham to contact us. All information will be treated in the strictest confidence. You can email

us securely at: ulet@protonmail.com

23 | P a g e .

Endnotes

1 See The Northern Ireland Assembly 1982-1986: A Constitutional Experiment. p.124.

2 Walker. G. A History of the Ulster Unionist Party: Protest, Pragmatism and pessimism. p.223.

3 Aughey. A. Under Siege: Ulster Unionism And The Anglo-Irish Agreement. p.70.

4 Ibid.p.72.

5 Aughey. A. Under Siege: Ulster Unionism And The Anglo-Irish Agreement. p.73

6 Lost Lives. p. 1006.

7 Ibid.p.1029.

8 Ibid.p.1058.

9 Sunday World, 6

th April 1986. p.11.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Davies. N. Dead Men Talking. Mainstrem Publish. London. 2004. p. 165.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Sunday World circulation figures for July – December 1986. Sunday World, 27

th March 1988.

18 Sunday World 6

th April 1986.

19 Ibid.

20 Author, Ian Woods, attributes the murder to a senior UDA figure. See Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the

UDA: A History of the UDA. p.90. 21

Lost Lives reference: 2738, p.1033 & 2745, p.1036. 22

Sunday World, 11th

May 1986, p.3. 23

Sunday World, 20th

July 1986. p.2. 24

Sunday World, 3rd

August 1986. Pp.12-13. 25

Sunday World, 21st

September 1986.p.2. 26

Sunday World, 3rd

January 1988.p.1. 27

Deposition to coroner, page 30. 28

Statement 34, page 74. 29

Gerry Bradly. Insider: A life in the IRA. pp.200-1. 30

Richard English, Armed Struggle: A History of the IRA. McMillen: London.2004. p.213. 31

Ibid. p.198. 32

Ibid.p210. 33

Ibid. p.220. 34

Ed Maloney. A Secret History of the IRA. Penguin: London. 2002. p.346. 35

Ibid.p.212.