Structural Factors vs Regime Change-Moldova

7/29/2019 Structural Factors vs Regime Change-Moldova

1/30

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

This article was downloaded on: 26 January 2011

Publisher Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-

41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

DemocratizationPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713634863

Structural factors vs. regime change: Moldova's difficult quest fordemocracyTheodor Tudoroiuaa Center for International Peace and Security Studies, Montreal, Canada

Online publication date: 24 January 2011

To cite this Article Tudoroiu, Theodor(2011) 'Structural factors vs. regime change: Moldova's difficult quest fordemocracy', Democratization, 18: 1, 236 264

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2011.532628URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.532628

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial orsystematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply ordistribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contentswill be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug dosesshould be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directlyor indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713634863http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.532628http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdfhttp://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdfhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.532628http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713634863


2/30

Structural factors vs. regime change:

Moldovas difficult quest for democracy

Theodor Tudoroiu

Center for International Peace and Security Studies, Montreal, Canada

(Received 28 January 2010; final version received 25 May 2010)

This article examines the state of and perspectives on democracy in theRepublic of Moldova. The fall of its communist authoritarian regime in 2009 sometimes compared to a colour revolution went against the trendtoward heavy authoritarianism now visible in the Commonwealth ofIndependent States. However, the regime change in Moldova does notnecessarily imply a process of genuine democratic consolidation. This articleargues that the future course of the Moldovan polity will be decided bystructural domestic and geopolitical factors different from those thatproduced the regime change. Most of these structural factors do not favourdemocratization. Moldovas only chance to secure a genuinely democratictrajectory may therefore be dependent on its relationship with the European

Union (EU). The article argues that nothing short of a process of accession tothe EU can modify factors that are likely to prevent democraticconsolidation. In its absence, the article contends that Moldova will eitherdevelop a Ukrainian-style hybrid regime or return to its authoritarian past.

Keywords: Moldova; democratization; democratic consolidation;transitology; Commonwealth of Independent States; European Union

Introduction

The worsening state of democracy in the Commonwealth of Independent States(CIS) is a subject explored already by a rich literature. During the last decade,

analysis has focused mainly on regime1 change and the weakness of civil

society. By illuminating these important elements, this research has led to a

better understanding of the post-Soviet political evolutions. However, in recent

years analysts have seldom scrutinized the deeper level of structural causes2 that

have helped prevent development of the civic sector and hence democratization.

This makes difficult a comprehensive explanation of undemocratic trends in the

CIS. The Republic of Moldova provides an interesting case study. Its 1992

2001 hybrid regime

3

was followed by a semi-consolidated authoritarian

4

one

ISSN 1351-0347 print/ISSN 1743-890X online

# 2011 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2011.532628

http://www.informaworld.com

Email: [email protected]

Democratization

Vol. 18, No. 1, February 2011, 236264


3/30

that lasted until 2009. The country is today at a crossroads as the recent democratic

opening might either evolve toward genuine democratization or follow the disap-

pointing course of Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan in the aftermath of their

colour revolutions. In order to understand the Moldovan trajectory and predict

its future, analysis of civil society and regime change are undoubtedly important.

But they are only part of a more complex phenomenon. This article tries to show

that domestic as well as geopolitical factors have made the citizens of Moldova

tolerant toward authoritarian practices and reluctant to develop civic engagement.

The ensuing weakness of civil society has prevented the development of a

consolidating democracy. After 2001, this allowed the communists to build a

semi-consolidated authoritarian regime. The latter acted against the civic sector,

thus preserving the conditions allowing its own survival. A favourable conjunction

of circumstances created the present democratic opening but did not modify the

structural factors that prevent the democratization. The article explores the possibleways of taking advantage of this opening in order to break the vicious circle and put

Moldova on a definitely democratic trajectory.

The article has the following structure: the next section makes a brief critical

assessment of the orientation of the recent research on the post-Soviet democrati-

zation. The three sections that follow present Moldovas past, portray the 2001

2009 communist authoritarian regime, and describe the situation created by its

fall. The subsequent section discusses the Moldovan transitology. Finally, a

European Union (EU) accession scenario is examined. The conclusion summarizes

the articles main findings.

Avoiding the regime change trap

In its 19992000 Nations in Transit report,5 Freedom House found no consoli-

dated or semi-consolidated democracy in CIS. There were five hybrid regimes

(including Russia), four semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes, and three conso-

lidated ones.6 The picture was hardly positive. During 20032005, the colour

revolutions seemed to indicate a wave of genuine democratization. However, the

situation depicted in the 2009 report was considerably worse than the one 10years earlier. Consolidated and semi-consolidated democracies continued to be

absent. But the hybrid regimes had shrunk from five to two (Ukraine and

Georgia) and the semi-consolidated authoritarian ones from four to two

(Moldova7 and Armenia). All the other eight republics had by then consolidated

authoritarian regimes.8 Still, this trend has become clear to researchers only

recently. During the early 2000s, they grew interested in hybrid regimes. The

number and the dynamics of these regimes in the post-Soviet area led many ana-

lysts to believe that a trajectory toward or away from ideal-type endpoints like

democracy or autocracy can no longer describe the CIS republics correctly.

9

Consequently, the study of hybrid regimes replaced the transitology paradigm

that was predominant in the 1990s.10 Then, the colour revolutions triggered a

new focus on regime change11 and democracy promotion.12 It was common to

Democratization 237


4/30

state in Ukraine (. . .) the severe crisis (. . .) of 2004 (. . .) brought in its wake a fun-

damental regime change (italics added).13 Today it is obvious that the regime

changed but the type of regime did not. From 1999 to 2009 before, during,

and after the Orange Revolution Ukraine had only hybrid regimes.14 When

the lack of genuine democratization became clear in the second half of the

2000s, the post-Soviet regime changes were compared with the swings of a pendu-

lum toward and away from democracy.15 But even that was wrong. The Common-

wealth of Independent States has now eight consolidated authoritarian regimes, the

biggest number since the fall of the USSR. Moreover, none of them is threatened by

serious crisis. It can be concluded that there is a long-term trend toward heavy

authoritarianism in the CIS area that was able to override the colour revolutions

and imposed itself as the dominant characteristic of the region. Unfortunately, in

recent years the causes of this phenomenon have seldom been explored beyond

the weakness of civil society and failure of democracy promotion. It seems thatmost researchers are reluctant to return to the transitology of the 1990s despite

the obvious merits of that approach. A notable exception is the February 2007

special issue of East European Politics and Societies. Analysing the domestic

determinants of democracy, its authors take into consideration a large number

of factors.16 The problem is that no differentiation is made between the structural

causes that favour or block the process of genuine democratization and the more

superficial elements that facilitate or hamper only the regime change (possibly

within the same category of regimes). Apparently, most researchers are today so

influenced by the decade-long study of regime change that they cannot put itaside even when they should concentrate exclusively on the profound causes of

democratization. The consequence is that they have not predicted or explained

the trend toward consolidated authoritarianism in the CIS. That is a trap this

article tries to avoid. The post-independence evolution of Moldova and its

present situation are not analysed in a regime change perspective. What I am

trying to assess are the fundamental structural causes that will either let

Moldova fall into the trap of the CIS general trend or allow it to follow a genuinely

democratic trajectory.

Moldova, a country of unfortunate paradoxes

Moldova is famously the only country in eastern Europe in which major disputes

exist among political and cultural elites over the fundamentals of national

identity.17 The eastern (and poorer) half of the Principality of Moldova became

a province of the Russian empire in 1812. Later, a process of Soviet social

engineering changed deeply its ethnical and social composition. By 1989, the

Moldovans represented only 64.5% of the population, against 13.9% Ukrainiansand 13% Russians.18 Their language, while identical to Romanian, was called

Moldovan. Most of their elites had been eliminated or denationalized. And their

identity-quest would soon create an array of diverging ideologies:

238 T. Tudoroiu


5/30

The pan-Romanian view, (. . .) strongest among the cultural intelligentsia, seesMoldovans merely as a regional group of (ethnic) Romanians (. . .). The Eurasianistview, espoused above all by most of Moldovas Russian-speaking minorities and theTransnistrian separatist regime, (. . .) see Moldova as part of the post-Soviet space

(. . .

) The dominant position in Moldova has been Basarabism, which advocatesMoldovan independence, a balance between Eastern and Western orientations anda compromise between the previous views on national identity. Moldovanismbridges both Eurasianist and Basarabist views. We can identify a neo-SovietEurasianist Moldovanism (. . .) and a Basarabist Moldovanism.19

During the last two decades, identity matters have been politicized and instrumen-

talized in a way that has hampered seriously the countrys unity and stability.

Things were further complicated by the 1992 Transnistrian civil war. Ethnic entre-

preneurs of the former Soviet elite exacerbated the fears associated with the dis-

mantlement of the USSR. The Kremlin instrumentalized the crisis in order topreserve its regional influence. An armed conflict ensued, leading to the creation

of a de facto independent Transnistrian republic. It also helped maintain Chi inau

in the Russian sphere of influence. In turn, this isolated Moldova from the process

of Europeanization that allowed its western neighbours to join the European

Union.

This represents only a part of the countrys bleak picture. The newly indepen-

dent Moldova experienced also a traumatic economic downfall. Between 1991 and

1993 production dropped by 60% and purchasing power by 80%.20 Throughout the

1990s, real GDP fell on average by 10% per year. Moldova became the poorestcountry in Europe and poorer than any other former Soviet republic except

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.21 By 2001, the average wage was under $2 per day.22

Massive emigration ensued. Out of a total of around 4 million, the number of

Moldovans working abroad in most cases, illegally has been variously esti-

mated between 600,000 and 1 million.23 900,000 seems to represent the most

likely figure.24 Accordingly, remittances grew steadily from 7.1% of the GDP in

1998 to 36.2% in 2007, turning Moldova into the worlds second remittance

recipient (in relative terms).25 This led to a certain improvement of the overall

economic situation. However, it also diminished seriously the available workforce

at home, which in turn hampered the domestic economic growth.

Predictably, identity disputes, civil war, and dramatic poverty had serious

consequences for Moldovan political life. After a brief period of hegemony, the

nationalist, pro-Romanian Popular Front ceased to be a significant political force

in the aftermath of the 1992 Transnistrian defeat. Its former ally, President

Mircea Snegur, became for a time an advocate of Moldovanism.26 In 1996 he

was defeated by the openly pro-Russian Petru Lucinschi. The new president was

unable to improve the economic situation and unwilling to try to consolidate

Moldovas weak democracy. But he tried to increase his own authority by replacing

the semi-presidential system with a strong presidential one. His rivals succeeded inblocking this plan and, on the contrary, created a fully parliamentary regime with

an indirectly elected president.27 In 2001, as a consequence of the economic

Democratization 239


6/30

collapse and continual infighting,28 the electorate voted massively for Vladimir

Voronins Party of the Communists, which won 71 of the parliaments 101

seats.29 It was for the first time in the post-communist world that a self-proclaimed

communist party was back in power.

The vertical of the power: communist rule, 20012009

The 19922001 Moldovan political system was a typical hybrid regime.30 Lucan

A. Way analysed it as a case of pluralism by default, in which political compe-

tition was not due to a robust civil society, strong democratic institutions, or demo-

cratic leadership but simply to incumbent incapacity. Moldovan politics remained

competitive only because the government was too polarized and the state too weak

to monopolize political control in an international environment dominated by

democratic powers.31 But after the 2001 election the communists became strongenough to build a semi-consolidated authoritarian regime characterized by

the overlap between state and political party structures; the concentration of all thelevers of power in the hands of the President and a small circle of intimates; (. . .)the limitations and infringements of basic rights and freedoms of citizens; thecontrol of the public and private mass-media and the harassment of the few indepen-dent ones; the quasi-voiding of sense of the very act of justice by subordinating thejudiciary to the political power; (and) the subordination and seizure of the businessenvironment.32

Moreover, the 2001 electoral platform was pro-Russian and included the return of

Soviet-era symbolism and rhetoric as well as a U-turn on economic reforms.33

However, from the very beginning the communists had to face massive public

protest against their planned changes, especially in the education system (such

as making Russian-language instruction mandatory in lower grades). They

reacted brutally and went as far as banning the main opposition party from political

activity for 30 days and threatening with dismissal the teachers and sometimes the

parents of students involved in anti-communist demonstrations. But this generated

highly negative domestic and international responses that were potentially danger-ous for a yet unconsolidated regime. Voronin chose to downscale his plans for

change. The re-sovietization and anti-reformism continued to be promoted, but

the most contested measures were cancelled.34 This limited responsiveness to

societal demands was the first sign that the communist leadership was not

simply following the examples of Belarus or Uzbekistan. A more ambiguous,

soft authoritarian regime would be built. It is important to note that I call this

regime communist simply because its creators have used this label to identify

themselves. But this is definitely not classical, totalitarian communism. It is a

neo-communist regime representing an effort to mirror the totalitarian pastwith the limited instruments of authoritarianism. Similarly to the undemocratic

constructs of Ion Iliescu in Romania (19901996) and Zhan Videnov in Bulgaria

(19951997), Vladimir Voronin and his associates tried to preserve and restore

240 T. Tudoroiu


7/30

communist structures, methods, and personnel but not the all-encompassing

totalitarian framework of the Soviet era.35 Their ideology included elements of

classical communist rhetoric and advocated redistributive social and economic

policies.36 At the practical level, however, this did not prevent prominent commu-

nists becoming extremely rich. The fortune of the presidents own son, Oleg

Voronin, is estimated probably exaggeratedly at no less than 2 billion US

dollars.37 Any comparison with Soviet communism is therefore inappropriate.

The regimes relative moderation was encouraged also by external factors. One

of Voronins main electoral promises had been the settlement of the Transnistrian

crisis through the creation of a special relation with Moscow. Russia reacted

favourably and put forward the 2003 Kozak Memorandum. But this plan was

imposing the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria until 2020 and gave to

the Transnistrians and the Gagauz the means to block any major Moldovan consti-

tutional and political change. Voronin initially accepted the plan but changed hismind due to fierce public protest. The Chi inau-Moscow relation further worsened

in late 2003, when Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan blocked Moldovas

accession to their planned Common Economic Space.38 At that point, Moldova

witnessed a surprising development labelled by Cristian Ghinea and Sergiu

Panainte the revolution in the head of Vladimir Voronin.39 In a speech at the

2004 Istanbul North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit, the Moldovan president

asked for the first time for the departure of the Russian troops from Transnistria.

Coming from a pro-Kremlin communist, this was totally unexpected. At that

time, the colour revolutions were changing the political geography of the formerSoviet Union while the European Union (EU) was launching its ambitious Euro-

pean Neighbourhood Policy. Taking advantage of these new circumstances, the

Moldovan communists adopted an openly pro-European Union position. They

created a partnership with the instigator of the anti-Voronin 2002 protests, the

pro-Romanian Christian Democratic Popular Party, and won the 2005 election

with a programme claiming unconditional support for EU accession, reform, and

democracy.40 For a time, they appeared to succeed in convincing most observers

of their genuine interest in change.

But nothing happened beyond the rhetorical level. Assessing the effects of theEU-Moldova Action Plan, Dumitru Mnzarari could ask ironically An Unfinished

Task or a Complete Failure?41 The communist defeat at the 2007 local election

made Voronin aware that his openness to the West affects the very foundation

of his power.42 New restrictions were imposed in 20072008 on the press and

the political parties. Hoping to relegitimize his regime, Voronin turned again to

Russia in order to reach a settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. By early 2009,

the authoritarian trends associated with what the opposition and the civic activists

in Chi inau called the vertical of the power reached their climax. It was only in

the field of economic reform that the Greceani government honoured previouscommitments. In fact, in 20082009 Moldova even became one of the six low-

or lower-middle-income global top economic reformers.43 Yet, before the

5 April 2009 parliamentary elections the polls suggested a support of only

Democratization 241


8/30

3540% for the communists. They nevertheless secured 60 of the 101 parliamen-

tary seats. Of course, even today there is no unquestionable and generally accepted

proof of large scale rigging. The oppositions contrary claims could therefore be

considered simple allegations. But they were credible enough to ignite large

scale youth protest. It started during the evening of 6 April and took mass pro-

portions the next day. In fact, the centre of Chi inau became the scene of two sep-

arate events. One was a peaceful mass demonstration demanding new elections and

the investigation of the alleged fraud. The other was a violent movement that occu-

pied the lower floors of the presidency building and then assaulted the parliament

while the police remained surprisingly passive. While unable to produce any

evidence in support of their claims, the anti-communist activists and mass media

insisted that the violence was instigated by Voronins agents provocateurs who

failed to take control of the more numerous, peaceful demonstration. For their

part, the communists made the equally unsupported claim that the riots were orga-nized by the opposition as part of a Romanian-orchestrated coup detat. The Roma-

nian ambassador and journalists were expelled and visas were imposed on

Romanian citizens entering the country.44 That night, the police started to arrest

hundreds of people. The arrests continued during the following days. The govern-

ment and the opposition made again opposing statements. The former claimed it

was looking for the perpetrators of the violence while the latter saw the arrests

as targeting peaceful protesters. What cannot be contested (due to the findings of

an international inquiry) is the fact that out of the nearly 700 detained protesters,

at least 300 suffered beatings, sleep deprivation, and verbal abuse.45

Two of thevictims died while in custody with marks of violence on their bodies. Many of

the detained persons claimed that the police tried to obtain by force confessions

proving that the violence was instigated by opposition political parties and

Romanian agents. The General Prosecutor of Moldova nevertheless stated in

July 2009 that Romania was not involved in the protests.46 In any case, in the

short term the repression created an atmosphere of general fear among the anti-

communist activists. Some protesters even went into hiding. The communists

had the situation fully under control and were prepared to rule the country for

four more years.

Change, hope, and uncertainty

At first, the April protests were perceived as igniting a Moldovan colour revolution.

But their rapid suppression and the communists success in intimidating the oppo-

sition and the civil society offered a picture closer to the June 2009 Iranian election

and failed protests. Still, the situation would change fundamentally in less than five

months. Ironically, this was due to a procedural detail. Voronins party had secured

a solid majority of 60 parliamentary seats. But they needed 61 votes to elect thecountrys president. The communists made all possible efforts to get the missing

golden vote from the opposition MPs. Opposition leaders even spoke of

attempted bribery and blackmail.47 But this failed and Voronin decided to

242 T. Tudoroiu


9/30

respect the electoral law: early elections were called for 29 July 2009. This time,

the communists secured only 48 seats. The rest was divided between the Our

Moldova Alliance (7 seats), the Liberal Party (15), the Liberal Democrat Party

of Moldova (18), and the Democrat Party of Moldova (13). These four parties

created the Alliance for European Integration (AEI) whose 53 seats allowed it to

form a coalition government. On 11 September 2009, the new president of the

parliament, Mihai Ghimpu (a former founding member of the Popular Front,

now head of the Liberal Party) became Moldovas acting president. On 25

September, Romanian-educated Vladimir Filat, the leader of the Liberal Democrat

Party of Moldova, was voted prime-minister.48 His government started to

implement a resolutely pro-democracy and pro-Western programme. It rapidly

improved relations with Romania and initiated a campaign intended to bring

Moldova closer to EU accession. Domestically, it launched the dismantling of

the communist-built vertical of the power. For their part, the communists faceda number of defections. The first was that of the prominent Marian Lupu. President

of the parliament between 2005 and 2009, he was expected to replace Zinaida

Greceani as Prime Minister. But disputes with Voronin made him leave the

party in early June 2009. He joined the Democrat Party whose electoral support

immediately increased from 2.97% to 12.54%.49 Four more communist MPs led

by Vladimir Turcan, followed later by a fifth one, left the party on 15 December

2009. They joined eventually the extra-parliamentary party United Moldova.50

However, it seems that despite these crises Voronin and his close associates such

as Mark Tkaciuk, the communists ideologue and grey eminence,51

were ableto preserve their strict control of the party.

At first view, due to all these developments Moldova experienced an apparently

fundamental change and appeared to be following a genuinely democratic trajec-

tory. But optimism might be premature. First, the ruling alliance was unable to

secure the eight votes it needed to elect a president. The communists stated that

new early parliamentary elections must be held. The government coalition

passed a law imposing a one-year interval between two consecutive early elections

and used this delay to prepare a constitutional reform modifying the election of

the president. Heated debate ensued, mainly because the Alliance for EuropeanIntegration wanted to change the constitution without holding new parliamentary

elections. The communists and some legal experts opposed this plan, claiming it is

unconstitutional. On 9 March 2010 the leaders of the AEI decided to call before

16 June a referendum for the reform of the constitution while rejecting early

elections.52 But on 12 March the European Commission for Democracy through

Law of the Council of Europe (the Venice Commission) recommended that the

Republic of Moldova hold early parliamentary elections and give up the idea of

organizing a constitutional referendum.53 The president of the European Commis-

sion, Jose

Manuel Durao Barroso, as well as other European officials askedMoldova to implement these recommendations.54 Finally, the AEI decided to

accept holding early elections. Overall, the situation is far from clear and the com-

munists are very vocal in condemning the alliances moves. This and the social

Democratization 243


10/30

consequences of the economic crisis might allow them to win the early elections if

these are held in the following months.

Secondly, the new ruling coalition is fragile. There are few ideological affinities

between the liberal parties and the Democrat Party of Moldova. Until now, Marian

Lupu has constantly rejected the communists proposals for a government

coalition. But he might change his mind if tensions appear inside the present alli-

ance. Overall, the situation remains unclear. The democratic forces have the chance

of consolidating their rule, giving the resolute impulse Moldova needs in order to

follow the European trajectory of its Western neighbours. But at the same time, the

communists are strong enough to challenge their rivals. This might result in an

unstable political situation similar to that of Ukraine since the Orange Revolution.

The key of this dilemma is not in the hands of the politicians in Chi inau. The

final outcome will be decided most likely by the structural factors affecting the

Moldovan society itself.

Moldovan transitology

The troubled evolution of Moldovan democracy is well illustrated by the Freedom

House quantitative assessment of political rights and civil liberties shown in

Figure 1.55 During 19921993 the Transnistrian crisis caused a deterioration of

the situation in comparison with the final years of the Soviet Union. The country

started to democratize effectively only in 1994. By 1998, it reached the score of

3.0 representing the limit of the partly free category. But the situation stabilizedat that level, with no further improvement. The communists coming to power was

immediately followed by a worsening of the score, which stabilized again at the

clearly partly free level of 3.5 before the final degradation of 2008. It was only

the end of the authoritarian regime that triggered an improvement of the situation.

Overall, Figure 1 closely mirrors the evolution described in the previous sections

and supports their qualitative assessments. But in order to understand the causes of

this evolution, the analysis has to go beyond the factual level related with the

Moldovan polity. It has to identify the structural determinants that explain the

countrys trajectory and allow the assessment of its democratic perspectives.Sometimes simply called democratization, transitology is the sub-field of

comparative politics studying the transition toward democracy. During the last

four decades, it has identified a number of conditions that influence greatly the

process of democratization. The first one is national unity.56 It is difficult to

build democracy in a country plagued by violent secessionist movements.

Indeed, the war in Transnistria and the de facto independence of this region

affected seriously and durably Moldovas politics and democratization. It is inter-

esting, however, to note a major difference from similar cases. Civil wars and

especially ethnic ones usually help create and maintain ultra-nationalistregimes that are incompatible with democratization. This is what happened in

Tiraspol but not in Chi inau. The 1992 defeat led to the marginalization of the

nationalist Popular Front. The new leadership adopted a very moderate attitude

244 T. Tudoroiu


11/30

on ethnic matters. The autonomy of the Gagauz region is frequently mentioned as

an example of very generous treatment of an ethnic minority. Another interesting

aspect was noted by Lucan A. Way in his assessment of Moldova as a case study of

pluralism by default. During the 1990s, the tensions over national identity were

severe enough to undercut efforts by any single group to monopolize political

power in the country. Consequently, they helped prevent the creation of an author-

itarian regime.57

But Way equally emphasizes the fact that such tensions alsoprevent the consolidation of a stable and effective democratic government.58

Indeed, the Transnistrian conflict diverted the Moldovans attention and efforts

away from the democratization process that should have been their main preoccu-

pation in the early 1990s. Instead of following the democratic and pro-Western

trajectory of the Baltic republics, Moldova was caught in the trap of local

warfare and crisis management. Later, the Transnistrian crisis was instrumental

in the very dismantlement of the pluralism by default. The communists 2001

landslide electoral victory and the ensuing creation of their authoritarian regime

were largely facilitated by Voronins credible promises to put an end to the seces-

sion due to good relations with Moscow (and ideological affinities with Tiraspol,

one might add). Even today Transnistria remains a serious problem. Given the

nature of the regime in Tiraspol, it is clear that a suddenly democratic and

Figure 1. Freedom House Political Rights and Civil Liberties average scores for Moldova,the Commonwealth of Independent States, and 10 Central and East European countries(19902009).

Source: Freedom House. Country Ratings and Status by Region, FIW 19732009; andFreedom in the World 2010: Global Data.

Democratization 245


12/30

Westernized Moldova would lose any chance of recovering the secessionist region.

This is a price that many Moldovans are not ready to pay precisely because they

have been told for almost two decades that reunion with Transnistria and not

Europeanization is Moldovas most important goal.

Socio-economic development represents another factor. Lipset was the first to

state that economic development modifying the social structure in a way favour-

able to the growth of the middle class leads to a change of the political culture

that supports democratization and democratic consolidation.59 This theory can

easily explain, for example, the obvious differences between the post-communist

democratization of Visegrad and Balkan countries.60 I have already mentioned

that Moldova is the poorest country in Europe. A more complex analysis can be

made on the basis of the Human Development Index (HDI).61 With a HDI of

0.720, Moldova ranks 117 out of 182 countries, between Vietnam and Equatorial

Guinea. Its score is less than the CIS average (0.764) and considerably lower thanthe average HDI of the 10 post-communist countries that became members of the

EU (0.877).62 This means that the population is affected by poverty, health

problems leading to reduced longevity, and low education. One can easily

conclude that Moldova is hardly the ideal place for the development of a prosper-

ous and numerous middle class. Things are worsened by the economic polarization

of the society. The inequality of income or wealth can be assessed with the help of

the Gini coefficient.63 According to the estimates of the United Nations Develop-

ment Programme, its value for Moldova is 0.356. This means that inequalities are

higher than the CIS average (Gini coefficient 0.3485) and significantly higher thanin the 10 states of Central and Eastern Europe (0.3159).64 In a society that already

has a low level of human development, high income inequalities can only lead to a

social structure which consists of a very small elite and a huge mass of impover-

ished citizens. In between, there is little place for the middle class. This numerically

reduced middle segment cannot impose its values on the rest of the society, which

makes democratization unlikely.

While acknowledging its importance, Lipset did not focus on the political

culture itself. In a different approach, Gabriel Almond and Simon Verba saw it

as the very engine of democratization.65

It is clear that important differencesexist between the political cultures of the post-communist countries and these

differences were used to explain the diverging democratic trajectories of Central

Europe, the Balkans, and the CIS.66 Moldova is not an exception. First, in terms

of historical cultural factors, it was ruled from 1812 to 1917 by the tsars. The

Russian absolutist empire helped create and maintain a political culture that

would later hamper democratization.67 Secondly, religion equally played a role,

separating Catholic and Protestant Central Europe from the Orthodox East and

South-East. Orthodoxy, to which Moldova belongs, is frequently presented as

creating a cultural environment less favourable to democracy and marketeconomy.68 Thirdly, there is the influence of the pre-communist democratic experi-

ence. As part of Romania, Moldova did have such an experience between the two

World Wars. But the Romanian democracy was hardly a consolidated one and its

246 T. Tudoroiu


13/30

echo in the peripheral province of Bessarabia was even weaker. Fifty years later,

nobody could remember it. Fourthly, the harshness of the communist repression

cannot be ignored. In Moldova the imposition of communism during and after

the Second World War was particularly brutal. The Soviet invasion forced a signifi-

cant part of the intelligentsia and the middle class to flee to Romania. Those who

remained became the target of Soviet deportation plans. To give just two examples,

on the night of 12 to 13 June 1941, 8500 Moldovan counter-revolutionary acti-

vists and 33,000 members of their families were to be deported. Some were

lucky enough to escape arrest, at least in the short term. But 22,848 were effectively

banished to Kazakhstan and West Siberia. Between 5 and 7 July 1949, 11,253 more

families (35,796 persons) were also deported, mainly to Siberia.69 Many of them

would never return. They were replaced by migrants from other parts of the

USSR who had been formed under communism and contributed to the complete

sovietization of the Moldovan political culture. By 1989, the latter didnt bearany resemblance with its Central European counterpart.

It can be concluded that the nineteenth-century historical influences, the Ortho-

dox religion, the limited pre-communist democratic experience, and the harshness

of the communist repression led to the creation of a political culture that could only

hamper Moldovas democratization. The situation has been aggravated by the

massive emigration of recent years. Out of a total of around 4 million, as many

as 900,000 Moldovans work abroad frequently in remote countries such as

Italy and Portugal. Their remittances help the country survive, but they seldom

return to Moldova and are unable to take part in its social and political life. Thismeans that many active and open-minded Moldovans cannot bring their contri-

bution to the development of the political culture of their homeland. The latter

remains dominated by the older, Soviet-educated generation that shares conserva-

tive and undemocratic convictions. This is illustrated by the anti-communist mass

demonstrations of 7 April 2009 that mobilized a large number of very young

people. At that time, many of the adults that would have most likely joined them

were abroad. This generational imbalance also explains the strong Soviet nostalgia

revealed by the opinion polls. In November 2009, 48.6% of the Moldovans were

regretting the dismantlement of the USSR while only 32.4% did not. The impact ofthis dismantlement on Moldova was perceived negatively by 51.65% of the

respondents and positively by only 22.6%. Moreover, 40.3% wished the re-

establishment of the USSR and of the former socialist system (32.2% did not)

and 43.7% would have voted for the return of the Republic of Moldova back in

a totally or partly restored USSR. Only 29.9% would have voted against.70

Overall, the negative consequences of Moldovas conservative political culture

are reflected clearly in the weakness of the civil society that is analyzed below.

Another factor used frequently to explain the transition to democracy is

represented by institutional variables. In general, parliamentary systems areconsidered more favourable to democratic consolidation than presidential ones.

In the post-communist case, it is claimed that the danger comes from the existence

of a strong leader that can take advantage of a presidential system to impose a

Democratization 247


14/30

non-democratic evolution.71 Many CIS leaders such as Lukashenka and the Stali-

nist Central Asian dictators illustrate this theory. However, it is not certain that

the constitutional system represents an independent variable. Usually, it is only

an instrument created by the dictator-to-be to serve his political objectives.72 In

Moldova, at the end of his presidential tenure Petru Lucinschi did try to create a

strong presidential system intended to increase his power. Most probably, he was

regarding this move as the first step of an authoritarian construct. But his plans

failed and a fully parliamentary system was adopted. Still, the new constitutional

framework did not favour democracy. That same year, the communists came to

power and created their own authoritarian regime. Institutional variables are there-

fore unable to provide an explanation of Moldovas undemocratic evolution.

Another factor is related to the voluntarist approaches taking into consider-

ation the role of the elites. With respect to Moldova (as well as Russia and

Ukraine), Philip G. Roeder expressed the opinion that the socio-economicfactors and the political culture are not significant, as they cannot explain the demo-

cratic transition of the early 1990s. The latter could only be explained by the nego-

tiation process that accompanied the fall of communism.73 This might be

exaggerated, but it does not imply that the role of the elites can be ignored. In

Moldova, only the leaders of the Popular Front in the early 1990s and those of

the liberal parties in the late 2000s did not belong to the Soviet political elite.

From 19931994 to the 2009 change, the country was dominated by the former

members of the USSR state and party apparatus. This included all the three presi-

dents and most of the ministers and MPs. Despite claiming different ideologicalaffiliations, they all shared the old Soviet undemocratic mentalities. This had

visible consequences on their domestic and foreign policy choices. In fact, most

of the CIS republics were in the same situation. Consequently, their elites acted

differently from those of Central Europe, hampering, blocking, or reversing the

democratization process. The fact that most of Moldovas new government is

formed by non-members of the Soviet nomenklatura is therefore an important

development for the democratization process. However, these newcomers are far

from representing the majority of the Moldovan political or economic elite.

The final major factor is the international one. The transition to democracyseldom takes place in states completely isolated from the outside world. In most

cases, international determinants including geopolitical ones can be easily

identified. Moldova is no exception. From the very beginning, Moscow was

clearly interested in maintaining it within its sphere of influence. Russia supported

militarily the Transnistrian secession and then became the biased referee of the

peace process. It still refuses to retreat its forces stationed in Transnistria despite

Yeltsins commitment at the 1999 Istanbul OSCE summit. The terms on which it

may agree to settle the crisis are well illustrated by the 2003 Kozak Memorandum

(see above). Given the already mentioned importance of the Transnistrian questionfor most of the Moldovan citizens, Moscow is able to influence considerably

the political scene in Chi inau through the simple manipulation of the puppet

government in Tiraspol.

248 T. Tudoroiu


15/30

Beyond the instrumentalization of the Transnistrian crisis, Moscow has also

made visible efforts to project its influence inside Moldova itself. Using Moldovan

printed media, local publication of popular Russian newspapers, and internet-based

platforms, Moscow conducted an efficient propaganda campaign that discredited

NATO, the United States, Western Europe, as well as pro-Western and pro-

Romanian local politicians.74 In addition to other reasons (such as history), this

explains why in July 2009 no less than 51.8% of the Moldovans considered that

Russia should be their countrys most important strategic partner. The much less

active European Union was supported by only 26.2% of the population. Moreover,

while the then Moldovan president Voronin was trusted by 44.4% of the respon-

dents, the Russian president Medvedev was trusted by 73.4% and Vladimir

Putin by 77.9%. Unsurprisingly, accession to NATO was supported by a meagre

20.7% and rejected by 46.4%. The United States were preferred as Moldovas

most important strategic partner by only 2% of the population.75 And this is farfrom exhausting Moscows arsenal. When the Moldovan communists came to

adopt a rather pro-Western stance, the Russian National Security Council, the

Russian government, and the State Duma decided to use a complex pressure

mechanism against Moldova (and Georgia). The most visible measure was the

2006 banning of the Moldovan agricultural and wine imports. Chi inaus depen-

dence on Russian gas was also fully exploited. It should be noted that the first

set of measures targeted the economic interests of the Moldovan elites. The

second affected seriously the conditions of living of the common people.76 Voro-

nins 2007 pro-Russian turn was therefore hardly surprising, and that turn was pre-cisely a move that allowed the communists to reinforce their authoritarian regime.

It is true that, after the leadership change in Chi inau, it was the new ruling

coalition and not the communists that received moderate Russian support. But

this seems to be a tactic move intended to prevent Moldova from adopting a Geor-

gian-type foreign policy stance. Moscow has simply no interest in supporting

democracy per se and it clearly shares more affinities with the party of Voronin

than with its democratic adversaries.

Contrary to Russia, the United States has always avoided any serious involve-

ment in Moldova. Despite Washingtons supportive rhetoric, there is no sign of amajor change of attitude. Neighbouring states such as Romania and Ukraine have

played an equally minor role. Most likely, they will preserve this largely neutral

approach. The only international actor that has already started to show an increas-

ing interest in Moldova is the European Union. Its past actions were rather unsuc-

cessful, but the new political context in Chi inau creates the favourable conditions

for a major change. This will be analyzed in the following section.

For now, it can be concluded that the problems related to national unity, the low

level of socio-economic development, the political culture inherited from the

communist and pre-communist past, the dominant role of the Soviet elites, andthe Russian influence have all hampered the development of the Moldovan demo-

cracy. Building a hierarchy of these factors is rather difficult because their effects

are interrelated. The political culture could be considered the key element as it

Democratization 249


16/30

influences directly the countrys politics. But the Moldovan political culture itself

has been influenced negatively by the Transnistrian secession, Lipsetian factors,

Soviet elites, and Russian propaganda. The comparison with other post-Soviet

republics can be also misleading as the combinations of factors at work in different

countries are not necessarily the same. To give an example, in socio-economic

terms Belarus performs better than Moldova while its democracy score is lower.

But it would be difficult to claim on this basis that Moldovan poverty did not

contribute indirectly to the creation of Voronins regime.

The above mentioned factors led Moldovas citizens to remain tolerant toward

authoritarian practices and reluctant to civic engagement. Indeed, even in Novem-

ber 2009 (that is, some months after the fall of the communist authoritarian

regime), 56.8% of the Moldovans did not believe that the will of the people

rules in the Republic of Moldova. Only 24.5% thought that it does. When

asked to what extent can people like you influence on the important decisionsto be taken at national level?, almost two thirds of the respondents (63.3%)

answered that only to a small or very small extent. Only 18.4% believed they

could really influence such decisions. And 42% (against 42.3%) were convinced

that the elections were not free and fair, despite the recent democratization

process.77 Such convictions generate a passive attitude that can be easily exploited

by authoritarian regimes. The reduced level of civic engagement and the implicitly

weak Moldovan civil society represent an even bigger problem. It is widely

accepted that the degree of democratization of a country is directly related to the

development of its civil society.78

Consolidated democracies have highly devel-oped civil societies while the authoritarian regimes are characterized by weak

ones. In fact, dictators are frequently aware of the lethal threat represented by a

strong civic sector and do everything in their power to stop and reverse its devel-

opment. The extreme case is represented by the totalitarian regimes that completely

destroy civil society in order to ensure full control of their citizens. The USSR was

such a regime. Consequently, Moldova inherited from the Soviet era a no-civil

society situation. It is true that some cultural associations played an important

role in the mobilization of the population during the Perestroika years (as did

ecological groups in Bulgaria). Yet, in 1992, there were only 38 registeredMoldovan non-governmental organizations (NGOs).79 Afterward, civic develop-

ment was hampered by the structural conditions mentioned above. In addition,

the communists were aware of the danger represented by the civil society and

made efforts to block its development. They were especially hostile to the

Chi inau-based pro-democracy think tanks and claimed that the NGOs which

perform activities and implement projects that are foreign-financed represent a

potential threat to the national security.80 They also tried to clone important

civil society organizations. This is why after 2001 there were two labour unions,

two journalists unions, two writers unions, etc.

81

The fall of the authoritarian regime changed fundamentally the attitude of the

authorities but other negative aspects persist. Out of the 7000 Moldovan NGOs

registered at both the national and local levels82 it is estimated that only around

250 T. Tudoroiu


17/30

200 are active. 22% of the NGOs have not prepared any project during the previous

two years. 15% have prepared only one or two projects. 36% have not implemented

any project. More than 59% do not have an employee, while 76% of them have

never used temporary employees. Only 7% of the NGOs have a development strat-

egy and only 8% are efficient in attracting financial resources (most of which are

international).83 In geographical terms, 98% of the NGOs are located in the

capital and only 1% in the countryside, despite the fact that 53% of the Moldovans

live in rural areas. More disturbing, most of the Moldovan NGOs are based on

vertical relations. The structures that are envisaged to promote democratic

values at national level are dominated by authoritarian leaders that do not tolerate

any internal opposition. The replacement through election of the leaders seems to

be incompatible with the huge majority of the Moldovan NGOs.84

This negative assessment of the Moldovan civic sector is confirmed by the

comparison with other post-communist states made on the basis of quantitativedata provided by two independent sources. First, there is the NGO Sustainability

Index computed yearly by United States Agency for International Development

(USAID). The Index uses a seven-point scale, with seven indicating an extremely

low level of development and one a very advanced NGO sector.85 Since 2000,

when Moldova entered the Index, the average of the 10 Central and East European

countries fluctuated between 2.6 and 2.7 until 2003 and between 2.82 and 2.85

afterward. This places the region in the consolidation phase of development.

Moldova and the Commonwealth of Independent States belong to a completely

different category. Except for a slight initial improvement, the CIS averageremained at 4.484.66. The index for Moldova started at 4.6 and then fluctuated

between 4.2 and 4.3. This is better than the CIS level. But the development of

the Moldovan civic sector remains far below that of Central and East Europe as

mid-transition states with a score between four and five have their NGO sustain-

ability minimally affected by local practices and policies.86 A second assessment

is provided by Freedom House, whose Nations in Transit annual reports compute a

Civil Society Index based on a one to seven scale similar to that used in Figure 1.

From 1999 to 2009, the average for the New EU Members improved slightly

from 2.15 to 1.73 (in 2005) and then fluctuated around 1.8. The situation of theCommonwealth of Independent States worsened slightly but constantly from

4.81 to 5.13. The value for Moldova fluctuated between 3.75 and 4.00.87 This is

better than the CIS average but unsatisfactory when compared with Central and

Eastern Europe. Therefore, despite minor differences, USAID and Freedom

House concur in providing a similarly pessimistic assessment of Moldovas

civic sector. Its situation is one of the best in the CIS area but far below that of

the countrys western neighbours. This can only have negative consequences for

the countrys democratic perspectives.

The difficult situation of the non-governmental organizations is paralleled bylow levels of civic engagement, trust, and tolerance. To give just an example, a

social capital comparative inquiry found that the percentages for low/middle/high trust in other people were 49.0/26.6/24.4 in Moldova against 41.9/22.8/

Democratization 251


18/30

35.3 in Romania. The tolerance of public meetings was 3.7 against 4.3. The

tolerance of neighbours was 3.8 against 4.2.88 In terms of social capital,

Romania is one of the laggards of Central and Eastern Europe and this is reflected

in its difficult post-communist democratization. Moldovas more difficult situation

can hardly provide reasons for optimism.

To conclude, a specific set of domestic and external structural factors caused a

weak civil society and a reduced level of social capital. In turn, this made genuine

democratization impossible. This is why Moldova experienced the hybrid regime

of the 1990s and the semi-consolidated authoritarian regime of 2001 2009. Once

again, it is important not to mix the fundamentally different categories of democra-

tization and regime change. The latter can take place due to a favourable conjunc-

tion of circumstances. Indeed, democratic political forces have been in power in

Chi inau since autumn 2009. But this does not guarantee Moldovas democratic

future. Elsewhere in the CIS, the initially promising coloured revolutions werenot followed by democratic consolidation. Genuine democratization cannot take

place as long as the structural factors that have prevented it for two decades

remain unchanged. In the case of Moldova, there is no visible modification of

these factors. In terms of national unity, the secession of Transnistria and the iden-

tity dilemma it embodies can only be worsened by the existence of a pro-Western

government in Chi inau. Poverty is increasing in part due to the recent world finan-

cial crisis. Political culture will likely not change as long as a significant number of

the most active and open minded Moldovans choose to emigrate. The Soviet elites

and their like-minded descendants are still dominant. And Moscow is makingvisible efforts to preserve its sphere of influence. The conclusion is dismal. Left

to itself, the country will not democratize genuinely despite all the efforts of its

well-intentioned present leaders. In order to have real change, Moldova needs a

major external impetus.

Europeanizing Moldova?

Given the elements presented in the previous section, there appears only one major

development that could create a fundamentally new dynamic. For some years, theEuropean Union has shown increased interest in Moldova. The fall of the commu-

nist regime created the conditions for a new beginning of the Chi ina u-Brussels

relation. Ideally, this could lead to a revolutionary change.

Bilateral relations were initiated in 1994 with the signing of a modest European

Union-Moldova Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. It entered into force only

in 1998. In June 2001, Chi inau also became member of the EU-initiated Stability

Pact for South-Eastern Europe. But Moldovas importance continued to be per-

ceived in Brussels as marginal. Between 1991 and 2006, the EU assistance

amounted to onlyE

300 million.

89

However, an important development was thelaunching of the European Unions European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).90

This was a major step in the EU eastern policy. Within the new framework, an

ambitious joint ENP Action Plan was adopted in February 2005 by the

252 T. Tudoroiu


19/30

EU-Moldova Cooperation Council. The European Union also increased its

presence in Moldova. In October 2005, a full European Commission Delegation

was opened in Chi inau and, in addition, Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged was

appointed EU Special Representative for Moldova.91 At that time, Voronin had

adopted a resolutely European discourse. Brussels preferred to ignore his author-

itarian practices, hoping that closer ties would lead implicitly to gradual democra-

tization. Instead of putting pressure on the communist leadership, Jacobovits

successor, Dr Kalman Mizsei concentrated his efforts on the settlement of the

Transnistrian crisis. It is true that a success in this aspect would have increased con-

siderably the prestige of the European Union in Moldova and the surrounding

region. But a precondition for this success was political stability in Chi inau.

Consequently, the EU Special Representative supported constantly the communist

government despite its undemocratic actions. After the April 2009 riots he went as

far as trying to temper the EU ambassadors anti-communist criticism. He also triedto convince the opposition parties to give the communists the vote they needed to

elect a president and remain in power.92 Needless to say, this paradoxical attitude

was counterproductive. The Transnistrian crisis could not be solved while the

communists took advantage of the situation to delay indefinitely the implemen-

tation of their own commitments. As the Action Plan came to an end, major

deficiencies concerning the judicial reform, the freedom of media, and the business

climate had not been addressed.93

Moldovas attitude changed completely under the new ruling coalition. Its very

name the Alliance for European Integration as well as its political programmeshow that its members understand fully the opportunity offered by Brussels open-

ness. The new leaders in Chi inau have not spared any occasion of pressing the EU

officials to offer Moldova an enhanced status. The incumbent European Commis-

sioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-

Waldner, visited the Moldovan capital in November 2009 and expressed the EU

support for Moldovas European aspirations.94 The negotiations for a new Associ-

ation Agreement started on 12 January 2010. That same day the European Union

chief negotiator, Gunnar Wiegand, stated that Moldova is prepared for the con-

clusion of this agreement.95

At the Moldova Partnership Forum, jointly hostedon 24 March 2010 by the European Commission and the World Bank and attended

by the Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat, the new EU Commissioner for Enlar-

gement and European Neighbourhood Policy, Stefan Fule, described Moldovas

government as a reliable partner with a coherent strategy of reforms and clear

targets. He also mentioned a 75% increase in the EU contribution for 2011

2013, with more funds to come. Consequently, Moldova now receives the

second-largest share of EU aid per capita. Moreover, this is only a part of the

massive $2.6 billion half of it in the form of nonreturnable grants pledged

by international donors. The European Commissioner also stated that talks on aMoldova-EU free-trade agreement and the Moldovans visa-free travel in the

European Union would start shortly.96

Democratization 253


20/30

The problem, however, is that Brussels is not offering an explicit path to EU

accession. The experience of other post-communist states shows that only such a

carrot leads to full compliance with EU conditionality. This implies profound pol-

itical and economic reforms as well as the adoption of the acquis communautaire.97

The post-communist countries that underwent this complex and demanding process

were transformed radically. Even in the case of laggards such as Romania and Bul-

garia, democratization became irreversible. Much has been said and written on the

socialization process affecting both the elites and the society of the candidate states.

What is mentioned much more seldom is the fact that the process of accession

changes or overrides the very structural factors that otherwise hamper or block

the democratization process. In the case of Moldova, the first obstacle is represented

by national unity and identity disputes. But out of the large number of Moldovans

that have acquired Russian or Romanian citizenship, many did it simply in order to

work abroad. For them, a common gastarbeiter identity blurred previous differ-ences. The scale of this mutation would increase considerably if all Moldovans

(including the Transnistrians) were offered the perspective of a European identity.

This might help moderate diverging trends and, ideally, start a process leading to the

creation of a common, balanced identity that would make present disputes irrele-

vant. The second factor is low socio-economic development. EU membership

brings typically an important increase in trade and investment. In the 1990s,

Central European economies benefitted greatly from their accession perspectives.

There was a considerable raise in wages that triggered a visible increase of the stan-

dard of living. In the 2000s, when high wages made those countries less competi-tive, the investors moved some of their production to Romania, initiating a similar

process. If Moldova starts credible accession negotiations, investments can only

increase. In time, they might reach a significant level. The ensuing socio-economic

development would activate a Lipsetian process favouring genuine democratiza-

tion. Thirdly, EU accession means frequent and massive contacts with Western indi-

viduals, ideas, and values. Especially in a small country like Moldova, this can only

bring an important change of the political culture. Compliance with the EU

democratic conditionality would also contribute to this change. Fourthly, the

Soviet-era elites would be socialized in a new, more profitable European environ-ment. Of course, the new EU members still dominated by their previous communist

elites, such as Romania or Bulgaria, are not the champions of reform or democracy.

But they demonstrate that appropriate incentives can make these elites respect the

rules of democracy and give up any authoritarian project. In fact, it is not difficult to

understand that becoming a Berlusconi-style prosperous European elite is more

attractive than remaining the old-style nomenklatura of impoverished and isolated

Moldova. Fifthly, it is clear that Russia is not ready to relinquish its influence on

Moldova. But after accession, this influence could take a form similar to that exist-

ing in present Bulgaria. While important in the fields of culture, trade, investment,and foreign policy (as well as organized crime, one might add), it has little or no

impact on the state of local democracy and represents an acceptable modus

vivendi for both Europe and the Kremlin.

254 T. Tudoroiu


21/30

Of course, this deus ex machina perception of the European Union could seem

overoptimistic. Anastasios Giamouridis even wrote an article on The New Euro-

pean Myth of EU enlargement. Adopting a rationalist perspective that emphasizes

the importance of economic factors, Giamouridis formulates an interesting criti-

cism of the accession process on a point that might be of importance for

Moldova. He claims that the current EU accession process is to a great extent

based on an obsolete model developed in the 1970s and 1980s to accommodate

the accession needs of more advanced and industrialized economies.98 This

model has not been designed to assist the transition from central planning to

market economies. Consequently, the structure of incentives and constraints

imposed on the candidates economic and regulatory policies may be inappropriate

for countries facing acute development and reconstruction problems. Post-

communist countries can thus find themselves in a position where they would

do better if they disregarded EU directives and policies.99 This could explaincertain differences between the more developed Central European states on the

one hand and economically less advanced Romania and Bulgaria on the other.

Due to its low level of development, Moldova could find itself in an even more

critical situation.

Another flaw of the enlargement process was identified by Tom Gallagher. He

used the Romanian case to expose the EU incapacity to project its institutions and

norms in unfamiliar terrain.100 In Bucharest, the main challenge was represented

by a political elite that was cynical and amoral to an extent unusual even in the

former Soviet satellites.101

These highly motivated and resourceful peoplecreated a trans-party alliance designed to channel public money into private

hands.102 Consequently, instead of choosing the way of genuine reforms, the

Romanian political elite adopted a range of rituals and initiatives which were

essentially nothing but public relations gimmicks in order to satisfy Eurocrats.103

On their side, the European officials have caved in to this resourceful and preda-

tory group that exploited the unwieldy multi-layered system of decision-making in

Brussels to join the European club on its own limited agenda.104 Old political struc-

tures which had blocked reform were left substantially unchanged. The economy

remained under the influence of a narrow set of forces. The absorption of Europeanvalues, norms, and decision-making procedures was effective only at a superficial

or declaratory level.105 Overall, the process of Europeanization was replaced by a

process of pseudo-Europeanization or Euro-Balkanism.106 For Gallagher, this

is one of the biggest setbacks for democracy seen in Europe since 1945.107

Much of this criticism is undoubtedly justified. But two important points have

to be made. First, despite the flaws described by Giamouridis and Gallagher, all

new members including Romania are now better in terms of democracy

and market reform than before the beginning of the accession process. In certain

cases the improvement is still modest, but it is nevertheless an improvement.Secondly, it is most likely that the EU learned its lesson and will not repeat past

errors.108 The Romanian experience will certainly be used when dealing with

CIS countries.

Democratization 255


22/30

It can be concluded that, despite past difficulties, the European Union has the

key to ending Chi inaus problems. At the same time, Brussels political will to act

in this direction is not strong enough to allow Moldovas accession. Of course, the

organization has a limited absorption capacity. But the Moldovans represent less

than 1% of the Unions population. The reason for EU reluctance is the fear that

creating a CIS precedent would stimulate similar demands from other post-

Soviet republics. Aware of that, Chi inau supported by Bucharest is trying

to exploit its membership of the EU-initiated Stability Pact for South-Eastern

Europe. From the very beginning, the latter was perceived by the Moldovans as

a backdoor to EU membership as it breaks the association between Chi inau and

the CIS area.109 A diplomatic tour de force might put Moldova in the same

category as the Western Balkans and allow it eventually to start accession

negotiations. This seems to be the countrys only chance to secure a genuinely

democratic trajectory.

Conclusion

Despite the optimism caused by the 2009 dismantlement of the communist semi-

consolidated authoritarian regime, Moldova is most likely experiencing only an

ephemeral and imperfect democratic parenthesis. There are serious structural pro-

blems concerning national unity, low level of socio-economic development, politi-

cal culture inherited from the communist and pre-communist past, dominant role of

the Soviet elites, and Russian influence. These factors prevent the development ofcivil society and block implicitly the countrys genuine democratization. Of course,

this does not mean that Chi inau will necessarily follow the CIS general trend

toward heavy authoritarianism. A Ukrainian-style hybrid regime is equally poss-

ible. But without an external impetus, Moldovas democratic consolidation is unli-

kely. The present democratic leadership can break the vicious circle of the last two

decades in only one way: by convincing the reluctant European Union to open the

accession door. This would help modify the very structural factors that prevent

democratization, thus putting the country on a pro-European and pro-democracy

course. Chances are slim, but diplomatic mastery abroad and ambitious reformsat home might convince Brussels that Moldova performs better than Montenegro

and Bosnia and should be included in the same category of candidate countries.

Nothing short of this can change Moldovas troubled destiny.

Notes

1. A brief intuitive definition of political regime was formulated by Marcus Alexander:regime signifies a set of rules of the game by which elites compete; in this viewregimes are not always static, and the extent to which they are democratic or author-

itarian changes gradually over time (Alexander, Democratization and HybridRegimes, 931). A more elaborate definition is provided by Svend-Erik Skaaning:political regime designates the institutionalized set of fundamental formal and infor-mal rules identifying the political power holders (character of the possessor(s) of

256 T. Tudoroiu


23/30

ultimate decisional sovereignty) and it also regulates the appointments to the mainpolitical posts (extension and character of political rights) as well as the vertical limit-ations (extension and character of civil liberties) and horizontal limitations on theexercise of political power (extension and character of division of powers

control and autonomy) (Skaaning, Political Regimes and Their Changes, 15; fora review of the literature see pp. 315).2. For definitions and reviews of the literature on the structural causes of democratiza-

tion and democratic consolidation see Doorenspleet, The Structural Context ofRecent Transitions to Democracy, 311 21; Gasiorowski and Power, The StructuralDeterminants of Democratic Consolidation; Mller and Skaaning, The ThreeWorlds of Post-Communism, 299 302.

3. According to the Freedom House definition, the hybrid regimes are electoral democ-racies that meet only minimum standards for the selection of national leaders. Demo-cratic institutions are fragile and substantial challenges to the protection of politicalrights and civil liberties exist. The potential for sustainable, liberal democracy is

unclear. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009, Methodology. See alsoDiamond, Thinking about Hybrid Regimes; Bogaards, How to Classify HybridRegimes.

4. The semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes attempt to mask authoritarianism withlimited respect for the institutions and practices of democracy. They typically fail tomeet even the minimum standards of electoral democracy. Freedom House,Nations in Transit 2009, Methodology.

5. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009, Tables, Table 9.6. The consolidated authoritarian regimes are closed societies in which dictators

prevent political competition and pluralism and are responsible for widespreadviolations of basic political, civil, and human rights. Freedom House, Nations in

Transit 2009, Methodology.7. The 2009 ratings reflect the period 1 January through 31 December 2008.8. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009, Tables, Table 10.9. Hale, Regime Cycles, 134.

10. Gelman, From the Frying Pan, 6.11. For a review of the literature on regime change see Gelman, From the Frying Pan,

811.12. For a recent review of the literature on democracy promotion see the August 2009

special issue ofDemocratization 16, no. 4 (2009).13. Gelman, From the Frying Pan, 7.14. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009, Tables, Table 9.15. Gelman, From the Frying Pan, 7.16. See Ekiert, Kubik, and Vachudova, Democracy, 13 17.17. King, The Moldovans, 229.18. Skvortsova, The Cultural and Social Makeup, 163.19. March, From Moldovanism to Europeanization, 603 4. See also King, Marking

Time, 6082, and Heintz, Weak State, Uncertain Citizenship.20. Ghinea and Panainte, The Political System, 99.21. Crowther, Moldovas Post-Communist Transition, 37.22. Hensel and Gudm, Moldovas Economic Transition, 90.23. Culic, Eluding Exit and Entry Controls, 151.24. Chiriac, Republic of Moldova, 150.25. Institutul pentru Dezvoltare si Initiative Sociale Viitorul, Political & Security State-

watch, 96.26. Crowther, Moldovas Post-Communist Transition, 34.27. Roper, Regionalism in Moldova, 116.

Democratization 257


24/30

28. Crowther, Moldovas Post-Communist Transition, 43.29. Panainte, Moldova. At the Crossroads, 96.30. See note 3.31. Way, Weak State and Pluralism, 455. See also Way, Pluralism by Default in

Moldova.32. Panainte, Moldova. At the Crossroads, 96.33. Crowther, Moldovas Post-Communist Transition, 42.34. Ibid., 43 4.35. For a discussion of this subject see Gallagher, Building Democracy in Romania,

392, and his quoting of Romanias former president Emil Constantinescu.36. See Partidului Comunistilor din Republica Moldova, Statutul PCRM and Progra-

mul PCRM.37. Oleg Voronin face business n Romania. Ziarul de Garda, April 10, 2009; Oleg

Voronin are o avere cat jumatate din PIB-ul Moldovei. Business Magazin, April16, 2009; Voronin, cel mai bogat, corupt, cinic si autoritar. Ziarul de Garda,

August 3, 2009.38. Munteanu et al., Moldova, 228.39. Ghinea and Panainte, The Political System, 100.40. March, From Moldovanism to Europeanization, 601.41. Mnzarari, EU-Moldova Action Plan.42. Ghinea and Panainte, The Political System, 101.43. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank,

Doing Business 2010, 2.44. Ibid., 113 15.45. Bencomo, Entrenching Impunity.46. Ghinea and Panainte, The Political System, 114.

47. Ibid., 118. See also the interview given by Vlad Filat, president of the DemocratLiberal Party, Comunistii au vrut sa ia presedintia cu 2 milioane de euro.Evenimen-tul Zilei, July 25, 2009.

48. Benita Ferrero-Waldner: UE poate sa ajute Moldova sa-si construiasca viitorul.Timpul, November 27, 2009.

49. e-Democracy, Partidul Democrat din Moldova.50. Racu, Patru comuni ti au parasit frac iunea PCRM; e-Democracy, Partidul

Moldova Unita.51. Vulcan, Interviu cu eminen a cenu ie de la Chi inau, Mark Tkaciuk.52. AIE a decis: Constitutie noua prin referendum, fara alegeri anticipate.Moldova Azi,

March 9, 2010. http://www.azi.md/ro/story/9845 (accessed May 20, 2010).53. European Commission for Democracy through Law, Amicus Curiae Brief ;

AllMoldova, March 16, 2010.54. Barosso: Moldova to Implement the Recommendations of Venice Commission.

Jurnal de Chi inau, March 24, 2010.55. A one-to-seven scale is used, with one representing the highest degree of freedom

and seven the lowest. 3.0 is the limit for partly free states and 5.5 for not free ones.56. Rustow, Transition to Democracy, 350.57. Way, Pluralism by Default in Moldova, 137.58. Ibid., 138.59. Lipset, Some Social Requisites; for a recent update see Acemoglu and Robinson,

Economic Origins.60. Lewis, Democratization, 410.61. For details see United Nations Development Programme, The Human Development

Index.62. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2009.

258 T. Tudoroiu
http://www.azi.md/ro/story/9845http://www.azi.md/ro/story/9845


25/30

63. The Gini coefficient can range from 0 to 1. A low Gini coefficient indicates a moreequal distribution while higher Gini coefficients indicate more unequal distribution.See World Bank, Measuring Inequality.

64. United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report 2009, Gini

Index.65. Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture.66. See Blokker, Multiple Democracies; Klingemann, Fuchs, and Zielonka, Democ-

racy and Political Culture.67. Klingemann, Fuchs, and Zielonka, Democracy and Political Culture, 85 98.68. Enev, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy; Wiarda, Development on the Periphery,

18890.69. Polian, Against Their Will, 121 3, 168 9.70. Institutul de Opinii Publice, Barometer of Public Opinion (November 2009).71. Bunce, Comparative Democratization, 711; Ekiert, Kubik, and Vachudova,

Democracy, 1415.

72. Elgie and Zielonka, Constitutions and Constitution Building, 47.73. Roeder, The Rejection of Authoritarianism, 23.74. Mnzarari, Russian Foreign Policy, 424.75. Institutul de Opinii Publice, Barometer of Public Opinion (July 2009).76. Mnzarari, Russian Foreign Policy, 189; 27.77. Institutul de Opinii Publice, Barometer of Public Opinion (November 2009).78. For a review of the literature see Petrova, Civil Society, 1284 5.79. Marin and Trdea, Dimensiunea capitalului social, 72.80. Ibid., 74.81. Ibid.82. USAID, The 2008 NGO Sustainability Index, 164.

83. Cenusa, Consolidarea societatii civile, 19 21.84. Marin and Trdea, Dimensiunea capitalului social, 724.

85. USAID, The 2008 NGO Sustainability Index, 1.86. Ibid., 15, 165, 252.87. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009, Tables. See also Freedom House,

Nations in Transit 2009, Moldova, 369.88. Badescu, Sum, and Uslaner, Civil Society Development, 2224.89. Commission of the European Communities, EC Country Strategy Paper, 10.90. A detailed presentation of this policy is available on the internet site of the Delegation

of the European Commission to Moldova, http://www.delmda.ec.europa.eu/eu_and_moldova/2_en.shtml (accessed May 20, 2010). For further details see Popescu, TheEU in Moldova, 9.

91. Delegation of the European Commission to Moldova, http://www.delmda.ec.europa.eu/eu_and_moldova/index_en.shtml (accessed May 20, 2010).

92. Ghinea and Panainte, Moldovas Relations, 125 6. In the opinion of Mizsei,contesting the results of the vote and holding new elections would have had negativeconsequences by preventing the government from fighting the effects of the worldeconomic crisis (Kalman Mizsei: Este nevoie de o mpacare na ionala. Timpul,April 15, 2009). In a 5 May article the Special Representative criticized the violationby the police of elementary human rights and the governments use of terms such ascriminals and fascists against the opposition. But he equally condemned theabusive language of the opposition and asked it to stop unsubstantiated allegationsabout the course of events on April 7 and wild exaggerations about the nature of theelections (Mizsei, Kalman, Time for Change and Reconciliation. OMEGA, May 5,2009). Basically, he saw a balance between the communists feeling that the opposi-tion wanted to steal their victory with illegal means and the opposition side wounds

Democratization 259
http://www.delmda.ec.europa.eu/eu_and_moldova/2_en.shtmlhttp://www.delmda.ec.europa.eu/eu_and_moldova/2_en.shtmlhttp://www.delmda.ec.europa.eu/eu_and_moldova/index_en.shtmlhttp://www.delmda.ec.europa.eu/eu_and_moldova/index_en.shtmlhttp://www.delmda.ec.europa.eu/eu_and_moldova/index_en.shtmlhttp://www.delmda.ec.europa.eu/eu_and_moldova/index_en.shtmlhttp://www.delmda.ec.europa.eu/eu_and_moldova/2_en.shtmlhttp://www.delmda.ec.europa.eu/eu_and_moldova/2_en.shtml


26/30

over the alleged election abuses as well as over policy violations (Ibid.). Conse-quently, during their research visit in Chisinau, Cristian Ghinea and Sergiu Panaintewere amazed by the lack of trust and by the frustration manifested by the oppositionand by the anti-Voronin journalists and activists against Kalman Mizsei. The same

authors claim that the Chisinau and Brussels EU Commission staff shared a criticalview of Mizseis position (Ghinea and Panainte, Moldovas Relations, 126).93. Mnzarari, EU-Moldova Action Plan.94. Benita Ferrero-Waldner: UE poate sa ajute Moldova sa-si construiasca viitorul.

Timpul, November 27, 2009.95. Moldova este pregatita de negocierile pentru semnarea Acordului de asociere cu

Uniunea Europeana. Hotnews Moldova, January 12, 2010. http://hotnews.md/articles/view.hot?id=302 (accessed May 20, 2010).

96. Lobjakas, Moldova Impresses EU With Reform Agenda.97. See Vachudova, Europe Undivided; Grabbe, The EUs Transformative Power;

Schimmelfennig, European Regional Organizations.

98. Giamouridis, Only through Enlargement, 195.99. Ibid.100. Gallagher, Romania and the European Union, 14.101. Ibid., 6.102. Ibid., 7.103. Ibid., 6.104. Ibid., 15.105. Ibid., 3.106. Ibid., 11, 3.107. Ibid., 15.108. It is logical to believe that this concerns also Mizseis actions.

109. Basarabia rama

ne la periferia Uniunii Europene. Ziua, June 3, 2006.

Notes on contributor

Theodor Tudoroiu is an associate researcher at the Montreal Centre for International Peaceand Security Studies. He works mainly on subjects related to the democratization ofpost-communist states. His most recent publication in this field is Post-CommunistDemocratization Revisited: An International Relations Approach, Perspectives on

European Politics and Society 11, no. 1 (2010).

BibliographyAcemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and

Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.Alexander, Marcus. Democratization and Hybrid Regimes: Comparative Evidence from

Southeast Europe. East European Politics and Societies 22, no. 4 (2008): 92854.AllMoldova. CE Venice Commission Recommends Moldova to Hold Early Parliamentary

Elections, March 16, 2010. http://www.allmoldova.com/en/moldova-news/1249046708.html (accessed May 20, 2010).

Almond, Gabriel, and Simon Verba. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracyin Five Nations. An Analyse Study. Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1965.

Badescu, Gabriel, Paul Sum, and Eric M. Uslaner. Civil Society Development and

Democratic Values in Romania and Moldova. East European Politics and Societies18, no. 2 (2004): 316 41.

Bencomo, Clarisa. Entrenching Impunity. Moldovas Response to Police Violence Duringthe April 2009 Post-Election Demonstrations. Soros Foundation-Moldova; Swedish

260 T. Tudoroiu
http://hotnews.md/articles/view.hot?id=302http://hotnews.md/articles/view.hot?id=302http://www.allmoldova.com/en/moldova-news/1249046708.htmlhttp://www.allmoldova.com/en/moldova-news/1249046708.htmlhttp://www.allmoldova.com/en/moldova-news/1249046708.htmlhttp://www.allmoldova.com/en/moldova-news/1249046708.htmlhttp://hotnews.md/articles/view.hot?id=302http

Structural Factors vs Regime Change-Moldova

Documents

Transcript of Structural Factors vs Regime Change-Moldova