Studying who values whom in the U.S. House of Representatives Kristin Kanthak EITM July 11, 2007.
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Transcript of Studying who values whom in the U.S. House of Representatives Kristin Kanthak EITM July 11, 2007.
Studying who values whom Studying who values whom in the U.S. House of in the U.S. House of
RepresentativesRepresentatives
Kristin KanthakKristin Kanthak
EITMEITM
July 11, 2007July 11, 2007
This talk is based on…*This talk is based on…*Group ‘Tokenism’ and Descriptive
Representation within Political Organizations:
Gender and Colleague Valuation in the U.S. House of Representatives
Kristin Kanthak †University of Pittsburgh
George A. Krause ‡University of Pittsburgh
& Amanda Driscoll #
Washington University – St. Louis
* Coauthors bear no responsibility for the “crimes of research” confessed herein.
Operationalizing the Operationalizing the “smoke-filled room”“smoke-filled room”
Real legislating happens behind Real legislating happens behind closed doorsclosed doors
Member-to-member contribution Member-to-member contribution patterns allow us to glimpse member patterns allow us to glimpse member valuationsvaluations Leadership PACsLeadership PACs
Leadership PAC dataLeadership PAC data
Donor/recipient dyadsDonor/recipient dyads Each leadership PAC matched with each Each leadership PAC matched with each
party memberparty member Values range from zero to $15,000Values range from zero to $15,000
91 percent of observations are zero91 percent of observations are zero Donations are a consumption goodDonations are a consumption good
No effect on electoral outcomesNo effect on electoral outcomes Tiny percentage of total campaign Tiny percentage of total campaign
receiptsreceipts
““Soaking and poking”Soaking and poking”Proportion who received donation, 2000 Proportion who received donation, 2000
cyclecycle
Men DonorsMen Donors Women Women DonorsDonors
DemocratsDemocrats Men: 0.10Men: 0.10
Women: 0.08Women: 0.08Men: 0.11Men: 0.11
Women: 0.14Women: 0.14
RepublicansRepublicans Men: 0.12Men: 0.12
Women: 0.17Women: 0.17Men: 0.07Men: 0.07
Women: 0.06Women: 0.06
TokenismTokenism
E.g., Kanter (1977), Laws (1975)E.g., Kanter (1977), Laws (1975) ““Token” minorities receive special Token” minorities receive special
attention from majority, are attention from majority, are suspicious of each othersuspicious of each other
Non-“token” minorities worry the Non-“token” minorities worry the majority, can work together majority, can work together
Why should we care?Why should we care?
Descriptive representation critical to Descriptive representation critical to democracy (Mill 1861, Pitkin 1967, democracy (Mill 1861, Pitkin 1967, Mansbridge 1999)Mansbridge 1999)
Representation of women increases Representation of women increases legitimacy of government (Schwindt-legitimacy of government (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005, Lawless Bayer and Mishler 2005, Lawless 2004)2004)
The paper, beta versionThe paper, beta version
Report of the empirical patternReport of the empirical pattern Grounded in tokenism literatureGrounded in tokenism literature Reviewers didn’t buy itReviewers didn’t buy it
The paper, reloadedThe paper, reloaded
Need to think carefully about first Need to think carefully about first principlesprinciples What do utility functions look like?What do utility functions look like?
What is the role of ideology?What is the role of ideology?
First principlesFirst principles
Token minorities get “special” Token minorities get “special” attentionattention Pressure to “be one of the boys”Pressure to “be one of the boys”
Non-token minorities get ignoredNon-token minorities get ignored But “old girls’ network” startsBut “old girls’ network” starts
But really, ideological proximity is But really, ideological proximity is most importantmost important
Constrained optimizationConstrained optimization
The idea: Members value their The idea: Members value their colleagues subject to some budget colleagues subject to some budget constraintconstraint
The problem: What’s the constraint?The problem: What’s the constraint? The moral: Formal models can reveal The moral: Formal models can reveal
assumptions that do not make senseassumptions that do not make sense
Decision theoryDecision theory
““Am I better off with or without Am I better off with or without another member of my own group?”another member of my own group?”
Valuation is not a strategic choiceValuation is not a strategic choice A consumption goodA consumption good
How to value the other How to value the other groupgroup
Small “other” groups are tokensSmall “other” groups are tokens Larger groups threaten, then take, Larger groups threaten, then take,
the majoritythe majority Very large “other” groups make you Very large “other” groups make you
the tokenthe token
Marginal utility from the other Marginal utility from the other groupgroup
First derivative provides the utility First derivative provides the utility for each additional member of other for each additional member of other groupgroup The valuation of each individualThe valuation of each individual
What does this look like?What does this look like?
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Group BProportion
Uti
lity
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Group BProportion
Mar
gin
al U
tilit
y
w*- w*+
Figure 1:Group A Utility and
Marginal Utility from Members of Group B
w**
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Group BProportion
Uti
lity
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Group BProportion
Mar
gin
al U
tilit
y
w*- w*+
Figure 1:Group A Utility and
Marginal Utility from Members of Group B
w**
How to value your own How to value your own groupgroup
Small token groups feel threatened Small token groups feel threatened by each otherby each other
After some threshold, large enough After some threshold, large enough to work togetherto work together
When very large, new token group is When very large, new token group is valuedvalued
Marginal utility of own Marginal utility of own groupgroup
Again, derivative gives utility for Again, derivative gives utility for each additional member of own each additional member of own groupgroup The valuation of each individualThe valuation of each individual
What does this look like?What does this look like?
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
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0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1Group B
Proportion
Uti
lity
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1Group B
Proportion
Mar
gin
al U
tilit
y
w*- w*+
Figure 2: Group B Utility and
Marginal Utility from Members of Group B
w**
Valuation within the same Valuation within the same larger grouplarger group
Assumption: Valuations are symmetricAssumption: Valuations are symmetric If group sizes were switched, behavior would If group sizes were switched, behavior would
be the same (Young and James 2001)be the same (Young and James 2001) Therefore, inflection points are the sameTherefore, inflection points are the same Behavior for different subgroups on Behavior for different subgroups on
different sides of the inflection points different sides of the inflection points ought to be differentought to be different
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1Group B
Proportion
Ma
rgin
al U
tilit
y
Group B
Group A
Figure 3: Differences in Group A and Group B Marginal Utility Valuations
Within the Same Larger Group
**w
**w
**w
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1Group B
Proportion
Ma
rgin
al U
tilit
y
Group B
Group A
Figure 3: Differences in Group A and Group B Marginal Utility Valuations
Within the Same Larger Group
**w
**w
**w
Gender is binaryGender is binary
Gender is a dichotomous variable, WGender is a dichotomous variable, W Not enough variation in wNot enough variation in w
Parties are on either side of Kanter’s Parties are on either side of Kanter’s (arbitrary) 15 percent inflection point(arbitrary) 15 percent inflection point Republicans are 8-9 percent womenRepublicans are 8-9 percent women Democrats are 18-19 percent womenDemocrats are 18-19 percent women
What about ideology?What about ideology?(other group)(other group)
Conservative theory: Ideology is Conservative theory: Ideology is what really matterswhat really matters At the extremes of ideological At the extremes of ideological
divergence, being in the other group has divergence, being in the other group has no effectno effect
2 2 2, 1 2 31 ( 2 3 ),A DMU D D w w
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Group B Proportion
Mar
gin
al U
tilit
y D=0
D=.25
D=.5
D=.75
D=1
Figure 4: The Impact of Value Divergence (D) on Group A
Marginal Utility Valuations
wHwL
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Group B Proportion
Mar
gin
al U
tilit
y D=0
D=.25
D=.5
D=.75
D=1
Figure 4: The Impact of Value Divergence (D) on Group A
Marginal Utility Valuations
wHwL
The mirror image of other group The mirror image of other group valuationvaluation At the extreme of ideological At the extreme of ideological
divergence, being in one’s own group is divergence, being in one’s own group is all that mattersall that matters
What about ideology?What about ideology?(same group)(same group)
2 2 2, 1 2 31 ( 2 3 ),B DMU D D w w
Figure 5:The Impact of Value Divergence (D) on Group B
Marginal Utility Valuations
-3.5-3
-2.5-2
-1.5-1
-0.50
0.51
1.5
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1Group B Proportion
Ma
rgin
al U
tilit
y D=0
D=.25
D=.5
D=.75
D=1
wHwL
Figure 5:The Impact of Value Divergence (D) on Group B
Marginal Utility Valuations
-3.5-3
-2.5-2
-1.5-1
-0.50
0.51
1.5
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1Group B Proportion
Ma
rgin
al U
tilit
y D=0
D=.25
D=.5
D=.75
D=1
wHwL
Theoretical predictionsTheoretical predictions
Majority group (or fellow minority group) Majority group (or fellow minority group) valuations of minority group members valuations of minority group members are negatively (or positively) related to are negatively (or positively) related to the minority’s relative group sizethe minority’s relative group size
The size of the minority group The size of the minority group influences how dramatically preference influences how dramatically preference (ideological) divergence affects (ideological) divergence affects colleague valuation colleague valuation
Nature of the dataNature of the data
Donor/recipient dyadsDonor/recipient dyads Every leadership PAC matched with Every leadership PAC matched with
every party memberevery party member Donations range from $0 to $15,000Donations range from $0 to $15,000
Virtually all donations are $0Virtually all donations are $0
Ancillary variablesAncillary variables
Donor and recipient from same stateDonor and recipient from same state Donor and recipient from same regionDonor and recipient from same region Donor and recipient on same committeeDonor and recipient on same committee Percent of vote recipient received in last Percent of vote recipient received in last
electionelection Number of terms recipient servedNumber of terms recipient served Recipient in leadership, on power committeeRecipient in leadership, on power committee Size of PACSize of PAC
Tobit modelTobit model
Workhorse of campaign contributions Workhorse of campaign contributions empirical modelsempirical models
Allows truncated normal distributionAllows truncated normal distribution But what does zero mean?But what does zero mean?
Some unobserved latent value, NOT the Some unobserved latent value, NOT the value itselfvalue itself
Heckman modelHeckman model
Two stage Heckman modelTwo stage Heckman model Do I donate?Do I donate? How much do I donate?How much do I donate?
Zero here means donor chose zero in Zero here means donor chose zero in the first stagethe first stage
But regressors cannot be the same in But regressors cannot be the same in the selection and outcome equationthe selection and outcome equation
Corner solution semi-Corner solution semi-logarithmic Tobit modellogarithmic Tobit model
Zero is a (meaningful) corner solution Zero is a (meaningful) corner solution to an optimization problemto an optimization problem Wooldridge 2002; Gordon, Hafer, and Wooldridge 2002; Gordon, Hafer, and
Landa 2006Landa 2006 (But they all give about the same (But they all give about the same
results anyway)results anyway)
““Additive model”Additive model”
What is the effect of gender on What is the effect of gender on valuation?valuation?
Gender, plus ideological distanceGender, plus ideological distance, , plus ancillary variablesplus ancillary variables
ResultsResults
IndependentVariable
Rep. Men Rep.Women
Dem. Men Dem.Women
WomanRecipient
1.808*(0.3326)
1.819(1.265)
-3.270*(0.5421)
-2.193*(0.8763)
IdeologicalDistance
-12.01*(1.425)
-28.29*(7.202)
-6.966*(1.120)
-6.183*(1.979)
Effect of genderEffect of gender
Republican and Democratic men have Republican and Democratic men have significantly different donation patternssignificantly different donation patterns Republicans give 20 percent more to womenRepublicans give 20 percent more to women Democrats give 26 percent less to womenDemocrats give 26 percent less to women
So do Republican and Democratic womenSo do Republican and Democratic women Republicans give 10 percent more to womenRepublicans give 10 percent more to women Democrats give 22 percent less to womenDemocrats give 22 percent less to women
““Multiplicative model”Multiplicative model”
Do colleagues “punish” men and Do colleagues “punish” men and women equally for ideological women equally for ideological divergence?divergence?
Gender, plus ideological distance, Gender, plus ideological distance, plus gender X ideological distanceplus gender X ideological distance, , plus ancillary variablesplus ancillary variables
ResultsResults
IndependentVariable
Rep. Men Rep.Women
Dem. Men Dem.Women
WomanRecipient
1.424*(0.3596)
0.5995(1.265)
-3.030*(0.5729)
-2.276*(0.9236)
IdeologicalDistance
-13.76*(1.864)
-37.45*(9.646)
-6.437*(1.193)
-6.435*(2.267)
WomanRecipient xIdeologicalDistance
7.425*(2.484)
32.81*(12.60)
-4.324*(3.469)
1.575(4.545)
SimulationsSimulations
What are the “real” effects of gender What are the “real” effects of gender and ideological distance on donations?and ideological distance on donations?
Two sets of deterministic simulations, Two sets of deterministic simulations, setting ancillary variables at their setting ancillary variables at their meansmeans Decision to giveDecision to give How much to give, given a decision to giveHow much to give, given a decision to give
Figure 6: Simulated probability of donation for differing ideological distance,
all other values held to their means
Men Women
Republican Men Donors
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Ideological distance
Pr(D
onat
ion)
Democratic Men Donors
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Ideological distance
Pr(D
onat
ion)
Republican Women Donors
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Ideological distance
Pr(D
onat
ion)
Democratic Women Donors
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Ideological distance
Pr(D
onat
ion)
Men Women
Republican Men Donors
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Ideological distance
Pr(D
onat
ion)
Democratic Men Donors
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Ideological distance
Pr(D
onat
ion)
Republican Women Donors
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Ideological distance
Pr(D
onat
ion)
Democratic Women Donors
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Ideological distance
Pr(D
onat
ion)
Figure 7: Simulated amount donated (given that a donation is made)
for differing ideological distance, all other values held to their means
Republican Women Donors
0
500
1000
1500
2000
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Ideological distance
Amou
nt o
f don
atio
n
Democratic Women Donors
0
500
1000
1500
2000
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Ideological distance
Amou
nt o
f don
ation
Men Women
Republican Men Donors
0
500
1000
1500
2000
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Ideological distance
Amou
nt o
f don
atio
n
Democratic Men Donors
0
500
1000
1500
2000
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Ideological distance
Amou
nt d
onat
ed
Republican Women Donors
0
500
1000
1500
2000
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Ideological distance
Amou
nt o
f don
atio
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Democratic Women Donors
0
500
1000
1500
2000
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Ideological distance
Amou
nt o
f don
ation
Men Women
Republican Men Donors
0
500
1000
1500
2000
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Ideological distance
Amou
nt o
f don
atio
n
Democratic Men Donors
0
500
1000
1500
2000
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Ideological distance
Amou
nt d
onat
ed
Support for theorySupport for theory
Republican men give more to womenRepublican men give more to women Democratic men give less to womenDemocratic men give less to women Republicans punish more than Republicans punish more than
Democrats for ideological divergenceDemocrats for ideological divergence
Divergence from theoryDivergence from theory
Republican women do not give less to Republican women do not give less to womenwomen No significant gender effectNo significant gender effect
Democratic women do not give more to Democratic women do not give more to womenwomen They give significantly less to womenThey give significantly less to women
Republicans punish women less for Republicans punish women less for divergencedivergence
Democratic men punish women more for Democratic men punish women more for divergencedivergence
ConclusionsConclusions
Tokenism existsTokenism exists Explains majority group behavior and Explains majority group behavior and
ideology-based valuationsideology-based valuations Token valuations can trump ideology-Token valuations can trump ideology-
based valuationsbased valuations Minorities may feel pressure to mimic Minorities may feel pressure to mimic
majority group behaviormajority group behavior