Student and Environmental Protests in Chile: The...

Student and Environmental Protests in Chile:The Role of Social Media

Andrés SchermanUniversidad Diego Portales

Arturo ArriagadaUniversidad Diego Portales

Sebastián ValenzuelaPontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

In 2011, Chile experienced two massive protest movements – one against the cost and quality of publiceducation and another against the construction of power plants in Patagonia. This represented a uniqueopportunity to analyse and compare how Facebook and Twitter use were related to street demonstrations.Using a probabilistic face-to-face survey among urban youth (18–29 years old) conducted shortly after theprotests, this study revealed a positive relationship between the use of social media and participation in bothsocial movements, even controlling for other relevant variables (e.g. political interest, ideology and trust). Thetheoretical and methodological implications of these findings are discussed in this article.

Keywords: social movements; protests, environmental; Facebook; Twitter

IntroductionThe year 2011 was a turning point in the history of social movements in Chile. For the firsttime since the wave of demonstrations against the military dictatorship in the 1980s, thou-sands of citizens took to the streets to protest: students marched for quality education, andenvironmentalists acted against the construction of power plants in Patagonia and otherprotected areas. Thus, Chileans joined the worldwide wave of political unrest spearheaded bythe Arab Spring, the Spanish indignados and Occupy Wall Street in the United States. Ofcourse, each of these movements originated and developed differently, but a common trendwas the role played by new communication technologies, especially social media, in thecoordination of these movements. The purpose of this article is to provide an in-depthempirical examination of the uses and effects of Facebook and Twitter on student andenvironmental demonstrations in the Chilean winter of 2011. Specifically, it attempts toprofile those who demonstrated and link their use of social media to their offline protestparticipation, paying particular attention to differences in participation according to individ-uals’ materialist and postmaterialist values.

The article is organised as follows. We begin by discussing the transformation experienced byChilean youth in terms of citizenship, review international literature on the role of socialmedia in protest movements and define how we understand materialist and postmaterialistvalues, as well as the relationship between value systems and political participation. After this

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POLITICS: 2015 VOL 35(2), 151–171

doi: 10.1111/1467-9256.12072

© 2014 The Authors. Politics © 2014 Political Studies Association

theoretical discussion, we turn to the empirical analyses using a cross-sectional survey of arepresentative sample of young adults (School of Journalism Universidad Diego Portales &Feedback, 2011). We describe who protests and uses Facebook and Twitter, and we test thecorrelations between using social media and participation in the student and environmentalmovements in Chile in 2011. We conclude by discussing the contribution of our findings tocurrent debates on citizenship, participation and new media.

The context of the 2011 protests in ChileDerided during most of the 1990s and early 2000s as an ‘indifferent’ and ‘politically dis-engaged’ group, Chilean students – both high school and university – demanded in 2011through massive street protests that the government end for-profit universities, offer freehigher education and improve the quality of the educational system in general. The leadersof the movements relied on social media, including Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, tocommunicate with the rest of the student body and amplify the voice of the demonstrationsto attract media attention and public support. Thus, in similar fashion to developments inother countries (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012; Ekström and Östman, 2013), the diffusion ofthe Internet and social media has changed the way young people in Chile exert theircitizenship, increasingly blurring the boundaries between online and offline politicalparticipation.

At the same time, green movements mobilised youth against HidroAysén – a planned powerplant in Chilean Patagonia – through large public demonstrations in Santiago, the capital city.Promoted by the Spanish company Endesa and the Chilean company Colbún, HidroAyséninvolved the construction of five plants on the Baker and Pascua rivers, flooding 5,910hectares of pristine land, and installing a transmission line across most of the southern andcentral regions of Chile. The project, as could be expected, garnered the firm opposition ofenvironmental groups.

The strength and widespread nature of these social movements became evident on reviewingsome of the results of the survey on Youth, Participation and Media Consumption 2011(School of Journalism Universidad Diego Portales & Feedback, 2011) – an annual studycarried out in the three most important urban centres in the country since 2009. Accordingto this study, in 2012, 33 per cent of the population between 18 and 29 years old confirmedthey had attended at least one public demonstration over the last 12 months – a figure thatis more than double the response rates obtained in the 2009 and 2010 surveys for the samequestion.

Youth, participation and online mediaIn step with the international trend, young people in Chile account for low participation levelsin national politics. From 1988 to 2009, the levels of electoral participation of youth between18 and 29 years old diminished from 35 to 9 per cent. Some authors believe this worldwidephenomenon of low electoral commitment reflects changes in the definition and individualpractice of exercising citizenship. Bennett (2008) and Dalton (2008), among others, suggestthat ‘obedient citizens’ are being replaced by ‘self-actualising citizens’. The former channeltheir political actions through more traditional forms of participation such as voting, whereasthe latter do so through civic actions such as community work and non-conventional politicalactivities like protesting, incorporating the use of digital technologies.

152 ANDRÉS SCHERMAN, ARTURO ARRIAGADA AND SEBASTIÁN VALENZUELA

© 2014 The Authors. Politics © 2014 Political Studies AssociationPOLITICS: 2015 VOL 35(2)

As expected, the increasing use of online media for political issues has generated an academicdebate on the connection between their use and the type of political behaviour adopted byyoung people (Xenos and Moy, 2007). The so-called ‘cyberoptimists’ adopt an instrumentalvision of the Internet by suggesting that it decreases the costs of communication, associationand participation (Rheingold, 2000). ‘Cyberpessimists’, on the contrary, argue that the use ofthe Internet drives people away from politics, public affairs and social life (Nie, 2001).However, this dichotomy ignores a more nuanced reality, where the consequences of onlinemedia in the political participation of individuals are contingent to the various contexts, usesand traits of people employing these media (Bimber, 2001, 2003; Kwak, Shah and Holbert,2004; Shah, Kwak and Holbert, 2001). In other words, the effects of online technologies onthe political behaviour of young people are mediated by specific uses (e.g. information versusentertainment) and moderated by predispositions.

Prior research lends support to a more nuanced view of social media effects on politicalbehaviour. Vitak et al. (2011) found that social network sites can impact psychologicalengagement, campaign recruitment and access to resources – all necessary ingredients forparticipation. Studying young people as well, Xenos, Vromen and Loader (2014) argued thatsocial media use may influence engagement by interacting with individuals’ socialisation andemerging forms of citizenship. Specifically, these authors posited that exposure to social media– whether incidental or not – can increase participation for people raised in families wherepolitical discussion is usual. In addition, social media can moderate the relationship betweennew forms of citizenship (e.g. opinion expression in digital media, fighting for consumers’rights, etc.) (Xenos, Vromen and Loader, 2014). In their study on adolescents, Ekström andÖstman (2013) found that online and offline participation through social media was differentdepending on whether social media was used for consuming information, talking with othersusers, creating content or searching for entertainment.

Bearing in mind these considerations, the meta-analysis developed by Boulianne (2009) usingUS data did not find any evidence to suggest that the use of technology and online servicesis related to a lower political commitment of people. On the contrary, a positive associationexists between being exposed to online information and political participation (Owen, 2008;Raynes-Goldie and Walker, 2008; Valenzuela, 2013; Valenzuela, Park and Kee, 2009). In thecase of Chilean youth, prior research has found a positive connection between the use ofonline platforms, including social media, and their level of participation in political and civicactivities (Scherman and Arriagada, 2012; Scherman, Arriagada and Valenzuela, 2012). Theseresults are consistent with studies carried out in other countries (see Bakker and De Vreese,2011; Gil de Zúñiga and Valenzuela, 2011; Harlow, 2012).

Protests and the use of social mediaA study on social media begs the question of what social media is in the first place. Here wewill rely on Ellison and Boyd’s (2013, p. 158) definition. According to the authors, socialmedia are platforms ‘in which participants (1) have uniquely identifiable profiles that consistof user-supplied content, content provided by other users, and system-level data; (2) canpublicly articulate connections that can be viewed and traversed by others; and (3) canconsume, produce, and interact with streams of user-generated content’.

Profiles allow users to obtain substantial information about the profile owners and theirrespective social networks, including personal trajectory, photographs, networks of contacts,and literary and musical tastes (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung and Valenzuela, 2012). Furthermore,

SOCIAL MEDIA AND PROTESTS IN CHILE 153


communication between users of social media can be either public (e.g. commenting on auser’s Facebook Wall) or private (e.g. chatting or internal messaging). Howard and Parks(2012) suggest that, in addition to these characteristics, social media consist of: the informa-tional structure and necessary tools to produce and distribute content with individual value,but that reflect shared values; content in digital form of personal messages, news and ideaswhich are then converted into cultural products; and persons, organisations and industriesthat produce and consume technological tools and their content.

Social media provide a wide variety of possibilities for promoting participation among youth,especially in protest demonstrations. By presenting online individuals’ offline social networks,websites such as Facebook or Twitter facilitate access to a large number of contacts, increasingthe probability of reaching critical mass. The digital nature of these media diminishes themonetary cost involved in the mass distribution of information to mobilise individuals. Socialmedia can also promote the construction of social and individual identity – informationrelevant to the protesting activity (Dalton, Sickle and Weldon, 2009) – enabling multiplechannels for interpersonal feedback and peer acceptance and strengthening group standards.These sites can also operate as information centres. For example, Facebook users have a newsfeed that monitors their contacts with regular updates on what they are doing (Hargittai,2007). Likewise, these services allow users to create and join groups with common interests.Hence, people belonging to social and political movements can receive useful information thatmay be difficult to obtain otherwise, such as finding opportunities to become involved inpolitics. At the same time, the frequent participation of individuals – in both online and offlinegroups – helps build trust among members, thus increasing the social media potential tostimulate commitment in protests, as well as other political behaviours (Kobayashi, Ikeda andMiyata, 2006). Social media are effective platforms for social interaction. Whether as aninstance for chatting, connecting with family, friends and society, or accessing content of otherpeople, social media can create the conditions that instill in youth an interest for collectivepublic affairs. In addition, social media allow people to find others with similar ideas (Fábregaand Paredes, 2013) and, eventually, to organise activities with them. At the same time,through these sites people can access alternative news sources and increase their levels ofsocial capital (Ellison et al., 2014; Valenzuela, Park and Kee, 2009). Finally, people non-interested in politics can engage with public affairs due to a casual or incidental exposure tosocial media (Xenos, Vromen and Loader, 2014, p. 154).

The connection between social media use and protests has been shown in several interna-tional studies. In fact, the social mobilisations and democratisation in the Arab world in 2011,known as the ‘Arab Spring’, has intensified research on the relationship between social mediaand participation. Tufekci and Wilson (2012) found that the use of social media (mainlyFacebook) had increased the likelihood of Egyptians attending the protests at Tahir Squareagainst the Hosni Mubarak regime. Likewise, Lim (2012) explains how social media helped toarticulate opposition movements to the government even before demonstrations began in2011.

In this context, social media emerge as resources to develop collective experiences – anecessary condition for the success of social movements and protests. As Bennett (2008)suggests, with their condition as ‘digital natives’,1 young people can experiment with newways of exercising citizenship that aspire to achieving collective experiences associated withthe use and appropriation of social media. For this reason, the first hypothesis of this articlesets forth that:



H1.1: There is a positive relationship between Facebook and the participation of Chileanyouth in protest demonstrations.

H1.2: There is a positive relationship between Twitter and the participation of Chilean youthin protest demonstrations.

The relationship proposed in the first part of the hypothesis implies that users of this socialmedia are more inclined to protest because they become involved in activities that areessential for collective action such as processing useful information, exchanging and formingopinions on public affairs, and building a common identity with their peers. This means thathaving a Facebook account or frequent media use increases the probability of performingthese activities, but does not mechanically facilitate the action of protesting.

Because Facebook and Twitter are different platforms, it is advisable to analyse their influenceon protest participation separately. For one thing, the demographic profile of users is different.In Chile, Facebook has always been more popular among youth than Twitter (see Figures 3and 4). The socioeconomic profile of users varies across network sites: whereas Facebookusers are similarly distributed among the rich, middle and poor classes, Twitter users tend tocome disproportionately from higher income groups (School of Journalism Universidad DiegoPortales & Feedback, 2011).

Moreover, the types of networks tapped by Facebook and Twitter are different, too. Facebooktends to be a symmetric network because both parties, or ‘friends’, must approve theirFacebook relationship (Valenzuela, Arriagada and Scherman, 2014). Thus, Facebook ‘friend-ships’ tend to occur among people with an existing, offline relationship, which explains thebenefits of Facebook for maintaining existing social ties (Ellison, Steinfield and Lampe, 2007).In contrast, Twitter networks are rather asymmetrical: users can have a relationship withoutboth agreeing to it. Although Twitter users can protect their accounts by asking for permissionto approve potential followers, compared to Facebook it is safe to assume that Twitter is moreopen to weak-tie relationships.

Considering the differences in the social ties promoted by Facebook and Twitter, it is notsurprising that both sites differ considerably in the type of content that is shared by users.Whereas Facebook users mostly share material related to their private and social spheres (e.g.family events, personal pictures, and videos), Twitter users frequently post and discuss news,current events and politics (School of Journalism Universidad Diego Portales & Feedback,2011).

Postmaterialism and ideologyIn addition to describing the nature of the relationship between Facebook use and protesting– and the mechanisms through which this relationship exists – it is important to analyse theconditions that may regulate the role of online social relationships. There are reasons tobelieve that political and cultural values of individuals can expand or diminish the role playedby social media.

‘Materialist values’ refer to security and survival goals that can be attained by material means,such as economic growth and maintaining public order. ‘Postmaterialist values’, in turn,emphasise autonomy and quality-of-life aspects, prioritising goals such as self-expression andachieving gender equality. They are postmaterialist in the sense that they do not refer tomaterial or economic conditions per se. In his seminal The Silent Revolution, Inglehart (1977)



developed and tested two propositions regarding the development of these values. Thescarcity hypothesis states that people’s goals are shaped by their socioeconomic environmentso that the greatest value is placed on aspects of life that are in relatively short supply. Itimplies that wealth promotes postmaterialist values, whereas economic decline promotesmaterialist values. This relationship, however, is qualified by the socialisation hypothesis,which posits that the effect of the socioeconomic environment on goal priorities is notimmediate, but takes place over the long run. Thus, most values develop before reachingadulthood and change relatively little thereafter (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).

In the case of Chile, a period of high economic growth and relative prosperity has coincidedwith the diffusion of postmaterialist values among young people.2 Not surprisingly, thisprocess has been characterised by a tendency for youth to opt for direct political action (e.g.street demonstrations) instead of participating through conventional channels such as voting.At the same time, the participative and open nature of the internet and social media iscoherent with a spirit of disrespect for traditional forms of authority – typical ofpostmaterialism – among those who use them for protesting and political mobilisation.

Different studies have shown that the existence of postmaterialist values is associated withonline media use (Davis and Owen, 1998; Theocharis, 2010). The question is whetherpostmaterialist values contribute to the emergence of online extra-institutional formsof political participation. In his study of the political participation of young people in Greece,Theocharis (2010, p. 215) found ‘postmaterialism is a weak predictor of online extra-institutional activities’. For these reasons, we think that the interaction betweenposmaterialist values and social media influences political participation – albeit values are oneof myriad possible mechanisms.

In addition to postmaterialist values, an individual’s ideology may broaden the relationshipbetween the use of social media and protesting. In general, people at the left of the ideologicalspectrum are more likely to participate in protests as part of their repertoire of political actions(Dalton, Sickle and Weldon, 2009). In Chile, issues such as public education and the envi-ronment are ‘owned’ (Petrocik, 1996) by progressive social movements and left-wing politicalparties. However, it must be said that postmaterialist values and the issues related to left-winggroups overlap each other. Hence, individuals with left-wing ideas may foster the relationshipbetween Facebook and Twitter use and elite-challenging activities such as protesting. In sum:

H2: The existing relationship between the use of social media and protesting is moderatedby individuals’ political and cultural values. Specifically, the relationship between the use ofFacebook and Twitter and the action of protesting is stronger in individuals that identifywith postmaterialist values.

Social capital is another dimension worthy of consideration. For Bourdieu and Wacquant(1992, p. 14), social capital is ‘the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to anindividual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institution-alized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition’. In the same direction, Lin(2001) equated social capital to an ‘investment in social relations’, which highlights theimportance of personal relationships (Ellison, Steinfield and Lampe, 2007). Prior research hasshown that social capital has a positive relationship with political participation in variousways. Through social capital, civil society can become strengthened and the social coordina-tion of individuals is facilitated – both of which can result in higher levels of participation (Gilde Zúñiga, Jung and Valenzuela, 2012; Putnam, 2000; Valenzuela, Park and Kee, 2009).



Interest in politics and political trust, are important determinants of participation, too. Interestin politics is an important predictor of political participation (Mannarini, Legittimo and Talò,2008). Moreover, trust in political authorities has a controversial effect on political participa-tion. Some authors say that trust in authorities increases participation overall (Fennema andTillie, 1999; Sharoni, 2012), whereas others posit that trust increases conventional politicalparticipation only, but that mistrust triggers extra-institutional forms of participation, such asprotests. Furthermore, when mistrust is accompanied by the perception of having a greatcapacity to influence public policy decisions, unconventional participation is particularlylikely (Gamson, 1968; Johnson, Kaye and Kim, 2010; Mannarini, Legittimo and Talò, 2008).Although we do not posit specific hypotheses about the interaction between social media use,social capital, political interest and trust, we take into account these factors as control variablesin the statistical models.

MethodTo test the hypotheses, we rely on data from the Youth, Participation and Media ConsumptionSurvey of 2011, which contains detailed measures of protest participation, social media useand other sociodemographic variables. This survey interviewed 1,737 individuals aged 18 andolder, living in Chile’s three largest urban centres (Greater Santiago, Greater Valparaíso andGreater Concepción), which comprise nearly two-thirds of the country’s adult population.The sample was probabilistic and queried using a face-to-face questionnaire. For the regres-sion analyses, only young adults (in the 18–29 age group) were selected (N = 1,014). For moredetails on the survey, see Valenzuela, Arriagada & Scherman (2012).

In order to test the hypotheses, regression models were built to explain two dependantvariables: participation in the student movement (measured through an index with aminimum and maximum value of 0 and 4,3 respectively), which accounts for the type ofactivities carried out by the people in relation to this issue); and participation in the move-ment that opposed the HidroAysén construction (also considered through the construction ofa counter, with minimum and maximum values of 0 and 3, respectively).4

There are five groups of explanatory variables: (1) use of online and traditional mass media(consumption hours of broadcast television, radio, press and online media); (2) presence onsocial media (registered with a Facebook and Twitter account); (3) postmaterialist values andideology; (4) political and social variables previously identified as determinant of politicalparticipation (trust in institutions, social capital, political effectiveness, interest in politics);and (5) sociodemographic variables (gender, age and socioeconomic level).

Results

Descriptive results

Of the 1,014 respondents, 50.4 per cent were men, their mean age was 23.5 (standarddeviation (S.D.): 3.6) and socioeconomic status was distributed in the following manner: 6.4per cent ABC1 (upper class), 24 per cent C2 (upper middle class), 48 per cent C3 (lowermiddle class) and 21.8 per cent D–E (low class).

In the realm of participation, the mean of activities linked with the student protests was 1.3(S.D.: 0.9) measured through an index between 0 and 4, and the actions linked withenvironmental protests was 0.9 (S.D.: 0.8) measured through an index between 0 and 3.



Another relevant finding revealed that even though young people have voted with much lessfrequency than the rest of the population over the last two decades, the level of declaredinterest in politics for the 18–29 age group is not less than that of older individuals. In otherwords, despite an obvious lack of electoral participation among youth, this does not mean alesser connection of youth with the debate on issues of public interest, or, as we recentlyanalysed, in their wish to demonstrate publicly (see Figures 1 and 2).

As Figures 1 and 2 show, interest in politics displayed by young people is very similar to thatof the rest of the population. In fact, their political participation through non-electoralchannels exceeds that of adults on several occasions.

The survey also showed the extensive use of social media among Chilean youth. Facebook,without a doubt, leads the pack: 86 per cent of the population between 18 and 29 stated theywere registered on this platform and 52 per cent logged on at least once a day. Twitter occupiesa distant second place: 21 per cent declared having an active account and 14 per cent loggedon every day.

Likewise, the frequency in use of these social media in the 18–29 year old segment issignificantly higher than in the adult population. While 86 per cent of youth have a Facebookaccount, only 39 per cent of the 30 + age group are in the same situation and, in the case ofTwitter, the percentage of youth registered on this network is triple that of adults (seeFigures 3 and 4).

The relationship between youth participation in public affairs and the use of social media canbe analysed in two important conflicts that marked the debate agenda in Chile in 2011:student demonstrations and first-semester protests against the HidroAysén power plant

Figure 1: Interest in politics

ON A SCALE FROM 1 TO 5, WHERE 1 MEANS “NOT INTERESTED” AND 5 MEANS “VERY INTERESTED”, HOW INTERESTED WOULD YOU SAY YOU ARE IN…? (ONLY ALTERNATIVE “4+5”)

47%

43%

49%

42%

46%

43%

Talking about the situa on and poli cal actors in Chile with friends and family

Poli cal news

TOTAL 18-29 years old 30+ years old

Source: Youth, Participation and Media Consumption 2011 Survey.



Figure 2: Non-electoral participation

IN THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS, HAVE YOU…? (ONLY FOR AFFIRMATIVE ANSWERS)

16%

10% 8% 7%

32%

14% 13%

7%10% 9%

6% 7%

Par cipated in public protests and gatherings?

Signed a ci zen pe on addresses to a public authority?

A end a forum or debate on poli cal issues or public interest?

Par ciping in a mee ng with authori es?

TOTAL 18-29 AÑOS 30+ AÑOS


Figure 3: Registered on Facebook

86%

14%

18-29 years

YESNO

39%61%

30 years +

YESNO

DO YOU HAVE A FACEBOOK ACCOUNT?




project. Both conflicts were covered in depth in the 2011 survey, placing special emphasis onthe ways in which people were informed and/or participated in each event.

In terms of participation, social media played a relevant role in both conflicts as a mediumthrough which a significant number of young people expressed their opinion or helpedcommunicate information on the issue. For example, in the case of HidroAysén, communi-cating or exchanging news on the project was the second most frequent form in which youthrelated to the debate and was only exceeded by interpersonal conversations. Even commu-nicating messages on social media and incorporating into groups created within them wasmuch more widespread than traditional forms of participation such as street demonstrations,meetings with authorities, approaching political parties or attempting to contact traditionalmass media (see Figure 5).

In generational terms, there is also an obvious difference in the intensity with which youthuse social media to become involved in this type of debate in comparison with the rest of thepopulation. To cite just one example, while 42 per cent of young people exchanged informa-tion on the HidroAysén project through social media, only 14 per cent of those older than 30did the same.

In the case of student demonstrations, the role of social media as a form of youth participationwas also important and it constituted the most frequent form of involvement in this debateafter interpersonal conversations (see Figure 6).

More than enabling new forms of participation, social media have also become a source ofrelevant information on issues of public interest, especially for youth. This situation becameapparent on asking for the principal form in which people informed themselves on theHidroAysén project. Internet news sites and social media surpassed radio and newspapers inthe ranking of the most important information sources in the 18–29 age group. In any case,

Figure 4: Registered on Twitter

21%

79%

18-29 years

YESNO

7%

93%

30 years +

YES

NO

DO YOU HAVE A TWITTER ACCOUNT?




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we must highlight that in spite of this difference with some of the traditional mass media(radio and press), digital platforms are still far behind television, which continues to dominatethe information diet of Chileans of all ages (see Figure 7).

Testing of hypotheses

The results of the regression analysis (see Table 1) substantiate our first hypothesis: having aFacebook account and being registered on Twitter are variables that are related to a higherparticipation in the student movement and protests against the construction of HidroAysén.This reaffirms the mobilising potential that social media can exert, even on a segment of thepopulation that has overwhelmingly shown its distance from traditional political institutions(mainly parliamentarians and political parties) and electoral participation.

In comparison to online social network use, traditional mass media news consum-ption shows a low association with the analysed forms of participation. News consumptionfrom broadcast television and the press does not have a significant impact on the formsof participation associated with the student movement, and in the case of demons-trations against HidroAysén, the impact of exposure to broadcast television news is nega-tive. Meanwhile, radio shows a positive relation with the possibility of getting involved inthe student movement, but the impact is relatively limited. On the other hand, the use ofonline mass media for information (news sites and blogs) does show a positive impact onthe two movements under analysis, accounting for a clear contrast with traditional massmedia.

In line with the theory of ‘changing values’, the presence of postmaterialist values and theideological position also appear linked with participation in both movements. Young peoplewith postmaterialist values5 (i.e. when able to choose, they privilege freedom of expression orgreater participation in political decisions over alternatives such as keeping law and order ora lower inflation rate) show a significantly higher link than the rest of their peers withnon-electoral political participation, especially in the student movement. Likewise, those whoidentify with right-wing political views6 are less likely to become involved in this type ofparticipation.

Along with variables linked to the use of social media and mass media, it is relevant to analysethe weight of other factors that have been approached by literature specialised in politicalparticipation. Social capital, measured in terms of the respondents’ participation in differenttypes of social organisations, shows an important impact. In fact, not belonging to any type ofsocial organisation diminishes the probability of a youth becoming involved in the studentmovement or demonstrations against HidroAysén.

Other highly relevant variables are political interest and institutional trust. The former is astrong predictor of participation while the latter has a negative effect, meaning that the peoplewho took part in the two forms of protests we are measuring did so because of strong mistrustof institutions (particularly political institutions). Indeed, this mistrust was precisely one ofthe factors that led them to demonstrate.

On analysing the sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents, the incidence of thesocioeconomic level is remarkable: belonging to a high-income group (ABC1) is positivelyrelated to having participated in the protest movements, which does not hold true for anyother socioeconomic segment. This reflects that the participation of higher-income segments



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in these movements was greater than that of the rest of the population, even though, inprinciple, these protests sought to benefit the poorest sectors of society, as is the case of thepetitions made by the student movement.

Finally, analysis of the interaction between the presence of postmaterialist values and socialnetwork use (see Table 2) did not provide enough evidence to substantiate our secondhypothesis that the use of social media and protesting is moderated by people’s social andpolitical values. Although the use of social media and the presence of postmaterialist values

Table 1: Poisson regressions for predicting participation in the student movement andopposition to the Hidroaysén project

Studentmovement (B)

Opposition toHidroaysén (B)

Gender (Female)Male −0.068 0.004

SEG (D–E) (low class)ABC1 (upper class) 0.293* 0.227*C2 (upper middle class) 0.165 0.121C3 (lower middle) 0.032 0.017

Age −0.046** −0.003Values (Materialism)

Mixed 0.134 0.055Postmaterialism 0.415** 0.150*

Trust in other people (No)Yes 0.121 0.293**

Trust in institutions −0.194** −0.213**Political effectiveness 0.008 0.003Political interest 0.130** 0.138**Associativity (Participates)

Does not participate in organisations −0.303** −0.205**Political position (left-right) −0.079** −0.037**Hours of broadcast TV news −0.012 −0.020*Hours of radio news 0.046* −0.002Hours of press news 0.020 0.004Hours of online media news 0.033* 0.040*Registered on Facebook (No)

Yes 0.221* 0.173*Registered on Twitter (No)

Yes 0.180* 0.186*N 704 704Deviation (Value/gl) 0.663 0.392

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.



are significant predictors of participation (as independent variables), it does not hold truewhen the interaction between both is analysed. Only in the case of participation in thestudent movement does the joint presence of postmaterialist values and being registered onFacebook show a significant impact – a finding that was not repeated on establishing thedeterminant factors of the protests against HidroAysén or on studying the interaction betweenpostmaterialist values and the use of Twitter.

Table 2: Poisson regressions to predict participation in student movement and actions inopposition to the Hidroaysén project (including interaction effects)

Studentmovement (B)

Opposition toHidroaysén (B)

Gender (Female)Male −0.063 0.003

SEG (D–E) (low class)ABC1 (upper class) 0.315** 0.220*C2 (upper middle class) 0.182** 0.113C3 (lower middle) 0.037 0.017

Age −0.046** −0.003Values (Materialism)

Mixed 0.138 0.053Postmaterialism −0.146 0.293

Trust in other people (No)Yes 0.123 0.240**

Trust in institutions −0.205** −0.213**Political effectiveness 0.004 0.005Political interest 0.133** 0.137**Associativity (Participates)

Does not participate in organisations 0.309** 0.202**Political position (left-right) −0.079** −0.036**Hours of broadcast TV news −0.012 −0.020Hours of radio news 0.043* −0.003Hours of press news 0.020 0.004Hours of online media news 0.031* 0.040**Registered on Facebook (No)

Yes 0.110 0.210*Registered on Twitter (No)

Yes 0.132 0.162*Interactions

Facebook x Postmaterialist values 0.566* −0.185Twitter x Postmaterialist values 0.148 0.089

N 704 704Deviation 0.659 0.392

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.



We can think of two reasons that may explain why H2 was not supported. From a methodo-logical perspective, there may be a problem with measurement error. In this research,postmaterialism was gauged with Inglehart’s (1997) classic four-item index, which has beenfound to be less reliable than the more extensive 12-item measure proposed later by the sameauthor (Inglehart, 1990). As is well known, measurement error can significantly attenuatecorrelation. From a theoretical perspective, the scant work available that has tested theinteraction between values and using digital media has also not been able to establish a strongrelationship between postmaterialism and online political participation (e.g. Theocharis,2010, p. 215).

ConclusionThis article has analysed the relationship between the use of social media and youth protestsin Chile on issues of education and the environment. According to the analyses presented, weconclude that there is a positive relationship between the use of both Facebook and Twitterand participation in student demonstrations and street marches against the construction of apower plant in the Patagonia. Controlling for ideology, political interest, social capital andtraditional media, people with an active account in these online media are more likely toprotest.

It is relevant to note that this study deals two different movements – student and environ-mental – formed by individuals with different characteristics and goals that use social mediaintensively to influence the public debate. This phenomenon could be indicative of a moregeneral change in the way young people are protesting, where social media are becomingmore important in coordination and motivation for participation in social movements. Never-theless, the greater role of social media does not remove the importance of demonstrationsoutside the online world. Although it is not possible to separate the offline and online spheres,the lower costs for accessing information and resources to coordinate actions with socialmedia reinforce the attendance to public protests. Offline and online actions are complemen-tary forms of participation – not competitive ones.

It is also important to note that social media have a stronger association with public partici-pation than do traditional media. The results show that newspaper reading is not related tothe participation in the movements under study. They also demonstrate that the exposure tobroadcast television news has a small negative relationship and, finally, exposure to radionews increases slightly the possibility of protesting. In summary, this investigation shows thatfor urban youth in Chile, the association between social media and participation is morerelevant than traditional sources of information. This result is consistent with prior researchnot only in Chile, but elsewhere (Valenzuela, 2013; Valenzuela, Arriagada and Scherman,2012; White and McAllister, 2014; Xenos and Moy, 2007). As a consequence, it is likely thatnew protest cycles will confirm the power of social media over other media in mobilisingyouth.

The relationship between social media and public participation notwithstanding, it should beemphasised that traditional variables related to citizen participation – ideology, politicalinterest and social capital – are important factors associated with the involvement in thestudent and environmental movements and should always be considered in analyses thatinvolve public participation. In this sense, following the idea of the ‘virtuous circle’ (Norris,2000), social media probably reinforce and strengthen previous interests in public affairs,



increasing the possibility of participation. The influence of media is not mechanical; it is partof a more complex process that involves multiple variables.

Regarding the hypothesis that tested the interaction between postmaterialist values and socialmedia use on participation, the data presented do not allow us to confirm that the use of socialmedia is moderated by people’s political and cultural values. Bearing in mind that Facebookand Twitter use and ascribing postmaterialist values are predictors of participation in protests,the interaction between values and social media use only has a positive relationship in thecase of the student movement and not in the case of the HidroAysén protests.

Despite the fact that the interaction between values and social media use shows a weakassociation with participation in protests, it is important to analyse the strong relationshipbetween postmaterialist values and participation (see Table 1). Young people that ascribe topostmaterialist values – linked to self-expression and quality of life – are more likely toparticipate in social movements. This result is consistent with the strong economic growth ofChilean economy in the last 25 years, allowing the transition from materialist topostmaterialist values in Chilean society (Scherman and Arriagada, 2012).

Although the use of these digital platforms reduces the costs of organising and spreading thepetitions of those protesting in the public sphere, the socioeconomic differences observedamong the users of these online digital media is alarming. This inequality of information andtechnological capital may minimise the political repertoire of similar citizens or that have notyet incorporated the use of Facebook or Twitter into exercising their citizenship.

The cross-sectional characteristic of our data limits the possibility of establishing causalrelationships; however language was used carefully to not imply causal effects. Also, due tothe usage of survey data, the self-report about participation and media use may be affected bysocial desirability bias. The usage of panel data would allow the establishment of causalrelationships with more confidence.

Regarding the case studies, the types of participation analysed in both cases (if the personjoined organisations linked to the student movement, if they participated in public demon-strations, if they donated money and if they spoke about the subject with other people) areoriented towards legal changes or another type of reaction by the government or the state.There are open questions regarding the relationship between protest and the use of socialmedia when the counterpart is a private company. Bennett (2004) suggests that there are lessinstitutionalised forms of protest – labeled ‘lifestyle politics’ – where political communicationand demands ‘adopt a lifestyle vocabulary anchored in consumer choice, self-image, andpersonal displays of social responsibility’ (Bennett, 2004, p. 102). This form of protest (e.g.boycotting) can involve actors with various motivations and forms of expressions that areorganised in similar or different ways by actors using social media platforms.

Future research should explore further the relationship between people’s cultural values anduse of social media. Given that we found a weak, but positive, interaction between these twovariables for the student movement, it is possible that we may find this phenomenon in othersituations. Similarly, there is a black-box that needs to be opened regarding the types ofnetworking and engagement formed through uses of social media that evolve into protest.Finally, a qualitative inquiry on social media use for protest behaviour and political partici-pation should be conducted.



AcknowledgmentsThe authors are grateful to Teresa Correa, who contributed with important comments that enriched this article. Also,we are grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their feedback and contributions.

Notes1 This concept refers to managing the technical knowhow to use digital technology. Having grown up in the digital

era, youth are more exposed to the use and appropriation of these digital technologies. This leads to thedevelopment of skills and knowledge in order to use technology such as online social media.

2 In the period 1986–2011, the Chilean economy had an average growth of 5.4 per cent. In the same period, thepopulation in poverty fell from 38.6 per cent (1990) to 15.1 per cent (2009). Meanwhile, the per capita grossdomestic product (PPT) increased from US$3,350 (1986) to US$15,800 (2011).

3 In order to construct this counter, four factors linked to the student movement are considered: if the person joinedorganisations linked to the student movement; if they participated in public demonstrations; if they donatedmoney; and if they spoke about the subject with other people. People who did not perform any of these activitiesreceived the minimum value of 0, while those who did all of them received the maximum value of 4.

4 With the same logic of the previous indicator, three factors linked to the opposition to Hidroaysén were considered:participation in public demonstrations; making money donations; and talking about the subject with others.

5 For this work, the postmaterialism index with four items proposed by Ronald Inglehart was used and therespondents were classified as mixed or materialist postmaterialists.

6 This variable was measured on a scale from 1 to 10 in which the respondents were asked to place themselves, with1 representing the left and 10 the right.

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About the authorsAndrés Scherman (MA, Universidad Católica de Chile) is Associate Professor in the School of Communications atDiego Portales University, where he is also Director of the International Master in Communication. His research focuseson political participation, political communication, social media and youth. Andrés Scherman, School of Communi-cations, Universidad Diego Portales, Vergara 240, Santiago, Chile. E-mail: [email protected]. Twitter: @aschermant

Arturo Arriagada (PhD, London School of Economics and Political Science) is Assistant Professor in the School ofCommunications and Adjunct Professor in the School of Sociology at Diego Portales University. His research topics arethe relation between culture and digital technologies, political communication and social media. Arturo Arriagada,School of Communications, Universidad Diego Portales, Vergara 240, Santiago, Chile. E-mail: [email protected]: @arturoarriagada

Sebastián Valenzuela (PhD, University of Texas at Austin) is Assistant Professor in the School of Communications atPontificia Universidad Católica de Chile and Associate Researcher at the National Research Centre for IntegratedNatural Disaster Management (CIGIDEN). He specialises in political communication, social media and public opinionresearch. His work is supported in part by CONICYT (Chile) via Fondap no. 15110017. Sebastián Valenzuela, Schoolof Communications, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Alameda 340, Santiago, Chile. E-mail: [email protected]: @SebaValenz



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