Strong performers and successful reformers OECD...
45
OECD EMPLOYER BRAND Playbook 1 PISA 2012 Strong performers and successful reformers in education Andreas Schleicher Brazil, 6 December 2013
Transcript of Strong performers and successful reformers OECD...
OECD EMPLOYER
BRAND
Playbook
1
PISA 2012 Strong performers
and successful reformers
in education
Andreas Schleicher
Brazil, 6 December 2013
2 PISA in brief
• Over half a million students… – representing 28 million 15-year-olds in 65 countries/economies
… took an internationally agreed 2-hour test… – Goes beyond testing whether students can
reproduce what they were taught…
… to assess students’ capacity to extrapolate from what they know and creatively apply their knowledge in novel situations
– Mathematics, reading, science, problem-solving, financial literacy
– Total of 390 minutes of assessment material
… and responded to questions on… – their personal background, their schools
and their engagement with learning and school
• Parents, principals and system leaders provided data on… – school policies, practices, resources and institutional factors that
help explain performance differences .
What do 15-year-olds know… …and what can they do with what they know?
No country improved learning outcomes faster than Brazil…
…but Brazil still has a long way to go
3
Change in performance between PISA 2003 and 2012
Indonesia
Thailand
Russian Fed.
United States
Latvia
Spain
Norway Luxembourg
Ireland
Austria
Switzerland Japan
Liechtenstein
Korea
Brazil
Tunisia
Mexico
Uruguay
Turkey
Greece
Italy
Portugal
Hungary
Poland
Slovak Republic
OECD average
Germany
Sweden
France
Denmark
Iceland
Czech Republic
New Zealand Australia
Macao-China
Belgium
Canada
Netherlands
Finland
Hong Kong-China
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
350 400 450 500 550 600
Ave
rag
e a
nn
ual m
ath
em
ati
cs
sc
ore
ch
an
ge
Average mathematics performance in PISA 2003
Imp
rovin
g p
erfo
rma
nce
D
ete
riora
ting
perfo
rma
nce
PISA 2003 performance below the OECD average PISA 2003 performance
above the OECD average
Fig I.2.18 4
B
o No country improved enrolment faster
– 15-year-olds enrolled • 2003: 65%
• 2012: 78%
o No country saw steeper performance gains since 2003
– 35 score points on the mathematics scale observed
– 44 score points adjusting for the ‘drag’ from newly enrolled students
o With that pace Brazil will catch up with the United States in 18 years and the OECD average in 21 years .
5 The Brazilian miracle
Performance of countries in a level playing field
How the world would look if students around the world were living in similar social and economic conditions
6
340
360
380
400
420
440
460
480
500
520
540
560
580
600
Sha
ngh
ai-
Ch
ina
Sin
ga
po
reH
ong
Kon
g-C
hin
aC
hin
ese
Taip
ei
Vie
t N
am
Ma
ca
o-C
hin
aK
ore
aJa
pa
nL
iech
tenste
inP
ola
nd
Sw
itze
rla
nd
Esto
nia
Neth
erla
nds
Germ
any
Belg
ium
Fin
land
Cana
da
Port
ug
al
Austr
iaC
ze
ch R
ep
ub
licN
ew
Ze
ala
nd
Latv
iaF
ran
ce
Slo
ven
iaIr
ela
nd
Austr
alia
OE
CD
ave
rag
eT
urk
ey
Slo
vak R
epu
blic
Spa
inH
ung
ary
Luxe
mb
ou
rgIt
aly
Ru
ssia
n F
ede
ratio
nU
nited
Kin
gd
om
Denm
ark
Lithu
ania
Cro
atia
Un
ited
Sta
tes
No
rwa
yS
wede
nIc
ela
nd
Rom
ania
Isra
el
Serb
iaT
haila
nd
Gre
ece
Bulg
aria
Chile
Uru
gua
yM
ala
ysia
Kaza
kh
sta
nC
ypru
s5,
6M
exic
oC
osta
Ric
aU
nited
Ara
b E
mira
tes
Bra
zil
Mo
nte
neg
roT
unis
iaIn
do
ne
sia
Peru
Arg
en
tin
aC
olo
mb
iaJo
rdan
Qata
r
Me
an
ma
the
ma
tic
s s
co
re
Mean score at the country level before adjusting for socio-economic status
Mean score at the country level after adjusting for socio economic status
Mathematics performance in a level playing field Mean mathematics performance after accounting for socio-economic status
Fig II.3.3 7
US would rank lower in a level playing field: • Ranks 3rd in wealth per person (explains 12%) • Ranks 5th in spending per student • Has average share of disadvantaged students • Ranks 6th in parental attainment • Has 6th largest share of immigrant students
(explains 4%)
The dream of social mobility
In some countries it is close to a reality
8
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Sh
an
gh
ai-
Chin
aH
on
g K
on
g-C
hin
aM
acao
-Chin
aV
iet
Nam
Sin
ga
pore
Ko
rea
Chin
ese
Ta
ipe
iJap
an
Lie
chte
nste
inS
witze
rlan
dE
sto
nia
Ne
the
rlan
ds
Po
lan
dC
an
ad
aF
inla
nd
Be
lgiu
mP
ort
ug
al
Ge
rma
ny
Tu
rke
yO
EC
D a
vera
ge
Italy
Sp
ain
Latv
iaIr
ela
nd
Au
str
alia
Th
aila
nd
Au
str
iaL
uxe
mb
ourg
Czech
Rep
ublic
Slo
ve
nia
Un
ite
d K
ing
do
mL
ith
uan
iaF
rance
Norw
ay
Ice
lan
dN
ew
Zea
land
Ru
ssia
n F
ed
.U
nite
d S
tate
sC
roa
tia
Den
ma
rkS
wed
en
Hun
ga
ryS
lova
k R
ep
ub
licM
exic
oS
erb
iaG
ree
ce
Isra
el
Tu
nis
iaR
om
an
iaM
ala
ysia
Indo
nesia
Bu
lga
ria
Ka
za
kh
sta
nU
rug
ua
yB
razil
Costa
Ric
aC
hile
Colo
mbia
Mo
nte
ne
gro
U.A
.E.
Arg
en
tina
Jord
an
Pe
ruQ
ata
r
%
Percentage of resilient students
More than 10
% resilient Between 5%-10% of resilient students Less than 5%
Fig II.2.4 9
Socio-economically disadvantaged students not only score lower in mathematics, they also report lower levels of engagement, drive, motivation and self-beliefs. Resilient students break this link and share many characteristics of advantaged high-achievers.
A resilient student is situated in the bottom quarter of
the PISA index of economic, social and cultural
status (ESCS) in the country of assessment and
performs in the top quarter of students among all
countries, after accounting for socio-economic status.
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Score
10 Social background and school performance - Brazil
Belo
w leve
l 1
Leve
l 1
Leve
l 2
Leve
l 3
Leve
l 4
Leve
l 5
PISA index of social, economic and cultural status
Private school
Public school in rural area
Public school in urban area
B
-125
-100
-75
-50
-25
0
25
50
75
100
Ch
inese
Taip
ei
Ho
ng
Kon
g-C
hin
aT
haila
nd
Vie
t N
am
Luxe
mb
ou
rgS
witze
rla
nd
Ind
one
sia
Italy
Kaza
kh
sta
nJa
pa
nC
ze
ch R
ep
ub
licN
eth
erla
nds
Esto
nia
Alb
an
iaIr
ela
nd
United
Sta
tes
Hung
ary
Sw
ede
nK
ore
aU
nited
Kin
gd
om
Fin
land
Denm
ark
OE
CD
ave
rag
eF
ran
ce
Sha
ngh
ai-
Ch
ina
Austr
alia
Spa
inS
lovak R
epu
blic
Me
xic
oG
erm
any
Austr
iaC
olo
mb
iaC
hile
Cana
da
Pola
nd
Jo
rdan
Arg
en
tin
aU
nited
Ara
b E
mira
tes
Port
ug
al
Peru
Costa
Ric
aB
razil
New
Ze
ala
nd
Ma
laysia
Slo
ven
iaU
rug
ua
yQ
ata
r
Sc
ore
-po
int
dif
fere
nc
e Performance advantage of public schools
Performance advantage of private schools
Differences in mathematics performance between private and public
schools shrink considerably after accounting for socio-economic status
Observed performance difference
After accounting for students’ and schools’ socio-economic status
Fig IV.1.19
-2,00
-1,50
-1,00
-0,50
0,00
0,50
Peru
Costa
Ric
aM
exic
oB
razil
Ind
one
sia
Thaila
nd
Colo
mb
iaN
ew
Ze
ala
nd
Turk
ey
Arg
en
tin
aU
nited
Sta
tes
Uru
gua
yA
ustr
alia
Chile
Vie
t N
am
Jo
rdan
Sha
ngh
ai-
Ch
ina
U.A
.E.
Rom
ania
Sw
ede
nIs
rael
Bulg
aria
Ch
inese
Taip
ei
Ma
laysia
Irela
nd
Gre
ece
Tunis
iaP
ola
nd
Cana
da
Ja
pa
nM
aca
o-C
hin
aO
EC
D a
ve
rag
eL
uxe
mb
ou
rgQ
ata
rR
ussia
n F
ed.
Icela
nd
Belg
ium
Fra
nce
Sw
itze
rla
nd
Port
ug
al
Ho
ng
Kon
g-C
hin
aS
pa
inL
ithu
ania
Denm
ark
Kaza
kh
sta
nIt
aly
Cze
ch R
ep
ub
licN
eth
erla
nds
Esto
nia
Hung
ary
Slo
ven
iaA
ustr
iaS
inga
po
reL
atv
iaS
lovak R
epu
blic
Mo
nte
neg
roK
ore
aG
erm
any
Serb
iaU
nited
Kin
gd
om
No
rwa
yC
roa
tia
Fin
land
Lie
ch
tenste
inA
lban
ia
Me
an
in
de
x d
iffe
ren
ce
Difference between socio-economically disadvantaged and socio-economically advantaged schools
Educational resources are more problematic in disadvantaged
schools in most countries
Advantaged and private schools
reported better educational
resources
Disadvantaged and public schools
reported better educational
resources
Fig IV.3.8
Math teaching ≠ math teaching PISA = reason mathematically and understand, formulate, employ
and interpret mathematical concepts, facts and procedures
13
0,00
0,50
1,00
1,50
2,00
2,50S
we
de
nIc
ela
nd
Tu
nis
iaA
rgen
tin
aS
witze
rla
nd
Bra
zil
Luxe
mb
ou
rgIr
ela
nd
Neth
erla
nds
New
Ze
ala
nd
Costa
Ric
aA
ustr
iaL
iech
tenste
inM
ala
ysia
Ind
one
sia
Denm
ark
United
Kin
gd
om
Uru
gua
yL
ithu
ania
Germ
any
Austr
alia
Chile
OE
CD
ave
rag
eS
lovak R
epu
blic
Th
aila
nd
Qata
rF
inla
nd
Port
ug
al
Colo
mb
iaM
exic
oP
eru
Czech R
ep
ub
licIs
rael
Italy
Belg
ium
Hong
Kon
g-C
hin
aP
ola
nd
Fra
nce
Spa
inM
on
ten
eg
roG
reece
Tu
rke
yS
loven
iaV
iet N
am
Hung
ary
Bulg
aria
Kaza
kh
sta
nC
hin
ese
Taip
ei
Cana
da
United
Sta
tes
Esto
nia
Ro
ma
nia
Latv
iaS
erb
iaJa
pa
nK
ore
aC
roa
tia
Alb
an
iaR
ussia
n F
ede
ratio
nU
nited
Ara
b E
mira
tes
Jo
rdan
Ma
ca
o-C
hin
aS
inga
po
reS
ha
ngh
ai-
Ch
ina
Icela
nd
Ind
ex
of
ex
po
su
re t
o f
orm
al m
ath
em
ati
cs
Focus on conceptual understanding Fig I.3.1b 14
0,00
0,50
1,00
1,50
2,00
2,50C
zech R
ep
ub
licM
aca
o-C
hin
aS
ha
ngh
ai-
Ch
ina
Vie
t N
am
Uru
gua
yF
inla
nd
Costa
Ric
aS
wede
nJa
pa
nC
hin
ese
Taip
ei
Italy
Isra
el
No
rwa
yE
sto
nia
Ho
ng
Kon
g-C
hin
aA
ustr
iaS
erb
iaK
ore
aC
roa
tia
Latv
iaS
lovak R
epu
blic
Gre
ece
United
Kin
gd
om
Irela
nd
Luxe
mb
ou
rgB
elg
ium
Mo
nte
neg
roA
rgen
tin
aS
loven
iaB
ulg
aria
OE
CD
ave
rag
eL
ithu
ania
Hung
ary
Sw
itze
rla
nd
New
Ze
ala
nd
Germ
any
Turk
ey
Denm
ark
Ru
ssia
n F
ede
ratio
nS
inga
po
reIc
ela
nd
United
Sta
tes
Spa
inQ
ata
rL
iech
tenste
inP
ola
nd
Austr
alia
Fra
nce
Bra
zil
Ma
laysia
Peru
Cana
da
Chile
Un
ited
Ara
b E
mira
tes
Rom
ania
Tu
nis
iaN
eth
erla
nds
Port
ug
al
Colo
mb
iaA
lban
iaK
aza
kh
sta
nJo
rdan
Me
xic
oIn
do
ne
sia
Thaila
nd
Ind
ex
of
ex
po
su
re t
o a
pp
lie
d m
ath
em
ati
cs
Students' exposure to applied mathematics Fig I.3.1c 15
430
450
470
490
510
0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0
Me
an
sc
ore
in
ma
the
ma
tic
s
Index of exposure to applied mathematics
rarely sometimes frequently never
Relationship between mathematics performance
and students' exposure to applied mathematics Fig I.3.2 16
OECD countries
All participating countries and economies
17 17 L
essons f
rom
hig
h p
erf
orm
ers
Catching up with the top-performers
Low impact on outcomes
High impact on outcomes
Low feasibility High feasibility
Money pits
Must haves
Low hanging fruits
Quick wins
18 18 L
essons f
rom
hig
h p
erf
orm
ers
Low impact on outcomes
High impact on outcomes
Low feasibility High feasibility
Money pits
Must haves
Low hanging fruits
Quick wins
Commitment to universal achievement
Gateways, instructional systems
Capacity at point of delivery
Incentive structures and accountability
Resources where they yield most
A learning system Coherence
19 19 L
essons f
rom
hig
h p
erf
orm
ers
Low impact on outcomes
High impact on outcomes
Low feasibility High feasibility
Money pits
Must haves
Low hanging fruits
Quick wins
Commitment to universal achievement
Gateways, instructional systems
Capacity at point of delivery
Incentive structures and accountability
Resources where they yield most
A learning system Coherence
A commitment to education and the belief that competencies can be learned and therefore all children can achieve Universal educational standards and personalization as
the approach to heterogeneity in the student body…
… as opposed to a belief that students have different destinations to be met with different expectations, and selection/stratification as the approach to heterogeneity
Clear articulation who is responsible for ensuring student success and to whom
United States
Poland
Hong Kong-China
Brazil
New Zealand
Greece
Uruguay
United Kingdom
Estonia Finland
Albania
Croatia
Latvia
Slovak Republic Luxembourg
Germany
Lithuania
Austria
Czech Republic
Chinese Taipei
France
Thailand
Japan
Turkey Sweden
Hungary Australia
Israel
Canada
Ireland Bulgaria
Jordan
Chile
Macao-China
U.A.E.
Belgium
Netherlands
Spain
Argentina
Indonesia
Denmark
Kazakhstan
Peru
Costa Rica
Switzerland
Montenegro
Tunisia
Iceland
Slovenia
Qatar
Singapore
Portugal
Norway
Colombia
Malaysia
Mexico
Liechtenstein
Korea
Serbia
Russian Fed.
Romania
Viet Nam
Italy
Shanghai-China
R² = 0.36
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
-0,60 -0,40 -0,20 0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20
Me
an
ma
the
ma
tics
perf
orm
an
ce
Mean index of mathematics self-efficacy
OE
CD
ave
rag
e
Countries where students have stronger beliefs
in their abilities perform better in mathematics 20 Fig III.4.5
Perceived self-responsibility for failure
in mathematics
Percentage of students who reported "agree" or "strongly agree" with the following statements:
0 20 40 60 80 100
I’m not very good at solving mathematics problems
My teacher did not explain the concepts wellthis week
This week I made bad guesses on the quiz
Sometimes the course material is too hard
The teacher did not get students interested inthe material
Sometimes I am just unlucky
%
Brazil Shanghai-China OECD average
Fig III.3.6 21
US B
The parent factor
Students whose parents have high educational expectations for them tend to report more perseverance, greater intrinsic
motivation to learn mathematics, and more confidence in their own ability to solve mathematics problems than students of
similar background and academic performance, whose parents hold less ambitious expectations for them.
22
-16
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
Germ
any
Belg
ium
(F
lem
ish)
Me
xic
o
Chile
Port
ug
al
Italy
Ma
ca
o-C
hin
a
Ho
ng
Kon
g-C
hin
a
Cro
atia
Kore
a
Hung
ary
Pe
rce
nta
ge
-po
int
ch
an
ge
Percentage-point change in arriving late for school that is associated with parents expecting the child to complete a university degree
Parents’ expectations for their child have a strong
influence on students’ behaviour towards school 23 Fig III.6.11
0,00
0,05
0,10
0,15
0,20
0,25
0,30
0,35
0,40
0,45
0,50
Belg
ium
(F
lem
ish)
Kore
a
Italy
Ho
ng
Kon
g-C
hin
a
Chile
Port
ug
al
Hu
ng
ary
Cro
atia
Ma
ca
o-C
hin
a
Me
xic
o
Germ
any
Me
an
in
de
x c
ha
ng
e
Change in the index of intrinsic motivation to learn mathematics that is associated with parents expecting the child to complete a university degree
Parents’ high expectations can nurture
students’ enjoyment in learning mathematics 24 Fig III.6.11
25 25 L
essons f
rom
hig
h p
erf
orm
ers
Low impact on outcomes
High impact on outcomes
Low feasibility High feasibility
Money pits
Must haves
Low hanging fruits
Quick wins
Commitment to universal achievement
Gateways, instructional systems
Capacity at point of delivery
Incentive structures and accountability
Resources where they yield most
A learning system Coherence
Clear ambitious goals that are shared across the system and aligned with high stakes gateways and instructional systems
Well established delivery chain through which curricular goals translate into instructional systems, instructional practices and student learning (intended, implemented and achieved)
High level of metacognitive content of instruction …
USA Poland
Hong Kong-China
Brazil
New Zealand
Greece
Uruguay
UK
Estonia
Finland
Croatia
Latvia
Slovak Rep.
Luxembourg
Germany
Lithuania
Austria
Czech Rep.
Chinese Taipei
France
Thailand
Japan
Turkey
Sweden
Hungary
Australia
Israel
Canada
Ireland
Bulgaria
Jordan
Chile
Macao-China
UAE
Belgium
Netherlands
Spain
Argentina
Indonesia
Denmark
Kazakhstan
Peru
Costa Rica
Switzerland
Montenegro
Tunisia Iceland
Slovenia
Qatar
Singapore
Portugal
Norway
Colombia
Mexico Korea
Serbia Russian Fed.
Romania
Viet Nam
Italy
Shanghai-China
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
-5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Va
ria
tio
n in
ma
the
ma
tic
s p
erf
orm
an
ce
ex
pla
ine
d b
y s
oc
io-
ec
on
om
ic s
tatu
s (
%)
Percentage of students who have repeated at least one grade
Adjusted by per capita GDP
Grade repetition is negatively related to equity Fig IV.1.4
R2=0.05
Greater equity
Less equity
R2=0.07
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
Ja
pa
n
Norw
ay
Esto
nia
Icela
nd
Isra
el
Un
ited
Kin
gd
om
Slo
ven
ia
Pola
nd
Cze
ch R
ep
ub
lic
Kore
a
Sw
ede
n
Fin
land
De
nm
ark
Ne
w Z
eala
nd
Slo
vak R
epu
blic
Austr
alia
Cana
da
Ire
land
Un
ited
Sta
tes
Austr
ia
Italy
Port
ug
al
Germ
any
Spa
in
Fra
nce
Ne
the
rla
nds
Belg
ium
%
US
D, P
PP
s
Total cost per repeater (one grade year)
Total annual cost, relative to total expenditure on primary and secondary education (%)
Grade repetition is an expensive policy Fig IV.1.5
28 28 L
essons f
rom
hig
h p
erf
orm
ers
Low impact on outcomes
High impact on outcomes
Low feasibility High feasibility
Money pits
Must haves
Low hanging fruits
Quick wins
Commitment to universal achievement
Gateways, instructional systems
Capacity at point of delivery
Incentive structures and accountability
Resources where they yield most
A learning system Coherence
Capacity at the point of delivery
Attracting, developing and retaining high quality teachers and school leaders and a work organisation in which they can use their potential
Instructional leadership and human resource management in schools
Keeping teaching an attractive profession
System-wide career development …
-1,5
-1
-0,5
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
Luxe
mb
ourg
Jord
an
Th
aila
nd
Tu
rke
yS
han
gh
ai-
Chin
aIs
rae
lC
olo
mbia
Pe
ruC
hile
Neth
erl
an
ds
Me
xic
oG
erm
an
yV
iet
Nam
Russia
n F
ed
.U
rug
ua
yN
orw
ay
Ka
za
kh
sta
nIn
do
nesia
Be
lgiu
mIt
aly
Ma
laysia
Au
str
alia
Bra
zil
Ice
lan
dU
.A.E
.S
ing
ap
ore
New
Zea
land
Ko
rea
Sw
itze
rlan
dE
sto
nia
Ma
cao
-Chin
aC
osta
Ric
aO
EC
D a
vera
ge
Sw
ed
en
Arg
en
tina
Tu
nis
iaA
ustr
iaQ
ata
rIr
ela
nd
Ch
ine
se
Ta
ipe
iF
rance
Den
ma
rkU
nite
d K
ing
do
mH
on
g K
on
g-C
hin
aA
lba
nia
Jap
an
Can
ad
aS
lova
k R
ep
ub
licL
atv
iaG
ree
ce
Un
ite
d S
tate
sC
zech
Rep
ublic
Cro
atia
Fin
land
Mo
nte
ne
gro
Rom
an
iaH
un
ga
ryL
ith
uan
iaS
love
nia
Sp
ain
Se
rbia
Po
rtug
al
Bu
lga
ria
Po
lan
d
Me
an
in
de
x
Mean index Top quarter of this index Bottom quarter of this index
Teacher shortage Fig IV.3.5
-4,00
-3,00
-2,00
-1,00
0,00
1,00
2,00
3,00
Sin
ga
po
reQ
ata
rA
ustr
alia
Ch
inese
Taip
ei
Sw
itze
rla
nd
Un
ited
Kin
gd
om
Hong
Kon
g-C
hin
aJa
pa
nS
loven
iaF
ran
ce
Un
ited
Sta
tes
U.A
.E.
Pola
nd
Ma
ca
o-C
hin
aB
elg
ium
Ca
na
da
Austr
iaR
om
ania
Ne
w Z
eala
nd
Ne
the
rla
nds
Hung
ary
Port
ug
al
Lithu
ania
Sha
ngh
ai-
Ch
ina
Uru
gua
yIr
ela
nd
Germ
any
Kore
aO
EC
D a
ve
rag
eS
wede
nC
ze
ch R
ep
ub
licIt
aly
Luxe
mb
ou
rgL
atv
iaS
pa
inB
ulg
aria
Denm
ark
Esto
nia
Norw
ay
Fin
land
Ma
laysia
Icela
nd
Gre
ece
Isra
el
Chile
Turk
ey
Alb
an
iaJo
rdan
Ru
ssia
n F
ed.
Vie
t N
am
Mo
nte
neg
roC
roa
tia
Bra
zil
Arg
en
tin
aS
lovak R
epu
blic
Serb
iaT
haila
nd
Kaza
kh
sta
nIn
do
ne
sia
Me
xic
oC
osta
Ric
aP
eru
Tunis
iaC
olo
mb
ia
Me
an
in
de
x
Mean index Top quarter of this index Bottom quarter of this index
Adequacy of educational resources Fig IV.3.8
31 31 L
essons f
rom
hig
h p
erf
orm
ers
Low impact on outcomes
High impact on outcomes
Low feasibility High feasibility
Money pits
Must haves
Low hanging fruits
Quick wins
Commitment to universal achievement
Gateways, instructional systems
Capacity at point of delivery
Incentive structures and accountability
Resources where they yield most
A learning system Coherence
Incentives, accountability, knowledge management
Aligned incentive structures
For students How gateways affect the strength, direction, clarity and nature of the
incentives operating on students at each stage of their education
Degree to which students have incentives to take tough courses and study hard
Opportunity costs for staying in school and performing well
For teachers Make innovations in pedagogy and/or organisation
Improve their own performance and the performance of their colleagues
Pursue professional development opportunities that lead to stronger pedagogical practices
A balance between vertical and lateral accountability
Effective instruments to manage and share knowledge and spread innovation – communication within the system and with stakeholders around it
A capable centre with authority and legitimacy to act
Hong Kong-China
Brazil
Uruguay
Albania
Croatia
Latvia
Lithuania
Chinese Taipei
Thailand Bulgaria
Jordan
Macao-China
UAE Argentina
Indonesia
Kazakhstan
Peru
Costa Rica
Tunisia
Qatar
Singapore
Colombia
Malaysia
Serbia
Romania
Viet Nam
Shanghai-China
USA
Poland
New Zealand
Greece
UK
Estonia
Finland
Slovak Rep.
Luxembourg
Germany Austria
Czech Rep.
France
Japan
Turkey
Sweden
Hungary Australia
Israel
Canada
Chile
Belgium
Netherlands Spain
Denmark
Switzerland
Iceland
Slovenia
Portugal
Norway
Korea
Italy
R² = 0,13
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
-1,5 -1 -0,5 0 0,5 1 1,5
Ma
the
ma
tics
perf
orm
an
ce
(sc
ore
po
ints
)
Index of school responsibility for curriculum and assessment (index points)
Countries that grant schools autonomy over curricula and
assessments tend to perform better in mathematics Fig IV.1.15
Schools with more autonomy perform better than schools with
less autonomy in systems with more collaboration
Teachers don't participate inmanagement
Teachers participate inmanagement455
460
465
470
475
480
485
Less school autonomy
More school autonomy
Score points
School autonomy for resource allocation x System's level of teachers
participating in school management
Across all participating countries and economies
Fig IV.1.17
Schools with more autonomy perform better than schools with
less autonomy in systems with more accountability arrangements
School data not public
School data public464
466
468
470
472
474
476
478
Less school autonomy
More school autonomy
Score points
School autonomy for curriculum and assessment
x system's level of posting achievement data publicly
Fig IV.1.16
No standardisedmath policy
Standardised mathpolicy455
460
465
470
475
480
485
Less school autonomy
More school autonomy
Schools with more autonomy perform better than schools with
less autonomy in systems with standardised math policies
Score points
School autonomy for curriculum and assessment
x system's extent of implementing a standardised math policy (e.g. curriculum and
instructional materials)
Fig IV.1.16
36 36 L
essons f
rom
hig
h p
erf
orm
ers
Low impact on outcomes
High impact on outcomes
Low feasibility High feasibility
Money pits
Must haves
Low hanging fruits
Quick wins
Commitment to universal achievement
Gateways, instructional systems
Capacity at point of delivery
Incentive structures and accountability
Resources where they yield most
A learning system Coherence
Investing resources where they can make most of a difference
Alignment of resources with key challenges (e.g. attracting the most talented teachers to the most challenging classrooms)
Effective spending choices that prioritise high quality teachers over smaller classes
Money makes a difference…
…but only up to a point
37
Spending per student from the age of 6 to 15 and
mathematics performance in PISA 2012
Slovak Republic
Czech Republic Estonia
Israel
Poland
Korea
Portugal
New Zealand
Canada Germany
Spain
France
Italy
Singapore
Finland
Japan
Slovenia Ireland
Iceland
Netherlands
Sweden
Belgium
UK
Australia Denmark
United States
Austria
Norway
Switzerland
Luxembourg
Viet Nam
Jordan
Peru
Thailand
Malaysia
Uruguay
Turkey
Colombia
Tunisia
Mexico Montenegro
Brazil
Bulgaria
Chile
Croatia Lithuania
Latvia
Hungary
Shanghai-China
R² = 0,01
R² = 0,37
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
0 20 000 40 000 60 000 80 000 100 000 120 000 140 000 160 000 180 000 200 000
Ma
the
ma
tics
perf
orm
an
ce
(sc
ore
po
ints
)
Average spending per student from the age of 6 to 15 (USD, PPPs)
Cumulative expenditure per student less than USD 50 000
Cumulative expenditure per student USD 50 000 or more
Fig IV.1.8
Hong Kong-China
Brazil
Uruguay
Croatia
Latvia
Chinese Taipei
Thailand
Bulgaria
Jordan
Macao-China
UAE
Argentina
Indonesia
Kazakhstan
Peru
Costa Rica Montenegro
Tunisia
Qatar
Singapore
Colombia
Malaysia Serbia
Romania
Viet Nam
Shanghai-China
USA
Poland
New Zealand
Greece
UK
Estonia
Finland
Slovak Rep.
Luxembourg
Germany
Austria France
Japan
Turkey Sweden Hungary
Australia Israel
Canada
Ireland
Chile
Belgium
Spain Denmark
Switzerland
Iceland
Slovenia
Portugal Norway
Mexico
Korea
Italy
R² = 0,19
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
-0,500,511,5
Ma
the
ma
tics
perf
orm
an
ce
(sc
ore
po
ints
)
Equity in resource allocation (index points)
Countries with better performance in mathematics tend
to allocate educational resources more equitably
Greater
equity Less
equity
Adjusted by per capita GDP
Fig IV.1.11
SHA
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Sh
an
gh
ai-
Chin
aH
on
g K
on
g-C
hin
aF
rance
Slo
va
k R
ep
ub
licM
acao
-Ch
ina
Italy
Sw
itze
rlan
dQ
ata
rC
zech
Rep
ublic
Isra
el
Th
aila
nd
Arg
en
tina
Den
ma
rkB
elg
ium
Vie
t N
am
Ge
rma
ny
U.A
.E.
Unite
d K
ing
do
mG
ree
ce
Indo
nesia
Sp
ain
Ch
ine
se
Ta
ipe
iS
ing
ap
ore
Jap
an
Fin
land
Uru
gua
yP
ola
nd
Sw
ed
en
Au
str
alia
New
Zea
land
OE
CD
avera
ge
Neth
erl
an
ds
Ma
laysia
Au
str
iaL
uxe
mb
ourg
Bu
lga
ria
Me
xic
oJord
an
Pe
ruIc
ela
nd
Po
rtug
al
Bra
zil
Tu
rke
yR
om
an
iaC
an
ad
aN
orw
ay
Tu
nis
iaL
ith
uan
iaC
hile
Se
rbia
Ko
rea
Un
ite
d S
tate
sR
ussia
n F
ed
.C
osta
Ric
aK
aza
kh
sta
nM
on
ten
eg
roC
olo
mbia
Cro
atia
Slo
ve
nia
Ire
lan
dL
atv
iaE
sto
nia
Sc
ore
po
int
dif
fere
nc
e
before accounting for students' socio-economic status after accounting for students' socio-economic status
Difference in mathematics performance,
by attendance at pre-primary school
Students who attended pre-primary
school perform better
Fig III.4.12 40
41 41 L
essons f
rom
hig
h p
erf
orm
ers
Low impact on outcomes
High impact on outcomes
Low feasibility High feasibility
Money pits
Must haves
Low hanging fruits
Quick wins
Commitment to universal achievement
Gateways, instructional systems
Capacity at point of delivery
Incentive structures and accountability
Resources where they yield most
A learning system Coherence
Coherence of policies and practices
Alignment of policies across all aspects of the system
Coherence of policies over sustained periods of time
Consistency of implementation
Fidelity of implementation (without excessive control)
CAN
42 42 L
essons f
rom
hig
h p
erf
orm
ers
Low impact on outcomes
High impact on outcomes
Low feasibility High feasibility
Money pits
Must haves
Low hanging fruits
Quick wins
Commitment to universal achievement
Gateways, instructional systems
Capacity at point of delivery
Incentive structures and accountability
Resources where they yield most
A learning system Coherence
43 43 L
essons f
rom
hig
h p
erf
orm
ers
Some students learn at high levels All students need to learn at high levels
Student inclusion
Routine cognitive skills, rote learning Learning to learn, complex ways of thinking, ways of working
Curriculum, instruction and assessment
Few years more than secondary High-level professional knowledge workers
Teacher quality
‘Tayloristic’, hierarchical Flat, collegial
Work organisation
Primarily to authorities Primarily to peers and stakeholders
Accountability
What it all means
The old bureaucratic system The modern enabling system
Thank you !
Find out more about PISA at www.pisa.oecd.org
• All national and international publications
• The complete micro-level database
Email: [email protected]
Twitter: SchleicherEDU
and remember:
Without data, you are just another person with an opinion
Do you have an idea on how to use this data to improve education in your country?
Would you like to work with us to develop that idea?
Apply to the Thomas J. Alexander
fellowship programme!
http://www.oecd.org/edu/thomasjalexanderfellowship.htm
