STRENGTHENING ACCOUNTABILITY AMONG CIVIL

SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN UGANDA

By

Consulting Agency: Platform for Citizenship Participation and Accountability (PLACA)

Consultant: Assoc. Prof. Yasin Olum (PhD) Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Faculty of Social SciencesMakerere University

P. O. Box 7062Kampala

Email: yasin.olum@yahoo.co.uk, yolum@ss.mak.ac.ug

March 2011

Table of Contents

Acronyms 2List of Tables 3List of Figures 4Section One: Introduction 51.1 Background to the Study 51.2 Objectives of the Study 71.2.1 Overall Objective 71.2.2 Specific Objectives 71.3 Rationale and Justification of the Study 8Section Two: Literature Review on Civil Society Accountability 9Section Three: Methodology 263.1 Introduction 263.2 Research Design 263.3 Area of Study 263.4 Study Population 273.5 Sample Size Determination and Allocation 273.6 Recruitment and Training of Research Assistants 293.7 Date Collection, Field Editing, Processing and Management 293.8 Quality Control in the Field 303.9 Instrument Administration, Ethical considerations and Organization of the Survey 303.10 Analysis, Presentation and Dissemination of the Findings 30Section Four: Findings and Discussion 324.1 Introduction 324.2 Background and Composition of Respondents 324.3 Accountability Issues within the CSOs and Stakeholders 354.4 Types of CSOs 364.5 Accountable Governance System in CSOs 464.6 Appropriate Accountability Framework/Model used by CSOs 534.7 Compliance Response Mechanism 584.8 Accountable Resource Usage and Management 654.9 Challenges of CSO Accountability 70Section Five: Conclusions 72Section Six: Recommendations 73References

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Acronyms

BoDs - Board of DirectorsBSC - Balanced Scorecard CAO - Chief Administrative Officer CAR - Capability, Accountability and Responsiveness CBO - Community Based OrganizationCDO - Community Development Officer CSO - Civil Society OrganizationFDS - Focus Group DiscussionsGAP - Global Accountability ProjectICT - Information Communication TechnologyINGO - International Non-Governmental OrganizationKI - Key InformantLCIII - Local Council ThreeLCV - Local Council FiveNPO - Non-Profit OrganizationOSANGO - Organizational Self-Analysis for NGOQuAM - Quality Assurance Certification MechanismRDC - Resident District CommissionerSAP - Structural Adjustment ProgramSPSS - Statistical Package for Social SciencesSWOT - Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and ThreatsUWESO - Uganda Women’s Effort to Save Orphans

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List of Tables

Table 1: Types of Civil Society Organizations 13Table 2: Mutual Accountability Relationship and Management Issues 20Table 3: Sample Size 28Table 4: Composition of Respondents by Position held in the Organization 31Table 5: Age Distribution of Respondents by Sub-region 32Table 6: Educational Level of Respondents by Sub-region 34Table 7: Length of Time the CSOs have been in Operation 37Table 8: Number of Years Respondents Have Worked in the CSOs 38Table 9: Registration Status of CSOs by Sub-region 39Table 10: Roles of the Boards in the Governance of CSOs 42Table 11: Nature of Services Provided by CSOs 44Table 12: Accountable Governance System 46Table 13: Knowledge and Involvement of CSOs in Umbrella Organizations 47Table 14: Accountability Systems within CSOs 50Table 15: Involvement of Stakeholders in CSO Accountability 51Table 16: CSOs Accountability Framework/Model 53Table 17: CSOs Accountability Framework that Enhances Evaluation 57Table 18: Compliance Response Mechanism in CSOs 59Table 19: Capability of CSOs in Ensuring Accountability 60Table 20: Accountable Programs in CSO Umbrella Organizations 63Table 21: Accountability Program within CSOs 65Table 22: Human Resource Gaps within CSOs 65Table 23: Accountable Financial Resource Management 66Table 24: Challenges in Accountability Faced by CSOs 70

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List of Figures

Figure 1: Distribution of Respondents by Position Held in CSOs 32Figure 2: Age Distribution of Respondents by Sub-region 33Figure 3: CSOs Basic Knowledge about Accountability 35Figure 4: Length of Time CSOs have been in Operation by Sub-region 38Figure 5: CSOs Registered by Sub-region 39Figure 6: Sources of Funding to CSOs 40Figure 7: Roles of Boards in the Governance of CSOs 42Figure 8: Major Areas of Operation of CSOs in Uganda 43Figure 9: Nature of Services Provided by CSOs 44Figure 10: Mode of Communication in CSOs 45Figure 11: Accountable Governance Systems in CSOs 46Figure 12: Reporting Accountability Issues by CSOs 49Figure 13: Accountable Governance in CSO Umbrella Organizations 49Figure 14: Accountability System within CSOs 50Figure 15: Involvement of Stakeholders in CSOs Accountability 51Figure 16: CSOs Framework that Encourages Accountability 52Figure 17: Accountability Framework in CSOs that Ensures Transparency 54Figure 18: Compliance and Response Mechanism in CSOs 59Figure 19: Capability of CSOs in Ensuring Accountability 61Figure 20: Accountability Programs in CSOs 61Figure 21: Accountability in CSOs Umbrella Organizations 64Figure 22: Human Resource Gaps Amongst the CSOs 66Figure 23: Accountable Financial Resource Management 67Figure 24: Accountable Human Resource Management 68Figure 25: Challenges in Accountability Faced by CSOs 70 Figure 26: Suggested Remedies to Challenges Facing CSOs Accountability 73

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Section One: Introduction

1.1 Background to the Study

As a key non-state actor in Uganda’s governance and development processes, civil society has become increasingly active over the past four decades or so. This is why today Uganda has about 7,000 registered civil society organizations (CSOs)1. These CSOs range from grassroots organizations, economic associations, and community based organizations (CBOs) at both the national and district levels. Other CSOs which are active in policy and development issues include faith-based groups, the media, trade unions and religious organizations. It has to be acknowledged that in Uganda CSOs continue to play the critical role of policy advocacy, civic education, emergency preparedness, delivery of social services, and social networking (especially for the small informal groups). Indeed, in the last decade, the focus of CSOs has shifted from humanitarian and emergency initiatives to policy advocacy, economic development and poverty alleviation. Besides delivering public goods and services, CSOs play the role of deepening democratic processes through enhancing public participation and promoting consultation, transparency and public accountability.

In Uganda, some CSOs have taken accountability seriously.2 Thus, from around 2004, they have been developing various instruments with the sole purpose of generating awareness and commitment to values and principles of accountability beyond the usual codes of conduct currently prevalent in most organizations. Specifically, in 2004, the CSOs Minimum Agenda was launched that advanced eight principles and values expected of every civil society actor, namely: integrity and accountability; transparent decision-making; active citizen participation; peaceful co-existence; tolerance and reconciliation, effective sharing and separation of power; openness to change; willingness to negotiate; and equitable distribution of resources. To enhance civil society accountability, NGOs formulated a self-regulating instrument known as the Quality Assurance Certification Mechanism (QuAM) in September 2006. This instrument was meant to promote the adherence by NGOs to acceptable ethical code of conduct or standards, integrity, legitimacy and transparency.3 Although the QuAM sets out clear principles and standards of behavior for ethical practice in order to protect and preserve the credibility and integrity of certified NGOs and their networks in Uganda, its effective enforcement has been problematic mainly because it lacked the legal tooth to bite errant CSOs. There are also cases where some CSOs have not developed Codes of Conduct to regulate their internal behavior. Besides these instruments, the Government 1 For details of operations of CSOs in Uganda, see PLACA (2010) “Terms of Reference for a Consultancy Study about Strengthening Civic Society Accountability in Uganda”, August. 2 This statement is contained in Commonwealth Foundation (2010), Civil Society Accountability Principles and Practice: Uganda Tool Kit (London: Commonwealth Foundation and One World Trust), p. ix. 3 In an article he published, Rubongoya Joshua B. (2006) “The Politics of Uganda’s Anti-Terrorism Law and Its Impact on Civil Society” in Jude Howell and Jeremy Lind (eds.) Civil Society Under Strain: Counter-Terrorism Policy, Civil Society and Aid Post-9/11 (Kumarian Press), p. 222, notes that the Anti-Terrorism Act “… and related penal code restrictions have had clear impacts on parts of civil society as well as on the space for political debate more generally”.

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of Uganda has also put in place stringent regulations to be adhered to by the CSOs such as the NGO Act – an Act which many CSOs have since criticized for stifling their efforts.

Besides the failure to effectualize QuAM and other related Government regulations, criticisms CSOs have been criticized for failing to enforce accountability in their organizations. For instance, the many networks and coalitions that CSOs have entered into at regional, national and district levels, have been accused of not only failing to identify with a clear constituency - thus making those in authority to question the constituency they claim to represent - but they have been found to be unaccountable except to their donors and regulators.4 The public, for whom many CSOs claim to speak, have generally not identified with their outspoken positions thus causing them enormous difficulties in causing government and other national institutions to behave accountably. Yet CSOs realize that they are increasingly operating in a more complex environment where they have higher levels of visibility and pose enormous influence on government and the private sector. In other words, CSOs are experiencing new pressures for greater accountability, transparency and legitimacy in an age where ‘blind faith’ in institutions is over.5

Three main reasons have contributed to the debate on CSO accountability. First, there has been an explosive growth of non-profit organizations (NPOs) and citizen groups in recent years, particularly in the past decade since the end of the Cold War and the wave of democratization which swept through many parts of the world. As they have proliferated and become more visible, while remaining unregulated in many parts of the world (compared to government and the private sector), questions have been raised about the basic ‘checks and balances’ on the activities of CSOs. Second, some high profile scandals involving NPOs have attracted public attention and have seriously damaged the overall credibility of CSOs. These scandals have led to the questioning of whether accountability mechanisms of CSOs are sufficiently robust and developed for ensuring accountability. Third, as CSOs have mushroomed, their scope and influence have also grown. Thus, their growing political role have been seen as a challenge by other established political actors who question what right they have in demanding a say in policy decisions.6

These pressures have caused the CSOs to do something about accountability and transparency within themselves if they are to uplift their reputation by limiting the damage that has emerged regarding their image and that of the wider civil society sector. Thus, subjects such as transparency, evaluation, participation, management capacity, and rendering account are now firmly demanded from the CSOs. It is, therefore, not enough for the civil society sector to engage

4 See Brown L. David and Jagadananda (2007) “Civil Society Legitimacy and Accountability: Issues and Challenges” (CIVICUS and Hauser Centre for Nonprofit Organizations), January, p. 3.5 This interesting statement was made in an address delivered by Naidoo Kumi (2003) “Civil Society Accountability: “Who Guards the Guardian?” at the UN Headquarters in New York on 3rd April, p. 2 – unpublished. 6 Ibid., p. 3.

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in studies such as scoping (which uses research/situational analysis including tracking as well as community citizen centred approaches through citizens’ forums/meetings, whistle blower campaigns, suggestions boxes, toll-free telephone lines, prepaid post office boxes and report cards) or “pilot project” phenomena (where projects are designed in capital cities and implemented at the local levels without involving the beneficiaries or a clear understanding and/or survey of the geographical area thus causing failures in implementation procedures and ownership), or the Rights Based Approach to development which focuses on political and social accountability, or citizen dialogues.7 The inherent problem associated with these approaches is that they deal with how CSOs seek accountability from other organizations rather than their own.

Time has, therefore, come for CSOs to explain more where they get their resources from, whom they represent, how they arrive at the decisions they make, and what impact their activities have had on the ordinary person.8 If CSOs fail to tackle these critical concerns, they have no alternative but to be accused of being illegitimate and thereby bent at pursuing their own selfish agendas. In fact, some CSOs have been seen to be engaged in unbecoming vices such as corruption, bad governance (they lack internal democracy in areas such as transparency and accountability) and being driven by the mantra to appease donors rather than their own communities, thus causing them to be accused of periodically failing to live up to the standards and values they claim to promote for others.9

1.2 Objectives of the Study

1.2.1 Overall Objective

The overall objective of this study was to investigate the efficacy of existing internal and external accountability mechanisms of CSOs with the view to recommending innovative and practical ways of self-assessment for improved service delivery to the stakeholders they serve.

1.2.2 Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of the study were as follows:

1) To assess how the concept “accountability” is perceived by the different CSOs;

7 These studies are contained in a Report of the Proceedings of a Workshop organized by the Uganda National NGO Forum, OXFAM and DFID (2010) “Building a Knowledge Base on Accountability Work by Civil Society in Uganda”, 26-27 May, pp. 4-11. 8 On the debate regarding who civil actors represent and account to, see Peruzzotti Enrique (2006) “Civil Society, Representation and Accountability: Restating Current Debates on the Representativeness and Accountability of Civic Organizations”, in Lisa Jordan and Peter Van Tuijl (eds.) NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations (London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan), pp. 49-55.9 A study was carried out and published by Commonwealth Foundation (2009, p. 6) that highlighted these pitfalls in the misconduct by some CSOs.

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2) To examine the existing internal and external accountability mechanisms amongst the different CSOs with the view to identifying the good, fair, and bad practices within them;

3) To identify and analyze the self-regulatory mechanisms existing within the informal social networks;

4) To explore the main challenges affecting the accountability by CSOs ; and5) To recommend appropriate accountability model(s) or mechanism(s) on how to

improve internal and external accountability of CSOs.

1.3 Rationale and Justification of the Study

If CSOs are to effectively champion accountability in other organizations they must begin from enforcing accountability credentials within their own organizations. Indeed, it is only through sound internal accountability that the CSOs’ demand for accountability from other actors such as government and private sector institutions will become credible. Hence, this study can be justified on the grounds that CSOs should subject themselves to intricate scrutiny by their own constituents and stakeholders. Short of this measure, they have no moral authority to speak on matters of accountability by other institutions. Hence, this study aims to assess how CSOs are using their own power by challenging them to consider if its usage is always to the benefit of their beneficiaries.

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Section Two: Literature Review on Civil Society Accountability

Although historically the contemporary term ‘civil society’ had appeared much earlier, its origin in the early modern period is the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.10 It can be traced back to Greek political philosophy whereby Aristotle talked about politike koinona (political community/society) to refer to a rule-governed society in which the ruler puts the public good before his private interest. Aristotle’s term was translated in Latin as Societas Civilis. Kaldor notes that civil society’s renaissance in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were inextricably linked to theories of individual rights and the idea of a social contract.11 The Scottish enlightenment thinkers were to augment the concept with their emphasis on the importance of commercial society. They saw the market as the condition for individualism and the existence of a civil society. But their understanding of the term was the same as a rule-governed society based on consent of individuals that differed from the state of nature where there were no rules, or with despotic systems where rules were superimposed through coercion.

Hegel was the first to use the term civil society as something distinct from the state. He defined it as “… the realm of difference, intermediate between the family and the state”.12 Because civil society was equated with the economy, Hegel used the term “bourgeois society”, a definition which was taken up later by Marx, Engels and nineteenth-century thinkers. However, unlike Hegel, Marx and Engel argued that the state was subordinate to civil society because they saw the former as an instrument in the hands of the dominant class. To them, civil society was the

… theatre of history … Civil society embraces all the material relations of individuals within a definite stage of development of productive forces. It embraces the whole commercial and industrial life of a given stage and, hence, transcends the State and the nation, though, on the other hand again, it must assert itself in its foreign relations as nationality and inwardly must organize itself as State.13

Thus, civil society is “… an arena for voluntary formal and informal collective citizen engagement distinct from families, state, and profit seeking organizations”.14 It comprises of citizen organizations that converge to pursue interests and purposes for the good of all.15

10 This historical narrative is obtained from Kaldor Mary (2003) “Civil Society and Accountability”, in Journal of Human Development, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 6-11. 11 Ibid., p. 6. 12 Ibid., p. 7. 13 Ibid., p. 8. 14 This definition by Fowler A. was used by Malunga Chiku (2006) “Civil Society Efforts in Improving Accountability in Africa”, being a paper he presented at a Workshop in Harare 30 th November – 2nd December, pp. 1-2 – unpublished. 15 Civil society comprises of the following organizations: NGOs, community groups (CBOs), labor unions, professional associations, faith based organizations (FBOs) or religious organizations, media, academia, social movements, social organizations such as traditional institutions, and nationalist groups.

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In contemporary usage, the term civil society can broadly be distinguished into three versions: the ‘activist’, the ‘neo-liberal’, and the ‘post-modern’.16 The activist version emerged simultaneously in the 1970s and 1980s in Latin America and Eastern Europe as a way to create autonomous public spaces in the context of authoritarian states – military dictatorships and totalitarian Communist regimes, respectively. The basic idea was that instead of trying to change the state, it was important to change the state-society relations, to create self-organized institutions, independent of the state that could challenge the reach of the state. In the US, Europe, and especially India, civil society was understood to mean the ‘new politics’; an idea of a realm outside political parties where individuals and groups aimed to democratize the state, to re-distribute power, rather than to capture power. It was associated with the new social movements that emerged after 1968, concerned with issues such as peace, the environment, women, and human rights. In sum, civil society was involved in an effort to create a public space where individuals could act and communicate freely, independent of both the state and capitalism.

The neo-liberal version is associated with ideas about the ‘third sector’ or the ‘non-profit sector’ that developed in the US in the 1970s and 1980s. Its philosophy is that there is a group of organizations that are neither controlled by the state nor the market, but which play an essential role in facilitating the operation of both. It owes much to the Tocquevillian emphasis on associationalism and is linked to neo-liberal ideas about minimizing the role of the state. That, because NGOs, NPOs, charities and voluntary associations, are more flexible and innovative than the state, they can substitute for the state, in providing social services, check abuses of the state and poor governmental practices, and they can call corporations to account. The ideas of Robert Putnam about ‘social capital’ and Francis Fukuyama about trust are in line with this version of civil society – the notion that trust and social interaction are essential ingredients of good governance and properly functioning markets. It is this version that was taken up by Western donors (development partners) in the early 1990s. The donors argued that civil society was needed as a cushion against shocks associated with structural adjustment programs (SAPs), to provide a social safety net. It should, however, be noted that with the failure of SAPs and other [classical] neo-liberal economic reform programs in reducing poverty, development theory and practice emphasized the role of a capable state for effective interaction with markets and citizens.17

The post-modern version emerged as a result of anthropologists criticizing from a relativist position, the term civil society as defined from the activist and neo-liberal versions; these latter versions were seen as being a Western discourse. Thus the post-modern version contends that there exist various traditional and neo-traditional organizations, based on kingship or religion that remain autonomous from the state and offer alternative sites of power or autonomous spaces.

16 These different variants are discussed in detail by Kaldor M. (2003), op. cit., pp. 8-11. 17 This argument is put forth by Ahmad Raza (2008)”Governance, Social Accountability and the Civil Society”, in JOAAG Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 11.

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This version argues for a more culturally sensitive concept, which involves various national and religious groupings and a contestation of narratives.

In spite of the above three different versions, both historically and in the contemporary period, there is a common core of meaning behind the term civil society. Civil society always meant:

… a rule governed society based on the consent of individuals … Today civil society is transnational, engaged in process of debate and negotiation with governments, companies and international organizations … the groups involved have extended beyond urban elites to include women, indigenous groups and other excluded people … the differing contemporary meanings … reflect different political perspectives about the goals of the process of negotiation … civil society has to include all the groupings … in the different versions…”18

However, in defining civil society (and accountability), care has to be taken to avoid its economic conception. Indeed, “an … overly economic … focused understanding of civil society has the potential to ignore important democratic channels of communication that affect legitimation processes”.19

Functionally, therefore, civil society performs five main functions: raising awareness and understanding of development policies, laws and regulatory institutions; providing opportunities for stakeholders to communicate with governance institutions and elected representatives by especially giving voice to marginalized groups; offering enriching input into discussions about development policy and implementation strategies by suggesting and advocating new perspectives, policies and methodologies; making citizens more aware of what socio-economic development decisions are being taken, by whom, from what options, on what grounds, with what expected results, and with what resources to support implementation; and, playing a crucial ‘watchdog’ role in monitoring the implementation and effects of national and international programs and policies.20 By increasing accountability through these five functions, CSOs are critical in the promotion of democracy and development. In spite of the significance of the latter role, this particular study is concerned with CSOs’ own accountability. But what is accountability?

Although accountability is a protean or amorphous concept and placeholder for multiple contemporary anxieties, it can be defined as a social relationship in which an actor feels an

18 Ibid., p. 11. 19 For this significant statement, see Lehman Glen (2005) “The Accountability of NGOs in Civil Society and its Public Spheres”, being a paper presented at the Australian Association for Professional and Applied Ethics 12 th

Annual Conference”, held on 28-30th September, at Adelaide, p. 4 - unpublished. 20 These roles are aptly captured in Commonwealth Foundation (2004) Framework for Action on Maximizing Civil Society’s Contribution to Development and Democracy (London: Commonwealth Foundation), p. 11.

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obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct to some significant other.21 It is an organization of citizens who converge to pursue interests and purposes for the benefit of all. In the civil society sector, there is a diverse range of meanings attached to the concept “accountability”.22 Also, the term accountability is complex in relation to CSOs because of the multiplicity of actors with whom they engage and to whom they are accountable. However, a more agreeable position defines accountability as the requirement to explain and accept responsibility for carrying out an assigned mandate that was entrusted to one in light of the agreed upon expectations. Furthermore, accountability in civil society is generally considered as “… the means by which individuals and organizations report to a recognized authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their actions”.23 Essentially, therefore, accountability is a process related to the stakeholders, engaging them in a participative way and focusing on the long-term results.

Hence, key to the notion of accountability is trust, due diligence, and feedback. The 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (Principle of State Policy XXVI, art. 17 and 38)24

extends the definition of accountability to embrace a key principle of democratic governance, with public trust, faithful discharge of duty, transparent and efficient use of resources, effective communication and feedback, and measure of answerability and enforceability being integral ingredients. In other words, accountability ensures that actions and decisions taken by organizational officials meet their stated objectives and respond to the needs of the community they are meant to be benefiting, thereby contributing to better governance.

As stated above, accountability involves two distinct stages, namely; answerability and enforcement. Answerability refers to the obligation of organizational or public officials to provide information about their decisions and actions and to justify them to their clientele and those institutions of accountability tasked with providing oversight.25 Enforcement is about the capacity of accounting agencies or organizations to impose sanctions on power-holders who have

21 This expression and definition is used by Mashaw Jerry Loius (2007) “Accountability and Institutional Design: Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance”, in http://papers.ssrn.com/ p. 1; see also Olum Yasin (2008) “Public Accountability and Governance in Uganda”, in Local Governance and Development Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, December, p. 79. 22 See Ekwee Ocen Benson (2009) “Accountability and Transparency at the Grassroots: Experience in Uganda”, being a paper presented at the 12th Conference on Democratic Transition in East Africa, held at the Snow Crest Hotel and Wildlife Safaris Ltd., Arusha, Tanzania, 17th -18th November, pp. 2-4 - unpublished. 23 This definition is by Edwards M. and Hulme David (1996) Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post-cold War World (West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press). 24 Republic of Uganda (2006) Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (Kampala: The Uganda Law Reform Commission), 15th February. 25 On the meanings of answerability and enforcement, see World Bank (2004) “State-Society Synergy for Accountability: Lessons for the World Bank”, in World Bank Working Paper No. 30 (Washington D.C.: World Bank), April, p. 7. For another definition of accountability, see Twijukye Gerald, Ruta Doreen, Mwondha Martin and Anguzu Dickens (2004) Biting the Hand that Feeds You? Examining Sub-contracting and Accountability Mechanisms between Civil Society Organizations and Local Governments in Arua and Kabale Districts (Community Development Resource Centre), pp. 11-13.

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violated their public duties. Based on these two stages, different organizations of accountability can be responsible for either or both of them.

Accountability can, therefore, be defined broadly as:26 being open and sharing information, engaging individuals and groups in the activities and decisions that affect them, and knowing how the organization is performing and being able to demonstrate it to stakeholders. The first meaning implies that transparency is central to whatever a CSO is doing, what it is planning to do and how it is performing in relation to the goals it has set itself. All stakeholders have to access this information, in a timely manner and it has to be communicated through appropriate mediums and clear language.

The second meaning of accountability which deals with CSOs’ engagement with communities and beneficiaries implies listening to stakeholders’ (both internal such as staff and external such as communities and beneficiaries) views as well as being responsive to them, and ensuring that the act of leading, where appropriate, achieves practical change (see Table. 1 on stakeholders).

Table 1: Types of Civil Society Actors Social Movements NGOs Social organizations Nationalist and

Religious groupsMission Emancipation of the poor

and excludedDevelopment and humanitarian relief

Protection and promotion of members’ interests

Empowerment of national and religious groups

Activists Protests, demonstrations, mediatique events

Service provision and advocacy

Service provision, lobbying

Mobilization through media, religious organizations, and sometimes violence

Social Composition Activists, committed individuals, students

Professional staff Workers, farmers, employers, local communities, displaced persons

Newly urbanized groups, peasants

Forms of Organization Loose horizontal coalitions, network

Ranges from bureaucratic and corporate to small-scale and informal

Ranges from vertical and hierarchical to informal networks

Vertical and hierarchical although can involve networks of tightly organized cells, charismatic leadership

Source: Kaldor Mary (2003), p. 12.

Ultimately, CSOs’ engagement with their stakeholders should lead to their effective support and empowerment so that they can influence the activities and decisions that affect them.

The third meaning of accountability deals with how the organization is performing in terms of monitoring and evaluating progress regarding goals and objectives and being able to feed back to the organization whatever has been learnt from the process. In this sense, accountability is about:

The … means through which individuals and organizations are held responsible for their decisions and actions … take internal responsibility for shaping their organizational mission and values … for assessing performance in relation to goals …

26 Commonwealth Foundation (2009), op. cit., pp. 7-10.

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promotes a culture and practice of compliance with organizational policies … advances learning and innovation, and enables the organization to maximize its potential in relation to internal and external factors”.27

The purpose of accountability is to preserve the charitable assets that benefit all the members and to attain the organizational goals, while complying with principles of good management, the law and ethics.28 It is also important that CSOs are open to feedback from stakeholders, whether positive or negative, and learning from it. Indeed, for CSOs to justify their existence and succeed in mobilizing future funding, they have to demonstrate their progress against the goals they have set.

In the accountability process, the relationship between the accountor (actor) and the accountee (forum) or the account giving, usually consists of at least three elements.29 First, the actor must feel obliged to inform the forum about his or her conduct by providing various sorts of data about the performance of tasks, about outcomes, or about procedures. Second, the information should prompt the forum to interrogate the actor and to question the adequacy of the information or the legitimacy of the conduct (debating phase). Third, the forum should be able to pass judgment on the conduct of the actor. In case of a negative judgment, the forum may impose some sort of sanctions on the accountor, which could be formal, such as fines, disciplinary measures, or dismissals, but they could also be implicit or informal, such as negative publicity.

Given the above elements, any accountability system should give priority to four key issues30 - these issues are discussed in detail later on. The first issue is that accountability must give priority to the transparency of records, files and data. The second is that accountability must give priority to the independent audit of financial statements, management systems, and transactions. The third issue is that accountability must give priority to review of decisions and behavior for compliance with the law and policy. However, Suri Sanjay notes that:

The future can’t just be about compliance; not just about preventing organizations from doing things, but about how to get them to do things… accountability must inevitably track the line of power, and people must do all they can to hold that power to account ... accountability is not a tool or mechanism . It is a relationship between

27 This definition is provided by Blagescu Monica and Young John (2005) “Partnerships and Accountability: Current Thinking and Approaches among Agencies Supporting Civil Society Organizations”, Working Paper 255 (London: Overseas Development Institute), August, p. 4. 28 See Halachmi Arie (2007) “Where the Rubber Meets the Road: Governance and Accountability Issues in Civil Society-Based Organizations”, in The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal, Vol. 12(3), Article 3, p. 5. 29 This clarification is propounded by Curtin D. (2005) Public Accountability and the Evolving EU Executive (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 30 These key issues are elaborately explained by Aucoin Peter and Jarvis Mark D. (2005) Modernizing Government Accountability: A Framework for Reform (Canada School of Public Service).

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people and organizations who have power, and between organizations and people whose potentials and possibilities are governed by that power.31

Lastly, the fourth issue is that accountability must give priority to the public (beneficiaries) to question their officials about their policies and actions. However, these issues will apply based on the types of accountability existing in that organization.

Of late, there has been a growing discussion within both academic and development communities about the different typologies of accountability. Thus, accountability can be classified according to the type being exercised and the person or group or institution the officials answer to. The different forms of accountability are best understood by reference to opposing forms of accountability. These forms are: horizontal versus vertical accountability (social and diagonal accountabilities) and political versus legal accountability. The other forms of accountability include: financial accountability, moral accountability and professional accountability.

Horizontal accountability is the capacity of a network of relatively autonomous powers (other institutions) that can call into question and eventually punish improper ways of discharging the responsibilities of a given official. It also refers to the relationship that exists between civil society actors, who see themselves as part of a public process rather than part of a competitive culture (e.g., the case of business community).32 Hence, horizontal mechanisms occur externally and involve one party holding another accountable and therefore exercising ‘superior authority’ or greater power.33 Vertical accountability is the means through which citizens, mass media and civil society seek to enforce standards of good performance on officials.

Social accountability is an approach which builds accountability that relies on civic engagement, namely; a situation whereby ordinary citizens and/or CSOs participate directly or indirectly in executing accountability.34 The mechanisms for implementing it are ‘vertical’. Mechanisms of social accountability can be initiated and supported by the state, citizens or both, but very often they are demand-driven and operate from the bottom-up. Examples where social accountability is applicable include ‘traditional’ forms such as: public demonstrations, advocacy campaigns, investigative journalism; and the recent ones such as participatory public policy-making and budgeting, public expenditure tracking, administrative procedures act, social audits, and citizen report cards, all of which can be used by citizens for oversight and control purposes. Sometimes social accountability is equated to upward accountability, which is accountability to donors,

31 Suri Sanjay (2010) “Accountability – Long Word, Long Way to Go”, citied on 09/12/2010 from http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=37881, pp. 1-2. 32 See Naidoo Kumi (2003), op. cit., p. 2. 33 Ahmad Raza (2008), op. cit., p. 11. 34 Ibid., p. 11.

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funders, governments or other external actors. It is often accountability for resources or the fulfillment of particular service targets.

Diagonal accountability entails vertical accountability actors. It seeks to engage citizens directly in the workings of horizontal accountability institutions. It augments the limited effectiveness of civil society’s watchdog function by breaking the state’s monopoly over responsibility for official executive oversight. The main principles of diagonal accountability are: participation in horizontal accountability mechanisms (community advocates participate in institutions of horizontal accountability rather than creating distinct and separate institutions of diagonal accountability); information flow (community advocates can access information about government agencies that would normally be limited to the horizontal axis, for example, through internal performance reviews); compelling officials to answer (community advocates co-opt the horizontal accountability institution’s authority to compel a government agency to answer questions); and capacity to sanction (community advocates acquire the authority of the horizontal accountability institution to enforce the findings or influence elected officials).

Political accountability or political responsibility or strategic accountability or downward accountability is about accountability towards the beneficiaries, or the people, or the community groups, or activists that the CSOs are trying to help. It is about how the CSOs remain true to their stated missions and goals. Sometimes, political accountability is referred to as moral accountability to mean someone accounting for his or her moral turpitude after executing a particular activity. Procedural accountability, on the other hand, refers to internal or management accountability

Financial accountability implies accounting for the funds under one’s control to accounting and auditing bodies. Financial accountability is how money earned or received is budgeted and spent. In the civil society sector, internal or functional accountability relates to internal management practices and responsibility for resources. Financial accountability also embraces financial transparency which refers to the development of, and adherence to clear, well defined and written financial regulations that are consistent with financial management principle and practice.35

Professional accountability is the requirement that an individual conducts his or her actions within stipulated rules, regulations, ethical standards, procedures and expertise. Associated with this form of accountability is functional accountability. It is concerned with concrete requirements such as accounting for expended resources and registering immediate accomplishments.36

35 This critical aspect of financial accountability is offered by PF Secretariat (2008) “Transparency and Accountability within Civil Society: An Opportunity for Self-Reflection”, being a Brief Report on the 7:30 Breakfast Debate, July 25th, p. 1.36 Naidoo Kumi (2003), op. cit., p. 2.

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Although accountability is crucial to organizational performance, increasing it may also create adverse effects. O’Neill notes that “… beyond some critical threshold, further increases in accountability may actually decrease legitimacy and trust.”37 The premise of his argument is that every glitch in a policy process and every disappointing policy outcome may become a source of public outrage and political bickering. Indeed, Brin contends that: “… too strong an emphasis on criticizing and sanctioning may lead to disdain for government and paranoia.”38 In fact, it is because of such statements that Power argued that “… increased transparency may lead to a call for even more transparency, setting in motion a vicious cycle of control and distrust.”39

In spite of these contestations, it is worth noting that accountability is not only a technical procedure related to financial accounting, but also a moral responsibility that needs to be reflected in an organization’s daily existence.40 In addition, accountability requires community level institutions where the quality of service delivered is discussed; and a link between these institutions and management of service. Service users must be able to insist on a good service. Ultimately, accountability is about power relations and how they are managed. Thus, the different definitions attached to the meaning of accountability pose a challenge when trying to develop a common approach.

Indeed, the major problem with CSOs is that they mainly focus on social accountability (by focusing their efforts towards holding government and other power-holders accountable for their decisions, actions and results), upward accountability (by focusing their accountability to donors who finance their work), and, minimally, downward accountability (by focusing their accountability to the people they are meant to serve). They focus less (if at all) at their own accountability. In fact, the efforts of CSOs at achieving accountability are frequently thwarted because they face an internal accountability crisis.41 Therefore, organizational members should be accountable to the mission and values of their organization or group. The mission articulates the identity of the organization or group, why it exists, whom it serves and how it will serve them. The values articulate what behaviors the people must embrace in order to serve their beneficiaries better. Also, values articulate the high quality of societal standards the people in the organization or group must embody.42

37 O’Neill O. (2002) A Question of Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 38 Brin D. (1998) The Transparent Society (Reading: Perseus), p. 140. 39 Power M. (1999) The Audit Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press).40 This definition is used by the Government of Uganda in its past Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). See Makara Sabiti (2010) “Local Governance, Decentralized patronage and Service Delivery in Uganda”, in Mawazo, Vol. 9, No. 1, February, p. 16. 41 This is a position that has been noted by Fowler A. (2006) “Public Support and Accountability: Why, What and How for NGOs”, p. 2 – unpublished. 42 See Malunga Chiku (2006), op. cit., p. 3.

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Hence, to assess the identified accountability practices of CSOs, this study will adopt a combination of frameworks or models. These models, among others, include the Global Accountability Project (GAP) and the Capability, Accountability and Responsiveness (CAR). The GAP framework is a model developed by the One World Trust, a British society. One of its purposes is to strengthen the concept of accountability in global organizations. The GAP proposes the following four dimensions: transparency, participation, evaluation, and compliant and response mechanisms, including the elements of the organization (referred to as the Council) such as Mission statement and governance boards. These four dimensions must be integrated into an organization’s policies, procedures and practices, at all levels and stages of decision-making and implementation, in relationships with both its internal and external stakeholders. The higher the quality and level of embeddedness of these dimensions in all organizational policies, processes and practices, the more accountable the organization is. These four dimensions are connected and impact on each other. Therefore, effective accountability requires that all parties in an accountable relationship fully understand and agree on their obligations and rights, and believe that the other will act accordingly.43

While the CAR framework is about political ‘voice’ or citizen ‘voice’ on matters of accountability and moves away from looking at institutional development and accountability structures regarding governance issues, its relevance to this study is that its elements can be cascaded to CSOs for purposes of assessing the extent to which they are behaving accountably. The CAR framework has three fundamental features: formal institutions for ensuring that activities are performed in particular ways or that rules and standards are adhered to. This feature has four stages – setting standards, how investigation is done, how answerability is conducted and how sanctioning is enforced. The second CAR feature is responsiveness. This addresses the behavior of organizational members regarding the extent to which they respond to the demands of their stakeholders. The third feature is capability. This one seeks to find out the extent to which the organization can get things done. It is also the ability to think, to prioritize, to manage, and to deliver. Organizational capabilities include: good leadership, good governance structures and management, proper use of resources and sufficient skills to get the job done. When the three features are used in combination, they can aid in understanding why duty bearers are solving or not solving certain issues within their organizations. However, in order to use these features, for example, in the development of M&E systems, the indicators to be measured have to be specific in relation to steps required to achieve overall impact.

Other scholars have identified similar accountability mechanisms that are critical to managing accountability claims which this study will also use. Brown and Jagadananda identify four accountability mechanisms which have both internal and external stakeholders, namely: transparency mechanisms; participation mechanisms; evaluation mechanisms; and compliant and redress mechanisms.44 The compliant and redress mechanism is sometimes referred to as the 43 For these arguments, see Blagescu Monica and Young John (2005), op. cit., p. 5. 44 Brown L. David and Jagadananda (2007), op. cit., p. 11.

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compliance regime because of its emphasis on explicit internal policies and procedures that staff must follow.45

Transparency, which means being completely open and frank about things, is an indispensable aspect of accountability because effective accountability requires a statement of goals, transparent decision-making and relationships, and honest reporting of efficient resource use and the achievements and impact of the effectiveness of the work.46 Transparency mechanisms enable the free flow of information between organizations and stakeholders in decision-making, performance and reporting. It is also about a process whereby relevant information of an organization is made accessible to the stakeholders, including the public, to enable them to assess, evaluate, and make their own judgments about that organization.47 Reporting and disclosure systems and processes enable information sharing among parties. Examples include audited accounts and reports being made available to stakeholders. Participation mechanisms enable internal and external stakeholders to be involved in organizational decision-making about goals and activities which are critical in accountability for their performance. Evaluation mechanisms enable stakeholders and the CSO to assess activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts. Monitoring and assessing results enable judgments about the success of organizational efforts in meeting its performance premises. Lastly, complaints and redress mechanisms provide

45 Ebrahim Alnoor and Herz Steve (2007) “Accountability in Complex Organizations: World Bank Responses to Civil Society”, being a Draft Working Paper, October, p. 9, define compliance regime as consisting of: (a) information disclosure policy which is designed to increase transparency and access to organizational documents and to make them available online through public information centres, (b) Safeguard policies that detail the procedures and protections that must be followed when a project is likely to have significant social and environmental impacts, (c) Independent evaluation group (IEG) that conducts detailed analysis of the organization’s activities and is accountable directly to a board rather than to management. The aims of the IEG’s evaluations are to learn from experience, to provide an objective basis for assessing the results of the organization’s work, and to provide accountability in the achievement of its objectives. Internally, a Quality Assurance Group (QAG) supports staff in improving the quality of projects and impacts based on the organization’s objectives, (d) Compliant and response mechanisms available to citizens and civil society, through which they may report possible violations by the organization of its own policies (particularly of its social and environmental safeguards). The core of the compliance regime is the safeguard and disclosure policies; this is directly affected by the quality of the consultations at the policy level through which such policies are reviewed. When stakeholders make any inputs in the way an organization is doing its business, it has to be considered and accepted (where possible). Where the input is not accepted the rationale for not doing so should be explained. The disclosure policy, which aims to make much information available after key decisions have been made, takes care of any possibility of exclusion. In addition, to improve the quality of engagement, adequate benchmarks and standards and learning systems must be put in place. 46 See Adeh Ignatius (2004) “Fostering Accountability in Zimbabwean Civil Society”, in The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, Vol. 6, Issue 3, June. 47 Transparency and honesty indicators include: budgeting and monitoring, auditing and evaluation, producing reports and press releases, holding public meetings, properly exploiting information and communication technologies, and project management in general. All these require adequate management skills, capacity (to identify new needs and develop viable projects that can attract funding) and dedication as well as highly motivated staff. In addition, organizations should have adequate financial resources and financial sustainability plans. Other strengths of CSOs should include: people who do not want to benefit personally, teamwork, fairly good communication, good planning in relation to identifying issues systematically and strategizing goals, ability to clearly identify beneficiaries, proper documentation of activities and practices to enhance learning and exchange of ideas, adopting a code of ethics and putting in place disciplinary measures to deal with staff and members who attempt to gain personal benefit from the organization or assets.

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vehicles for raising questions about CSO’s performance and for sanctioning failures to deliver on performance goals.

The forms the above mechanisms take vary across accountability models, because the underlying characteristics of the relationships differ (see Table 2).

Table 2: Mutual Accountability Relationship and Management IssuesMutual Accountability

Status of Parties Parties engage each other to achieve shared goalsTransparency Parties report to each other on compact-related goals and

activitiesParticipation Parties influence each other to define shared values, goals and

compactsEvaluation Parties and peers assess performances defined by compact

agreementComplaints/Redress Peer networks enforce expectations with identity and

reputation sanctionsSource: Modified version of Brown L. David and Jagadananda (2007), p. 12.

Furthermore, to construct accountability systems, CSOs have to clearly define their missions and strategies because the criteria for accountability vary across them. For instance, service delivery CSOs have to demonstrate the quality and reach of their services and make themselves accountable to donors and service regulators to get critical resources. Capability building CSOs have to work closely with clients to develop programs and so emphasize accountability to clients whose active cooperation is essential to co-producing enhanced capacities. Advocacy CSOs may need to build legitimacy with both the constituents they represent and the targets they seek to influence. In creating organizational strategy, CSO leaders must define: (1) What and how it will create value (such as services delivered, capacities built, or policies influenced, (2) how it can gain support and legitimacy for its work, and (3) how it will develop the operational capability to carry out its strategy.48 Accountability systems assess information about activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts, report results to relevant stakeholders, and enable stakeholders to hold the CSO accountable.

Building accountability systems involve six tasks: articulating strategies and value chains, identifying and prioritizing organizational stakeholders, setting standards and performance measures, assessing and communicating performance results, creating mechanisms that enable performance consequences so stakeholders can hold the CSO accountable, and organizational learning, operational capacity and legitimacy. The first task is about clarifying CSO strategies for accomplishing their missions. The second task notes that since CSOs have many diverse

48 This extensive discussion is from Brown L. David and Jagadananda (2007), op. cit., pp. 17-24.

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stakeholders – donors, members, regulators, clients, allies, targets – trying to be fully accountable to all of them may be a recipe for paralysis or constant firefighting. Therefore, prioritizing accountabilities can be vital to mission accomplishment. CSOs should identify and map stakeholders who have important accountability claims by focusing on value creation, legitimacy and support, and operational capability. While identifying the relevant stakeholders, CSO leaders can assess the nature and importance of accountabilities on three dimensions: (a) Accountability on legal grounds (such as suing it to compel compliance with contractual obligations to provide donors with audited accounts), (b) Accountability on normative grounds (such as some stakeholders calling for accountability on grounds of values and norms held by the CSO), and (c) Accountability on prudential or practical grounds (whereby some stakeholders can exact high costs for accountability failures as in donors refusing to re-fund programs).

The third task of setting standards and measuring performance is whereby accountability systems depend on agreements about performance and how it can be measured. The challenges of creating performance measurement systems that serve multiple stakeholders have inspired a number of innovations such as the Organizational Self-Analysis for NGOs (OSANGO).49 This approach emphasizes working with stakeholders – particularly clients and beneficiaries – to define problems, identify indicators and measures of impact, and assess and interpret results.

The fourth task is on assessing and communicating performance. Some CSOs invest time and other resources in self-evaluations, deploying staff to collect and analyze information about program performance and how much their activities have achieved the impacts intended. Others commission external evaluations (or have evaluations imposed on them) to gain the advantage of technically sophisticated and organizationally independent feedback. Communications include disclosure statements, annual reports, or publications of internal and external evaluations. The critical issue here is making information available in forms that are comprehensible and useful to various stakeholders. An important initiative in assessing and reporting CSO impacts has been the rise of social auditing which develops indicators and tools for assessing social and environmental impacts as well as economic results.50

The fifth task is to create performance consequences. This assumes some degree of voice and influence from the relevant stakeholders and some power to ensure that CSOs have strong incentives to listen to stakeholders. The Accountability, Learning and Planning System (ALPS) 49 OSANGO or self-management assessment system enables NGOs to assess their performance with respect to their missions, values and operating principles. It offers a framework for analyzing organizational structures and processes and can provide computerized feedback that compares the organization to others. OSANGO emphasizes NGO accountabilities to stakeholders and particularly to beneficiaries by encouraging agencies to: a) be aware of statutory obligations and other legal requirements; b) develop goals and objectives in cooperation with stakeholders, c) engage in dialogue with beneficiaries to solve local problems, d) seek feedback on program impacts from beneficiaries and other stakeholders, and e) measure performance in cooperation with other stakeholders. 50 An innovation in the area of assessing and communicating performance is the Keystone initiative. This initiative builds on the assumption that better performance and reporting standards will expand the resources available for social programs.

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created by ActionAid to help focus on program reporting and evaluation on important outcome is a good example.51 The point is that accountability to clients and beneficiaries is an empty term if they do not have the power to demand attention to their concerns. Hence, mutual learning and accountability has to be explicitly woven into programs and implemented with considerable commitment if it is to be effective.

The sixth and last task is organizational learning, operational capacity and legitimacy. The information generated by accountability systems has several uses. It offers opportunities to organizations operating in complex and changing contexts for organizational learning from information about program outputs, outcomes and impacts. This information can help CSOs to learn what works at the operational level as well as how accurately its theories of change can predict and explain results.

Yet another important tool that this study will use in the assessment of accountability within CSOs is what is referred to as the “balanced scorecard” (BSC)52 which was developed in 1987 by Art Schneiderman and later adopted by Robert S. Kaplan and Nolan-Norton. The BSC is a strategic performance management tool and a measurement system that considers not only financial measures but also customer, business process, and learning measures. Managers can use it to keep track of the execution of activities by staff within their control and monitor the consequences arising from these actions. The BSC translates the organization’s strategy into four perspectives with a balance between the following: internal and external measures, objective measures and subjective measures, and performance results and the drivers of future results. It should be noted that the BSC goes beyond standard financial measures (includes measures such as operating income, return on capital employed, and economic value added; it attempts to answer the question: How do we look to customers?) to include the following additional perspectives: customer perspective (includes measures such as customer satisfaction, customer retention, and market share in target segments; it attempts to answer the question: How do customers see us?); business process or business planning perspective (includes measures such as cost, throughput, and quality; it attempts to answer the question: What must we excel at?); and learning and growth perspective (includes measures such as employee satisfaction, employee retention, and skill sets; it attempts to answer the question: Can we continue to improve and create value?).

51 The ALPS process emphasizes appraisal, strategy formation, program review, and annual reflections in cooperation with community groups and partners, with a special emphasis on downward accountability. It includes elements to ensure: (i) participation by primary stakeholders in various phases of work, (ii) transparency, sharing and reporting across stakeholders, (iii) recognizing different forms of literacy, communication and reporting, (iv) emphasis on learning with stakeholders about achievements and failures, and (v) downward accountability to poor people. 52 “The Balanced Scorecard” is cited from http://www.quickmba.com pp. 1-4; see also “Balanced Scorecard” cited from http://en.wikipedia.org pp. 1-10.

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These four perspectives are logically interconnected in the sense that learning and growth lead to better business processes, which in turn lead to increased value to the customer, which finally leads to improved financial performance. Although BSC helps focus managers’ attention on strategic issues and the management of the implementation of strategy, it has no role in the formation of strategy. What it does do is to comfortably co-exist with strategic planning systems and other tools.

On the other hand, each perspective of the BSC includes objectives (major objectives to be achieved), measures of those objectives (the observable parameters that will be used to measure progress towards reaching the objective), targets (the specific target values of those measures), and initiatives (action programs to be initiated to meet the objectives). Although the BSC was originally conceived as an improved performance measurement system, it was later used as a management system to implement strategy at all levels of the organization by facilitating the following functions: clarifying strategy – the translation of strategic objectives into quantifiable measures clarifies the management team’s understanding of the strategy and helps to develop a coherent consensus; communicating strategic objectives – translates high level objectives into operational objectives and communicates the strategy effectively throughout the organization; planning, setting targets and aligning strategic initiatives – ambitious but achievable targets are set for each perspective and initiatives are developed to align efforts to reach the targets; and strategic feedback – executives receive feedback on whether the strategy implementation is proceeding according to plan and on whether the strategy itself is successful.

However, to make good use of the BSC in this study, attention will be focused on ensuring that it takes care of the bottom line score or unified view with clear recommendations. Otherwise, adopting one organization’s BSC to another is generally not advised by experts who strongly believe that much of the benefit of the BSC comes from the design process itself. Nevertheless, the BSC is ultimately about choosing measures and targets.

There are a range of other accountability mechanisms that are being used by civil society groups in order to pro-actively and self-critically take responsibility for their organizational structures, operations, policies and activities. However, as tools, they are far from being mutually exclusive. In many instances, a combination of these techniques are integrated to meet the different demands of ‘upwards’ and ‘downward’ accountability. These tools, some of which have been discussed before and are also relevant to this study, are: self-regulation mechanisms; governing boards; standards of disclosure and public reporting; and consultative and participatory mechanisms.53 The self-regulation mechanisms include voluntary (certified) compliance with codes of ethics or codes of conduct. Elements of these codes embrace issues ranging from transparent governance structures to hiring practices and communications policies. Its basic idea is that the sector itself should be actively engaged in promoting certain set values and norms as

53 Naidoo Kumi (2003), op. cit., pp. 4-5.

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part of maintaining a public reputation for professionalism and high ethical behavior. However, its limitation is ‘non-enforceablity’. Nevertheless, certain models (such as in Philippines) involve certification process whereby teams of evaluators are empowered to grant or revoke certification to CSOs.

On governing bodies, this is comprised of individuals external to the organization that are selected by and operate according to clearly defined and transparent procedures. Although the specific tasks of governing boards vary, they are generally intended to act as guardians of the interests of the organization’s membership. At the same time, they ensure that the organization operates in a way that is in compliance with both statutory obligations and in accordance with its own mission and values.

Standards for disclosure and public reporting are determined in some countries by national legislation, but are adopted by CSOs in other contexts on a voluntary basis. Vehicles such as annual reports, organizational or project evaluations, strategic plans based on external assessments, and regular communications (newsletters, updates, briefs) can provide channels for public access to information about the organization’s work, financial status, governance structure and operational impact.

Lastly, consultative and participatory mechanisms allow for the meaningful involvement of diverse constituencies (including beneficiaries) in the organization’s work, from project planning through to evaluation up to impact assessment.

Besides the above four significant tools, there are two other critical ‘built-in’ accountability mechanisms worth mentioning, namely; the principle of ‘perform or perish’ and the effectiveness of civil society advocacy efforts.54 On the question of ‘perform or perish’, the concern is that not a single cent which is secured to undertake CSO activities is obtained on the basis of obligation. No matter how the funding has been derived (government agency, donor, foundation, business organization, multilateral institution), resources will not continue to flow unless the CSO is performing on the basis of its vision, mission and objectives. In fact, sanctions have to be imposed on any CSO if basic accountability requirements are not met.

As regards the effectiveness of civil society advocacy efforts, the argument is that CSOs that do not have credibility, genuine links to the grassroots level and expertise around an issue are automatically limited in their effectiveness when it comes to advocacy. This particular aspect deals with a reflection on the ‘internal’ drive for accountability within most CSOs – i.e., it is about the sense of responsibility deriving from within the group which pushes it to act in concert with its articulated mission and values in making a meaningful contribution to the vision for which the organization exists.

54 See Naidoo Kumi (2003), op. cit., p. 5.

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These accountability mechanisms can only achieve their aims through the relationships they construct. Three main models of accountability relations have emerged from work in different sectors, namely: representative accountability, principal-agent accountability, and mutual accountability (see Table 2).55 Representative accountability is commonly used in government circles. It emphasizes the obligations of representatives to their constituents. Principal-agent accountability is most widely used in the business world. It focuses on motivating agents to achieve the goals of their principals. Mutual accountability is particularly used by CSOs. It focuses on creating compacts that bind members through shared values, respect, trust, mutual influence, aspirations and social identities.

In conclusion, because of the diversity of the civil society sector, there are neither universal approaches to CSO accountability nor magic frameworks or set of mechanisms that can be used by all CSOs to ensure the highest standards of accountability. Indeed, this study will take cognizance of the fact that the accountability demands on a CSO will depend on factors such as: type of organization (local, national, global, single organization, association); the sector in which the organization works (bearing in mind sector-specific accountability requirements); the number and type of stakeholders involved and their ‘position’ (funders, constituents and partners); and the context in which the CSO operates (political environment and relevant legislation).56 Also, this study finds the “Uganda Toolkit” for civil society accountability extremely useful in assessing the extent to which CSOs account for their actions.57 However, in using this toolkit, it has to be noted that CSOs vary in their mission, values, organizational structure and membership base and so the accountability challenge that each faces vary. Nevertheless, they share most of the accountability challenges. In sum, the different frameworks/models discussed in this section will offer a clear perspective as to how to go about assessing accountability among the different types of CSOs.

55 See Brown L. David and Jagadananda (2007), op. cit., pp. 9-10. 56 Naidoo Kumi (2003), op. cit., p. 2. 57 Commonwealth Foundation (2009), op. cit., p.p. 4-5.

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Section Three: Methodology3.1 Introduction

In the collection, analysis and management of data and information, several methods were used. The study used both qualitative and quantitative methods. On the former, the study relied on the perceptions of the respondents on the term “accountability” and “accountability mechanisms” used by different CSOs through Key Informant (KI) responses and Focus Group Discussions (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 2010, pp. 5-7). The quantitative method, through the use of self-administered questionnaires constructed on a scale of 1-5, was deployed to augment the main qualitative method.

3.2 Research Design

By design, the study was basically exploratory. This design was chosen mainly because of the newness of the study area. However, some features of cross-sectional survey design, because of the cross-cutting nature of the issues investigated, was also used.

3.3 Area of Study

The geographical coverage of the study was the entire country. However, because the entire country was too gigantic to be explored effectively given the scarcity of time and money, it was divided into five regions, namely: north, west, south, central and east. Due to internal homogeneity of the population in these regions, two districts per region were selected using simple random sampling procedures in which each district had an equal probability of belonging to the sample based on socio-cultural behaviors of the communities forming the stratum. The districts and the sub-counties or Divisions studied were as follows: Central - Kampala (Naguru 1, Nakawa Division and Makindye II Parish, Kelezia Zone, Makindye Division) and Mukono Nakisunga and Nama sub-counties); Western - Mbarara (Kamukuzi and Nyamitanga Divisions) and Bushenyi (Bushenyi Municipality and Ishaka Town Council); Northern – Gulu (Coro and Paicho/Unyama sub-counties) and Lira (Lira and Adeko sub-counties); Eastern – Mbale (Namanyoni and Busoba sub-counties) and Soroti (Asuret and Gweri sub-counties); and Southern – Masaka (Katwe Butego, Kimanya-Kyabakusa, and Mukungwe sub-counties) and Sembabule (Mijwaala sub-county and Sembabule Town Council). The number of CSOs visited depended largely on the number of CSOs in the selected district. On average, thirty five CSOs were visited in each district.

The timeframe/period of the study will be from 2006 when QuAM came into force till the expiry of the study in six months time. Specifically, this study builds on QuAM whose main objective is strengthening and increasing the effectiveness of CSOs in the country.

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3.4 Study Population

In this study, the population was comprised of different categories that have a stake in civil society accountability. The first category of respondents was comprised of key officials from the different types of sampled CSOs so as to get a wide range of information on the efficacy of the existing accountability mechanisms and to obtain a representative coverage. The other category embraced those who had interest in civil society accountability (central and local government, media, local community, and development partners). Specifically, the different types of CSOs selected from the two districts in each of the five regions included: local CBOs, national NGOs, INGOs, national and district CSO networks, faith-based organizations, professional organizations (e.g., trade unions), and informal social networks.

The other categories of respondents selected were: key central government officials (Local Government) and local government representatives (Councilors); the media; elders; opinion leaders; and members of the community who were considered because they are the consumers or beneficiaries of the services rendered by the CSOs.

3.5 Sample Size Determination and Allocation

A representative sample size from each of the categories was selected for interviewing, administration of questionnaires and FGDs. In each CSO, Board Members, Management and Staff were selected for face-to-face interviews. With regard to FGDs, a minimum of five members and a maximum of twelve were selected to constitute each FGD and each lasted not more than one hour. As stated earlier, in each of the regions, two districts were selected at random to represent the region, sampling frame for different categories of respondents were then used to select respondents from the sample. Two sub-counties were selected at random from the lists of sub-counties to enhance the conduction of FGDs, and KI interviews. The sample size was determined by using Kesh and Leslie’s formula as follows:

2

22

* *Z p qn

d

*NR

Where:- n = sample size

2Z = 1.96P = 50% = 50/100 = 0.5 q =0.5d = 0.5

2

2

(1.96) *0.5*0.5(0.029)

n *1.1

=384*1.1 (Non Respondents)

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n = 423 respondents (Registered CSOs, Board members, Sub-committees, and staff) (see Table 3).

Table 3: Sample SizeRegion District District

CAO, RDC, CDO, LCV

SC CDO, Chief CDO

FGDs Informal CSOs, Burial and

drinking group, rotation digging, community leaders

(8-12 members)

CSOs Formal NGOs, Radio, FBO

(will depend on listing

Eastern 1 4 1 3 22 3

2 4 1 3 22 3

Regional Total

8 18 4

Northern 1 4 1 3 22 3

2 4 1 3 2

Regional Total

8 18 4

Western 1 4 1 3 22 3

2 4 1 3 22 3

Regional Total

8 18 4

Southern 1 4 1 3 22 3

2 4 1 3 22 3

Regional Total

8 18 4

Central 1 4 1 3 22 3

2 4 1 3 22 3

Regional Total

16 18 4

National Totals

80 interviews at district

levels

90 interviews at s/c levels

20 FGDs 846 interviews

The total sample size was 423 obtained from national samples of CSOs with two interviews conducted for each CSO resulting into 846 interviews. CSOs were selected using systematic sampling procedure from the main frame of registered CSOs at district level. The FGDs were

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conducted at sub-county level. Opinion leaders and other members of the community were selected to form a focus group. KI interviews at sub-county level were conducted with sub-county chiefs and LCIII Chairpersons and CDOs, while at the district level CAOs, selected district sector Heads, CDOs, LCV Chairpersons and RDCs were interviewed. The response rate from the FGDs and KIs was great because all were interviewed as designed.

3.6 Recruitment and Training of Research Assistants

Due to insufficient time and funds, the Consultant recruited one Research Assistant for each region who had adequate experience in working with CSOs and Local Governments and could speak the local language. He briefed them thoroughly on how to administer the questionnaires and the conduction of interviews of both KIs and FGDs. The list of key personnel contacted during the study is appended to this document (Appendix I). The content of the briefing focused on the use of research instruments, namely; objectives of the survey, CSOs, Key Informant Interview Guide and management of the FGDs.

3.7 Data Collection, Field Editing, Processing and Management

Data collection entailed the identification and actual administration of the various instruments (interview guides for KIs and FGDs and questionnaires). The cleaning, editing, and compilation of the data and information was done by the Statistician and the Consultant. The Statistician ensured data quality, reception and processing while the Consultant performed the following roles: assigned data collection responsibilities to Research Assistants and supervised data collection. Contact persons in the regions were identified by the Research Assistants and the Consultant who proved useful in identifying individuals for the FGDs and the collection of the questionnaires from the CSOs. Editing of the questionnaire by the Consultant and Research Assistants began from the field. This method helped in effective correcting mistakes that cropped up during recording of responses from respondents. For example, those found with errors were referred to the respective interviewees for correction, including re-interviewing where need arose. A record of daily activities showing the number of questionnaires completed and interviewees conducted by each Research Assistant were religiously kept to track the completed questionnaires.

Data processing and management was the immediate post-fieldwork activity and it involved: office editing which dealt with the examination of questionnaires and interview responses for completeness and consistency before it was keyed into the designed computer. Office editing was done as the questionnaires came in; Data keying or entry and cleaning exercise started with designing data entry screens. Data entry involved the capturing of all the qualitative and quantitative data collected using computers and this was done by two Data Entry Clerks. Eventually data was entered in the computer using SPSS (18). The computer-based data was cleaned by examining the data already entered using frequency distributions of the variables in

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order to identify outliers and variables that could have been missed. On completion of data entry, data was anglicized by use of SPSS software for analysis and subsequent generation of tables. Qualitative data was analyzed by first developing themes out of the responses and making sense of the contents. The qualitative finding was ultimately integrated with the quantitative results to the statistics to augment the analysis.

3.8 Quality Control in the Field

The average duration an interview is supposed to take is one of the quality controls in the field which the interviewers used. The Consultant checked each and every questionnaire for the average time taken on an interview. No variance in time was witnessed during interviewing. After the Research Assistants completed the interviews, the Consultant checked all the questionnaires for accuracy, correctness, consistency and completeness. With regard to quality control during data processing, in order to minimize errors during data capture, all the questionnaires were given serial numbers. This approach enabled the Research Teams to trace errors in data entry to original questionnaires for corrective action. The utilization of data validation using SPSS software enhanced the quality of the data.

3.9 Instrument Administration, Ethical Considerations and Organization of the Survey

In this survey, all the instruments were administered by the Research Assistants. They explained the importance of the study to the respondents. All respondents were assured of confidentiality of the information they provided. The respondent’s right to choose to participate or not to participate was guaranteed. Generally, cooperation from the KIs, members of FGDs and some of the CSOs was remarkable. However, other CSOs were either reluctant to cooperate or just out-rightly refused to cooperate. With regard to the organization of the survey, the Consultant worked closely with the implementing partner (PLACA) during the execution of the survey.

3.10 Analysis, Presentation and Dissemination of the Findings

Data analysis was conducted by the Statistician through the use of SPSS and the report was prepared using MS Word. For purposes of data validation, the Consultant will present the report to a group of selected stakeholders drawn from the five regions of Uganda to seek their input and validation of the findings.

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Section Four: Findings and Discussion

4.1 Introduction

This section presents the research findings and their discussion. The presentation of the section is based on the following main issues: background and composition of the respondents, accountability issues within CSOs and stakeholders, types of CSOs, accountable governance in CSO umbrella organizations, CSO accountability framework/model, compliance/response mechanism, capability, accountable programs in CSO umbrella organizations, accountable resource usage and management, and challenges of CSO accountability.

4.2 Background and Composition of Respondents

The background and composition of the respondents is shown in table 4 and figure 1 below.

Table 4: Composition of Respondents by Position held in the CSORegion

TotalRespondents position Central Eastern Northern Southern WesternAccountant No.

Respondents18 2 8 1 3 32

% 10.0% 5.7% 19.5% 1.9% 11.1% 9.5%

Administrator No. Respondents

76 16 12 9 16 129

% 42.2% 45.7% 29.3% 16.7% 59.3% 38.3%

Extension worker

No. Respondents

35 16 17 35 5 108

% 19.4% 45.7% 41.5% 64.8% 18.5% 32.0%

Others No. Respondents

7 0 0 3 1 11

% 3.9% .0% .0% 5.6% 3.7% 3.3%

Secretary No. Respondents

44 1 4 6 2 57

% 24.4% 2.9% 9.8% 11.1% 7.4% 16.9%

Totals No. Respondents

180 35 41 54 27 337

% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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Figure 1: Distribution of Respondents by Position Held in CSOs

Both table 4 and figure 1 show that the majority (38%) of the respondents interviewed were administrators followed by extension workers (32%) and only 10% were accountants. They also show that the composition of the respondents varied from region to region, for example, central and western regions were 42.2% and 59.3% for administrators, followed by secretaries, respectively. The reason behind such a variation is perhaps because the Head Offices of the CSOs are located in Kampala and Mbarara than the other sub-regions. Hence, the northern, eastern and southern regions, had more extension workers and beneficiaries represented by 41.5%, 45.7%, and 64.8%, respectively.

Age Distribution of Respondents

This study took age as a critical factor in the running of the CSOs simply because the older or mature the respondents are, the more the wealth of experience he or she had accumulated and, in turn, the better the expected performance of the CSOs. Table 5 shows the age distribution of respondents by sub-region.

Table 5: Age Distribution of Respondents by Sub-region

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Region

Total

Age groupsYears Central Eastern Northern Southern Western

Below 19 No. Respondents 0 0 0 1 0 1

% .0 .0 .0 1.9 .0 0.3

19-23 No. Respondents 9 5 1 6 0 21

% 5.2 14.3 2.9 11.1 .0 6.5

24-28 No. Respondents 55 10 16 19 8 108

% 31.6 28.6 47.1 35.2 30.8 33.4

29-33 No. Respondents 41 5 11 9 10 76

% 23.6 14.3 32.4 16.7 38.5 23.5

Above 33 No. Respondents 69 15 6 19 8 117

% 39.7 42.9 17.6 35.2 30.8 36.2

Total No. Respondents 174 35 34 54 26 323

% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Figure 2: Age Distribution of Respondents by Sub-region

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The results in table 5 and figure 2 clearly show that 36.2% of all the respondents were aged

above 33years followed by those within the age brackets of 24-28 years. This age–related

statistics of the respondents signifies the fact that many respondents who are old were engaged

more in administrative positions followed by extension workers. However, in some sub-regions

the respondents were relatively younger with their ages being below 29 years old; most of these

rightly belonged to the category of extension workers.

Educational Level of Respondents

The study was also interested in the knowledge and skills bases of the respondents so as to

ascertain whether or not they had the requisite qualifications to do what they were doing. Table 6

shows the educational level of the respondents by sub-region.

Table 6: Educational Level of Respondents by Sub-region

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Region

TotalEducation level Central Eastern Northern Southern Western

Degree No. Respondents

44 17 26 17 17 115

% 24.5 48.6 63.4 31.5 63.0 34.1

Diploma No. Respondents

28 15 8 17 5 73

% 15.6 42.9 19.5 31.5 18.5 21.7

Masters No. Respondents

13 0 1 3 3 20

% 7.2 0.0 2.4 5.6% 11.1 5.9

No Formal Education

No. Respondents

6 0 0 0 0 6

% 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8

Others No. Respondents

1 0 0 0 0 1

% 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 .3

Primary No. Respondents

9 0 0 0 0 9

% 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7

Secondary No. Respondents

50 0 1 6 0 57

% 27.8 .0 2.4 11.1 0.0 16.9

Tertiary No. Respondents

29 3 5 11 2 50

% 16.1% 8.6% 12.2% 20.4% 7.4% 14.8%

Total No. Respondents

180 35 41 54 27 337

% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Clearly, table 6 indicates that most of the respondents visited are degree holders followed by

diplomas, 34.1% and 21.7%, respectively. The figures further show that many of the CSOs in the

northern, eastern and western had staff with higher qualifications compared with the central

region in which the majority had primary and tertiary qualifications. No explanation could be

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adduced for this disparity in education although one would have expected that the central region

which has had many educational and tertiary institutions of learning for long periods could have

had staff with much higher qualifications as compared to the other regions.

4.3 Accountability Issues within CSOs and Stakeholders

In this section, two key issues stood out for investigation, namely; understanding the meaning of the term “accountability”, and the stakeholders that related with CSOs on matters of accountability. Each of these two issues will be treated in turn.

Defining Accountability:

Figure 3 below shows the level of understanding of the respondents regarding the term “accountability”.

Figure 3: CSOs Basic Knowledge about Accountability

What figure 3 does show is that, overall, above 79% of the respondents have basic knowledge about accountability. Looked at from a regional perspective, 70% of the respondents in the central region have clearer knowledge about accountability. It is likely that this time around, the educational factor could have a lot to explain why many respondents from the central region understand the term better than those in the other sub-regions. It can be seen that of the respondents from the central region, 28% have had secondary education followed by 21.8% with degree. In the north, few respondents in FGDs had little knowledge about the term accountability especially in Lira sub-county in Lira District; this area also had few CSOs. Strangely, in Kampala, e.g., Naguru 1, Nakawa Division, some members of the FGD did not understand what accountability means. Generally, however, the term accountability was understood to mean:

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process of representing how public funds and other resources are spent by an individual and organization; record showing how money was spent on behalf of the people; all employees always being accountable to their immediate supervisors in their respective organizations; follow-up or investigating activities of CSOs to find out how they are operating in terms of the use of finance, materials and human resources and the impact of their activities on the people they serve; evidence of activity; presentation of proof of how money has been used by a CSO in a given period of time; and how money is received, spent and its subsequent outcome.

In Katwe Butego Division, Masaka district, this is how the members of the FGD understood the word accountability:

Box 1: Meaning of accountability by members of a FGD in Masaka District:

Procedure of handling income and expenditure in an organization; Process of writing what has been done and spent in an organization; Borrowing of money and paying quickly; Taking stock of human, material and financial audit in an organization; and Process through which an organization makes commitment to respond to and balance the

needs of stakeholders.

Members of a FGD in Bushenyi Municipality, Bushenyi District, and in Mijwaala sub-county in Sembabule district, understood accountability to mean the following:

Box 2: Meaning of accountability by members of a FGD in Bushenyi and SemambuleDistricts:

Procedure of writing what has been done in the borrowing/spending and use of finances; Decision-making on organizational commitment and responding to needs of stakeholders; Process of listing organizational assets, liabilities and finances at a specific moment in

time; and Preparation of cash flows and financial statements for audit and sharing with stakeholders

during annual general meetings.

It has to be stated that these different meanings attributed to accountability largely agree with what the literature says regarding the meaning of accountability. The positive value inherent in this understanding of what accountability means is that the stakeholders can at least cause the CSOs to account for what they do or do not do.

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On the stakeholders who are expected to relate with CSOs on accountability, the respondents identified the following: community leaders; LCs, sub-county officials (e.g., sub-county chief), community development officials, the communities or beneficiaries (e.g., youth women, etc), CSO staff, volunteers, and donors. These stakeholders are broken down as follows: all districts had local (e.g., African Evangelistic Enterprise AEE, ATOMUNU Farmer’s group and Oremai Youth Cooperative Group in Asuret sub-county), and international NGOs (e.g., Save the Children International, IRC, WFP, World Vision which provides health, education and livelihood services such as food crisis or food security and adult education, Save the Children International, Uganda Women Effort to Save Orphans or UWESO, NRC, ARC and Care International). In some of the districts, it was observed that some of the NGOs are closing down while others have already closed down. Local CBOs such as Waloku Kwo in Acholi (example, Community Care Coalition, drama clubs, dancing groups, farmers’ groups) also exist. With regard to what they do, some FGDs observed that they are seen but they have no idea of what they are doing, hence, the difficulty understanding their accountability procedures.

4.4 Types of CSOs

This section deals with the length of time the CSOs have been in operation, the number of years the respondents have working in the CSOs, the registration status of the CSOs, sources of funding to the CSOs, the governance structure of the CSOs, major areas of operation of the CSOs, lessons learnt, reporting accountability issues, mode of communication in the CSOs, and the nature of services provided by the CSOs.

The first issue that is dealt with is length of time the CSOs have been in existence. When respondents were asked this question, their responses are captured in table 7 and figure 4 below.

Table 7: Length of Time the CSOs have been in Operation

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Years in operation

Region

TotalCentral Eastern Northern Southern Western

0-4 No. Respondents

64 6 14 15 2 101

% 35.6 17.1 34.1 27.8 7.4 30.0

5-9 No. Respondents

54 11 16 8 16 105

% 30.0 31.4 39.0 14.8 59.3 31.2

10-14 No. Respondents

27 11 7 15 7 67

% 15.0 31.4 17.1 27.8 25.9 19.9

Above 15 No. Respondents

35 7 4 16 2 64

% 19.4 20.0 9.8 29.6 7.4 19.0

Total No. Respondents

180 35 41 54 27 337

% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Figure 4: Length of Time the CSOs have been in Operation by Sub-region

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Table 7 and figure 4 show that 30% of the respondents observed that most CSOs were relatively

new, approximately, less than 4 years in operations. This response was followed by 31.2% of the

respondents who said that some CSOs have been in operation for 5-9 years. Specifically, 59.3%

of the respondents observed that most CSOs in the western sub-region have been in operations

for 5-9; this was followed by 39.0% of the respondents who observed that the next longest

duration are CSOs in the north (39.0%). In other words, the retention capacity of the CSOs is

low. Indeed, old CSOs tend to close their business within a short span as new ones are

established. However, 29.6% of the respondents noted that in the southern part of the country

higher percentage of CSO have been in operation for at least 15 years.

Besides the length of time of the existence of the CSOs, the study also interrogated the number

of years the respondents have worked in the CSOs. Table 8 below captures their longevity in the

different CSOs for which they worked.

Table 8: Number of Years Respondents have worked in the CSOs

Region

Total

Years worked with the CSOs Central Eastern Northern Southern Western

0-4 No. Respondents 102 5 3 32 14 156

% 65.4 31.2 75.0 64.0 53.8 61.9

5-9 No. Respondents 41 5 1 8 9 64

% 26.3 31.2 25.0 16.0 34.6 25.4

10-14 No. Respondents 11 5 0 4 2 22

% 7.1 31.2 .0 8.0 7.7 8.7

Above 15 No. Respondents 2 1 0 6 1 10

% 1.3 6.2 .0 12.0 3.8 4.0

Total No. Respondents 156 16 4 50 26 252

% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

From table 8, the majority of the respondents from Central (65.4%), Northern (75%), Southern

(64%) and western (53.8%) have worked for less than 5 years. This was followed by those who

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had been in the CSOs for about 5-9 years. No significant explanation can be attached to this

variation in the number of years that individuals have worked for the CSOs.

In order to decipher whether or not the CSOs are operating formally or informally, the study asked the respondents whether they were aware of the registration status of the different of CSOs. Their responses are represented in table 9 and figure 5 below.

Table 9: Registration Status of CSOs by Sub-regionCSOs registration

Region

TotalCentral Eastern Northern Southern Western

Dont know No. Respondents 42 11 24 7 0 88

% 25.5 31.4 58.5 13.0 .0 26.2

No No. Respondents 4 1 4 3 0 12

% 2.2 2.9 9.8 5.6 .0 3.6

Yes No. Respondents 130 23 13 44 27 237

% 72.2 65.7 31.7 81.5 100.0 70.3

Total No. Respondents 180 35 41 54 27 337

% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Figure 5: CSOs Registered by Sub-region

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Table 5 and figure 9 shows that the respondents were aware of the registration or non-

registration status of the CSOs. The respondents observed that most of the CSOs are registered in

their respective sub-regions, namely; Central (72.2%), Eastern (65.7%), Southern (81.5%) and

Western (100.0%). However, the northern (31.7%) sub-region was seen as having the worst

registration record. Looked at nationally, the respondents (70%) observed that most of the CSOs

operating are registered. When the respondent were probed further on the mode of registration,

they were clear that CBOs are registered locally at the district levels with the District

Community Development Officers (CDOs). When it came to the registration of national and

international NGOs, they correctly noted that it was done by the Ministry of Internal Affairs

through the NGO Registration Board in Kampala. However, some respondents did not know of

some of the registration procedures and those of their own organizations. For example, groups

such as that for the Disabled and Nakisunga Elders Association both in Mukono district could

not explain their organization was registered. Other CSOs, by virtue of being informal, for

example, KAME Valley Market Association, in Mukono district, are neither registered nor do

they have Board of Directors (BoDs). What happens in the latter type of organizations is that the

members simply identify themselves with their line of business and reject those who are not in

their trade. It needs to be underscored that in those organizations where members are not aware

of how they were started or registered, the potential for fowl play could be high, as has been

witnessed in some of them.

In fact, related to registration of CSOs, is the proper acquisition and management of documents. This study was interested in finding out how CSOs handle their documentation with the view to ascertaining the sophisticated nature of their operations. On this issue the respondents gave several ideas as follows: a) Some CSOs document their activities through annual reports or activity reports (e.g., annual financial and audit reports, and publications, b) some CSOs maintain improved information flow within their different constituencies through fundraising, membership drive, and marketing their services. Some respondents could not explain their mode of documentation (Mukono district).

It is near impossible for an organization to manage its funds properly if it has no proper documentation. Similarly, this study investigated the financial processes of the CSOs. Specifically, on the question of the financial base of the CSOs, the respondents noted that the membership fee varies from organization to organization (see figure 6 below).

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Figure 6: Sources of Funding to CSOs

The results in figure 6 show that 32% of the respondents noted that the major source of funding for CSOs is from NGOs and development partners while 31% of the respondents said CSOs’ funds are obtained from community contributions. Only 4% said that funds for CSOs are from well-wishers. However, some respondents said that director’s contribution contributed only 10%. For example, among the Nakonte Rice Growers Association in Mukono District, while membership is open to all farmers, for most CBOs, monthly contributions range from Shs200,000/= to Shs500,000/=. Some respondents argued that the financial figures for international NGOs are not known because they are concealed from the public. Some other respondents did not know how much money was in the pockets of some of the CSOs, for example, Nakonte Rice Growers Association, could not mention their figures.

One of the most critical aspects related to the way CSOs conduct their accountability is through the type of governance structure that is established. In this regard, when asked about the basic governance structures of CSOs, most members of the FGDs observed that although they may exist, they depend on the type and purpose of the organization. Nevertheless, they identified the following:

Box 3: Governance Structure of CSOs:

Some are written in regulatory instruments such as Constitutions and Human Resource Manuals;

Some CSOs draw up their own informal structures; and BoDs define the activities to be undertaken by the management.

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Although some respondents said that some CSOs do not follow any hierarchical structure in their modes of governance or some CSOs have vague or unclear structures, generally, however, most CSOs were seen as having the following officers: Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson, Treasury, Secretary, and Committee Members. However, the structures are either simple in the case of informal organizations with few office bearers (Chairperson, Secretary, Treasurer, and Publicity Secretary) or merely informal, thus causing some of them to be run in a rather efficient and effective manner.

In terms of roles of BoDs, it was noted that by virtue of the fact that they are integral to the way formal CSOs operate, they perform the following (see table 10 and figure 7): provide prestige, credibility, and know-how/ or experience or skills; develop effective principles which are statements of values and qualities; review and approve budgets and development plans; recruit staff; define operational standards and practices; develop strategies to attract new programs or projects or activities; develop principles of how to promote decent work and social justice for all; ensure fair and inclusive participation by gathering information from lower level managers to make decisions, leadership and democratic ownership of organizational activities; monitoring and evaluation; and ensure that members commit themselves to transparent relationships with stakeholders (internal and external), share developmental goals and trust. Generally, therefore, they plan and budget, guide and supervise, and formulate policies, mobilize funds, and develop strategic plans for the future direction of the CSOs. So, activities of BoDs are common across organizations.

Table 10: Roles of the Boards in the Governance of CSOs Sub region

Don’t know

No Partly Yes Total

Central266.0 246.0 421.0 687.0 1620.016.4 15.2 26.0 42.4 100.0

Eastern37.0 12.0 67.0 199.0 315.011.7 3.8 21.3 63.2 100.0

Northern7.0 9.0 73.0 280.0 369.01.9 2.4 19.8 75.9 100.0

Southern97.0 27.0 51.0 311.0 486.020.0 5.6 10.5 64.0 100.0

Western29.0 15.0 62.0 137.0 243.011.9 6.2 25.5 56.4 100.0

Total436.0 309.0 674.0 1614.0 3033.014.4 10.2 22.2 53.2 100.0

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Figure 7: Roles of Boards in the Governance of CSOs

Table 10 and figure 7 present the responses on the roles of BoDs among others: monitoring and evaluation of the performance of the organization in line with the strategic objectives of the CSO to ensure that the organization performs as expected; and involve beneficiaries in board decisions. Statistically, 52% of the respondents observed that the BoDs were involved in the governance of the CSOs. Regionally most of the CSOs in northern Uganda were seen by the respondents (75.9%) as having high involvement of BoDs in the governance process in comparison to the rest of the other sub regions. The involvements of board members in the governance of CSOs were low in Central region and western regions reflected by only 42% and 53% respectively which reflects on the accountability issues.

Since CSOs are meant to engage in development work, the study focused on the key areas of operations of the CSOs to assess whether or not what they were doing were in the interest of their beneficiaries (see table 11 and figure 8). When the respondents were asked the question concerning the kinds of activities undertaken by CSOs, the broad categories were identified as shown in figure 8 below.

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Table 11: Nature of Services Provided by CSOs Nature of service provided by CSO

Region

TotalCentral Eastern Northern Southern Western

Don’t know No of responses 31 2 17 3 1 54

% 17.2 5.7 41.5 5.6 3.7 16.0

Both No of responses 93 18 11 38 17 177

% 51.7 51.4 26.8 70.4 63.0 52.5

Demand driven No of responses 42 14 9 9 7 81

% 23.3 40.0 22.0 16.7 25.9 24.0

Supply driven No of responses 14 1 4 4 2 25

% 7.8 2.9 9.8 7.4 7.4 7.4

Total No of responses 180 35 41 54 27 337

% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Figure 8: Major Areas of Operation of CSOs

From figure 8, the respondents (27.9%) observed that most of the CSOs were operating in the areas of education across the country. This was followed by (17.4) in the areas of communications and community awareness. 14.4% of the responses were in agriculture with a small percentage in the areas of counseling, health, income generation, funeral and/or vulnerable group and government. Generally, several other responses from FGDs revealed that some CSOs

46

engage in civic empowerment or sensitization of the communities on their civil rights e.g., about accountability and responsible family; money lending and leasing organizations – e.g., credit and saving programs (UWESO and NABAD in Mbale); relief (World Vision) and scholastic materials (UWESO); economic empowerment or income generating activities through micro-finance support by lending money through loans (e.g., UWESO and Lira sub-county); religious or spiritual activities and education sponsorship by paying schools fees for primary school-goers (e.g., Abudaya in Mbale); legal aid support; peace and domestic violence (e.g., Peace Kawumera in Mbale); facilitation and training in the health sector, e.g., HIV/AIDS, PACE in Naguru 1, Nakawa Division, provides mosquito nets, counseling to HIV/AIDS). In Bushenyi Municipality and Mijwaala sub-county, the following activities of CSOs were mentioned: raising funds, service delivery, recruitment of members, coordinating organizational activities, devising media and public outreach strategies, developing project budgets, planning meetings; developing and approving annual plans; recruiting and coordinating volunteers; and orienting and training BoDs.

Furthermore, and as is gown in figure 9 below, the respondents argued that the services rendered were the ones that the local citizens want.

Figure 9: Nature of Services Provided by CSOs

From figure 9, 52.5% of the CSOs reported that their services provided are both demand and supply driven although demand driven services were Northern supply driven services across all region, it was also important to note that most the respondent in the north did not know the nature of service their organizations are providing (41.5%)

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When members of the different FGDs were asked to enumerate the lessons that have been learnt to effectively carry our development activities, both positive and negative were mentioned except that these lessons depended on the type of organization. The positive lessons included the following: a) empower local people to claim their rights, b) build capacities within communities and sectors that is inclusive of all actors, c) engage communities by seeking synergies based on mutually agreed priorities and approaches; inculcate values of humanity and development through transforming their communities; and respect and spiritual virtues embedded in culture; and importance of teamwork that have enabled them to support each other especially in their domestic needs. Other FGDs could not mention lessons learnt (Mukono district). The negative lessons mentioned include the following: some people are greedy in society, e.g., someone borrows money from an organization and refuses to pay back (FGD in Mbale); other respondents noted that some members are lazy and avoid work; failure by some members to imbibe and reflect positive virtues of internal democratic governance; and poor ethical conduct regarding accountability.

To enhance the process of accountability, the respondents were asked about the mode of communication that exists in the CSOs. Figure 10 below shows what they thought about the communication system in most of the CSOs.

Figure 10: Mode of Communication in CSOs

Clearly, from figure 10, the use of telephone accounted for a larger mode of communication accounting for 33.2% followed by other electronic medium (19.1%). The other modes of community reported by the CSOs were through circulars, during meetings, via radio and verbally. It should be noted that although the study did not enquire into the viability of each of the different communication mode in terms of how they affect the efficacy of the CSOs, a use of the modes in combination could be a better approach. Relying on only one method could certainly have its won drawbacks.

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4.5 Accountable Governance System in CSOs

The centrality of a governance system in the accountability of CSOs needs no over-emphasis. In this regard, the study delved into the extent to which CSOs have been able to establish accountable governance systems. Table 12 and figure 11 expose the responses of the respondents on this critical matter.

Table 12: Accountable Governance System Sub region

Don't know

No Partly Yes  

 Central

171.0 209.0 337.0 1022.0 1739.09.8 12.0 19.4 58.8 100.0

 Eastern

16.0 9.0 68.0 253.0 346.04.6 2.6 19.7 73.1 100.0

 Northern

1.0 22.0 19.0 363.0 405.00.2 5.4 4.7 89.6 100.0

 Southern

18.0 26.0 87.0 397.0 528.03.4 4.9 16.5 75.2 100.0

 Western

10.0 12.0 37.0 209.0 268.03.7 4.5 13.8 78.0 100.0

Total216.0 278.0 548.0 2244.0 3286.06.573341 8.460134 16.67681 68.289714 100

Figure 11: Accountability Governance System in CSOs

From table 12 and figure 11, the national statistics shows that 68.3% of the CSO reported that they have established governance systems that handle accountability. However, in the central sub-region, the existence of accountability governance systems was reported by only 58.8% of

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the respondent. It has to be realized that this is a low response and could adversely affect the way CSOs account for their behavior. Indeed, it could also affect the knowledge and involvement of CSOs in umbrella organizations, if that is how they are managed (see table 13).

Table 13: Knowledge and Involvement of CSOs in Umbrella Organizations Sub region

Don’t know

No Partly Yes Total

Central165.0 160.0 200.0 375.0 900.018.3 17.8 22.2 41.7 100.0

Eastern49.0 17.0 25.0 84.0 175.028.0 9.7 14.3 48.0 100.0

Northern10.0 8.0 25.0 162.0 205.04.9 3.9 12.2 79.0 100.0

Southern38.0 19.0 58.0 155.0 270.014.1 7.0 21.5 57.4 100.0

Western26.0 10.0 23.0 76.0 135.019.3 7.4 17.0 56.3 100.0

Total288.0 214.0 331.0 852.0 1685.017.1 12.7 19.6 50.6 100

Furthermore, there was a need to find out whether or not there exists a transparent process for accepting new members in CSOs’ umbrella organization. To this concern, which received positive response, the respondents had this to say of the functionality of CSOs: a) they recruit openly, b) they demonstrate some degree of accountability, c) they integrate gender in their activities, d) they enter into partnership agreements to attain developments, e) they encourage stakeholders to influence and participate in organizational activities, f) and, they explicitly define terms and conditions of service of their organizational members.

On the issue of active involvement of members in the development of policy and strategy in CSOs, responses were as varied from sub-region to sub-region: a) members in CSOs are encouraged to share knowledge through networks and coalitions, b) some of them build common actions on program basis rather than project basis, c) through consultation, CSOs ensure authorization and involvement of members, d) they are supposed to put in place mechanisms and policies for accountability and capability enhancement; in some CSOs, executive committees are used to maintain focus of the organizational plans for short and long term cause, make decisions on items which need response in meetings, ensure that organizational, administrative and legal structures are adequate and appropriate; some CSOs build common actions on program activities and under a personnel committee they define and manage job descriptions for all staff review and then they make necessary adjustments yearly on personnel practices as well as handling staff

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grievances; in some organizations, fundraising committee is involved in developing fundraising plan and identify potential funding sources.

As for the criteria for membership of in informal organizations, the members of FGDs across the sub-regions observed that it is simple: open to all able-bodied persons (above 15 years), individuals register by paying a membership subscription fee (weekly or monthly, or annually) ranging from Shs1,000/= (e.g., Kame Women’s Association in Mukono district) to Shs5,000/= (e.g., Nakisunga Boda Boda Riders Association in Mukono district (some demand weekly subscription of 100-200/=), willing to attend meetings, responsible, trustworthy, being able to work in a team, and not having been convicted of criminal offence. Other organizations are started by specific age group or sex (e.g., AEE in Lira does not allow men to join). Others CSOs advertize via radio, newspapers, religious institutions such as Churches in order to recruit. Short-listed individuals are interviewed and merit is used in selection. However, others recruit on the basis of sectarianism (e.g., nepotism in UWESO in Mbale).

On the issue of decision-making not being dominated by a small group within the CSOs, members of FGDs observed the following divergent issues: a) they engage stakeholders to collaborate and synergize on mutually agreed priorities, b) some CSOs conduct open forum consultations, c) they undertake people-centred activities in communities, d) they share long-term plans, set clear policies and procedures so as to nurture durable systems, e) since they are development actors, they focus on people and their empowerment, f) some formulate clear picture or vision of where the CSO is supposed to head, g) some CSOs define clear roles for every organizational member. In the case of informal groups, there are no policy strategies and the decision of members is passed on informally. Their agenda is geared towards the purpose for which their organization is formed, e.g., pooling finances, as is the case of Kame Valley Market Association in Mukono district. Other organizations such as the Tukolele Wamu Farmers Group in Mukono district, members participate actively in decision-making, especially during group meetings. Among Kame Women’s Association in Mukono district, views of the members are passed on in meetings whereby minutes are written and resolutions and action points taken, e.g., Nakisunga Boda Boda Riders Association in Mukono district.

With regard to how accountability issues are handled in the CSOs, FGDs members observed that they: a) stress the importance of nurturing the spirit of volunteerism or personal sacrifice, b) develop accountability mechanisms, c) take organizational audit as laid down in the governing instruments, d) ensure that each person executes his/her responsibilities through inter-personal connectivity, e) ensure that decision-making processes are transparent so that staff and members know who makes the decisions, how they are made and who is accountable to whom, f) they establish special group of monitors and committees to undertake monitoring, having passbooks and organizational registers, g) informal ones, are simple to manage, e.g., KALE Valley Market Association in Mukono district. No meetings are held and there are no by-laws to guide organizational practices; communication is done informally. As for Nakisunga Boda-Boda

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Riders Association, leaders are accountable to the members. However, in other FGDs, some members said they: don’t know how money disappears; other CSOss out-rightly conned people and ran away with their monies, e.g., AEE in Lira district, under the guise that they will supplement on their contributions to the scheme.

Consequently, when the study posed questions on the reporting on accountability issues by CSOs, their responses were captured as shown in figure 12 below.

Figure 12: Reporting on Accountability Issues by CSOs

From figure 12, 29% of the respondents observed that the point where accountability issues were frequently reported was to the Executive Directors. The second point which the respondents (20%) mentioned was Finance Department. The third point respondents (16%) mentioned was to the Board. Reporting to fellow workers registered 14%. Donors received a paltry 11%. Going by what they said, it would, therefore, appear that the respondents have basic understanding of where accountability issues should be reported.

While CSOs have to understand how accountability issues are reported, it was also considered prudent that umbrella organizations, where they exist, should establish accountable governance within themselves. Figure 13 below shows the extent to which this is or is not the case.

Figure 13: Accountable Governance in CSOs Umbrella Organizations

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From figure 13, accountability governance in CSOs umbrella were reported in the areas of ensuring clear membership criteria and a transparent process for accepting new members as well as keeping registered members regularly updated of what goes on in the CSO. They are also expected to ensure the active involvement of members in the development of policy and strategy, meetings of Boards are open to all members as stated by 50% of the respondents; however it was more pronounced in the northern sub-region as reflected by 79% of the repondents. CSOs umbrella organizations in the central and eastern sub-regions were below the nation level with only 41.7% and 48% of the respondents stating that they are active in enhancing accountability in CSOs, respectively. Respondents were able to cite some CSOs, NGOs, CBOs which have umbrella organizations, for example, AIDS network; Masaka District Farmers Association (MADIFA), Positive Men Union (PMU) and Buwunga Forum for PHA Network.

Much as umbrella organizations are expected to establish accountability systems for the organizations they are mandated to oversee, CSOs are expected to build systems that can enforce accounatbility. Table 14 and figure 14 adress this critical concern.

Table 14: Accountability Systems within CSOs

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 Sub region

Don’t know No Partly Yes Total

Central649.0 389.0 747.0 1994.0 3779.017.2 10.3 19.8 52.8 100.0

Eastern75.0 12.0 130.0 518.0 735.010.2 1.6 17.7 70.5 100.0

Northern32.0 10.0 104.0 714.0 860.03.7 1.2 12.1 83.0 100.0

Southern128.0 33.0 133.0 840.0 1134.011.3 2.9 11.7 74.1 100.0

Western50.0 14.0 116.0 387.0 567.08.8 2.5 20.5 68.3 100.0

Total934.0 458.0 1230.0 4453.0 7075.013.2 6.5 17.4 62.9 100.0

Figure 14: Accountability System within CSOs

It has to be said that CSOs have to construct accountability systems by setting clear objectives and strategies for accountability and translating them into quantifiable measures to clarify on management’s understanding of where the CSO is coming from and where it is going. The strategy should help in the development of consensus and achievable targets and initiatives. They also ensure that they receive feedback on whether strategy implementation is proceeding according to plan. Most of the respondents (62.9%) agreed that CSOs practice accountability and this was reported highly in all the sub-regions. In the central sub-region, less mechanisms to ensure accountability in CSOs was mentioned.

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To enforce accountability in CSOs will necessitate a high degree of stakeholder involvement. Respondents were asked the extent to which stakeholders were involved in CSOs accountability. Table 15 presents this result.

Table 15: Involvement of Stakeholders in CSOs Accountability Sub region

Don’t know

No Partly Yes Total

Central161.0 87.0 139.0 513.0 900.017.9 9.7 15.4 57.0 100.0

Eastern29.0 7.0 32.0 107.0 175.016.6 4.0 18.3 61.1 100.0

Northern8.0 3.0 19.0 175.0 205.03.9 1.5 9.3 85.4 100.0

Southern37.0 18.0 26.0 189.0 270.013.7 6.7 9.6 70.0 100.0

Western6.0 4.0 30.0 95.0 135.04.4 3.0 22.2 70.4 100.0

Total241.0 119.0 246.0 1079.0 1685.014.3 7.1 14.6 64.0 100.0

Figure 15: Involvement of Stakeholders in CSOs Accountability

Table 25 and figure 15 shows that 64% of the respondent reported that stakeholders are involved in CSOs accountability and most of the CSOs in the northern (85.4%), southern (70%) and western (70.4) reported high involvement of stakeholder involvement in CSOs accontability processes. However, central sub-region had low involvement of stakholders in the accountability

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processes. On the issue of active involvement of members in the development of policy and strategy, and to ensure that decision-making is not dominated by few members, respondents said that this depends on the CSO. In some CSOs, decision-making involve local communities or beneficiaries, sub-county councils, etc, in their activities. Others, e.g., CBOs, call for meetings where both the executive and general members of the organization will evaluate whether or not the person qualifies. The person is then given time to express his or her interest in an annual general assembly. Thereafter, a decision is taken as to eligibility or non-eligibility of the person).

The only way in which stakeholders can get involved in accountability in CSOs is through putting in place accountability frameworks. Consequently, respondents were asked whether CSOs have accountability frameworks (see figure 16 below).

Figure 16: CSOs Framework that Encourages Accountability

Figure 16 shows that most CSOs have put accountability systems of assessing their activities, outputs, outcomes and impact through regular monitoring and evaluation while making stakeholders participate in all the processes. They also endeavor to listen and acts on feedback from their beneficiaries. The results of fgure 16 show that many respondents (88.2%) say that the northern sub-regionreported that the CSOs accountability framework encourages evaluation in CSOs followed by southern (69.8%), and western (65.6%). The central sub-region remained very low with only 47.5% the respondents accepting that the framework within CSOs enhance evaluation. 4.6 Appropriate Accountability Framework/Model used by CSOs

Transparency

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On the issue of appropriate models/frameworks for transparency and accountability used by CSOs, FGDs members observed that they: a) endeavor to balance the needs of stakeholders with those of the CSOs in aspects such as decision-making processes and activities, b) try to deliver according to commitments, c) put in place accountability capabilities – i.e., structures, mechanisms, policies and systems of accountability; ensure organizational transactions are made through executive, annual and extraordinary meetings – e.g., through receipts, recording in notebooks, report presentation during AGMs (financial reports and physical evidence) either on weekly or monthly or annual basis, d) ensure that each person is responsible for managing work is done through reciprocity, e) ensure that shortfalls are addressed, f) behave inclusively and openly to scrutiny. However, some members said they are not aware how organizations account for their activities. Table 16 and figure 17 gives an empirical response to the kind of CSOs accountability frameworkmodel.

Table 16: CSOs Accountability Framework/Model  Sub region

Dont know

No Partly Yes Total

Central425.0 259.0 376.0 920.0 1980.021.5 13.1 19.0 46.5 100.0

Eastern73.0 14.0 64.0 234.0 385.019.0 3.6 16.6 60.8 100.0

Northern31.0 12.0 71.0 337.0 451.06.9 2.7 15.7 74.7 100.0

Southern90.0 21.0 114.0 369.0 594.015.2 3.5 19.2 62.1 100.0

Western30.0 12.0 61.0 194.0 297.010.1 4.0 20.5 65.3 100.0

Total649.0 318.0 686.0 2054.0 3707.017.5 8.6 18.5 55.4 100.0

Figure 17: Accountability Framework in CSOs that Ensures Transparency

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The study found out that some CSOs have models/frameworks for accountability that were in use. The most noticeable framework or model is through sharing information and engaging stakeholders in the activities and decisions that affect them while ensuring free information flow and proper utilization of resources to implement planning and budgeting through participatory processes. About 55% of the respondents reported that they have modality and approaches that ensure accountability. However, this accountability framework was more reported in northern region (74.7%) followed by western, southern and eastern with 65.5%, 62.1% and 60.8%, respectively. The least sub-region was central with only 46.5% reporting that they have accountability framework that ensures transparency.

On how CSOs share information and engage stakeholders in the activity and decisions that affect them, FGDs members observed the following: e-newsletters and brochures, t-shirts, badges, transparent standards for governance, e.g., by committing to transparent relationship with counterparts, reports (annual, etc.), and engaging in participatory decision-making although the Board may have the final say, developing and clearly defining objectives of their public relations plans; within organizations.

Once in a while when the organization is holding annual or extraordinary meetings, the stakeholders are involved in the decision-making activities but the major decision is always made by the top managers and Board.

On whether CSOs review their decisions whenever the need arises, FGD members noted that they: a) conduct internal evaluations, b) establish through agreement quality standards, clear operating standards, c) engage in collective decision-making by soliciting advice and suggestions from staff, and stakeholders such as members and volunteers, d) measure performance based on

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agreed upon indicators before the services are provided and the commitment of staff to implement them, d) deliver services (outputs) on identified inputs, e) Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis, f) hold BoD and Staff retreats, g) compare their activities with others, h) hold regular meetings, and i) do so when need arises.

Whether information flows openly and honestly without interruption in CSOs, members of FGDs across the five sub-regions observed the following: open forums where ideas are shared freely, keeping records of all suggestions, carrying out consultations and research studies, publications, instituting internal democracy, accountability, teamwork, effective leadership, and electronic and print media. Some said information flow is not open because some leaders are not honest and others suppress the views of the people.

Members of the FGDs said that CSOs use their information through the following measures: sharing accountability with stakeholders, through checks-and-balances, transparent policies, encouraging trustworthiness and reliability among stakeholders, shaping priorities with key stakeholders, putting in place procedures for opening, registering and handling different materials within the organization, having guidelines for storage and retrieval of information, and effective leadership, some information is in the internet (e.g., FGDs in Nakawa Division, Naguru 1 and their view on FAWE and PACE). However, some said that not all resources are used or spent appropriately, especially the way top managers spend funds and other assets such as vehicles and computers (they are used for personal reasons).

On the question of how CSOs staffs get motivated, FGD members across the ten districts observed that: staff are accorded the opportunity to evaluate their efforts and those of their leaders, putting in place volunteer stipends and positive staff reward system, e.g., honorarium, encouraging maternal and paternity leave, distribution of authority to as many members as possible, encouraging staff to be innovative, and by the public recognizing services of staff through written letters of appreciation and praise. Staffs in CBOs have no other motivational incentives other than receiving salaries and wages, celebrating the contribution of staff and other members for their hard work and dedication, criticisms being done in private rather than openly by citing poor performance to avoid demoralization, and soliciting staff ideas regularly to be included in decisions. National and international NGOs have various ways to motivate their employees, e.g., good pay and offering training to motivate them.

Whether CSO staff participate effectively in planning and budgeting: in developed CSOs,the FGDs said: staff are involved in planning, budgeting and development; Planning and budgeting occurs in international or donor-driven CSOs through involving staff in the establishment of operating procedures; in other cases, Boards and top management receive instructions from Head Office for implementation. Hence, some CSOs divide responsibilities between the Board and staff. Others said there is no motivation because people just sacrifice. Others said they don’t participate at all.

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Participation

As to whether CSOs include stakeholders in their decision-making, some respondents in FGDs said they do so through: time management; setting clear standards by establishing good systems and procedures; including some stakeholders in planning, decision-making, evaluation and performance reporting; and developing principles of partnership, and codes of conduct, through sharing responsibilities and power. Other respondents said participation is not inclusive at all stages (“commoners” are not included – FGD in Naguru 1, Nakawa Division) but noticeable in AGMs where all stakeholders get involved in decision-making; especially in planning and budgeting process; some members noted that in some CSOs, stakeholders (beneficiaries) believe in the culture of being planned for.

On the question whether CSOs have strategic plans that have been developed through participatory process and sharing with the public, the members said: only international organizations and some few local CSOs have strategic plans developed through participatory process and sharing with the public, collaboration and building synergy among stakeholders based on mutually agreed development priorities and approaches – hence, the entire organizational members participate in the development of the strategic plan. Some CSOs have annual planning meetings where all stakeholders are invited. Others said some CSOs have plans but do not share them publicly.

Whether CSOs have fairly good communication and exploit properly ICT: Some organizations have no fairly good communication and do not exploit ICT; in others, information flow is downward because it is dominated by top management. Some CSOs especially those that are urban or town based, have fairly good communication, e.g., international NGOs have ICT, e.g., computers and phones.

Whether CSOs emphasize teamwork: some said teamwork is a developing culture in some CSOs whereby organizational members share ideas amongst themselves; some CSOs encourage the Board, staff and beneficiaries to work as a team in a transparent way especially regarding financial accountability; some organizations have mobilisers at local levels (Parish); some CBOs have representatives in the localities (Parish) who transmit the organization’s information; teamwork is encouraged in some organizations because tasks are made clear; and to attain results from activities of some NGOs, they have to engage in teamwork – e.g., sanitation, water, HIV/AIDS.

Whether CSOs hold public meetings with internal and external stakeholders: Some organizations hold public meetings with internal and external stakeholders through monitoring and collecting data for review. The common ones held are with BoD and Committee members’ planning and budgeting meetings, bi-annual and annual meetings; when disseminating information and

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conducting sensitization by some CSOs that have outreach crusades, workshops, seminars, conferences; some CSOs invite various stakeholders (Government officers, e.g., sub-county chief, CDOs, funders, public, etc.) to their meetings; some CBOs invite only internal stakeholders. Sanctions: some CSOs have sanctions against members who fail to attend three consecutive meetings – e.g., payment of fine as stipulated in the CSOs’ constitution or reporting to police to cause an arrest.

Evaluation

The study also focused on how evaluation is conducted in CSOs to enhance accountability. Table 17 below is the result of the responses.

Table 17: CSO Accountability Framework that Enhance Evaluation Sub region

Don’t know

No Partly Yes Total

Central246.0 135.0 281.0 598.0 1260.019.5 10.7 22.3 47.5 100.0

Eastern49.0 12.0 42.0 142.0 245.020.0 4.9 17.1 58.0 100.0

Northern10.0 1.0 23.0 253.0 287.03.5 0.3 8.0 88.2 100.0

Southern46.0 27.0 41.0 264.0 378.012.2 7.1 10.8 69.8 100.0

Western13.0 9.0 43.0 124.0 189.06.9 4.8 22.8 65.6 100.0

Total 364.0 184.0 430.0 1381.0 2359.0

Whether CSOs have systems of evaluating their activities, outputs, outcomes and impact, the respondents said: some CSOs have management systems that assess their leadership, resources and activities; some CSOs have M&E systems; some have process and performance indicators, supervision, and workshops; some CSOs undertake audit preparation exercises; some have team leaders charged with the responsibility to follow up various activities within their jurisdictions and then report to the management during meetings held; some engage in verbal communication and written reports; others do so when undertaking strategic planning; some don’t have well-developed instruments for assessing their activities; other respondents said No (Naguru 1, Nakawa Division). Whether CSOs engage in regular M&E of their activities: most FGD respondents said that most CSOs fail to engage in regular M&E of their activities due to lack of sufficient capacity and resources (funds and personnel). As for M&E, special teams are sometimes sent once in a while in the different areas. One member of an FGD said:

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For example, if the organization is responsible for paying school fees, we send people who are not known in that school to find out if there is no syndicate in selecting the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the fees. Evaluation is done through monthly meetings and management or extraordinary meetings and a report is produced.

Some respondents stated that there are some CSOs which do not conduct regular M&E. As to whether stakeholders of the CSOs participate in their evaluation (annual reports, etc.), some FGD members said that stakeholders rarely participate in evaluation. Some only participate in M&E at the monitoring phase. While other members said participation takes place only during planning meetings.

4.7 Compliance/Response Mechanism

Whether CSOs have systems of enforcing sanctions, the responses were as follows: a) through implementation of their respective governance instruments they enforce sanctions; b) other CSOs do so at the end of the year whereby reports are written about results of activities. C) other organizations have well-written constitutions and other internal rules and regulations which govern the code of conduct in the organization; d) and through policy and decision-making initiatives and power bestowed upon the Board. Table 18 gives empirical responses to this subject.

Table 18: Compliance and Response Mechanism in CSOs Sub region

Don't know No Partly Yes Total

Central 

219.0 52.0 184.0 625.0 1080.020.3 4.8 17.0 57.9 100.0

Eastern 

37.0 3.0 22.0 148.0 210.017.6 1.4 10.5 70.5 100.0

Northern 

11.0 0.0 14.0 221.0 246.04.5 0.0 5.7 89.8 100.0

Southern 

38.0 19.0 34.0 233.0 324.011.7 5.9 10.5 71.9 100.0

Western 

13.0 4.0 22.0 123.0 162.08.0 2.5 13.6 75.9 100.0

Total 

318.0 78.0 276.0 1350.0 2022.015.7 3.9 13.6 66.8 100.0

Figure 18: Compliance and Response Mechanism in CSOs

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In table 18 9and figure 18) a high percentage (89.8%) of the respondents from northern sub-region reported that most have mechanism for compliance through safeguarding its policies and practices, imposing sanctions on its staff who have violated their responsibilities, operating in accordance with the law, policy, code of ethics/code of conduct and disclosing information to its stakeholders in various forms. This was however reported by 57.9% in the central sub region. This was enforce within CSOs organization by putting in place a system of imposes sanctions on its staff who have violated their responsibilities so as ensure that staff behaves in accordance with the law, policy, code of ethics/code of conduct and disclose information to its stakeholders in various forms.

Whether CSOs impose sanctions on their staff who have violated their responsibilities, FGD members further observed that: the majority of the respondents said sanctions are imposed on individuals who violated their responsibilities based on closed supervision and appraisal reports. For instance, they cited cases of warning letters issued to the affected member twice but if the member does not change, then in the third write-up membership is terminated, fined, and then taken either to the police or LC for disciplinary action depending on the gravity of the offense; other respondents had no idea of how organizations impose sanctions on their staff who have violated their responsibilities.

Whether CSOs behave in accordance with the governing instruments, policy, code of ethics/conduct, some respondents said: they endeavor to do so while carrying out supervision and monitoring of performance indicators; others said some CSOs have leaders that are autocratic especially those founded by individuals or family members and run by them as owners; other members said the majority of CSOs, especially CBOs, do not respect the application of

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governing instruments as they manage premises, equipments and materials; other respondents had no response (said in Katwe Butego Division, Masaka district).

Capability of CSOs

Whether CSOs have well designed and established systems for achieving their goals, many respondents, including FGD members, said they have well designed and established system for achieving organizational goals (i.e., clearly defined vision, mission, objectives and work-plans), setting realistic targets, and provision of adequate resources; some have technical teams which develop, e.g., plans and budgets through a participatory system and it is monitored throughout the year. Others said that systems are either not in existence or is partially done (see table 19 and figure 19).

Table 19: Capability of CSOs in Ensuring Accountability Sub region

Don’t know

No Partly Yes Total

Central222.0 81.0 193.0 584.0 1080.020.6 7.5 17.9 54.1 100.0

Eastern50.0 6.0 31.0 123.0 210.023.8 2.9 14.8 58.6 100.0

Northern17.0 4.0 22.0 203.0 246.06.9 1.6 8.9 82.5 100.0

Southern51.0 10.0 30.0 233.0 324.015.7 3.1 9.3 71.9 100.0

Western17.0 8.0 21.0 116.0 162.010.5 4.9 13.0 71.6 100.0

Total357.0 109.0 297.0 1259.0 2022.017.7 5.4 14.7 62.3 100.0

Figure 19: Capability of CSOs in Ensuring Accountability

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Table 19 and figure 19 show that most of the CSOs ensure capability through the use of well designed and established system for achieving the goals they promised, manage and deliver on their plans through recruiting capable leaders, putting in place management personnel and skilled staff so as to build legitimacy with their stakeholders. Sixty two percent of the CSOs reported having enough capability in handeling accountability in CSOs and many (82.5%) were reported in the north followed by 71.9%, 71.6% in southern and western respectively, meanwhile central sub-region continues to perform relatively lowly (54.1%) implying it has less capability.

Whether CSOs have the ability to think, prioritize, manage, and deliver their plans, FGD members noted that: those with sound founding fathers do so. Those which don’t have sound founding fathers lack financial and managerial skills to effectively think, monitor, manage and deliver on plans. This is why some seek refuge in their parent bodies.

Whether CSOs have capable leaders, management personnel, and skilled staff, most members of FGDs across the regions said: some members said that some CSOs have capable leaders, management personnel and skilled staff. It was also observed that CSOs which from the very start recruit members who share in the organization’s vision, mission and goal give their full commitment to the mandate of the CSO; their values and attitudes reflect those of the CSO. Some said they lacked skilled staff.

Accountable Programs

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Whether CSOs have accountable programs and specific plans that link to and support the realization of the overall mission and goals of the organization, some respondents said: CSOs which have adequate procedures for dealing with satisfactory work performance and administrative systems have programs and specific plans that link to and support the realization of the overall mission and goals of the organization. In addition, those that have struck harmonious working relations between Board, management and stakeholders have created such linkages. Others said only few CSOs have done so.

Figure 20: Accountability Programs in CSOs

Figure 22 shows that most of the respondents (81.3%) in the northern sub-region reported that they have accountability program in their governance reflected through the involvement of the beneficiaries at all stages of the planning process, evaluation of the CSOs, incorporating learning from program evaluations into their strategic plans, ensuring that specific plans that link to and support the realization of the overall missions and goals of the organizations, providing beneficiaries with sufficient information to understand their objectives and activities

Whether CSOs involve beneficiaries at all stages of the planning process, most members of FGDs said they do not – i.e., not all stakeholders/beneficiaries are invited at all stages of the planning process because some of the CSOs have planning committees. Those that are sensitive to facts and people-centred involve beneficiaries at all the planning stages. In addition, those that have terms of reference for teams, staff, and committees involve beneficiaries.

Whether CSOs provide beneficiaries with sufficient information to understand their objectives and activities, some respondents said: few do so; others said not all beneficiaries are provided with sufficient information to understand the organization’s objectives and activities; others said

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notice-boards are used; and some CSOs select a few individuals for specific types of official information. On the reasons given for lack of providing information respondents identified the following: lack of effective communication, resource constraints (e.g., funds), and lack of effective networking.

Whether CSOs systematically M&E programs, some respondents said few CSOs systematically M&E programs; this is done three times – beginning of programs, middle and at the end. And, as to whether CSOs involve beneficiaries in M&E of programs, some respondents said few CSOs involve beneficiaries in M&E in order to obtain realistic assessment of organizational effectiveness. Others said some CSOs do not do so because it is staff of the organizations who are charged with M&E.

Accountable Programs in CSO Umbrella Organization

Whether CSO umbrella organizations demonstrate the collective ‘voice’ of members they represent, some respondents said: they tend to represent the collective ‘voice’ of their membership through exchange of information and coordination of activities, openness during meetings (AGM, internal organizational meetings, annual work-plans, reports, etc.). Others said the representation of ‘voice’ is inconsistent in some CSOs (see table 23 and figure 23).

Table 23: Accountable Programs in CSO Umbrella Organizations Sub region

Don’t know

No Partly Yes Total

Central 136.0 42.0 88.0 274.0 540.0  25.2 7.8 16.3 50.7 100.0Eastern 40.0 4.0 19.0 42.0 105.0  38.1 3.8 18.1 40.0 100.0Northern 12.0 10.0 17.0 84.0 123.0  9.8 8.1 13.8 68.3 100.0Southern 17.0 4.0 16.0 125.0 162.0  10.5 2.5 9.9 77.2 100.0Western 11.0 4.0 19.0 47.0 81.0  13.6 4.9 23.5 58.0 100.0Total 216.0 64.0 159.0 572.0 1011.0  21.4 6.3 15.7 56.6 100.0

Figure 21: Accountability in CSO Umbrella Organizations

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In table 23 and figure 21, clearly the respondents (56%) said that accountability in CSOs’ umbrella organizations exist through espousing the collective ‘voice’ of their members, actively engaging members in the development of programs and identifying how they have strengthened the organizational capacity of their members to achieve their goals. This percentage was however very high (77%) in the northern sub-region, low in the eastern and central sub-regions accounting for 40% and 50.7%, respectively.

Whether CSO umbrella organization can identify their strengths and the organizational capacity of their members to achieve their goals, some respondents said: they had no idea; other respondents said “somehow”. Some respondents said they do so because some umbrella organizations identify strengths based on how decisions are made and how people are involved in the activities and setting yardsticks which members are expected to achieve. The major problem identified by some respondents is that some umbrella organizations engage too much in politicking which interferes with the identification of the strengths of member organizations.

Whether CSO umbrella organizations actively engage members in the development of their programs respondents said: some do especially those that are credible, trust worthy and reliable; others said they have never witnessed it from their umbrella organizations; and others said out-rightly no because they have no umbrella organization; and others said it is done by their donors (see table 21).

Table 21: Accountability Program within CSOs

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 Sub region

Don’t know

NO Partly Yes Total

Central 325.0 191.0 314.0 789.0 1619.0  20.1 11.8 19.4 48.7 100.0Eastern 81.0 10.0 57.0 167.0 315.0  25.7 3.2 18.1 53.0 100.0Northern 33.0 5.0 31.0 300.0 369.0  8.9 1.4 8.4 81.3 100.0Southern 47.0 34.0 59.0 346.0 486.0  9.7 7.0 12.1 71.2 100.0Western 16.0 4.0 62.0 161.0 243.0  6.6 1.6 25.5 66.3 100.0Total 502.0 244.0 523.0 1763.0 3032.0  16.6 8.0 17.2 58.1 100.0

4.8 Accountable Resource Usage and Management

In this section, two key issues were fundamental, namely; accountable human resource management and accountable financial resource management. With regard to the former, the following responses were obtained (table 22 and figure 22).

Table 22: Human Resource Gaps within CSO Man power gap within CSOs

Region

TotalCentral Eastern Northern Southern Western

Don't know No of responses 87 15 16 49 5 172

% 48.3 42.9 39.1 90.7 18.5 51.1

No No of responses 8 0 5 0 13 26

% 4.4 .0 12.2 .0 48.1 7.7

Yes No of responses 85 20 20 5 9 139

% 47.1 57.1 48.6 9.3 33.3 41.2

Total No of responses 180 35 41 54 27 337

% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Figure 22: Human Resource Gaps Amongst CSOs

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Figure 12 shows that overall, 51% of the personnel working with CSOs do not have an idea about the vacant positions and human resource challenges in their respective organizations. The high percentage however varied across the sub-regions as shown by 91% of the respondents from western Uganda having no idea followed by central (48%).

With regard to accountable financial resource management, the responses were as shown in table 24 and figure 24).

Table 23: Accountable Financial Resource Management Sub region

Don’t know

No Partly Yes Total

Central 275.0 202.0 254.0 709.0 1440.0  19.1 14.0 17.6 49.2 100.0Eastern 67.0 17.0 39.0 157.0 280.0  23.9 6.1 13.9 56.1 100.0Northern 28.0 26.0 48.0 226.0 328.0  8.5 7.9 14.6 68.9 100.0Southern 38.0 24.0 70.0 300.0 432.0  8.8 5.6 16.2 69.4 100.0Western 15.0 20.0 34.0 147.0 216.0  6.9 9.3 15.7 68.1 100.0Total 423.0 289.0 445.0 1539.0 2696.0  15.7 10.7 16.5 57.1 100.0

Figure 23: Accountable Financial Resource Management

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Overall about 57% of the respondent reported the existence of accountable financial resource management in the CSOs through accounts being audited annually and making them widely accessible, establishing the procedure for staff to report in confidence and without fear of intimidation, putting in place effective systems to account for all incomes and expenditures and providing evidence that they were used for the purposes for which they were intended, reporting all relevant financial information to beneficiaries, receiving funds that are consistent with organizational mission or goals and ensuring adequate financial resources and financial sustainability plans.

How frequently CSOs audit annual accounts and whether they are widely accountable: the responses were as follows: a) most CSOs are acquainted with the culture of auditing and accounting, b) those that adhere to financial management and control and liaison with other organizations and public relations annually carry out the audit exercise and endeavor to make them accessible, c) some members of FGDs said no specific period for auditing account but external auditors come once in a while. Not sure of how widely accessible the audited accounts are (nature of the organization could determine this haphazardness). Some respondents said monthly or annual auditing reports are accessible to stakeholders all. Other members of FGDs said those that have not taken donor funds do not take accountability and ethical behavior seriously.

Mechanisms used in CSOs for staff to report in confidence without fear, instances of internal fraud, waste and corruption, some members of FGDs said: some CSOs have mechanisms and cited “suggestion boxes” are available for members to express their views and comments, administrative hierarchy is responsible, and staff regulation manuals do assist the reporting and

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appeal procedures; others said through provision of skills and knowledge and giving opportunity to everyone or creating an environment where teamwork is supposed to thrive; criticizing members in private; some said they don’t have.

Whether CSOs have in place effective systems to account for all incomes and expenditures and provide evidence used for the purposes for which they are intended, the general response was as follows: open information policy; financial reporting to the beneficiaries through receipts, book/record keeping and providing bank reconciliation statements; and disclosure of evaluation reports, e.g., end of the FY, all members discuss how funds were used and receipts must support expenditures. Any inconsistency in accountability must be explained by the member concerned.

Whether CSOs report relevant financial information to beneficiaries (e.g., budgets expenditures, direct project costs, etc.) some respondents in FGDs said: some CSOs do during meetings, display on notice-boards, etc.; some members said those that have effective teamwork to monitor performance, praise and offer personal support give relevant information to stakeholders; others said no open reporting is done by some CSOs to their beneficiaries.

Effective financial management needs effective human resource management (see figure 24).

Figure 24: Accountable Human Resource Management

From figure 24, more than 61% of the respondents reported that they have accountable human resource management in their CSOs through transparent recruitment of staff. As to whether CSOs recruit staff in a transparent manner according to merit, the respondents made the following observations: a) international organizations and some NGOs recruit staff in a

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transparent manner based on accountable, transparent, on merit and on academic qualifications; these types of CSOs define clear tasks with clearly shared commitments and clear mandates. Advertisement in the papers, radio stations, Churches, and notice-boards scattered around the district. Other CSOs founded by individuals and family members recruit on the basis of nepotism, and religious grounds, except accountants (including UWESO in Mbale). In some CBOs, no recruitment of staff is done because the founders constitute the staff.

Whether CSOs management ensure that staff receive regular feedback on their performance, respondents said: some CSOs ensure staff receive regular feedback on their performance; those which ensure that members get to know what they are supposed to do, how to do it and whether what they do fit in the organizational framework, ensure that staff receive regular feedback on their performance (e.g., Bushenyi Municipality); CSOs with clear standards of performance and deal with poor time keeping, poor work attitudes and methods, create and maintain a safe and pleasant physical environment and maintain procedures, ensure that staff receive feedback on their performance - this is done through weekly meetings of reviews and advice on individual level. Some CSOs do not have feedback mechanisms.

Whether CSOs have staff development systems such as training and monitoring, some FGD members said: some organizations have staff development systems whereby training programs such as refresher and tailored courses are held and especially when starting a new system. Some CSOs invite speakers; others have visual aids like films which they use in meetings, lectures, conferences or residential events which have educational value decide on their training needs; Some organizations are supported by umbrella organizations on specific issue areas. Other members of FGDs said there are no systems.

Whether CSOs have built accountability into staff inductions, appraisals and development plans, some members said: some CSOs especially those that collect and act on information about statutory, charitable and other funding sources as well as those that have proper financial management systems ensure that organizational resources is fairly communicated. Some have not done it. Others said they have no idea.

Ensuring that staff receive regular feedback on their performance, organizing staff development system and put in place an internal staff policies on: recruitment, remuneration, promotion, disciplinary and grievance mechanisms, and health and safety. This was reported above 50% across all the country, however only 52% of the respondent at the central were in agreement.

4.9 Challenges of CSO Accountability

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There are several challenges both nationally and globally that impair accountability in CSOs. The respondents identified the following critical challenges (Table 25 and Figure 8)

Table 24: Challenges in Accountability Faced by CSOs Sub region

Don’t know

No Partly Yes Total

Central 179.0 155.0 195.0 434.0 963.0  18.6 16.1 20.2 45.1 100.0Eastern 57.0 33.0 29.0 64.0 183.0  31.1 18.0 15.8 35.0 100.0Northern 37.0 24.0 63.0 100.0 224.0  16.5 10.7 28.1 44.6 100.0Southern 32.0 35.0 51.0 162.0 280.0  11.4 12.5 18.2 57.9 100.0Western 25.0 27.0 23.0 70.0 145.0  17.2 18.6 15.9 48.3 100.0Total 330.0 274.0 361.0 830.0 1795.0  18.4 15.3 20.1 46.2 100.0

Figure 25: Challenges in Accountability Faced by CSOs

The results in table 24 and figure 25 reveal the following challenges facing the operation of CSOs in Uganda: insufficient funds, poor accountability mechanisms, internal conflicts, lack of skilled personnel, and high community expectations, all accounting for 35.8%, 14.9%, 8.7%,

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7.5% and 5.4% respectively. In addition, many respondents (15.3%) reported problems of accountability within CSOs as follows:

Lack of adequate security measures or information storage to ensure that cash or cheques are not misused or records are not lost;

Lack of advisors in financial matters in some CSOs; Poor resource mobilization; No specific format for accountability, Some organizational members are illiterate and cowardly and so they fail to ask

superiors to account; Beneficiaries look at services provided to them by CSOs as a favor and so they do not

take accountability seriously; Lack of modern accounting packages, e.g., ICT, hence reliance on paperwork; Lack of competent leadership who can manage and evaluate the activities of the

organization; Gap or distance between the service provider and beneficiaries; Lack of essential personnel with skills (e.g., financial); Late release of funds and the rushed demand for accountability; Some accounting standards demanded by donors which cannot be met in rural areas; Lack of clarity about donor policies interferes with how accountability should be

enforced; and Corruption.

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Section Five: Conclusions

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Section Six: Recommendations

Several recommendations have been suggested to address the challenges facing the operation of CSOs in Uganda (Figure 9).

Figure 26: Suggested Remedies to Challenges Facing CSOs Accountability

As shown in figure 26, the respondents suggested several measures to address the challenges of accountability in CSOs. These measures include:

Box 4: Proposed CSOs’ Accountability Model: Increase government support to CSOs to build their accountability systems and

personnel without causing it to interfere in CSOs independence (33.5%); Improve funding (internal and external) sources to ensure funds are available for

CSOs’ program activities and motivation of personnel to undercut corruption tendencies (22.2%);

Provide tailored training and capacity building opportunities to enhance accountability skills of staff (12.0%);

Increase community sensitization on effective resource management and accountability ethos (7.2%);

Top management should rigorously tackle accountability and other problems through major strategic decisions about the organization’s objectives, policies and procedures and maintaining long-term overview of the organization’s program activities;

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Set up of special or technical committees to follow-up organizational activities with the view to correcting any errors as they emerge.

Involve realistically the beneficiaries (especially local people) in the planning and budgeting process of CSOs’ activities;

Conduct follow-ups and use the information gathered to build viable systems; Put in place decision-making procedures which are transparent so that answerability

is at all levels; Encourage consistency in recording all organization’s resources in a designated point

and format (records books, receipts, invoices, etc) and make sure such records are accessible by all stakeholders;

Acquire ICT, e.g., computers, for proper records and financial management; Infuse moral advocacy programs to encourage transparency and introduce strict rules

to enforce accountability; Institutionalize proactive rather than reactive approaches to accountability; See accountability as a learning process rather than as a mere compliance activity; Establish clear governance structures that can enhance communication and decision-

making amongst all stakeholders without discrimination; Conduct sensitization seminars based on a clear needs assessment of existing

knowledge gaps to ensure that stakeholders understand accountability concept, procedures, and standards.

Establish clear sanctions within the organizations to mete out punishments commensurate with irresponsible behavior of organizational members – e.g., suspend or sack employees especially when they fail to produce accountability within a defined timeframe;

Introduce regular (e.g., weekly, monthly) reviews of organizational or governance structures and missions; and

Encourage the culture of honesty, integrity and voluntary accountability and reward those who ‘blow the whistle’ upon those who interfere with the organization’s transparency and accountability mechanisms.

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Appendix I: List of Participants FGDs

(Word processing of all the names is now on)

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