Study on the Issues about Hydrogen Explosion at Fukushima...

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Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization 1 Study on the Issues about Hydrogen Explosion at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS Masao Ogino Nuclear Energy System Safety Division Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization Technical Workshop on the Accident of TEPCO s Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS July 2012

Transcript of Study on the Issues about Hydrogen Explosion at Fukushima...

  • Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization

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    Study on the Issues about Hydrogen Explosion at Fukushima

    Dai-ichi NPS

    Masao Ogino Nuclear Energy System Safety Division

    Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization

    Technical Workshop on the Accident of TEPCO’s Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

    July 2012

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    ❏ Background

    ❏ Hydrogen Explosion at Unit 1 and Unit 3

    ❏ Cause of explosion at R/B of Unit 4

    ❏ Summary and Remarks

    Outline

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    Background

    ❏ Hydrogen explosion occurred in the R/Bs of Unit 1, Unit 3 and Unit 4 during accident progression at Fukushima Dai-ich NPS in March 2011.

    ❏ R/B has safety functions of confinement to protect from FP release to the environment as well as installment of many safety equipments in it.

    ❏ Explosion in the R/B made obstacles against operators to mitigate the accident at the site.

    ❏ Investigate the cause of hydrogen explosion in the R/B to investigate Fukushima accident and to study countermeasures for such hydrogen explosion.

    ❏ In this presentation, describe about the hydrogen explosion at Unit 1 and Unit 3 at first, then the cause of explosion at Unit 4.

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    Hydrogen Explosion at Unit 1 and Unit 3

    ❏ Investigate the cause of hydrogen explosion at Unit 1 and Unit 3 by explosion analyses comparing with the existing conditions of R/B after explosion.

    ❏ Total amount of hydrogen gas released into R/B from

    PCV and its released rate were used referring the accident progression analysis results of Unit 1 and Unit 3 by severe accident analysis code MELCOR.

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    Hydrogen Explosion Analysis

    (4F floor)

    (5F floor)

    Mixing model and explosion model

    ❏ Purpose: Investigate what exactly has happened in the reactor

    buildings

    ❏ Approach: - Mixing analysis with FLUENT code - Explosion (detonation) analysis with AUTODYN code

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    [m/s]

    PCV top flange leak

    Hydrogen gas flow velocity

    Released hydrogen gas accumulated evenly in the top floor (5F) with high concentration of about 20vol%

    Released flow rate of hydrogen gas was 100kg/h for 4 hours

    0%

    5%

    10%

    15%

    20%

    25%

    0 1 2 3 4 5 6

    経過時間 hour

    平均水素モル分率

    5F

    4F

    3F

    2F

    1FMole

    fra

    ction

    Time (h)

    Hydrogen gas conc.

    Hydrogen mixing in R/B (Unit 1)

    【Assumptions】

    Hydrogen gas of 400kg released to the top floor (5F) of R/B from the PCV top flange

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    PCV leak to 1F floor

    Hydrogen gas distribution

    Mole fraction (-)

    0%

    5%

    10%

    15%

    20%

    25%

    30%

    35%

    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

    経過時間 hour

    平均水素モル分率

    5F

    4F

    3F

    2F

    1F16.5%(1F)

    Time (h)

    Released flow rate of hydrogen gas was 200kg/h for 5 hours

    Mole

    fra

    ction

    Hydrogen gas conc.

    Released hydrogen gas accumulated evenly in the whole of R/B with high concentration of 16-17vol%

    Hydrogen mixing in R/B (Unit 3)

    【Assumptions】

    Hydrogen gas of 1000kg released to the first floor(1F)of R/B from PCV penetration, S/C or etc.

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    t = 100 (ms)

    [m/s]

    t = 100 (ms)

    [m/s]

    Propagation of detonation pressure in the reactor building of Unit 1

    Walls and roofs of top floor (5F) were largely destroyed and debris scattered around the R/B

    Good simulation of the actual explosion at Unit 1

    【Assumption】 Hydrogen gas of 400kg released to the top floor (5F)of R/B

    Hydrogen explosion in R/B (Unit 1)

    (福島中央テレビホームページ) (東京電力ホームページ)

    Detonation analysis with AUTODYN:

    圧力コンター図(10~100ms) t = 20 (ms) t = 100 (ms)

    [kPa]

    t = 10 (ms) 圧力コンター図(10~100ms) t = 20 (ms) t = 100 (ms)

    [kPa]

    t = 10 (ms)

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    Propagation of detonation pressure in the reactor building of Unit 3

    [m/s]

    (福島中央テレビホームページ)

    (東京電力ホームページ)

    Walls and roofs of top floor(5F) and 4F were largely destroyed and debris scattered around the R/B

    Good simulation of the actual explosion at Unit 3

    【Assumption】 Hydrogen gas of 1000kg released to the first floor (1F)of R/B

    Hydrogen explosion in R/B (Unit 3)

    Detonation analysis with AUTODYN:

    t = 100 (ms) t = 35 (ms) t = 5 (ms)

    [kPa]

    t = 100 (ms) t = 35 (ms) t = 5 (ms)

    [kPa]

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    -200

    -150

    -100

    -50

    0

    50

    100

    -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200

    North-South (m)

    West-

    East

    (m)

    West Side Wall (Center)

    West Side Roof (Center)

    1F3

    7sec Wind

    Debris

    Debris

    120m

    Web:福島中央テレビ

    Scattered debris on the ground around Unit 3

    ❏ Distribution of scattered debris of walls and roofs of the west side of Unit 3 agreed with the actual distribution.

    ❏ Debris with initial velocity of 70m/s can reach to about 250m height from the top of R/B in 7 seconds.

    ❏ Agreed with the actual phenomena observed

    at the Unit 3.

    Debris with initial velocity of 20 m/s to 70 m/s

    [m/s] ~70m/s

    Hydrogen explosion and debris scattering (Unit 3) TV broadcast picture

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    ❏ Analyzed R/B hydrogen explosion phenomena during

    Fukushima Dai-ichi accident with FLUENT code and

    AUTODYN code getting insight of the R/B hydrogen

    explosion at Unit 1and Unit 3.

    ❏ Estimation by the hydrogen explosion analysis:

    - Hydrogen gas(~400kg) leaked from PCV upper flange

    and exploded in the top floor of R/B (Unit 1)

    - Hydrogen gas(~1,000kg) leaked to the1F of R/B

    and exploded in the whole R/B (Unit 3)

    (Observed high radiation around the equipment hatch (1F)

    by inspection )

    Summary of R/B hydrogen explosions

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    Cause of explosion at R/B of Unit 4

    ❏To investigate the cause of explosion in the R/B of Unit 4 by evaluating analytically reverse transportation of the vented gas from Unit 3 to the R/B of Unit 4 through vent lines.

    ❏To survey the way of inspection to confirm the

    analytical results

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    ❏ Containment venting flow rate of Unit 3

    Time (h)

    0

    5

    10

    15

    20

    25

    0 50 100 150 200

    Gas

    flow

    rate

    (kg

    /s)

    Mass flow rate of containment venting (Unit 3)

    - MELCOR results(*)

    - Vent gas flow rate:

    0~ 20kg/s

    (*)Report of Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety - IV. Occurrence and Development of the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations, June 2011.

    Containment venting at Unit 3

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    - Analysis code: FLUENT

    - Mesh Model: 237,600meshes

    - Stuck height: 120m

    ❏ CFD model of containment venting line

    Analytical Model of Containment Vent Line

    Junction

    Vent flow

    Stuck

    Unit 3 Unit 4

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    ・ All of vented gas from Unit 3 releases to the environment through the stuck with low venting flow rate.

    ・ Around one quarter of the

    vented gas from Unit 3 reversely flows into the R/B of Unit 4 with high venting flow rate of 20kg/s.

    ❏ Reverse gas flow in to the R/B of Unit 4

    - FLUENT results show that:

    Velocity field in the containment venting line

    [m/s]

    Unit 4 Unit 3

    Outlet of Stack

    CFD analysis results

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    Picture of exploded R/B of Unit 3 and Unit 4

    Unit 3 Unit 4

    (写真:東京電力ホームページより)

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    ❏ Expected cause of explosion

    - Condition of the exploded R/B of Unit 4 was between that of Unit 1 and Unit 3.

    - Indicating the order of total amount of hydrogen gas

    exploded in the R/B of Unit 4 was between Unit 1(400kg) and Unit 3 (1,000kg).

    - Reported that the water level of the spent fuel pool kept

    covering the top of fuels at Unit 4 . - Supposed small amount of hydrogen gas generation by

    radiolysis in a few days before the explosion

    Cause of explosion at R/B of Unit 4

    →Indicating the vented gas from Unit 3 reversely flowed into the R/B of Unit 4

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    - Hydrogen gas generation in SFP of Unit 4: Small amount of hydrogen gas generation in the pool. - Reverse flow of vented gas from Unit 3 to Unit 4: How did large amount of hydrogen gas flow into the

    R/B of Unit 4 from Unit 3?

    ❏ Validation

    Cause of explosion at R/B of Unit 4

    →Need of inspection of the junction area of vent lines of Unit 3 and Unit 4 (bottom of stuck) to evaluate the flow distribution at the junction area with radiation monitor or any other ways

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    Summary and Remarks

    ❏ JNES analyzed hydrogen explosion phenomena in R/B of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS getting insight of the cause of explosions.

    ❏ Estimation by the hydrogen explosion analysis:

    - At Unit 1: hydrogen gas(~400kg) leaked from PCV upper flange

    and exploded in the top floor of R/B (Unit 1)

    - At Unit 3: Hydrogen gas(~1,000kg) leaked to 1F of R/B and

    exploded in the whole R/B (Unit 3)

    - At Unit 4: Total amount of hydrogen gas between that of Unit 1

    and Unit 3 exploded in the R/B (Unit 4),

    which caused by reverse flow through containment vent line

    from Unit 3

    ❏ Need to continue further investigation to fix above estimation.